

# **CAB 195/1**

## **WAR CABINET**

### **MINUTES**

W.M.(42) 47<sup>th</sup> Meeting – W.M.(42) 155<sup>th</sup>

Meeting

Since last report

C.A.S. 30 missing (4 heavies) ex 1.000 sorties

Hamburg - bad weather once

Essen - 4 : incldg. last night, believed good

Photo. Lubeck ½ old town gutted.

Last night - Italy : Turin : no black-out : diverted fr. Genoa. Full reports not in.

Fighters 2.900 sorties. Lost 22 (8 pilots)

Y'day 9 bombers bait + 250 fighters.

Large no. enemy up (190)- lost 15

(11 pilots) Destroyed 4. 4 prob. 11 damaged.

Coastal. 8 lost (420 sorties) – but only 1 ship, saw no U-Boats.

Enemy – Fighters (day) – surviving. Beam on Brockworth, but turned away.

P.M. Fighter work over France shd. be. shut down if no profit shown. Look at it again in a week's time.

C.A.S. Malta. Bombing more inaccurate or indiscriminate.

10 extra Hurricanes flown in. Aircraft are being damaged on ground – 15 total.

Enemy 35 : 9 : 32 Lost 5 in combat

A.D.C. v. critical of German tactics

Egypt. Lost 14 : 7 down. 6 on grd.

Enemy 10 : 4 : 8.

2 night attacks Alex : night fighters shot down 2 : 1.

Burma: Aus Vol. Grp. in action again. 47 of Kittihawks (ex 50) ar<sup>d</sup>. - India

Destroyed 18 for loss 2 Hurricanes. 6 lost on ground.

But v. hard to support troops.

Trincomalee. 94 craft fr. carriers. Bldgs. damaged. 14 : 12 : 2 for loss of 6.

Blenheims lost 5 out of 9. shot down 4 but missed carrier.

Fulmers won 3 for loss of 2.

Ceylon total = 21 : 14 : 5. Against 14 : 7 to us.

P.M. 10.000 ton. Jap. carrier operates 42 aircraft – many more than we do.

1<sup>st</sup> Ld. They haven't armoured them. They carry on upper deck. They have hangars open at sides.

P.M. Admy. to look into this to see whtr. we can't increase carrying capacity of ours.

C.A.S. Pacific. Offensive v. Kopang & La 17 J. down. grd. 2 destroyed in air for loss of 4 : 2.

P.M. Income and expend<sup>t</sup>. of Japs?

C.A.S 2.000 in 17 wks. lost. Output operate. types 350 (750?) p. month – i.e. prod<sup>n</sup>. 66% of loss

But pre-war reserve not known.

1<sup>st</sup> Sea Lord

For wk. 15 ships sunk by sub  
6 “ “ “ aircraft  
2 “ “ “ mined  
3 “ “ fr Gothenburg  
4 marine casualties  
2 Japs in Bay Bengal  
5 N. Atlantic – not known how.

213.000 tons ) 50 ships 265.000 tons  
Overdue 52.000)

180 – 190.000 tons in the week in N. Atlantic alone.

P.M. How came it that ships sheltering in Calcutta were sent out to their doom.

1<sup>st</sup> S Ld They were ordered out before known Japs were in Bay of Bengal.

Agreed however that reconnaissance wld. have helped.

Convoys off N. America. Middle section (Hampton Rds to Key West) to be introduced by 15 May. Southern section in July.  
Russian convoys. Bad time. 24 ships + 16 escort. Ice unexpectedly – 4 of convoy and 3 ships damaged and returned. Rest of convoy going on – submarines awaiting them.

Returning convoy 17 + 8 escort. Being attacked 1<sup>st</sup> air. then U-Boat – 3 known to have bn. sunk.

20 U-Boats can be concentrated in this area.

P.M. ? Convey to Russians seriousness of effort we are making – the great risk wh. we are running.

Admiralty + FO support to see Russians on this, and press for more air and sea support & co-operation.

1<sup>st</sup> Sea Ld Truant (sub) sunk. 2 returning. Jap transports. (empty)

C.I.G.S. Burma.

On E.Rd 22<sup>nd</sup> Division (Chinese) lost 1200 men (heavy)

96<sup>th</sup> “

Chinese expected to occupy Mandalay soon.

P.M. No guerrilla activity going on in China. Their own war is not being waged.

In Burma they are fighting well.

Libya. 7<sup>th</sup> A.Division is now Sidi Omar ) changes in  
disportions  
5<sup>th</sup> Indian Division in Sollum area ) as fr. map

R. came on 3 columns. last few days. 11/4 signs retirement north of line and far south.

But centre (Sidi Rezegh – Segnali) they are holding out. We have withdrawn outpost line. Looks like reconnaissance in force. We don't want him in South – he is going back there now.

Russia. No change in line. Now in South restricting fighting. Offensive cd. start in May. Genl indic<sup>ns</sup>. of prob. offensive in Crimea.

F.O. Russo – Turkish situation over bomb.

R. conv. this Germ. plant and have handled on that basis asking them to release the 2 Russians arrested. Turks have refused this, as they had to do, and R has retorted with tart communiqués.  
Turks annoyed with R. attitude – wh.has not bn. sensible.

H.O

Glo'ster Aircraft Factory – attack on change-over of shift – C.D. services have shown up well.

I. Release of Whole-time C.D. Personnel for War Industry.

H.O. Element of risk – but need for offensive spirit.

Aim – 30% C.D. Gnrl Services to be released.

Fire Service. Specl. recruitment stopped – induction 1/6<sup>th</sup>.

Police. Release men under 25. 7.000 in all.

S/Doms How can they return quickly if blitz resumed?

H.O. Oblig<sup>n</sup>. is give part time service – this is main substitute in ordinary times. Recall in blitz. Diff<sup>y</sup>. is highest nos in Ldn. Region & many of these may have to go long way off. Some days to get them back. Risk – but offset by power to require others to give part-time service.

Part of N.F.S. being segregated to do own motor repairs.

T.J. Still short of N.F.S. in Scotland. Need 850 more full time for minimum standard on major pumps. Agree with proposals subject to being allowed to recruit these.

Agreed.

II. Anti-Gas Precautions.

S/Doms No good running intermittent stunts. No case therefore unless ready to keep up all round.

Need however to ensure respiration in good cond<sup>n</sup>.

L.P. a) Better prep<sup>d</sup>. than in Germany?  
b) True that G. have new resicant gas?

H.O. Rumours on b) – told sometime ago it was o.k.

L.P. Enquiry to be made – homologue of mustard gas : much more volatile & therefore more pervasive. Not suggested, respirators not good v. it. But it wd. be first case of blister gas wh. is volatile. Need, if true, to review our preparations.

S/Doms On a) Mil<sup>y</sup>. said G. as well equipped as we in anti-gas prep<sup>ns</sup>. Italians are not so well prepared.

S/Doms Agreed to get authentic reports on a) )

) Agreed

“ “ “ “ “ “ b) )

H.O. Tho' we are reasonably well prepared, we must expect that at beginning of gas attack there will be teething troubles and confusion.

M/Supply afraid of relaxation of precautions in manufg. plants.  
Suggested special warning (S/Doms).

S.Doms Laundries. M/L I have scheduled them.  
M/H On "my" point (i.e. prices) this is with W.O. not me.  
I am concerned only with civilian decontamination. The W.O. are negotiating with the laundries and the neg<sup>ns</sup>. are now in last stage. Results expected in 2 weeks. S/Doms. We shall have to put an order on them if we can't get them into line v. soon.

S/Doms to report in a week.

### III. Political Meetings in Factories.

L.P. Summarised memo. General agreement by Dpts primarily concerned. New rule wd. not prevent informal gatherings to be addressed by rep<sup>res</sup>. of managements or T. Unions.

Admr<sup>y</sup>. Diff<sup>y</sup>. about "political" mtgs – Shop Stewards returning fr. national gathering & holdg. mtgs.

Agreed.

### IV. Supplies to Russia.

[M/P. Hopkins & Harriman pressed for prelim. study to find out prob. ceiling for supplies to Russia. We might get finality on limit of capacity to convoy & protect. This wd. be one stable element. Having got that, decide tank & aircraft figure, get monthly figure of free space & ask Russians how they want it used.

This may throw into relief diff<sup>cs</sup> of dealing with this on Protocol basis.

S/S. Air. Will this mean any increase on present quantities? V. doubtful.]

F.O. Americans not anxious for conf. in Moscow. Wd. prefer tht. U.S and we shd. decide inter nos what we can send and tell Russians this is all we can manage.

Agree each discussion with U.S. people – on what level?

Agreed with Hopkins no comm<sup>n</sup> to Russia till we had agreed inter nos.

Prepare our pos<sup>n</sup> not only qua prod<sup>n</sup>. but also qua protection.

- M/P. This is being done now by my people – in touch with M/W.T. & Admy.
- F.O. This must be a joint ceiling for U.S. & our supplies – even tho’ we have to do all the conveying.
- M/W.T. We see no chance of continuing to convoy the numbers wh. U.S. are laying on.
- 1<sup>st</sup> Sea Lord. 25 ships in each of 2 convoys a month – is our present estimate. But our experience of s. heavy escorts now accompanying present convoys will teach us something. Weight U Boat attack now near U.S. coast.
- S/Doms. Estimate of R. Production and needs?
- M/W.T. 4/5ths of the 40 U.S. ships a month are carrying non Protocol material. The U.S. are laying on ships for the sake of it and we have to provide the convoy. The lack of lifting capacity on these ships means they can’t lift the tanks & for this reason they are loading food & other material wh. R. need less.
- M.A.P. 14-16 ships a month have fulfilled our part of the Protocol. 40 a month fr. U.S. will go well beyond their part of the Protocol.
- M.W.T. This 40 a month is at our expense – some are our ships.  
Not so far the result of joint discussions.
- M/P. We can’t get informt<sup>n</sup> about R. needs w’out disclosing our strategic plans : and we shall tell the truth and they won’t!
- 1<sup>st</sup> Lord. Experience suggests we must expect to lose 20% of merchant tonnage used in each journey. And havg. to cover the convoy by major naval units involves v. large measure of risk to UK.
- S/Doms. Continuance of specific commitment ties our hands elsewhere. And we don’t know how far it takes precedence over all other needs – even in new situations.
- M/P. See where we get to on basis of convoy limitations – what is a reasonable rate fr. Admy. point of view. But if they answer 50 ships a month – then this wd. carry the Protocol + the 50% promised – and perhaps more. So it wouldn’t much help.
- 1<sup>st</sup> Sea Lord. We cd. give better protect<sup>n</sup>. to 1 convoy of 25 ships p. month.  
This wd. half the risk to the Home Fleet (cut 7 days vice 14 p. month).



S/Doms. Complete study initiated by M/Prod<sup>n</sup>. & W. Cab. consider it again.

F.O. S/S War suggested linking this with negotiations on Treaty. Generally agreed preferable to keep them separate.

Agreed – consider next week; and tell Americans meanwhile what we are doing.

Naval & Military Situation.

C.A.S.      Bomber      75 day sorties - lost 8  
809 night      “ 30  
75 tons bombs 232 mines.

Light bombers on France almost every day.

Lancasters. Unlucky in mtg fighters (lost 4) Fighters expected to be diverted.

Fighter      5.400 sorties. Enemy disinclined fight. Lost 15 (12 pilots)

Enemy 17 : 9 : 23. day  
4 : 3 : 1. night

Coastal      524 sorties 3 lost.

Malta Slight falling off – still severe. 2 squadrons re-inforcements in w’out loss. (Subject to check).

Signs of enemy squadrons leaving Sicily.

Depending on a.a. we got 15 : 5 : 17.  
lost. 2 (air) 5 (ground) 1 damaged.

Egypt Attempt on convoy Beaufighters – no definite result.

(2) Torpedo bombers lost  
(2) “ “ “

we lost 11 + 1

enemy “ 6 + 1 + 3

Wellingtons go direct w’out call at Malta.

Burma Attacks aerodromes & Jap flying boats Port Blair. We got 5 + flying boats.

Pacific Enemy lost 7 : 22 damaged.

We “ 9 : 5 “

P.M. Record our admiration of admirable raid on Augsburg. This is quite outstanding.

Germans will imitate this – don't you worry.

Admy. owe us x Bofors guns – wh. must now be returned, as soon as possible.

V.C.N.S. Renown & Wasp shd. be on their way back fr. the Straits.

Destroyer attacked by sub., when out to pick up an aircraft down.

Convoy to Murmansk in – only 8 arrived : 1 sunk y'day close in : 15 turned back.

Fleet back y'day morning. Those undamaged by ice will be in next convoy starting 26/4. Distribution of cargo – some ships more valuable than others but efforts made to spread. M/W.T. to look into this.

Likely to be bad year for ice.

65 ships loaded or on their way cd. have joined next convoy. Congestion.

We can't convoy more than 25 – and not more than 3 convoys in 2 months.

But operation for Home Fleet; & we'd better not give a figure.

F.O. Many ships fr. U.S. don't have high priority cargo. Must stop this.

M/L. What is counterpart in U.S.A. to Allied Supplies Executive. Casey : Munitions Assignment Board. I think.

P.M. Diffy. in getting ships there is a new development.

F.O. M/Prod. F.O. 1<sup>st</sup> Lord to meet & discuss.

V.C.N.S. 2 U-Boats sunk and 1 probable.

2 Platoons Marines destroyed W/T station at .....

Truant (sub) got 2 transports (empty) in Malacca Straits

Shipping Losses. (103.000 tons. relate to 1<sup>st</sup> 2 weeks of month.)  
166.000 tons lost }  
31.000 belated } 236.000  
38.000 overdue }

[81.000 damaged.]

Actual loss this week is about 150.000.

P.M. Bulk still on N.E.Am. coast. Arranged with President to lay off until U.S. convoys are going. Lamentable necessity. U.S. v. slow in getting this on foot.

Enemy may run short in air : & we may do so in ships.

B. of Bengal. Why did they send out 100.000 tons w'out knowing what was on?

Did they confer with us?

V.C.N.S We warned them to reduce traffic on E. Coast. Then had thinned it a bit & that week was less than the week before.

U.S. Navy expect begin first convoy 1/5

C.I.G.S. Burma No gt. change. 35 miles back.

Chinese moving down in support.

His/Alexander's strength in effectivities not likely to be more than 10.000.

Promised to enquire. Air support – about 15B. + 15 A.V.G.

Japs have landed another Divn. Hard to say how long they will take to reach China frontier.

Refugees between Mandalay & India. 70.000 in Mandalay alone & present road takes only 1.500 a day.

Not worth putting more troops in because we can't supply them.

Pacific. American re-inforcements.

New Caledonia filling up. New Hebrides also.

M.East. No change.

Russia. Little change. Report of German success nr. Moscow – prob. accumulation of some wks.

Foreign. F.O. Vichy. Genl. view German anxiety about internal situation. Hence put in man likely to give them most help.

Diff. to make a better guess.

P.M. Fleet turned against us? Admy. Not v. easy to guess.

P.M.'s telegram to U.S. F.O. inclined to think sign of weakness.

Condition of ships at Toulon? Admy. Not fit to fight, tho' fit to steam.

P.M. thought they wd. scuttle, rather than let Germans take & fight them.

1<sup>st</sup> Lord. Jap. Adml. is going to Madrid & Lisbon. What does that portend?  
Bases for submarine.

Sec/Doms. Vichy people in Dominions.

Canada. [Welles anxious that they shd. stay for the time]

S. Africa. Smuts anxious to throw them out.

P.M. Why do it now, when things all in the balance.

F.O. Vichy man in S. Africa has bn. up to no good. No harm in sending this individual.

P.M. Tell Smuts we aren't pressg. Canada and [ ] – but leave it to him.

Home. 40 aircraft in Soton etc.

20 “ Thurs/Frid. in same area & Avonmouth

12 “ Wed/Thurs. Tees & Tyne. 100 houses badly damaged  
Middlesbrough.



Malta. 100-150 enemy bombers a day – bit less. Delib. attacks on hospitals – also in Egypt. We lost 12 : 30. Enemy 58 : 16 : 81. On ground we lost 22 : 25 damaged.

In 6 weeks here destroyed {76 : 40 prob Malta {151 : 45 prob.  
lost {75 {90 : 110 damaged.  
inclgd. ground

H.O. Enemy Attack

Bath. 27<sup>th</sup> April Started 1.27 am. lasted 1 hr. 60 HE. old & raised. pt.City. 26 fires.

480 houses destroyed 5.000 slightly damaged.

For 2 nights 148 dead (20-30 more likely).

Water – not serious. Gas – out for week. Electricity – OK

Rlway – Bath St<sup>n</sup>. out of use. Discussions.

Food supply not v. good.

Exeter.

(Dead both raids 41. dead. 16 seriously injured. 53. slightly injured.)  
(For the 3 raids. 60 “ 21 “ “ 36 “ “ )

Admy. Sat. 2 offices damaged & one out therefore UXB.

Sund. Francis Hotel out : Pump Room Hotel partly damaged : no. hutments at Lansdown knocked out.

Sat. C.D. Services wavered because HQ knocked out. But Admy. P.D. worked well.

Nos, Admy staff homeless. Thinking of bringing 400-450 staff back to Ldn. to ease homeless situation – integral unit of staff. Not to be done in a hurry.

H.O. These are Cat. C. cases – and not so well off for shelter.

P.M. Move some rocket batteries? C.A.S. Will enquire. P.M. 52 deployed + v. mobile.

C.A.S. Egypt. 5 : 2 against enemy 5 : 3. Enemy conserving.

Burma. 4 enemy v. 1 + 1 on ground.

Pacific. Rabaul – Enemy: 33% of bombers & fighters off Darwin.

Naval. 13 ships on Atlantic. 3 mined E. coast. 101.000 tons for the week, as  
C.N.S. against 236.000 last week. No particular reason – save good luck.

Marine casualties – 2 lost.

A.V.A. Weekly figures not always accurate. 46.000 tons reported lost have  
arrived.

Italian claims to have sunk one sub.

P.M. U.S. Navy not doing much. C.N.S. just back from U.S.A.

C.N.S. Adml. King more frank this time – no secrets from me. A little  
luxurious in weight of escorts on convoys. They say they are putting  
all they have got into it. Certainly putting much aircraft into it. On N.E.  
Coast.

Worst feature is no convoys in Caribbean until 15/7.

A.V.A. Odd that they have so few anti-sub. vessels except destroyers.

P.M. Sinkings figures reflect the fact that traffic suspended over large part of  
N.E. Coast. But no comfort in that.

Military. Burma. V. changes save in E. Route up fr. Loykor? – most  
dang. part of front.

C.I.G.S. Japs have pushed up the road – advanced 130 miles in 5 days. 6<sup>th</sup>  
Chinese Army doesn't therefore look so good.

Strength of our forces. No reply to our wire. But we think about 9.000  
effectives. + 50 tanks perhaps in action still.

China. Force facing Russians increased by 3 Divisions. May be first  
indications of something important.

Pacific. P.M. Any change that Japs may go S.? C.N.S. Some  
possibility and U.S. think so.

Force in Bay of Bengal likely to be used as concentrated force & kept  
together.

Libya. Nothing new. P.M. Why don't we pounce on isolated Italian  
force?

Answer – we did: at least they didn't stay here.

Russia. No change. Prob. weather. Now not before 15/5 & prob. later.  
No marked indications of movement at all. 7 or 8 armoured divisions



“lost” to our intelligence for a few weeks. Move of flak southwards to cover bridges etc., Rlways in south improved too: but believe that done also in North.

C.A.S. Indications of move twds East in Mediterranean. Those moving fr. Sicily may go part to Russia part to E. Mediterranean.

P.M. Garrison in Cyprus is weak.

C.I.G.S. M/East are considering this.

F.O. Foreign Situations. Hitler’s speech. Apologia for Russian campaign. Looks as tho’ he’s bit nervous, not about Army, but about civilian morale.

Black market in food. Pos. preparg. for a purge.

Much more of this speech devoted to us, not Russia.

Russian Convoys. Just seen Ambass. – worried about delay – explained position & said might pos. be able to get 35 in next time.

P.Q.16. they said. cd. go to Archangel.

Guadeloupe & Martinique. - trying, without success, to get US to take a stronger line. P.M. Don’t want U.S to break with Vichy.

## II Admiralty Construction Programme.

A.V.A. 5 cap. ships to replace 5 lost.  
Main state of Fleet  
Carriers. ...

cruisers 58 + 4 by Allies Lost 18.

destroyers 249 “ 71. but more than made up for losses.  
(31 by air attack alone)

sub. 80 + 22 Allies.

Corvettes. 169 + 9 “

sloops 37 + 6 “

a) Still not proposed to put Lions in, tho’ going on with gun mountings.

Interim report of Buckmill Cttee on loss of P.of W. & Repulse almost ready.

Vanguard likely to be ready in 2 years.

b) Cruisers. 8 in – gun cruisers. prev. app<sup>d</sup>. Impossible to go on with them.

Propose to go on instead with middle class.

c) Destroyers – wd. like more but proposals will fill all available berths.

Will take 3 months more to build because of increased protection & armament.

P.M. raised battleships ques – 1 carrier per ship “cruiserkins”

d) Carriers. 2 bldg. Ask for 4 intermediate carriers – 3 ordered, with Ty concurrence. They will be 28 months or so bldg. – but Nav.Staff asked to go into details to cut out refinements & get down to 21 months.

P.M. U.S. are bldg 20 carriers. + 80 auxiliaries.

C.N.S. Many are converted cruiser hulls (8) – small carriers 25 aircraft each.

P.M. ? Tell them only 2 more in next 4 years. But ours are more often at risk. Will you give us replacements of first 2 or 3 we lose. We cd. build others for them later.

C.N.S. President now says don’t turn over anything larger than a destroyer but instead take over the duties. Policy and war as supreme naval power.

P.M. Let me have a draft to write to President.

e)T.L.C. Sizeable ships. 12½ knots & carry 150 tanks – 150 ft. long.

P.M. Don’t let them screw them up to the point where you can’t get away.

A.V.A. a) Speed – b) degaussed – c) crew accommd<sup>n</sup>. for distances.  
Requirements of C.O.H.

P.M. On c) let crew live ashore until op<sup>s</sup>. begins.

P.M. Are U.S. makg. any? A.V.A. They are bringing on the short ones – putting larger ones at end of programme.

M/Prodn. Preparg. memo. on this. Canada can do a lot of small ones – 50ft. 6½ knots Chrysler engines. As soon as these are assembled in our ports they will draw German strength to the West.

- C.I.G.S. We shall need 650 at least : and we are talking only of 450 by May '43.
- M/L. Work will have to be spread over more yards & simplified. Wd. like to see a quick decision. Hope some work cd. be done in Ldn – so simplify C.D. release problem. Want also to know designed so that we can begin training the men.
- Also can we put some in Severn. 4 Chepstow – ships built opposite in last war. Also Portishead.
- P.M. Cd V. Chiefs look into this & report to Defence Cttee. ? with COH.
- F.O. R. class battleships to stay un-modernised? P.M. Floating coffins. Unsafe to face any modern vessels or air attack. C.N.S. If you increase their armour & add big bulges you will reduce speed to 15 knots : and this wd. reduce their value. As ocean going ships they have
- K.W. No obj<sup>n</sup>. to programme.
- A.V.A. Merchant ship building now proceeding at rate of 1¼ m.gross tons in the year.

Naval, Military & Air Operations.

P.M. welcomed Evatt.

C.A.S. Bomber 700 night 70 day. Lost 41. 821 tons 264 mines.

Cologne Kiel Hamburg. 2 unsucc. attacks Tirpitz in Norway – smoke screens.

Paris – Gnome Rhone factory missed.

Fighter 5600 sorties 750 of wh. night. Lost 42 (35 pilots)

Of 166 cu. bombers combats 48 21 : 4 : 11.

AA. 1 : 6.

Night bombers 1 : 2 : 2.

53 : 35 : 61. for loss of 43 F. 86 (total)

Germans admit loss of 45? in exped<sup>ns</sup> to England.

Norwich first night Germans admitted 3 lost when we claimed none.

4 months 4'42 Fighter Command destroyed 212 for loss of 190.

Enemy Attack. 60 over last night – all over Exeter.

H.O. Exeter. Lasted 1 hr. 10 mins. 80-100 HE + 40 UXB. Damage mainly fire in centre. All fires now out. Direct hit on cathedral. City Hosp. & St<sup>n</sup> damaged.

Other details as in written report of Home Security.

Gas – serious. Electricity – 66% available.

Rlways – substantial interference.

Police re-inforced. Labour force 1.000 (400 soldiers) brought in & at work.

44 killed. 56 seriously injured – but material increase expected.

C.A.S. Fighter – defence. All 7 were brght down by fighters.

H.O. thanked R.A.F. for success of

Coastal. 600 sorties. Lost 2. 7 attacks on subs one prob. hit + 8 merchant ships (one sunk) & 1 destroyer.

Malta. First 3 days 156 bombers a day ) Marked falling off.  
Last 4 “ 28 “ “ “ )

17 destroyed : 13 : 22. Lost 3 : 3. 5 : 6 on ground.

M.East. Normal – casualties about even.

Burma. A.V.G. shot down 13 for 0. at “Loyween”. Total loss for week 1 damaged.

Pacific. Destroyed 16 : 8 : 4 for loss of 12. Darwin & Port Moresby.

Naval.

C.N.S. 14 ships (9 by sub. – 5 cause unknown) – 81.700 tons.

P.M. 2 Tankers lost off Trinidad (23.000 tons).

C.N.S. Not stopped all traffic – they are escorted to Azores but they have to run in fr. there to Trinidad.

1<sup>st</sup> Ld. Some services must be continued to meet urgent commitments. No general re opening of these services. Admitted no defence on run-in to Trinidad.

C.N.S. 6.00,000 tons for April – total losses.

P.M. McGovern’s speech. include. reference to shipping losses over 800.000 tons p.month.

M/Inf. He said “I can say because publicly announced .....”

P.M. Assumption tht. this based on P.M.’s speech in Secret Session. Invited L.P.S. to look into this as breach of privilege.

C.N.S. Russian Convoys. Attack by J.K.88 fought off. Later by U-Boat, 1 ship torpedoed. Y’day attack by 5 subs. driven out. Germans have announced 3 sunk – but no confirm<sup>tn</sup>. They are now 1½ days out of Murmansk. 13 escorts (6 destroyers).

Returning. 10 escorts (5 destroyers) incld. Edinburgh. Latter torpedoed & had to return to Murmansk – with 2 destroyers towing. Enemy attacked them – Ed. destroyed one destroyer & damaged one. Ed. Subsequently sunk.

Geo.V in collision Punjabi. Latter sunk & her depth charges exploding damaged Geo. V.

Net result returning convoy will have lost 1 ship

“ “ outgoing “ “ prob “ 2 or 3 ships – of 25.

V.important to say nil abt. Geo V. Maybe poss. to put her right in course of 6 weeks refit wh. she was to undergo.

P.M. Telegram fr. Roosevelt about surplus of American ships – protests about our re-loading & re-arranging cargoes so as to concentrate in available ships the high priority munitions supplies. Various interchanges endg. with proposal by Adm. King tht. we shd. take 10 ships off Atlantic convoys. Read text of his reply on this point.

F.O. We can pack our Protocol requirements in 24 ships in 2 months. This leaves ?26 for U.S.. – ample. Reason for U.S. surplus now is overtakg. arrears, and also despatch of useful but superfluous cargoes – eg. food.

Evatt. Last Wed. at Pacific Council Washington R. spoke on this point in a sence wh. indicated that he now accepts P.M. view Strings on the Protocol?

P.M. Yes. we can alter on new circs.

#### Military.

C.I.G.S. Burma. Last wk. fighting on E-N road : main threat was on Lashio. Rapid progress made – & Japs. were in Lashio by 30/4. This forced retirement on Mandalay front. 29/30 we withdrew over Irrawaddy no complete means of our present dispositions. Gave account of best estimates we can make fr. here.

Certain Chinese forces will have to conform with this withdrawal.

N.E. of Lashio new Divn. from inside China.

Nearer sea-coast evacuation of Makiow ordered.

Advance on Lashio not carried out in gt. force. – done with tanks and M.T. Feared 6th Ch. Army didn't fight well.

5 Jap. Divns. active in Burma.

P.M. Telegram fr. Govr. Burma, who is cut off fr. Alexander.

I have ordered him to return by air to India, as soon as he feels he can do no more. Now heard that he has left, by air.

As regards Alexander, I have told Wavell that when his force falls below that of Divn. he shd. return to India. Wavell replied – can't get him out until he reaches : Kalua.

C.I.G.S. Further east, no more signs of movement into Manchuria.

Libya. Bad sandstorms & little change.

Repairs going well, or better. And spares have improved.

Russia. V. little. Minor operation at Murmansk – landed behind German lines & moved down S.W.

Still no sign of big offensive. Inclined now to think cdn't start until 1/6. And even so no sign tht. we cd. do anything v. big.

Malta. Change of Govt. Report by M/State favoured change, & appointment of Govt.

P.M. Reported on action taken. Read telegrams sent.

C.O. I have wired Dobbie about public<sup>n</sup> – ascertain his views.

Told him Govt shd. take over at once on arrival.

Agreed – no announcement. until Govt has arrived.

F.O. Can we publish the weight of the attack?

Agreed – F.O. & C.O. to consult with other Dpts a substantial statement. Malta for release to Press on Dobbie's resignation being announced – by statement in H/Commons pm. on Thursday.

War Cab approved P.M.'s action.

Tankers. (M/W.T. and Sec Petroleum attending).

M/W.T. No final stoppage. Complete off U.S. sea-board – considerable on entry to Caribbean. But we can't stop all. Certain amount of re-routing – using Freetown convoy as far as they can. We must do this, to meet commitments places where no stocks. When enemy gets to know, we must re shape our course.

Since orders for stopping off given 3 wks. ago losses have bn. much less.

Fact that we lose one here & there mustn't be taken as reason for complete stop.

Sec/Pet. 20 tankers a week/month lost in March & April. Down now to 6.

Stoppage in Caribbean for a week will mean loss on our stocks of 200.000? tons.

What we shd. like is small shuttle convoy fr. W. of Trinidad to E. of Aruba.

This is now under consid<sup>n</sup>. by Admy.

P.M. Accepted the case put fwd. by M/W.T.

See/Pet. Supplying Australia from Trincomalee

Only way in wh. we cd. supply U.S. needs in Australia was to run down stocks in Trincomalee. Those stocks were 850.000 tons.

C.N.S. Convoys off U.S. Coast. Have just had signal fr. Adml. King to say that convoy from central Section – Hampton Roads to Key West – Ready by 15 May, but think won't be able to start until 15 June.

Troubled because hint tht. King still not wholly convinced of value of convoy system.

This was being cleaned up.

Foreign Affairs.

F.O. Giraud. Did go to Vichy. Laval wanted him to see Petain – so tht. latter cd. urge him not to play heroic part! We believe he is still in Vichy.

Germans have asked for his surrender – wh. Vichy have refused.

Australia

Evatt. Invited by P.M. to speak – said brght. good wishes of his Govt. & P.M. who had no object other than to advance the common cause.

Prod: improved but that doesn't mean our Army is well equipped.

To-day short even in small arms. Increased output – overtime - Labour are pulling well - dir<sup>n</sup> into danger spots in North.

MacArthur and his Directive. Disturbed by “priority plan” of dealing with Germany first & Japan later. Japan had showed themselves v. highly skilled in use of all 3 arms. On outbreak of war with Japan we had not one fighter plane in Australia. We now have aircraft because of fall of Dutch E. Indies.

MacA. now given orders about his duties, incldg. attack on Japanese.



MacA. thinks supplies are not sufficient. Altho. U.S. are putting in 700 aircraft there are 13 squadrons of R.A.A.F wh. have nothng. better than Harvard trainers.

Tendency to segregate the requirements of the 3 diff. services.

Aust. Govt. think it necessary to have a re-assessment of the strategic situation. We understand that we are only one part of the world situation – but we fear a certain tendency, here and in the U.S.A., to underestimate the Japs.

Mr Curtin feels that, subject to ground strategy, one Australian Divn. might be left in M-East but rest might come back.

We don't want it to appear that Australia is the responsibility of the U.S.A. Our allegiance is to H.M. the King.

P.M. We will facilitate your enquiries into requirements – details but v. important. Let me know if you want any help.

See at Admy. what our strengths & commitments are.

But in principle Jap's next move is uncertain. Got all he wants in Co-Prosperity plan. If we cd. hold it. Is he now going to make another move – if so where? Signs tht. possibly they may go v. Russia while she is in death grapple with Germany. Or will she go up into China & liquidate that? And, if either, what resources for attack on either India or Australia. Our view, on the whole, is tht. he is unlikely to make a heavy attack either on Australia or on India. For why hasn't he done it earlier?

C.O.S. to work out itinerary – if we diverted to Australia then 8<sup>th</sup> Armoured Divn. en route for India how wd. they proceed i.e. where land & where go feed.

Evatt. We suggest small expenditure of aircraft now might serve to prevent the Japs fr. attempting invasion of Australia.

Fact tht. America has taken operational responsb. for defence of Australia does not for one moment mean that we abate one jot of our determination to see that our people in Australia are defended to the utmost of the power of the United Nations.

I. Naval, Military & Air Operations.

C.A.S. Bomber. 760 sorties lost 35.  
Hamburg. Stuttgart <sup>3)</sup> Warnemunde – night. Visibility bad: results less good.

3) lost 19. – cause attempt low attacks & heavy light concentrations..

Day. Power stations.

Fighter. 5.000 sorties. Enemy not concerned now to stop bombing by light bombers.

17 : 9 : 11 for loss of 25(22 pilots)

Night of 117 bombers destroyed 7 : 3 : 1. AA 4 : 1. Balloons 1. i.e. 12.

Night bombers 4 : 3 : 5. Total 32 : 15 : 25 for loss 66 (total).

Coastal. 550 sorties for loss of 6.

Malta. 64 Spitfires flown off 59 made Malta but 2 lost on way in.

132 sorties on Sat. by our fighters.

30 (9 guns) : 25 : 40 (6 guns) { losses 9 : 11  
  {     1   3 on ground.

[Last 36 hrs. 18(5) : 19 : 23. Loss 3 (2 pilots). ]

Attack made by 60 bombers.

Burma:       A.V.G. v. Rangoon.

Coral Sea: Appears Japs. 37 : 8 : 18 for our loss of 13 : 4. This takes no a/c of aircraft lost in carriers.

Heavy damage to ships.

C.N.S. 27 ships by sub. 5 aircraft 6 marine loss 2 unknown.

= 210.000 tons. 9 were tankers.

23 off American U.S. coasts –  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the tonnage.

PM. How much is British?

1<sup>st</sup> Lord. 9 ships

P.M. Why is U.S. traffic not stopped? I will telegraph to President about this.

P.M. 620.000 tons of imports last week – something of an improvement.

Coral Sea. Attack by air at Talaqi Island where Residency of Solomon Islands is.

Moving round N. Guinea to attack P. Moeresby or Australia expedition.

Intercepted by 2 forces. Japs had sunk 1 carrier (converted) 1 heavy cruiser damaged 1 carrier big one: prs. now sunk) : 1.

U.S. 1 destroyer sunk. 2 carriers hit – hoped to get them back.

Exped<sup>n</sup> believed to have turned north.  
(40 transports = 1 Divn. – guess).

No ship v. ship fighting. Aircraft attack only – on both sides.

P.M. U.S. want the Wasp back.

Evatt. What inference as to J. intentions.

C.N.S. Attempt to consolidate their pos<sup>n</sup> eg. on Pt. Moeresby.

A.V.A. J. have lost 8 cruisers now – 1/5<sup>th</sup> of original strength.

Evatt. Anxiety about Admy. denial of J. report of sinking of ship of Warspite class.

Malta. Gort has asked for more powers.

C.I.G.S. Told him to read his instructions – he has got all he should want.

Read out para 4 of original telegram.

P.M. He shd. have more power. The Commanders shd. be under him, not under their G.O.C's in M/East. But wait and see what he replies.

Russian Convoys. Believe Hipper. Scheer have gone up to Nobvrik & U-Boats come down there too.  
Looks as tho' intend to work U-Boats south & surface ships up in the north.

[Poblem to get Trinidad out.]

Pos<sup>n</sup> will be better in June, ice further north, & can keep away fr. air attacks.

P.M. Have telegraphed to Stalin – to make clear to him our grt. diff<sup>cs</sup>.

C.I.G.S.

Burma. J. occupied Mandalay 4/5.

200<sup>th</sup> Divn. left behind, have attacked J. fr. the rear – prob. the case not certain.

3 Divns. up in north : 4<sup>th</sup> nr. Rangoon.

F.O. Adverse effect on U.S. opinion of announcements that we have are “continuing to withdraw”, while Chinese (going in same direction) are said to be advancing!

P.M. Deeds not words count. Don’t care what Chinese say about us. And don’t bother about words.

Madagascar.

{Attack fr. west. No.5 Commando led. Arrived 4.15p.m. Diego Suarez  
{Landed Ambararata Bay – another force. 17<sup>th</sup> Brig. re-inforced. etc

General account of the operations.

Casualties 457 in all.

P.M. As soon as possible Union Brigade shd. get in to Madagascar & release a Brigade to get on to M-East - & thus enable Australian brigade to leave Ceylon.

C.N.S. Submarines : 2 sunk and the rest gone off.

F.O. Why was Brig. Lusk sent as Political Offr. with this Force, after his failure in Abyssinia?

P.M. asked WO for report on this.

Administration. If Free French are to go in, pos best man wd. be M. le Gentilhomme. We must bring them in to this if we are to keep F. French going at all.

Jap Forces. 23 Divisions in Manchuria – but elsewhere consid. scattering.

Russia. Not v. much. But attack in Crimea 8/5 with 2 Divns + 1 armoured Divn.

Prob. beginning of some offensive. Some signs of movement to the south.

Poles say indications of large movement : but no corroboration.

P.M. Book by Victor Cazalet based on experience gained on official visit. Describes himself as “P.M.s rep<sup>ve</sup> in Poland”. Not mine!

P.J. Not ours” His position shd. be regularised.

M/Inf He is “hostess to the Poles”.

C.I.G.S. Russian Front. Genl. offensive by G. not now likely to begin before 21/6<sup>7</sup>

P.M. Referred to statement in Times 11/5. about report by Mostov. – last year G. were battling only against a screen of 2<sup>nd</sup> rate troops; this time they will be up against core of good R. troops. Put out deliberately – prob. by Army v. Party.

I. Naval, Military & Air Operations.

C.A.S

Bomber. 170 sorties – weather bad – mining only

Fighter. 12 : 8 : 16 for loss 9 (8 pilots). Weather again limiting.

Coastal. Brunt. 500 sorties 18 lost. Shot down 5. Bombed 14 merchant ships.

Main op<sup>n</sup>. v. Prinz Eugen. Found Sunday – picked up & attacked 9pm by 27 Beaufonts. Possible 4 prob.2 hits. No certain report. Lost 7 Beaufonts & some others.

[Enemy 18 : 8 : 17. Ours totalling 40. Home Theatre losses for week]

C.N.S

Long wireless signal soon after attack – prob. Means damage. Reports not complete.

Malta. Sp. Serviceability decreasg. rapidly – next re-inforcement. much needed.

46 : 22 : 46 for loss {in air 8 : 11. }  
{on ground 2 : 6}

Change in enemy tactics – fighters + few bombers – to wear us down, but these results show heavy loss to them.

Report that 2 Fr. Aircraft had shot down off Algiers a Catalina preceding the carrier re-inforcing Malta.

Egypt. Convoy JU.52. (14 – 20) intercepted. More than ½ destroyed & the rest damaged. Full, but fear full of Italians only!

Burma. A.V.G now gone China : ours to India. Dropping supplies to our troops & bombg. their aerodromes.

Pacific. 19 : 8 : 10 for loss 6 : 12

Eastern Front 21/3 – 13/5.

{Estimate of losses} Germ. claim 1932 admit 551. Losses of  
{of Aircraft. } Russ “ 1844 “ 206. aircraft.  
If claims right German mendacity factor = 3 times Russian.  
If losses “ Russian “ “ “ German.

C.N.S.

Shipping losses	32 ships sunk.	170.000 tons.
	2 belated	15.000
	Overdue	16.000
	Total	202.000 “

Most in W. Atlantic. But 7 in returning (? Russian) convoy.

U.S. Convoys. K. West – Hampton Rds. Convoy started 15 or 17/5 as planned.

Caribbean – originally planned for 15/7 may come in on 15/6.  
U.S. have lent us 70 tankers – balance of earlier promise of 100 – prob = 90 by now.

Queen Mary arrived with 9.500 Americans – in the Clyde, for transshipment to N.Ireland.

Ital. attack on Alexandria with “human torpedoes” failed.

C.I.G.S. Burma. Our forces are withdrawing over border into Assam.  
x/Remnants of 2 Chinese Divns. also moving into Assam.  
Bulk of Chinese forces now back in China – but elements still holding out much further south. Japs operating well inside China.

S/S. India. Telegram fr. Assam indicates Chinese at x/ are rabble, tending to loot.  
Suggested disarming them.

P.M. consult F.O. about this. 6 – 8.000 B. and 25 – 30.000 Indian are still with Alexander’s force.

C.A.S A.V.G we think have gone to China. We have nothg. now in Burma and can only bomb over the mountains fr. India.

Madagascar.

F.O. – do we go on cleaning up when S.Africans arrive?

P.M. Depends how long it will take. Don’t want to lock up for too long troops wh. might be going on to India, or M/East. Political negotiation may give us the guarantees we need. Choice to be made when Union Brigade arrives in Madagascar.

Russia. Kerch offensive has pushed Russians back with fairly heavy losses.

Kharkov. Russian attempt to widen base of salient to get K. To-day looks tho’ they are carrying on. G forced to throw in a fresh Armoured Divn.

Otherwise no indications still of major offensive – this (Kerch) is not the beginning of a major push, wh. now cd. not start until 15/6/42.

II Convoy to Russia.

- P.M. 22 out of 25 got thro' – but that. Does not reflect true risk. Convoy at 8 knots will be 6 – 7 days w'in range of air attack fr. Norway – because ice still further south & no longer poss. to go N. of Bear Island.
- Lost Edinburgh one convoy & Trinidad the next.  
Next convoy now due – and C.N.S. believe more may be lost than get through.  
The G. air reconnaissance is v. good in this area. Not only was Trinidad spotted & sunk. But the covering force of cruises also spotted tho' none hit.  
Ques is therefore whtr. to suspend until July – i.e. missing two convoys. We shd. have to inform Russians & Roosevelt.
- C.N.S. Suggest put to Stalin the slender chances of an 8 knot convoy movg. within range not only of JU.88 but also JU87 & ask whtr. he wd prefer to lose a lot more now or wait 6 weeks and get much more through.
- C.A.S. G. have 100 Bombers there, of which 70 are long range, & v. fine reconnaissance. Only chance of getting much through is bad weather.
- C.N.S. Weather prospects – on average of last 14 years – in 2 months much inferior weather. But Trinidad was sunk when visibility at sea level was poor.
- M/L. Cd convoys be enlarged after July?
- C.N.S. Yes. But diff. to make up the full loss - & limits to what Archangel can take.
- L.P.S. Ask Stalin whtr. in desperate need - & if so will he tell us what & we will try to run a convoy in.
- M/W.T. Maisky saw me to-day & urged need for trucks as well.
- F.O. We must decide - & put all risks to Stalin even if we decide to send it.
- C.N.S. By end May 102 ships will be piled up waiting. We might in July put up the convoy to 50.
- F.O. We had grave doubts about the last, but 22 out of 25 got through. It may be difficult to persuade Americans & Russians that we are wise.
- L.P.S. & M/L. Suggested putting facts to Stalin before convoy sails.
- P.M. Not much time. Our duty is to fight our way through & get as much as we can to those who are fighting this fearful battle against the German Army.
- 1<sup>st</sup> Lord There is the risk to our naval strength, as well as poss. loss of merchant ships.



- C.N.S. If we are going to do this, we are inclined to put in 35 in the convoy.
- L.P.S. Try to get as speedy a convoy as possible.
- M/W.T. We have selected the ships already & its difficult to change them now.
- L.P. Send this convoy – tell Stalin all about it & say if losses heavy in May we may have to defer the June convoy until July.
- M/Prod. Agreed.
- P.M. Press Stalin at the same time to send up his heavy bombers to help. Agreed. Send Convoy : tell Stalin we are comg. but explain risks urge him to send his bombers to attack their aerodromes : & put the warning suggested by L.P.

### III Defence Arrangements in W. Africa.

- C. Govrs' Conference in W. Africa lately modified by giving Chairman over-riding powers. But even so not satisfy. Govrs. & G.O.C.'s often in disagreement & no one person to decide. Agree therefore with C.O.S. recommend<sup>f</sup>. Draft Directive – not to exercise operational over Services. Service man – so as not to prejudge post-war question of closer union of W. or E. African Colonies. He wd. live at Lagos. Exact machinery to be worked out after arrival.
- L.P.S. Support need for co-ordination. But it is essential a job of civil co-ordination. Feel strongly therefore need is for a good civilian.
- M/P. Agree with this – and in so far as necessary to co-ordinate Services more difficult still for a Service man.
- P.M. Some minor M/State – who cd. co-ordinate relations with Belgiums, U.S. dir?
- M/W.T. Support sugg<sup>n</sup> for co-ordination, of wh. v. great need.  
Agreed – shd. be civil, not military, man.
- +/P.M. But shd. there not also be a centralised military command.
- S/S. War. I believe it shd. be military man with [latent] operational control, as Layton has in Ceylon.
- C.I.G.S. Agreed with P.M. at x/ , whatever decision about the other man.
- F.O. Two quite separate jobs, both of wh. shd. be filled.
- First Lord. Wd. like military man because of diffy. Of findg. Civilian impervious

to trade interests.

Coal – Reorganisation – Production Programme 1942/43 – Fuel Rationing.

- L.P. Summarised statistical review set out in W.P. (42)226.  
Leaving out economy in domestic consumption, we have deficiency of 3.2 m. tons & have made no allowance for contingencies eg. Bolero.
- On this – do not recommend withdrawal of men from Field Army.  
Shall we proceed with rationing – wh. wd. save 6m. tons?  
This turns on decision about re-organisation. Summarised proposals.  
Regional organisation – complete control over operation of mines – no interference with financial structure of the industry.  
If good will behind it, this re-organisation shd. arrest decline in output and in addition give us some net increase in production.  
That being so, prefer to put emphasis on increased production – but get ready to introduce points rationing at short notice and press for voluntary economy.
- B/T. On the rationing scheme. Many consult<sup>ns</sup> – incldg. Conferences with Local Fuel Overseers.  
Conclusion – v. gt. diffy. in applying any scheme without points & coupons. Alternative scheme wd. involve more staff (for enforcement) & persons of higher calibre.  
Original scheme simplified & modified. Total staff requ<sup>d</sup> reduced.  
Overriding limit of 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ % to reduction wd. relieve anxieties about the larger houses.  
Householders appl<sup>n</sup> form – v. simple – wd. give a simple assessment.  
Wd. disclose stocks held. Provision to claim supplementary ration.  
Agreed with some reluctance that, if re-organisation can be got going with good will, we need not introduce rationing at this stage. Think we are running large risks – some of the reductions in L.P.'s memo. Are risky.  
L.P. Cttee unanimous that, if rationing has to come, this is the best (and indeed the only practicable) scheme so far devised.  
Restrictions on deliveries will be maintained meanwhile – under control.
- W.W. Certain people are now doing without their basic allowance while others are getting supplementary allowances.
- B/T. We will look into this.  
If we wait till autumn, the scheme can't differentiate between – those with & those without stocks. Much of the domestic winter coal will be already in stock, & that much more will be outside rationing control.
- P.M. Man-Power. Short-term. Release proceeding satisfactorily.  
Long-term. Forster Cttee? Report end June.

- L.P. Wastage – must be checked.
- M/L. Hope to releases on medical grounds by re-habilitation scheme. Experiment at Mansfield great success. Great man-power gain both ways – the fit men shd. stay in mining, but those not fit enough for mining can be rescued for other work before it is too late. Attitude of owners?
- K.W. No great diffy. expected.
- Wages?
- B/T. Miners & owners have asked to see Ministers on wages.
- P.M. Peace-time system of ascertainment shdn't be disturbed lightly. But new factor introduced by direction to & retention in mining.
- L.P.S. And you have also fixed prices therefore Govt. is controlling the amount available for distribution.
- P.M. On this account Govt. shd. give something additional in wages.
- K.W. We shall have to hear what they say. Advantages in relating increased wage to increased output, if that is possible.
- P.M. Consider, yes, but we must open that door. Miners are a special community - & if you have taken their liberty away there is a case for differentiating them from men in other industry. Something separate & apart fr. what wd. be paid under the ascertainment procedure.
- K.W. All financial ques left over for discussion with the parties.
- P.M. But in White Paper a) Forster Cttee & long-term intake.  
b) Finance, wages, to be subject to consultation.
- S/Doms. Bear in mind psychology of industry. Agree can't interfere now with the financial structure of industry. But we shd. say something about the future – is show that Govt. will not let the industry down after the war. i.e. this is immediate war-time system, we shall consider the future as part of post-war problems.
- M/L. Two questions on wages.  
a) minimum. This affects my direction of men to return. I wd. wish miners wd. consent to deal with this first & quickly. Men returned have bn. out of mines for some time, & it's a little while before they can earn their money. This lag is difficult for me. Settle it quickly.  
b) B/T. is keen on output bonus. V. difficult. Experience of datum line in last war not v. encouraging. This is sound in principle, but will take some time to work out.

- K.W. even on a) we must consider repercussions.
- P.M. If there is one trade you can pick out from all others, surely mining is that one.
- K.W. Economy. Sustained publicity will be needed. Prepared to see Editors and get them right. Also get them to lay off criticism of rationing.
- M/L. Wages. No reference in White Paper. No obj<sup>n</sup> to reference in speech to willingness to discuss wages with industry.
- P.M. White Paper. Statement on Tuesday that Debate will be held on Wednesday week – L.P. to open and L.P.S. to wind up.  
Lay White Paper on Wed-evening – show it to both sides on Wednesday (earlier).  
After Debate (Sunday evening) I will be ready to broadcast.
- Ch.Whip. H/C. will want 2-day Debate. If so P./Bd. of Trade should speak.
- L.P.S. May I arrange the order of debate?
- P.M. Yes.
- Cranborne. Unnecessary to have Debate in H/Lords.

Foreign Affairs.

- A.E. Sikorski pleased with Russian Treaty.  
China. Chinese fear we are more interested in the war v. Germany than that v. Japan.  
Suggest a) P.M. to see Koo this week b) Koo to go back to China to report. c) Loan – we shall have to try to help. They recognise our diff<sup>ies</sup> are greater than U.S. but Chang K.S. has committed himself too far to his public.
- P.M. Wd like to send personal message to C.K.S. as soon as we know what we can do militarily to help.
- A.E. Ground personnel of R.A.F. with Chinese – they hope something airborne may follow it.
- C.A.S. Diffy. is range for supplying. Maintenance may be beyond our power. C. in C. wd dislike it. A.V.G. ought to go, if anyone.
- Bruce. Australia's view's abt. importance of war v Japan cd. be quoted with effect to Chinese.

Air Raid Casualties.

- H.O. Reg. Commrs. warned v. reprisals for Köln. Attack on Canterbury. 50 overland, mostly over Canterbury. New type of IB. oil bomb. Cathedral Library & walls damaged. 2.000 – 2.500 houses damaged. Fires in hand. Casualties (to 3pm to-day) 22 killed : 50 injured : 34 slightly injured.

Functions of Chairman of Reconstruction Problems Cttee.

- A.E. Agreed with C.O.S.
- P.J.G. W.O. have bn. exploring problems of military occupation immediately post-war. Wd. like clear line of distinction between – W.O. functions & Jowitt's function.
- A.E. No proposal to remove any function from any Dept. Intention merely to give J. co-ordinating power. – to bring together the ideas & plans of all Depts concerned.
- P.J.G. Don't want too much detailed work put on W.O.
- P.M. Come & complain if you get too much.

Daily Worker

Took note.

H.O. Cab. doesn't dissent fr. sugg<sup>n</sup> that we might review the position later on? Beginning Sept., T.U.C. will consider this. Their decision may make it awkward. And the longer Communists behave well, the stickier the wicket will be.

P.M. We'll decide when the time comes – meanwhile I'm not keen on removing this ban.

S/S. Air. The Labour Party resolution does affect the position. But for that, I shd. favour the immediate removal of the ban.

Agreed – say no intention of change, and let it run until September.

Milk – White Paper.

M/Food. During winter milk scarcity – hence need to control distrib<sup>n</sup> to ensure that it reaches right people.  
Trade v. difficult – full of disagreements – but they are agreed now on plan outlined in W.Paper.  
Plan – M/F. will intervene between – producer & seller, who will technically buy & will then direct distribution.  
War-time association of distributors. Agreed – provided smaller men get share.  
Maps showing orderly distribution – cpd. present chaos. Eliminalis v. long hauls.  
Only risk – that some-one may run out on it. D.Express campaign that this will kill the small man. Have written to D.Express and they have stopped their campaign.

A.V.A. Special bonuses?

M/F. “ “ for production will remain & be paid by M/Food.  
“ “ “ deliveries will not remain.

A.V.A. Individual consumers who wants pasteurised milk.

M/F. Most will be pasteurised. Consumer who wants b.t. milk will be able to get it.

Approved.

Coal – White Paper.

S/Doms. √ Para. 7. Make industry attractive to boys – don't give impression of dragooning them into the mines.  
Para 12. State reasons why you can't nationalise because

financial structures of the industry (wages). And indicate that Parl. will consider long term future.

K.W.           √           But this is not the only reason. If you mention one, you should mention others.

B/T                           Raise these points in debate.

M/L           √           Point on para. 5 - comm<sup>d</sup> to B/T.

Para. 17.

S/Mines.       Para. 10.       Omit figures. Pointers only. They may raise controversy.

Generally agreed.

Agreed – L.P. B/T. to settle final draft.



Foreign Affairs

AE. a) Reminder about need for F.O. to see in advance draft speeches on foreign affairs – particularly now we are getting nearer the point when post-war pos<sup>n</sup> is being envisaged.

Wohner's speech in H/Lords Debate unfavourably noticed by P.M. – who asked Cranborne to keep an eye on him.

P.M. Military matters (not concerned only write his own rpt.) – Ministers outside War Cabinet can & shd. consult Ismay.

Secretary to prepare a Minute for circulation.

A.E. b) Talk with Sikorski – v. pleased with new Russian Treaty. Asked to meet Molotov on return. V. good thing that he should.

M/L. Capini (Polish Minister/Trade) tells me that morale of Russian Army is being well maintained by regular arrival of our convoy supplies – less well impressed with American performance.

P.M. Appreciation of Russian chances by J.I.C. cd. be circulated to War Cab. (but not sent out of country) with covering note by C.I.G.S. warning readers tht. this is slightly optimistic.

A.E. c) Negotiations betwn. Turkey & Germany: Not good. need watching. Perhaps try to get Molotov to talk with Turkish Ambassador.

d) Tibet – telegrams. Purely political.

P.M. Essential to give China something to keep them in good heart.

Yugoslav Army Crisis.

A.E. Military people in M/East incline too much to military view & pay insufficient attention to our political diff<sup>nces</sup> here.

Amery. These offrs. were associated with Simovitch & the decision to capitulate. They carry no conviction among their countrymen. They have got support fr. M/East mainly because made friends with our military there.

A.E. Right course is to ship them home.

C.I.G.S. 1200 men have upset the whole of the M/East. Clear the lot out.

A.E. Handed round copies of draft telegram.

P.M. Too submissive. Civil power pre-dominates. The Govt. has the right to appoint their C.in.C & we must accept view tht. he must be obeyed. Our offr. had no right to encourage the dissident elements.

L.P.S. Some of these offr. are bad lots – 2 were in Russia & suspected of espionage.

W.O. see para 4 of Tel. 1147 from M/State. “Get Yugoslav Govt. to accept a reasonable solution or I will ship the lot home”.

C.I.G.S. Then transfer them to some quieter Front. eg. India or S. Africa.

A.E. Why? There is no trouble over those who are actually in the field.

P.M. Telegraph more shortly and more strongly – saying that these 300 men are to be sent to this country at once.

[There is no principle to be followed except to support the national Govt.]

Agreed.

Policy in Madagascar.

P.M. Turns out tht. Barnett hasn't got Annet's authy. V. diff. pair of shoes.

A.E. Three courses -

- a) stay put & let Vichy Govt. stew. No more troops. But Smuts against & insecure.
- b) capture the whole Island. Advantages obvious. Disadvantage – troops needed, long campaign.
- c) make terms with Vichy man in Madagascar.

Tell Smuts what has happened, put alternative to him, & let Platt Sturges & Smuts get together and make proposals.

Meantime Barnett shd. carry no message back.

P.M. Let Platt go to M and discuss with Sturges. Then both go on to see Smuts.

Bruce. Hasn't Smuts indicated tht. he wdn't have this plan even if it were backed up by the Govr.

P.M. Not since he saw my further explanation.

- P.M. Smuts diffy – his advisers were against sending the Brigatz.  
Tell whole story to Smuts – it isn't fr. Govr therefore will do no more –  
we will send P & S to talk it over with you. Had it come from Govr it  
had the basis of something wh. wd. have bn satisfy. in view of our  
anxiety to free our troops.
- C.I.G.S. Mayn't the Govr. be behind this?
- A.E. Too thin, esp. if Smuts is hostile.
- W.O. Remember Platt favours doing a deal at Jibuti. He may be inclined  
therefore to favour finding a modus vivendi in Madagascar.

Reprisal for German Massacre of Village

- P.M. Conversation with Benes about possibility of reprisal for savage cruelties now being practiced by Germans in Czechoslovakia. Suggested wiping out German villages (3 for 1) by air attack. View of A.D. in C. Bomber Command. 100 bombers wd. be required. Low attack 2/3rds incendiaries. Bright moonlight wd. be reqrd. Objection & reasons shd. be announced aftwds.
- F.O. in favour.
- If thought worthwhile, give RAF discretion to fit it in when they can.
- L.P.S. Is accuracy of report beyond doubt?
- P.M. Germans announced.
- S/S.Air. Disliked it. Diversion of effort fr. military objective. Risking aircraft & crews. Wd we not be led on to do it more & more – if Germans knew we wd. answer thus.
- S/Doms. Doubt if it is useful to enter into competition in frightfulness with Germans.
- H.O. Wd. like to consider – reprisals on English villages, where no shelter, & low scale a.r.p. Public wd. say “why did you draw this down on to us?”
- C.A.S. If they came in low & not far inland they wd. run v. small risk.
- F.O. Even so, there might be a deterrent element in this.
- M/L. German responds to brute force & nothing else.
- Bruce. It might lead to even greater atrocities in Czechoslovakia.
- General view that it wd. be wise to think this over.
- L.P. Danger is that it costs us something & them nothing. Against it.
- General feeling of Cabinet – against doing this. (i.e. L.P., M/Inf., CO., H.O.)
- PM My instinct is strongly the other way.
- F.O. Strongest argument against – waste of a moonlight night. Bigger diversion than I had thought.

- Amery. Why a village? Why not a quiet residential town?
- L.P.S. Operational argument against is v. strong.
- P.M. I submit (unwillingly) to the view of Cabinet against.

### India

- Amery. Viceroy increasingly convinced Ghandi means real mischief. Won't act until after mtg. Congress Workg. Cttee beginning July. Propose circulate memo – so that Cab. may consider its line, so as to inform Viceroy.
- W.O. If need to act v. G., speed essential if effect on India is to be produced. Won't do to wait until quite abundantly clear that action must be taken.
- L.P. Act quickly when you do – but not prematurely. And take him right out of India.

### The Levant-Caspian Front

- C.I.G.S. Easier now because R. have asked us to help to mend some of the roads in North. Possible therefore that R. may agree to proposed reconnaissances.
- Wd. F.O. take it up.
- M/L. Are our people in Persia dealg with Russians in the new spirit wh. we adopt? Wd. we not get it straighter if taken up on higher level?
- L.P.S. We have bn. foolish in our approaches, over N. Persia & Caucasus – eg. trying to push people in w'out permission.
- P.M. Awkward moment – they resent enquiries wh. suggest their Front may crack. And we're not v. strong – we've only 2 men & a boy there, and Libya has lost us some face again.
- F.O. Why not start talkg. to R. general who is here with a broken leg. If we do, there must be clear understanding tht. while we are negotiating this our people must not snoop around on their own.
- i.e. we'll see what can be done: but meanwhile our soldiers must behave.

### Report on Public Feeling

- P.M. Likely news for next few months will cure undue optimism. No practical change of the Second Front wh. newspp. think so easy.

- M/I The Second Front decision is now to be celebrated at meetgs. organised all over the country.
- P.M. Can't be helped. But Ministers shd. be careful – the less said the better on grd. of not saying anythg. about forthcoming operations.

Re-organisation of Colonial Service

- C.O. Consid. advance already made twds unification. a) But salaries still paid by CO. Govts - & poorest, who need best men, often gets worst. b) Rapid fluctuation in demands, acc. to Col. booms & slumps. c) Power to remove passengers. Ask only for approval in principle & leave to proceed with detailed scheme.

Agreed.

Empress Hall Demonstration

- H.O. Mtg. discussed previously. Inside control by Communist Party.
- 250 C.D. workers in uniform asked for – diff. for me to refuse, as Coldstream Guards Band & the L.P.S. are going.
- But for future, shd. Cab. decide tht. Mil or C.D. form<sup>ns</sup> shd. not attend functions unless organised by State or la. or for charity.
- W.O. We asked F.O. and they said they were in favour.
- P.M. This was political issue and shd. have bn. dealt with betwn. Ministers.
- L.P.S. Or, better still, organise this sort of thing ourselves.
- P.M. Important thing is to make it clear tht close relations with Russia does not involve coddling our Communists.

This ques to be considered by War Cabinet – H.O. being present.

Message to the Mtg. Agreed. L.P.S. is going representing the Govt but no need for other Ministers to send messages.

Air Operations

C.A.S. Weather – only mining Wed. & Thurs. nights.

M.E. Convoy. U.S. aircraft did quite well, tho' nothing like what they claimed in Press.

They did materially better than over Ploesti oilfields.

Air losses in M.E. We started ahead & losses so far have bn. equal.

II. Report of Arrival of American Forces.

V.C.I.G.S. Leakages – inevitable. Genl. Chaney agrees can't do more than avoid disclosure of date & place of arrival.

M/I. Americans main source of leakage.

Propose to talk to Editors on lines of memo. The date & place of arrival are covered by general D Notice. But will ask for general damping down of publicity.

Agreed.

III. Carriage of American Troops in B.Vessels

M/W.T. Genl. Lee is keen on stepping up the nos. carried – both in large & small ships. If we will sanction it qua. ships, they will adopt it at once qua troops . Ques of public interest so far as large ships concerned.

1<sup>st</sup> Lord. Risk of subm. attack not v. great with these large ships. But there is always a chance of an unlucky find & hit. Also signs of increased air attack in W. Approaches. Wd. therefore favour no increase.

W.O. 120.000 short by March 31<sup>st</sup> '43 – this measure wd. reduce the shortage by half.

H.O. Speed of their arrival will affect civil problems. Unless militarily necessary to get them here as quickly as possible, better to have them in steadily.

W.O. No phased plan. But Americans want to push them in as fast as they can - & politically P.M. wd. not wish to stand in their way.

Accomm<sup>tn</sup> will not be a bottleneck.

M/L. Don't like idea of 15.000 on these ships.

- L.P. But even 10.000 raises that problem. And it is the Americans who want this.
- M/W.T. Wd. W.O. do it with B. troops?
- Nye. Wd. depend on the operational urgency. We have no comparable problem. But we have stepped up our stowage by 30% for a 2 month journey.
- L.P.S. Cd. we charter the ships to them - & leave the whole responsibility to them.
- M/W.T. It will be under our flag & we shall be responsible. Our flag & our crew – whtr. we “chartered” or not.
- M/L. Difficult to resist if Americans press.
- M/W.T. In the end they put it to us on the basis – wd. the crew mind.
- L.P. This is not a thing we wd. do ourselves. Make this plain to them & say our risk is only the crew & then leave the responsibility to them. Put this in writing.
- W.O. You can say that W.O. wdn’t do this except for reasons of extreme operational urgency.

Agreed.

#### IV. Parliament

Statement on M.East on Tuesday. Auchinleck to be asked for statement.

#### V. Pritt’s offer to lecture to Troops

- W.O. Pritt v. angry at having his offer refused. Threat to make public statement. Propose to let him talk if he wants to. Shall not give him any reasons.
- H.O. The answer is “P. is not a suitable person to address the troops”. Better to keep that answer until extracted from you.
- L.P.S. Disposed to give a reason at once.



I Naval, Military & Air Operations

C.A.S. Mainly mining. Havg. apprec. effect.

Bomber 750 sorties – 25 missing.

Coastal New searchlight attack technique – promising.

Fighter Success on rlwy engines causing trouble to Germans.

3.100 sorties – lost 14. 10 : 11 : 13 for loss of ?  
17 : 14 : 2. total. enemy loss.

Malta. Destroyed 21 : 4 : 16 for 15 : 10.

Claims to damage to Ital. warships 2+1 hits) not confirmed.

Libya. Activity mostly v. ground troops. Over Tobruk much outnumbered. Now concentratg. all available aircraft in W. Desert – some air superiority gained – increasg. supplies at expense of other treaties.

Diversion of Spitfires fr. Australia: We cd. send 42 Spitfires now being embarked for Australia – this wd. mean delay of 1 month to Australia & gain of 1 month for M/East.

Bruce. They won't like this. circs of course have changed. But Aust. Govt. will have to be given clear picture of diff<sup>ies</sup> in M/East and proposals for dealg. with it – make it clear these aircraft won't be thrown away there.

A.S. The squadrons will go to Aust. as planned – all that will happen is tht. their machines will be a month late.

Bruce. Give also assurance tht. this is only a one month delay – not to be repeated.

Agreed – Aust. to be asked, on basis of full statement.

Libya. 46 : 16 for 25 : 9 : 18 enemy.

Only 5 damaged on aerodromes – as against over 400 enemy aircraft picked up in our advance. Tribute to salvage & removal organisations.

Pacific. 21 : 8 : 10 for 18 : 4 of ours.

C.N.S. Losses. (52 Total 44 by U-Boat (34 off U.S.)  
( 6 “ mine  
(1 marine casualty and 1 unknown.

261.000 tons. Possibly 559.000 for month.  
Plus related reports 14.000 tons for previous months.

U.S. Convoys in Caribbean to start on 31/7 (or ? 1/7).

Then U-Boats will swing back to Atlantic convoys – wh. we don't  
back up so much now.

W. Med Convoy. 43 aircraft destroyed + 22 probable.

E. Med Convoy. 22 “ “

- V.C.I.G.S. Russia. Centre. Partisans being eliminated.  
South. G. bridgehead slightly extended at Donets.  
Russians say G. attack definitely held up. Air support  
decreased.  
Crimea. G now v. close to bay itself. V. heavy losses.  
Inference offensive in S. Sector delayed until  
Sevastopol cleared up.
- Libya. W.D. asked for inform<sup>n</sup> about circs. attendg. our loss of  
tanks. No confirm<sup>n</sup> of press story of tanks running into  
tank trap.
- F.O. Murmansk.
- Air Raids. 50 aircraft v. Soton.  
14 killed 29 seriously injured – Nos. may increase.  
4 destroyed : 4 damaged – enemy aircraft.
- Libya. Telegram from P.M. to Auchinleck. Read out.
- II. Statements on Libya and Malta Convoys.
- S/Doms. Much to be said for followg. last precedent & reading out only or  
mainly Auchinleck's statement. Add – Tobruk has now fallen – no full  
inform<sup>n</sup> - and then something on lines of P.M's telegram to  
Auchinleck.  
No doctoring of A.'s communiqué. Give it as his, & add brief  
comments of my own.
- M/L. Express fighting confidence tht. situation will be restored.
- S/Doms. This is not the end in Libya – battle is still on.  
Must be a discussion – but premature to have it now.

L.P.S. Awkward day – Consol. Fund Bill & on tht. they can debate this issue if they want..

H/C. ugly on this – want someone’s blood.

Convoys.

A.V.A. Read draft statement.

Suggested this shd. be limited to factual statement – omit prelim. appreciation of the diff<sup>cs.</sup>

S/S. War. There is suggestio falsi in this statement.

Criticism likely to be “over-optimistic communiqués – part<sup>ly.</sup> in M/East.

Some substance in this. And this statement is disingenuous.

Agreed 1)Vice “not without some less” read “admittedly with serious losses”.

2)Amend to show tht. E. Convoy turned back for lack of fuel.

3)Statement to be made by S/Doms together with Libya Statement.

III. Miners’ Wages – Effect of increases on Stabilisation Policy.

K.W. Nothing to add to memo.

No great difficulty so far as concerns cost of living, which dropped a point this morning.

L.P.S. Understood that this rise was to make no difference to cost of living.

S/Doms. Agreed – this was my impression.

K.W. No. I said I wd. see it didn’t affect stabilisation policy – i.e. I would see that we didn’t break over the 201 limit.

M/L. I said – C. of L. reviewed every month : and we will adjust to make sure we don’t go over C. of L. ceiling.

K.W. Will prepare a statement – keeping to basis of L.P. Cond<sup>ns.</sup> .

M/L. Keep away from any Parl<sup>y.</sup> debate or statement on wages.

Parliament

S/Doms 1)In answer to Ques or aftwds.

Agreed. Say in answer to that I will make a statement at end of Ques.

Then you can't adjourn the House first.

2) Can I say to Press in attendance that I'll be making this statement.  
Agreed. Yes.

I. Debate in H/Commons.

S/Doms. Labour Party not likely to support any Motion of Censure – but want an enquiry – designed to safeguard future rather than recriminate about past.

W.O. Material or generalship?

Whitely First stressed rather than second.

S/Doms. Diffy. in doing this w'out the Genls. in the Field.

W.O. On equipment I'm reasonably satisfied tht. on tanks & anti-tank weapons we're likely to be thro' our troubles in about 6 mos. time. Arrangements made for production policy in U.S. related to the minimum no. of types etc.

L.P.S. Say to-morrow – “we propose if Mot. of Censure put down to allot time for that on Wed. & Thurs. If not put down, we will have a debate on salary of M/Defence – with a vote.”

S/Doms. If W. Milne Motion not put down, unlikely that Labour Party wd. table Motion asking for enquiry.

P.M. shd. speak on first day – so tht. Labour Party can meet betwn. these 2 days.

L.P.S. I shd. like P.M. to wind up also, answer criticisms & get the vote. He can speak twice if it is Supply Day.

S/Doms. Developing as personal attack on P.M. important therefore tht. he shd. speak early.

Cranborne. Danger of takg. it on M/Def. salary is focussing whole attack on P.M.

Whitely. We wd. put 2 or 3 Votes down, incldg. M/Defence to get the necessary breadth of Debate.

Cranb. H/Lds. Addison's Motion Thursday (next week) intends to go for Govt., not generals. Will not press it to a Division. Will not suggest anthg. like Censure Motion. Will ask for enquiry.

II. The Tank Position in Middle-East.

M/S. Past history in narrative. Hardly does justice to Mech & Aero. Facts are as set out – but cumulative effect does them less than justice. They have done v. good

work on tanks – tho' in this part. tank there were faults due to engineering wh. were not tackled early enough.

For future, organis<sup>n</sup> keyed up to catch these defects earlier & quicker. Duty of Tank Design Dpt. to follow up complaints & see tht. modif<sup>ns</sup> carried out.

These old models will always give trouble because engineering skill in original designing was not good enough.

Cromwell II will be regarded as reliable engineering job from the start. V. difft. matter fr. adapting faulty old designs. We shall then have better tanks than Germans.

Remember tht. tanks now being used by G. were designed in 1935. i.e. they had this degree of start on us.

Cromwell I begins late summer. Will be free of this type of defect.  
“ II “ end of '42. “ “ a really superior article.

- L.P.S. Mar. 41 – Feb. 42 who was Dir. of Tank Design?
- M/S. Durrant. He hadn't enough staff – he assumed Nuffield's engineers wd. have bn. at the trials. He still is Director – but is supervised now as he wasn't then.
- L.P.S. See top p.3. He left simple remedy unapplied for 11 months.
- M/S. Disagreed. Capable of palliative but not remedy w'out fundamental re-design.
- M/P. In fact, it isn't easy to remedy.
- W/O. And doubtful if it's right even now.
- L.P.S. Has system of insp<sup>n</sup> bn. changed?
- M/S. Nothng. much wrong there. Even these defects were mostly not revealed in U.K. – only M/East brght them out. You'd never get prod<sup>n</sup> if much more insp<sup>n</sup>. Best test is pre-prod<sup>n</sup> model – and we'll get more of that in future.
- M/L. Complaints of excessive insp<sup>n</sup> met by leaving much to the firm. Was this the cause of these troubles?
- M/S. No.
- L.P.S. Do arrangements at Farnboro' & Lulworth correspond to those described in memo? The defects found at Lulworth cd. surely have bn. found in the 7 mos. at Farnboro'?
- W.O. Many of the defects in tanks disclose themselves after long time.
- M/S. These were operational tests – not the sort done at Farnboro'.

- L.P.S. But c'dn't these be done simultaneously with other tests? To avoid this delay.
- S/Doms. No one person who throughout was looking at the tank as a whole rather than a collection of parts each of which has to be tested individually.
- M/S. Right method – now in force – is to test all yr. components before assembly. Trouble was that
- M/P. These things do happen. The American light tank had v. many operational defects of this kind.
- M/S. Originally D/Prod<sup>n</sup> was responsible for design. When at M/S. earlier I separated them & appt<sup>d</sup> a D/Research, Development & Design.
- M/L. When under test, are reports taken fr. men themselves?
- M/S. Yes. Soldiers – trained as testers.
- M/L. This is what engineers often do.
- L.P. Design – too highly specialised and too much sub-divided.
- W.O. Crusader wh. is being modified to take 6 pdr. The alterations make it v. difficult & uncomfortable for the men – but quickest way to get the 6 pdr. tank. Recall also circs. after Dunkirk – decision to concentrate on numbers of the only available design.
- M/S. Why was Valentine the only satisfy. tank then?
- W.O. Because it was infantry tank, only type considered pre-war, & worked on by one man in one firm.
- M/S. Lesson of this is – don't press us, when we've got a winner, to rush into prod<sup>n</sup> before we've fully tested them out. Or, if we have to rush it, don't expect to avoid all these troubles.  
Policy in past has bn. devote full energy to improving existg designs and to go ahead rather more quietly with new designs.
- F.O. Reports on re-conditioned Churchill?
- W.O. Slow - & useless in Egypt. Drinks in sand.
- W.O. Amendments. of wording of App II. Handed in for incorporation.  
Part I of the Report.
- L.P.S. Who failed to pass the inform<sup>n</sup> on? 2<sup>nd</sup> para. of summary on p. 5.

- W.O. Well known in W.O. only complaint can be tht. W.O. failed to pass it on to Defence Cttee & War Cabinet.
- S/Doms. Last para. in Part I of my Rpt.
- W.O. Point is – wd. Nov. offensive have bn. postponed if more had been known about the German gun.
- M/P. If that is the point, what happened in Nov. We ran Rommel out of Libya.
- S/Doms. But Auchinleck’s statement, as quoted, was not quite correct.
- M/L. Who wd. know of this at W.O.?
- W.O. Telegrams to W.O., copies of which went to P.M.
- M/L. Who at W.O. was responsible for not bringing this specifically to Defence Cttee.
- W.O. When Def. Cttee considers a particular operation, they take the advice of the Commanders on ques whr they feel able to undertake it.
- M/L. This is vital. Controversy in War Cab. about German 4½ pdr. and our 6 pdr. – revealed for first time in War Cabinet.  
{ lack of tank spares.
- This was followed by controversy betwn. B’brook & Margesson. The comparisons of strength were put to War Cab. while op<sup>ns</sup> were being considered & at no material time was the danger of the 4½ pdr. G. disclosed to us.
- W.O. Remember tht. Auchinleck wanted the offensive postponed.
- M/P. In the M/East we were prep<sup>d</sup> to go on, tho’ we knew they had some 4½ pdrs. It was not until after the beginning of the Nov. offensive that it was realised, even in the M/East, that the 4½ pdr. made such a difference.
- W.O. Once inform<sup>n</sup> had gone automatically to P.M. no one in W.O. wd. think it necessary to bring it specifically to the notice of War Cabinet & Def. Cttee.
- S/Doms. The lay members of the War Cab. (or Def. Cttee) shd have all the material facts.
- L.P. 2 points. 1) Telegrams went automatically to P.M. & Jacob. Is that sufficient, for purpose of bringing inform<sup>n</sup> as such to Def. Cttee.



2) When this inform<sup>n</sup> came in, the worth of the gun was to be appreciated. It is clear that up to March, tho' knowing of it, he did not think it so important.

On 1) I shd. have said tht., if the inform<sup>n</sup> was relevant to a gun under discussion by Def. Cttee, W.O. shd. be responsible for seeing tht. it was brought to the notice of the D. Cttee.

W.O. What about inform<sup>n</sup> recently given by C.A.S. relative merits of Spitfire & F.W.210.

F.O. What is clear is tht. no-one here appreciated the significance of the 4½ pdr. G. gun.

M/L. What I want to ensure is tht. any significant change in relativities is appreciated brought to notice & acted upon.

W.O. Assurance tht. we have set up an organisation with exactly that duty.

L.P. There shd. in each Service Dpt. be an organisation responsible for picking up all this inform<sup>n</sup> - appreciatg it, working on it, and in add<sup>n</sup> considering what circulation this inform<sup>n</sup> shd. be given.

S/Doms. The significance of the 4½ pdr. was appreciated – because action was taken to counter it. But W.O. evidently did not think it worth while to bring it to the notice of the Def. Cttee.

M/L. Is specialist treatment & enquiry by experts carried out while operations proceed?

W.O. Yes.

M/L. Cd. the appreciations of relativities – weaknesses & strength – be circulated to War Cabinet?

S/S. Air. Isn't this the responsibility of the C.G.S. & Ch. of Staffs.

A.C.I.G.s. Two ques. 1) What inform<sup>n</sup> shd. C.I.G.S. have put to W. Cab.  
2) Had W.O. appreciation bn. diff. wd. prob<sup>n</sup> of 6 pdrs. have gone quicker.

If C.I.G.S did not put this factor to W. Cab. it was because he didn't think it was of primary importance. Nothg. wrong with the system. Our judgement may have bn. wrong – and may be again.

On 2) W.O as matter of course were developg. new weapons. Two on hand : 6 + 17 pdr. Had we realised then the full significance of this factor it wd. have made no diff<sup>er</sup> to rate of prod<sup>n</sup> of either of these guns. This as it happens is true. But remember tht. we are always

workg. to beat the Germans – apart fr. our knowledge of what Germans have.

S/Doms. Position of W. Cab. Ministers, We are ready to take risks but wd. like to take them with our eyes open.

M/L. Don't accept the statement tht. we cdn't have accelerated the 6 pdr.

M/S. & W.O. Dissented.

“Took note of memo”

A.V.A           Anxious to show tht. at this stage shippg. is so critical tht. it can't be met only by a) relying on bldg., incldg. American and b) limiting consumption of imports. Admy. feel tht. sh. Cttee Rept. is optimistic. Unless we reduce sinkings loss will be more than 6.5 m.tons. 3½m. already by enemy action this year. Other causes, marine losses etc, will be 650.000 tons. The gap will be therefore 7.5m.tons, or something like it.

Expectations for next 6 mos. Losses 1<sup>st</sup> half of year due largely to U-Boats in W.Atlantic.

2.221.000 tons = losses since 12/1 off U.S. Coasts & in Caribbean.

513 ships convoyed & total losses 3 all mined – Results of Key West Convoy.

120 ships convoyed & total losses 3.                   – Aruba convoy.

Convoys thus improvng. the pos<sup>n</sup> – but this only means tht. U-Boats will move elsewhere.

Assist<sup>ce</sup> to U.S. has meant re-arrangement of our convoy groups in N. Atlantic : and when U-Boats move there we shall be less well equipped to beat them off.

Expected U-Boat strength. In 13 German ports 271 U-Boats bldg. or fitting out now.

By March 500 will be available, 140 wd. be always training or fitting.

Unless we can sink a good many there will be 500 workg. against us by July '43.

Losses of escort vessels & destroyers v. heavy in first 6 mos. - 30 destroyers alone.

Replacement of merchant vessels. Much depends on fulfilment of original progress.

Diversion of U.S. effort is bldg. of escort ships reduces their programme of merchant ships.

Vital therefore to concentrate attack on U-Boats at sea.

We can't guarantee tht. there won't be increasg. losses in next 6 months.

Thus, too dangerous to seek to restore pos<sup>n</sup> only by a) and b) at outset.

Extended help fr. R.A.F. during last few weeks shown how much more cd. be done with greater air attack.

- S/Doms            These points for review –
- a)        prospects of building
  - b)        efficacy of. convoy system
  - c)        offensive v. U-Boat as cpd. with defensive action by merchant ship.
- (a)
- M/Prod<sup>n</sup>        U.S. Bldg. Prospects v. good.
- 30.000 tons d.wt. over schedule in May.
- 8m tons d.wt. in 1942. Shortage of plate might reduce it to 7.5 m. tons.
- 20m tons in 1943.
- M/W.T.        Much of this will be taken away for other use – e.g. aircraft carriers.
- S/Doms        Cd. Kaiser's methods be applied here?
- M/P.            No. Pre-fabrication carried to an extent not feasible in this country.
- Escort vessels. Optimum = 20 : 100 merchant ships. Or prs. 17.
- Our programmes provided hitherto for only 5 : 100.
- A.V.A.        The escort vessels won't affect the pos<sup>n</sup>. until at least end 1942.
- S/Doms        The rest of this year will be v. tight. What will pos<sup>n</sup>. be in 1943?
- Does M/P. report mean tht. U.S. building will offset our losses?
- L.P.            Only if we get the use of that tonnage.
- M/W.T.        We can get no indication of that.
- Danger is margin of error, on the balance sheet – 3m. tons either way.
- That is the significant feature because it cuts not into margin but into essentials.
- M/W.T.        Our calculations were on U.S. building of 14 m. tons for '43.



- M/L. Don't agree. Ship-builders have held it back because it doesn't fit in with their future.
- L.P.S. Why not get Kaiser over?
- M/P. First await results of investigation into ship. bldg. methods – by Panel of M/P.'s appointmt.
- S/Doms. Replacement 1943.
- M/W.T. Everything depends on what we can get from U.S.A. Hopkins has said they'd get us 24 m. tons of imports – keep up at this rate.
- L.P. But the Sh. Cttee calculation is based on running down stocks on assumption of v. much increased rate of imports in second half of '43.
- (b) Efficacy of Convoy System.
- A.V.A. No indic<sup>n</sup> of decrease in U-Boats fr. June to Dec. – increasing – yet losses pos<sup>n</sup> was improvg. because effective escorts.
- Pos<sup>n</sup> deteriorated since Dec because entry of Japan into the war.
- If U.S. entry into war hadn't opened W. Atlantic to U-Boats we shd. have expected to do even better against continuance of attack in W. Approaches.
- S/Doms. Cd. you give us figures for nos. of unsuccessful attacks?
- A.V.A. Yes. But you'd have to allow for deterrent effects of large escort strength.
- M/P. 17% of nominated ships for Bolero already sunk!
- M/W.T. When U.S. convoy plans completed, we shall expect improvement because bulk of the vessels will remain w' in the protect<sup>n</sup> – only a small prop<sup>n</sup> will have to go on outside the convoy. But this is what I wd. rely on to estimate that the present rate of 7.5 m. losses will not take us over-all above 6.5 m. from the year.
- (c) Offensive against U-Boats.
- A.V.A. Many come fr. Biscay - & you can get them there more easily.
- They stay out 6-8 weeks – of wh. 12/14 days on target station.
- M/W.T. Americans will now press us to do more to stop them coming out.
- S/Doms. What can we do?

- A.V.A. Nothing more than increased air attack.
- L.P.S. Methods of increasing cargo space. Towing cargo shells eg. Have all these bn. considered?
- M/W.T. Studied & abandoned because of danger to ships. Now being considered again – made of glass.
- S/S. Air. Ready to co-operate.
- Diverted 4 squadrons fr. Bomber to Coastal.
- 84% of bldg. capacity for U-Boats is w'in reach of Bomber Command all the year round. And we think the best way of keeping down the U-Boats is to hit them in the places where they are being built. 64% are bldg. in Bremen, Kiel & Hamburg.
- Raid on Emden was particularly successful. U-Boat yard hard hit.
- A.V.A. This we welcome – but it won't effect the nos. of U-Boats in operation in next 6 months.
- L.P. If you cd. deal equal destruction at sea and at yard, balance wd. be in favour of attack at sea because you kill the crews also.

C.I.G.S. Russian Front.

North. G. claims of captures s. Leningrad. ) nothing v.  
)serious  
“ “ “ “ 3.000 before Moscow)

From Kursk southwds signs of definite offensive. R. holding on at Sebast. delayed move of air force for major offensive. New attack at Kursk started today.

Goering at Poltava. This looks like first stages of major offensive.

Up to now 3-4 armoured & 8-10 infantry div<sup>ns</sup>. have bn. doing these attacks – no indic<sup>ns</sup>. of strength comparable with last year.

Air Raids. Wed/Thurs. 50 of wh. 35 on Nuneaton.  
Fri/Sat. Norwich (30) – fires : serious damage.  
Sat/Sun. 40-32 overland in S.W. counties incldg. Weston-S-Mare.  
Sun/Mon. Weston – 40 overland – 70 fires, many serious.

Weston – aerodrome. 8. aircraft factory, R.A.F. training establ<sup>mnt</sup>.

C.A.S. Sun/Mon. 2 destroyed.

Foreign Affairs.

a) Evacuation of Civilians fr. Egypt.

F.O. Lampson told this shd. not be discussed by telegram.

Agreed – Details to be arranged with M/State if nec. War Cab. will support.

b) Removal of civilians fr. Iraq.

Agreed – stay where they are.

c) Foreign Visitors – Norwegians, Dutch etc.

Ministers to tell F.O. what is said: & if possible consult F.O. in advance.

d) Moscow – Amb. wd. like to come home. Let him come after he has finished with Molotov conversations.

Agreed – subject to P.M.

e) Imperial Policy Group – poisonous publ<sup>ns</sup>. : esp. about Russians.



K. de Courcy up to mischief.

[M/L. will consider calling him up].

H.O. Publ<sup>ns</sup>. not w'in limits of what can be suppressed.

III. Evacuation of Families of Service Personnel from Malta.

C.O. Dockyard – decided months ago.

Military – now decided by Govt.

We were against it because effect on Maltese. We still are. If now we clear relatives of B and do nothg. about Maltese, unfortunate reactions.

Suggest           a) restore to voluntary basis: or  
                          b) offer facilities for vol. evacuation of M. dependents.

W.O. Unless quota basis, this wd. mean none cd. go.

C.O. Offer 50% share of available facilities.

S/S.Air a) moral claim of those who have gone in higher than that of indigenous prep<sup>n</sup>

b) if Malta fell, public opinion wd. condemn action resultg. in B being left behind.

[Cab. dissented from (b)]

C.O. 1200 British. Many more Maltese.

C.A.S. Any aircraft reachg. Malta fr. Gib. shd go back at once.

Any increase in traffic means increased petrol consumpt<sup>n</sup> fr. Malta.

Only a trickle cd. be brought out.

No regular air traffic fr. Egypt.

K.W. In fact v. little will be done. Why not give 50/50 facilities, for the little that will be worth. Let it be voluntary for the Maltese.

F.O. Don't like it. Wd. prefer to tell everyone to stay where they are.

S/Doms. Any priority at all shd. be given to those needed elsewhere.

L.P. If there cd. be evacuation, we think it shd. be shared. As there can't be any, put a stop to all of it. Govr. to be so instructed.

A.V.A. Can't we bring out children of Naval ratings.

Cabinet – No.

Agreed – As in L.P. view. Bring up again if becomes possible to undertake large-scale evacuation.

IV. Auchinleck i/c 8<sup>th</sup> Army.

P.M. proposes to announce in H/Commons at noon to-morrow.

Prev. agreed not to announce. But now leakg. via U.S.A.

C.I.G.S. to inform Auchinleck.

V. Representatives of Baltic States.

Agreed.

Foreign Affairs.

- A.E. b) Madagascar. Genl. there wants existg. pol.offr. to continue & my man to serve under him. (Brig. Lush) P.M. approved (7/5) sending my man out.
- P.M. Settle this with S/S War – not for Cabinet (?). I will settle if you can't agree.

Czecho-slovakia.

- A.E. Won't give Benes all he wants – he once resigned & there isn't therefore same continuity in his Govt. But it will clear the point about Munich.
- L.P.S. Para 7. What does decl<sup>n</sup>. mean?
- A.E. Sudetens are takg. line they won't go. I want to make it clear tht. they can't rely on that – rather than other way round.
- P.M. Make it clear tht. it is populations not territory.
- S/S.Doms. Smuts prev. asked tht. Dom. P.M.s shd. be consulted before changes made.
- P.M. Necessary?
- S/Doms. Smuts felt strongly.

Agreed in principle : AE. to talk to Benes on these lines : Doms. to be consulted & then in a few days decl<sup>n</sup>. can be made public.

Treatment of War Criminals

- P.M. Idea of my paper – you don't pass judgement but collect facts in auth<sup>ve</sup>. manner. Make a big show of it. Publish ev<sup>ce</sup> fr. time to time to hot up the fires of war.
- Fact-finding Comm<sup>n</sup>. only. Flourish of trumpets. Washington will take initiative.
- Simon. Similar Cttee appt<sup>d</sup>. Sept. 1914 – Bryes. Pollock. H. A. L. Fisher. Harold Cox. Alfred Hopkinson.
- But contained no names of offenders.
- P.M. Contemplate tht. if Hitler falls into our hands we shall certainly put him to death.

Not a Sovereign who cd. be said to be in hands of Ministers, like Kaiser.

This man is the mainspring of evil. Instrument – electric chair, for gangsters no doubt available on Lease Lend.

- A.E. “Takg. depps. & interrogating eye-witnesses” ) need  
Names suggested ) revision
- L.P.S. They must be “official” body. Appt<sup>ed</sup>. by Govt.
- P.M. Cttee to work out details ) – Ld. Chancellor : L.P.S. : F.O. A.G.  
of both W.P. Papers. ) M/Information.

A.V.A. Dpts. with minor points can send them to the Cttee.

Debate on Shipping Situation – deferred.

Policy in Relation to Gandhi.

- L.S.A. G. will encourage resistance of peasants to troops – non-compliance with salt laws.
- P.M. Why go on with salt tax – v. little money in it.
- S/S. War 10% of pre-war revenue.
- P.M. But universal requirement – like taxing air.
- L.S.A. Congress now mtg. – by Mon. next we shall know.
- L.P.S. G. is on the retreat surely : latest speeches suggest v. little fire in him.
- L.S.A. Statement on 30/6 is fairly strong.
- P.M. Back to salt. Get rid of it.
- S/S War. What of Viceroy’s pref. for holding G. in India?

Genl. feeling in favour of removing him from India.

Otherwise – took note.

Debate on Shipping Situation.

- L.P.S. Debate is on M/W.T. Vote : but they have said they want to talk abt. shipping.
- P.M. Our practice therefore in Secret.

- Ch.Whip.      Secr. Session gettg. unpopular. Two Priv. cases arisen fr. it.
- P.M.            We can't make our case in public.
- A.V.A.          Policy of U.S. Navy Dpt – publish sinkings only where survivors land on Am soil and even these no mention of name or tonnage. Nothing therefore in claim tht. we are withholdg. while U.S. are publishing sinkings figures.
- Goebbels regularly publishes figures wh. are wrong but not deliberately inflated.
- We don't want to give him the correct figures.
- Therefore dead against surrender to present claim in H/C. for publ<sup>n</sup>. of losses.
- P.M.            I suggested to President tht. it was inconvenient tht. they shd. publish more about losses than we do. Weekly publ<sup>n</sup>. enables them to check their U-Boat reports. Bad also for public to take its pulse so frequently.
- I didn't know how limited their publication was. I have asked Hopkins to let me know at once their final conclusion on my request.
- A.V.A.          Press conference accepted my view of this.
- L.P.S.          You won't satisfy H/C unless you give them the figures in Secret Session at end.
- Ch.Whip        Disagreed.
- M/L.            Stand on our existing practice.
- L.P.S.          But you can't explain in public Session why U.S. figures are not satisfactory or full.
- Simon.         Why can't you explain publicly reasons v. publ<sup>n</sup>. – as Churchill did in last war.
- M/Inf.         Get back-benchers to read what U.S. papers say in ref. to Am. publ<sup>n</sup>. & its value.
- M/L.            Don't satisfy Shinwell & the critics in H/C. at expense of confidence of the sailors.
- A.V.A.          No kick in the last Debate.
- P.M.            Our losses are not so v. bad.

- Cranb. Addison wants Debate in H/Lords. <sup>x/</sup> But he is concerned rather about B. building.
- S/Doms. H/C., doesn't want a Secret Session.
- A.V.A. But you can't deal with <sup>x/</sup> in public session.
- P.M. Pity to have scare-mongering public debate, then answer it in Secret. – Agreed.
- S/Doms They want to talk of methods in ship bldg : possible need for further belt-tightening.
- P.M. My diff<sup>ty</sup> is tht. a really good answer (even on this) can't be given in public.  
 Leader shd. explain why we don't intend to publish figures of losses.  
 U.S. figures are on a diff. – basis: [but they are so designed tht. it doesn't give inf<sup>mn</sup> to the enemy.]
- L.P.S. leave out [ ]: it will lead to argument.  
 In spite of losses arrangements made with U.S. will enable war to be carried on, enough shipping. Want full debating power – can't have it save in S.Sessions.  
 If you want it therefore you must have it in Secret Sessions.
- Ch.Whip. We have had one Secret. We don't want – nor do they – another.  
 No need to have it in Secret if we aren't going to give the figures.
- P.M. Then the Govt. can't make its best case.
- K.W. They will walk out of a Secret Session.
- Cranb. H/Lords wouldn't look at a S. Session.
- L.P.S. Trouble is uncertainty & rumours built up on the Am figures.
- P.M. This can be met by our saying tht. we can see our way thro' with U.S. assistance.  
 If you want this fairly debated, it must be in Secret.
- L.P.S. Then if they raise losses we shall have to go into Secret – not because afraid of facts but because givg. inform<sup>n</sup> to enemy.

P.M. Wd. like to be able to take H/C. into confidence - & give them all we can.

Halifax. Hope care will be taken to avoid impression in U.S. that things are all right.

L.P.S. I will tell them then tht. we can't have losses discussed in public Session – we will discuss the other matters.

Select Cttee on Exdpnditure – Enquiry into Tanks

A.E. Precedent of Govt.

S/S War G. was specl. case : other Genls have gone since.

Shipping Debate.

- L.P.S. If these Votes are down you can't say talk on losses is out of order. Ques whtr. or not Govt. will answer is immaterial. You can't answer in public. Nec. therefore to warn House at outset tht. if they talk on this we'll go into Secret Session. Even then, shd. we give the losses?
- P.M. I wdn't mind giving them a picture, in Secret.
- I don't distrust H/Commons.
- K.W. Indiscretions – this may reach the enemy.
- P.M. Much smaller risk. Real trouble is publ<sup>n</sup> in Press.
- A.E. No indication tht. anything has got out thro' Secret Sessions.
- P.M. Don't take too low a view of H/Commons.
- L.P.S. View of            you can't have this in public. Apart fr. other things, it wd. not be poss. in public to give any explan<sup>n</sup> of U.S. pos<sup>n</sup> wh. might be interpreted in U.S. as criticism.
- P.M. What you are really discussing is American affair – their losses & their potential gains fr. bldg.
- A.V.A. Ditto with shipbldg – wh. I wd. debate anywhere if allowed to give the figures.
- I have a v. good case – but am not allowed to make it in public.
- P.M. Wd. risk full disclosure rather than have criticism in public & answer in Secret.
- Ch.Whip. Labour Party have asked for debate in public – but they haven't asked for losses.
- L.P.S. Genl. dislike of Secret Sessions. Labour Party have asked for it; and a general feeling in H/Commons against Secret discussions.
- M/L. People thinkg. now we have bn. giving too much information – endangering the lives of our men.
- P.M. Say “we will not take this in public” : & if they protest X/ [move into Secret Session and say why.]
- K.W. Unfortunate public effect.



- P.M. Two or three newspapers will write what they wd. write anyway.  
Cannot be discussed satisfy. or thoroughly except in Secret. If House desires will move into S. Session to explain reasons.
- L.P. Cdn't the reasons for not holdg. it in public be stated in public. You can't give all the reasons – but surely you can say enough to satisfy the House.  
Agreed – withdraw X/ above.
- L.P.S. I will draft statement on business & show it to P.M. tomorrow am.
- A.V.A. If we talk abt. bldg., how much can we say about naval programme?
- P.M. Show the figures give globular results – “in every category we had replaced our losses”.
- P.M. Let L.P.S. explain reasons why we hold it in secret. Then let Sir A. Salter open.
- Salter. Difficult for me. H/C has complained before of not havg. genl. background. stated at outset, Wd. resent opening speech by person known to have bn. out of the House for 15 months.  
Genl. feeling tht. First Lord shd. open.
- P.M. Well. L.P.S. on Procedure  
First Ld. open on merits.  
Salter to wind up.

I Post-war relief

- P.M. As in his memo. Parl. & the nation shd. know before we bind ourselves to such a far reaching commitment.
- F.O. We say only (1) there will be a system of rationing after the war.  
We shall then be dependent on U.S. They intend to continue lease-lend.
- P.M. We shall then have greatest home production over.
- K.W. Gratuitous offer. Pos<sup>n</sup> same as regards stocks.
- F.O. Disagreed as rgds stocks. Ty. policy is now what is was when it provoked this war.
- K.W. Don't bind ourselves now. See how we stand then.
- M/P. Stocks. Ques.is whtr. we shall do better by putting ours into pool with U.S.A. or by selling them against gold.
- M/L. How will you get order when the chaos is on us unless we begin to plan now.  
Not afraid of promise – so long as we don't bind ourselves to any specific level of rationing.  
There must be orderly relaxation after the war: we must therefore let people begin to plan it now.
- P.M. We can't tie our people up in this suffering – bureaucratic machinery.
- Halifax. If there are starving people in the countries wh. we have fought to liberate, wd. our people hesitate to accept rationing in their interest.  
Anyhow you will have to do it in any event.  
We'll have to live on U.S. charity for some time after the war. And this sort of thinking is the only contribution we can make to international relief after the war.
- S/Doms. Position is tht. we are saying now tht. after war we shan't immediately scrap all control & engage in unregulated scramble. We will maintain a system of rationing, to control the position.
- P.M. Canada cd. supply us if we needed it.

- M/L. Yes – as after the last war. And 2-3m. unemployed followed.
- F.O. For some yrs. after the war there will not be enough food or shipping to allow us to revert to system of winning food by sale of goods. We shall have to continue a system of rationing.
- P.M. At the end of this war I will submit to no inequality with U.S.
- B/T. Our proposal is consistent with your minute. Quoted from Annex.  
  
Our standard of living will remain, for all this, above that of European countries.
- B/T. advise tht. in any event we shall have to maintain rationing for some years after the war.
- M/W.T. Shipping. By end of '43 U.S. will have more shipping than B. + B – controlled.
- L.P.S. We want a plan to be made for relief. What other contribution can we make.  
  
And if we make it, we shall be protecting ourselves from being put on a level with other “distressed” countries.
- M/P. Textiles. After war there will be no stocks of clothing in Europe at all. Unless you maintain rationing for 2 yrs or so, the prices will go so high tht. the poor won't be able to buy a shirt.
- Halifax. U.S. will be supplying most of the food etc. That will mean v. heavy taxation. That will be their contribution.
- P.M. If we contribute, let our people do so as a generous gift.
- S/S.Air European Allies are working out relief plans for their countries which contemplate rationing. In Washington they are bound to ask what we are going to do.
- F.O. The Allied Govts are already trying to buy and to collar the shipping. We must avoid this competition scrambling.
- M/L. I favour this because I believe the poor will get a better chance that way in the period immediately after the war.
- Jowitt. This means only – some system of orderly distrib<sup>n</sup> to avoid waste. We can't give much in the way of food. We say therefore tht. we won't indulge in plenty while the rest of Europe is starving.
- F.O. The whole thing is governed by “as part of a common plan”. We are not committed unless we like the plan.

- L.P.S. Referred to P.M.'s statement of June 1940. This implies that we are going to do something to build up supplies. K.W. is now saying don't do anything about it now.
- P.M. Position has deteriorated since then.
- L.P.S. If we are going to plan, to enable us to redeem this pledge, we must make some contribution now.
- K.W. X/ Let us at least avoid public declaration at this stage, until we have seen the common plan.
- M/L. Favoured X/. So long as L. Ross knows where he is.
- K.W. Can we agree to ( a) enter into no commitment  
y/ instruct L. Ross on ( b) see tht. no publ<sup>n</sup> of this  
these lines ( c) make it clear that when we see the plan  
( as a whole we will make up our mind.
- M/W.T. We have no assurance of getting a share post-war of the surplus of U.S. shipping.
- K.W. Further telegram to L. Ross – in light of further discussion in Cabinet – to effect of y/.
- P.M. Remained of opinion that we shd. not do this unless U.S. equally find themselves to equal rationing.
- Let K.W. prepare a draft telegram & bring it to the War Cabinet.
- ( [ Also ? need to consult Ministers about the line.]  
( in consult<sup>n</sup> with F.O. and B/Trade.

I. Foreign Affairs

French Ships at Alexandria

A.E. Godfrey's attitude v use of w/t. F.O. and Admy. to investigate.

Evacuation of civil pop<sup>n</sup> fr. Alexandria

A.E. Bad plan – and bad moment. Agreed, subject to C.O.S. lay off this.

Madagascar

P.M. C.O.S. asked to consider further clearing up – in view of unsatisf. attitude of Govt.

III. Air Raids

H.O. Nothing much – save indications of lone daylight attacks increasing – e.g. Leamington and Dagenham.

IV. Conscription of B. Subjects in Egypt

H.O. Why not (a)?

C.O. Because local leg<sup>n</sup> can deal with Colonies – not therefore necessary for them.

H.O. Canada?

M/L. Now they have conscription, same plan as in U.S.A.

L.P.S. When will it be introduced?

A.E. Before recess if possible.

L.P.S. Wdn't keep them sitting for this.

Simon. If introduced & not taken, some wd. volunteer.

L.P.S. Might take a day. Go away on Friday rise Thursday.

P.M. Or sit later on one day.

Agreed.

V. Polish & Greek Refugees fr. M/East

C.O. 60.000 p of war ) Total 88.000. Have bn. accepted by E.African Colonies  
13.000 H civilians ) They can take no more – a) food. b) no accommod<sup>n</sup>  
1.000 others etc ) Until the newcomers build, no more can be put up.

S/Doms. Ditto for S. Africa and Rhodesia. Ask, but don't expect favourable answer.

F.O. How can I get the Polish Divns. – if I can't accommodate their families.

C.O. 1.000-1.500 p. fortnight after mid-Oct.

P.M. x/ F.O. C.O. & D.O. with W.O. meet & decide what can be done.

A.E. And I will press the U.S. Govt. to take more.

M/W.T. I cd. carry many in returning ships.

S/Doms to convene & report back only if necessary

Ministers as at x/ to be brought in.

#### VI. Carrying of Respirators by Members of Public

H.O. Need for economy much greater – rubber shortage, & large nos. sent abroad.

P.M. When last brought up I opposed it because we were about to make our threat about G. use of gas in Russia.

No obj<sup>n</sup> now. Couple it with increased precautions to ensure they're in order.

#### V.II. Report on Home Opinion

Para 6. Agreed – cd. have bn. better handled.

Took note.

#### VIII. Parliamentary Recess

L.P.S. 6/8 – 8/9. Then after 3 days adjourn again to end of Sept.

As last year.

Criticism likely – we wd. find time to discuss a) Army pay b) Air co-operation wh. some members want to debate and we've said "no time".

- K.W. Cd. P.J. see the leading Conservative M.P's and quieten them down on (a).
- L.P.S. Lib. Nat. Whips have asked for (b) Cd. they do it on Approp<sup>n</sup> Bill?
- S/S.Air. Diff. time to discuss it – organisation now under review, with the Americans.  
Now thinking of drastic re-organisation. Cdn't discuss that now.
- P.M. Offer day for that in Sept.

Air Raids

- H.O.            Thurs/Frid. 40. inland – scattered.
- Sat/Sun. 20    “    Middlesbrough. Consid<sup>bl.</sup> damage to bldgs &  
                  commun<sup>cns.</sup>
- I.C.I. Billingham – prod<sup>n.</sup> will be held up.
- Mon. am. 5.45a.m. S. Coast. 7a.m. E. Anglia. 7.30. N.E.
- 25 in all. Every Region except Scotland & Newcastle had  
                  warnings and in most bombs dropped.
- Derby – R. Royce: central machine stores? shop.
- 2<sup>nd</sup> near R.Royce works.
- Witham – Critall’s.
- Swindon – GWR works & gas-holder.
- Noticeable how widespread the attack was. Worrying – need to get  
                  them down.
- Active defence shd. be as lively as possible.
- C.A.S.           We scattered them. but weather was v. diff. for us.  
                  Precision bombing by isolated aircraft v. diff. to stop.  
                  AA. claimed damaged one – only, tho’ fire opened at many places.
- III.    Eire Officers at Battle Schools in N. Ireland
- P.M.            W.O. propose they shd. attend. Americans will be at these schools as  
                  well as British.
- Situation changed as cpd. 2 yrs ago – no risk now of invasion of  
                  Ireland: at least tht. danger has receded.
- S/Doms.        This won’t affect Eire neutrality. If attacked she will fight. Important  
                  therefore to make them as efficient as possible. And also encourage  
                  them by supplies (Item 3 on Agenda IV).
- Comp. small amounts. Mil. auth<sup>ies.</sup> in Eire v. co-operative.
- We have given them small amount fr. time to time.



P.M. Doubtful about giving them mines. – to lay in Eire harbours : against whom?

Don't mind the other things so much.

S/Doms. AA guns & indicators.

S/Air. Surely we cd. do with these ourselves.

H.O. Eire c'dn't defend herself : we wd. have to do it. They have untrustworthy elements.

S/Col. Good thing to back up mil. auth<sup>ies</sup>. esp. Mulcay (?)

A.V.A. 1<sup>st</sup> Sea Lord : I am opposed to supply of mines.

P.M. AA Guns : predictions – don't we need them e.g. Biggin Hill. Surely those points shd. have priority over Eire.

S/Doms. But this list passed by V/C.D.S. as what we cd. give if ques of policy cleared. Their view = useful to let Eire have these, for support of their mil. auth<sup>ies</sup> if no political objection to sending them.

P.M. C.O.S. to examine afresh.

S/Doms. Yes – quite apart from any political question.

P.M. Courses – discuss separately.

No sufft. objn. to that.

S/Doms. But this connection that if they are taught to handle weapons they will want the weapons the more.

S/Col. Shd. not N. Ireland Govt. be consulted?

H.O. Yes. I will look into this.

#### IV. Power of Punishment to Indian Commissioned Officers.

S/India. K. Comm. Offrs. have the power. ) Small matter, but cause v. great  
Ind “ was not given that ) diffy in mixed form<sup>ns</sup>. & great  
power. ) resentment.

Matter raised 3 mos. ago. as matter of urgency, by Viceroy. I put W.O. objns. to Viceroy and have now had his view C – in – C – as in memo.

B. Offrs. throughout Indian Army wd. support their view.

This is a distinction on ground of colour.

- W.O. King Comman<sup>d</sup>. offr. V. few were approved, after last war – but died out. Viceroy's Comm<sup>n</sup> is now normal practice.
- Not a small thing.
- Sooner or later we may have to do this. But face of white man in East is low enough and this is not the time to do it. Gandhi's likely movement.
- A.V.A. Navy – no real precedent because no mixture of black and white crews.
- S/Air. Matter of discipline, not principle. Offr. shd. not have to go outside his unit to find some other offr. who can punish. The pos<sup>n</sup> in R.A.F. is the same.
- We wd. be willing to change, but wd. need legis<sup>n</sup>.
- C.I.G.S. Have to do it ultimately – but not now.
- L.P.S. If they are fit to command, they should not be denied the attributes of command.
- L.P. Why is it more degrading to be punished by an Indian than to be ordered by one?
- S/Doms. Really logic of W.O. case is opposition to Indianisation.
- L.P.S. Drew attention to x/ in Memo.
- P.M. But political capital will be made out of it in India.
- S/India. No. Will encourage our friends.
- M/L. Cdn't India Cttee or some other body ascertain the facts. Particularly. whtr leg<sup>n</sup> is involved. /How many offr. have arrived at this pos<sup>n</sup> etc./
- [S.India. Viceroy wants statement made this week.]
- Warning to Congress
- P.M. (1) Report to Cabinet showing no. of offr. who (have) K.Comm<sup>n</sup> //  
(have not)  
(whtr. it will involve legis<sup>n</sup>)
- (2) On larger issue, circulate the text and I will see whtr. it need come to Cab.
- If any member of War Cab. has an obj<sup>n</sup> he can inform Sir E. B.

V. Reduction of Hours of Broadcasting.

The Shipping Situation

- L.P. Rep<sup>ns</sup>. to U.S.A. at least 3 m. tons of imports in first half of '43.  
Even so factors up re<sup>p</sup> large margin of error – a) sinkings b) military demands c) Bolero.
- A.E. As in P.M.'s memo. Base demand on full employment of our seamen.
- M/W.T. Wd. prefer to put it quantitatively first.
- In Bolero negotiations I am seekg. assistance 500.000 tons gross shipping in first 9 months – 1.7.42-31.3.43 and 1.500.000 tons 1.4.43-31.12.43 wh. wd. give us margin. [Hope thus to get 7-7½ m.tons imports additional over period of 18 months]
- 25 m. = 1942 : 27 m. = 1943.
- L.P. This is a diff. method of bridging the same gap.
- M/W.T. Cherwell now wants 28 vice 27.
- P.M. I said to President “27 or 28”. Stand by that.
- M/W.T. 5.000.000 gross t. shipping additional in first phase: and up to 1.5 m. at end of 9 mos for second phase.
- This is what I am asking Americans for.
- If we get this help on Bolero, we shall benefit by repercussion.
- 1.3 gross tons remain as contrib<sup>n</sup>. twds. Bolero.
- We now found we can ship less than ½ of U.S. original demands for Bolero.
- Even if they reduce their scales fr. 9 tons to 6 tons p.mon we can't do it.
- Sinkings in first 9 mos estimated on first 6 mos of 1942 less 25%.
- Turn-round. Less good because military stores. 4 voyages vice 4.7.
- Better to have this ½ m. & 1½ m. in the 29 mos. & get [ ] extra imports.
- P.M. Bolero is subject to delay – fixed for April but cd. be put back.

M/W.T. Estimates raised on 23 m. U.S. bldg. programme. Tho' M/P. more optimistic, their programme has since bn. cut. Cd. we help them with steel?

M/P. Not if we have to cut ourselves.

P.M. Let 25 & 27 m. be fixed figures - & Bolero variable, in time. Bolero must carry any contingencies – e.g. from sinkings.

Consumption Economies

Rationing bread.

P.M. Why not? c.f. great waste.

Hens – new regulation will mean tht. people will feed them bread.

M/F. Rationing means equal distrib<sup>n</sup> to all. Important to preserve one commodity free for ironing out personal inequalities. Bread mops up individuals' variation. Fill up on bread.

Doubt how much waste of bread there is – don't believe there is much. Wd. rather risk that than risk people going hungry.

Differential – v. difficult.

I can save 800.000 tons of shipping without rationing bread.

P.M. But a) will stop waste b) saving in tonnage c) bargaining point with U.S.A.

M/F. Straight rationing of bread wd. increase consumption.

Points wd. help that – but wd. involve loss of variety

And burden wd. fall most heavily on heavy workers, whose need for bread is greatest.

P. M. You might save 500.000 t. imports by this means.

Agreed – L.P.Cttee to re-consider. Not worth doing unless it brings ½ m. tons.

Dilution.

Agreed : as in L.P.Cttee conclusions.

[Waste of Potatoes. New machinery for reducing to a minimum.]

U.S. Army Requirements. What scales are U.S. Army working on? Prob. excessive.

- M/P. Said his people were looking into these points - & working them out.
- M/P. Press them to use our equipment & ship their's direct to theatres of War.
- P.M. Waste of space by Services in shipping space allocated to them.
- Cherwell. 1.100 vehicles boxed in April = 80.000 tons saved.  
 1.460 “ “ “ May = 100.000 “ “  
 No ships reqr<sup>d</sup>. is defined by no. of vehicles – their search round for cargo.  
 Shocking waste of space in past: position is now much improved.  
 Scale of equipment for M.T.
- S.S War. Promise of 20-30% reduction – now come down to 10-12% in view of change in role of Army.
- P.M. Circulate to those concerned the Cttee's Rpt. rec<sup>d</sup> in W.O. today.
- P.M. Only way of getting results here is to impose over-all cuts or let Dpts work out how they will operate them.  
 We can't press U.S. to cut down w'out doing it ourselves.  
 Services have bn. completely uncombed for man-power. Need for searching enquiry into use of man-power by R.A.F. & Army. Service Ministers must help.
- S/Air. We've tried hard. But new strategic demands – swinging Air Forces from one threat to another
- A.E. Wastage rates (sick) v. high in M/East & India.
- P.M. We must lighten our establishments for overseas service.
- A.V.A. We ought to have a go at it – it had to be done in 1917 & again in 1918.
- M/L. You will have to do it if you expect production to keep in step.  
 Need for co-oper<sup>n</sup>. not opposition. Everyone says what can't be done.
- M/L. You call up only Grades 1 & 2. Yet you use them on “tail” at 1 : 1 Army. 60 : 1 R.A.F.

That is surely a waste of fit men.

I can only ring the changes on priorities.

W.O. Taking troops abroad will mean an increase of our tail – not a decrease

P.M. Women drivers on home service?

W.O. We can't get enough women.

And can they be directed into searchlights?

P.M. Yes. This doesn't involve use of lethal weapons.

Phosphates.

M/Ag. Now has to come fr. Gulf. We are now 2 mos. short. because U-Boats off U.S. coast.

If we have sinkings, then we shan't be able to keep factories going after June.

40.000 tons must be moved in winter : and this is v. unlikely.

Apatite fr. N. Russia is off!

We haven't enough in country to last beyond Christmas.

M/Prodn. is helping me with this : and I can wait for 2 weeks.

Tractors

L.P. There is a plan for pooling them as between. W.O. and M/Ag. Total to co-ordinate.

P.M. Let us have a memo. for Cabinet on this (? Not persist in this request).

L.P. Facilities for service & repair can also be improved by pooling.

P.M. This was explanatory.

- But -
- a) Bolero = vsid. legatee
  - b) 25 & 27 for 42 & 43 are firm.
  - c) F.O. to focus rep<sup>ns.</sup> to U.S.A. for firm guarantee as to shipping required to meet b)
  - d) Economies – L.P. recommend<sup>ns.</sup> app<sup>d.</sup>

- e) Bread rationing – L.P.Cttee to consider.
- f) Service man-power – Cab.Cttee. S/Doms. L.P.S. & F.O. R.A.F. and Army  
  
Comb tail and sharpen teeth. Beach Divns. to be made fully effective.
- g) Vehicular economies. Report to come to Cabinet.
- h) Packing of vehicles.

W.O. May cttee on (f) proceed in such a way as will not involve detailed scrutiny of past establishments.

P.M. has held one review already.

Only way to do it is to fix global figure & let Army work out details.

S/Doms. Food supplies of expeditionary Force shd. be as far as possible dried etc.

L.P.S. Other aspects for discussion -

Shipbuilding in this country.

Anti-U-Boat campaign.

A.V.A. Admy. have bn thro' this problem of concrete ship or other variant for economical bldg.

M/L. Civil engineers shd. be allowed to try.

P.M. M/W.T. to obtain report fr. U.S.A. on their new methods of bldg.

M/L. T.L.C.'s being built like 1<sup>st</sup> class ships: not "rough & readies."

Super accommod<sup>n</sup> on crews quarters – too much amenity.

P.M. Let Cab. have a memo. on this – W.O. & Admy. in consult<sup>n</sup>.



I. PM's Visit. Leakage

- S/Doms. Fri. night Lisbon – then in Continental Press. Telegram from P.M. fr. Gib.  
i.e. before answer rec<sup>d</sup>. fr. Moscow.
- M/F. Bullitt? Talking e.g. about Torch.
- EEB. Reports prevalent in Lisbon pm 31/7. Then on Transocean 5 a.m. 1/8.  
Experts say cipher break unlikely.  
Read preliminary report on enquiry.
- S/Doms. a) Enquiry into leak  
b) When shd. we now announce? Read terms of P.M.'s note and telegram sent to him: suggesting we shd. now disclose visit to Moscow.
- L.P.S. Diff. betwn. offl. announcement and mere rumour. Second much less certain. May be a "fish" to elicit the announcement.
- S/Doms. Trouble if we hold it.
- L.P.S. Don't assume they know for certain. Announce it in Secret Session only. And do it Tuesday. i.e. no public announcement about Moscow part of visit.
- M/L. Leave it to P.M. to decide what he announces about Moscow.
- F.O. Public announcement – ques. left now to P.M. on CRA's telegram.
- M/L. Draft statement for S. Session. Omit ref<sup>ce</sup>. to Moscow (or even Russia).
- Ch. Whip Wd. prefer it done Tuesday. In any event, before Wed. adjournment. L.P.S. and Ch. Whip to meet S/Doms. 10.30 a.m. on 4/8.  
Bullitt's indiscretion.
- A.E. Agreed to speak to Winant.  
i.e. speaking. to M/P about Torch in presence of Layton.  
Leakage: enquiry.

S/Doms. By "C" – or if more formally someone else eg AG.

## II Service Pay and Allowances.

W.O. Two questions Tuesd (Lyons and S.O. Davies) soldiers pay. Don't want to give a stalling answer without knowing mind of Cab.

Seen Erskine Hill (as sugg<sup>ed</sup> by C/E). Went over figures. No poss. competing US rates. Always some anomalous comparisons possible. He nevertheless said he wd. press for another ½ day. 1922 Ctte. however, not thought to have any definite ideas.

Last time Cab. decided to give somethg. tho' Senior Ministers thought a few minor concess<sup>ns</sup>. wd. do.

Posn. looks like slipping. D. Herald has said increases wd. be made.

Non-Ministerial Members of Army Council (prev. against increase). Married soldiers small balance in favour of industrial employee. civilians. Small intrinsic case therefore for some rise. But Press have led troops to think they're underpaid – psycholog. diff. Recommended therefore 1/= a day rise, privates, grading down with higher rank. Nothg. more on allowances – tinkering with fam. all<sup>ces</sup>. wouldn't give same result. Officers : prom<sup>ed</sup> to Lieut. at 6 mos vice 18. If that done, no case for genl. increase – tho' some case for increasing married allow<sup>ces</sup>. – outfit allow<sup>ces</sup>.

Answer sugg<sup>ed</sup> by Ty. won't do if there's any ques. of standing pat. "Await debate" answer will invite cont<sup>d</sup>. Press agitation.

A.V.A. Genl. ques – no time to consider.

Last time (April) were willg. to stand fast. Cab. gave way – at cost of £11.65.

Agitation growing. Wd like to have more time for details.

Pay of offr. (junior) we are anxious about : and already in con<sup>ce</sup> with Ty. on this.

V. little demand in R.N. fr. ratings – except for genl. background.

S/Air. Agree about junior offr. Feelg. tht. they are underpaid. Wd. like that considered. Pilot offr. and flying offr. Prom<sup>n</sup> (first) at 6 vice 12 mos. wd. help.

Want not to discourage young offr. fr. marrying and having families. Consider therefore increased allow<sup>ces</sup>. for offr. with children.

Allow<sup>ces</sup> while livg. with families – but get “consolidated allow<sup>ces</sup> if they move away from families. This is hard on families. Wd. please R.A.F. if “consolidated” allow<sup>ces</sup> abolished.

But can't do this for offr. and for men. Admit no pressure for increased pay fr. ranks. Propose therefore increase 1/= p. day for AC2. reducg. to 6d p. day for sergeants.

K.W. Last increase. Cab. Cttee appt<sup>d</sup> to consider. At opening each Serv. Min<sup>tr</sup> said no demand for further increase and that they didn't ask for any. Part<sup>ly</sup> true of W.O. When I said some increase necessary to meet P.M. the W.O. objected and strongly : and put it in writing that there was no case. Demand shd be resisted. Non-Service Ministers on Cttee thought somethg shd. be done (part<sup>ly</sup> because of rel<sup>n</sup> to industrial workers).

When our Rpt. considered, thought so important tht. P.M. said he wd. announce it.

Reasons a) concessions important b) avoid continuing pressures for more: “final” award. We have since answ<sup>d</sup>. Ques in this sense.

Since then – arrival of U.S. troops and many more to come. About 6 weeks ago P.M. asked what was being considered about U.S. soldiers. I have talked to Winant. Hoped some of their pay might be retained in the U.S.A. Winant said this was out of ques – settled by Congress and jealously guarded by them. Any sugg<sup>n</sup> fr. us wd. be v. ill-received.

Not a hope of Congress legislating now, when elections pending : little hope thereafter.

Mitigating action taken thro' Bolero – U.S. military authorities co-operating well in these

In Northern Ireland the men are in fact sending a lot home, of own free will.

80%-90% were doing the right thing.

No hope of basing our pay on U.S. standard.

This really is only material change in circs. since last decision.

Views in H/Commons.

Conservatives : agit<sup>n</sup> engineered by Taylor M.P. and one or two others with v. little influence. Taylor got cold welcome from 1922 Cttee. If anything to be done, not on basic pay.

Labour. Saw Milner MP (Chairman : Sub-Cttee on Services).  
Impressed mainly with allowances – tho' they wd. have to ask for ½  
p.day on basic.

Merits.

W.O. put fwd. nothing much but agitation in Press & its unsettling  
effect.

V. flimsy reason for increased expenditure £M.85-100 at 1/= p.day  
(inclgd. C.D. Services)

And a new level set wh. may have to extend into the peace – when  
armed Forces of same size will prob. have to be maintained for some  
time. Effect in reducg. our capacity to afford some re-construction  
plans.

Anyhow advocate White Paper setting out comparative position.

Officers.

Admy. have asked for increase for all offr. up to Admiral – and no rise  
for ratings. Wd. be ready to agree to statement giving no  
encouragement or expectations but indicatg. Cab. Cttee to enquire. Put  
out at same time W.Paper on Facts.

L.P.S. Say we'll lay a White Paper on facts and say no more, save you'll have  
a Debate after recess. If anything said about "considering", we shall  
not be able to avoid concessions setting out facts as to Serv.  
remuneration.

K.P. (Gt misapprehension as to Serv. emoluments and how they  
(compare other walks of life and W.Paper with show it.

M/L. Take care not to draw too sharp contrast betw<sup>n</sup>. industry & Services  
L.P.'s formula wd. do better.

A.E. W.O. to agree terms of answer with L.P.S. and M/L & Treasury.

("settg. out all material necessary to enable judgement to be  
formed").

(Refer to misunderstanding as in L.P.'s phrase.

M/L. C/Exchequer to answer this Ques as it affects all 3 Services – Agreed.

M/L. Wd. like statement on expenses wh. offr. have to invent. White Paper  
to be done by Service Depts + Ty. after consultation with M/Labour.

III Russian Convoy. Statement in Parliament.

S/Doms. P.M. thought unwise to make public statement.

L.P.S. But all I want to know is whtr. if pushed for inform<sup>n</sup> in Secret Session, I should say something on the lines of the Press statement.

A.E. Last para. Puttg scattering items is no v. good. Reverse order.

S/Air. Third para. Yet when threat materialised they withdrew.

Ch.Whip. Vague – no indic<sup>n</sup> how serious losses were – House unlikely to be satisfied.

General feeling that the statement cd. be improved – in detail.

L.P.S. If Shinwell gets on to this, we'll move into Secret Sess<sup>n</sup>. make some such statement as this. Prob. Thursday.

A.V.A. I will prepare another draft (for consid<sup>n</sup> Tuesd) bearg. in mind Saty's decision and today's discussion. Agreed.

#### IV Statements about Second Front

S/Doms. Don't see that much can be done. Radcliffe not in favour of seeing Editors.

A.V.A. This kind of thing does "impinge on security".

L.P. But you only check statements of fact – not exp<sup>ns</sup> of opinion.

A.E. You cd. tell Editors how that one sentence came into the communiqué.

As rgds. Maisky saw him – he promised stringent inst<sup>ns</sup> to see tht. nothing more will be put out by Embassy.

W.O. These demands are doing much harm – to spirit of nation & Army.

K.W. Too late and too dangerous to touch this.

L.P.S. B'brook Mtgs. No good dealing with this on "Press" lines.

Radcliffe here entered the meeting. Said – nothg. cd. usefully be said to Editors unless you cd. tell them definitely that it wd. or wd. not, take place.

#### V Foreign Affairs

A.E. a) Russian Convoys. Re-routing requ<sup>d</sup>. We have agreed nothing fr. here to be shipped via Persian Gulf that can go direct fr. U.S.A. Politically disadvantageous – economically sound.

Except<sup>n</sup> 4 ships with 100 Hurricanes etc.

b) Second Front. Soviet News Sat<sup>y</sup>. "Hitler is takg. 20 Divns fr. West", Spkg. to Maisky on this.

c) Evacuation fr. M/East. Stay-put – some modif<sup>n</sup>. wanted in Persia Palestine Iraq. Agreed.

d) Telegram fr. Seymour. Can Air Min<sup>y</sup>. and other Service Dpts think again for more help to China. E.g. cd. we swop with American squadrons. S/Air to consider.

L.P.S. The Loan?

A.E. No. What they really want is to have this for post war. We won't do that even for Doms. Seymour is sendg. another telegram on this. We'll reconsider when that is in.

Foreign Affairs.

A.E. Harriman to-day. Pres. had told him to be avail. for any journey. Wd. it be useful for him to go to Cairo and on. Advised him to wire Pres and invite him to wire his views to P.M. – if he favoured it.

L.P.S. Doubt whtr H's contract with Stalin was part<sup>ly</sup> good.

I therefore discouraged it, when P.M. mooted it to me.

Leakage.

A.E. Told Maisky this a.m. Put out. At a loss to explain. Scouted breakg. of cipher (R). He has learned he is not to go back to Moscow for the visit.

S/Doms. P.M. on telephone has said he doesn't want R. visit to be announced publicly.

II Publicity for U.K. Troops.

S/Doms. Troublesome part<sup>ly</sup>. fr. correspondents in theatres of war.

M/Inf. 18 English newsp. correspondence (accredited) in Cairo.

W.O. Their standard said to be low.

M/Inf. Generality are poor.

W.O. These inst<sup>ns</sup>. have bn. sent several times to M/East.

In last 10 days attacks were primarily infantry – and they are mainly Dom. and Indian.

M/Inf. Harm done throughout world to England has bn. incalculable.

Bruce: Both Aust. Press and returned Aust. soldiers have criticised this.

M/Inf. Ban now withdrawn on mention of names of B. requirements. W.O. now giving reasonable facilities. W.O. 6 months' ago.

M/Inf. Content cut of hand-outs fr. Cairo is what matters.

W.O. D.P.R. W.O. has exhorted the Press many times on this point.

L.P.S. Then cd. someone go out & try to straighten this out.

M/P. The D.P.R's job in Cairo is impossible. He's always wrong. Only way is to leave it to the offl. communiqués on one hand and on the other to

journalists alone. Cover in offl. communiqués the point about U.K. troops – by instructions – and leave the background to the unaided efforts of the journalists.

M/Inf. I will be content if U.K. troops mentioned in communiqués. Then I will hound the journalists out of the Cairo base and go seek inform<sup>n</sup> I can then stop them fr. hanging about for background from DPR talk in Cairo.

Also – the good journalists are all in the Army.

Took note.

### III Use of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in Services.

L.P.S. I can re-assure Cabinet on this.

Nash. P.10 Para 22 – despatch of feeble-minded men to M/East. Last quarter of 1941. This was preposterous. General feeling (strong) in agreement.

L.P.S. No selection technique applied to drafts?

W.O. No. But if selection is on its legs, they won't get into (or stay in) Army.

S/Doms. Selection for drafts. W.O. to consider how it cd. be tightened up.

M/L. Welcome report. Pleased so long as this is kept under control.

W.O. On Appendix, my advisers think too heavily loaded on the conservation side.

Wd. prefer that this shd. be left for discussion.

L.P.S. These were suggestions of Mellanby and Jameson.

A.V.A. My people think these selections v. bad – fr. pt. of view of working together. Great deal of controversy between Bartlett and Lewis v. service psychologists.

S/Air. I think L.P.S. mistaken in think<sup>g</sup> Services cdn't agree.

Agreed – subject to reconsid<sup>n</sup> of Appendix by L.P.S. & Service Ministers.

### IV Supplies to Russia. Statement in Parliament.

A.V.A. Circulated revised draft.

A.E. Omit para 2 of Note for Supplementaries – if possible. Agreed.



Ch. Whip. Unlikely to bring an opportunity for Shinwell to raise this on Adjournment.

Otherwise – agreed.

I. India – Possible Action against Congress. (- part heard).

a) Considering some form of deport<sup>n</sup> fr. India (Gandhi) wh. will not involve risk to his life.

Destination?

L.P. Prob. best solution to take him to Aden first – by sea. Agreed.

b) Deportation or not?

L.P. I favour deport<sup>n</sup> because I don't believe Govt. of India will be strong enough to hold him if he hunger-strikes in custody in India.

If those (30-40) who hunger struck in Andamans had bn. doing so in Bengal, this pos<sup>n</sup> wd. be v. much more difficult.

I am confirmed in my view by what Viceroy now says about letting him out.

Simon. Then? say to Govt. of India you think you must hold him even if he does hunger-strike. Will you be able to? Hence recommend deport<sup>n</sup> now.

L.S.A. Can you force Govt. of India to agree in advance to hold him even if he does h. strike?

L.P.S & S/Doms with W.O. Disagreed.

A.E. a) you must act. b) C. and Mouse – nonsense c) that being so, better surely to take him off now, out of India. We cd. say that to Viceroy now.

L.P. If you get G. away before he h-strikes, good chance the others won't do it. If he starts the others much likelier to follow his example.

Agreed - a) No C. & Mouse : no release fr. detention once he gets in, even tho' he hunger-strikes  
b) Tell Viceroy in our view better to take him out of India f.with – to Aden by sea.

L.S.A. The other 15/20 leaders?

L.P. & W.O. They don't matter if you get G. out.

L.P.S. From publicity pt. of view doubtful if wise to isolate G.

L.P. Take ½ doz. to Uganda by air – Agreed.

Simon. Send response. offr. with him. )  
 ) Agreed.  
Avoid phrases prison and Deport<sup>n</sup> . )

L.P.S. Publicity – Declare support of Executive Council.  
Make it clear only beginning of big scheme – publish documents.

A.E. Wd. like to notify U.S. Govt. & China in advance.

L.P.S. Send details of our plan to President. – Agreed.

M/L. Say we're doing this for sake of United Nations, not Britain only.  
Agreed : Don't tell China in advance.

III Alexandria

L.P. Register essential. But pref. perhaps to do it for some other ostensible purpose.

Telegram approved.

IV Statements about a Second Front

L.P.S. Many letters – Press rep<sup>ves.</sup> approach – sugg<sup>n.</sup> that somethg more shd. be said.

Favour statement of what might be done – on lines discussed in Cab – other day.

S/Doms P.M. said “you can say we are going to have a 2<sup>nd</sup> Front this year”. Some Ministers doubted whtr he said “this year”.

“Agree...urgent task” doesn’t imply decision to do it.

L.P.S. The communiqué is what causes the diffy.

M/L. Wise to say anything before P.M. sees Stalin? Anything said now wd. surely prejudice his talks. Best line surely is to keep quiet.

S/Doms. Public interest a) B. and b) Russian. We wdn’t know how any statement of ours might affect Russian public opinion.

Now it’s only a ques of waiting for a few days – and H/Commons not now sitting.

M/L I told 1.500 delegates of bldg. trade what this bldg. was for. The knowledge that we are moving is seeping through, surely.

Isn’t that the best way of letting people know. Best form of propaganda is to avoid Press like plague and tell people adding that it’s a great secret!

Wait therefore till we get the text out of the P.M. – Stalin talks.

Agreed – await P.M. communiqué – then consider what we say on whole question.

V India

L.P.S. If object to divorce India fr. G.? desirable to say somethg to acknowledge Tej B.... S.... movement. Help to divorce moderates from G. – and distract thoughts from G.

Draft subm<sup>n</sup>. as basis for discussion – handed round.

L.S.A. No use at this stage trying to do anything to help S's movement.

Clear fr. con<sup>ee</sup> with G. tht. he has put off real response to this: and Nehru has said time for this is past.

Congress isn't interested in constitutional ques – only in creating revolut. movemt.

Futile: also bad effect on mod. opinion in India and on Ex. Council. Some members of that Council are beginning to weaken. This wd. tend to make them wobble even more.

Tel. 2315-5. We cdn't make such a move after Congress resol<sup>n</sup>. passed.

Firm action essential now.

Convention of V. agreeing with Ex Council grown rapidly. He must be given every chance of carrying them with him.

L.P. Don't think Sapru cuts any ice. This nd. be taken as sign of weakness on our part.

Acc. to Press. G has said publicly nothg. drastic will follow hard on passg. of resolution.

Prs. he isn't v. sure of his ground – prs. he wants more time to prepare.

W.O. Agree. Save our statement "we wd. support him in any action in agreement with his Council". We must make it clear tht. he must act for good of India, whr. Ex Council can be carried along or not. Some of the Members are certain to run out – But it's his responsibility not the Council's.

M/L. We can give way no further. Too late.

M/P. Agreed.

S/Doms. “

L.P.S. I agree tht. Congress won't accept such overtures.

I agree to strong action v. Congress.

But I suggest this only qua effect on public opinion world-wide as well as India.

For we must not behave as tho' G. = India.

- L.P. Yes. But way to treat Indians at this stage is “polite but firm”. Don’t under-rate their real respect for firmness in Govt.
- L.S.A. Dispose of G. first. Then seek ways of encouraging Sapru.
- W.O. Will S/S. India convey to V. impression tht. time in acting shd. not be lost for sake of carrying Council with him. This can be fought and beaten : but delay at the start may lengthen the struggle.
- L.P. Don’t be overworried by signs of wobble in individuals. They can be nursed into collective firmness.
- L.S.A. Must [not sacrifice to this vital importance of showing firmness and determination in this crisis] to advantage of carrying Council with him. Attach v. great importance to prompt action. Will cable to V. in that sense.
- L.P. Every sympathy with his desire to carry his Govt. with him : but feel sure he will [ ]
- He will have the War Cabinet behind him.
- L.S.A. Pressure for Finance and Home Depts for Indians. None dismissed – continuity preserved – Indianised by increasg. portfolios – no need now to turn out 2 Europeans to appease Congress elements.
- S/Doms. No movement or change in this crisis. Agreed.
- L.S.A. Deport<sup>n</sup> of G. V’s reply to telegram sent last night.
- W.O. This telegram confirms my disquiet in V.’s capacity to govern in such a crisis.
- He is putting too much weight on carrying his Council with him.
- L.P. In this part. ques. you must allow V. to be swayed by his Council’s views. I favoured deport<sup>n</sup> because I doubted capacity of Govt. and India to stand firm. If they give a firm assurance to hold G. even tho’ he h-strikes we must accept their view on deport<sup>n</sup>. But we must get this assurance.
- L.P.S. It’s beyond expediency. For det<sup>n</sup> in India, with all its implic<sup>ns</sup>. will strain the competence of the Council to breakg. point.
- L.S.A. Will G. fast if told in advance tht. he won’t be released if he does?
- W.O. Trouble – because of V.’s weakness.
- Becoming necessary to telegraph to him that he, and not his Council is responsible.

- A.E. Sorry he has taken this decision. But can't overrule him.
- L.P. Yes. Say – we thought deport<sup>n</sup> wd. have made his pos<sup>n</sup>.easier. If he thinks t'other well : but we must ensure tht. he will hold G. in spite of h.strike.
- No Cat and Mouse etc. Agreed – as in EEB's notes.
- VI M: C. Taylor, M.P. Proposed Visit to Middle East
- S/Doms. Taylor M.P. invited by H. Balfour and others at Air Min<sup>y</sup>. to go to M/East to see for himself. Provided he gets P.M.'s consent. Came therefore to me.
- S/Air. Let me investigate.
- S/Doms. Any genl. line about M.P.'s facilities? Shd. then be a general policy?
- W.O. Nothg. moved about distant Fronts. There was one tour to France. But not by self-selection.
- Anyhow, he's a military officer : and shd. get W.O. consent.
- Agreed. S/Air to enquire. Permission must be refused in this case. W'out prejudice to future consid<sup>n</sup> of the genl. case.

Directing A.T.S. to Searchlight Duties. Part heard.

- M/L Anticipated Parly. diff<sup>ies</sup>.
- K.W x/ Do it now : and announce it by Ques when Parlt. re-assembles. Sept. 8.
- M/L. Thought this wd. cause trouble.
- K.W Then you'll have to wait till 8/9.
- L.P. H.O. are directing women to fire-watching, wh. is more dangerous.
- L.P.S. Surely no trouble over this.
- Agreed as at x/.
- W.O. then indicated tht. only small no. wd. be affected betwn. now & Sept. because intake now small.
- S/Doms. Then can't we wait until Sept?
- W.O. None will be on the job by then – tho' some may be being trained.

Liquor Policy in W.Africa

- C.O. Better to distil good stuff than sit back and watch growth of traffic in "hooch".
- Diffy. is Convention. But its object was to ensure that they get good gin and not too much of it.
- M/L. Wdn't mind if it were a State monopoly.
- C.O. Willing to put that to Govrs. If it all must be done by Govt. action.
- A.E. Willing tht. Convention shd. be breached temporarily.
- Halifax. U.S. were signatories. Will F.O. tell them the reasons?
- A.E. I will tell all the respectable signatories.
- Find out what French and Belgians and Portuguese are doing about this : and then try to concert a common policy.
- S/Doms. S. African gin?



- C.O. v. high class : not potath by W. Africans : no interference now with their importing it, but they can only sell it to Europeans and the v. richest W. Africans.
- Nash. You cd. keep inside the Convention if you manufactured outside W. Africa and imported it. E.g. if S. Africa were willing to distil a cheaper gin. (Not much enthusiasm for this).
- India.
- L.S.A. Little offl. news of trouble, save rioting in Bombay Residency. Police only tho' they used revolvers. Press however report troops called in (Bombay).
- Sugg<sup>d</sup>. to Govt/India limitation on cables to U.K. – detailed stuff. War Cab thought might be applied also to U.S.A. L.S.A. invited to suggest further damping down of sensational message.
- Halifax. Balance of evils. Dang to give imp<sup>n</sup> in U.S. tht. we are hushing up. Cdn't Govt/India damp them down by persuasion.
- Imperial Conference – War Conference
- S/Doms. Telegram fr. P.M. tht. Smuts likely to come here early Sept. : suggest therefore Imp War Cab. discussions, and get Curtin etc.
- All Dom. P.M.'s.
- Nash. Fraser will be in U.S.A. next week. Buit has to return N.Z. 16/9. to open Parl.
- Possible tht. opening might be deferred.
- Bruce. Curtin not intendg. to go to U.S. just yet. But wd. try for this.
- S/Doms. Will wire all P.M.'s suggesting early Sept.
- L.S.A. Two Indian rep<sup>ves.</sup> due 8-10<sup>th</sup> Sept.
- U.S. Forces.
- L.P.S. What is being done about social side?
- M/Inf. All Vol Soc<sup>ies.</sup> under one hat. Likely to get sensible organ<sup>ion.</sup> going before Winter.
- They will segregate blacks. Contingents of negresses comg. to care for them.
- Under weigh – tho' late in the day.

- W.O. F. Stewart at work on some of this. M/Inf. asked to get into touch with him.
- M/Inf. Liaison with W.O. and Air Min<sup>y</sup> will be arranged.
- M/Inf to refer to L.P. if he finds diff<sup>ies</sup>.
- Diff<sup>ies</sup>. about black troops. M/Inf. feared still more wd. come (up to 200,000).
- Bruce undertook to ask experience of black troops in Australia.
- India. Gandhi.
- L.S.A. Viceroy consulted Govrs. on W. Cab. view. Their views (with one exception) are strongly against allowg. G. to starve to death.
- L.P. Don't talk about jail. When in prison clear oblig<sup>n</sup> on govrs officers etc. to look after. When under detention, obli<sup>n</sup> is v. different.
- L.S.A. Punjab - favours release when dangerous.  
 Bihar - less bitter if he dies outside.  
 Bombay - grave polit. blunder to let him die in detent<sup>n</sup>. In Bombay we shd. then have few friends in any class of community.
- C.P. Local reactions most unfavourable – no friends in India.
- Hartley (vice Wavell) No effect on Moslems. Some on Hindu o.ranks. The offr. class as a whole wd. be v. critical.
- Assam. Similar view.  
 Sindh. Only one to take opposite view.
- Viceroy “can't disregard this unanimity of Govrs. Attach part. import<sup>ce</sup> to Lumley's view”.
- W.O. Viceroy told us everyone was against deport<sup>n</sup>. Hallett's telegram shows not only tht. he favours deport<sup>n</sup>, but also tht. he was not consulted on that point. H. being one of the few Govrs. who has had experience of Civil disstb<sup>ce</sup>
- Halifax. Wd. have no doubt myself tht. it wd. be mistake to let him die in detent<sup>n</sup>.
- Whatever the disadvantages of letting him out, his death in detent<sup>n</sup> wd. be worse.
- L.S.A. Wd. like to wait for Viceroy's final opinion.

L.P.                   What you must do is to prevent G. fr. carrying on his campaign. Therefore no greater degree of detent<sup>n</sup> than is necessary for that purpose. Shd. be possible to devise some method of detent<sup>n</sup> wh., while securing that object, will leave on others the responsibility for his health etc. And much to be said for arranging that now – before he starts to hunger strike – at least don't wait till he is so ill that he has to be moved.

W.O.                   I wd. leave him to die where he is – i.e. at Poona where he is in a Palace not a prison.

S.Doms.               It is up to Viceroy to tell us how he proposes to meet the L.P's condition.

Put that condition to him and ask him how he will meet it.

I Provision of Aircraft for the War at Sea. Part heard.

- S/Air. Bomber Command is shortest of all for aircraft.
- M/L. Someone shd. deal with (c) in memo.
- L.P.S. Sinclair means (b) is not a priority.
- S.Air. Aircraft don't exist is satisfy all.
- L.P. a.b and c. over-simplify. Bound to be some switching.
- M/L & L.P.S. Not prep<sup>d</sup>. to reach concl<sup>n</sup>. on these data.
- S/Doms. We need facts to support S/Air view tht. bombing of Germany is over-riding priority.
- L.P.S. This paper says we are sacrificing minimum needs for bombing.
- S.Air. This puts too much emphasis on minimum.
- L.P.S. Report of Brendan & Slessor – was it to same effect.
- M/T. Need whole picture, including wastage rates. But deprecate automatic removal fr. (c) to (b).
- L.P. Paper showing what aircraft used for (c) wh. cd. be used for (b) and showg. why not diverted.
- After mtg. a & b, how are aircraft under (c) being utilised.
- S/Doms. EEB formula and wastage. Agreed.
- Bruce. Para 19. Further parts on this – what types dealt with, and why not others. Agreed.

II Burma

- S/Doms. Can't reach decisions, but wd. like to hear Govr.
- D.Smith. Returng. tomorrow to Simla: wd. like some genl. guidance.
- Great debt to Burma because we cdn't defend them. Plight of peasants – who will suffer everythg. save starvation. Future – economic and political – uphill road.
- Country in trouble before war. Poverty (esp. Upper Burma). Little chances for emplt. for Burmese, either in Indian or European firms.

Debt – rural moneylenders. Constant hostility betwn. Burmese and Indians: almost worst features of all. Completely corrupt politics. These are the abuses we want to tackle on our return.

Period of direct rule after our return so tht. we can build new Burma on more solid foundations. Economic reforms – abolition of moneylenders (38% is lowest rate of interest now!) – medical services – education (essential if there is to be any form of Democratic Govt) – legal code. These things cd. not be carried through by the Burmese themselves. During the last days, when honesty supervened, the Burmese Ministers admitted this to me.

Want on my return to begin thinking out a plan. So tht. when we get back to Rangoon we shall know what we want and how we propose to seek it.

L.P. Worth while considering appt<sup>mnt.</sup> of Comm<sup>n</sup> in interim period vice appear to re-introduce G. Col. Govt. This wd. enable you to associate some Burmese, in more than advisory capacity.

Govr. as Chairman with 4 or so Members incldg. 2 Burmans

L.P.S. What about includg. Americans and Chinese?

A.E. Difficult internationally to appear to go back to direct rule. You don't really want to go back.

M/P. Philippine model. Direct rule + definite time limit.

M/L. Shdn't firms be called upon to make greater contrib<sup>n</sup> to welfare of Burmans.

We shd. conserve mineral and other assets for benefit of inhabitants.

D.S. Propose to go into this.

M/P. Bevin's sugg<sup>n</sup>. is fantastic. The big firms have made the largest contribution.

Agreed. Authorise D.S. to study and work up programme for submission at a later stage to War Cabinet as specific proposals. D.S. to enlist services of experts on this study.

### III India.

M/L. Labour Party, tho' in genl. support of Govt. policy, are disturbed by Press rpts of proposal to use c. punish<sup>mnt.</sup>

L.S.A. Lumley has re-introduced this Ordinance in Bombay. No offl. inform<sup>n</sup>.

May be only one provision in the code – and no intention to use it specially.

L.P.S. V. unfortunate publicity. Can't Viceroy handle the Press more intelligently.

L.S.A. 3 telegrams already sent : no answer.

S/Doms. Find out what is attitude of Govt/India twds. control over Press.

Say Govt. take v. serious view : bldg. up misleadg. picture.

Also see Editors here, in consult<sup>n</sup>: M/Inf<sup>n</sup>.

Find out about Whipping Ordinance.

I Russian Warships and Merchant Ships in Black Sea

[Malta Convoy – latest news

Yesterday. By 6p.m. Eagle sunk

36 Spitf. flown into Malta – carrier ret<sup>d</sup>. Gib.

1 merchant vessel hit.

6.40p.m. Air attack. Hudson hit by bomb.

Destroyer damaged – ret<sup>d</sup>. Gib.

8.30p.m. C.Bon U-Boat. Damaged Nigeria : turned back to Gib.

Cairo torpedoed and sunk by us.

9.15p.m. Kenya torpedoed or mined. Prob. turned back.

4 ships of convoy sunk.

10.15p.m. Dencalion believed sunk.

Italian surface force – turned E. and went home.

Today. 4.30a.m.

7.0.a.m. 5 ships + 4 destroyers + 1 ship 20 m. behind with destroyers.

130 miles off Malta at daylight = under Spitfire cover.

But fighter dir<sup>n</sup> will be lacking – RAF ships sunk or damaged.

Out of 14 ships 6 survive – prs. 7.

2 Italian cruisers prob. damaged.

2 U-Boats sunk and 1 probable.

Main losses due to U-Boats + v. heavy attack by E-Boats throughout last night.

If we get 5 ships in, it will give 9 weeks supplies]. (Later ( 7 ships now  
(thru and under  
(fighter cover.)

A.V.A. Considerable Fleet in Black Sea. Acc. to law, nothg. but to have them interned (if R. don't destroy them). V. unlikely tht. Turkey wd. connive at breach of law.

Hence best possibility is the swop sugg<sup>d</sup> in memo.

Submarines might break through.

x/Some months ago we helped them to get 4 out of 5 out. Subject to same cond<sup>ns</sup>. they might do same again.

Some tankers might be Fleet oilers. They wd. have to be "turned" into tankers.

A.E. Approach to R. diff because assumes they will lose last bases.

Turks. R. relations not so good now as x/.

Wd. not encourage R. to run warships thro' because Turk wd. fight. Don't encourage them even about submarines. Tankers we might try. Merchant ships no diffy.

Wd. like therefore to send telegram to Clark Kerr and tell him to discuss with P.M. Terms of draft read.

Wd. repeat telegram to Hugesson and get his comments on Turkish reactions.

Agreed to remind H. of sale of G. U-Boat to Spaniards.

L.P.S. Shd. telegram give impression tht. we favour internment vice destruction?

If we have a preference, we shd. let C. Kerr know what it is.

Halifax. That depends on estimates of Turkish reactions. Prob. more likely to come in our side than theirs. If so, wd. prefer internment.

A.E. Unless it made an extra temptation to Germans to attack Turkey. Or to demand their surrender of the ships.

Halifax. Say to H. "we've come down on side of internment because of our view of likely T. attitude". Get his views on this.

L.P. If you can't add para – indicatg. tht. you believe Turkey wdn't hand over the ships – then are you right in saying internment is better?

A.V.A. Turks wd. surely resist pressure to surrender them.

L.P. They wd. thus put tremendous weapon into G. hands.



- A.E. Wd. sooner see the ships sunk than being ground of controversy.  
Genl. feeling – pref. to sink the warships and run the subs out.  
Agreed. Make it clear tht. politically this wd. be easier course.
- II French Fleet at Alexandria.
- A.E. Disappointed – but agree with conclusion.  
Had hoped that the sailors’ mistresses cd. hold the sailors’ attent<sup>n</sup> while F. French or Americans got possession of the ships.
- S/Doms. Cd Laval’s recent pronouncement be made occasion for protest v. use of w/t for commun<sup>n</sup> to France.
- A.V.A We can’t physically stop them.
- A.E. V. uncomfortable position.
- L.P. But worst poss. pos<sup>n</sup> if we do anythg. implying distrust of G.’s honour.
- III Shipping Situation.
- S/Doms. Concl<sup>ns</sup>. were “provisional”. But action is procdg.; and we cd. regard these concl<sup>ns</sup>. as final.
- L.P. Bread rationing – discussed by L.P. Cttee. who decided against it. Put this on record.
- L.P.S. Yes. But keep it under progress Rpt. to Cabinet. Say in 2 weeks’ time inclgd. reports on cuts in materials imports
- IV India.
- S/Doms. L.S.A. thought time not propitious to see Editors because tone improving.  
Reason to believe now that trouble is mainly Reuters. Prefer to see them.  
Agreed. Easy to deal with them. L.S.A. to see them + or – Bracken.

Press Interviews by Senior Officers Abroad

- M/L. Statements in Sunday pp. by Air.V.M. Lloyd in U.S.
- a) Opportunity to cut Rommel's supplies not taken. Report on this.
  - b) Possibility of taking Tunis.
- Dangerous. Serving offrs. abroad shdn't engage in this sort of talk.
- S/Air. Must know first if mis-reported.
- At home rule now tht. offrs. shan't give interviews w'out permission – M/Inf<sup>n</sup> is co-operatg.
- In this case man at B. Embassy got him to give the talk w'out inf. to Ministers.
- Our rep<sup>ves.</sup> abroad shd. be told not to give such invitations.
- L.P.S. No objection if we had stuck to facts about Malta.
- Agreed. S/Air to obtain full report on what he said, who asked him etc.
- Halifax. Hope no rule tht. servg. offrs. abroad shd. say nothing w'out inf. home.
- E.g. Dill has bn. asked often to speak : I have said "Yes" if I saw brief. The rep<sup>ve.</sup> abroad shd. be in pos<sup>n</sup> to judge w'out reference home, wh. wd. involve delay.
- K.W. Unwise for offrs. to enter "political" arena at all.
- S/Air. Usually arises because asked questions, wh. they are pressed to answer.
- If Hal. sugg<sup>n</sup>. adopted, I don't mind but I can't then take responsibility.
- L.P.S. Diplomatic rep<sup>ves.</sup> don't always know military background.
- Hal. I have Joint Staff Mission to advise me.
- Statements ok – but interviews with Press v. much more objectionable.
- Halifax. Rigid rules about interviews. But give some latitude for set speeches.

- S/Doms. Statements if vetted can be passed by B. rep<sup>ve.</sup> abroad. But no Press interviews.
- Agreed.
- Nash. But young hero types don't have scripts in advance. They just talk. Don't stop them doing that.
- L.P.S. Junior offrs. in diff. pos<sup>n.</sup> Our ruling cd. be limited to senior officers. Exceptions can be made in particular cases – eg Mountbatten – with permission of War Cabinet.
- “Officers who have held high command.”
- Report on Women's Services.
- L.P.S. Sugg<sup>n.</sup> tht. recomm<sup>ns.</sup> have been, or are being, implemented. Can you publish statement of what is being or has been done.
- W.O. Say at publication a great many of recomm<sup>ns.</sup> have been, or are being, carried out.
- Agreed.
- W.O. Will M/Inf. lead Press on disposal of the rumours – vilification.
- M/Inf. Yes. If W.O. will give the hand-out. Agreed.
- M/L. 50. 211/212. Immobile women. I think much more can be done. Cd. some Cttee consider in detail. Agreed – defer till consider merits of Rpt.
- W.O. There is a Cttee wh. will take this in its stride – it is considg. how work in mixed stations can best be divided betwn. A.T.S. soldiers, civilians etc.
- Carlton Hotel as Officers' Club for U.S. Forces.
- L.P. U.S. Auth<sup>ies.</sup> now don't want it. Offrs. as against men.
- Read letter fr. Eisenhower. Action dictated solely by interests of U.S. Forces.
- Took note.
- India.
- a) Situation

- L.S.A. Generally, better. Most serious in Bihar – interference always continuing at Patna and scattered violence.
- Widespread attacks on commun<sup>ns</sup>. indicate premeditated purpose : but results indicate lack of organisation.
- No serious communal trouble so far.
- L.P. Report tht. Police in Bihar are cause for anxiety.
- L.P.S. Publicity in India leadg. to spread of disorder. Can't that be stopped?
- L.S.A. Viceroy is “considering”. War Cab. He seems a bit slow.
- W.O. But really he has decided not to do it. – L.P. agreed.
- Halifax. Introd<sup>n</sup> of Press Ordinance before result in voluntary cessation of public<sup>n</sup> of Nat. Press.
- Then rumours produced an almost worse situation. Prs. Govt/India are thinking of that.
- L.S.A. Give Viceroy time and discretion.
- L.P.S. Press here can play it down – but not to suggest tht. the thing is all over.
- b) Assurance to Viceroy's Council.
- L.S.A. Personal risk wh. members had run.
- Viceroy's approval to draft obt<sup>d</sup>. Since then – amended to meet L.P.S's criticisms.
- Amended draft approved.
- c) Gandhi's Fast.
- L.S.A. No alteration but unconditional release or let him die.
- Neither Govnrs. nor W/C in C. will face second.
- L.P.S. Why not let him out as soon as he begins to fast.
- L.P. This is cont. Let him out when he is likely to die. Who will judge that?
- The M.O. He will take no risks. What inst<sup>ns</sup>. will you give to M.O. – you can't do it. Either responsible professionally or not. He can't accept inst<sup>ns</sup>. v. his prof. discretion. With a man of this age, he will take no risks.

Halifax. Then M.O. will let him go as soon as health goes back.

L.P. It's a mockery then to talk about detaining him until health is in danger.

Halifax. Will you cat and mouse?

L.S.A. Original plan – but War.Cab didn't like it.

Halifax. I wd. in no circs. have G. die on my hands. Re-inforced by Weras? dying.

That being so, wd. leave handling of it to Viceroy. Make up your mind on this fundamental ques.

L.P.S. Once you've made up yr. mind not to keep him to death, let him out the moment he begins to fast.

W.O. Moral of this is tht. our original decision to deport was right.

L.P. Not going v. Viceoy if you accept my view.

My own experience. I've resisted sugg<sup>n</sup>. of inst<sup>ns</sup>. to M.O.

You can say "well hold him whatever happens : you do yr best for him" – he can cope.

But given this situation, M.O. will play for safety.

Unfair to ask M.O. that. Say "Tell us when yr. judgement it is unsafe to keep him".

Doubtful policy to put G. in, if you weren't going to be firm.

V. dangerous to yield to hunger strike.

I wd. put him in a ring fence – but take no responsibility for him or his health. No Govt. M.O. except at G's request. No rules about food. Then I wd. see it thro.

That prop<sup>n</sup> has never bn. put to G/India. This is what I did with Indians in Bengal. Made clear tht. they were responsible. Then let him starve.

W.O. agreed – and wished to be so recorded.

Modified form of internment of "Home domicile" in Bengal. Method well known in India.

W.O. Ques arose when I was in India. Viceroy asked his Council : about Fulla? – who said people in India wd. soon get over his death.

L.S.A. L.P.'s prop<sup>n</sup> wdn't meet obj<sup>ns</sup>.

S/Doms. Agreed with L.P. K.W. and L.S.A. leaned twds. the Viceroy.

L.P. Effect of G. dying wd. be considerable, in my view.

Halifax. Tell Viceroy we don't like his S. telegram. Put L.P.'s proposal to him. We wd. withdraw – our only cond<sup>n</sup> being prevent<sup>ion</sup> of his revolutionary courses.

Agreed.

d) Whipping Ordinance.

L.S.A. Telegram fr. Lumley. Acts v. useful – welcomed by large sections of community.

Sparingly used – 39 cases in 9 wks riot.

Riot, g.b.h. and only.

1) Asked to find out nature of the instrument.

M/Inf. Why did Lumley broad-cast?

L.P.S. 2) Issue some re-assuring statement.

Agreed – 1) and 2)

L.P. Hope they won't do any whipping. Agreed. (Convey that impression (to Viceroy. i.e. Don't (withdraw, but don't use. (Strong caution against.

c) Continued

W.O. Will it be most clear in telegram tht. we attach importance to G. not winning or scoring by fast. Issue is whtr. G/India or G. are going to win.

Express grave disquiet about this risk.

North American Supplies.

Took note of W.P. (42)353.

M: Nash.

Expressions of farewell.

I. Service Pay & Allowances.

- K.W. Debate line – people want to put views, let'em. Govt. W.Paper laid because matters wh. Govt think House shd. know. At end promise consider and announce decision later.
- Conservatives – division of opinion likely.
- S/Air. No comment.
- L.P.S. V. dangerous document – will provoke demands for increase. Shows soldier much lower paid than industrial and p.u. workers.
- K.W. You are comparing raw recruit with worker who has bn. in industry for long time.
- L.P.S. Wrong to make the comparison at all. Confine to statement of Serviceman's pos<sup>n</sup>.
- K.W. Face fact tht. comparison has bn. and will be made. This puts it in proper perspective.
- L.P.S. The nearer the comparison the greater the danger. Close enough to provoke argument that the narrow gap shd. be closed. Put fwd. the facts, w'out comparison : and don't therefore imply tht. comparison can properly be made. Only true comparison is what spending money has each left.
- L.P. i.e. purpose of Paper is to show what wd. be comparative consolidated rate incldg. all emoluments if he were in civilian life. This is the equivalent of an income of x in civil life.
- W.O. Necessary to bring out diff<sup>ces</sup>. in system – e.g. differential pay of married man. “No comparison can fairly be made” vice “consider before comparison is made”.
- Bruntisfield. 1<sup>st</sup> Lord shared view of L.P.S. Promise of W.Paper has excited expectations in Fleet : avoid therefore giving for material for argument.
- K.W. Remarkable that, when last addition made to pay, Admy. said no occasion for it.
- Then, a few weeks ago, Admy. asked for increases for offr. and nothing for men.
- Then they heard W.O. suggestg. another 1/= a day,



Then suddenly Admy. find Fleet v. much disturbed by announcement of W.Paper and advocate increased pay for ratings!

- H.O. Repercussions on C.D. pay. We have rejected industrial analogy : and stuck to cash value of emoluments of married soldier + 1 child. If you prove your case for Army pay too well, C.D. will ask for more! Wd. like further chance to consider W.Paper.
- S/Doms. W.Paper shd. not appear to make out a case. Factual & objective.
- Cranborne. Offr. class “specially favoured” in income tax.
- K.W. Modify wording to avoid that.
- L.P.S. Benefit of pensions not mentioned.
- W.O. Other than regulars, don’t get any save disability.
- L.P.S. Cheap goods at N.A.A.F.I.
- L.P. Mention them as further indications tht. you can’t make precise calculations.
- Halifax. Last para. to foot of p.3.
- K.W. this has bn. done already.
- K.W. Let me re-cast, in consult<sup>n</sup>. with H.O. and L.P.S. Service Ministers to see final version. Publish end of next week. Agreed.
- W.O. Tactics in debate. Shd. we not make up our minds in advance.
- K.W. Better, as they want to air views, to listen.
- H.O. But Govt. is losing its initiative then. Promise to consider will surely mean concessions. Sooner you make up your mind and say so, the better.
- S.Air. If we are going to make a concession, K.W.’s tactics are right. Otherwise, not.
- Generally agreed – decide before Debate whtr. concession is to be made.
- W.O. If you make it, do it on pay not by fiddling with allowances.
- K.W. Then Cab.Cttee at once.
- Ch.Whip. Agree tht. if we aren’t going to consider concession, better say so at once.

Bruntisf<sup>d</sup>. Our pos<sup>n</sup>. has been changed because of rise in mercantile marine pay.

L.P.S. You will never get this right w'out having a wages policy – for rest of war.

H.O. Ques of policy on Service pay to go to L.P. Cttee? Agreed.

II Participation of de Gaulle in Preparations for Operations in France.

A.E. Troublesome - no ideal solution.

We are agreed a) F.F. to be assoc<sup>d</sup>. in admin<sup>n</sup>. in Madagascar.

b) F.F. not to be used at all in Torch.

Sorry they know so much about it. Heard from Bullitt and ques fr. Phillips (U.S. Embassy).

France itself: The more you interest de G. in this, the easier to keep him out of Torch. I therefore wd. recommend fullest practicable use of him in round-up and SOE Met. France – as a way of keeping him out of Torch.

I wdn't have as much hope as C.O.S. of Vichy Army.

C.O.S. W.P. 349. para 2. Re-considered.

(1) true of Army: but now agree to return of Air Force.

(2) C.I.G.S. has talked to de G. about co-ordin<sup>n</sup>. of sabotage etc. with plans: expl<sup>d</sup>. tht. S.O.E. is general staff for this. We wd. like S.O.E. to go on co-ordinatg. & be the link with us.

Selbourne. de G. has no secret organis<sup>n</sup>. in France. Various units workg. on their own use him as symbol. We will go on co-operatg. with him. But don't want to hand this over to him in France because he has no organisation there.

S/Doms. Long-term position.

A.E. Don't know wht. de G's. l.term pos<sup>n</sup>. will be after Torch.

L.P.S. Diff<sup>ies</sup>. with French popul<sup>n</sup>. if 2 diff organis<sup>ns</sup>. workg. in parallel w'out co-ordination.

Selborne. Many independent groups wh. come to life independently – & use de G. only as symbol.

Pursue sugg<sup>n</sup>. of working Cttee to key in with de G.

- L.P.S. Tho' not now, de G. will soon be working a separate organisation of his own.
- S. Germans can break organ<sup>n</sup> in France much more easily than in Norway.
- A.E. Consider closer co-ordination – S.O.E. being channel for contact with C.O.S.
- S. We must maintain our non de G. contacts – wh. he wants us to repudiate.
- C.O.S. (4) in para 2. Still feel v. dangerous to let F.F. HQ to know plans. But no ob<sup>in</sup> to de G. being assoc<sup>d</sup> with plans for administration in France.
- W.O. U.S. if they command shd. be responsible for admin<sup>n</sup>. And the U.S. rep<sup>ve</sup> on x/ our Cttee takes view tht. de G. shd. not be in.
- A.E. Tendency for U.S. politicians is to encourage de G. overmuch.
- L.P. x/ is an impossible view.
- S. We expect bitter civil strife in France when Boche goes. Our contacts are with the people who have bn. sitting on the fence.
- A.E. Surely you cd. keep yr. Vichy contacts quite separate from yr. organisation in occupied France.
- W.O. On (4) dilemma. In military occupied territory source of auth<sup>y</sup> is military commander, whose object will be to restore civil Govt. In France, there is no constituted Govt. to restore – as in Holland or Belgium.
- L.P.S. Isolate occupied fr. unoccupied France for S.O.E. and admin<sup>n</sup> purpose. And broadly, bring de G. in on former while excluding him fr. latter.
- S and S/Doms. Not so simple. Unoccupied is base for work in occupied Fr.
- A.E. 3 (admin<sup>n</sup>) – postpone till after Torch.  
2 S.O.E. S.I.S. etc., Bring him in for occupied Fr., and leave ourselves a freer hand with unoccupied.  
1 Operations. What do C.O.S. say?
- C.A.S. We cdn't disclose until late stage, for security reasons.

- L.P. What wd. you say to him. Afraid of their flying off the handle if told nothing. Wd. prefer to tell them outline and put them on honour not to disclose.
- V.C.I.G.S. They know we have plans. We can say v. little w'out going into some detail.
- Any detail passed on to people at de G. HQ. is gone – no security at all.
- If we begin and then have to refuse to go further into detail, we are worse off than ever.
- S/Doms. Can you bring him in as technical expert – eg on tanks?
- W.O. Adding insult to injury.
- L.P.S. Can't keep him fr. knowing what we are at, can you?
- V.C.I.G.S. Apart fr. Bulitt, yes.
- A.E. I think he knows already.
- But I wd. be ready to rely on 2 for time being and hold up 1 to 3 until after Torch.
- My problem is to prevent an explosion when he hears about Torch.
- L.P.S. What is ob<sup>ins.</sup> to 3?
- W.O. It runs back into 1. Also U.S. have the lead on this.
- S/Air. After Torch you really can't keep him out of prep<sup>ns.</sup> on Round-up.
- S/Doms. Imposs. to give him inf. about op<sup>r.</sup> plans far in advance.
- Imposs. to keep him out of consid<sup>n.</sup> of admin<sup>ve.</sup> problems.
- Needs looking into.
- Halifax. Can't discuss oper<sup>n.</sup> plans.
- Can talk to him about S.O.E. activities. Explore and discuss: & gain time.
- Admin<sup>n.</sup> – discuss with him principles on hypothesis not plans.
- Principle – gain time, talk, tell him nothg. about plans.

L.P. Fact tht. C-in-C is American citizen does not mean that the source of all judicial power is American. He is i/c on behalf of U.Nations.

W.O. V.well. Then my ob<sup>jn</sup>. still stands because the Americans take this line. I'm not saying its not our affair : I'm saying only tht. it may be diff. to carry U.S. Army with us on this point.

Agreed. Approach U.S. Govt. on 3 and get their consent (F.O.).

A.E. Beware of developments after Torch. Someone else may come fwd.

L.P. Courted trouble by keeping de G. at arms length.

Agreed - (Do 2 and 3 (subject to U.S. consent)  
( Leave 1 above.

#### Death Sentences in Belfast.

S/Doms. 6 men condemned to death in Belfast for shooting policeman. Appeal now pending.

Rep<sup>ves</sup>. from Eire and U.S. Govt.

Have we any views? Ordinarily p. of mercy is for Govr. N/Ireland: but clause in instructions tht. he personally with advice of his Ministers shd. consider any case in wh. national interest involved.

L.P. Only one precedent. Prison wardens in Londonderry Gaol killed by accident in an escape. G/N.Ireland favoured execution. Fitzalan instr<sup>ed</sup>. by HMG. tht. on political grounds he must recommend reprieve and did so.

L.P. Intent<sup>n</sup>. of inst<sup>ns</sup>. – enable Govr. who ordinarily is constitutional sovereign bound act advice Ministers, to exercise personal discretion. Not intended to put Govr. in pos<sup>n</sup>. that he mut do what U.K. Ministers advise. He must take a/c advice fr. N.I. Minister : but he carries a personal responsibility too. He is not bound to take advice of U.K. Ministers.

Put to test in Fitzalan's case. It was rep<sup>d</sup>. v. strongly to him tht. larger interests of Empire cd. only be served by reprieve. After much anxiety, he decided himself to follow that advice, or take that view.

S/Doms. We cannot therefore avoid considering tendering our advice.

H.O. If a case arises when Empire or foreign cons<sup>ns</sup>. are involved, Govr. must take them into a/c and we may wish to give him our views.

Does this case come w'in that category? Eire and U.S. raised ques : but doesn't follow that we are obliged to give advice.

Gang violence – policeman was Catholic, brave man, awarded Police medal.

Eire bound politically to raise it. If we don't give way to him, doubt if anything will happen.

U.S. man only conveyed to us rep<sup>ns.</sup> by Eire Minister. Without comment.

But if we advise contrary to N.I.Govt. trouble.

My view therefore is tht. likelihood of repercussions not such as to require our intervention.

Seriousness of gang murder.

War Cab. shd. not ask me to intervene at all. Not a case of the character wh. calls for any intervention by U.K. Ministers.

S/Doms. I am told

- a) promiscuous shooting.
- b) we don't shoot 6 men for 1 death in this country.
- c) bound to have trouble in Eire if we don't reprieve; and some influence in U.S.
- d) U.S. troops in N.Ireland, whose Govt is not judicially minded.

A.E. I went thro' this over Coventry murder. And I will now admit I was in the wrong. There was no trouble in Eire, or America.

L.P. Gave particulars of Coventry case.

On ques of ( Never bn. practice of H.O. to reduce no. hanged by  
6 people (reason smallness no. killed  
killing one (Might discriminate on basis of degree of complicity.

Agreed. – insufficient grounds to intervene. Shd. be stated in terms of “Ministers here” or Cabinet – not personal responsibility as in case of murder in U.K.

Middle East: Division of Command.

C.A.S. C.O.S. considered. Welcome unity of Air Command. On splitting Army Command nothing to add to views exp<sup>d</sup> to W.Cab on 7/8.

V.C.I.G.S. Welcome Wilson's appointment.

S/Doms. We can only endorse – Agreed therefore S/Doms to telegraph accordingly.

V.C.I.G.S. Estimated strength of Rommel's forces.

C.A.S. About 100 up on us in aircraft – but some are Italian.

L.P.S. Times article today – ill judged. Can't Press be given guidance? – Cd. we not have more time to prepare ground for the new appointments.

Ismay. M/Inf. did see Editors before announcement re Auchinleck.

Agreed – M/Inf. to see Times Editor.

Ismay to handle this – via Radcliffe – or by seeing B.Ward himself.

Ismay to do it if B. Bracken is not available.

Add to telegram to P.M. ( Assume you will arrange for synchronised announcement. We ( shd. have 24 hours' notice.

P.M's Journey.

S/Doms. Announced P.M.'s return. No one to be told until arrival in U.K. Then other Ministers, High Commrs. Winant and Maisky. In advance War Cabinet : C.O.S.

I India.

L.S.A. Unoffl. advisers in s.93 Provinces.

Latest telegram 2558-5.

Hence not worth discussing all Govr's views known. Agreed.

Tendency to suggest Govr. Genl. in Council shd. exercise greater influence in Provinces.

Undesirable to encroach on Prov. autonomy in name of Indianisation.

Assam will now return to democratic govt.

General Situation.

Looks better. Even in Bihar (now the only centre of trouble) improvement in most parts – tho' still anxiety in some areas.

Loyalty of Police (except in Bihar) striking.

S/Doms. 5<sup>th</sup> Column not Congress?

L.S.A. Telegram – some movements unlike Congress inspired. May be engineered by forces directly by enemy. Money behind it – prominence of students – (tho' Moslem students have held aloof).

M/L. Need for labour policy for India in present stage. Political strikes because only people organising labour are politicians. Standard of life too low for state of production. Viceoy shd. consider development of social, industrial policy for India.

eg. Indian seamen : paid less than Chinese. Obstacle to improvement = big business in India. Insurance contributions paid into pool for B. Seamen : if they wd. run an Indian scheme, we cd. let them have the contrib<sup>ns</sup>. in respect of labour.

L.S.A. On seamen, M/L. M/W/T. and I.O. considering pos<sup>n</sup> now – hope something will emerge.

L.P.S. A good man shd. be sent out to India.



- M/L. Looking into that now.
- S/Doms. Cabinet to have a report on progress.

Gandhi

- L.P. Viceroy in recent telegram S. – strongly in favour of letting G. starve to death : + added all Moslem members of Council wd. take same view. Yet at the same time decision we were assured that all opinion was solid against that.

This was a relevant point on wh. Cab shd. have had information at the time. We are told now: but not told at the time of decision.

Gave us a partial opinion – without telling us it was a partial opinion. Disturbing.

- L.P. Intelligence in India shd. be able to find out whtr. anything more behind the disorders – eg. attempt to cut Bihar off. Important that, if this is so, we should show it up and make full use of it.

II Machinery of Government.

- L.P.S. Re-consider in light of war experience and post-war needs.

Small cttee – L.P. in Chair – co-opting as necessary - report to Cabinet and decide then whether publication is advisable.

- K.W. “Other central auth<sup>ies.</sup>” in + t of r.

- L.P.S. Semi-Govt. Dpts : not local govt. except in relation to central govt.

- S/Doms. Civil Service.

- L.P.S. Yes. “machinery and management.”

- M/L. Distribution of functions?

- L.P.S. Yes

- L.P. Haldane Cttee procedure inappropriate for domestic ques. such eg as super Ministers.

Hence liberty to call in outsiders but not giving them responsibility and not necessarily publish all the results.

Merits - agreed.  
Procedure - agreed better to do it “domestically”. Against “outside” bodies.

Too much work?

L.P. Slowly : and skilled Secretariat.

Method in memo. agreed. Personnel to be decided by P.M. Either 3 or 5 : smaller the better.

## II Parliamentary Business.

S/Doms. Shd. Parlt. meet earlier than 8/9. now that P.M. is back; for statement by him.

General feeling – public content to wait and give P.M. a rest.

Ch.Whip. Heard nothing. Press don't now expect it. P.M. averse from it. "He wd. have little to add".

S/Doms. Then hope P.M. won't broadcast.

Ch.Whip. When return known, put out idea that he shd. have a rest.

Programme – agreed as last year. Meet and sit 1 week : adjourn 2 weeks clear : then clear up outstanding business : and a few days recess before new Session.

## IV Foreign Affairs.

A.E. Argentine Amb. visit to-day. Diff. pos<sup>n</sup> in view of Brazil's declaration. "If Brazil wants us in they had better ask for our help". i.e. better way than U.S. bullying us in.

Foreign Affairs

A.E. Visit fr. Turk Amb. fear of pressure on Turks – if R. fall back in south. Emphasised lack of armaments – when wd. be able to supply them. We had taken American supplies en route for Turkey. Particularly, need anti-tank guns.

2½ pdrs.

C.I.G.S. Short of these for Iraq Persia front.

Cd. P.M. see the Ambassador?

P.M. Yes.

Talks with Stalin.

P.M. 4 mtgs. nil to add to a/c circulated. But opinion – large man : great sagacity. Expl<sup>d</sup> some past mysteries. Pre-war misleadg, of our Missions etc. because certain B. didn't intend war – wd. frame-up with French. Confirmed by our offers – F. 80 Divns. B. 3 Divns. Sure H. wasn't bluffing. At Munich an effort might have bn. made after tht. nil with our offered strength.

When Molotov there in June '40 you raided Berlin. Ribbentrop took him to shelter.

Effect on M. of his visit here has bn. permanent – never stops smiling – now thought in Russia to have a B. orientation, whereas of old he had a German orientation.

Public statement.

If battle in next few days, will broadcast on that – swing in some references to these other matters. If not, then I will wait until Parlt. re-assembles.

Stalin did not exaggerate his plight in order to exploit or extort help from us.

S/Doms. Expressed gratitude of War Cab. to P.M. for his great efforts.

P.M. Shah of Persia – v. good impression : thought well of him.

Khedir – didn't care for him. Liked Nahas Pasha.

Reference to need for Thermantidote (!) to keep our rep<sup>ves.</sup> cool in hot climates.

Will send telegram to Stalin tonight, thanking him.

Air Service to to M/East.

P.M. Everyone wants better services, but what is the cost?

C. V. old problem – Nov '41 – Air Min<sup>y</sup> were doing their best  
(from 12.000lb. a month April '42  
16.000lb. Sept etc.

When 14.000 lbs total, G.P.O. wanted 7.000 lbs. Serv. dpts. said impossible

Failing agreement. asked C.O.S. to fix priorities – they preferred urgent freight to mails.

S/Air. Promised 14.000 to end Aug. and then 16.000.

Average already 16.500 in last weeks – in spite of great diff<sup>ties.</sup>  
Boeings and Whitleys.

Better than our promise already. But wd. like to do still more.  
Recognises morale point.

Now considering (a) taking 1 Sunderland from production a month  
(out of 7 a month) for 6 months beginning Oct.

(b) (reluctantly) taking Warwicks (6000 lbs. for 800 mile range) –  
10/12 might be provided – at expense of Bomber Command. 2/3 in  
Sept rising to 10/12 over next few months.

Result: from 16.500 – increase by 10.000 by end of year.

P.M.G. Substantial increase in aircraft capacity – already – but no increase in  
allocation of space for mails. That static for 2 years. Thin p.c. +  
airgraph not enough in view of Commrs. Demand for sealed air letter  
(bd. a time). But I need 6.000 lbs. to start it. No prospect, not only of  
gettg. that, but even of maintg. p.c.s & airgraphs.

4.000 lbs. had recently to go by sea to W. Africa and then on by air.  
1.500 lbs. will have to go in end Aug.

Army grows and little chance of maintaining existg. facilities, still less  
provide more.

Feb '42 p.c. load = 953 lbs. a week) Due to increase in Army  
Last week “ = 3.106 “ “ ) strengths

- M/L. If capacity is to be raised by 10.000 lbs. can't you get some of yr. extra 6.000 lbs?
- W.O. But he must have a large and steady allotment before he can start a new venture.
- P.M.G. More than allocation – absolute shortage of capacity. I can't ask for priority over tank spares.
- S/Air. We can put extra stuff on for special crises for eg. tank spares.
- P.M. Matter of high military importance to ensure that the Army gets its letters.
- Let Coastal Command and Bomber Command (1:2) provide the aircraft needed.
- Morale of that Army must be maintained.
- A.V.A. Crises of U-Boat war a bad time for me to give up even one more aircraft.
- P.M. See what can be done. And remember this is a military objective. The men's minds are more important than their bodies.
- Reading matter (by sea).
- P.M.G. I want 6.000 lbs. a week on a definite basis.
- S/Air. I accept that ruling – if we can work up fr. Oct. onwards.
- P.M. (1) Mandate to produce a scheme for 6.000 lbs. a week to start in a month. If the cost is shown to be too great, we'll re-consider. But vital military objective.
- (2) W.O. to submit scheme for reading matter. Includg. re-printing in Cairo.

Air Raid Damage

H.O. High level – single bomb attack. B'tol. 48 killed – much damage  
Swindon 8 killed – 6 seriously injured

P.M. Importance of avoiding announcement indicatg. results. Why not mix up announcements.

H.O. No casualties issued. Will look into ques of giving it away because buses.

China

A.E. Air Instructors sent. Parl<sup>y</sup>. Mission (2 M.P.'s + 2 Peers) are being sent. This will help.

P.M. Why send 2 good men away for 3 months?

A.E. They will do good. They were chosen by Speaker. Ch. Whip knows.

L.P.S. Announcement in Press today tht. R.A.F. will be there. Looked official. Whence came it?

M/Inf. Promised to enquire.

S/Air. Renewed rep<sup>ves.</sup> sent to Peirse.

A.E. Groundstaff already there – doing nothing – bad impression.

P.M. Favoured sendg. a squadron.

S/Air. – considering only wthr. it can be done.

I am in favour of it, if practicable.

P.M. Renewed his protest v. Parly. mission : and indicated tht. he wd. like at least to be consulted in advance before anything like this is done again!

Loan to China.

A.E. Think C/E is right. Can't be pressed further.

India.

Gandhi starving.

L.S.A. Viceroy's latest telegram – L.P.'s suggested conditions seem acceptable to Viceroy.

- L.P.S. Put the issue as it presented itself previously to Cabinet. Issue = who is to be responsible for his health and welfare.
- K.W. Against letting all his friends visit him.
- L.S.A. Showing no signs so far of wanting to starve.
- P.M. Indian show-down v. satisfactory. Recruiting v. favourable. Congress shown unable to move the masses – a great flop. They have come out as a revolutionary movement : influenced or working with Japanese : and have failed. Shows that Congress don't represent India – only Congress caucus and Hindu priesthood.
- L.S.A. Tell U.S.A. that this impression has bn. done by Indian Executive Council and 5 Indian Provincial Govts.
- P.J.G. Go slow on that – the Council may get run out.
- H.O. Take the money from the offending Indian rich and distribute it to the unoffending Indian poor.
- M/L. Time is overdue for progressive social policy in India.
- P.M. Yes – start an anti-profiteer movement. Why doesn't some Indian Party take it up?
- What death duties?
- P.J. None.
- P.M. Why ever not?
- Agreed – Suggest to Viceroy tht. he submits some proposals.

Disciplinary Powers of Indian Army Officers.

- L.S.A. (1) No legislation here.  
 (2) Numbers. Mostly junior officers. V. few in command. A few 2<sup>nd</sup> in command who might command temporarily. Consider P.M.'s sugg<sup>n</sup> of giving them King's Comm<sup>ns</sup>. when occasion arises. Diff<sup>y</sup> is tht. need often temporary – awkward to make them permanently diff<sup>t</sup>. in status. Also automatic takg. over when superior wounded.
- Numbers small – but principle important. They may be turned sour, as Washington was by being put under B. junior officer.
- W.O. Worst moment for an inevitable change.

G. was writing about misconduct of B. troops. It will be raked up against you.

S/Doms. You are presenting them with great argument against us.

P.M. Pity to raise it now.

Agreed – accept L.S.A.'s proposal.

State of Home Opinion.

P.M. State of morale p. good.

K.W. Always is when Parlt. is not sitting.

P.M. How long do we sit?

K.W. If we sit on the Friday, we may get them to go away for 3 weeks. Two days on the war.

P.M. Statement first day about D/Kent. Follow with general statement on the war.

A.E. Impression in Press tht. 2<sup>nd</sup> Front is off for this year.

P.M. Important to play up the Germans – not let them draw off troops fr. France.

Took note.

Re-organisation of A.F.V. Divisions of M/Supply.

Took note.



I. The Military Situation.

Bomber.

1.000 sorties. 750 tons. dropped. 34 or 3½% lost. No moon.

Day – anti. sub. mostly 1 U-Boat attacked and prob. damaged.

420 tons on Saarlauten vice Saarbr. by mistake.

430 tons on Karlsruhe.

409 tons on Bremen. <sup>1/5</sup>

420 tons on Duisberg. – ground haze not v. well concentrated.

U.S. Bomber. 115 sorties. 150 tons.

Y' day attacked for first time – lost 2 : claim 5 : 13 : 25. Broke form<sup>n</sup>.

Coastal.

600 s. lost 7. 13 U-Boats attacked. 2 promisg. 3 prob. damaged.

Shot down 2 Arado.

Fighter.

2560 sort. lost 11. U.S. 250 no enemy met.

Enemy.

49 day. 31 night were over. Fighters 8 : 3 : 9 for loss 11.

Enemy loss for wk. 16 : 3 : 16. v. U.F. 37. B. 4 Coastal.

Difficulties: Coastal raids – R.A.F. wanting : patrols and coast guns v. expensive.

High-flying raids – Spitfire VI won't make the height. Blower being fitted. Spitfire IX will do the height, but no pressure cabin.

Spitfire VII has both : but not ready till Dec. Pilots specially trained.

Malta.

3 : 2 : 5 for our loss of 1. 4 raid-free days.

Loss of enemy merchant ships.

Egypt.

3800 sorties (890 in one day) incldg. U.S. Mostly (¾) v G. Army. V. heavy losses by concentrated bombing. 7 tanks by air weapons.

V. shipping – 3 sunk, 1 destroyer hit. Now hunting convoy of 4.

C.N.S. reported exact pos<sup>n</sup> now 3 + 9 destroyers.

Enemy 67 : 30 : 55. Ours 63 : 23.

India & Burma.

Nil to report.

Pacific.

Minor raids Darwin. 2 destroyed for more lost.

C.N.S. 3 destroyers sank U-Boat at Barbados. Another damaged into Santander.

P.Q.18. has sailed – 24 hrs. late. 40 ships.

M.T.B. raided Casquet on 2/3<sup>rd</sup>, (C.O.H.).

Losses. 55.000 tons with belated = 114.000.

W.India (4) Freetown (4) + new development. Aden by Jap. sub.

C.I.G.S. 180 tanks to Pt.122. held there at 31/8.

300 rounds p. gun fired on 2/9 v. them.

Genl. retirement started then - + carried on 3 days.

80 tanks destroyed : for loss of 52 of ours (30 Grants).

M.T. casualties : mainly by air attack on concentrations of 1.000 + 1200 M.T.

Some signs of fuel shortage.

Night 3/4<sup>th</sup> Italians landed 14 men to cut railway/pipeline. W<sup>'</sup> in 4 hrs. re-established and raiders captured.

G. 100 tanks running now.

193 Shermans disembarked fr. 2-6 Sept. 18 issued for training already.

20 p. day thro' workshops. 24<sup>th</sup> B<sup>de</sup>. completed by 14/9 and ready to fight 1/10.

2<sup>nd</sup> B<sup>de</sup>. completed by 20/9 and ready to fight 6/10.

Front now held by Italians while G. re-fit behind. Save in north.

Clear indication now that guns are getting the better of tanks in this desert fighting.

S. Pacific.

New Guinea. Indic<sup>ns</sup>. Japs may re-inforce. Aust<sup>ns</sup>. have bn. re-inforced: now 2 Divns.

Solomons. Japs seem to be preparg. another counter attack.

Russia.

V. little in north.

Stalingrad area. V. intense.

Grozny. Attacks mainly held.

In the passes – some progress in most westerly pass. Shd. be freezing up now.

Capture of Novorossisk – most serious event of week (if G. claim true) because it wd. enable them to supply fr. Crimea.

P.M. Statements by Litvinov in U.S.? Worth while to ask the Russians to put a muzzle on him. F.O. to consider (doubtful.)

Foreign Affairs.

Extra territoriality in China.

A.E. In spring set review on foot. Seymour thought no time to discuss future. (because our stock so low). U.S. agreed. U.S. now wd. like to take it up – leavg. Treaties affecting our post-war trade.

Trade agreements to stand over till after the war. We agree : and glad U.S. have approached us. We stand to gain if we move with U.S. rather than alone.

Will circulate details. But do War Cab. agree in principle. Yes.

Turkey.

A.E. Waitg. C.O.S. Rpt. on supplies (C.O.S. tomorrow).

Operational training of Turkish pilots. P.M. Enquired. But the training covers the whole range of Fighter Control – and we know tht. some G. spies included among the pilots. Air Min<sup>y</sup> will now give them a modified system of operational training.

S/Air. Wd. like to tell Ambassador as he had to refuse him before. Agreed.

P.M. May be able to spare some tanks for Turkey if Libya is cleared up satisfactorily.

W.O. to look into it. 2 pdr. guns also.

Russia.

Maisky – troubled by recent advance on mobility of Armies. Lorries to take precedence therefore over tanks in our convoys. We'll do this.

Transport aircraft also. Said, however, that we haven't any. Asked about U.S. output.

No record.

P.M.  
\* Preparation of another P.Q. Convoy – will have to be considered by smaller mtg. W<sup>3</sup> in the next week.

de Gaulle. Syria receives subsidy from us. Propose to hold it up – as pressure.

Air Raid Damage.

H.O. Small attacks. Main diff<sup>ries</sup>. as in C.A.S. statement. Casualties not heavy.

India: Detention of Gandhi.

L.S.A. Visitors – bond as in telegram.

Asked object – otherwise unlikely to get A. to play.

Wd. ask Viceroy to reduce visitors to minimum.

Meantime no indication tht. he will fast.

W.O. Doubtful about visit in principle : danger of communication esp. with Japs.

Agreed – subject to caution to Viceroy about not going too far.

M/L. Have you telegraphed Viceroy about social policy.

- L.S.A. Yes. I've written. But we can do it in s.93 Provinces.
- M/L. But was there not an understanding tht. protection leg<sup>n</sup> not be introduced while interim Govt. in force?
- L.S.A. Something like that.
- M/L. But 3 years have passed. We really shd. act on this now. Arcas being industrialised.
- Publication of Documents.
- F.O. As in memo.
- We ought to put out documents now and damaging our interests by not doing so. If not, at least prepare for public<sup>n</sup> and release at appropriate moment.
- K.W. Weight and size. Not 20 people will read them. Only damaging excerpts will be published.
- A.E. Also a shorter document prep<sup>d</sup>. wh. will sell.
- S/Doms. No reason why shdn't be published.
- M/Inf. At least prepare for public<sup>n</sup>.
- H.J. Wd. not object to public<sup>n</sup> now of the shorter edition.
- Simon. I did read them, at yr. request, and I made a report. No v. decided line – but what advantage will be gained? They show up G. as unreasonable and treacherous – but all know that. On other hand, the material is offered for those critics who want to pick out damaging documents.
- L.P.S. Opinion in U.S. is the most important consid<sup>n</sup>. This will provide the material for those who wish to support us.
- Report for public<sup>n</sup> (inclgd. short version).  
Cabinet auth<sup>y</sup> for issue to be obtained.
- Air Transport Facilities. Note taken.
- Scientists. Note taken.
- Service Pay & Allowances.
- L.P. Double War Pay. i.e. 3/6 to 7/=

Children's Allowances and other points as settled at L.P.Cttee.

Estimated cost £50M - incldg. repercussions on C.D. pay.

(£34M for

(£5M children 3 Offrs' prom<sup>n</sup> 3 for offr. allowances.

Agreed.

M/L. Cd Press be seen to stop stories about coloured troops?

Herald today. Dance at Eye.

P.M. Discuss it with M/Inf.

Parliamentary Business.

India Debate.

- L.P.S. Friday adjournment – free at present.
- P.M. Anyone can raise any subject they please. But don't want organised debate India.  
  
(Shd. have thought in order to discuss y'day – at least military situation).
- A.E. Pity to have whole day on India.
- L.P.S. If others raise it – shd. we have Govt. reply?
- Ch.Whip. If debate immed. followg. P.M. statement, pref. to make the statement on the adjournment not before it. It cd. still be statement, not speech.
- P.M. In that case, I wd. prefer to make a speech.
- L.P.S. Better not. Wd. encourage a day's Debate.
- L.P.S. Statement on 8.9.42.
- P.M. Why encourage criticism?
- L.P.S. Didn't. Regretted lost opportunity to express support.
- P.M. Silent support is prhs. best. H/C in v. good mood – better to have left them alone.
- L.P.S. Genl. affect was bad.
- P.M. Disagreed.
- L.P.S. If Parlt. is not then after a months' holiday then they might wait – at least until P.M. had finished his speech.
- P.M. Didn't worry me – luncheon engagements etc.
- S/Doms. Root diff<sup>ces</sup>. in hours of mtg. Lunch breaks first speech – and effect = dinner hour in place.
- L.P.S. House won't agree to meet 2 p.m.
- Ch.Whip. Papers going early to press – diff<sup>es</sup>. of transport – reasonable tht. H/C. shd. want to go on mtg. earlier.

- P.M. M.P.'s don't work by makg. speeches: watchdogs can be silent.
- L.P.S. Diff. view – many Members can debate w'out snarling.
- P.M. Country not perfervid – gettg. on with their jobs.
- A.E. if Manchester Guardian – debate not an anti climax.
- S/Doms. Members with engagements (Cttees etc) “mimed after P.M. has spoken”. And the Cttees etc wh. are part of Parl<sup>y</sup> life now have to be crowded into the 3 days sittings.
- [Torch. Danger of pieces of inform<sup>n</sup> being built into a story.]
- India – no organised Debate. Day is free if others raise it.
- P.M. Shd. I make my India statement Thursday – in order to separate it fr. Debate. Then have Friday free for all subjects at choice of members.
- Say today “P.M. will make short statement on India tomorrow”. If asked about Debate – say “not tomorrow because interference with Soldiers' Pay: but there's Friday when any subject can be raised on the Adjournment”.
- [Enemy convy Mediterranean 4 ships. 1 sub. claims one. Liberator claims hit. Looks promising]



I. Parliament. Debate India.

- Ch.Whip. After P.M. statement (adjournment talk and later Debate)  
Conservatives tabled a Motion (16 names). Argued tht. this wd. stop discussion tomorrow, on grd. tht. P.M. had promised time for formal discussion later. Done deliberately to stop discussion tomorrow.
- Cd. be avoided by saying no definite date for future Debate – S.O. “reasonable time”.
- P.M. Don’t want benefit by trick. But don’t want debate w’out Division. Prefer to promise Debate w’in 2 wks. of return. But cd. bring House back for formal Debate Tuesd. & Wed. Much less harmful than sporadic talk Friday.
- W. Durg. wk. trying hard to avoid debate. Hogg. yr. statement wd. clear the air. That statement did however irritate certain sections of House. I therefore sugg<sup>d</sup>. to Spker tht. we shd. have organised debate Friday – balanced views. Then resolution put down. Our policy to avoid Divn – tht. is what I’ve tried to avoid – eyes of the world on this discussion. I recognise no trick : but can I convince my Party of this? Put down, I think, to meet the challenge given this morning. But I wd. prefer a Debate tomorrow, without a Divn.
- S.Doms. A lot of steady Labour Members wd. speak tomorrow. Balanced views.
- L.P.S. If taken on motion spkers will be called in turn.
- M/L. Found tempers in H/Commons tonight running v. high. All this among our friends not the Shinwells – they feel they’d been tricked by the Motion. If debate tomorrow avoided, we may get split in Labour Party v member of Govt. All our Labour friends who have supported us in the India crisis must not be allowed to go off the rails over this point of procedure.
- Cd not Glyn and cd. withdraw their Motion?
- L.P.S. They can’t.
- P.M. If we say tomorrow full Debate w’in 2/3 weeks of re-assembling, Spker will call no-one on India. If we don’t say that, he will call India tomorrow. Therefore the issue is in hands of Govt.
- L.P.S. Can – if said P.M. promised debate, does not stand : answer wd. have to be given.

- P.M. "I won't say anything today wh. will hamper the House in their desire to talk about India today". "On some future date, dependent on circs in India" wd. meet Speaker.
- P.M. What sort of debate shd. we have tomorrow?
- S/Doms. Solid views will be exp<sup>d</sup> tho' some screamers will no doubt intervene.  
Given promise of future Debate in terms agreed with Speaker, and then let the discussion on adjournment proceed.
- P.M. Feeling only about Resolution?
- L.P.S. Not only that. Some obj<sup>ns</sup> to provocation tone of P.M.'s statement.
- A.E. If it goes ill tomorrow, we can put a Govt. motion down and get a vote later.  
Why did Conservatives put the Resolution down?
- Ch/Whip. V. largely because they believed this was not the time to debate India.
- L.P.S. But P.M. and I have both said there wd. be chance of talkg. about it on Friday.  
Say – we don't want to take any action wh. wd. debar discussion.  
L.S.A. to speak about 3 p.m.  
Right of secession – discussed.  
Decision - We think better to have had fixed Debate later. But as expect<sup>ns</sup> raised, wd. not be proper Govt. take any step wh. wd. make that impossible. Therefore no date for future debate sufficiently precise to prevent Speaker from callg. people on India tomorrow.
- P.M. Remains only to square the people to whom I promised today a debate soon after Recess. Ch. Whip to see these Members.  
Make it a reasonable Debate tomorrow.
- W. Greenwood will begin. Will take line of Labour party resolution.  
Jim Walker will follow. Spkr. will take whatever names sugg<sup>d</sup> to him.
- II Citrine's Visit to U.S.A. Statement at Blackpool criticising Halifax.
- A.E. Saw Citrine about his visit to U.S. Said hoped he wdn't go. He gave no promise – said initiation with U.S. not him.

L.P.S. He telephoned saying he understood A.F.L. wanted him to cancel his visit.

A.E. We had said we wished him to take initiation.

Today he spoke at B'pl. – disclosing tht. we had asked him not to go – criticised Halifax for his advice. See account in “Star” this evening. Said to give false impression of what happened.

Shd. I say somethg. in support of Halifax – who was [advised by Tawney and H. Butler]. Will wait and see whtr. Press play it down. If they don't will harm P. Notice Ques and answer firmly tomorrow referring to [ ] and sayg. satisfied with H. advice.

M/L. Say it – whtr. Press play it down or not.

Foreign Affairs.

P.M. Litvinov squealing : Maisky plaintive.

Worrying about P.Q. If only  $\frac{1}{5}$  etc get thro', is it worth while going on? More radical cuts must be considered.

Air Raid Damage.

H.O. Light week : but fear we shall get it later on.

P.M. Millstones round necks of our Bomber Command.

M/L Are we bldg. up our AA. Defence for the winter?

C.A.S. Borrowed a lot : but we have good allocation of Bofors guns for Sept. wh. we cd. use.

Current prod<sup>n</sup> in G. – only 1.200 operational types p. month + trainers : transports. Total potential bomber strengths v. us on 1/1/43 only 450. (Intelligence estimate). That wd. mean only 250/300 on big night. Allows rather large no. in Germany re-fitting etc. V. low wdn't put too much weight on it.

Supply of Transport Aircraft to Russia.

M/P. Saw Maisky Fri : said none in prod<sup>n</sup> here : and only one type in large scale prod<sup>n</sup> in U.S.A.

Promised ask P.M. to consider approach to President.

Declined to convert Wellingtons : but promised to consider other possibilities. e.g. Albemailes. There are 45 of these in maintenance units wh. in  $\frac{3}{4}$  wks cd. be converted to carry 20 men. Then at 20 a month up to 250.

C.A.S. If we have to do it. A. wd. fill the bill with least cost to us. But one of the diversions wh. affect Bomber Coastal Command indirectly. They were to be used to free Hudsons. 43 Operational squadrons a year ago now only 32 in Bomber Command.

P.M. It is for U.S. if they will.

M/P. W'out rep<sup>ns</sup>. to President you won't get it out of them.

M/P. Which P.Q. diff<sup>ed</sup>. with Russia : we might at least do the 45 fr. maintenance units.

P.M. Give this as interim measure – while we look into possibility of pressure on U.S.A. Russians must press U.S.A. I won't. Agreed. – No decision : M/Prod<sup>n</sup> to supply P.M. with material for telegram to Stalin.

Food for Ceylon.

R.M. In Mar. Ceylon Govt. asked for rice. Move related to military sit<sup>n</sup> – willing therefore to supply Ceylon on same basis as India. Indigenous prod<sup>n</sup> 150.000 tons.

30.000 t. p. m. as required. 35.000 tons. April and May to build up stocks. End of April shipping sit<sup>n</sup> deteriorated – only Karachi and country boats fr. southern ports. We did all we cd. in shipping situation – 116.000 tons in 5 months.

Then sit<sup>n</sup> worsened. Sindh crop lost (1m. acres flooded. 800/900.000 tons out of 26m. tons). Normally we imported 1½m. ton fr. Burma.

Transport worsened. I envisaged surplus prod<sup>n</sup> in various areas of Bengal and Orissa. Bengal 3m. tons excess. But rural areas both to send crop to market. Orissa was small surplus : Ministry will now be able to send this.

Since then comm<sup>d</sup> to supply Arabian States (on same priority) rice Burma supplies lost.

Madras now main source of surplus supply. Trouble here is transport. If we can overcome that. we cd. prob. work up to 30.000 tons.

Reluctance of Prov. Govts. to control prices. Since I left, conference wh. indicates likelihood of more price control.

Recommend urging Govt/India to concentrate on this – no Directive yet.

More effort. In reply to latest telegram.

C.O. When wd. full supply begin?

R.M. Rs. in October. Wd. deprecate pressure at this stage.

C.O. Ceylon will be out by 3<sup>rd</sup> week of Oct. We must fill the gap somehow. If I knew when Indian supply wd. come in. I cd. ask for more Australian wheat. I want current supply + 2 months' reserve.

A.E. Only 1/80th of Indian requirements will meet Ceylon's needs.

Jam Saheb. My area has no rice at all – eating millet.

C.O. Cd. M/W.T. Supply fr. Australia to carry us over until Oct.

M/W.T. 30.000 tons in Sept is all we cd do. Extravagant use of shipping.

L.S.A. Cd G/India be asked to ship as much as poss. early in Oct.

M/W.T. We can carry as much rice as India can provide.

R.M. If it only in 1 month, in advance, India cd. arrange.

Agreed. I.O. & C.O. to agree procedure.

Foreign Affairs.

Madagascar.

P.M. Don't have further trouble there for sake of pleasg. F.French.

War Criminals.

Stage for public announcement – Ld Chanc. Thursday H/Lds. Proposes to say a) favour fact-finding Comm<sup>n</sup>. b) prov<sup>n</sup>. for arrest in Armistice.

Will circulate memo to W. Cab. : merely give notice so tht. Ministers will know tht. announcement is to be made.

Air Raids.

H.O. Tendency for d. light raids to increase. Betteshanger : Petworth. 16 over on Wed : Worthing and elsewhere in Sussex and Kent. Colchester : 60 casualties. 7 fatal.

Soviet Warships in Black Sea.

F.O. No immediate action – authority to proceed w'out delay when need arises.

P.M. Sideshow : we have 2 destroyers to give to Turkey : cd. we give these to N. Russia if they gave 2/3 to Turkey.

F.O. Difficult ques to raise : shall leave it till last minute.

P.M. Best arrangement possible in the circs.

Agreed.

Refugee Children from Occupied France.

H.O. A no. of de facto orphans – we wd. prob. have to yield to pressure – better announce at once somethg. on wh. we don't have to give way. Then I'll stand pat.

Agreed.

Chinese Extra-territoriality.

F.O. Rec<sup>d</sup> text of proposed Treaty : wh. they propose to announce 9/10. Will circulate tonight. May have to ask for special mtg. of War Cabinet.

Parliament.

- L.P.S. Bernay's Ques – Motion for discussion of Army in Secret Session.  
Have sugg<sup>d</sup> to Cazalet cd. be done on K's Speech. If they asked for S. Session, we wd. comply. They wd. accept that.
- W.O. Had consulted P.M. suggestg. public Debate because of innuendos : Affect on troops in M/East – feeling of lack of confidence at home. Wd. prefer Debate later and in public.
- K.W. Can you give your defence in public.
- Ch.Whip. Has heard the topics wh. Bernays wishes to raise. Size of Army in relation to its role. Slow promotions for L/Corporals. Machinery for Parly. control over W.O. admin<sup>n</sup> of Army.
- L.P.S. They feel it awkward to discuss these ques in public because of their dual role as M.P.'s and junior officers.
- P.M. Say on K's speech. In principle, shd. be in public. But House can move in and out : and we cd. have a part of Debate in secret if desired.
- Ch.Whip. You can't come out again until topic concluded.  
  
No gt. harm in secret Debate? But W.O. shd. have chance of makg. his statement. Why not have 2 Debates on this subject on the Address. Or, why not have the open Debate early on the address : and then have the Secret Sess<sup>n</sup> on the amendment to the address. Or, preferably the other way round : debate in secret on the amendment then revive the genl. Debate in public for W.O. to reply.  
  
Then say – this matter will be discussed in any event in Debate on Address : they can raise their matters by putting down amendment to Address and this, if House desires, can be taken in Secret.
- F.O. Soviet Annual Day. demonstr<sup>n</sup> at Empress Hall. I've bn. asked to speak. H.O. told me however tht. it is promoted under Comm. influence. I've therefore refused.  
  
My colleagues shd. know in case they are asked.
- P.M. Offl. show of our own?
- H.O. This is anniversary of B. revolution!
- L.P.S. But in Russia it is comparable to the King's Birthday.
- H.O. i.e. the Czar's Deathday!



P.M. Why not have a mtg. sometime in Nov. (no specific Russian date) – to celebrate the R. resistance. Consider this (carefully!).

Manacling of Prisoners of War.

- S/Doms. Latest G. communiqué, threatening to manacle 3 times as many B. pris.
- Saw Massey and 2 Canadian Ministers and Bruce. Don't like pos<sup>n</sup>.
- a) Ref<sup>ce</sup>. shd. have bn. made to Protectg. Power.  
b) Subtefuge in our statements.
- If this kind of thing is started, no knowing where it may stop.
- What response fr. Canada?
- Adam. No reply yet.
- We thought this wd. bring G. to their senses. It hasn't.
- S/Air. Never thought it wd. at first. We knew we had to go thro' with it.
- M/L. Don't go in for any further reprisal yet.
- L.P. Distinction betwn. manacling men in custody and tying up men not yet in custody.
- S/Doms. Canadians think we have put ourselves in a false pos<sup>n</sup>. by concealing the truth.
- Adam. What we thght wrong was the advance instr<sup>n</sup>. to tie hands in every case to prevent destruction of documents wthr. or not any need to do so to prevent escape.
- S/Doms. Before any other action taken, we shd. invite views of Dom. Govts.
- L.P. We shd. now give more inform<sup>n</sup>. for our own people, about what happened at Dieppe.
- But don't manacle any more.
- Adam. Hope G. Army will put a stop to this nonsense.
- The only get-out we have offered them is tht. we will countenance no orders to this effect.
- S/Doms. It's not only a ques of orders. It is now a ques of fact because at Sark it has happened again.

Must we not say something to give G. a get-out – e.g. we have given orders, but we can't make rules governing conduct in the heat of action.

Adam. They will keep this on for a time and then give up, saying they'll resign if we do it again.

M/L. Doms shd. be given full report on the facts.

S/Air. And ? consult them on ques of manacling equal nos. as Germans, prs. after verifying thro' Protecting Power tht. Germans have done it.

A.V.A. Explain reasons why we acted y'day w'out consult<sup>n</sup>.

Public criticism if we take no action until Monday.

Agreed. a) Continue with what we have said we wd. do. b) Nothing more be done at present. c) Tell Doms facts (Dieppe and Sark) and law of war and view of propriety : and tht. if G. carry out their new threat, we shd. wish to do same : invite their views on that, quickly, with view to actg. Sat. night or Sunday.

Statement to Press? "No further statement at present".

P.M. consulted on telephone. Agreed : but asked to see draft of statement.

Manacling of Prisoners of War.

- W.O. Intercept radio – Germany refusing recognise intervention by Swiss. Besides Dieppe prs. 3 times 4.000 odd (?) put in chains.
- P.M. Doms. soft. If we are defeated on this ill treatment of prs. will be used as black-mailing tactics.
- What happens eg in trench and raids doesn't affect relations betwn. Govts.
- No enquiry possible into events in battle – eg wthr. a person was killed who might have bn. taken pr. And business of Protect<sup>g</sup> Power is with events in camps, not in field.
- W.O. 240 tied in U.K. during daylight only. Handcuffs with about 1ft. chain – taken off at night.
- P.M. Nothg. to be published to indicate diff<sup>ce</sup>. of opinion betwn. us and Doms.
- M/I. No danger in U.K. Press. Danger prs. later in Dom. Press.
- S/Doms. All 4 Doms. are unhappy : not Canada only. While they stand in with us on what we've done, they don't want to go further and wish to explore arbit<sup>n</sup> by P. Power.
- P.M. Bad ground to argue on facts.
- M/P. Begin by differentiating betwn. events in battle and treatment in cage.
- L.P. Said already.
- M/I. In Fleet Street. feeling tht. in auction of atrocities G. bound to win. No criticism (much) about actions taken so far : but don't want to see it pressed further.
- P.M. We've each tied up 1.500. G. threaten to go up to 5.000. They haven't publicly announced they've done it. No further action from us therefore until offl. G. announcement tht they have done so. Wd. say to H/C tomorrow “no further statement”.
- L.P.S. Advantages in saying tomorrow enough to enable us to stall for some days.
- Cranb. Motion in H/Lords by Bishop Truro.
- P.M. Still think no statement unless further announcement by Germans.

If they make a further bid, shd. we go on to manacle those not of the 5.000. I wd. then G. wd. have to chain another 12.000. Then diff<sup>ies</sup>. begin to be great. Then we chain 12.000. Then they have to go to 36.000. They will find that v. hard. And don't many of them work?

W.O. Yes – in mines. roads etc.

G. wd. be at end of tether after the 3<sup>rd</sup> round, no more prs. left.  
Alternative. Turn the other cheek and submit. We may have to – if opinion in U.K. Domes divided.

Hitler has triumphed – proved. B. at fault – wd. know he cd. do what he liked to our prs. w'out fear of retaliation on his.

But even that wd. be preferable to arbitration by a neutral Power into our actions. That wd. be the worst solution of all.

M/L. German propaganda. stresses a) introd<sup>n</sup> of Colonial troops & U.S. had led to this. B. wdn't behave like this. (b) followed on War Guilt statement.

Shdn't (a) be sent to Doms.

M/P. Another course. If you don't say nos. chained. G. have threatened to treble but we aren't going to say how many we will chain. Reserve right to manacle as many as we like. I wd. manacle then 3.600. This wd. get away from the arithmetical progression. And deprive them of a date and time.

S/Doms. Risk of other forms of beastliness.

Shd we not stand fast and wait for them to get tired.

M/L. Risk tht. Doms. won't manacle any more.

W.O. We cd. then take up the running with Italians.

M/L. But will our public opinion support any more.

Germans (radio) don't seem happy about it. Stand fast and await developments.

You can't withdraw. But if you make another threat, you invite rejoinder.

Fear tht. this may lead to G. shooting prs. – an example wh. we cdn't follow.

P.M. I wd. shoot in those circs.

- M/L. Doubt if public opinion wd. support that.  
Statement in H/C. tomorrow or not.
- L.P.S. This may be last occasion you can make one. Make it therefore if G. makes no move before then.
- P.M. Instinct is to say nothing.
- L.P.S. Something to be said for repeatg. in Parlt. in somewhat diff. way the latest statement to Press. If G. make announcement tomorrow morning, then say “no statement”.
- M/I. Supported M/P. sugg<sup>n</sup>. In reply to criticism tht. Prot. Power wd. find out what numbers, yes but that will take time : meanwhile it will all simmer down.
- W.O. What of ultimate release fr. this situation – by whose intervention?
- Cadogan. Office of Swiss Govt. F.O. wd. answer – “if any decl<sup>n</sup> you wd. like to make to both sides, no objection”. Possible way out. Related of course only to treatment in Camps.
- L.P.S. A proper course.
- S/Doms. Public anxiety “how are you getting out of this?” Welcome Swiss help if it affords a way out. What is alternative?
- L.P.S. Go on till both sides are bored.
- L.P. Treatment in camps is regulated by Convention : and we can’t refuse to discuss that with anyone, as implied by M/P sugg<sup>n</sup>.  
  
x/ Need to explain to our own people distinction between treatment in camps and treatment in course of capture.
- Cadogan. Article in Convention about dispute between belligerents. Providing for conference of belligerence on neutral soil. Dangerous if we get involved in that sort of thing.
- Cranb. There is in H/Lords a Motion for Debate : and, altho’ I can ask him, I doubt wthr. he will take it off.
- Ch.Whip. Valuable if statement cd. be made in H/Commons to clear up x/.M/Inf. supported this. M/L. didn’t object, providg. no statement of future action.  
  
Unwise to commit ourselves to future action. Also “no wordy discussion” with G.

- P.M. Why not reply to Swiss. Read out offer and reply in H/C. and decline to say more, on grnd. tht. we must await reply.
- Say to Swiss – Tying in heat of battle depends on circs. Haig not prep<sup>d</sup>. discuss events in field – this is diff. fr. camps – there they are protected by Convention. You offered to intervene. Pl. convey to G. our protest at their “reprisal” based on events in field. As soon as G. unchain them, we will unchain their prs.
- Cadogan. Private offer of help. Embarrassing to them if we replied in public.
- L.P. Make P.M. statement w’out ref.
- [P.M. withdrew to dictate draft statement.]
- Statement approved.
- W.O. to submit written statement tomorrow showg. how we are chaining the Germans.
- S/Doms. C.O.S. warned by Eisenhower tht. Morgenthau shd. be told nothing because likely to leak.
- P.M. Let C/Exchequer know.
- Madagascar.
- W.O. Cd. Cabinet know what F.O. has said to de Gaulle?
- P.M. I have sent him a Minute drawg. his attention to Platt’s recent statement tht. everything is going v. nicely in Madagascar, and advising caution.

Munitions Production.

Read telegram from President. Also fr. Halifax to effect that Hopkins won't come here.

P.M. Looks as tho' M/P. will have to go to U.S. taking Portal with him.

M/P. Ready to go in 10 days.

P.M. Ok but let us see beforehand what you will say.

Manacling of Prisoners of War

W.O. 240 G. warned 9.a.m to be manacled 12 noon.

Cruwell protested and asked to see Preiswerk – who was produced before noon. He said order must have bn. given by Hitler in person. Found however had eczema in wrists and hasn't bn-tied. Sick asked to be chained with comrades.

Handcuffs with 1ft. chains. Chained 9 a.m-9 p.m.

Telegram fr. Ottawa : resistance to shackling order. 400 only chained so far. Some injured. Enforcement in Ozada Camp wd. add to rioting. Cd. Swiss find out wthr. Canadians have visited and wthr. force had been used. Shd. we ask this ques?

L.P.S. Ask for inform<sup>n</sup>. about cond<sup>ns</sup>. etc. of shackling and add incidentally "has there bn. any trouble over it in camps".

L.P. Won't that prompt Germans to make same enquiry?

P.M. Wait – until Canada has rec<sup>d</sup>. our telegram, anyhow. Wait for next move.

Wd. want to enquire in day or two into cond<sup>ns</sup>. in Germany.

S/Doms. Reply to Red X?

P.M. Say we are actg. tho' protecting power.

P.M. Read out letter fr. Archbishop of Canterbury. Views of Bishops.

Cranb. I have persuaded Truro to postpone his Motion.

General Smuts. Speech to Parliament.

P.M. Good thing for S. to speak to both House in Painted Chamber?



- Cranb. In favour – but what effect on Mackenzie King and others. Will they be affronted if they aren't asked when they come?
- P.M. Smuts is unique. Age : mil.rank : Dom. P.M. who has fought against us: and only [one who was in War Cab. in last war.] Let him do it as [ ].
- Ch.Whip. Royal Gallery can take 700 chairs.
- L.P.S. Adjourn House at 4.30 for it – some day before 22/10.  
Announce arrangements Thursday (Secret Session) if possible.  
Agreed : Ch. Whip to arrange in consult<sup>n</sup> with L.P.  
U.S. Coloured Troops in U.K.
- P.M. Views of U.S. Army must be considered.  
Nothing to stand betwn. U.S. offr. and his troops : we mustn't interfere.
- H.O. I accept that. What I won't have is B. Police enforcing their rules for them.
- W.O. Eisenhowers inst<sup>ns</sup> are disingenuous – prescribes M. Roosevelt's doctrines as principles but adds rules of practice which have opposite result.
- M/L. Against written instructions.
- W.O. So am I. The S. Command inst<sup>n</sup> has "leaked", beyond those to whom issued.  
We won't segregate or discriminate in our canteens.  
Publish in ABO (for offr. only) article on history of problem.  
Other recommendations in end of memo.  
Post-war Anglo. Am. relations will depend on relations wh. we establish now with U.S. Army in this country.
- Ld.Ch. Test this. a) Victoria Stn. Canteen. If we conform to U.S. attitude then at this Canteen coloured troops can't be served.
- W.O. But see my proposal not App. – we won't discriminate in our canteens.  
b) Effect on our coloured people.

I think the statement by L.P.S. is v. nearly right.

What I can't accept is W.O. sugg<sup>n</sup>. tht. we shd. conform to U.S. attitude eg – in last sentence of memo.

- W.O. I wd. modify this statement.
- S/S.Air. Avoid “coloured”. The U.S. prefer to call them “American negroes”.
- W.O. We agree : a) if any segreg<sup>n</sup>. U.S. must do it not us. Their responsibility. b) Explain U.S. attitude and ask our people to pay attention to it. c) There shd. be a good deal of reserve in attitude of our troops, particularly to negroes.
- M/L. Educate them yes : but don't try to educate them into U.S. prejudices.
- W.O. Cranborne advocates no guidance at all. H.O. advocate not giving even information.
- S/Air. Education unsafe unless you include references to our attitude to coloured people.
- Cranb. Diff. in “not too matey” principle : because we have nos. of coloured people here. eg coloured Canadians. Change of policy.
- Educate both ways : both Americans and British in view of the other : and then leave it to common sense.
- If it can be said we have advocated “colour bar” all the coloured people here fr. our Empire will go back discontented and preach disaffection there.
- H.O. With v. small amendment wd. support L.P.S. memo.
- W.O. Referred to inst<sup>ns</sup>. issued by Eisenhower : guidance about our views.
- Cadogan. Eden accepted W.O. memo – save for wording of last phrase of all. Sugg<sup>d</sup>. “adopt ..... so far as may be possible w'out practising unfair or objectionable discrimination”
- P.M. L.P.S. document is better than any other. Let L.P.S. (with W.O. H.O.) settle any amendments : and then consider how and to what extent it shd. be published. Objective – a document tht. can go down as far as Col.s of Regts.
- L.P.S. Also to scrutinise the article for A.B.C.A. magazine.

Armistice Day.

a) As last year. b) Parlt. if meets that day to open at noon.

Smuts Address to Parliament.

- P.M. All arrangements made.
- M/I. Any obj<sup>n</sup>. to announcg. prev. day on B.B.C. – so tht. S.Africa can hear?
- P.M. Unwise (C.A.S. agreed). Better to make records and relay later.
- M/I. It is being relayed – and no one will know in advance.

Agreed – better relay record later to S. Africa. No announcement before 1p.m. news and no summary in earlier news bulletins.

- P.M. Accommodation – to be restricted to B. Commonwealth visitors. i.e. exclude Diplomatic Corps.

Commonwealth Trade Union Conference.

- S/Doms. Citrine wants conf. with U.K. + 4 Doms. T.U.'s. Sometime in April.
- Small nos. fr. all parts of Empire.
- Smuts. We have approved : a good thing.

Agreed.

Man Power: Lowering Age to 18. for call-up to Services.

- L.P. Last Proclamation affected all who had reached 18 at date.
- Instead of waiting another 6 months we propose another Procl<sup>n</sup>. after 3 months concerning all who became 18 between 30/6 and 22/10.
- Further sugg<sup>n</sup> – amend law so as to enable preliminaries to be got over before 18 is reached. Machinery proposal : but may be criticised.
- L.P.S. Care needed in drafting Bill to make it clear tht. we aren't calling up boys of 17.
- W.O. Hitherto we have allowed voluntary enlistment 6 months below compulsory age.

May we now enlist volunteers at 17½? Yes.

Agreed.

American Technical Mission to India.

- L.S.A.            Attent<sup>n</sup> to para 4 of final recommd<sup>ion</sup>. in para 9.
- R.Mudaliar.     Some recommd<sup>ns</sup>. can't be implemented because of some bottlenecks.
- V. cautious abt. wh. can be adopted w'out interfering with existg. programmes.
- Read extract fr. report fr. Indian M/Supply. Risk of going too fast and getting involved in larger projects wh. will be embarrassing.
- x/ No pressure fr. here in G/India merely because U.S. have recommended.
- W.O.             Endorse x/. U.S. tendency to intervene industrially in spheres hitherto ours'.
- Took note with approval.
- Strike in Belfast.
- P.M.             Losing a Stirling a day.
- M.A.P.           Cttee has bn. set up : sitting today. Meanwhile boiler-makers H & W have gone back. Mtg. strikers due this p.m. Total now out 8.000 miners 900 boiler-makers.
- H.O.             By 5 p.m. little development – slight trickle back to work. Hope more may return tomorrow.
- K.W.             M/L. Strong views – no action wh. wd. weaken T.U. influence. Stand aside.
- Leggett.         When Enquiry set up, feared large extension of strike. Felt Court wd. help to stop that. Impression now tht. position is improving.
- P.M.             Disgrace to N. Ireland – hope Govt. feel it.
- Weakness there – no conscription in N.Ireland.
- L.P.             We have in N.I. departed fr. policy to wh. we have adhered in Tyneside strike.
- Took note.

Foreign Affairs.

- A.E. Demonst<sup>n</sup> on Soviet Day. We undertook to accept invit<sup>n</sup> to send Service contingents and on L.P. decision we shd. not now send them. If we now withdraw ours, other Allies wd. be in awkward pos<sup>n</sup>.
- L.P.S. Our L.P. decision not intended to be retrospective.
- P.M. On merits, doubtful about wisdom of sending our troops to Communist organised affair.
- L.P.S. Incident if we withdraw now we have promised. F.O. supported this.
- P.M. Not so much if we take Allies into confidence and all withdraw.
- W.O. Original decision by Service Dpts. based on rather casual advice fr. H.O.
- S/Air. Wd. have preferred to stand by June decision of W. Cab. against Service attendance at this kind of thing.
- P.M. x// This must be discussed by Cab. after notice, and in presence of Home Secy.
- S/Air. But we have withdrawn our promise to attend.
- L.P. Home Secy. wd. have preferred to let it stand, as promises given : but deferred to W.O. wishes to get out of it.
- P.M. Separate military parade.
- M/L. Risk letting them go. Far more trouble by withdrawing.
- x// Agreed : meet Tuesday to decide. Full programme to be submitted to P.M. at least, if not W. Cabinet.

Prisoners of War.

- P.M. Stand where we are. No answer to our ques to Protectg. Power. Wait for it. Hitler's action, not that of German Genl. Staff or admin<sup>n</sup> of p.o.w. camps, wh. has bn. v. correct. Clear tht. his order is being questioned in offl. circles in Germany. He is in a diff. pos<sup>n</sup> fr. wh. he seeks to escape by enlarging area of controversy. See what they do before we act. German Army and F.O. will do their best to restrain him. Even if present reprisals drag on, no gt. harm will be done. We can ease it off.

S/Doms. Trouble in Canada – who are disturbed. So is opinion in country and in H/Commons.

Await reply, yes, but can't wait v. long.

F.O. Int. Red Cross telegram sent to us and G. Some answers requ<sup>d</sup>. Shd. we answer by referring to our comm<sup>n</sup>. Generally agreed.

P.M. “Weekly review” Germany to N. America – “Do Allies intend to repeat Geneva Convent<sup>n</sup>”?

If that is line they are going to take, our answer is easy.

Smuts. Notify Canada of our decision : Thursday p.m.

S/Doms. They have bn. informed, as have all Doms.

Agreed – a) Wait b) Answer B. Red Cross.

Bruce. Dom. Govts. views. I told my Govt. premature to make any decision before we get reply fr. P. Power. I thought it nec. to do so because not clear from D.O. telegrams. Pos<sup>n</sup> shd. be more clearly explained to Dom. Govts. – i.e. tht. we are waiting on reply fr. P. Power, and tht. we can't wait indefinitely.

P.M. Agreed – W.O. to prepare further statement (inclgd. (b) above).

S/Doms. Consult Doms on (b).

F.O. Unnecessary.

Agreed unnecessary.

P.M. This crossed W.O. telegram. No need to do more – save explain to Canada tht. they have crossed.

Posthumous Awards.

P.M. What is done in case of V.C. and other high awards – might with advantage be extended to other Awards – with limit on number.

L.P. x/ Ask Cttee on Honours for report, with a lead tht. Cab. wd. like it done if scheme can be devised.

S/Air. Diffy. in doing it now because of need for retrospection review.

P.M. Refer to Cttee as at x/ with ref<sup>ce</sup> to retrospective diffy.

Agreed.

Celebration of Soviet Annual Day – Participation of B. Troops.

- H.O. When Cab. decided inexpedient for A.E. to speak at the mtg. the decision of Serv. Depts to send contingents was revoked by mtg. of offrs. representing all Dpts. interested.
- Since then L.P. Cttee decision : as result of wh. this cdn't arise again.
- F.O. Dept were at mtg. and were in agreement.
- If w'out loss of dignity Serv.Dpts cd. agree to let contingents go, this wd. be best way out.
- W.O. V. few and small contingents. A&C cadets (1). Army = Band only. R.N. = none because invitation never answered. Agreed leave it unanswered.
- L.P. What about taking the salute?
- W.O. No regular contingents to go. Leave it as it stands.
- Agreed. Send nthg. more than is already arranged.
- F.O. to comm. with Allies in future and see to this now.
- Coal. Address to Miners.
- P.M. Promised to address miners on Sat. 10.30 a.m.
- Won't talk about coal. Will talk about the War : give them feeling that we're on the move. "So give us the coal".
- Wd. like Smuts to come with me.



Prisoners of War. (part heard).

P.M. Cd. the manacling be gradually reduced?

A.E. How cd. this be made known?

W.O. Tell P. Power revised nos. and revised times.

P.M. Don't let us be seen publicly to withdraw.

[M/L. Any way in wh. we cd. help people in occupied Europe who resist or evade the labour conscription of the Germans. Cd. F.O. consider whtr. any means are available?

S/Doms. It has bn. considered.]

P.M. Let P. Power find out – by visits to camps – don't tell them.

Books and Magazines for the M/East.

P.M. Best way to deal with Army in M/East. Papers locally produced – why shdn't M/I get proprietors to add another supplement for Army and subsidise the newspaper on that condition.

M/I. a) The B. Ambassador has told us not to interfere with local Press.

b) Paper supplies wd. have to be increased.

But subject to that : & Ty support we cd. make that a much more lively paper.

Agreed. M/Inf. to investigate and submit a scheme.

M/I. Cd. the S. African produced paper – and books also – be made available to the Army.

Smuts. Better scheme is the P.M.'s. The additional paper shd. come fr. U.S.A.

W.O. Ques raised in last para. Pooling with U.S.A.

Genl. feeling of Cabinet against this. Too dangerous.

I. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

B/T. Ask W. Cab. auth<sup>y</sup> to reply to U.S. on lines in Annex.

Mechanism – lynch-pin a Policy Cttee (Part 3) U.S. G.B. U.S.S.R. China.

Not committed at this stage to any precise promises as rgds. extent.

Agreement to be subject to our point about Canada being on Policy Cttee. We therefore recommend members extended to 7 incldg. Canada.

Raise ques with Doms. India and U.S.S.R. before reply to U.S.A.

P.M. Don't let us drift into attitude tht. we can't speak to U.S. before consulting U.S.S.R.

A.E. On this occasion we have already had consult<sup>ns</sup> with U.S. : we are referring to U.S.S.R. only at this stage before formal communication to U.S. This agreement was initiated by U.S.A.

P.M. May be right as diplomacy – but no rigid rule.

“No obligation on us to consult Stalin before we communicate with U.S.” Can that maxim be recorded.

L.P.S. Depends on subject matter. This is one affectg. Europe. Right tht. we shd. let U.S.S.R. be informed of nature of reply wh. we propose to send.

P.M. As rgds. Canada, everyone surely agrees.

S/Doms. Diffy : if you bring in all Doms, it will open the door to v. many others.

We must preserve our freedom to bring in one or other Doms. w'out all.

C.O. Para III 3. – (a small point not perfectly heard!)

P.M. Will you at least omit [ ] from para 5.

A.E. Very well.

Agreed – subject to omission of this phrase in communications sent.

S/Air. Proposed that this Body shd. deal with p.o.war. Wd. it not be better to leave this to military? B/T. undertook to clear this up with S/Air.

## II. Post-War Atlantic Bases.

A.E. Scheme promoted by Norway – after consult<sup>n</sup> with Dutch and Belgians.

P.M. Why do you want bases on Continent? Tremendous departure in foreign policy.

A.E. V. like S. Inland bases.

P.M. If air is reason – deal with that by international control of air forces, not by seeking and maintaining air bases all over the world.

S/Doms. When we thought in terms of sea-power, we secured bases all over the world. Worth considering.

L.P.S. Perhaps : but don't say it has our political support. That, surely is going much too far.

A.E. This is not national policy – proposal is that G.B., U.S. and countries concerned shd. join in this.

L.P.S. Enough to say we are prep<sup>d</sup> to explore the situation.

M/L. Unwise to deal with this piecemeal.

L.P.S. Selection, at initiation of Norway and based on a particular Alliance.

A.E. Americans have already bn. discussing this with Dutch and Norwegians.

If U.S went on with this and we were left out it wd. be v. awkward.

Prep<sup>d</sup>. however to re-draft para 6 in light of discussions : and circulate as amended.

Smuts. U.S. original demand for bases fr. us was a mistake : now abandoned.

Equally mistaken for us to claim bases in Europe.

We don't know where we'll stand after the war.

And what precedents will you set : Russia will want them too. And when will it end?

Whatever the small defeated countries say now, many people will say later on that this was pure Imperialism.

Policy for Europe shd. not be initiated by the smaller Powers “as and when”. Wait till we are ready to make the right approach. Let these ques. be considered by the Big 2 or 3 – don’t listen to cries of agony fr. the minor sufferers.

An item like this might be fitted into a larger scheme – we must see the pattern.

L.P.S. Then can we see the memo. prep<sup>d</sup>. by F.O.

III Malta.

P.M. Preserve status quo until we see what happens in Torch.

Defer this item until Wed.

I. Rudolf Hess.

P.M. Include reference to health and fall over bannisters etc.

L.P.S. : Separate statement.

P.M. Why not say on verge of insanity.

L.P.S. He wasn't when he arrived : we can't say he was.

P.M. Add – “medical report follows”; and put an addendum.

None of this for public<sup>n</sup> – for Maisky only.

F.O. Will send this to C. Kerr today saying “medical report follows”.

II. King's Speeches.

Controversial legislation.

P.M. We can't have 50/100 Conservatives or Labour Members steadily opposing the Bill.

S/Doms. Controversy on Party lines must be avoided – but Bills raising controversy within Parties cd. be taken.

K.W. Must be a substantial measure of agreement.

S/Doms. Within the Govt. L.P. And H/Commons.

P.M. Controversial for war effort doesn't matter.

S/Doms. But some war legisl<sup>n</sup>.

P.M. Formula for pledge. – as in K.S.(42) 1<sup>st</sup> Mtg Minutes annotated.

L.P.S. Yes – but what do you mean by “genl. measure of agreement”.

P.M. Cabinet decides. It means tht. oppos<sup>n</sup> by a small group can't hold it up.

M/L. Consider my difficulty. Labour Party and 1922 Cttee both say no organised oppos<sup>n</sup>.

Then the interests outside say its controversial.

P.M. My phrase meets that. The outside interests won't stop it if “genl. measure of agreement”.

- M/L. Not concerned fr. Party pt. of view. Concerned about admin<sup>n</sup> – eg demobilisation.
- L.P. “A substantial measure of general agreement”. Rejected.  
P.M.’s formula agreed.
- P.M. No oblig<sup>n</sup> to include in K. Sp. every measure you intend to bring fwd.  
Before putting a thing into K. Sp. you shd. have clear idea of what will be in the Bill. E.g. Education Bill. Nothing better than to reach concordat. But want to be sure we shan’t get into religious controversy.
- S. Both sides have forgotten the catch-words of 40 yrs. ago. R.A.B. has gone v. far and skilfully and is v. near to an agreement.
- R.A.B. <sup>2</sup>/<sub>3</sub>rds of my plan is ready for Cabinet. Sketch of other third (training of youth : with M/Labour).
- P.M. Produced a formula for K. Speech – wh. was generally agreed.
- R.A.B. Memo to R.P. Cttee first – after debate in National Church Assembly.  
Scott and Uthwall Reports.
- P.M. Promise here of legislation.
- S/Doms. Only on machinery.
- P.M. Where are the heads of the Bill?
- K.W. We may agree at once on machinery and compulsory purchase by l.a.’s. But previous ref. in para. talks about compensation and betterment etc. wh. are all matters on wh. we are unlikely to reach early agreement.
- P.M. Vague : general. Will create diff<sup>ies</sup>.
- L.P. Need this be in the Speech – can’t it be dealt with in the Debate.  
Catering Trades.
- M/L. Trying to complete organ<sup>n</sup> of Trade Boards. Next trade is catering trades.  
Can’t apply to Trade Bd. to it because too amorphous a trade.  
Same principle as Road Haulage Wage Bd.

Gnl. agreement or support fr. many sections of the industry. But Hotels and Rest Assoc<sup>n</sup> are raising the cry of controversy.

P.M. What about one-man family business?

M/L. That is matter for the Comm<sup>n</sup>

If you had a Trade Bd. it wd. have to cover them.

K.W. Cdn't you appoint the Comm<sup>n</sup> to enquire (non statutory) and promote leg<sup>n</sup> later to implement their recomm<sup>ns</sup> group by group.

3 Enquiries so far led to nothing.

M/L. But that was on scope – whtr. Trade Bds. cd. be applied to this industry.

Ch.Whip. a) I'm being asked is this necessary for the war.  
b) If this goes into the K. Speech, we'll get an amendment to the Address.

M/L. The trade is organised in Switzerland and in U.S.A.

P.M. I'm not against regul<sup>n</sup> of wages in these trades. The only ques is whtr. it wd. raise distracting controversy wh. we shd. find it diff. to overbear. You may get obstruction – eg. by Herbert Williams.

S/Doms. What about a Standing Cttee?

L.P.S. Let them have it on the floor. Keep them quiet.

Ch/Whip. Do you need to start the controversy early by puttg. it in K. Speech.

Agreed – Omit fr. K. Speech : but go on with the Bill (mentioning it in the Debate).

### III Malta.

K.W. Consultations taken place since last discussion.

£M.10 free gift. Available for war damage compens<sup>n</sup> under Malta leg<sup>n</sup>

Agreed. Statements in H/Lords and H/Commons (K.W.) simultaneously.

### IV Parliamentary Procedure.

P.M. At Guildhall will deal summarily with war – and say will reserve more for Parlt. In H/Commons I will speak : and will deal in narration with

these great events wh. are unfolding – and will themselves put in the right light prev. events eg. my visit to Russia. Nearly an hour.

L.P.S. Must speak on the social ques. Wind up the genl. Debate before the amendments.

Longest possible Debate on the Address.

L.P.S. to make a scheme – 11 or 12 days.

Junior Ministers and Duff Cooper shd. speak : 3 Ministers for every 2 days.

Ch.Whip. Colonial Development )  
Army Training ) subject already promised for this Debate  
Post-war )

M/L. Secret Session later to disclose true man-power position. When the figures available.



Military Situation (part-heard).

C.A.S. Air movement. Parachutists (U.S.) fr. U.K. left midnight Sat. Nothg. heard of them save a) 30 aircraft seen nr. Oran b) ordered today to go on to Bona

1 Airport Oran taken : Spitfires flown in. Also Algiers : Sp. and Hurr. flown in.

Tonight B. paratroops leavg. U.S. aircraft.

Casablanca – Fr. fighters attacked : air fighting : no news of airports captured.

Total Air Force to be put in = 1250 U.S. + 420 R.A.F. if all goes well, durg. next month.

P.M. Biggest combined effort since attack on Low Countries. And largest amphibian op<sup>n</sup> ever undertaken.

26/8 sugg<sup>d</sup> to President tht. we shd. relieve U.S. staffs of complications in planning due to anticipatg. political diff<sup>ies</sup>. Read our assumptions wh. I sugg<sup>d</sup> they shd. proceed upon. Proved by the event to have bn. sound.

A.E. Agreed.

P.M. Beg my colleagues and mil. auth<sup>ies</sup> to look on this as a springboard. We must look at once at mil. op<sup>ns</sup> undertaken fr. there. This is the moment for the offensive.

Smuts. We must go ahead at once with planning.

P.M. Tragic mistake to think we can take our time with this war. Hitler is playing now for a stalemate. This is our real danger. Never has there bn. more need for urgency in the war.

Smuts. This is our first big chance in the war. Move on at once and we shall then be able to strike hard in the spring. Vast advantages in shipping. In N. Africa we have the base for a real victory front – from the South not fr. the West.

P.M. Read exchange of telegrams with Stalin – our victory in Egypt, Torch, and promise of 20 Squadrons (U.S. & B.) to S. Russia. V. friendly in tone.

F.D.R. calls this the Second Front. We won't contradict this.

Foreign Affairs. King's Speech.

A.E. Passage in Opening Speech, about the victory.

P.M. Let the Cttee insert a para. "Prov. has blessed our Armies with notable victory ... stimulus to further effort". F.O. and L.P.S. to draft a paragraph.

Ringling Church Bells.

P.M. V. anxious to do this next Sunday.

Generally agreed – subject to progress during the week.

A.E. Supplies to Russia.

To be given Thurs. Response to 1. U.S. + British)  
2. Arrivals )

In 12 months – this is:

<u>arrivals</u>	<u>despatches</u>
2.500 aircraft	3.000
3.000 tanks	4.500
22.000 other vehicles	30.000
616.000 dt. weight tons miscellaneous	831.000

W.O. This is comparable to what we have sent to M/East. Best not say so.

Agreed – give what was sent.

Persia.

A.E. Best wait until we hear fr. Bulland. Disposed to avoid taking Persia over.

Prisoners of War.

P.M. Exchange of telegrams with P.M. Canada.

Tell Parlt. still in negot<sup>n</sup>. thro' Swiss Govt. – hope in little while to have a statement to make. We are ready at any time to untie our prs. if P.P. can get assurance tht. G. will do same.

Tell Swiss Govt. – why not try askg. both Powers whtr. they will untie.

A.E. They will ask me wht., reply I wd. give.

L.P.S. New circs. might make Swiss Govt. more willing to ask.

- P.M. Was hoping to get away with no further action for a week.
- A.E. Then I will ask Swiss if they have any news.
- W.O. will reduce the hours. No object<sup>n</sup> to Swiss getting to know this.
- Madagascar.
- W.O. Object to draft statement. Want to omit [ ]
- A.E. Risk is tht. French will raise Native Force and ask to take over mil. command of the land.
- Smuts. And add at end “under the terms of the arrangement. made with the Fr. Nat. Cttee”.
- P.M. We saw d. G. y’day : and he has behaved v. well.
- We can’t throw him over. He asked us to prevent U.S. fr. dividing the F. French.
- It was in this conn<sup>n</sup> that I was anxious to announce app<sup>mnt.</sup> of Legentilhomme.
- A.E. That is why I don’t want to refer to arrangement.
- Liability of Members of Parliament.
- M/L. Register : cards kept separately : I write askg. M.P. to define his choice : and on hearing his decision enter it on card. This is system for N.S. Acts – wd. like H. to assimilate their practice to mine.
- Approved.
- Armistice Day.
- P.M. Wd. have liked the 2 Minutes Silence and no more.
- H.O. We haven’t had it since the war. Recent decision already announced.
- B. Nationality and status of Aliens Bill.
- H.O. We shd. not go beyond French and extend to other nationalities.
- A.V.A. French naval offr. who has done v. dangerous work for us – aggrieved that pledge given by P.M. has not bn. honoured.
- Major Markham M.P. Visit to U.S.A.
- H.O. Wants to go to U.S.A. to discuss book with his publishers

See U.S. war effort.

No national advantage in letting him go. Shall I refuse?

Agreed – refuse permission : either as a soldier or as M.P. he shd. remain here.

Enemy Breaches of Rules of Warfare.

P.M. Why not publish this?

W.O. Some of it depends on inform<sup>n</sup> derived fr. prs. still in custody.

L.P.S. Deprecate early publ<sup>n</sup>.

Foreign Affairs. Spain.

P.M. Things not looking quite so good.

A.E. Agreed : not ground for special anxiety.

Report of H. makg. demand – not, however, fr. Berlin : only Rome.

Ceylon Rice Supply.

P.M. Mudaliar leaving for U.S. Canada – till Jan. Wish gt. success in his visit.

Congrats. also to M. on visit to Manchr. B'cast to India.

Jam Saheb's visits to naval and mil. stations. Thanks for their work.

C.O. Last time's conclusion – grateful to M.'s efforts : but situation no better.

Normal consumpt<sup>n</sup>. 47.000 tons a month : this therefore real minimum.

Further lt. fr. M. - G/India 36.500 tons in Nov./Dec.

Gives 60.000 + present reserve. Means no reserve at all.

x/ at end Dec.

Thus urge fresh pressure on India. War prod<sup>n</sup>. in Ceylon (rubber) already beginning to suffer.

Suggest addl. 20.000 tons fr. India in next 2 months – failg. wh. correspondg. increase in cereals fr. Australia.

M/W.T. No alternative – possible shipmts fr. Brazil or N. Orleans wd. be negligible

R.M. Oct. 6.700 tons. scut. Diff. methods calc<sup>n</sup>.

36.500 f. exclusion of fresh allotments in Nov/Dec – wh. can't be assessed yet.

Our trouble is flood cond<sup>ns</sup>. Quantity in market less than estimates of Dev. Dpts.

G/India fully aware of sit<sup>n</sup>. – establ<sup>d</sup>. separate M/Food : and central Govt. will now trench further on Provincial Govts. No further prodding fr. here will do good.

Ceylon Govt. shd. expedite despatch of their response to India.

No dir<sup>n</sup>. fr. W/Cab : better to have it to personal response by us and Cabinet Office.

After Dec. new crop will come on and M/F. will have more power to acquire.

- C.O. Reluctant to press : but want W/Cab realise x/.
- R.M. The area nearest Ceylon is the deficit area for rice, unhappily.
- A.E. Importance of rubber prod<sup>n</sup>.
- L.P. Rice is only practical solution. Wheat supplies v. diff. to increase.
- R.M. The rice isn't on market – the farmers are hoarding.
- W. If G/India wd. allow commercial firms to buy – they cd. get it fr. the hoarders.
- R.M. We have exploited the comm. agencies & it's because they have failed tht. we have put the job to Prov. Govts.
- C.O. Will impress on G/India grave importance of getting the 36.500 by end Dec.
- P.M. Magnitude of India's crop by ref. to ths. small need.
- Strategic import<sup>cc</sup>. Ceylon as naval barrier v. attack on India. Vital interest of India to buttress the people of Ceylon.
- G/India shd. therefore make a strenuous effort. Will M. convey our v. strong wish tht. further help be given.
- I.S.A. Vital importance – need 36.500 – hope for more in new year.
- R.M. Only 2m. tons in India now – end of Season.
- Publication of Beveridge Report.
- M/I. B. has asked us to facil. Press conf. enable him expound his Rpt. to English Press.
- B. also propose to have conf. Lobby Corresp<sup>ts</sup>. 2 wks before publ<sup>n</sup>.
- Workg. up political campaign. (To disclose not only contents of Rpt. but his views on it.

Response no facilities at M/Inf. or B.B.C.

- W.A.J. Saw B. tonight and told him improper to discuss before present<sup>n</sup>.
- K.W. Special interview (26/10?) D. Telegraph. "Half way to Moscow".  
Gave details of B.'s remuneration.
- P.M. Pity if such a comprehensive scheme failed to get fair chance because of propag. of its author. Cab. will have to consider – small Cttee of Ministers. He will spoil it all if he pushes it : will arouse opposition. W.A.J. shd. tell him so. Let us have a little order and discipline.  
Endorse M/Inf. proposals.
- W.O. Shdn't we suspend publ<sup>n</sup> also. Or B. will say we are depriving him of a chance to expound his own Rpt.
- M/L. Shdn't accept his date for publ<sup>n</sup>. Tell him he presents and Govt. decides publ<sup>n</sup>. Then fix a diff. date. Resentment in H/C if B. goes round expoundg.
- M/I. W.A.J.'s perm<sup>n</sup>. requ<sup>d</sup>. before B. expounds.
- P.M. The Rpt. is Govt. property. B. must be told he is not to expound the Rpt. – threaten him with Privilege.
- H.O. R. Comm<sup>n</sup>. procedure – Chairman presents and Govt. expounds.
- P.M. Promise to lay as Cmd Paper – say until then protected as Cmd Pp are.  
At same time defining our attitude to it : "like it, or not like it, or haven't made up our minds about it".

I. Migration to Dominions.

S/Doms. Ask for auth<sup>y</sup>. to consult Doms. on genl. ques.

Consulting. with Smuts and some other Dom. Ministers.

Bruce. Agree – sooner the better.

But approach will provoke enquiries as to post-war world economy – if expansionist, there will be room etc. Useful start made in discussions on economic ques. But this enquiry will intensify Dom. curiosity about these ques. No harm in that.

Migration fr. Europ. countries shd. also be opened.

We want, most people fr. here. but problem : people unwilling to sacrifice their rights here.

x/ Means will have to be found to get over this. Eg. reciprocal system. wh. will work in favour of Doms because more of our people go out.

Diff<sup>ties</sup>. of this shd. be tackled.

Agreed. (includg. demobilisation in Doms.)

D.O. to consult with Ty. on x/.

Bruce I won't take part in domestic disc<sup>ns</sup>. But may I spk. to S/Doms. later and learn your concl<sup>ns</sup>. for comm<sup>n</sup>. to Australia.

II

P.M. Future reviews of re-const<sup>n</sup>. work. Disc<sup>n</sup>. in W. Cab. every 3 months. To verify tht. work is procdg. on right lines. Periodic stock-taking.

Agreed.

III. Progress Rpt.

M.A.J. Survey – no decisions requ<sup>d</sup>. Review of genl. economic sit<sup>n</sup>. post-war.

Para. 6-7 summary. Background for our study of detailed problems.

S/Doms. Next report – means to avoid sudden deflation.

M/L. Only way through will be All Party Govt. for  $\frac{3}{4}$  years after war.



- K.W. Post-war credits – sudden increase of purchasing power – need to continue savings – v. unpopular : can be done only by united Govt.
- M/L. Inducement to convert into capital goods. E.g. bonus if they put the money into house.
- 1.8m. marriages w'out homes.
- A. Bldg. trade have bn. induced to put up a training scheme. Wd. like to announce a 20 years' bldg : but who will announce M/H. or M/Planning. V. big thing if they will train at rate of 100.000 a year. V. important because we shall be longer this time in re-tooling (12/18 mos.). Bldg. therefore is first line of defence v. unemployment.
- M.A.J To convene Cttee to decide a) demarcation betwn. M/H. on housing.  
b) training scheme.  
c) post-war bldg. programme.
- Training a) 3/4 mos. course for dilution.  
b) longer period for crafts
- B. Importance of setting agricultural policy. Wd. like to retain 1m. in ag. for some years.
- This is less dependent on external affairs.
- W.A.J. Report now being considered by R.P. Cttee.
- P.M. What prospects of getting our export trade back? What likelihood of U.S. agreeing not to have high tariffs?
- L.P.S. India – will demand goods v. their accumulated credits.
- P.M. You'll get no return from them because K.W. has "borrowed" the credits already.
- Controlled currency : but only w'in limits.
- K.W. Increase of consuming power + steady price level : this will give us best hope.
- M/L. Price level I wd. aim at is about present level. This wd. enable you to recover the export trade. Aim : 30% rise in c/living as above the war. There wd. be slight fall in prices, and this wd. relieve the Exchequer cost of stabilisation.
- K.W. First step of all is to begin our talks with U.S. Hope we shall begin soon.

M/L. Better understandg. than ever before of value as against money – and real fear of depreciation.

L.P.S. V. desirable to do it before pol. landslide in U.S.

K.W. Genl. approval of paras. 6-8 of W.P.(42)347? Agreed.

IV Demobilisation.

P.M. Based on length of service (yes) and age (no)! The young men won't wait. Experience of last war. "First out, first home" is the only principle they will understand.

M/L. But this time they've bn. called in by age group : and this means reversing the way they come out. Age therefore is a good criterion, now. Length of service introduced because benefit to territorials and those who volunteered early.

Explain it to Army in advance – so they will understand.

Para. 6 of W.P.(42)498 – Approved.

Para. 13

L.P.S. how far does (1) go?

W.A.J. See para 12.

S/Air. Para 6(a)4. Will this be made public now.

W.A.J. No. Public statement is para 13.

P.M. \* War Cab. not C.D.S. to decide.

Paras 6 and 13. Agreed.

V. Statement by Paymaster General.

K.W. This surely is o.k.

Agreed.

Reference to p. 1. can't go too fast.

V. Statement by Paymaster General.

VI Central Planning Authority.

K.W. First alternative: Cttee of Ministers + Commission for planning.  
Second " : planning to be responsibility of a M/Planning.  
Planning to be looked after by a Cttee of Ministers

Commission for some purposes – semi.judicial  
etc.

By this compromise we shd. hope to meet Parl<sup>y</sup> Beching v Uthwatt  
Rpt.

Set up: Planning = Cttee of Ministers

Planning = Minister + Commission to help him.

This is going to help, esp. with dissident Conservatives.