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PART BEGINS: April 1994	PART ENDS: 29 April 1994
	CAB ONE: [redacted]

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PREM 19/4778

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PART

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

29 April 1994

JIM MOLYNEAUX MP

I have heard through an indirect source that Jim Molyneaux is keen for the Prime Minister to receive the UUP Chairman, Jim Nicholson, together with Jeffrey Donaldson and Reg Empey. The purpose of the meeting would be to allow them to report on their visit to the United States and to discuss the talks which they are having with Michael Ancram. Jim thinks it would be best for him not to attend this meeting.

Could we have a word about this before Molyneaux calls on me on 4 May?

There are obvious pros and cons. It would be good to capitalise on the improved mood of Molyneaux and his associates, following their trip to the United States. On the other hand, the Prime Minister's diary is under its usual severe pressure; and it might create a pretty awkward precedent if he were to see one of the teams holding talks with Michael Ancram without offering meetings also to the SDLP and the Alliance Party.

RODERIC LYNE

Jonathan Stephens, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

RESTRICTED

EPU

CONFIDENTIAL

9 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1E 6JP

071-828 1884

28 April 1994

ADV/199/92

The Rt Hon Michael Howard QC MP
Secretary of State
Home Office
Queen Anne's Gate
LONDON S W 1

Dear Michael

TRANSFER OF PRISONERS TO NORTHERN IRELAND

1. My letter of 13 January set out the views of Alan Rodger and myself on various legal issues arising out of the Home Office policy of transferring prisoners to Northern Ireland on an "extended temporary" basis in order to deny them the earlier release which they would obtain under the Northern Ireland parole system following permanent transfer. We advised that there was a serious risk of successful legal challenge in the domestic courts to these extended temporary transfers. The only secure basis for the present policy would be to amend the 1961 Act to ensure that permanent transfer did not result in a reduction in the time spent in custody. We indicated that we wished to consider the ECHR issues with the benefit of assistance from the FCO and specialist counsel.

2. In your letter of 5 April to Patrick Mayhew you expressed a strong preference for modification of the November 1992 policy so as to refuse extended temporary or permanent transfer to those convicted of terrorist offences, rather than continuation of the present policy by amendment of the 1961 Act.

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The present policy

3. We have seen the Opinion of James Eadie on the ECHR issues (with which the FCO agree). We share the view expressed in that Opinion that the continued existence of differences between the early prison release regimes in the three UK jurisdictions itself carries some risk of a successful ECHR challenge. We agree that this risk would be reduced if the legislation were amended so that the transfer of a prisoner to serve his sentence in his home jurisdiction did not affect the length of time spent in custody (albeit that this period could be longer than if he had been convicted for the same crime in his home jurisdiction).

4. We have also seen further material supplied by Home Office legal advisers on the position in domestic law, including an Opinion from the counsel who acted on your behalf in the case of Grogan. We see nothing in this which causes us to modify our advice that amendment of the 1961 Act is needed (as recommended by the Inter-Departmental Working Group in 1992) if you wish to continue to transfer prisoners to Northern Ireland but deny them the generous early release provisions which apply under section 26(4).

5. You have expressed concern that if a court ruled that an extended temporary transfer was unlawful, as an artificial mechanism for avoiding the consequences of permanent transfer, you would be obliged as a matter of domestic law to make the transfer permanent. Our advice does not go this far. The basic rule is that where a court quashes a ministerial decision it does not substitute its own view but refers the matter back to the Minister to be decided afresh. It is true that in certain circumstances the factors which the Minister is required to take into account following the court's judgment may lead inexorably to a particular decision. But we do not believe that this is the case here. Leaving aside the option of granting a genuine

temporary transfer where there are grounds for doing so, you will have the choice of granting or refusing a permanent transfer. We see no reason why the striking down of an extended temporary transfer should be treated by the court as tainting or circumscribing the subsequent exercise of this discretion. We would only add that if you were to purport to refuse an application for permanent transfer on grounds which appeared inconsistent with your previous willingness to grant extended temporary transfer to terrorists - we have in mind general security considerations (as opposed to considerations specific to the individual case) - you would need to be in a position to explain this change of stance.

6. We have nothing to add to our advice of 13 January on the determination of pending applications made in reliance on the November 1992 policy. We do not consider that it would be unlawful to grant such applicants, as you propose in your letter of 5 April, short periods of temporary transfer (perhaps for 6 months) without any expectation of any further such transfer or the benefit of earlier release.

Future policy

7. We think it important to emphasise that any new policy under the existing legislation can only be a general indication of the way in which an individual case will be handled. It must not be applied in such a way as to allow the individual to argue that you have fettered your discretion and failed to consider the facts of his particular case.

8. In addition, any policy must accord with the general purposes of the legislation under which you are acting. In the case of the relevant sections of the Criminal Justice Act 1961 we believe these purposes to be essentially humanitarian. We are concerned in this context that the proposed change of policy set

out in your letter of 5 April would apply only to terrorist prisoners. The papers which have been provided to us do not provide any clear justification for the distinction between terrorist prisoners and other prisoners who have committed very serious crimes and in the absence of such justification we think the existence of a dual regime would be open to challenge, both in domestic law and in Strasbourg, by either class of prisoner.

9. We are also concerned about the distinction which the new policy would apparently draw between transfers to Northern Ireland and other transfers between UK jurisdictions. As we understand it the 1961 Act has in the past been operated without any distinction among prisoners based on the UK jurisdiction in which they originated. The policies announced in 1989 and 1992 were stated to apply to transfers between any of the UK jurisdictions. Again we believe that differentiation could, in the absence of objective justification consistent with the purposes of the Act, be challenged in the domestic courts and Strasbourg.

10. Deterrence of other terrorists has been suggested as a possible criterion for deciding future applications for permanent transfer to Northern Ireland. We do not believe, on the basis of the papers that have been put to us, that use of this criterion would be wise. Deterrence does not appear (subject of course to any further information you may have) to be a basis for differentiating between terrorist and non-terrorist prisoners, or between prisoners from different jurisdictions. Even if you were to apply the criterion for the purpose of determining <u>all</u> applications for transfer we are not clear what objective evidence exists to justify this. We doubt whether deterrence could in any event properly be treated as anything other than one of several factors to be taken into account.

11. If there is to be a change in the 1992 policy, without covering legislation, we believe that the new policy would be least at risk of successful challenge if formulated on the basis that you believe that any individual coming from one part of the UK who is convicted of a serious crime in another part of the UK should in general serve the same time in prison whether or not he is sent back to his home jurisdiction to serve his sentence. It is right that the time served in prison should be that which would normally be served in the jurisdiction where the crime is committed and sentence imposed. It would not be right that a prisoner should receive an advantage because he comes from and is returned to a different home jurisdiction. We believe such a policy has coherence and substance. The precise wording of any announcement would need care.

12. Our view of the best stance to adopt in domestic law is consistent with James Eadie's advice on the ECHR position.

13. I am copying this letter to Patrick Mayhew, Ian Lang and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever

Nick.

FAX MESSAGE

FROM: **Lord President's Office**

TO: All Departments

FOR THE ATTENTION OF: Party Clerks

NO. OF PAGES (including this one)

COMMENTS:

Mary Bames has put down Round Robin PQ on childcare facilities these will be no central guidance on this but I should be grateful to see all answers before they go

DATE:

Thanks

Gina 1/7.

TEL: 270 0489/219 4040

CONFIDENTIAL

Northern Ireland Office
Stormont Castle
Belfast BT4 3ST.

The Rt Hon Michael Howard QC MP
Home Secretary
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
LONDON
SW1

108/68/94

27 April 1994

Dear Michael,

INFRA-UK TRANSFER OF PRISONERS

Thank you for your letter of 5 April in which you repeat your concerns about the transfer of terrorist prisoners to Northern Ireland.

We have discussed your dislike of the policy announced to Parliament on 23 November 1992. I remain convinced that abandoning the policy or amending it to apply only to non-terrorists would hand PIRA a potent propaganda weapon that would be exploited to the full; not only is there considerable sympathy among moderate nationalists for the difficulties faced by the families of prisoners held in England but PIRA would undoubtedly take full advantage of the fact that we would be going back on our public commitments made to Parliament.

I am particularly concerned that you should contemplate sending prisoners for temporary transfers lasting 6 months. The process of shuttling some 35 prisoners back and forth across the Irish Sea would last well over a year, during which time incalculable damage would be done to our credibility, both at home and abroad. The movement of each prisoner back to England would undoubtedly become a public issue. I cannot agree to that.

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I do appreciate that, while the terrorist campaign continues, the movement of terrorist prisoners to Northern Ireland may upset some of our supporters. The key point, however, would be that prisoners will not serve shorter sentences as a result of a move. It is no part of our criminal justice system to punish the families of wrong-doers. Indeed, in all our jurisdictions, we are committed to the principle that prisoners should serve their sentences as close as possible to their families. This is consistent with our international position as a signatory of the European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Prisoners.

In my view we should therefore stick to our policy promulgated only 18 months ago and apply it. Nothing in this field is risk-free, but abandoning the policy carries many more risks. The heavily scorned three-day ceasefire will not be seen as having had anything to do with our decision. As to the important need for deterrence, the risk of long years in <u>any</u> prison is what will affect the minds of those 'volunteers' who are amenable to deterrence at all.

Turning now to the legal questions about extended temporary transfer, I note that further advice from the Attorney General is awaited and I would naturally like to see it before making final judgements. I agree that the one way to put the issue beyond doubt is to amend the 1961 Act. But we would first need to resolve important issues about the regime of transferred prisoners, both to facilitate the drafting of the Bill and so that we can advise Parliament on how the new transfer arrangements would work. I am thinking in particular about home leave and compassionate release: I would find it extremely difficult to ask the Northern

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Ireland Prison Service to operate a different regime for transferred prisoners. In practice, I believe that in these matters - sentence length apart - we would need to apply the regime of the receiving jurisdiction with, if necessary, responsibility for decisions passed to the receiving Secretary of State.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, to members of EDH, to the Attorney General and to Sir Robin Butler.

FROM: PS/MICHAEL ANCRAM
27 April 1994

File

cc PS/Michael Ancram (B&L) - B
PS/PUS (B&L) - B
PS/Mr Fell - B
Mr Thomas - B
Mr Bell - B
Mr Watkins - B
Mr Williams - B
Mr Marshall - B
Mrs Elliott - B
Mr Bryan - B
Mr Lyon, NIO - B

PS/Secretary of State

MEETING WITH JIM MOLYNEAUX

Michael Ancram met informally with Jim Molyneaux last night in the House of Commons. The meeting was at Mr Molyneaux's own invitation and lasted some three quarters of an hour. The reason was on the usual confidential basis: (a) to keep the Minister's point of view warm while Mr Molyneaux had gone; and (b) get a feel for Mr Molyneaux's views before talks.

2. Discussion was mostly about Mr Molyneaux's trip to the United States of America, which he found enthusiastic. He had been very well received by everyone and treated very seriously, especially by the President who had shown a good deal of interest in Northern Ireland affairs. Mr Molyneaux had indicated to the President that he was more that he expected major progress by Christmas.

3. The important point arising from that meeting is that Mr Molyneaux has returned in an extremely forward looking frame of mind. He is very keen to see progress towards an agreed Notions Paper (so long as this is not seen to cut across first). Overall, he has returned with a much more confident and certainly

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28 APR '94 10:26

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less defensive frame of mind [illegible] United States has built him up a serious [illegible] and the Minister believes that [illegible] momentum with him on the Talks front [illegible] bloody right. This new found enthusiasm [illegible] Secretary of State may wish to build upon [illegible]. It would be helpful however in [illegible] did not refer to Michael Ancram [illegible] feels that if a way can be found [illegible] back into the three stranded [illegible] terms of his public position.

4. I should also report that [illegible] Jean Kennedy-Smith has invited [illegible] Mr Maynaux has suggested that London [illegible] this invitation would appear to follow [illegible] the Kennedy clan in America.

Signed

KEITH JAGELMAN
PS/Michael Ancram

BB/MOFS/6934

FROM: PS/MICHAEL ANCRAM
27 April 1994

File

cc PS/Michael Ancram (B&L) - B
PS/PUS (B&L) - B
PS/Mr Fell - B
Mr Thomas - B
Mr Bell - B
Mr Watkins - B
Mr Williams - B
Mr Maccabe - B
Mrs Brown - B
Mr Brooker - B
Mr Daniell - B
Mr Lyne, No 10

PS/Secretary of State (B&L) - B

MEETING WITH JIM MOLYNEAUX

Michael Ancram met informally with Jim Molyneaux last night in the House of Commons. The meeting was at Michael Ancram's invitation and lasted some three quarters of an hour. Discussion was on the usual confidential basis. The purpose of the meeting from the Minister's point of view was (a) to hear how the US tour had gone; and (b) get a feel for Mr Molyneaux's disposition towards Talks.

2. Discussion was mostly centred upon a report by Mr Molyneaux of his trip to the United States about which he was most enthusiastic. He had been very well received by everyone and treated very seriously, especially by Vice President Gore who had shown a good deal of interest in the current Talks process. Mr Molyneaux had indicated in this regard to Vice President Gore that he expected major progress by Christmas.

3. The important point arising from this meeting is that Mr Molyneaux has returned in an enthusiastic and outward looking frame of mind. He is very keen to achieve progress towards an agreed Notions Paper (so long as this is not sent to Dublin first!). Overall, he has returned with a much more confident and certainly

CONFIDENTIAL

less defensive frame of mind. His performance in the United States has built him up a serious player in international eyes, and the Minister believes that this presents a potential for momentum with him on the Talks front if we get the immediate methodology right. This new found enthusiasm is something which the Secretary of State may wish to build upon at his meeting with Mr Molyneaux. It would be helpful however in this regard if the Secretary of State did not refer to Michael Ancram's meeting directly. The Minister feels that if a way can be found to gently bring Jim Molyneaux back into the three stranded process while retaining his own credibility in terms of his public position, this would be most helpful.

4. I should also report that since Mr Molyneaux's return, Jean Kennedy-Smith has invited him to dinner in Dublin. Mr Molyneaux has suggested that London might be a better venue. This invitation would appear to follow what was a warm reception from the Kennedy clan in America.

Signed

KEITH JAGELMAN
PS/Michael Ancram

BB/MOFS/6934

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER
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TAOISEACH'S SPEECH TO BRITISH IRISH INTER-PARLIAMENTARY BODY, DUBLIN 27 APRIL

SUMMARY

1. TAOISEACH ADDRESSES BRITISH IRISH INTER-PARLIAMENTARY BODY. STRONG PRESSURE FOR PROVISIONALS TO STOP PREVARICATING AND END VIOLENCE. BUT EMPHASISES LIMITED PLANS FOR CHANGE TO ARTICLES 2 AND 3. DISTINCT NATIONALIST TONE.

DETAIL

2. IN A SPEECH TO THE BRITISH IRISH INTER-PARLIAMENTARY BODY IN DUBLIN TODAY (27 APRIL) THE TAOISEACH POINTEDLY TURNED UP THE PRESSURE ON THE PROVISIONALS TO STOP PREVARICATING AND CEASE VIOLENCE. NOTING SINN FEIN CLAIMS THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE WAS THEIR TOTAL PRIORITY, HE ASKED HOW THEY EXPECTED THE PUBLIC TO BELIEVE THIS WHEN THEY SAW REPUBLICAN VIOLENCE ON THE RISE AGAIN? HAD THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT THE ABILITY AND COHERENCE TO AGREE ON PEACE, ON A BASIS THAT EITHER OF OUR DEMOCRACIES COULD ACCEPT?

3. REYNOLDS ALSO SPOKE MORE CLEARLY THAN BEFORE ABOUT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS ON CHANGING ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION, AS PART OF ANY OVERALL BALANCED PACKAGE. HE INDICATED THAT THE ONLY CHANGE HE CONTEMPLATED WAS FULLY TO REFLECT THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT, AS SET OUT IN THE JOINT DECLARATION. HE STRESSED THAT THE ''CONCEPT OF THE UNITY OF IRELAND'', EXPRESSED IN ARTICLES 2 AND 3, WAS ''VERY IMPORTANT TO MANY PEOPLE, NORTH AND SOUTH ... IT IS SEEN, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, BY NORTHERN NATIONALISTS AS A GUARANTEE OF THEIR IRISH IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP. IT CREATES IN THE SOUTH A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND AS A WHOLE. ARTICLES 2 AND 3 POSE NO PRACTICAL THREAT TO ANYONE, NOW THAT THEIR COMPATIBILITY WITH CONSENT HAS BEEN FULLY CLARIFIED, BUT THEY DO PROVIDE IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL

REASSURANCE''.

4. AS IN A SPEECH AT A CEREMONY ON 26 APRIL TO COMMEMORATE THE 75TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST DAIL, THE TAOISEACH SPOKE IN NOTICEABLY REPUBLICAN TONES. HE REFERRED AT LENGTH TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY WHICH UNDERLAY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND ACT 1920 AND THE TRAGEDY THAT THE SAFEGUARDS IN THAT ACT HAD BEEN ABANDONED, WITH NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR NORTHERN NATIONALISTS.

COMMENT

5. THE STRONG IMPLICATION OF REYNOLDS' LINE ON ARTICLES 2 AND 3 (PARA 3 ABOVE) IS THAT RADICAL CHANGE (IE TURNING THE CLAIM OF RIGHT INTO AN ASPIRATION) IS NOT AN OPTION: THE TAOISEACH'S SPECIAL ADVISER CONFIRMED THIS INTERPRETATION TO US AFTERWARDS. THIS MAY BE A NEGOTIATING POSITION, OR A BOTTOM LINE - OR, MOST LIKELY PERHAPS, REYNOLDS HAS NOT YET DECIDED.

6. THE NATIONALIST TONE OF THE TWO SPEECHES MAY REFLECT AN ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE HIGHER GROUND FROM SINN FEIN. IT MAY ALSO OWE SOMETHING TO THE IMPENDING EUROPEAN ELECTIONS ON 9 JUNE, WHERE FIANNA FAIL FACE DIFFICULTIES IN SEVERAL CONSTITUENCIES.

BLATHERWICK

YYYY

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CHIEF CLERK
SIR T DAUNT
MR ALSTON
MR BEAMISH
MR RICHARDSON

ADDITIONAL 45

NORTHERN IRELAND

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL

f/moly.rw
cc D.C. for Rod's diary & meeting arrangements

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 April 1994

CALL BY JAMES MOLYNEAUX MP

Jim Molyneaux telephoned me on 26 April, to make contact after his visit to the United States. He was still basking in the afterglow (which the Foreign Secretary carefully nurtured after his statement yesterday); and delighted at the effect which the Prime Minister's letter of introduction to Vice President Gore had produced. Judging from the usefully moderate statements which Molyneaux made in the United States, we appear to have had a decent return on the investment of help by our Washington Embassy and others in this visit.

I am trying to arrange for Molyneaux to see the Prime Minister in the fairly near future so that he can report back on the trip and have an informal discussion. We shall probably fix a short meeting at the House of Commons next week or the week after: I shall let you have the date.

In the meantime, Molyneaux has asked to call on me. He will come in at 4.30 on Wednesday 4 May. I do not need a brief, but please let me know if there are any particular points I should be aware of.

RODERIC LYNE

Jonathan Stephens Esq
Northern Ireland Office

CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL

CC RU

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CONFIDENTIAL

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND

The Rt Hon Michael Portillo MP
Chief Secretary to the Treasury
Treasury Chambers
Parliament Street
LONDON

25 April 1994

Dear Michael,

REFORM OF NORTHERN IRELAND CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION SCHEME

I wrote to you on 13 July and 8 December 1993 outlining a number of changes I proposed to make to the criminal injuries compensation scheme in Northern Ireland in light of the Home Secretary's proposals for reforming the scheme in Great Britain. I am writing now to let you, and other Cabinet colleagues with an interest, know that I am now convinced it is right to postpone the implementation of the proposed changes.

In my earlier letters I pointed out the very serious difficulties I faced in seeking to take forward reforms of this scale and nature. I anticipated vigorous opposition from all local politicians, the security forces, the judiciary and other members of the legal profession. I also explained the additional obstacles I was likely to face by virtue of the fact that the Northern Ireland scheme is based on statute, and therefore legislation should be required to change it.

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There has been escalating public opposition to any changes to the Northern Ireland scheme from a wide spectrum of interested groups in the Province. The opposition is already well orchestrated and does indeed represent a formidable set of interests - including, the Law Society, the Bar Council, local MPs, the judiciary, the security forces and their representative bodies, the District Councils, and local victim support interests.

In the current political and security situation I need to maintain, and strengthen, the morale of the community and the security forces in the face of a continuing terrorist campaign. The Government needs to be acutely aware, as I have become, of the hostility to altering a compensation scheme that is one of the main means of providing reassurance to the community, and support to those who have suffered injury of a criminal character. Yet there can be no disguising the fact that the proposed changes to the Northern Ireland scheme constitute a significant reduction in the rights of such victims. Most notably, they would lose their right of access to the courts, which is a distinctive feature of the Northern Ireland scheme, apart from the reductions in compensation which it is part of the purpose of this proposals to secure. This is far more than a case of the legal profession defending its own.

In all these circumstances I have concluded that it would be best to postpone the target date for the implementation of the proposed reforms in Northern Ireland for a year. Thereafter, I would propose to take stock of the political and security situation, and of the way the tariff scheme in Great Britain has worked in practice. Should I decide at

that stage to take forward the Northern Ireland proposals, the earliest possible date for their introduction would be 1 April 1996.

I know that, with me, you were hopeful that we could have moved more quickly. However, my political judgement is that the current circumstances in Northern Ireland are extremely unfavourable for a reform package of this nature. The changes would come at a time when the Government is already facing political difficulties in the Province. Moreover, there would be no financial savings to be realised over the 1994 Survey period, even though savings should begin to show thereafter.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Lord Privy Seal.

R26.4

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

File

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND

Mark Adams Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

25 April 1994

Dear Mark,

The Secretary of State has seen the Prime Minister's letter of 30 March to Mr Colin Parry in Warrington offering grant assistance to the development of the Warrington Project. The Secretary of State thought that the Prime Minister would be interested in the work with the Project already underway in Northern Ireland.

Department of Education officials in Northern Ireland have been in close contact with the Project since its launch in Warrington last year and have been offering advice and support towards the realisation of its aims. There is already a wide variety of activity underway which we are hoping to build on.

For example, two secondary schools in Warrington, including the school attended by Tim Parry, have accepted an invitation to join the European Studies Project which is jointly run by this Department and the Department of Education in Dublin. The Project, under which young people jointly study topics in a broad European context, has been in existence for eight years now and at present involves over 200 secondary level schools in several European countries.

Also, youth leaders in the Corrymeela Community are developing practical programmes between young people in Northern Ireland and in Warrington and it is expected that youth exchanges may result from this. In addition, pupils from schools in the Province and Warrington participated in a joint educational visit to the Czech Republic earlier this year and it is hoped that further links between the schools concerned will develop. Moreover, several Primary schools in Northern Ireland and in Warrington have recently embarked on a programme through which a whole range of prejudice issues can be explored.

To assist these contacts officials in the Department of Education in Northern Ireland have offered a £25,000 grant for the current year, principally to assist the Project organisers to employ a part-time Northern Ireland co-ordinator to liaise with Mr Donlan in Warrington and develop further links between the two areas. Interestingly, the Project organisers also hope to attract support from the Irish Government so that the programmes can have links with young people there.

The Secretary of State is hopeful that the sum total of support will enable the Project to make an important contribution to the processes of reconciliation in these islands.

I am copying this letter to Chris Hudson (Home Office) and Dickie Stagg (FCO).

Yours sincerely,

Simon Rogers

SIMON ROGERS

file

cc HO
NIO

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 March 1994

Dear Mr. Parry,

Thank you and John Donlan for your letter of 10 March about the work which the Warrington Project is doing in Tim's and Jonathan's memory to bring together and educate young people from Britain, the Republic, and Northern Ireland.

It is important that we all do what we can to wrest the initiative from the terrorists and tackle the ignorance which has contributed towards so much loss of life over the years. The Warrington Project provides a splendid example of the kind of initiative which is required if we are to achieve that goal and is a fitting memorial to Tim and Jonathan.

I have asked a number of Departments to explore the scope for helping the Project fulfil its objectives. In the short term, the Home Secretary has arranged for the Project to receive a one-off payment of £40,000. I hope this will go some way to helping the Project maintain its efforts to promote and develop mutual understanding between the communities here and in the Republic and Northern Ireland. Whether we can offer any longer-term support

is less clear and will take some time to clarify, particularly given the current constraints on Government expenditure.

I wish the Project every success in its important work.



Colin Parry, Esq.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

F/CLARIF-CH

bcc WEC
PLJ
RL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 April 1994

Dear Jonathan,

CLARIFICATION

Thank you for your letter of 22 April and for the enclosed line to take for Parliamentary use if necessary.

The Prime Minister agrees with your Secretary of State that we must avoid being drawn into further circumlocutions on the subject of clarification. He thinks it important that we should use a simple and straightforward line. Nothing should be said which might appear actively misleading, were knowledge of the substance of your letter of 20 April to become public.

I am sending copies of this letter to R J Sawers (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Roderic.

RODERIC LYNE

Jonathan Stephens Esq
Northern Ireland Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

From: The Private Secretary

Decline. file

Philippa

Request is for 15 minutes "in the coming months". On that basis, I would suggest it. Could he see the House on a Tuesday or Thursday. Could you pass to Dr Joe!

R.

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

22 April 1994

Dear Roderic,

You may recall that Dr Joe Hendron, MP for West Belfast, wrote to the Prime Minister on 8 June 1993 seeking a meeting to discuss the future of the Royal Victoria Hospital (RVH) which is situated in his constituency. Our advice then was that such a meeting would serve no purpose. At that time, Dr Hendron, together with a local GP from Protestant West Belfast, Dr Des Hall, collected a petition in favour of retaining services at the RVH.

Things have now moved on a good deal. An announcement about hospital services in the area has been made, and while some jobs will be lost at the RVH, additional jobs in the community will be created. Dr Hendron is aware of this, and is broadly content. He would however still like to present his petition to the Prime Minister, partly to demonstrate the strength of feeling locally about the importance of the hospital to the local (already depressed) economy, and partly because of the symbolic value of a petition presented by Dr Hall and himself representing the two communities of West Belfast, showing that they can work together on issues of mutual interest and thereby improving the image of the area.

My Secretary of State would now support the proposal that the Prime Minister receive the petition, and perhaps give

Drs Hendron and Hall 15 minutes of his time. There would be political advantage for Dr Hendron, a symbolic value to such an occasion and no adverse implications for health policy. Additionally, Dr Hendron has been very supportive of the Joint Declaration, and has his own reasons for wanting to press Adams, in particular, over Sinn Fein's failure to renounce violence. As such, perhaps you would consider whether the Prime Minister could find a slot in his diary for such an occasion in the coming months. The Secretary of State, or Baroness Denton, would attend any meeting to deal with any specific health issues Drs Hendron or Hall might seek to raise with the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely,

Simon Rogers

SIMON ROGERS

PM/SOFS/18118

PS TO PRIME MINISTER
NO 10 DOWNING ST

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NORTHERN IRELAND: CALL ON THE TAOISEACH

SUMMARY

1. TAOISEACH GENERALLY CONTENT WITH DEVELOPMENTS. INTENDS TO PUT PRESSURE ON ADAMS THROUGH HUME. CONCERN BUT NO CRITICISM OVER CROSSMAGLEN OPERATION. NO PLANS TO SET UP FORUM BEFORE JUNE ELECTIONS AT EARLIEST.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON THE TAOISEACH YESTERDAY FOR A CHAT ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND.

3. REYNOLDS SAID HE THOUGHT THINGS WERE GOING REASONABLY WELL. HE HAD NO RECENT INFORMATION ON THE PROVISIONALS' INTENTIONS, BUT BELIEVED THEY WERE FINDING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED VIOLENCE. HUME WOULD BE IN DUBLIN ON 22 APRIL AND HE INTENDED TO PRESS HIM TO PUT PRESSURE ON ADAMS: IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT HE AND HUME ACTED IN CONCERT.

4. REYNOLDS SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE TO STAND FIRM WITH US AGAINST NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PROVISIONALS UNLESS AND UNTIL THEY ABANDONED VIOLENCE, AND AGAINST GLOSSING THE JOINT DECLARATION. BUT HE HOPED WE WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR OUR VIEWS ON ASPECTS WHERE THE PROVISIONALS HAD GENUINE DOUBTS: THOUGH MOST ITEMS ON THE LIST RECENTLY SUPPLIED BY THE PROVISIONALS TO THE IRISH WERE FOR NEGOTIATION AND NOT CLARIFICATION, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE PROVISIONALS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SAY THAT HMG'S VIEWS ON SOME ISSUES REMAINED OBSCURE. I SAID THAT WE HAD SOUGHT TO DO JUST THAT THROUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AND IF GENUINE AMBIGUITIES REMAINED WE WOULD CONSIDER WHAT MIGHT BE DONE - PERHAPS THROUGH FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS. REYNOLDS SAID THIS WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD IN

MIND. HE WOULD NOT URGE US TO CHALLENGE THE PROVISIONALS OURSELVES: HE APPRECIATED OUR NEED TO AVOID A SLIPPERY SLOPE INTO NEGOTIATIONS.

5. I SAID THAT IF AT SOME FUTURE POINT PROVISIONAL VIOLENCE WERE TO FADE AWAY (THOUGH THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO SIGN OF THAT AT PRESENT), WE WOULD NEED A CLEAR STATEMENT BY THE PROVISIONALS THAT IT HAD ENDED BEFORE WE COULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT HAD DONE SO. AFTER PONDERING BRIEFLY, REYNOLDS SAID HE AGREED.

6. REYNOLDS ASKED WHAT NEWS WE HAD OF US OPINION. I SAID THAT THE NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY ON HIS RECENT TRIP HAD FOUND CONSIDERABLE SCEPTICISM TOWARDS SINN FEIN. THE UNIONIST LEADERS SEEMED TO HAVE GOT A BETTER HEARING THAN IN THE PAST. REYNOLDS SAID THAT AS HE HAD PREDICTED, LETTING ADAMS INTO THE US HAD WEAKENED THE PROVISIONALS CASE.

7. I ASKED ABOUT PLANS FOR THE FORUM. REYNOLDS SAID THAT THERE WAS NO POINT IN TRYING TO SET IT UP BEFORE THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN JUNE, SINCE UNIONISTS WOULD BE BOUND TO CONDEMN IT. HE HOPED THAT EVENTUALLY UNIONISTS MIGHT COME IN.

8. REYNOLDS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE REBUILDING OPERATIONS AT CROSSMAGLEN. HE UNDERSTOOD OUR DILEMMA, AND THAT WORKS HAD TO GO AHEAD, BUT THERE WAS A DANGER OF STIRRING UP SYMPATHY FOR THE PROVISIONALS. I SAID THAT THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CROSSMAGLEN OPERATION, AND INDEED ALL SECURITY OPERATIONS, WERE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED AND TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. BUT WHERE SECURITY ARGUMENTS WERE OVERRIDING, AS HERE, WE HAD TO ACT. I ADDED THAT WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP OF THE GARDAI AND THE IRISH ARMY, WHICH I KNEW HAD NOT BEEN WITHOUT OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL COST. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO MENTION THE PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT LETTER AND THE REQUEST FOR ENHANCED COOPERATION OVER HELICOPTER OVERFLIGHTS, POLICE STRUCTURES AND QUESTIONING OF SUSPECTS. WHILE SECURITY COOPERATION REMAINED GOOD, THESE WERE IMPORTANT OUTSTANDING ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD A HELICOPTER CRASH AND WE WERE FORCED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT GIVEN US THE OVERFLIGHT FACILITIES WE BELIEVED NECESSARY, THERE WOULD BE A ROW DAMAGING TO BOTH OF US. REYNOLDS, WHO WAS CLEARLY UNSIGHTED, SAID VAGUELY THAT HE LEFT ALL THAT KIND OF THING TO THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE.

9. IN CONCLUSION REYNOLDS SAID THAT THE SQUEEZE ON SUPPORT FOR THE PROVISIONALS WAS SLOWLY WORKING. WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO LET THEM OFF THE HOOK.

COMMENT

10. REYNOLDS WAS UNCLEAR ON SOME OF THE DETAILS BUT CONFIDENT THAT EVENTS CONTINUE TO UNFOLD AS HE HAS PREDICTED. HIS REACTION AT PARA 5 ABOVE WAS OFF THE CUFF AND SHOULD BE TREATED ACCORDINGLY.

11. HARNEY (PD LEADER) CONFIRMED YESTERDAY THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD TOLD THE OPPOSITION LEADERS THAT PLANS FOR THE FORUM WERE ON THE LONG FINGER.

BLATHERWICK

YYYY

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ADDITIONAL 45

NORTHERN IRELAND

NNNN

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

RL

CF

Pse return with letter
reqs. Are FCO going
to write, too?
Rem

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

22 April 1994

Fle.

Dear Rod,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE TAOISEACH

You asked for our views on your letter of 18 April to John Sawers.

We agree with you that it makes little sense for the two Prime Ministers to meet twice in a little over a fortnight. But, given this, we judge that a meeting in mid-June is the one to go for. This would be in the run-up to a meeting of the European Council, which means that attention need not focus exclusively on Northern Ireland. It would also be well timed for the two Heads of Government to discuss what may be a critical juncture on the talks/peace nexus in the wake of the European elections.

By comparison, a meeting in late May would not be able to take account of the outcome of the European elections. The next IGC, by which we hope to have made significant progress with the Irish on a joint framework document for the talks, is likely to take place in late May, so any summit would best follow that. But a meeting as late as July would be

too late for any reaction to the elections and would fall in the middle of Northern Ireland's marching season and the beginning of the summer holiday, when it will be hard to get much activity going with the political parties, if that is what the two Heads of Government want to do at that stage.

A copy of this letter goes to John Sawers and Melanie Leech.

Yours,

Jonathan.

JONATHAN STEPHENS

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CF R25/4

Prime Minister

T. Morris had let this go far too far. How long before Adams announces that you refuses to let one of your (willing) backbenchers meet him?

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

Rodent. 22 April 1994

2 Jr

File

I agree. Per a clot

Dear Rod,

MR PETER TEMPLE MORRIS MP

File with RL. - well meaning but innocent 26.4

Thank you for your letter of 14 April. My Secretary of State agreed strongly with the Prime Minister's view and accordingly saw Mr Temple Morris yesterday afternoon.

Sir Patrick told him that Sinn Fein's aim in persisting with calls for clarification without specifying to the Government what it was they wanted clarified, seemed to be to obtain a meeting with representatives of the Government, and to enter into negotiations with them, in advance of a permanent end to violence. That was unacceptable. Against that background, a meeting between a senior backbencher such as Mr Temple Morris and Mr Adams would inevitably be portrayed as a meeting with an emissary of the British Government. That would be deeply damaging and so the Government's advice was that Mr Temple Morris should not proceed with the meeting.

Mr Temple Morris immediately accepted this advice. In explaining the background, he said the idea had been floated with him from various sources including John Hume. He had discussed it last week with the Taoiseach, whom he had meet while calling on Dr Mansergh, and he understood that the

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

idea had been checked with Mr Adams through channels available to the Irish Government. A location for the meeting, and a cleric to accompany the participants, had already been identified.

The Secretary of State advised Mr Temple Morris that, in declining to participate in the meeting, he should rely on Mr Adams' refusal to condemn IRA violence and say that it was inappropriate for a senior parliamentarian to meet with someone who continued to justify the use of violence for political ends in a democracy.

A copy goes to John Sawers and Melanie Leech.

Yours,

Jonathan.

JONATHAN STEPHENS

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PAUL HILL APPEAL

SUMMARY

1. NO POLITICAL REACTION SO FAR TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION TO ACQUIT HILL OF MURDER IN BELFAST IN JULY 1974. EXTENSIVE PRESS COVERAGE, ON INSIDE PAGES.

DETAIL

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO POLITICAL REACTION SO FAR TO THE RULING OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND COURT OF APPEAL OVERTURNING PAUL HILL'S CONVICTION FOR THE MURDER OF A BRITISH SOLDIER IN 1974 ALTHOUGH THERE IS EXTENSIVE PRESS COVERAGE TODAY (22 APRIL).

3. TWO OF THE NATIONAL DAILIES CARRY EDITORIAL COMMENT. THE IRISH PRESS SAYS IT IS A ''TRAGEDY'' THAT IT SHOULD HAVE TAKEN 20 YEARS OF MR HILL'S LIFE TO ESTABLISH HIS INNOCENCE. IT NOTES HOWEVER THAT ''THE EXONERATION, WHICH HAD TAKEN SO LONG TO WIN, SEEMED ALMOST GRUDGING IN ITS TERMS'' AND CONSEQUENTLY ''IN SOME PEOPLE'S EYES'' A SHADOW WILL HANG OVER MR HILL WHATEVER THE OFFICIAL RECORD MAY SAY. THE CORK EXAMINER SAYS THAT, ALTHOUGH CLEARED OF THE MURDER OF A BRITISH SOLDIER, ''PAUL HILL WAS AGGRIEVED AT THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL YESTERDAY, WHICH IMPLIED THERE WAS SOME GUILT.'' HE WAS ''IN THE SAME POSITION AS ACQUITTED MEMBERS OF THE BIRMINGHAM SIX, WHO HEARD THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF THE WEST MIDLANDS POLICE SAY HE HAD CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE BOMBINGS IN THE CITY IN 1974, AND ALSO IMPLYING HE DID NOT ACCEPT THE INNOCENCE OF THE SIX.'' THE PAPER SUGGESTS THAT TO ALLOW THE WEST MIDLANDS POLICE FORCE ''TO INVESTIGATE ITS OWN FAILINGS IS A SAD REFLECTION ON THE ENTIRE BRITISH LEGAL SYSTEM WHICH MUST FURTHER ALIENATE THOSE NATIONALISTS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE ASKING TO SUPPORT SECURITY IN THE NORTH.''

BLATHERWICK

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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
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Prime Minister

The last sentence is certainly right. Rgds. Yes Absolutely 24.4.

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

22 April 1994

Dear Rod,

We discussed yesterday the lines on clarification. You asked for some more detailed advice on how we might deal with questioning on this topic.

Our view is that we should not overstate the difficulty we are in. Although the experience of last year and our contacts with the Provisionals naturally comes to mind, the present situation is very different from that. Then we were anxious to safeguard a necessary secret, premature disclosure of which could have jeopardised lives and what might have been a genuine opportunity to secure peace. In present circumstances the emphasis is on openness and there is nothing in the Provisionals' text itself which would be damaging to us if it became public. Our difficulty in dealing with it, however, stems from the basis upon which we have seen the document.

As I said in my letter of 20 April, the Irish Government passed it to us on an informal basis, in direct breach of the conditions set out by the Provisionals in the text. Yesterday, Sean O hUigginn reiterated to Quentin Thomas that there was no question of the Irish Government acknowledging publicly, or privately to the Provisionals, that it has been passed to us. Although the fact that it has been passed to us is awkward, the Irish were trying to help the process

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rather than to embarrass us, and we would certainly damage our relations with them - and the welcome degree of cooperation both over the peace process and through work in the Liaison Group on taking forward political talks - if we were to expose the fact that we have had the full text from them. If we could not protect confidential exchanges between Governments of this sort we might suffer on several fronts.

But there is clearly some risk of exposure. Although the Irish are unlikely deliberately to reveal that we have seen the document, its existence could become apparent through one of a number of channels, with or without a reference to it having been passed to us. If it simply became public, our response would, as our public lines state, depend on the circumstances; but if it also become clear that we had earlier been given a copy, then we might well have to acknowledge that the Irish had showed it to us informally and on a basis requiring that confidence to be respected.

In the meantime I attach a revised set of lines consistent with this approach. These seek to take account of the comments which Philippa passed to me earlier.

We have considered whether, in response to a question about our knowledge through indirect means of what Sinn Fein might want clarified, one might say: "Different people have said what they think Sinn Fein claims is in need of clarification. But Sinn Fein have not put specific points to the Government." This is factually correct, but my

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Secretary of State prefers that such a direct question, if asked, should be met with "I have nothing to add to what has already been said", as reflected in the attached lines. That avoids any risks if knowledge of what the Irish have passed us subsequently becomes public. Sir Patrick thinks we should not be drawn into further circumlocutions.

A copy goes to John Sawers and Melanie Leech.

Yours,

Jonathan.

JONATHAN STEPHENS

8

CLARIFICATION

It is for the IRA and Sinn Fein now to explain what possible justification there can be for wicked and murderous acts, such as that which killed Constable Pollock and injured Constables Carroll and McKnight in Londonderry last week. There can be no justification for any violence, whether Republican or Loyalist.

The Downing Street Declaration is very clear. Both Governments have made determined efforts to ensure it is fully understood. There will be no talks or negotiations with Sinn Fein until IRA violence has been brought to a permanent end.

Would you respond if Sinn Fein say what they want clarified?

We are not afraid of explaining what is in the Declaration and what is not, as we have already done. But we will not be drawn into talks or negotiations until IRA violence has been brought to a permanent end.

As my RHF has said, if there were genuine questions we would look to see if they had already been dealt with. Then we would consider our course of action in the light of all the circumstances.

Have you received a request for clarification from Sinn Fein?

For all their talk about clarification Sinn Fein have not told us what it is they claim needs clarifying - and it is now four months since the Declaration was signed and made public. When pressed in public they have not specified what they want clarified.

If there are genuine questions, let them be stated in public. Then everyone will know, ourselves included, at first hand what Sinn Fein are claiming. My RHF has made clear how we would react.

While Sinn Fein refuse to say in public what it is they claim needs clarifying, the inevitable conclusion is that they want to blur the vital distinction between politics and violence by drawing the Government into negotiations without a permanent end to IRA violence.

But are you aware by any means of what are the questions Sinn Fein want clarified?

I have nothing to add to what has already been said, nor to what my RHF said in the US last week.

Adams' Letters to the Prime Minister?

Sinn Fein have told you what was in those letters and I have published our replies.

150052
MDHIAN 1197

Following his statement today the Foreign Secretary took an opportunity to compliment Jim Mc. in the House on the success of his visit.

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MIPT: UNIONIST VISITS TO THE U.S.

Good

SUMMARY

1. SUCCESSFUL VISIT BY UUP DELEGATION LED BY MOLYNEAUX. HIGH LEVEL RECEPTION BY ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS A CONSCIOUS AMERICAN EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE EVEN-HANDEDNESS. MODERATE LINE ON JOINT DECLARATION AND TALKS WELL RECEIVED. UPBEAT ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR END TO VIOLENCE. MOLYNEAUX MAKES SOME PLAY OF PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER.

DETAIL

2. A DELEGATION OF UUP LEADERS LED BY JAMES MOLYNEAUX VISITED WASHINGTON FROM 18-20 APRIL. THEY WERE SEEN BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE, LAKE, TARNOFF, SPEAKER FOLEY, SENATORS KENNEDY, BIDEN AND LUGAR AND A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER OFFICIALS AND CONGRESSMEN, INCLUDING SUCH RADICALS AS JOE KENNEDY AND PETER KING. THERE WAS LITTLE U.S. TV INTEREST IN THE UNIONISTS BUT THEY GOT A GOOD RECEPTION FROM THE WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL BOARD AND OTHER PRINT JOURNALISTS. MOLYNEAUX MADE GOOD PLAY OF THE LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

3. THE ADMINISTRATION MADE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR EVEN-HANDEDNESS BY THE HIGH LEVEL AT WHICH THEY RECEIVED THE UNIONISTS. THE VICE PRESIDENT THANKED THEM FOR THE COPY OF THE LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER. HE COMMENDED MOLYNEAUX FOR BRAVELY PURSUING THE PATH OF MODERATION. THE ADMINISTARTION WANTED A PERMANENT END TO ALL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. IT WOULD CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE WAYS TO HELP. THEY DID NOT WANT TO MAKE MISTAKES BUT THEY REMAINED READY TO TAKE THE RIGHT RISKS AT THE RIGHT TIME IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. MOLYNEAUX SAID THAT GOING FORWARD WITH THE TALKS PROCESS WOULD ADD TO THE PRESSURE ON SINN FEIN TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND ENDORSE THE JOINT DECLARATION. LAKE ISSUED A

POSITIVE STATEMENT AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE GROUP (BY FAX TO THE DEPARTMENT) REITERATING THE ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO THE JOINT DECLARATION AND SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO BRING ABOUT PEACE.

4. THE VISIT PROVIDED A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR THE UNIONISTS TO GET THEIR CASE ACROSS. THEIR MODERATE LINE AND EVIDENT REASONABLENESS MADE A GOOD IMPRESSION ON BOTH THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS. THEY CORRECTED THE AMERICAN MISCONCEPTION THAT THEY HAD REJECTED THE JOINT DECLARATION AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT, UNLIKE PAISLEY, THEY FULLY SUPPORTED IT. THEY WANTED TO MOVE FORWARD IN THE INTER-PARTY TALKS WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. THEY ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE ADVANCES MADE IN THE ANCRAM ROUND AND PUSHED THEIR IDEAS OF AN INITIAL MODEST STEP TOWRADS DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT. MOLYNEAUX WAS UPBEAT ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR AN END TO VIOLENCE. THEY ASKED THE ADMINISTRATION TO PRESS THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO MOVE ON ARTICLES TWO AND THREE.

5. THE AMERICANS CONSCIOUSLY PITCHED THE UUP RECEPTION AT A HIGHER LEVEL THAN THAT OF THE DUP DELEGATION LED BY PAISLEY LAST WEEK. BUT EVEN THE DUP WERE SEEN BY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, SPEAKER FOLEY AND A NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN - A RECEPTION THAT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE A FEW YERAS AGO.

RENWICK

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MOLYNEAUX'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. JIM MOLYNEAUX AND KEN MAGINNIS CALLED IN LAST NIGHT TO THANK US FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAD MADE FOR THEIR VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND FOR ENSURING THAT THEY WERE SEEN BY THE VICE PRESIDENT, LAKE, FOLEY AND KEY SENATORS. THEY WERE DELIGHTED WITH THEIR RECEPTION AND FELT THAT THEY HAD GOT A VERY GOOD HEARING.

2. I SAID THAT I HOPED THAT THEY WOULD TAKE BACK TO NORTHERN IRELAND THE MESSAGE THAT IT WAS UTTER NONSENSE THAT GERRY ADAMS AND CO WERE WINNING THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE HERE. THE IMMENSE MAJORITY OF AMERICANS WERE TOTALLY OPPOSED TO TERRORISM IN ALL ITS FORMS. THE RESULTS OF ADAMS' VISIT AND HIS SUBSEQUENT FAILURE TO RENOUNCE TERRORISM HAD BEEN A DISAPPOINTMENT TO THOSE WHO HAD SUPPORTED IT. THERE WAS SOLID SUPPORT HERE FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION FROM THE ADMINISTRATION AS THE VICE PRESIDENT AND LAKE MADE CLEAR TO MOLYNEAUX, AND THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP. IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE UNIONIST LEADERS HAD COME TO PRESENT THEIR CASE HERE THEMSELVES. THEY SHOULD DO MORE OF THIS IN THE FUTURE.

3. MOLYNEAUX ASKED FOR HIS REGARDS AND THANKS TO BE PASSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND SIR PATRICK MAYHEW.

4. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

RENWICK

YYYY

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
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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

An awkward development. The public line is uncomfortable, though I don't have an improvement to offer yet.

Michael Ancram suspects that Anthony Berry may have an inkling of this.

Rodric

20/ii

PL prefer — answers work/ do: why - on earth - did Thomas accept it. ✓

(165)

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
Private Secretary to
The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A

20 April 1994

Dear Roderic,

CLARIFICATION

Quentin Thomas has been handed by his Irish counterpart, Sean O'hUiginn, a copy of a letter apparently from Gerry Adams to the Irish Government. Mr Adams' letter to the Irish Government encloses a list of 22 questions for clarification by the British Government. In handing this to Mr Thomas, Mr O'hUiginn made it clear that the Irish Government were not formally passing the letter and the questions to us: indeed, the letter from Mr Adams makes clear that the Irish Government is not meant to 'engage' the British Government 'until you receive confirmation that the British Government is willing to address the matters outlined above'. Of course, no such confirmation has been given.

The fact that we have seen a copy of this letter and its enclosure has potential for embarrassment if we are not careful. Although Mr O'hUiginn said that the Irish Government would not indicate publicly or privately that the paper had been passed to the British Government, we must anticipate that the Provisionals may attempt to make it

public at some stage and may claim that they have asked the Irish Government to obtain clarification from the British Government. With this, and the line which my Secretary of State took in the US last week, in mind, I attach some defensive lines to take, approved by my Secretary of State, to respond to direct questions asking whether we know the specific issues on which Sinn Fein want clarification. When he sees Mr O'hUiginn tomorrow (Thursday), Mr Thomas will point out the potential for embarrassment and will discourage him from passing similar such communications to us.

Meanwhile we are urgently analysing the questions themselves. Mr Thomas' covering minute, also attached, provides a very initial analysis. The questions contain the plainest indication of Sinn Fein's purpose to draw us openly into negotiations in advance of any move by them to end violence. Nevertheless, if they are made public, it may be to our presentational advantage to be able to point out that the answers to at least some of the questions are already in the public domain, while many others raise issues not to do with the text and which are matters for political negotiations from which Sinn Fein currently exclude themselves. For the meantime, however, we should stand on the attached lines.

A copy goes to John Sawers and Melanie Leach.

Yours sincerely,

Liz Rogers

for JONATHAN STEPHENS
Private Secretary

BB/SOFS/18146

Have you had any questions requiring clarification from Sinn Fein?

Sinn Fein have asked us no specific questions on the Joint Declaration on which they seek clarification. That is not surprising: the Joint Declaration is clear and both Governments have each said as much. [If Sinn Fein publicly put questions to us, we would, as my RHF made clear last week, consider our course of action in the light of all the circumstances.]

Do you know of any question Sinn Fein want clarified?

I will only know if and when they ask us. There have been a number of reports suggesting what Sinn Fein might want clarified, but no specific question has been addressed to us.

BB/SOFS/18146

Secret & Personal

15/4/94.

A Chara,

We appreciate your offer to obtain clarification for Sinn Féin from the British Government.

As we have already pointed out the British Government needs to provide full and frank clarification of matters contained in or related to the Downing Street Declaration so that republicans can properly assess its potential to move us in the direction of a lasting peace.

It is a matter of disappointment that they did not seize the opportunity of the recent unilateral and unconditional suspension of operations by the IRA to do so. I can only trust that the significance of this initiative has not been lost on the policy makers in London and that they will now act accordingly to move the situation forward.

The public refusal of the British to provide clarification in the way it did for all other political parties has, itself, created a political problem which would not be resolved if the clarification was provided secretly. In an atmosphere of continuing suspicion and mistrust, the British Government needs to provide some evidence that it is genuinely interested in developing a real peace process. The provision of clarification to Sinn Féin must, therefore, be accompanied by a public acknowledgment by the British Government that they have done so. In short, therefore, we are seeking some evidence that the British are now pursuing a strategy for peace rather than a strategy for victory.

Sinn Fein's democratic mandate has been publicly recognised by you. The democratic rights and dignity of our electorate must also be accepted and recognised by the British Government as part of, or in conjunction with, the provision of clarification.

As I have pointed out publicly, Sinn Fein has no great concern to be engaged in bi-lateral negotiations on constitutional matters with the British Government. In a statement on Monday 14th March I said:

"I welcome the IRA statement (of 13th March) which I consider to be a positive reiteration of its commitment to reaching a negotiated peace settlement. The search for that settlement remains the greatest challenge facing us all.

It is worth pointing out at this time that Sinn Fein has no great concern to be engaged in bi-lateral discussions on constitutional matters with the British government. These matters are more properly the business of all party talks, including the British government and with the Dublin government as the principle representative of the Irish side.

However, if the British government wishes to indicate a genuine interest in developing a peace process they should recognise our rights as a political party, the validity of our mandate and the rights of our electorate. This

is not an attempt to place conditions on talks. It is a recognition of political reality and an obvious requirement if progress is to be made.

As far as such talks are concerned I have no doubt that Sinn Fein and the British government will be involved in dialogue. The British have conceded this in principle. Unfortunately they have stalled on the conditions.

These issues are not the point of the reasonable call for clarification being made by us. Clarification has been provided to all other parties on request. Sinn Fein and our electorate have the right to equality of treatment.

Neither is clarification required as a means of negotiation. Clarification is necessary so that we can properly explore how the peace process can be moved forward. It should be provided on that basis".

The British Government has rejected this position. On Saturday, 19th March, Patrick Mayhew again dismissed our request for clarification. He, and the British Prime Minister, did so again during the recent IRA suspension of operations which presented a real opportunity to break this stalemate. The British Government stone-walled. This takes us to the nub of the problem of communication at this time.

We are prepared to be flexible, particularly given the obvious difficulties that the British have created for themselves by their public stance to date on this issue. We are not demanding a public climb-down by the British but neither can we be expected to simply concede this issue to accommodate British mishandling of the situation. The rights of our electorate and present political reality, therefore, demand that there be a public dimension to British clarification.

The provision of proper clarification combined with the recognition of our democratic mandate and the rights of our electorate would, we believe, end the present impasse and allow us to move forward.

Please find below some of the issues which require clarification by the British Government. You should not proceed however to engage with them on these until you recieve confirmation that the British Government is willing to address the matters outlined above.

Is Mise.

The matters relating to the Downing Street Declaration which require clarification are:
a)Matters of text;
b)Its interpretation by the two governments and conflicting commentary on what it means;
c)The peace process which the two governments envisage developing from the declaration.

To avoid the problems which occurred in the recent past clarification by the British Government would of necessity be formal, in writing, properly authenticated and publicly acknowledged. Though it may not be necessary there needs to be a facility for supplementary questions to be answered, if these arise.

1.
The long term political objectives of the two governments are of crucial importance if we are to move out of the present failed political structures. While accepting what he regards to be present political realities the Taoiseach has, nevertheless, clearly stated the long term objectives of the Irish Government in the search for a lasting settlement. It is essential that the British Government displays the same honesty and frankness in outlining its long term attitude towards the Irisn people. What are the British Government's long term interests and objectives in relation to Ireland?

2.
The Taoiseach has made it clear that he sees no major difference of substance between the position put by him to you in June 1993 and the Downing Street Declaration of December 15.
a)Do you share this view?
b)On what basis did you reject the June position?
c)If the difference is, as is claimed, minimal are you prepared to assist in closing this gap?

3.
The British and Irish Governments have said that political structures cannot be predetermined, now, or in the future. How do you reconcile this with your adherence to the partition of Ireland and the maintenance of the union?

4.
The British Government says, in the Downing Street Declaration, "that they will uphold the democratic wishes of a greater number of the people of Northern Ireland".
What is the British Government's precise definition of "a greater number of the people of Northern Ireland" and how would this be measured in practical terms?

5.
The British Government has said that it has "no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland". Would it not be more in accord with democratic principles for the British Government to base its Irish policy on the objective of ending the union?

6.
On March 23, 1993, a representative of the British Government told representatives of Sinn Féin that:
"The final solution is union. It is going to happen anyway. The historical train - Europe - determines that. We are committed to Europe. Unionists will have to change. The island will be as one".
Is this the position of the British Government?

7.
The British Government has said that its primary interest is to see agreement reached between all the Irish people.
a)Given the continued intransigent attitude of the Unionist leaderships, how, in real terms is such agreement to be encouraged?
b)What will be the response of the British Government if the Unionist parties refuse to engage in the search for agreement?
c)What does the British Government consider to be a 'reasonable time-scale' for agreement to be reached.
d)What is the framework which the British Government intends to create for the achievement of agreement.
e)Does the British Government accept that, given the preponderance of the nationalist position and opposition to partition among the Irish people as a whole, that substantial movement on constitutional issues by the British Government and the Unionist Parties will be required if democratic agreement is to be reached?
f)How is agreement to be measured in practical terms and at what stage does the with-holding or absence of agreement on the part of one section of the Irish people become a veto over change?

8.
Given the British Government's agreement that it is for the Irish people to exercise our right to self-determination, what is the basis for the British Government's qualification of this right in Paragraph 4 of the Downing Street Declaration?

9.
In the Downing Street Declaration the British Government gives a commitment to allow the Irish people to freely determine their future without external impediment or interference. Do you accept that the Government of Ireland Act, particularly Section 75, directly affects present political structures and that it can only be regarded as an external impediment and interference in the free determination by the Irish people of their future?

10.
How does the British Government reconcile its stated objective of maintaining the union with its declared lack of strategic or economic interest in Ireland

11.
Given the commitment by the two governments that everything will be on the table for negotiation;
a) Will the union between Ireland and Britain be on the agenda for negotiation.
b) Will the Government of Ireland Act be on the agenda for negotiation?
c) Will you give a commitment to end the Government of Ireland Act as part of an overall settlement?

12.
Given the statement by the British Government in the Downing Street Declaration that "it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent;
a) Is the continued operation of the Government of Ireland Act subject to agreement on this basis?
b) Is the continued existence of the union subject to agreement on this basis?

13.
Does the British Government accept that while the consent of a majority of the people of the 6 county state to constitutional change, as referred to in the Downing Street Declaration, may be desirable it is not a legal requirement in international law?

14.
Given the commitment in the Downing Street Declaration to work towards a balanced constitutional accommodation does the British Government accept that the present structures and arrangements do not represent a balanced constitutional accommodation?

15.
Given the commitment in the Downing Street Declaration to work towards a balanced constitutional accommodation, what constitutional options does the British Government see as being consistent with this objective?

16.
The Taoiseach has said that Unionists only possess a veto in regard to whether to belong to a sovereign United Ireland or the UK, that they do not possess a veto over the policy of the two governments or over interim measures which may be adopted. Is this also the position of the British Government?

17.
The Taoiseach has said that political parties need not accept every phrase or word in the Downing Street Declaration. In fact the DUP have rejected the declaration in total.
a) Does absolute rejection of the declaration by a political party exclude that party from involvement in talks on the development of new political arrangements.
b) Do parties which are opposed to aspects of the Downing Street Declaration have the right to dissent from it and yet be engaged in talks on the development of new political arrangements.

18.
Exploratory Dialogue.
Sinn Fein, as a matter of policy, advocates inclusive dialogue without preconditions. We do not accept the imposition of preconditions on our party or on any other party. However, in the interests of clarity we wish to explore the British Government position on these matters as outlined in the Downing Street Declaration.
a) The British Government has called upon Sinn Féin to renounce violence. What does this involve?
b) Patrick Mayhew is reported as saying that a permanent cessation of violence "is the way in which full recognition can be accorded to the mandate which Sinn Fein candidates are accorded at the polls" (Irish Times, Thursday, 14/4/94).
How does the British Government reconcile its refusal to recognise our democratic mandate with its stated commitment to democratic principles?
c) The British Prime Minister has referred to a period of decontamination for Sinn Féin. What does this mean?
d) What would be the purpose of the exploratory dialogue between Sinn Féin and the British Government?
e) How long would this exploratory dialogue last?
f) Within this process, when would negotiations about the future constitutional and political shape of Ireland take place?

19.
a) Given the declared opposition of both government's to coercion, how will the coercion of northern nationalists into the 6 county state be addressed in real terms?
b)How will the denial of nationalist rights be redressed in real terms?
c)When will repressive legislation be ended?

20.
How would the process of demilitarisation be implemented in real terms.

21.
An amnesty for political prisoners is an obvious element of a peace process. How will the British Government address this issue?

22.
The Downing Street Declaration is described as "the starting point of a

peace process designed to culminate in a political settlement". What are the subsequent steps which the British Government envisages in this suggested peace process?

SECRET and PERSONAL

QT

FROM Q J THOMAS, DUS(L)
19 April 1994
DUSL/MR/47197

PS/SECRETARY OF STATE(L&B)
-[1&2]-MR J STEPHENS*/+

cc PS/PUS(L&B)-[3&4]*/+
Mr Fell-[5]*
Mr Daniell-[6]+
Mr Rickard-[7]*
Mr Beeton-[8]+
File Copy-[9 of 9 copies]
* Mufax via Liaison(L)
\+ via Liaison(L)

JOINT DECLARATION CLARIFICATION: AN APPROACH TO THE IRISH GOVERNMENT

In the margins of the Liaison Group yesterday Mr O hUiginn gave me the attached paper "on a personal basis". He said the Irish side had received it the previous day. I asked what was meant by that: in particular could I take it that the Irish Government would not indicate publicly or privately that the paper had been passed to the British Government? He confirmed this, and pointed out that the last paragraph itself of the covering letter (which I understand is from Gerry Adams) makes clear that the Irish Government is not meant to "engage" the British Government "until you receive confirmation that the British Government is willing to address the matters outlined above". Having said that, I think we must have some doubts about the capacity of the Irish machine to respect this confidence over a significant period, particularly given Mr Mansergh's involvement (there have been a number of bits of evidence suggesting that he talks in an engagingly frank way with all sorts of people.)

2. In effect the Irish Government are, sensibly, seeking our reactions and guidance before they consider how it should be carried forward. I did not have time to read these papers before the Liaison Group broke up, though I did have time to note that the first sentence of the letter implies that the Irish Government has offered to obtain clarification for Sinn Fein from the British Government. Mr O hUiginn appeared to assent that the Irish Government had indeed said something to this effect.

3. The meeting of the Liaison Group in Dublin on Thursday (21 April) would give me an opportunity to respond to Mr O hUiginn. (Indeed the fact that it would do so was one of the considerations which enabled me to persuade a somewhat reluctant Mr O hUiginn to meet again this week.) Equally I confirmed that there would be no difficulty if the Secretary of State took the view that the best way of proceeding would be for him to discuss it with the Tanaiste in the margins of the forthcoming IGC.

4. On the substance of the paper, Mr O hUiginn indicated that it was in some ways an odd document. It was difficult to know what to make of it or how to come to grips with it. He clearly personally retains an open mind whether this, and other demands for clarification, are no more than a tactical manoeuvre by the Provisionals to cover indecision, to wrong-foot the British Government and to keep open their options, or whether lurking within all this is a serious concern to find a way to peace, though naturally on the best terms obtainable. I too think this paper does not enable us to answer conclusively the question whether they are merely manoeuvring, as they certainly are, or are also seeking a way forward.

5. The Secretary of State may wish to discuss this. He may also wish to widen the circle of those informed about it. I have deliberately restricted the circulation of this note, given both the sensitivity of the subject and the terms on which the paper was given to me. (Mr O hUiginn made it clear that in saying that he had given it to me personally he was really saying that it had not formally given to the British Government. He assumed that I would consult within my system.)

6. It may be worth making some preliminary points:

(i) The Secretary of State has said publicly that Sinn Fein have failed to specify precisely what in the Joint Declaration requires clarification; and he has

come close to indicating that if specific matters are identified which have not been covered in public statements already some kind of response, perhaps in public form, could be contemplated. Given this paper, it may at some point become difficult to sustain the line that Sinn Fein have not identified things on which they seek clarification;

(ii) on the other hand much, perhaps most, of the examination sheet set by Sinn Fein is less a request for textual exposition of the Joint Declaration than a process of wider political interrogation, seeking clarification of HMG's general policies, long-term intentions and so on;

(iii) though it would be possible to answer these questions - some of them are rather difficult - without straying into negotiation, everything about this paper justifies Mr Spring's observations, in his Tralee speech, that the Provisionals are trying to lure us into a world of verbal mirrors and shifting goal-posts (one of the most telling mixed metaphors of the year). Some of the questions are valid, and it is understandable that Sinn Fein should ask them, but they are almost impossible to answer, just as they would be if they were asked by any of the existing participants in the Talks process. For example paragraph 18(e) asks how long would exploratory dialogue last, and Question 22 asks what are the subsequent steps building on the Joint Declaration which the British Government envisages in the peace process. The truth is that Sinn Fein, if they come in from the cold, will face the same kind of uncertainties about the scope for making political

progress as the UUP, SDLP and the others have long learnt to live with;

(v) Overall the paper increases my sense that the Joint Paper we are now embarked on working up with the Irish side through the Liaison Group and the IGC has very considerable potential for the "peace process". A joint statement by the two Governments, deployed in the right way and at the right time, may be the best way of indicating how in practice the political process will be given momentum, and the extent, if any, to which the two Governments are prepared to go to carry things forward even if some participants hang back. (Underlying some of Sinn Fein's questions is the not unreasonable perception that if political progress is made dependent on the full-hearted co-operation of one or both Unionist parties the prospectus may be for decades of impasse.)

7. The Secretary of State mentioned at the Ministerial meeting yesterday the possibility of responding to the various demands for clarification in further speeches. I suggested then, knowing of this paper, that the speech opportunity on Wednesday might be premature for this. I think it would indeed be difficult to envisage a public speech which answered all the questions in this examination paper, though it would be possible to distil some of the main areas of concern and send some of the right signals in public speeches (as indeed the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister and others have already been doing ever since the Joint Declaration was made). Another approach would be a Press Statement.

8. It is helpful that the Irish side have given us an opportunity to respond informally at this stage. It is not clear that we want or can use any intermediary channel of communication with the

Provisionals, but, leaving aside that which was exposed last year, I guess that if we did want to have such a facility we are unlikely to do better than the Irish Government, despite the doubts about its discretion expressed above. (We noted in putting up the paper about Archbishop Eames, that a theoretical possibility was that Cardinal Daly would emerge clutching a piece of paper; John Hume is another obvious possibility; and various other people have been identified, or may volunteer themselves, for some intermediary function.) Equally we could seek to cut the Irish Government out of the story, by getting Adams to write again to the Prime Minister. Clearly one thing the Provisionals are doing in this exercise is seeking to keep the Irish Government in step with them by showing that there are indeed genuine questions which require clarification. We need to handle this matter carefully not only because of its implications for dealings with the Provisionals, and the prospects for peace, but also because of our wish to maintain the very close relationship built up with the Irish Government.

9. We shall be analysing the paper further and considering possible responses to it. There is considerable risk in encouraging the Irish side to put the paper to us formally: the covering letter makes clear that the demand is that HMG must acknowledge publicly that we have given clarification. This may indeed accompany a longer ceasefire, perhaps spanning the Election, which we have in any case thought a plausible scenario. (We must also bear in mind the fiction that even if Sinn Fein were satisfied they would then have to consult the IRA.)

10. Now that this paper has been written the Provisionals will almost certainly get it to us somehow (Hume? Cardinal Daly?) or simply make it public. The examination paper also makes clear the possible need for supplementary questions: that could be difficult. We need to consider a public line. This could range from a crisp dismissal; through a speech responding to the general

thrust of enquiry; to a detailed blow-by-blow response, apt for a written public statement. My own assumption is that any response, if it is made at all, would be made publicly (as Sinn Fein envisage too), and that, given the nature of the questions, a public written statement may be more appropriate than the speech we had previously envisaged.

11. It is perhaps easier to form a judgement when a draft is available. Mr Daniell and Mr Beeton are trying their hands at a response. The Secretary of State may want an early discussion; but it would not, perhaps, matter if it took place after a draft emerges. (I can always stall Mr O hUiginn on Thursday.)

[SIGNED]

Q J THOMAS
19 April 1994
OAB 6447

CONFIDENTIAL - COMMERCIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

1) GRO scan
2) RE

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
STORMONT CASTLE
BELFAST BT4 3ST

Tel. Belfast (0232) 763255
Facsimile 768938

Came by fax
& scanned

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

19 April 1994

Dear Roderic,

HUALON

Thank you for your letter of 14 April to Jonathan Stephens. As I mentioned to you on the telephone yesterday an amendment has been agreed to take account of the point about project staging. This has been agreed with HMT. A copy of the revised draft letter is attached, with the amendment underlined.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours,

Ken

W K LINDSAY
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL - COMMERCIAL

BB/SOFS/18116

DRAFT LETTER FOR SIGNATURE BY PRIME MINISTER

J Delors Esq
President
European Commission
45 Avenue D'Auderghen
BRUSSELS
B1040

SCANNED
DELORS2

April 1994

Hualon is a leading Taiwanese textile corporation which proposes to establish a large plant in Northern Ireland. This important potential investment is currently the subject of an Article 93(2) procedure. My purpose in writing is to emphasise the immense importance and regional benefits the project would bring to one of the most economically disadvantaged regions of the Community.

The Hualon project would be implemented over an eight year period. It would involve investment of around £160 million. At full capacity it would directly create 1,800 jobs with a further 500 indirect jobs. It will provide some 2,000 man years of construction work.

The project would be located near to Belfast and would draw labour both from the mainly Protestant North Belfast and the mainly Catholic West Belfast. Both these areas are severely economically disadvantaged. Unemployment levels are around 24% and 25% respectively. Fifty six per cent and 64% of these unemployed have been without work for over twelve months. Some have never held a full-time job.

In addition to its economic and social benefits, the project would be of great political importance. The links between terrorism and social and economic deprivation are well recognised. Investments such as that proposed by Hualon, when located in areas to which both sections of the population have ready access, help the political progress to which the UK and Irish Governments are firmly committed.

I understand that Karel Van Miert is sympathetic to the case, but that there are some lingering concerns about the impact this project may have on existing European producers. In their detailed appraisal of the project my officials, working with internationally recognised textile consultants, concluded that Hualon will be competing in the low cost, high volume sectors of the EC fabric market which have been increasingly penetrated by imported fabrics and abandoned by EC producers in favour of higher quality fabrics. They were therefore satisfied that the impact of Hualon on existing producers would be minimal. Indeed, Hualon's investment should be seen as a welcome reversal of the trend.

There is intense public interest in Northern Ireland in the Commission's decision. Commission clearance of Government backing for this project, <u>which will be paid out and carefully monitored as the project moves from phase to phase</u>, would be a clear endorsement of the social and economic progress which is crucial to the prospects for peace. This major investment, the largest in Northern Ireland for over twelve years, would help our efforts to build on December's Downing Street Declaration, which you so helpfully supported.

Your personal concern for the well being of the people of Northern Ireland has been much appreciated and I hope you will feel able to support the case for the proposed aid.

BB/SOFS/18117



Northern Ireland Office

Whitehall, London SW1A 2AZ

Telephone: Direct Dialling 071-210 ...6447
Exchange 071-210 3000

T. ~~be opened only by:~~

MR Roderic LYNE
PS/Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
London SW1

With Compliments

A Thomas

PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL

FROM Q J THOMAS, DUS(L)
19 April 1994
DUSL/MR/47196

File.

PS/SECRETARY OF STATE(L&B) cc PS/PUS(L&B)
Mr Daniell
Mr Rickard
Mr Archer RID/FCO
Ms Melanie Leech, CabOffice
Mr R Lyne, No.10 Downing St.

MR PETER TEMPLE MORRIS

In the margins of the Liaison Group meeting yesterday, I mentioned to Mr O hUiginn the proposal that Mr Temple Morris and others in the British-Irish Interparliamentary Body might arrange a meeting with Sinn Fein.

2. Mr O hUiginn made it clear that he was aware of this proposal and that Mr Temple Morris had discussed it with Mr Archer.

3. I said that Mr Temple Morris had made it clear that he would wish to go ahead with this only if Ministers approved. I said that I thought it was likely that Ministers would strongly advise Mr Temple Morris not to proceed. I emphasised that it was very important that no word of this should reach Mr Temple Morris from Irish sources.

4. I said, with Mr Lyne's letter of 14 April in mind, that given the importance of the two Governments standing together on all issues concerning the Joint Declaration etc., I hoped the Irish side would give no encouragement to others with similar proposals. The British line was likely to remain firmly against this kind of activity and if the Irish side were seen to be encouraging it, it would merely open up a gap between the two Governments. Mr O hUiginn duly noted and agreed to report back, making it clear that there would be some disappointment in his system as I

acknowledged there was likely to be on the part of Mr Temple Morris.

[SIGNED]

Q J THOMAS
19 April 1994
OAB 6447

CONFIDENTIAL
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

19 April 1994

Dear Roderic,

NORTHERN IRELAND: POLITICAL SITUATION

The Prime Minister told Michael Ancram that he would welcome a short update on the political scene in Northern Ireland.

Summary

2. The situation is steady and by no means unhopeful. We are past the initial excitements (and over-reactions) caused by the Joint Declaration and the parties have begun to settle into their positions in the run-up to the European elections. There remains an overwhelming desire for peace but most people are realistic about its achievement in the short term. We would not rule out another, possibly longer, ceasefire in the run-up to the European elections.

3. Our common approach, with the Irish, to the Joint Declaration and the associated issues of ceasefires and clarification continues to hold. The good news is that they have now produced a draft of the 'framework document'. This may allow us, at last, to start working on a way back to round table talks. Michael Ancram continues his discussions with the Northern Ireland parties.

4. The major lessons from my Secretary of State's recent visit to North America are the importance of both Governments continuing to be seen to stand shoulder to shoulder, and the need to avoid being perceived as inflexible on the issue of clarification.

Political Talks

5. Over the past two weeks, there has been a steadying of nerves in the political parties: partly because they have worked out their positions on the Declaration; partly as they put increasing energy into the European elections. Dr Paisley intends using the elections as a vote against the Declaration; the UUP are less volatile following the publication of their Blueprint for Stability.

6. Following the DUP last week, when Dr Paisley was on his best behaviour, it is the UUP's turn (including Mr Molyneaux) to be in the US this week including for meetings with the Administration at which my Secretary of State has urged the latter to be as forthcoming as possible. The SDLP remain bilious because of the Boundary Commission proposals, the new NI Select Committee and speculation that the Government is set to increase the powers of District Councils. But, as far as Talks are concerned, they remain friendly.

7. Michael Ancram met both the SDLP and UUP last week on our "notions" paper. The UUP gave a constructive response. While insisting publicly that they are not participating in three-stranded talks, they told Michael Ancram that they wanted to see progress before the European elections so as to isolate the DUP. However, they may envisage progress on

Strand 1 only, which would not be acceptable to the other parties. They also explained that it would help them to be helpful if we could make it clear that our discussions with them were about Strand 1 as well as Strand 2. (They prefer, by the way, the term "relationship" to "strand".) Certainly, this would pose fewer problems than the suggestion which Jim Nicholson made to the Prime Minister in Northern Ireland that we should publish details of Strand 1 (your letter of 1 April). This would merely provoke an immediate and strong reaction from the Irish Government and the SDLP who would see it as pre-empting agreement in the three stranded talks. (Not quite what Nicholson said).

8. The SDLP took the "notions" paper away for more detailed consideration. Even John Hume, who seems increasingly out of step with his more realistic Parliamentary colleagues, described it as a "reasonable agenda".

IRA Ceasefire

9. The three day ceasefire won more publicity for the IRA than its brevity deserved. The two Governments held firm on the line that it was only a permanent cessation that mattered. But the Taoiseach gave the unfortunate impression - which does not seem to have been picked up - that a longer ceasefire might have been more successful in producing a response from the British Government. Unhelpfully, but not surprisingly, John Hume called on the Government to do whatever was necessary to secure peace, including sending a back-bencher to talk to the IRA or engaging in face to face talks. Cardinal Daly and Kevin McNamara also began to wobble.

10. There are lessons in this for the future. Our line of refusing talks or negotiation in the absence of a permanent cessation remains absolutely right. But there could be problems if the IRA go for another, longer ceasefire in the near future of a kind one could not rule out in the run-up to the European elections. We are, however, in a stronger position than ever before given the way my Secretary of State has demonstrated on the record that Sinn Fein have never, for all the opportunities they have been given, spelt out what it is they want clarified and despite what was made absolutely clear in the Declaration itself and what has been said about it since.

Irish Government

11. It has been interesting to watch the position of the Irish Government. The Taoiseach has invested a great deal in "peace" and the longer Sinn Fein have delayed the more he has come under pressure, domestically, to explain where he goes from here. He has been at one with us in spelling out that the Talks process goes on despite Sinn Fein and, in the absence of good news about the ending of violence, has increasingly returned to the Talks process. Indeed, the Taoiseach's major speech last Saturday could be construed, in a curious Irish way, as an attempt to woo unionists - although, before a party audience, he still felt obliged to express a belief that a united Ireland by agreement was a realistic long term option, and he still kept an eye on Republican opinion.

12. This may have had a bearing on the fact that the Irish finally produced, last Friday, their long-awaited draft of a document designed to lead to a 'shared understanding'. This is welcome in itself for the serious commitment it shows to

the Talks process, although its details are flawed and not thought through - especially in regard to North/South institutions. It does provide a basis for further negotiation. Officials discussed it in the Liaison Group on Monday. The Irish are now, however, seriously engaged, and there will be a further discussion on Thursday (21 April) before the IGC on 25 April.

US Visit

13. My Secretary of State found a growing understanding and support for the Government's position among opinion-formers in the US and Canada. The Joint Declaration has transformed the attitudes of much of Irish America towards the British Government's policy in Northern Ireland. There were generous and warm tributes to the Prime Minister's vision and courage. The most powerful card to play was the continued unity of purpose of both Governments.

14. A number of influential Americans, however, raised genuine concerns about 'clarification'. They understood and supported our refusal to negotiate or talk with Sinn Fein in advance of a permanent renunciation of violence but, when told Sinn Fein had yet to say specifically what needed clarification, pressed strongly for their bluff to be called. When pressed whether, if Sinn Fein did specify what needed clarification, the Government would respond, the Secretary of State took the line that we would look to see if such points had already been dealt with. If not, we would consider our course of action 'in the light of all the circumstances'. (See, for example, the attached interview extract.) The Secretary of State sees this as an opportunity to put further pressure on Sinn Fein by keeping open the possibility that the Government will deal with

genuine requests, but without any direct talks or negotiations. He feels that no other answer to that direct question would now be sensible. Sinn Fein may, of course, seek to rise to the challenge.

Outlook

15. We will continue to emphasise the ever strengthening demand for peace and the opportunities afforded by the Declaration. At the same time, we will continue working with the Irish Government to finalise the 'framework document' and to agree with them how it should be played in to the best effect in the Talks process. If difficulties emerge, the Prime Minister's forthcoming meetings with the Taoiseach could help. Should we succeed in reaching early agreement on the framework document it might be possible to restimulate the parties before the June elections; there could be advantage in that, in terms of preventing Dr Paisley from dominating the political agenda. However, we are likely to be beyond the June election before we are ready - or have a shared understanding with the Irish - to start maneovures back towards round table talks.

16. I should also mention that, although Mr Molyneaux has authorised his team to carry on talking to Michael Ancram about all three relationships, in public the UUP deny that their Talks are part of the 'three stranded process'. It would not suit our purposes to highlight the contradiction. For reasons of self-protection, against the DUP, the UUP are having to say that they are not participating in the three stranded talks on the basis of the 26 March 1991 Statement.

The essential thing, however, is that they <u>are</u> continuing to talk to us - <u>and</u> about all three relationships. And that is good news.

17. I am sending copies of this letter to John Sawers and Melanie Leech.

Yours sincerely,

Sir Rogers

for **JONATHAN STEPHENS**

Jim Dougal
Having said all that, it did seem to me as well that there are many politicians here who believe that the Government should actually meet the Sinn Fein demand for clarification of the Declaration?

Sir Patrick Mayhew
Yes, I have had that expressed to me quite widely and I think when you look at it superficially that it's perfectly understandable, but I have explained to these people that on no occasion - and we are now nearly 4 months down the road - has Sinn Fein, has Mr Adams or anybody else said: - "Look, we're puzzled about this or that or the other". There was a Press Conference about a week ago now where it was reported that journalists said: "Well now look, what is it, what are the specific examples you give. Tell us one just" and the spokeswoman refused time and again. When I point that out and when I remind them that, for example, Mr Spring has said, and I warmly agree with it, that everything's on the table, it's all very clear, well then they say: "We do see your fear that what you're being asked to do is to get into negotiation". Well they know very well that we can't do that, they wouldn't do it themselves.

Jim Dougal
Sir Patrick, if Gerry Adams or any other member of Sinn Fein were to publicly detail, define or specify exactly what it is about the Declaration that they want clarified, would you find yourself in a position to do that, even publicly?

Sir Patrick Mayhew
Well, we would look to see whether it had already been answered in the many points that have been made by both Prime Ministers and other Ministers about what the Declaration contains, what it doesn't contain, since it was published. It would be very surprising indeed if anything that was raised as in need of clarification hasn't been made absolutely clear either in the Declaration itself or what has been said about it since.

Jim Dougal
But if there was, if you found something that you felt might help, would you do it?

Sir Patrick Mayhew
We always look at circumstances to see what the sensible way of reacting to them is. The Governments have thought it right to make speeches about what the Declaration says, what it means, what it doesn't say, and we would look to see whether that has been really met. If there was something that hadn't been met then we would want to look at that in the light of the circumstances.

Jim Dougal
And you would clarify publicly, or in a statement, ...?

Sir Patrick Mayhew
Well, I have said exactly what I mean to say that we would look at it in the light of the circumstances, we have already explained what it says, and we would expect and would like to find that that had already been made clear. If it hadn't been made clear, we would consider what it would be sensible to do in the light of the circumstances.

Jim Dougal
But no talking and no direct contact?

Sir Patrick Mayhew
That is absolutely right. Both Governments made that clear. I think it's a very important point here that Mr Reynolds, in the Joint Declaration, he say's that he's going to set up what I think is called 'a forum for peace and reconciliation'. That's going to take place down in the Republic. It's entirely a matter for the Irish Government. What is very significant here is that Mr Reynolds very recently has said that he would not invite Sinn Fein to take a part in that unless and until they had permanently renounced the justification for violence. Now that's pretty interesting and very significant. I'm sure that it's the right - not for me really to express an opinion about what they do in their own jurisdiction - but it's entirely consistent with what the position of the Government is about talking to Sinn Fein while they continue to justify the use of violence.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 April 1994

Dear Stagg,

HUALON

As you know, NIO recently submitted a draft letter from the Prime Minister to the President of the European Commission, lobbying on behalf of the Hualon Project.

NIO told me yesterday that they had now reached agreement on the terms of the draft with the Treasury. (FCO and DTI had given their agreement at an earlier stage.) The signed version of the Prime Minister's letter is enclosed. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its rapid transmission to Delors, supported by any explanation and oral points which UKREP may require.

I am copying this letter to Ken Lindsay (Northern Ireland Office), Peter Wanless (Chief Secretary's Office), Peter Smith (Department of Trade and Industry) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

C. R. V. Stagg, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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BM

Cle SM
c FCO
CO
DTI
HMT
NIO

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 April 1994

Dear Jacques,

Hualon is a leading Taiwanese textile corporation which proposes to establish a large plant in Northern Ireland. This important potential investment is currently the subject of an Article 93(2) procedure. My purpose in writing is to emphasise the immense importance and regional benefits the project would bring to one of the most economically disadvantaged regions of the Community.

The Hualon project would be implemented over an eight year period. It would involve investment of around £160 million. At full capacity it would directly create 1,800 jobs with a further 500 indirect jobs. It will provide some 2,000 man years of construction work.

The project would be located near to Belfast and would draw labour both from the mainly Protestant North Belfast and the mainly Catholic West Belfast. Both these areas are severely economically disadvantaged. Unemployment levels are around 24 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. 56 per cent and 64 per cent of these unemployed have been without work for over twelve months. Some have never held a full-time job.

In addition to its economic and social benefits, the project would be of great political importance. The links between terrorism and social and economic deprivation are well recognised. Investments such as that proposed by Hualon, when located in areas to which both sections of the population have ready access, help the political progress to which the UK and Irish Governments are firmly committed.

I understand that Karel Van Miert is sympathetic to the case, but that there are some lingering concerns about the impact this project may have on existing European producers. In their detailed appraisal of the project my officials, working with internationally recognised textile consultants, concluded that Hualon will be competing in the low cost, high volume sectors of the EC fabric market which have been increasingly penetrated by imported fabrics and abandoned by EC producers in favour of higher quality fabrics. They were therefore satisfied that the impact of Hualon on existing producers would be minimal. Indeed, Hualon's investment should be seen as a welcome reversal of the trend.

There is intense public interest in Northern Ireland in the Commission's decision. Commission clearance of Government backing for this project, which would be paid out and carefully monitored as the project moves from phase to phase, would be a clear endorsement of the social and economic progress so crucial to the prospects for peace. This major investment, the largest in Northern Ireland for over twelve years, would help our efforts to build on December's Downing Street Declaration, which you so helpfully supported.

Your personal concern for the well being of the people of Northern Ireland has been much appreciated and I hope you will feel able to support the case for the proposed aid.

Yours Ever,
John

Monsieur Jacques Delors

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

This letter is in support of a very big inward investment project. Sir P. Mayhew is very keen that you should write, and is supported by DTI and FCO. Michael Portillo has expressed reservations about its long-term viability, but has agreed to stage 1 of the project and to the Delors letter.

Roderic.
18/iv



TO: Roderic Lyne

FROM: Ken Lindsay
Ps/SofS
N. Ireland


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NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW: 2

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Can I have the Hurd draft back quickly pse?

INSTRUCTIONS:



To Roderic Lyne,

Amended para 3, page 2 of Hurdon letter. The underlined portion has been agreed with HMT.

Ken Lindsay 18/4

In addition to its economic and social benefits, the project would be of great political importance. The links between terrorism and social and economic deprivation are well recognised. Investments such as that proposed by Hualon, when located in areas to which both sections of the population have ready access, help the political progress to which the UK and Irish Governments are firmly committed.

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CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

18 April 1994

Dear John,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE TAOISEACH

We had a word about Graham Archer's minute of 13 April, which Dickie Stagg copied to me.

There seems to have been a misunderstanding over 26 May. I said in my letter of 11 April that the Prime Minister would probably be able to fit a meeting with the Taoiseach into the early evening of that day. We have a window in the diary between 6 and 9pm, perhaps half of which could be given over to an informal meeting with the Taoiseach. This would seem to fit with the suggestion made by Frank Murray in Dublin. I do not understand why David Blatherwick told him that the Prime Minister could not manage a meeting on that evening. We certainly don't wish to hold the meeting on Saturday 28 May (when the Prime Minister has a number of political engagements, and a number of other people may be hoping to begin their Bank Holiday weekend!).

I do not think it makes sense to think in terms then of holding the next bilateral summit on 13 or 14 June. These dates are not at the moment free in the Prime Minister's diary. Moreover, I think it would be illogical for him and the Taoiseach to meet twice in little over a fortnight. If the 26 May date can be confirmed, I suggest that we then think in terms of moving the formal summit meeting back into the second half of July, which would allow a more reasonable space between the two events. I should be grateful for your comments and those of the NIO on this suggestion.

CONFIDENTIAL

I am sending copies of this letter to Jonathan Stephens (Northern Ireland Office) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

R J Sawers Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FILE MRCM

cc FCO
NIO

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 April 1994

Dear Jim,


I understand that you will be seeing Vice President Gore during your visit to Washington next week.

You might wish to tell the Vice President how much I valued my meeting with him six weeks ago. I am grateful for the support which he and other senior members of the Administration have been giving us over Northern Ireland, which will doubtless be reflected in his meeting with you. The Administration's response to the IRA's three-day ceasefire was very similar to our own, and it is helpful that the United States has continued to emphasise the need for a permanent end to violence on the basis of the Joint Declaration.

The Vice President and I discussed Bosnia, and you might brief him on Parliamentary views on this. We are clearly in the middle of a rather tense period, in which it is important to sustain the diplomatic process so far as we can while showing that UNPROFOR will defend itself firmly against any attacks or impediments. So you might wish to tell the Vice President of the strong support extended across the House of Commons for the United Nations in handling this delicate situation.

E4

I hope that you have a most useful visit to the United States, and I look forward to hearing your impressions of it. It is important that public opinion there should hear all sides of the argument.



The Rt. Hon. James Molyneaux, JP, MP

RESTRICTED - PERSONAL

FILE
F1 HUME - MRO
bcc J. Holroyd

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 April 1994

Dear Jonathan,

CARDINAL HUME

The Prime Minister will be having a private conversation with Cardinal Hume on 4 May.

They are very likely to discuss Northern Ireland.

I would be grateful if you could provide a short brief by Friday, 29 April.

Yours ever

Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

Jonathan Stephens, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER
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VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

SUMMARY

1. SUCCESSFUL VISIT BY SIR PATRICK MAYHEW. STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION. WIDE ACCEPTANCE THAT FUTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND MUST BE DETERMINED BY CONSENT AND FOR OUR REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH SINN FEIN WHILE VIOLENCE CONTINUES. SENATOR KENNEDY URGES PUBLIC PRESSURE ON SINN FEIN TO SPELL OUT PRECISELY WHAT THEY WANT QUOTE CLARIFIED UNQUOTE. SIR PATRICK MAYHEW EMPHASISES THE NEED TO RETAIN UNIONIST SUPPORT. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL MAKE A FUSS OF MOLYNEAUX.

DETAIL

2. SIR PATRICK MAYHEW VISITED WASHINGTON FROM 13-15 APRIL. HE GOT A VERY SYMPATHETIC HEARING FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WARREN CHRISTOPHER, AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, TONY LAKE, BOTH OF WHOM EMPHASISED STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION AND EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HELP IN ANY WAY BRING ABOUT PEACE. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, JANET RENO, AND THE FBI DIRECTOR, LOUIS FREEH, RESTATED THEIR FULL SUPPORT IN THE BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISM.

3. SIR PATRICK MAYHEW SAW SPEAKER FOLEY, SENATORS MITCHELL, MOYNIHAN AND KENNEDY AND A NUMBER OF OTHER CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WHO ALSO EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION. THERE WAS GENERAL ACCEPTANCE THAT HMG SHOULD NOT BE DRAGGED INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IRA. SENATOR KENNEDY SUGGESTED THAT WE CALL SINN FEIN'S BLUFF BY PUBLICLY CHALLENGING THEM TO SPELL OUT PRECISELY WHAT THEY WANTED

CLARIFIED. SIR PATRICK DEALT ROBUSTLY WITH PETER KING AND A HANDFUL OF OTHER GREEN CONGRESSMEN WHO CRITICISED HMG FOR NOT TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE IRA CEASE-FIRE AND RAISED THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRITICISM OF THE SECURITY OPERATION IN CROSSMAGLEN.

4. NO ONE IN THE ADMINISTRATION RAISED THE ADAMS VISA. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE IT CLEAR TO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS THAT THIS WAS WATER UNDER THE BRIDGE. SENATOR MOYNIHAN COMPLAINED THAT, ALTHOUGH A STAUNCH OPPONENT OF THE IRA OVER MORE THAN A DECADE, HE HAD BEEN TRADUCED IN THE BRITISH PRESS FOR SUPPORTING THE ADAMS VISA. HE WAS TOLD THAT HE MUST EXPECT A STRONG REACTION FROM THE BRITISH PUBLIC TO ANY FLIRTATION WITH ADAMS IN THE ABSENCE OF A GENUINE MOVE TOWARDS PEACE. THERE WAS SOME INTEREST IN BOTH THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS IN THE SUPPOSED SPLIT IN THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT.

5. THE VISIT WAS WELL TIMED COMING AFTER REYNOLDS' VISIT AND THE IRA CEASE-FIRE. SIR PATRICK MAYHEW WILL HAVE NOTED THE STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION AND GENERAL CRITICISM OF GERRY ADAMS AND THE IRA FOR CONTINUING VIOLENCE. THERE WERE MANY TRIBUTES TO THE POLITICAL COURAGE SHOWN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND HMG IN DEVELOPING THE JOINT DECLARATION AND TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S OBVIOUS SINCERITY.

RENWICK

YYYY

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ADDITIONAL 45

N. IRELAND.

NWNN

MESSAGE VIA CABINET OFFICE COMCEN
FROM RODERIC LYNE, 10 DOWNING STREET
TO PROFESSOR ANTHONY LAKE, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WHITE HOUSE

Dear Tony,

As this is a little less pressing than Bosnia or Iraq, I thought I would send it in writing rather than by telephone. On the helicopters, as I told Nancy Soderberg earlier this evening (15 April), the Prime Minister was very touched by the President's gesture in telephoning. The Prime Minister is extremely sorry that the President is having to cope with this tragic accident, and appalled at the loss of the lives of so many brave Americans, as well as their French, Turkish and British companions. Do please associate the Prime Minister with condolences to their families.

My original purpose in writing was to say a few words about Ireland. While I was away last week, Philippa Leslie-Jones kept me in touch with her discussions with Nancy about your response to Gerry Adams. We were very grateful to her and you for consulting us so fully.

The ceasefire and the IRA's subsequent return to violence were disappointments, if not a surprise. But there is growing support for the Joint Declaration. We heard this from a number of sources, including long serving members of the security forces, during the Prime Minister's latest visit to Northern Ireland on 30 and 31 March. He used that visit to spell out once again that he is not going to be deflected from the measured and determined approach which he has taken towards the Northern Irish problem.

I was glad to hear from Jim Molyneaux MP that you have found time to see him when he visits Washington next week. Jim told me that he was also hoping very much to see the Vice-President, and I gather that there has been some speculation about this in Northern Ireland. I understand from Nancy that there may be a problem over the timing, but I hope that you will manage to find a way round it. These meetings will undoubtedly have a most helpful effect in Northern Ireland. You will find the Ulster Unionists in a rather nervous mood in the run up to the elections to the European Parliament in early June. In Northern Ireland, these elections tend to turn into something of a beauty contest, and Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionists are doing all that they can to garner votes from Molyneaux's Party by taking an extreme stance against the Joint Declaration. Largely as a result, I think, Molyneaux has recently shifted his public stance and has taken the line that the Joint Declaration has now run its course and should be set aside (some of his Party put it more strongly). But he is a thoughtful man who listens carefully, and it would steady his hand to hear from you and the Vice President of the beneficial impact of the Joint Declaration on attitudes in the United States.

Best wishes,

Yours every,

Roderic

RMJL
15/iv

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British Embassy
Washington

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TO [redacted]

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DRAFT LETTER FROM RODERIC LYNE TO PROFESSOR ANTHONY LAKE, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WHITE HOUSE

We can give this to Nancy Soderberg.

While I was on my Easter holiday, ~~Nancy Soderberg kindly liaised with~~ Philippa Leslie-Jones [illegible] your reply to Gerry Adams. ~~I have now~~ received the copy which was given to our Embassy (for which I understand you are not initiating publicity).

Can kindly leave in safe

If I may say so, I think that your letter strikes exactly the right note. It is particularly helpful to demonstrate to Gerry Adams at this stage that there is no ~~daylight between the Administration's stance and our own~~ and I understand that you

The ceasefire and the IRA's subsequent return to violence were disappointments, if not surprises. But there is continuing evidence that the Joint Declaration is eroding support for those who advocate violence. We heard this from a number of sources, including long serving members of the security forces, during the Prime Minister's latest visit to Northern Ireland on 30 and 31 March. He used that visit to spell out once again that he is not going to be deflected from the measured and determined approach which he has taken towards the Northern Irish problem.

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(2)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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Washington

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FROM Sir Robin Renwick

TO [redacted]

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL - COMMERCIAL

FILE JD

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 April 1994

Dear Jonathan,

HUALON

I have had a word with Peter Wanless about the Chief Secretary's minute of 14 April.

I understand that the Treasury are not necessarily objecting to the proposal that the Prime Minister should intercede with Delors. Their main concern is that his letter should not be seen as representing a commitment beyond the first stage of the project, to which they have assented.

I enclose the draft letter in the form prepared for the Prime Minister's signature (i.e., with some relatively minor editorial changes from the previous version). I should be grateful if you and Peter Wanless could take a further look at the draft, to check that it could not be read (were this private correspondence to become public) as embodying a commitment by the Government to provide support for those later stages of the project which have yet to be agreed in Whitehall. You will obviously wish to try to resolve this as quickly as possible and return the text to me for the Prime Minister's signature.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Peter Wanless (Office of the Chief Secretary, HM Treasury), Dickie Stagg (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Peter Smith (Department of Trade and Industry), and Geoffrey Fitchew and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

Jonathan Stephens Esq
Northern Ireland Office

CONFIDENTIAL - COMMERCIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

Hualon is a leading Taiwanese textile corporation which proposes to establish a large plant in Northern Ireland. This important potential investment is currently the subject of an Article 93(2) procedure. My purpose in writing is to emphasise the immense importance and regional benefits the project would bring to one of the most economically disadvantaged regions of the Community.

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, which would be paid out and carefully monitored as the project moves from phase to phase,

Your personal concern for the well being of the people of Northern Ireland has been much appreciated and I hope you will feel able to support the case for the proposed aid.

Monsieur Jacques Delors

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 April 1994

File.

Dear Roderic,

Correspondence between the White House and Mr Gerry Adams

You kindly sent me a side copy of your letter of 13 April to Simon Rogers in the Northern Ireland Office. A further copy went to Robin Renwick in Washington.

We have discussed your proposed letter to Tony Lake with Washington. They advise that Mr Lake is not aware that we have copies of the exchanges between him and Adams. They have reason to believe that Lake intended that the copies should not have been given to us. In these circumstances Robin Renwick would not wish a letter to Tony Lake to issue in the terms proposed.

I understand (though Simon Rogers may wish to comment) that the Northern Ireland Secretary, who is in Washington at present, has been consulted and has endorsed the advice that your proposed letter should not be sent.

I am copying this letter to Simon Rogers (Northern Ireland Office), Robin Renwick (Washington) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

John

(R J Sawers)
Principal Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

14-10

CONFIDENTIAL

Faxed to
071-976 7727

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 April 1994

Dear Mr King,

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GERRY ADAMS

You telephoned about Gerry Adams's recent letters to the Prime Minister. I thought that these had been published, but on checking discover that I am wrong. Sinn Fein appear not to have put out the texts; and we have not done the job for them, of course, although we have published the reply which I sent on the Prime Minister's behalf.

I am sending copies of all three letters with this fax, but would be grateful if you could treat the letters from Adams as personal rather than public until such time as Sinn Fein put them out.

Yours sincerely,

Roderic Lyne

RODERIC LYNE

The Rt Hon Tom King MP

Duty clerk
for info.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 April 1994

VISIT OF JAMES MOLYNEAUX MP TO THE UNITED STATES

From conversations which I and others have had with him, I think that Mr Molyneaux would welcome a letter from the Prime Minister giving him some points to pass on to Vice President Gore. The letter should be in the form which would allow Molyneaux to leave a copy with the Vice President.

I enclose a draft. I would like to try to get this signed this evening. May I therefore have comments from you and the FCO by telephone **by 1700 today?**

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Sawers (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

RODERIC LYNE

Simon Rogers, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

DRAFT LETTER: F\MOLY.MRM

I understand that you will be seeing Vice President Gore during your visit to Washington next week.

You might wish to tell the Vice President how much I valued my meeting with him six weeks ago. I am grateful for the support which he and other senior members of the Administration have been giving us over Northern Ireland, which will doubtless be reflected in his meeting with you. The Administration's response to the IRA's three-day ceasefire was very similar to our own, and it is helpful that the United States has continued to emphasise the need for a permanent end to violence on the basis of the Joint Declaration.

The Vice President and I discussed Bosnia, and you might brief him on Parliamentary views on this. Douglas Hurd and I were encouraged by the solid support shown by all parties earlier this week for the use of close air support by UNPROFOR and NATO, and more generally, for the robust efforts of Sir Michael Rose and his colleagues to extend the areas of ceasefire. I think that an important element on both sides of the House is that the UN acted strictly within the framework of Security Council Resolutions 836 and 844. There is a strong feeling that we should continue to back the judgement of the UN's

civilian and military leaders on the ground, and to sustain the impetus of the diplomatic process while showing that UNPROFOR will defend itself firmly against any attacks. UNPROFOR's impartiality and neutrality is another important point. We must be very careful to ensure that the UN is not drawn into the position of taking sides in the war. It is important that this point should be impressed on all parties.

I hope that you have a most useful visit to the United States, and I look forward to hearing your impressions of it. It is important that public opinion there should hear all sides of the argument.

The Rt. Hon. James Molyneaux, JP, MP

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

FILE JD

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 April 1994

Dear Jonathan,

MR PETER TEMPLE MORRIS MP

The Prime Minister has seen the minute of 13 April from Graham Archer of the FCO to Quentin Thomas at the NIO about Peter Temple Morris's interest in meeting Gerry Adams.

I understand that your inclination is likely to be the same as Graham Archer's - i.e., that Mr Temple Morris should be advised very firmly not to see Adams.

I am writing to confirm that the Prime Minister would wish Mr Temple Morris to be warned off unambiguously. It is hard to imagine that the proposed meeting would serve any useful purpose. Its most likely consequences would be to present Adams with a propaganda coup; to embarrass HMG; and to alienate the Unionists.

It seems foolish and tiresome that the Taoiseach and Martin Mansergh are conspiring with others to manoeuvre a senior Conservative back bencher into this meeting; and it is a pity that Mr Temple Morris has discussed the possibility with members of at least two other Parties, before receiving guidance from Ministers. You and the FCO might wish to consider whether there is any way that we can discourage Mansergh and co from trying to put us in embarrassing positions of this kind.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Sawers (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

Jonathan Stephens Esq
Northern Ireland Office

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

K

cst.ul/letters/2mp14.4

CONFIDENTIAL - COMMERCIAL

FROM: CHIEF SECRETARY
DATE: 14 April 1994

PRIME MINISTER

HUALON

I have seen a copy of Patrick Mayhew's letter to you of 7 April in which he seeks your support in obtaining Jacques Delors' backing to provide EC financial assistance to Hualon in Northern Ireland.

2. Patrick's letter clearly sets out the benefits that may accrue if Hualon can be established in Northern Ireland. I fully acknowledge that the project could bring significant social, economic and - perhaps most importantly at the present time - political benefits to the Province.

3. But, as Patrick knows, I have very serious misgivings about the long term commercial viability of the project. I have been prepared to agree to a package of grants and loans for the first phase of the project. But I have asked specifically that no commitment should be given, or even suggested, to support the second or subsequent phases.

4. In proposing that you should write to Delors, Patrick appears to be signalling the Government's longterm commitment to this project. I understand why; tactically it may secure EC support. But you should at the same time be aware of the very serious grounds for misgivings about the project. Patrick understandably highlights the positive features identified in the independent marketing report. But the consultants also make clear that their conclusions are qualified by a lack of concrete evidence.

cst.u1/letters/2mp14.4

CONFIDENTIAL - COMMERCIAL

5. My concern is that the letter to Jacques Delors raises the stakes and appears to signal a level of commitment which, in my judgement, the Government may ultimately not be prepared to meet.

6. The draft letter also sits a little uncomfortably with the campaign against State Aid in the European Union that DTI Ministers and I are planning - I hope with the co-operation of colleagues.

7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Patrick Mayhew, Michael Heseltine, Douglas Hurd and Sir Robin Butler.

MICHAEL PORTILLO

T-Norris
cc CDP - PS
should be
warned off by Paddy
14.4

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I cannot see that an Adams / Temple Morris meeting would serve any useful purpose except to give Adams a large propaganda coup; embarrass Hdq; and alienate the NUP.

Sir J. Hayhew should presumably warn him off very firmly.

Irritating behaviour by Albert R., & foolish of T-M to talk so widely around the House.

Rodric. 13/4.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: GRAHAM ARCHER
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND DEPARTMENT

M Lyne (Personal), No.10

DATE: 13 APRIL 1994

For info. Follows the line I understand is preferred by the Prime Minister.

13/4

cc: PS
~~PS~~ (for PS/No 10)
Sir T Daunt
PUSD
PS/SOSNI
Mr Daniell, NIO
Mr Rickard, NIO
HMA, Dublin

Mr Thomas
NIO

PROPOSAL FOR MEETING BETWEEN SINN FEIN REPRESENTATIVES AND CO CHAIRMAN OF BIIPB

1. Mr Peter Temple Morris MP has asked for Ministerial guidance on whether he should see Mr Adams in Dublin privately on 24 April together with the Irish Co Chairman of the British Irish Parliamentary Body (BIIPB), Mr Ahern. The Irish Government have encouraged them to meet Mr Adams.

2. The Northern Ireland Secretary may wish to see Mr Temple Morris next week to advise against the meeting.

3. As I told you, Mr Temple Morris talked to me a few weeks ago about the current situation on follow up to the Joint Declaration and said that he was always ready to help if required. I was politely but firmly discouraging about the scope for an intermediary and we left it at that.

4. He asked me to see him again today. Events have moved on. He has been approached by an Irish journalist, Mr Frank Connelly who has interviewed both him and Mr Adams for the Sunday Business Post. Mr Connelly had talked about him to Mr Adams who had responded that it would be helpful if he could see him. Mr Temple Morris had mentioned this to Mr Ahern his Co Chairman in the BIIPB. He had met Mr Ahern in Dublin on 11 April on BIIPB business. Mr Ahern had arranged for them both to see Dr Mansergh in the Taoiseach's office. He had been forewarned about the Sinn Fein proposal for a meeting. Mr Adams was keen to have a meeting in the next few weeks and thought it would be helpful if the two Co Chairmen could see him on 24 April ahead of the BIIPB Conference that begins on 25 April. There would be no publicity.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

ID 4327

5. Dr Mansergh took Mr Temple Morris and Mr Ahern to see the Taoiseach. Mr Reynolds thought that a meeting would help with the efforts of both Governments to get Sinn Fein to agree to a total cessation of violence. His approval appeared similar to the reasons for his earlier support for a US visa for Mr Adams. He envisaged that a message on the lines of that given to Sinn Fein by both Governments but coming from parliamentarians would be helpful. He had added that Mr Temple Morris and Mr Ahern should not expect that if they agreed to see Mr Adams anything would be achieved during the course of the meeting itself. It would be a case of building up pressures from all directions. Mr Temple Morris had responded that he needed time to think about the proposal and would wish to inform the Foreign Office about his discussion with Dr Mansergh and the Taoiseach.

6. Before talking to me Mr Temple Morris had had a private discussion with Mr Hume last night. Mr Hume, not surprisingly, had urged him to follow up the idea. Mr Temple Morris had also spoken to Mr Winnick, the senior Labour Party member of the BIIPB. Mr Winnick had also encouraged Mr Temple Morris to go ahead but had cautioned that Mr MacNamara was opposed to the idea of meetings between Labour MPs and Sinn Fein.

7. Mr Temple Morris said he would wish to be guided by ministers wishes. If they told him that he should not go ahead with a meeting he would accept their advice (but he would clearly be disappointed to be warned off). He understood the delicacy of the position including the Unionist and electoral angles. He also recognised that news of the meeting would almost certainly leak. But he would need to tell the Irish Government and those whom he had consulted if he was advised not to see Sinn Fein. If ministers did not stand in the way of a meeting he would make it clear that he was seeing Mr Adams in a private capacity but he would want briefing on the line to take. Whatever the response to his enquiry he hoped that he could see a minister next week to discuss how he should respond.

8. I warned him that I thought it unlikely that he would get a green light but undertook to consult ministers.

9. As I told you, I am not surprised that the Irish should back the idea of a meeting. It would fit in well with the Taoiseach's belief that a series of signals will encourage the moderate wing of Sinn Fein. But I assume that ministers will wish to give Mr Temple Morris a firm steer away from taking part in a meeting. News of the meeting would almost certainly get around quickly. As a senior Conservative back bencher he would be assumed to be a Government emissary. A meeting would not respond to Sinn Fein's wish for a channel to the British Government unless it was a channel for messages and it would be inherently unsuitable as a secret channel.

10. Given the Taoiseach's personal involvement with Mr Temple Morris and the proposal for an early meeting we agreed that there appeared to be a strong case for your Secretary of State himself seeing Mr Temple Morris to give him a response. I undertook that we would let him have advice early next week.

G R Archer

CONFIDENTIAL

SM
cc RL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 April 1994

Dear Simon,

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND GERRY ADAMS

Graham Archer at the FCO has sent you a copy of his minute of 12 April, attaching the exchange of letters between Gerry Adams and Tony Lake at the White House.

As Graham says, the outcome is as good as we could have hoped for. It is helpful that Lake and his team have taken fair account, this time, of the views we put to them.

I think that I ought to send Tony Lake a personal message expressing appreciation. This would provide an opportunity for one or two other observations. I enclose a draft. I would like to get it off by the weekend. **May I therefore have your comments, and those of the FCO, by 1400 on Friday 15 April?**

I assume that Lake is aware that his staff have given our Embassy copies of the correspondence. I would be grateful if the FCO could confirm this.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Sawers (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Sir Robin Renwick (Washington) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

Simon Rogers Esq
Northern Ireland Office

CONFIDENTIAL

KW

DRAFT LETTER FROM RODERIC LYNE TO PROFESSOR ANTHONY LAKE, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WHITE HOUSE

While I was on my Easter holiday, Nancy Soderberg kindly liaised with Philippa Leslie-Jones here over your reply to Gerry Adams. I have now received the copy which was given to our Embassy (for which I understand you are not initiating publicity).

If I may say so, I think that your letter strikes exactly the right note. It is particularly helpful to demonstrate to Gerry Adams at this time that there is no daylight between the Administration's stance and our own.

The ceasefire and the IRA's subsequent return to violence were disappointments, if not a surprise. But there is continuing evidence that the Joint Declaration is eroding support for those who advocate violence. We heard this from a number of sources, including long serving members of the security forces, during the Prime Minister's latest visit to Northern Ireland on 30 and 31 March. He used that visit to spell out once again that he is not going to be deflected from the measured and determined approach which he has taken towards the Northern Irish problem.

I was glad to hear from Jim Molyneaux MP that you and, I understand, the Vice President, have found time to see him when he visits Washington next week. This, too, will have a very helpful effect in Northern Ireland. You will find the Ulster Unionists in a rather nervous mood in the run up to the elections to the European Parliament in early June. In Northern Ireland, these elections tend to turn into something of a beauty contest, and Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionists are doing all that they can to garner votes from Molyneaux's Party by

taking an extreme stance against the Joint Declaration. Largely as a result, I think, Molyneaux has recently shifted his public stance and has taken the line that the Joint Declaration has now run its course and should be set aside (some of his Party put it more strongly). But he is a thoughtful man who listens carefully, and it would steady his hand to hear from you and the Vice President of the beneficial impact of the Joint Declaration on attitudes in the United States.

f\lake.sm

10 DOWNING STREET

Rod /:

1. I thought we'd offered early evening of Thursday. No joy?

2. June 13/14 - NOT ideal: I want to keep Monday 13 June free post Euro Elec Results (EEEK!!) and 14 June is PMQs.

3. Why is allowing it to drag on a

but ??

I hand Staff Supper
Thursday, 26 May
to Meeting + Supper
1800 - 2100 ??



CONFIDENTIAL

(1) cc PS/No 10

(2) Mr Thomson

Thank you

Arabella

Comments on dates?
I really don't think
we need two meetings
in a fortnight. I shall
try to avoid this. What
if we put the
Summit back to July?

PS

Robin Byng
13/4

FROM: GRAHAM ARCHER
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND DEPARTMENT

DATE: 13 APRIL 1994

cc: Sir T Daunt
Head of News Dept
Mr Rogers, NIO
Mr MacNaughton, Home Office
Mr Pitt Brooke, MOD
Ms Leech, Cabinet Office

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT

1. In his letter to you of 11 April Mr Lyne asked that HMA Dublin should make tentative soundings about dates for a meeting in late May.

2. I attach a minute from Mr Blatherwick recording his discussion about this with the Irish Secretary to the Government, Mr Murray. As you will see it appears possible to fit in:

a short restricted meeting on 26 or 28 May

a full summit on 13 or 14 June.

3. You will wish to pass this on to No 10. It may now be sensible for them to talk direct to the Taoiseach's office about firming up diary entries.

A

G R Archer

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 4326

CONFIDENTIAL

From: D E S Blatherwick
Date: 12 April 1994

To: Mr G Archer, RID (By fax)

SUMMITS

1. Thank you for your letter of earlier today. I duly delivered the letter from the Prime Minister to the Taoiseach into the hands of the Secretary to the Government this afternoon, and made soundings about possible dates for meetings. I said that we hoped there might be an occasion for a small meeting (principals plus two officials) on the occasion of the Taoiseach's visit on 27 May, though neither that day nor the previous evening were possible for the Prime Minister. A full Summit might be deferred into June.

2. Murray said that he would investigate the possibilities. A meeting earlier on 26 May might be possible (though he noted that this had not been floated with the Prime Minister). Alternatively, Saturday 28 May might be possible. The Taoiseach's diary was free, though he might well want to spend the day canvassing for the European elections.

3. As for June itself, Murray said (and confirmed with the Taoiseach's Office) that the Irish Fund dinner is on 13 June not 8 June. Again, the Taoiseach's diary looked possible for 13 or 14 June, which would fit in well with the Corfu European Council on 24/25 June. I said I did not know what the Prime Minister's commitments might be at that time, but if he was free, it looked a suitable time for a full Summit.

4. We left it that both would explore the possibilities for a restricted meeting later on 26 or on 28 May, and for a Summit on 13 or 14 June, presumably over lunch given the Taoiseach's commitment.

(Signed)
D E S Blatherwick.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

C PS
PS/PM
Sir T Dmr
HPS

114160

Mr Archer RID

Grateful for X

Rjmail Stagg

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1994

12/4 11/IV.

Mr George
Ms Clark
Letter sent by bag with fax to Dublin. HMA will echo action Friday
12/4

Dear Rodric,

LETTER TO THE TAOISEACH

With his letter of 8 April, Simon Rogers (NIO) enclosed a draft letter from the Prime Minister to the Taoiseach, mainly about security co-operation.

I now enclose the signed top copy, and would be grateful if you could organise rapid transmission through our Ambassador at Dublin.

The Prime Minister's letter anticipates a meeting in the second half of May, and the NIO tell us that the Taoiseach is thought to be planning a visit to London on Friday 27 May. It is likely that the Prime Minister will be out of London for most or possibly all of 27 May. However, he would probably be able to fit a meeting with the Taoiseach into the early evening of 26 May (although he has an engagement elsewhere at 9.00 p.m.). When delivering the letter, David Blatherwick might make some tentative* soundings on whether this time might be convenient for the Taoiseach. (On looking at the diary for late May, I fear that we will be more than usually constrained in our choice of options.)

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Simon Rogers (Northern Ireland Office), Joan MacNaughton (Home Office), John Pitt-Brooke (Ministry of Defence) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

C.R.V. Stagg, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*David should stress that this is a reading of the provisional diary, not a proposal on which we have consulted the Prime Minister yet.

CONFIDENTIAL

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 4778 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: minute and attachment from Galsworthy to Lyne dated 12 April 1994	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	8/8/18
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NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

From: G R Archer
Republic of Ireland Dept

Date: 12 April 1994

cc: PS
PS/PUS
Mr D Wright
Mr Beamish
Mr Pellew, NAD
PS/SOSNI
PS/Michael Ancram
PS/PUS, NIO
Mr Thomas, NIO
Mr Bell, NIO
Mr Daniell, NIO
Sir T Daunt PS/No. 10

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR ADAMS AND PRESIDENT CLINTON

1. The National Security Council have given the Embassy in Washington the attached copies of the letter from the Sinn Fein President to President Clinton and Mr Lake's reply.

2. Our initial line with the Americans had been that it might be best to avoid replying to the Adams letter. This was the line provided by the State Department to the NSC. However, it became clear late on Friday that the Administration had decided to acknowledge the letter. No. 10 consulted me and were able to make suggestions to the NSC. These have been incorporated in the reply.

3. It is not the Administration's intention to give any publicity to Mr Lake's letter although they assume that it is possible that Sinn Fein may have had publicity in mind.

4. I think that the outcome is as good as we could have realistically hoped for, in particular the reference to Mr Lyne's letter and the absence of any reaffirmation of a possible US role which had at one stage been in the working draft.

G R Archer

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-Apr-1994 19:03 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Julien D. LeBourgeois (LEBOURGEOIS)

FROM: M. Brooke Darby
(DARBY)

SUBJECT: adams letter - per your request

Text of letter from Gerry Adams to President Clinton (dated March 31):

I trust this letter finds you well.

By now you will have learned of the initiative taken by the IRA. I have welcomed this as a positive and significant indication of goodwill and flexibility aimed at providing space for the British government to end the current deadlock. I hope the British government will seize that opportunity.

For some time now the British government has rejected the reasonable request by Sinn Fein for clarification of the Downing St. Declaration. The provision of such would of course allow Sinn Fein to conclude our assessment of the Declaration's potential to move the situation in the direction of a lasting peace based on democratic principles and to speedily come to a definitive position.

Given that the British government had been involved in protracted contact and dialogue with Sinn Fein when it did not claim to have a basis for a settlement it is illogical that they now refuse any contact or dialogue when they claim to have such a basis.

On the other hand the Dublin government has, from its perspective, provided the necessary clarification as a means to assisting the process. This is of course most welcome and helpful.

I therefore trust that the opportunity now provided is taken up by the British government and that the friends of the Irish and British peoples in the international community will encourage them to do so.

The provision of the necessary clarification in a manner which respects the legitimacy and democratic integrity of the Sinn Fein electorate and our rights as a political party would certainly assist progress.

I know that this is a serious and genuine initiative by those concerned. It must be built upon. If it fails to create the necessary momentum especially because of the British reluctance to meaningfully engage with Sinn Fein or to recognize the rights of our electorate we must then seek other ways to move forward.

We must exhaust all possibilities to advance the peace process.

I am fully committed to doing so.

You have shown your willingness in the past to assist the peace process. The decision to grant me a 48 hour visa to enter the U.S.A. was a positive contribution to this.

I hope that you will find it possible to use your good offices again to move the whole situation on. Many thanks.

Is mise le meas (Yours sincerely),

G. Adams
President of Sinn Fein

CC: Non Records

(NONRECORD)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 8, 1994

Dear Mr. Adams:

Thank you for your letter to President Clinton of March 31. He has asked me to reply on his behalf.

As the President said publicly upon the announcement of the IRA's three day cessation of violence, we hope that Sinn Fein and the IRA will renounce violence permanently and endorse the Joint Declaration as the best path forward for peace in Northern Ireland. We have repeatedly urged all involved to end the use of violence as a means of advancing political goals; it is time for the people of Northern Ireland to resolve their differences through dialogue and negotiations. It was in that spirit that the President permitted your attendance at the peace conference in New York earlier this year.

As the end of the three-day ceasefire approaches, I urge you to work to prevent a resumption of the violence that has cost so many lives and to bring about an end to the IRA's killing once and for all. I know you have been pressing for the British government to enter into a dialogue with you. It has been pressing you for a permanent renunciation of violence and an endorsement of the Joint Declaration. In his letter sent to you yesterday, Prime Minister Major's Private Secretary Roderic Lyne set out a path for achieving the objectives you seek. Extending the ceasefire permanently could clearly lead to the dialogue outlined in Mr. Lyne's letter and I hope you will work to achieve that goal.

Again, the people of Northern Ireland have suffered the violence for too long and deserve a lasting peace. We look forward to making progress toward the important and long overdue objective.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Gerry Adams
President
Sinn Fein
51/55 Mothar na bhFal
Beal Feirste BT12 4PD
IRELAND

RESTRICTED - COMMERCIAL

f/hualon.kw

bcc RL
MF
Policy

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1994

HUALON

The attached letter from Northern Ireland Office does not appear to have been copied to you and to other addressees, although it has apparently been cleared with the appropriate departments.

Before I ask the Prime Minister to sign the letter to Delors, I would be grateful for confirmation that you and copy addressees are content with the draft. I shall assume assent if I do not hear to the contrary by 1800 on Wednesday 13 April.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Geoffrey Fitchew (Cabinet Office), Peter Smith (Department of Trade and Industry) and Nick Macpherson (HM Treasury).

RODERIC LYNE

C R V Stagg Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CONFIDENTIAL

fyi TW
cc AW

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1994

Dear Dickie,

LETTER TO THE TAOISEACH

With his letter of 8 April, Simon Rogers (NIO) enclosed a draft letter from the Prime Minister to the Taoiseach, mainly about security co-operation.

I now enclose the signed top copy, and would be grateful if you could organise rapid transmission through our Ambassador at Dublin.

The Prime Minister's letter anticipates a meeting in the second half of May, and the NIO tell us that the Taoiseach is thought to be planning a visit to London on Friday 27 May. It is likely that the Prime Minister will be out of London for most or possibly all of 27 May. However, he would probably be able to fit a meeting with the Taoiseach into the early evening of 26 May (although he has an engagement elsewhere at 9.00 p.m.). When delivering the letter, David Blatherwick might make some tentative* soundings on whether this time might be convenient for the Taoiseach. (On looking at the diary for late May, I fear that we will be more than usually constrained in our choice of options.)

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Simon Rogers (Northern Ireland Office), Joan MacNaughton (Home Office), John Pitt-Brooke (Ministry of Defence) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Roderic

RODERIC LYNE

C.R.V. Stagg, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*David should stress that this is a reading of the provisional diary, not a proposal on which we have consulted the Prime Minister yet.

CONFIDENTIAL

DCA

SUBJECT MASTER

Filed on:

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 April 1994

Dear Albert,

Thank you for your letter of 31 March replying to mine of the 24th.

The events of the past few days have demonstrated the value of the close working relationship that has developed between us and our Governments. There can be no doubt on the part of the Provisionals, or anyone else, about the firmness of our joint commitment to a permanent cessation of violence as the only route through which Sinn Fein can enter the political process. I was delighted that the forthright stands taken on your side and ours were so consistent and well-matched and indicated the firmness of our partnership in the search for peace. At the same time we shall continue to spell out in positive terms the opportunity afforded Sinn Fein by the Joint Declaration if the violence does stop for good. The letter issued by my office to Gerry Adams was drafted with this in mind.

In the overall scheme of things, it is important that the two Governments should hold the initiative and take the political process forward - whatever the Provisionals do. The sense of urgency being demonstrated by all involved in the work of the Liaison Group is, therefore, welcome. I look forward to seeing the outcome of their work after the next meeting of the IGC.

We should of course continue to keep in close touch. Meetings between us are important in taking matters forward, on the security and political fronts, and in demonstrating unity of purpose. I agree that we should review the position after the next Conference and that we should aim for a meeting in the second half of May. There will be plenty to talk about, including not only the scope to give further impetus to the political process after the European elections, but also our joint security concerns (and it would also be helpful to talk in advance of the next European Council).

On security co-operation, I understand that the Chilcot/Dalton Group will not now be able to meet again before May. (As you note, the Inter-governmental Conference will meet before then and will as usual review the security situation; but I understand that there are no current plans for it to discuss the issues which have been remitted to the Chilcot/Dalton Group.) I value the capacity of this Group to facilitate practical work, and I know that they are currently taking matters forward in a number of areas. It may be worth setting out the three issues on which I particularly hope that the Group will be able to make early progress.

The first concerns police organisation to counter terrorism. Our overriding priority here is to seek to ensure that we have structures in the Border area which are mutually supportive and complementary, with the aim of enabling our police forces not only to acquire and use intelligence with maximum effectiveness but also to focus their operational activities as sharply as possible. I believe this is a fundamental area which merits the most careful consideration, and I look to the Group to examine the options in detail.

Second, I believe there would be much to be gained by giving our police forces the reciprocal ability to question or assist in the questioning of suspects being held in the other force's jurisdiction, thus bringing us into line with the arrangements which exist between many friendly European countries. I am confident that there would be benefits to both our forces, and that such improved arrangements (which would of course apply to all types of crime) would be widely accepted as being in our mutual interest.

Third, an issue which is of considerable concern to me and has I know been the subject of much discussion is border flight safety zones. Here, in the interests of increasing the safety of security force helicopter operations (which have developed considerably in recent years), we are seeking limited flexibility to overfly in designated areas where the border constrains the use of the safest flight paths in variable weather conditions. In addition to the safety considerations, helicopters using the current, predictable, flight paths are particularly vulnerable to terrorist attack in their immediate approach to and departure from border security force bases. (Last month's attack in Crossmaglen clearly showed the terrorists' determination to attack helicopters.) I am concerned that it is only a matter of time before lives are lost. While I know that this proposal is not without difficulties for you, I do assure you that helicopter flight safety is a real, serious and growing problem for us. I hope the Group will be able to propose a sensible and practical arrangement to minimise the risk to helicopters in the border area.

I do of course agree with you on the need to avoid security co-operation measures which benefit the terrorists. In practice, I hope that our assessments of the balance of advantage from particular measures would be very close, but even where they do not entirely coincide I trust that our strong mutual

determination to defeat terrorism will enable us to reach an accord on the way forward. If there are continuing difficulties with specific proposals, then that clearly strengthens further the case for us to review the position together on the basis of a report from the Chilcot/Dalton Group (which would reflect not only their own work but also any discussion of the issues in the Inter-governmental Conference).

I look forward to seeing you in May, diaries permitting, to discuss these issues.

Yours Ever,
John

Mr Albert Reynolds TD

From: Philippa Leslie-Jones
Date: 8 April 1994

File

RODERIC LYNE

US REPLY TO GERRY ADAMS LETTER

I mentioned to you today that the Americans were considering sending a reply from Tony Lake to the letter Gerry Adams sent to Clinton.

After consulting the NIO and FCO, I had several conversations with Nancy Soderburger about this. In the end the letter seemed more or less alright; it stresses the need to a permanent end of violence and ends with a rather helpful paragraph:

> "I know you have been pressing the British Government to enter into a dialogue with you. It has been pressing for a permanent renunciation of violence and endorsement of the Joint Declaration. In his letter sent to you yesterday Roderic Lyne set out a path for achieving the objectives you seek. Extending the cease fire permanently could clearly lead to the dialogue outlined by Mr. Lyne, and I hope you will work to achieve that goal."

However there was one doubtful passage in the letter, referring to the United States interest in peace and an end to violence which was why the President permitted Gerry Adams' attendance at the Peace Conference. The passage concludes that "the US stands ready to assist for working for peace in Northern Ireland". I explained our problems with this (it might look like an offer to Adams of, for example, US mediation). Soderburger insisted he would not take it in this way; the US had used the same phrase publicly on many occasions.

But she took note and agreed to pass on our doubts. She accepted that at least some amendment separating the reference to Adams at the Conference and the US readiness to help, would be better.

I don't know how the final draft will emerge. Soderburger said she would let us know, but was coy about sending a copy. They plan to get it out before the end of the cease fire tonight. They do not propose to publish it, unless there is unhelpful speculation about its contents. They will however make it clear that they reiterated their call for a permanent end to violence.

Marie Mills

pp **PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES**
8 APRIL 1994

[PLJ\Adams.MRM]

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OTTAWA FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND'S PARTY

ADAMS LETTER TO CLINTON

SUMMARY

1. NSC BRIEFING ON ADAMS' LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON. APPARENTLY NOTHING NEW. CLINTON HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO REPLY. NSC ASK WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING HELPFUL THEY CAN DO.

DETAIL

2. NANCY SODERBERG IN THE NSC TELEPHONED US TODAY TO BRIEF US ON GERRY ADAMS' LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON MENTIONED IN TODAY'S IRISH TIMES. SHE SAID IT APPEARED TO CONTAIN NOTHING NEW OR NOTEWORTHY, BUT IT WAS THE FIRST TIME ADAMS HAD WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT. SHE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE COPY OF ROD LYNE'S LETTER TO ADAMS, WHICH WE HAD SENT HER.

3. ADAMS' LETTER WAS DATED 31 MARCH. HE WELCOMED THE IRA CEASE-FIRE. THIS WAS A POSITIVE AND SIGNIFICANT GESTURE OF GOODWILL. HE HOPED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD RESPOND. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD CLARIFY THE JOINT DECLARATION TO SINN FEIN. THEY HAD HAD CONTACT WITH SINN FEIN BEFORE AND IT WAS ILLOGICAL FOR THEM TO REFUSE TO DO SO NOW. DUBLIN HAD PROVIDED CLARIFICATION. ALL FRIENDS OF THE IRISH PEOPLE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SINN FEIN ELECTORATE SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED. IF THIS FAILED TO CREATE THE NECESSARY MOMENTUM THEN THEY WOULD SEEK OTHER WAYS TO MOVE FORWARD. ADAMS SAID HE WAS COMMITTED TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND ASKED CLINTON TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES TO MOVE THE SITUATION ON.

4. SODERBERG SAID THEY HAD NOT INTENDED TO MAKE THE EXISTANCE OF THE LETTER PUBLIC. THEY WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHING IT. IF ASKED ABOUT IT THEY WOULD CONFIRM RECEIPT BUT REFUSE TO COMMENT

ON THE CONTENTS. THEY WOULD STRESS THEIR HOPE FOR A PERMANENT CESSATION OF VIOLENCE. THEY HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO REPLY. THEY WOULD WAIT TO SEE DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS BEFORE MAKING A DECISION. IF THEY COULD BE HELPFUL IN RESPONDING WE SHOULD LET THEM KNOW.

5. SENATOR TED KENNEDY'S OFFICE ALSO CALLED US TO LET US KNOW THEY HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM ADAMS. IT TOO APPEARED TO SAY NOTHING NEW. IT STRESSED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THREE DAY CEASE-FIRE AND SAID HOW HARD THIS HAD BEEN FOR ADAMS TO ACHIEVE. KENNEDY'S OFFICE WELCOMED LYNE'S LETTER TO ADAMS.

RENWICK

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ADDITIONAL 45

NORTHERN IRELAND

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SECRET

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Prime Minister

re timing of this operation is not ideal (end of the ceasefire) but the NIO judge the risk to Crossmaglen to be high, and it might be a target for a first strike after the ceasefire.

The Taoiseach may try to phone you about this: points to make are included in this brief.

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Ms Philippa Leslie-Jones
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1 2AA

8th April 1994

Dear Philippa,

The purpose of this letter is to advise the Prime Minister about a major security operation which is to begin in Crossmaglen, Co Armagh at 18.30 on Sunday 10 April.

Crossmaglen Security Force Base, which is jointly occupied by the RUC and the Army, is the subject of repeated sniper and mortar attack by the Provisional IRA. Since February 1993 there have, for example, been five mortar attacks on the base causing a number of security force and civilian casualties. The latest mortar attack, on 19 March, brought down a helicopter and it was only by good fortune that lives were not lost.

The building does not provide adequate protection against mortar attack for personnel working within it, and additional protective measures are urgently required. These include "hardening" of the building and the erection of an elevated sangar. The work is expected to take about 3 months.

The operation will begin at 1830 on Sunday 10 April when, because of the very high risk to those carrying out the work, it will be necessary to move additional troops into the area. Vehicle checkpoints to control all traffic entering the town will also be necessary. It is inevitable that this will also cause some inconvenience to locals. In

addition, there will be some disruption caused by the large numbers of lorries bringing in building materials, and some increase in noise from additional helicopter flights.

To facilitate work on the base and the establishment of vehicle checkpoints it will be necessary to acquire compulsorily several small areas of land, including land belonging to the local Gaelic Athletic Football Club which is adjacent to the base. The latter, in particular, is likely to be resented.

The decision to proceed with this operation was taken after very careful consideration by the security forces in consultation with the Secretary of State. The threat to the base is very high and the lives of those occupying it are considered to be at an unacceptable level of risk. Although the work on the base will for a period inevitably increase the risk to security force personnel and civilian workers, the threat to the base is such that Ministers have concluded that there is no scope for delay.

While it is perhaps not ideal that the operation is scheduled to begin shortly after the end of the PIRA ceasefire, the choice of date is coincidental and in any case there is a real risk that the terrorists might try to mark the end of the ceasefire with a further attack on Crossmaglen which they regard as a prime target.

Any advance warning of the operation would greatly increase the threat against personnel engaged on it and the plans have been kept strictly on a "need to know" basis (although the Secretary of State did brief the local MP, Seamus Mallon, in general terms). We have also today briefed the

Irish through the Secretariat (Irish Ministers heard of the operation initially from the Garda, since the RUC had to ask for the assistance of the Irish security forces some time in advance).

A detailed handling plan has been prepared and will be fully deployed on Monday morning once the security measures are in place.

It is just possible that the Taoiseach will attempt to contact the Prime Minister to express unease about the matter. If so, the points to make are:

i) overwhelming operational case in favour of this project;

ii) understand Irish officials at the Secretariat have been briefed in advance and that Sir John Wheeler is writing to Mrs Geoghegan-Quinn;

iii) very grateful for Garda assistance.

The Prime Minister could also take the opportunity to comment on the letter to Mr Adams, which set out the need for a permanent end to violence, but (importantly to the Taoiseach) also set out in positive terms the opportunity afforded to Sinn Fein by the Declaration if violence ends. The Prime Minister may also like to comment on the united front both Governments showed on the ceasefire.

Yours sincerely,
Rafiq Hussain

P.P. SIMON ROGERS

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PIRA THREE DAY CEASEFIRE: FURTHER IRISH REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. TANAISTE CHALLENGES SINN FEIN/IRA TO BRING ABOUT PERMANENT CESSATION OF VIOLENCE. REJECTS THEIR DEMANDS FOR CLARIFICATION ON GROUNDS THAT THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST OF THE CONFUSION. TAOISEACH SAYS AN EXTENSION OF CEASEFIRE ''ESSENTIAL''.

DETAIL

2. SPEAKING TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES MEMBERS ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE ON 7 APRIL (SPEECH FAXED TO NIO AND RID) THE TANAISTE DESCRIBED THE PIRA CEASEFIRE AS ''A PATHETICALLY BRIEF RESPITE FOR THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED SO MUCH FROM VIOLENCE, NOT LEAST IN THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY ITSELF'' HE BLUNTLY CHALLENGED THE PROVISIONALS: ''THOSE WHO PROCLAIM THEIR UNDOUBTED CAPACITY TO WAGE 25 YEARS MORE VIOLENCE MUST EXPLAIN HOW THEY THINK THIS WILL PRODUCE A BETTER RESULT THAN THE ALTERNATIVE NOW ON OFFER''. HE ALSO SAID THAT IF THE CEASEFIRE WERE TO HAVE ANY POTENTIAL IT COULD ONLY BE REALISED ''BY EXTENDING IT AND MAKING IT PERMANENT''. HE ACCUSED THE PROVISIONALS OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR MUCH OF THE CONFUSION WHICH ''AROSE FROM THEIR OWN FAILURE TO SPECIFY IN A COMMONSENSE WAY THE POINTS THEY WISHED CLARIFIED''. THEIR FAILURE TO DO THIS RAISED UNDERSTANDABLE WORRIES THAT THEIR AIM WAS TO DRAW THE GOVERNMENTS INTO A WORLD OF ''VERBAL MIRRORS AND SHIFTING GOAL-POSTS'' SO AS TO BLUR THE VITAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLITICS AND VIOLENCE. ''IF THESE SUSPICIONS ARE GROUNDLESS, IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT TO ALLAY THEM''.

3. SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE TAOISEACH (CURRENTLY IN CYPRUS) A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN SAID THAT AN EXTENSION OF THE CEASEFIRE WAS ''ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL''. THE TAOISEACH, HE SAID, RECOGNISED THE VERY STRONG MOMENTUM FOR PEACE AMONG ORDINARY PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES AND THEREFORE SAW A LONGER CESSATION OF

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THE IRA CAMPAIGN AS ''ELEMENTARY''.

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British Embassy
Washington

8 April 1994

BY FAX

G R Archer Esq
RID
FCO

Dear Graham,

IRA CEASEFIRE

1. Thank you for your telephone call this morning about [illegible] contacts between No.10 and the NSC in connection with [illegible] letter to President Clinton. We followed up with the [illegible] instructed, explaining that our preference was that [illegible] be no reply to Adams. If, for political reasons, [illegible] issue, it should not go from the President himself, and should reiterate the language of the White House's 30 March [illegible] calling for a permanent end to violence.

2. I also briefed Rannie in EUR, State Department, on the No.10/NSC exchanges. He told me that State had been irritated to learn of the Adams letter from the Irish Times article, a full week after it had reached the White House. He suspected orchestration between Adams, Senator Edward Kennedy's staff and Nancy Soderberg in the NSC. Tarnoff, Political Under-Secretary, had been briefed to speak to Lake later today and argue that no reply should be sent to Adams' letter, even at official level. Establishing a dialogue with Adams in such a way would start the Administration down a "slippery slope" which would only result in sending confused signals on the merits of violence, without doing the peace process any good. Rannie doubted whether the argument would prevail - opponents would use Rod Lyne's reply to Adams to support their case - but felt it right to try. Tarnoff's fall-back position was that, if a reply had to be sent, it should go from a not-too-senior NSC official and refer unequivocally to the need for a permanent end to violence.

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3. Parmly confided that Mrs Kennedy Smith (amongst others) was pressing hard for a reply to be sent to Adams. One of her aims, he believed, was to be able to argue that a precedent had been created for her to establish a dialogue of her own with Adams. She undoubtedly had her lines out to Sinn Fein already, but HMG saw good reason to avoid giving them any greater legitimacy.

Yours ever,

Peter

Peter Westmacott

cc (by fax): R M J Lyne Esq CMG, NO 10
M E Pellew Esq LVO, NAD, FCO
T Daniell, NIO(L)
J A Dew Esq, Dublin

PS
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8 April 1994

BY FAX

G R Archer Esq
RID
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Dear Graham,

IRA CEASEFIRE

1. Thank you for your telephone call this morning about the contacts between No.10 and the NSC in connection with Gerry Adams' letter to President Clinton. We followed up with the NSC as instructed, explaining that our preference was that there should be no reply to Adams. If, for political reasons, a reply had to issue, it should not go from the President himself; and should reiterate the language of the White House's 30 March statement calling for a permanent end to violence.

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Yours ever,

Peter.

Peter Westmacott

cc (by fax): R M J Lyne Esq CMG, No.10
M E Pellew Esq LVO, NAD, FCO
J Daniell, NIO(L)
J A Dew Esq, Dublin

PS
Mr Powell

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND'S VISIT TO OTTAWA, 7 APRIL

SUMMARY

1. TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE VISIT BY SIR PATRICK AND LADY MAYHEW. STRONG ASSURANCES FROM NEW LIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SUPPORT FOR HMG'S POLICY AND CONTINUED COOPERATION ON ANTI-TERRORISM. GOOD REPORT FROM BELL NORTHERN RESEARCH/NORTHERN TELECOM OF THEIR INVESTMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. GENERALLY FAVOURABLE MEDIA COVERAGE.

DETAIL

2. SIR PATRICK MAYHEW CARRIED OUT A STRENUOUS PROGRAMME IN OTTAWA ON 7 APRIL, WHICH BEGAN WITH TWO TELEVISION INTERVIEWS AND A PRESS BREAKFAST. HE THEN CALLED ON THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL (HOME SECRETARY EQUIVALENT) AND LATER MET THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND MINISTER FOR INDUSTRY OVER DINNER IN MY HOUSE.

3. IN HIS CONTACTS WITH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND MEDIA ALIKE, SIR PATRICK PUT ACROSS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:-

(A) HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CANADIAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY IN CHECKING PIRA TERRORISM.

(B) HE CONFIRMED THE COMMON DETERMINATION OF THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS TO PROMOTE THE JOINT DECLARATION.

(C) HE STRESSED THE INADEQUACY OF THE IRA THREE DAY CEASE-FIRE AS BEING MERELY A SUSPENDED DEATH SENTENCE.

(D) DRAWING ON THE FAVOURABLE EXPERIENCE OF BOMBARDIER AND NORTHERN TELECOM, HE BROUGHT OUT THE ADVANTAGES OF NORTHERN IRELAND FOR CANADIAN INVESTORS ENTERING EUROPE.

4. HERB GRAY, THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL, CONFIRMED CANADIAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BRITISH POLICY - HE HAD ALREADY SEEN AND ADMIRED SIR PATRICK'S PERFORMANCE ON CANADIAN BREAKFAST TELEVISION. SIR PATRICK THANKED GRAY FOR THE HELP GIVEN BY CANADIAN SECURITY AND POLICE AUTHORITIES IN FIGHTING PIRA TERRORISM. GRAY CONFIRMED THAT THIS COOPERATION WOULD BE MAINTAINED. HE AGREED WITH SIR PATRICK ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS THE ANTIDOTE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE. AS INDUSTRY MINISTER IN A PREVIOUS LIBERAL GOVERNMENT, GRAY HAD HELPED LAUNCH THE CHALLENGER AIRCRAFT WHICH NOW FORMS THE BASIS FOR THE BOMBARDIER/SHORTS REGIONAL JET.

5. THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL ASKED IF SIR PATRICK MAYHEW COULD INTERVENE WITH THE HOME SECRETARY, TO ENSURE THAT CANADA (AND THE US) COULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE MEETING OF EU HOME AFFAIRS MINISTERS IN JUNE, AS THEY HAD BEEN INVOLVED WITH TREVI MEETINGS IN THE PAST.

6. SIR PATRICK MAYHEW GAVE A BRIEFING TO A VERY WELL ATTENDED SESSION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (IAC - EQUATES TO THE JIC) ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND SECURITY SITUATION. HE THANKED ALL THE CANADIAN DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES CONCERNED FOR THEIR HELP IN COUNTER-TERRORISM AND RECEIVED A FIRM ASSURANCE OF FUTURE COOPERATION. HE DID NOT PURSUE DETONATOR MARKING. HE RECOGNISED THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO PICK OUT PIRA FUND-RAISING BODIES FROM A WIDE RANGE OF GENUINE CHARITIES. BUT HE URGED THE CANADIANS TO DO WHAT THEY COULD TO PIN THEM DOWN AND EXPOSE THEM.

7. ON A VISIT TO BELL NORTHERN RESEARCH (BNR), SIR PATRICK WAS ABLE TO SEE EXAMPLES OF THE LATEST TECHNOLOGY WHICH BNR ARE DEVELOPING FOR THEIR PARENT COMPANY NORTHERN TELECOM. BNR WERE VERY PLEASED WITH THE QUALITY OF THE WORK BEING DONE BY THEIR NORTHERN IRELAND FACILITY NITEC, WHICH HAS EXPANDED SINCE NORTHERN TELECOM'S TAKE-OVER OF STC. THEY PARTICULARLY VALUED THE QUALITY OF THE WORKFORCE AND THEIR LINKS WITH NORTHERN IRELAND UNIVERSITIES. LIKE BOMBARDIER (SEE MONTREAL'S SEPARATE TELEGRAM), THE BNR MANAGEMENT WERE HAPPY TO COMMEND NORTHERN IRELAND TO OTHERS AS A GOOD PLACE TO INVEST.

8. THE CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BEING OUT OF THE COUNTRY, SIR PATRICK MAYHEW CALLED ON LAVERTU (POLITICAL DIRECTOR) AT THE DFA. LAVERTU RECALLED THE STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE JOINT

DECLARATION HIS MINISTER HAD GIVEN AT THE OUTSET AND CONFIRMED CANADA'S FULL BACKING FOR BRITISH POLICY. HE RENEWED THE ASSURANCE THAT GERRY ADAMS WOULD NOT BE ADMITTED TO CANADA IF HE SOUGHT ENTRY - UNLESS WE WISHED A CHANGE IN ATTITUDE. LAVERTU AGREED STRONGLY WITH SIR PATRICK THAT NOTHING LESS THAN FULL RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE BY THE IRA WOULD BE ADEQUATE: OTHERWISE DEMOCRACY WOULD BE UNDERMINED.

9. LADY MAYHEW FOLLOWED A PROGRAMME OF CALLS BASED ON HER INTEREST IN SCHEMES WHICH ADDRESS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND DEPRIVATION, INCLUDING A COMMUNITY POLICE CENTRE, A FOOD BANK, AND A YOUNG OFFENDERS UNIT. AS REQUESTED, WE WILL BE FAXING A MORE DETAILED RECORD OF THESE MEETINGS TO LADY MAYHEW BEFORE SHE RETURNS TO THE UK AND ARE HAPPY TO PROMOTE FURTHER CONTACTS WITH PROGRAMMES OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE.

COMMENT

10. THIS WAS A TIMELY VISIT, WHICH ENABLED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO BRIEF THE NEW LIBERAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITATIVELY ON DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE CANADIANS FULLY ENDORSED SIR PATRICK'S ARGUMENTS ON MAINTAINING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND RESISTING ALL CONCESSIONS TO THE USE OF VIOLENCE FOR POLITICAL ENDS.

11. THE CANADIANS CONFIRMED THEIR CONTINUED COOPERATION IN ANTI-TERRORISM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S BRIEFING TO THE IAC HAS GIVEN VERY VALUABLE IMPETUS TO OUR CONTACTS WITH THE KEY AGENCIES, ESPECIALLY CSIS AND THE RCMP.

12. THE EVIDENT SATISFACTION OF NORTHERN TELECOM AS WELL AS BOMBARDIER WITH THEIR NORTHERN IRELAND OPERATIONS WILL BE VERY HELPFUL IN MOBILISING INTEREST BY OTHER CANADIAN COMPANIES IN INVESTING IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND'S VISIT TO MONTREAL, 5-6 APRIL

SUMMARY

1. SIR PATRICK MAYHEW'S SHORT VISIT TO MONTREAL A GREAT SUCCESS. VALUABLE TALKS WITH BOMBARDIER WHO ARE PLEASED WITH THEIR MASSIVE INVESTMENT IN BELFAST. SECRETARY OF STATE MET AND ADDRESSED SOME LEADING QUEBEC BUSINESSMEN AT LUNCH AND DINNER, INVITING THEM TO TAKE HEART FROM POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THEY HAD SOME GOOD IDEAS OF THEIR OWN FOR PROMOTING INVESTMENT THERE. A BRIEFING FOR FRANCOPHONE PRESS AND TV ON INVESTMENT AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS RESULTED IN SOME VERY HELPFUL PUBLICITY. IMPORTANT THAT SIR PATRICK SHOULD HAVE COME TO MONTREAL WHICH HAS A LARGE IRISH-ORIGIN POPULATION.

DETAIL

2. ON THE FIRST LEG OF HIS ELEVEN DAY NORTH AMERICAN TOUR, SIR PATRICK MAYHEW SPENT JUST OVER 24 HOURS IN MONTREAL. AT DINNER AT MY HOUSE HE MET THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF QUEBEC, A DIRECTOR OF BOMBARDIER AND UNIVERSITY CHANCELLOR, THE QUEBEC DEPUTY MINISTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, IMMIGRATION AND CULTURAL COMMUNITIES AND THE ORGANISER OF THE QUEBEC LIBERAL PARTY'S REELECTION CAMPAIGN. HE WAS ABLE TO BRIEF THEM AUTHORATIVELY. EVEN TO PEOPLE AS EMINENT AS THIS, SOME OF WHAT HE SAID ABOUT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS CAME AS AN EYE-OPENER.

3. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE VISIT TO MONTREAL WAS TO VISIT BOMBARDIER, ACCEPTING AN INVITATION MADE PERSONALLY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE BY THE CHAIRMAN. SIR PATRICK TOURED THE CANADAIR PLANT WHERE HE SAW HOW AIRCRAFT FUSELAGES, ENGINE NACELLES ETC MADE AT SHORTS IN BELFAST WERE ASSEMBLED ONTO THE AIRCRAFT IN MONTREAL. THERE WAS MUCH PRAISE OF SHORTS FOR ITS HIGH TECHNOLOGY, PRECISION AND CURRENT EFFICIENCY. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THERE WAS NO TALK OF LAY-OFFS AT SHORTS (THOUGH WE KNOW FROM EARLIER

CONVERSATIONS WITH BOMBARDIER THAT FURTHER LAY-OFFS ARE POSSIBLE).

4. BOMBARDIER LEFT THEIR INVITATIONS TO THEIR LUNCH UNTIL TOO LATE AND SO DID NOT QUITE GET THE TURNOUT WE HAD HOPED FOR. NEVERTHELESS THERE WERE SOME HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL OPERATORS AROUND THE TABLE. SIR PATRICK'S ADDRESS TO THEM ON THE OPPORTUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND ON THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE WAS FOLLOWED BY SOME PARTICULARLY INTERESTING SUGGESTIONS FROM THE BUSINESSMEN ABOUT WAYS OF BETTER PROMOTING INVESTMENT THERE. JAMES GRAY, THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD REPRESENTATIVE FOR NORTH AMERICA, WAS PRESENT AND WILL NO DOUBT BE PURSUING ON HIS OWN CHANNELS. BUT THE BUSINESSMEN THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE MORE EMPHASIS ON NORTHERN IRELAND AS A SPRING-BOARD INTO EUROPE AND ON THE CLOSE LINKS BETWEEN INDUSTRY AND THE TWO UNIVERSITIES (TAILOR-MADE COURSES IN PARTICULAR). THEY ALSO SUGGESTED THERE SHOULD BE MANY MORE OFFICIALLY-ORGANISED VISITS BY BUSINESS PEOPLE IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOUND THESE IDEAS WORTH PURSUING.

5. PRESS INTEREST IN NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (THE IRA'S THREE-DAY TRUCE, THE SINN FEIN LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER ETC) COULD SCARCELY HAVE BEEN HIGHER DURING SIR PATRICK'S VISIT. OVER 82,000 PEOPLE IN QUEBEC PROVINCE GIVE THEIR ORIGIN AS ENTIRELY IRISH. IT WAS GOOD LUCK AND VALUABLE THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD HAVE MET THE LOCAL PRESS AT JUST THIS TIME. HE TOLD THEM THERE WERE SENSIBLE GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM THAT THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD END, HE DENOUNCED THE POLITICAL CYNICISM OF THE IRA'S THREE-DAY TRUCE AND REPEATED THAT THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE THE TOTAL ABANDONMENT OF VIOLENCE BY TERRORISTS OF WHATEVER SIDE. THE PRESS BRIEFING WAS WELL COVERED BY BUSINESS AND EDITORIAL WRITERS DESPITE A HEAVY SNOWSTORM.

6. WE ARRANGED A SEPARATE PROGRAMME COVERING SOCIAL DEPRIVATION AND DISCRIMINATION QUESTIONS FOR LADY MAYHEW. SHE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MY WIFE ON VISITS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MONTREAL'S SOCIOLOGY DEPARTMENT AND TO A MONTREAL CITY SOCIAL WELFARE EXPERT. LADY MAYHEW WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED BY THE WAY UNIVERSITY OF MONTREAL WAS ASSISTING THE GOVERNMENT WITH RESEARCH ON INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF POVERTY AND PATTERNS OF DISCRIMINATION.

CONCLUSION

7. THE VISIT RISKED BEING CANCELLED BECAUSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UK. IRISH AFFAIRS WERE ONCE AGAIN AT A HIGHLY DELICATE STAGE. BUT I AM SURE THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT, BRIEF THOUGH IT WAS, WAS

WORTH EVERY MOMENT. BOMBARDIER TOO WERE EVIDENTLY PLEASED THAT SO MUCH TIME WAS SPENT WITH THEM. THEY WILL HAVE BEEN REASSURED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MESSAGE OF MEASURED OPTIMISM. A WIDER PUBLIC HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BENEFIT FROM THE PRESS BRIEFING.

RAWLINSON

YYYY

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ADDITIONAL 45

NORTHERN IRELAND

NNNN

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Ms Philippa Leslie-Jones
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1 2AA

8th April 1994

Dear Philippa,

LETTER FROM THE TAOISEACH

It was agreed at the meeting which the Prime Minister held on 15 March that two letters focusing on security co-operation should be sent to the Taoiseach. The first letter was sent on 24 March, making a general pitch for enhanced co-operation. I sent Roderic Lyne a draft of a second letter, putting forward a list of specific points on which the Group co-chaired by Sir John Chilcot and Mr Timothy Dalton might focus, under cover of his letter of 30 March. Before this was put to the Prime Minister, however, we received the Taoiseach's reply of 31 March to the first letter, and I agreed with you that we would submit further advice, taking into account the Taoiseach's reply, before the papers were put to the Prime Minister.

The Taoiseach's letter concerns both security co-operation and political issues, including the significance of the 3 day cease-fire. At the time of writing, there seems little prospect of the ceasefire being extended. It is difficult to conclude that it was ever anything more than a ploy to keep the Provisionals in the public eye, and perhaps to drive a wedge between the two Governments. If that was PIRA's intention, they were singularly unsuccessful. Dick Spring, in the Taoiseach's absence on holiday, has been particularly forthright in his assertions that only a

permanent cessation of violence will do. Similar noises have been coming from the Taoiseach, although the statement from his office that a suspension of a longer duration was needed "to change the situation", (front page of Irish Times of 7 April) is capable of sending the wrong message. The Prime Minister's letter affords a good opportunity to re-emphasise the importance of sticking to the "permanent cessation" line.

On the political front, the work of the Liaison Group continues. The Irish have undertaken to produce the first draft of the "shared understanding", based on the outcome of discussions between the two sides. There was a particularly useful meeting of the Group on 29 March and we are confident that Irish officials are under a remit to get on with it. There should be a substantive paper for Ministers to discuss at the next Inter-Governmental Conference on 25 April.

As for the timing of the next Heads of Government meeting, the Taoiseach's letter talks in terms of "some time in May" when he is likely to be in London for other reasons. We understand that he has a visit planned for 27 May. At the last meeting of the Liaison Group, Irish officials told us that they had reservations about arranging a meeting earlier than the usual June summit, for fear of arousing unrealistic expectations about the likely outcome. It was also apparent that there was some mild resentment at the reporting in the British Press after the Heathrow attack in which there were implicit criticisms of the Irish approach to security co-operation along with suggestions that the Prime Minister would press for an early meeting. They remain sensitive about the possibility of being seen to give way to British pressure.

The proposed timing is later than the Prime Minister had envisaged in his 24 March letter. However, in terms of potential outcome, it might fit in rather well with the political process. The outcome of the Liaison Group's deliberations will have been considered by the Conference - and with European electioneering in its final stages, the time would be right to consider options for increasing the impetus behind the three-stranded process. And since it now seems likely that the Chilcot/Dalton Group will not be able to meet before May, our security interests might also be well met by a meeting towards the end of that month. The attached draft accordingly takes up the Taoiseach's hint of a May meeting.

On security co-operation, the Taoiseach's letter suggests that "the work of the Group under Tim Dalton and John Chilcot will be discussed" at the 25 April IGC. He also cautions that the Irish may well not agree to particular security co-operation measures which we favour because of their judgement that they might tend to increase support for terrorism. On the first point, the Irish have **not** in fact put forward any firm proposal to discuss the work of the Chilcot/Dalton Group on 25 April; and if they do we shall need to be quite clear about the purpose of such a discussion. The Irish have tried to argue in the past that the Group is under the political steerage of the IGC, although in reality its status derives from the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach (it was established following the December 1991 Summit, and has a continuing remit to report to leaders on security co-operation issues, as exemplified in the Joint Report submitted for last December's meeting). While there is no problem in side-reporting on the Group's work to the IGC, one of its great advantages for us is its direct line to the Heads of Government meeting, and we could not accept any suggestion that the

Group is tasked by and reports to the Conference (where Mrs Geoghegan-Quinn has proved particularly unyielding on disputed co-operation issues such as border flight safety zones).

On the second point, we have yet to be convinced by Irish arguments that a number of co-operation measures might actually increase support for terrorism. The underlying suggestion that such measures as border flight safety zones would be regarded by normally law-abiding people in the Border areas as an infringement of Irish sovereignty, which might lead them to give support to PIRA, is questionable; and Irish attitudes are perhaps more motivated by a desire to avoid the political problems which the measures could well cause them, but which might well be resolvable by sufficient determination on their part and perhaps some willingness to compromise on ours. A discussion on security co-operation at Summit level would, of course, enable the Prime Minister to bring home to the Taoiseach the security and political imperatives operating in the UK in favour of meaningful practical measures, and the great strain which might be put on Anglo-Irish relations if British servicemen lost their lives because the Irish Government had found it politically inconvenient to adopt security co-operation measures which we had pressed on them.

I accordingly attach a revised draft letter which is based on the earlier draft but which includes a considerable amount of fresh material reflecting the considerations set out above. We shall advise further on the scope for an early Summit meeting after the next meetings of the IGC and the Chilcot/Dalton Group.

The draft has been cleared by Sir John Wheeler and Michael Ancram, in the Secretary of State's absence.

Copies of this letter and attachment go to John Sawers (FCO), Joan McNaughton (Home Office) and John Pitt-Brooke (MOD).

Yours sincerely,
Rafia Hussain

P.P. SIMON ROGERS

Re for Immediate to
Rod Lyne PS/No10 (direct line)
desk by 1700z Ambassador

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

John Sawers PS/FCO (same desk by), 07-Apr-1994 19:03 EDT KT
Graham Archer KID
Mark Fellows MAD.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Julien D. LeBourgeois (LEBOURGEOIS)

FROM: M. Brooke Darby
(DARBY)

SUBJECT: adams letter - per your request

Text of letter from Gerry Adams to President Clinton (dated March 31):

I trust this letter finds you well.

By now you will have learned of the initiative taken by the IRA. I have welcomed this as a positive and significant indication of goodwill and flexibility aimed at providing space for the British government to end the current deadlock. I hope the British government will seize that opportunity.

For some time now the British government has rejected the reasonable request by Sinn Fein for clarification of the Downing St. Declaration. The provision of such would of course allow Sinn Fein to conclude our assessment of the Declaration's potential to move the situation in the direction of a lasting peace based on democratic principles and to speedily come to a definitive position.

Given that the British government had been involved in protracted contact and dialogue with Sinn Fein when it did not claim to have a basis for a settlement it is illogical that they now refuse any contact or dialogue when they claim to have such a basis.

On the other hand the Dublin government has, from its perspective, provided the necessary clarification as a means to assisting the process. This is of course most welcome and helpful.

I therefore trust that the opportunity now provided is taken up by the British government and that the friends of the Irish and British peoples in the international community will encourage them to do so.

The provision of the necessary clarification in a manner which respects the legitimacy and democratic integrity of the Sinn Fein electorate and our rights as a political party would certainly assist progress.

I know that this is a serious and genuine initiative by those concerned. It must be built upon. If it fails to create the necessary momentum especially because of the British reluctance to meaningfully engage with Sinn Fein or to recognize the rights of our electorate we must then seek other ways to move forward.

We must exhaust all possibilities to advance the peace process.

I am fully committed to doing so.

You have shown your willingness in the past to assist the peace process. The decision to grant me a 48 hour visa to enter the U.S.A. was a positive contribution to this.

I hope that you will find it possible to use your good offices again to move the whole situation on. Many thanks.

Is mise le meas (Yours sincerely),

G. Adams
President of Sinn Fein

CC: Non Records (NONRECORD)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 8, 1994

Dear Mr. Adams:

Thank you for your letter to President Clinton of March 31. He has asked me to reply on his behalf.

As the President said publicly upon the announcement of the IRA's three day cessation of violence, we hope that Sinn Fein and the IRA will renounce violence permanently and endorse the Joint Declaration as the best path forward for peace in Northern Ireland. We have repeatedly urged all involved to end the use of violence as a means of advancing political goals; it is time for the people of Northern Ireland to resolve their differences through dialogue and negotiations. It was in that spirit that the President permitted your attendance at the peace conference in New York earlier this year.

As the end of the three-day ceasefire approaches, I urge you to work to prevent a resumption of the violence that has cost so many lives and to bring about an end to the IRA's killing once and for all. I know you have been pressing for the British government to enter into a dialogue with you. It has been pressing you for a permanent renunciation of violence and an endorsement of the Joint Declaration. In his letter sent to you yesterday, Prime Minister Major's Private Secretary Roderic Lyne set out a path for achieving the objectives you seek. Extending the ceasefire permanently could clearly lead to the dialogue outlined in Mr. Lyne's letter and I hope you will work to achieve that goal.

Again, the people of Northern Ireland have suffered the violence for too long and deserve a lasting peace. We look forward to making progress toward the important and long overdue objective.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Gerry Adams
President
Sinn Fein
51/55 Bothar na bhFal
Beal Feirste BT12 4PD
IRELAND

CONFIDENTIAL

RLO
H/ Moman-Epm

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 April 1994

PQ BY KEN MAGINNIS

Thank you for your letter of 31 March to Alex Allan concerning the response to the recent PQ by Ken Maginnis MP. We have no comments on the draft.

I am copying this letter to Simon Rogers (Northern Ireland Office).

MARK ADAMS

Mr Praveen Moman
Privy Council Office

KW

CONFIDENTIAL

cc PU

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND

The Rt Hon John Major
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

7 April 1994

Dear Prime Minister,

HUALON

I am writing to seek your support in obtaining EC approval to the provision of financial assistance to the establishment of Hualon in Northern Ireland.

Hualon is a major, publicly-quoted Taiwanese textile corporation employing around 9,000 people manufacturing textiles in Taiwan and Malaysia. Sales in 1992 were almost £600m.

Hualon proposes to establish a large scale vertically integrated textile plant in Northern Ireland to service principally the European market. The investment will be in four phases spread over an 8-year period. Fixed capital investment totals approximately £160m. At full capacity the plant will produce 170m metres of fabric each year and directly employ 1,800 people. Industrial Development Board in Northern Ireland proposes to offer approximately £61m in financial assistance (well within EC regional aid limits). All necessary approvals within HMG have been obtained.

In accordance with the then requirements of the Synthetic Fibre Discipline, the project was notified to the EC in December 1992. After consideration the EC decided, in

August 1993, to open a procedure under Article 93(2). Five objections were lodged. The common theme to all was the perceived negative impact of a project of this magnitude on existing European producers in an industrial sector which had already been through a period of structural change. It was contended that 1971 and 1977 Textiles Frameworks preclude Member States assisting additional capacity in the sector.

HMG on the advice of Kurt Salmon Associates (internationally recognised textile industry consultants) argue that in the sub sectors of the textile market to be targeted by Hualon:

- import penetration is already high and will continue to increase;

- Hualon products will compete principally with imports;

- Hualon's equipment is designed specifically for the efficient production of high volumes of basic fabrics;

- European producers are progressively abandoning this sub sector and either moving production offshore, importing fabrics or moving to up-market fabrics;

- with or without a base in Europe Hualon will continue to import (as will others) and therefore offer competition.

From a regional perspective the benefits are immense. Apart from the direct jobs a further 500 indirect jobs are anticipated plus 2,000 man years of construction work. Located just outside Belfast it will draw labour from North and West Belfast, both areas with major long term economic and social problems.

As a result of the 93(2) procedure, there is widespread public knowledge of the project in Northern Ireland where both expectation and anxiety are high. The three MEPs have lobbied Van Miert's Cabinet.

The procedure is nearing completion and a decision is anticipated before the end of April. Tim Smith has met with Commissioners Van Miert and Millan and will also be trying to meet Commissioner Brittan as soon as possible. They are sympathetic to the regional case but not wholly convinced on sectoral issues.

This project is now reaching a critical stage and it is clear the decision will hinge largely on political issues. It is my view that a letter from you to President Delors emphasising the importance of the project to Northern Ireland, especially at this time, would be most helpful.

If you are in agreement, I attach a draft letter (cleared with DTI, UK Rep, FCO and Cabinet Office) for your consideration.

Yours sincerely
Sir Rogers

for SIR PATRICK MAYHEW
(Approved by the Secretary of State
and signed in his absence)

J Delors Esq
President
European Commission
45 Avenue D'Auderghen
BRUSSELS B1040

April 1994

HUALON

I am sure you are aware of this major potential investment which is currently the subject of an Article 93(2) procedure. The project would be located in Northern Ireland and my purpose in writing is to emphasise the immense importance and regional benefits the project would bring to one of the most economically disadvantaged regions of the Community.

The Hualon project would be implemented over an eight year period. It would involve investment of around £160m. At capacity it would directly create 1,800 jobs with a further 500 indirect jobs. It will provide some 2,000 man years of construction work.

The project would be located near to Belfast and would draw labour from the mainly Protestant North Belfast and the mainly Catholic West Belfast - both these areas are severely economically disadvantaged even by Northern Ireland standards. Unemployment levels are around 24% and 25% respectively with 56% and 64% of these having been unemployed for over twelve months. Some have never held a full-time job.

The political importance of securing this project for Northern Ireland now cannot be overestimated. With your own sympathetic understanding of our problems I know you will recognise this. The

links between terrorism and social and economic deprivation are well recognised. There is no doubt that investments such as that proposed by Hualon, when located in areas to which both sections of the population have ready access, are very helpful to the constructive political progress to which the UK and Irish Governments and all political parties are firmly committed.

I understand that Karel Van Miert is sympathetic to the case but there are some lingering concerns about the impact this project may have on existing European producers. In their detailed appraisal of the project my officials, working with internationally recognised textile consultant, concluded that Hualon will be competing in the low cost, high volume sectors of the EC fabric market which are increasingly penetrated already by imported fabrics and abandoned by EC producers in favour of more up-market fabrics. They were therefore satisfied that the impact of Hualon on existing producers would be minimal, and indeed Hualon investment should be seen as a welcome reversal of the trend.

The Northern Ireland community already has extensive knowledge of the Hualon project, as a result of the 93(2) procedure, and there is considerable public expectation and anxiety about the Commission's decision. Announcement of this major investment, the largest in Northern Ireland for over twelve years, would be particularly helpful in contributing to a positive cross-community atmosphere in the aftermath of the Downing Street Declaration of December last which you so helpfully endorsed. Your personal concern for the well being of the people of Northern Ireland has been much appreciated there and in London. Commission clearance of Government backing for this project would be a clear endorsement of the social and economic progress which is crucial to the prospects for peace.

I have no doubt that you will agree the importance of this project to the people of Northern Ireland cannot be over-emphasised and against this background I hope you will feel able to support the case for the proposed aid.

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE
2A

cc FCO HCKB
HO
MOD

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 April 1994

Dear Simon,

LETTERS FROM GERRY ADAMS

Thank you for your letter of 6 April, and your further comments on the draft reply to Gerry Adams' two letters.

I enclose the final version of the reply from Roderic Lyne to Gerry Adams, which the Prime Minister has agreed. I should be grateful if you would arrange for it to be forwarded by fax to the Sinn Fein offices in Belfast today.

The Prime Minister has agreed that we should publish the reply, but not Gerry Adams' letters. We need to co-ordinate today over timing of the letter's publication, and the line to take with the press.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours ever,
Philippa

MS PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

Simon Rogers Esq
Northern Ireland Office

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 April 1994

Dear Mr Adams,

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your letters of 30 March and 6 April.

You ask for direct dialogue in which there would be clarification and discussion on how to move matters forward. You also see this as a means of demonstrating recognition of Sinn Fein's position as a political party with a valid electoral mandate.

The issues which you raise were fully addressed in the Joint Declaration, which states clearly:

> "... democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate fully in democratic politics and to join in dialogue in due course between the Governments and the political parties on the way ahead."

Many other passages in the Joint Declaration are also directly relevant to issues which you have raised. For example, paragraph 4 can leave the reader in no doubt over the Government's future intentions towards Northern Ireland.

You are wrong to say the Government have caused a stalemate. Any pause in the movement towards peace is because of the continuing violence, and Sinn Fein's failure unequivocally to renounce violence as a means of achieving political ends. It is Sinn Fein that excludes itself from playing a full part in the political process.

The Prime Minister, in addressing the House of Commons on 15 December, said that if there was a permanent end to violence, and if Sinn Fein committed itself to the democratic process, then the Government would be ready to enter into preliminary exploratory dialogue with it within three months.

This dialogue would have the following purposes:

(i) to explore the basis upon which Sinn Fein would come to be admitted to an inclusive political talks process to which the British Government is committed but without anticipating the negotiations within that process;

(ii) to exchange views on how Sinn Fein would be able over a period to play the same part as the current constitutional parties in the public life of Northern Ireland;

(iii) to examine the practical consequences of the ending of violence.

We await a positive response. The people of the island of Ireland, north and south, and from both traditions, want violence to stop now, not temporarily but for good. So do their governments.

The Joint Declaration offers the way forward. Sinn Fein can take it. Or reject it. But if violence continues, it will only be because Sinn Fein have spurned the opportunity to enter the democratic process.

In view of the importance of these issues to the people of these islands, the Prime Minister has decided to make this letter publicly available.

Yours sincerely,

Roderic Lyne

RODERIC LYNE

Gerry Adams Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 April 1994

Dear Simon,

LETTERS FROM GERRY ADAMS

Thank you for your letter of 6 April. I attach a revised draft reply to Gerry Adams, which reflects the Prime Minister's views. I should be grateful if you could let me know as soon as possible whether you have any serious difficulties with our amendments.

Yours ever,
Philippa

MS PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

Simon Rogers, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT LETTER TO GERRY ADAMS FROM RODERIC LYNE

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plj\adams.tmw

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Phillipa Leslie-Jones
Date: 7 April 1994

Phillipa
We agreed
fine
(without Spring quote)
7.4.

Copy sent with Cond 1411

PRIME MINISTER

LETTERS FROM GERRY ADAMS

I attach the revised draft reply to Gerry Adams.

The NIO are happy with our amendments. They have suggested a couple of minor drafting amendments on the first page. These seem OK. I have entered them in manuscript.

NIO have also asked that we reinstate the second quotation from Dick Spring on the second page. I have marked it in manuscript. The purpose is to underline the fact that the two governments stand together in their dislike. The media will also pick this point up. I think it is worth it.

Content?

If you agree with the draft, NIO will arrange transmission to Gerry Adams. We would then publish the letter (but not Gerry Adams's reply).

MS PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

DRAFT LETTER TO GERRY ADAMS FROM RODERIC LYNE

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* As Dick Spring said on 20 March, "If Sinn Fein want to enter the political process there has to be a permanent cessation of violence and a very firm declaration to that effect".

plj\adams.tmw

CONFIDENTIAL

From: **Phillipa Leslie-Jones**
Date: **7 April 1994**

Phillipa
We spoke
Sue
(without Spring quote)
7.4.

Copy sent with Good Hall

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MS PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

plj\nio.tmw

DRAFT LETTER TO GERRY ADAMS FROM RODERIC LYNE

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your letters of 30 March and 6 April.

You ask for direct dialogue in which there would be clarification and discussion on how to move matters forward. You also see this as a means of demonstrating recognition of Sinn Fein's position as a political party with a valid electoral mandate.

The issues which you raise were fully addressed in the Joint Declaration, which states clearly:

> "... democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate fully in democratic politics and to join in dialogue in due course between the Governments and the political parties on the way ahead."

Many other passages in the Joint Declaration are also directly relevant to issues which you have raised. For example, paragraph 4 can leave the reader in no doubt over the Government's future intentions towards Northern Ireland.

You [were] are wrong to say the Government have caused a stalemate. Any pause in the movement towards peace is because of the continuing violence, and Sinn Fein's failure unequivocally to renounce violence as a means of achieving political ends. It is Sinn Fein excludes itself from playing a full part in the political process. that

The Prime Minister, in addressing the House of Commons on 15 December, said that if there was a permanent end to violence, and if Sinn Fein committed itself to the democratic process, then the Government would be ready to enter into preliminary exploratory dialogue with it within three months. This dialogue would have the following purposes:

(i) to explore the basis upon which Sinn Fein would come to be admitted to an inclusive political talks process to which the British Government is committed but without anticipating the negotiations within that process;

(ii) to exchange views on how Sinn Fein would be able over a period to play the same part as the current constitutional parties in the public life of Northern Ireland;

(iii) to examine the practical consequences of the ending of violence.

We await a positive response. The people of the island of Ireland, north and south, and from both traditions, want violence to stop now, not temporarily but for good. So do their governments. *

The Joint Declaration offers the way forward. Sinn Fein can take it. Or reject it. But if violence continues, it will only be because Sinn Fein have spurned the opportunity to enter the democratic process.

In view of the importance of these issues to the people of these islands, the Prime Minister has decided to make this letter publicly available.

plj\adams.tmw

* As Dick Spring said on 20 March, "If Sinn Fein want to enter the political process there has to be a permanent cessation of violence and a very firm declaration to that effect."

faxed FCO NIO ✓

GERRY ADAMS
President of Sinn Féin
51/55 Bóthar na bhFál, Béal Feirste BT12 4PD

6/4/94.

Mr Major, a Chara,

I wrote to you last Wednesday after the IRA announced that they were to unilaterally suspend their activities for 72 hours in an attempt to break the stale-mate in the peace process.

To date I have received no response to my letter. Instead the public response of you and your ministers to this significant initiative on the part of the IRA has been negative and dismissive.

I am writing to you again to ask you to reflect on the seriousness of the present situation and on the opportunity to move out of the present impasse, provided by the IRA. I would again urge you to grasp this opportunity to move the peace process forward. You can best do so by authorising a meeting with representatives of Sinn Féin so that we can receive clarification of the Downing Street Declaration in the same manner it was provided to other political parties. Your refusal to do so up to now has created the present stale-mate situation. It is crucial to the peace process that this stale-mate be ended.

I have already made it clear that Sinn Féin has no great concern to be engaged in bi-lateral discussions on constitutional matters with your government. I have publicly outlined my position in this regard on a number of occasions. This is, properly, the business of talks involving the two governments and representatives of all the Irish people, including Sinn Féin.

This, however, is not the point of our reasonable calls for clarification. Clarification, clearly, is not negotiation. Clarification is required so that Sinn Féin, and everyone else, can properly and fully explore how the peace process can be moved forward at this time and, specifically, how the Downing Street Declaration fits into this.

Direct dialogue is the obvious and most effective method of providing the necessary clarification.

But, just as importantly, direct dialogue would also indicate a genuine interest, on the part of the British Government, in developing a real peace process through the essential recognition, by you, of our rights as a political party, the validity of our mandate and the integrity of our electorate.

We cannot accept a situation in which those who vote for our party are discriminated against and excluded from involvement in the political process.

I understand that you face many difficulties but I am convinced that the initiative taken by the IRA creates the opportunity for you to respond in a way which moves the peace process out of the present impasse. I would therefore urge you to reflect again on the the IRA initiative and on the opportunity it provides and to respond to it in a positive and imaginative way.

I look forward to your response.

Is Mise.

Gerry Adams.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

NIO's proposed response to Gerry Adams's two letters, which should issue as a PS (Rod) letter tomorrow.

They are anxious not to be too negative, in order to keep in line with the Irish Government and to ensure we don't close down all options.

No effect is a bit limp; I think we can toughen up the letter without too much harm.

I will fax up suggested amendments.

Philip

CONFIDENTIAL
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Ms Philippa Leslie Jones
10 Downing Street
LONDON

6 April 1994

Dear Philippa,

LETTERS FROM GERRY ADAMS

Jonathan Stephens spoke to Roderick Lyne over the weekend about Adams' letter to the Prime Minister of 30 March. They agreed that it was desirable to issue a response before the end of the ceasefire (midnight on Friday) - if only to ensure that we were not represented as having let an opportunity slip by default. A further letter has now been received - handed in to No 10 earlier today; it adds nothing of substance to the first.

The tone of the draft is important. The Secretary of State's first inclination was to adopt an uncompromising and dismissive posture in response to something which Ministers have already represented as a cynical exercise. However, on reflection, he feels that a firm approach is called for, but one which encourages the recipients to think along positive lines. This would sit more easily with the views of the Irish (see below) and the line being taken by Cardinal Daly, who is an important figure in all of this. Another important factor here is the PR battle, which the Secretary of State feels that we are winning at present; he wants to retain the moral high ground. Moreover, if there are those in the Provisional movement who are trying to inch towards peace, we do not want to appear to be slapping them down.

The Secretary of State is conscious that we and the Irish Government have been as one in our response to this "temporary ceasefire". In that context, HM Ambassador in Dublin was briefed on the Taoiseach's view of things, expressed at the start of his holiday in Cyprus. The Taoiseach said that both Governments had provided clarification ad nauseam and nothing was left to clarify; also, both had clear, publicly stated answers on the next stage of the process if peace came about. Nevertheless he felt that there might be a case for going over the ground again in public statements so as not to leave Sinn Fein/PIRA propaganda unanswered.

Adams' letters are rather more rational than his previous one of 7 January and it is worth considering them in association with his article in today's Guardian. Clarification is again raised and two themes are highlighted - how to move the peace process on and recognition of Sinn Fein as a valid and legitimate political party. The Guardian article gives three broad areas for clarification (none of them new) and also addresses an issue which has featured frequently in recent Sinn Fein statements and speeches:- Britain's long term intentions towards Ireland. The attached draft, for a Private Secretary signature, forces home the message that the onus is on the Provisionals to stop the violence and stop it for good. We have included quotes from Tanaiste to demonstrate the unity of view between the British and Irish Governments. The draft also restates the positive consequences that an end to the violence would bring for Sinn Fein; and in so doing it is likely to be welcomed in Dublin.

The question arises of whether we should publish the correspondence. In the last exchange of letters, we published the response from No 10 and Adams' original letter on the ground that Adams had publicly announced that he was writing to the Prime Minister. We were also concerned to demonstrate that Adams was at the time plainly seeking renegotiation. The arguments for and against publication on this occasion are finely balanced. Adams has again let it be known that he has written to the Prime Minister; and the second letter was handed in at No 10 amid considerable publicity. The Sinn Fein representatives told the press in very general terms what was in the second letter; but they said that the details were private and confidential. Our advice is that while the letter from No 10 should be published, in order to avoid speculation and suspicion about its content, those from Adams should be held back, initially at least. It is not of course routine to publish correspondence received by the Prime Minister. Questions from the media about the content of the Adams' letter would be dealt with by saying that it was for him to decide whether to make them public (the reply in effect reveals the content anyway).

We would recommend that the letter, if approved, should issue in the course of tomorrow (Thursday). As happened last time, we would arrange for a signed copy to be faxed from here to the Sinn Fein offices in Belfast. Our two offices would need to be in touch over co-ordination of the timing of the issue of the letter and of its release to the press. We are working up some press lines.

The advice in this letter has been discussed and cleared with the Secretary of State.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Sir Rogers

SIMON ROGERS

DRAFT FOR SIGNATURE BY PS/ PRIME MINISTER

Gerry Adams

April 1994

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your letter of 30 March and the follow-up of 6 April.

In your letters you ask for direct dialogue in which there would be clarification and discussion on how to move matters forward. You also see this as a means of demonstrating recognition of Sinn Fein's position as a political party with a valid electoral mandate.

The issues which you raise have been fully and clearly addressed in the Joint Declaration and in messages passed between the Government and the leadership of the Provisional Movement, which were all published last year. The Joint Declaration states:-

> "... democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate fully in democratic politics and to join in dialogue in due course between the Governments and the political parties on the way ahead."

Many other passages in the Joint Declaration are also directly relevant to issues which you have raised. For example paragraph 4 can leave the reader in no doubt over the Government's future intentions towards Northern Ireland. In your letters you are not specific on the matters which you claim to be in need of clarification. As Dick Spring said on the Today Programme on 31 March:-

> "both Governments have made a very serious effort since 15 December to spell out what we intend doing and everything is now on the table and very clear."

Your party is of course free to participate in elections and, if elected, Sinn Fein members can take their seats. However, it is because of the continuing violence, and its failure unequivocally to renounce violence as a means of achieving political ends, that Sinn Fein excludes itself from playing a full part in the political process.

The Prime Minister, in addressing the House of Commons on 15 December, said that if there was a permanent end to violence, and if Sinn Fein committed itself to the democratic process, then the Government would be ready to enter into preliminary exploratory dialogue with it within three months. This dialogue would have the following purposes:-

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(iii) to examine the practical consequences of the ending of violence.

These commitments remain in place. Dick Spring made the point on 21 March when he said:-

"if Sinn Fein want to enter the political process there has to be a permanent cessation of violence and a very firm declaration to that effect."

The people of the island of Ireland, North and South, and from both traditions, agree. Violence should stop now, not temporarily, but for good.

In view of the importance of these issues to the people of these islands, the Prime Minister has decided to make this letter publicly available.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Philippa Leslie-Jones
Date: 6 April 1994

PRIME MINISTER

GERRY ADAMS' LETTERS

Your box contains the NIO submission on Gerry Adams' two letters, and a proposed PS reply.

I attach an amended version of the reply, which excises references to messages passed between the Government and the Provisional leadership, and gets rid of the implied invitation to Gerry Adams to return to us with the specific matters he wants clarified, which is a hostage to fortune. I also do not think we need to quote Dick Spring to support our case.

This leaves the draft as a clear restatement of what Sinn Fein must do to enter the political process, and what would then be on offer. The message remains that there must be a permanent end to violence.

It would be best to get this reply out tomorrow, in good time before the end of the ceasefire.

PHILIPPA LESLIE-JONES

plj\gerry.jd

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT FOR SIGNATURE BY PS / PRIME MINISTER

Gerry Adams

April 1994

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your letters of 30 March and ~~the follow-up of~~ 6 April.

~~In your letters~~ You ask for direct dialogue in which there would be clarification and discussion on how to move matters forward. You also see this as a means or demonstrating recognition of Sinn Fein's position as a political party with a valid electoral mandate.

The issues which you raise ~~have been~~ were fully ~~and clearly~~ addressed in the Joint Declaration ~~and in messages passed between the Government and the leadership of the Provisional Movement, which were all published last year~~. The ~~Joint Declaration~~ clearly states:-

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SOFS/21850

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> "both Governments have made a very serious effort since 15 December to spell out what we intend doing and everything is now on the table and very clear."

You are wrong to say the name caused a stalemate. You know which you can do to move things forward.

~~Your party is of course free to participate in elections and, if elected, Sinn Fein members can take their seats. However, it is~~ because of the continuing violence, and Sinn Fein's failure unequivocally to renounce violence as a means of achieving political ends, ~~that~~ Sinn Fein excludes itself from playing a full part in the political process.

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(iii) to examine the practical consequences of the ending of violence.

We await a positive response.

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The people of the island of Ireland, North and South, and from both traditions, ~~agree~~ can, Violence should stop now, not temporarily, but for good. *

In view of the importance of these issues to the people of these islands, the Prime Minister has decided to make this letter publicly available.

* to do their part. The ball is in the way forward. S.F. can take it. Or reject it. But if violence continues it will only be because S.F. have spurned the ~~the~~ opportunity to enter the democratic process.

SOFS/21850

GR

File

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND

The Rt Hon The Lord Wakeham
Lord privy Seal and Leader of the
House of Lords
Privy Council Office
Whitehall
LONDON
SW1A 2AT

6 April 1994

Dear Lord Wakeham,

Thank you for your letter of 23 March conveying EDH approval for the extension to NI of the "cross border arrest" provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill. I understand that the requisite amendments have now been tabled.

I am grateful for colleagues concurrence in this important matter at such a late stage and I appreciate concerns that extension of the provisions to Northern Ireland should in no way jeopardise their progress, either in Parliament, or upon implementation.

In answer to the two points raised by Michael Howard I will, of course, be pleased to supply whatever briefing is required on the Northern Ireland amendments. The RUC consider that such powers of arrest would be of practical assistance in proceeding against individuals who may otherwise escape prosecution as a result of difficulties inherent in the present system. I can confirm that the drawing up of detailed operational protocols in respect of

Northern Ireland will be taken forward through ACPO and I will ensure that any assistance which is required will be made available.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, members of EDH and LG and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Simon Rogers

for SIR PATRICK MAYHEW
(Approved by the Secretary of State
and signed in his absence)

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER
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IRA CEASEFIRE: FURTHER IRISH REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. TANAISTE AND OPPOSITION LEADERS HOLD TO LINE THAT THERE CAN BE NO TALKS WITH SINN FEIN UNTIL A PERMANENT CEASEFIRE OF VIOLENCE. SOME EDITORIALS WOBBLY, PUBLIC OPINION (SO FAR AS ONE CAN JUDGE) MORE SCEPTICAL OF SINN FEIN CLAIMS.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING SINN FEIN ATTEMPTS AT EASTER COMMEMORATION CEREMONIES TO DRIVE WEDGES BETWEEN HMG AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, THE TANAISTE ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT ON 3 APRIL (THE TAOISEACH IS ON HOLIDAY IN CYPRUS). IT WAS NO LONGER ENOUGH TO ISSUE ''VAGUE RITUALISTIC STATEMENTS CALLING FOR CLARIFICATION, WITHOUT EVER SPELLING OUT THE ISSUES THAT REQUIRE IT.'' BOTH GOVERNMENTS SAW THE DECLARATION AS ''A FOUNDATION STONE FOR ALL FUTURE PROGRESS'' AND ''SHORT TEMPORARY CEASEFIRES'' WOULD NOT LEAD TO SINN FEIN'S INCLUSION IN THE PROCESS. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WAS ''VERY DISAPPOINTED'' AT THE IRA'S ''TOKEN GESTURE''.

3. EARLIER ON RADIO SPRING HAD SAID ''I DON'T SEE ANY PROSPECT OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND SINN FEIN AT THIS STAGE. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT CLARIFICATION THEY ARE LOOKING FOR AND FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THE ONLY CLARIFICATION NECESSARY IS A RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE AND A PERMANENT CESSATION OF VIOLENCE AT THIS STAGE.''

4. ON 2 APRIL THE LEADERS OF THE THREE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTIES CALLED ON PIRA TO END PERMANENTLY ITS CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE: A THREE DAY SUSPENSION WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO THE OVERWHELMING DESIRE OF THE IRISH PEOPLE FOR PEACE. THEY OFFERED TO HOLD ALL PARTY TALKS ON NORTHERN IRELAND IN ORDER TO ''DEMONSTRATE THAT CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICIANS, NOT MEN OF VIOLENCE, SET THE AGENDA.'' THE TANAISTE, WELCOMING THEIR

OFFER, SAID IT WAS NECESSARY ''TO DEVELOP MAXIMUM CONSENSUS AROUND DEMOCRATIC AND NON-VIOLENT APPROACHES TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION.''

5. SOME OF THE WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS HAVE BEEN LESS FORTHRIGHT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SUNDAY TRIBUNE SUPPORTED JOHN HUME'S VIEW THAT NO STONE SHOULD BE LEFT UNTURNED IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE: ''THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY PROVIDED LONG DISTANCE CLARIFICATION. TO HAVE A SENIOR OFFICIAL SPELL THAT OUT, FACE TO FACE WITH SINN FEIN LEADERS, WOULD INVOLVE THE ABANDONMENT OF NO DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE.'' THE IRISH TIMES TODAY (5 APRIL) SAYS THAT ''IN THE LAST ANALYSIS IT IS HARD TO REJECT JOHN HUME'S ARGUMENT. IF THE PROVISIONALS SAY THAT THEY NEED DIRECT CLARIFICATION FROM THE BRITISH TO ACCEPT THE DECLARATION, WHY NOT CALL THEIR BLUFF - IF BLUFF IT IS? AND IF THE BRITISH COULD MEET THE PROVISIONALS SECRETLY OVER A PERIOD OF 30 MONTHS WHEN THERE WAS NO PEACE PLAN ON THE TABLE, WHERE IS THE LOGIC OF REFUSING TO MEET THEM, EVEN BRIEFLY, AT THIS STAGE WHEN SUCH A PLAN EXISTS?''

6. IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHAT THE MAN IN THE STREET THINKS. SOME NO DOUBT WILL BE SWAYED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IF A LITTLE FLEXIBILITY ON HMG'S PART IS ALL THAT IS REQUIRED, FLEXIBILITY SHOULD BE SHOWN. BUT MANY OTHERS UNDOUBTEDLY SUPPORT THE TOUGHER LINE TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENTS AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES HERE. A PHONE-IN RADIO PROGRAMME ON 2 APRIL SUGGESTED WIDE SCEPTICISM AND HOSTILITY TOWARDS SINN FEIN'S PROPAGANDA AND THE CEASEFIRE, AND A WELCOME FOR AUSTIN CURRIE'S EFFECTIVE DEMOLITION OF A SINN FEIN SPOKESMAN ON THE SAME PROGRAMME (WE HAVE ASKED RTE FOR A TAPE).

BLATHERWICK

YYYY

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ADDITIONAL 46

NORTHERN IRELAND

NNNN

SEPO

HOME SECRETARY

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

- 5 APR 1994

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Secretary of State

TRANSFER OF PRISONERS

I was grateful for the opportunity of our meeting on 24 March for a further discussion of the difficult and sensitive issues concerning the transfer of prisoners, including terrorist prisoners, to Northern Ireland.

As you know, the present policy, announced to Parliament on 23 November 1992, is that a permanent transfer may be refused if a prisoner's crimes were so serious as to make it inappropriate that he or she should benefit from any substantial reduction in time left to serve which would be a consequence of transfer; and that temporary transfer may instead be granted for up to 12 months with the prospect of further extension. Following judicial challenges brought by prisoners temporarily transferred to Northern Ireland, the Attorney General was asked for advice on the lawfulness of that policy. His initial view, which I share, is that the policy is vulnerable to challenge for so long as it relies on the concept of 'extended temporary transfer'. There is a danger that our courts would hold we were using a device to make permanent de facto transfers but without allowing prisoners the benefits of the differing release arrangements which would flow from actual permanent transfers. The Attorney has therefore advised that if the intention of the 1992 policy is to be sustained we should, as a matter of urgency, buttress it with primary legislation. The effect of this would be that where a prisoner was permanently transferred between UK jurisdiction his home leave and release arrangements would remain those of the jurisdiction in which he was sentenced.

Further advice from the Attorney General is awaited but I am deeply concerned at the prospect of implementing a policy which affects the detention of prisoners convicted of the most serious terrorist offences and which may be found by the courts to be unlawful. It could not be ruled out that a consequence of a successful legal challenge would be that my jurisdiction over the prisoners' continued detention and

release would be compromised. I cannot accept such a prospect.

We therefore need to resolve collectively whether the 1992 policy - which has not yet been implemented - should be reconsidered or whether we should legislate.

As you know I have little sympathy with the policy announced in November 1992. Although it received general cross party support at the time, including from Unionists in Northern Ireland, there were strong representations against it from those who feared that it might eventually pave the way for the earlier release of those sentenced for serious terrorist offences in Great Britain and, in any event, were hostile to a policy motivated by sympathy for the families of those who had shown no sympathy for the families of their victims.

The police and the Security Service, when privately consulted before the decisions were taken in 1992, made it clear that they would prefer the old policy of requiring terrorist prisoners to serve out their time in Great Britain to remain unchanged. They pointed out that PIRA members greatly disliked being in English prison and saw this as providing some means of general deterrence.

When we met you made it clear that you thought that abandoning the 1992 policy would hand PIRA a propaganda weapon which they would successfully exploit with the moderate nationalist community and with Dublin, who are already taking a keen interest in this subject. Your preference, therefore, would be to start to implement the transfers which have been expected since November 1992.

Given the continuation of the terrorist campaign and, in some respects, its escalation (particularly the recent attacks on Heathrow) I fear that once we notify any decision to transfer terrorist prisoners to Northern Ireland (and one of the first to apply is the Brighton bomber) the general support given in November 1992 would quickly be drowned out by a chorus of protests from parts of the press and from our own backbenchers. There is also a real risk that any early announcement would be seen as a reward for PIRA's 72-hour ceasefire. My strong preference therefore is to announce that, after further consideration, we have decided to modify the November 1992 policy so to exclude from it those convicted of terrorist offences. I would have no objection to the November 1992 criteria continuing to apply to those convicted of other offences.

If we go down this road the Attorney General has advised that we shall need to have regard to the legitimate expectation of those whose applications under the November 1992 criteria await determination. Clearly there must be some risk of legal challenge if we treat them less generously than they had hoped but I believe that the risk could be substantially mitigated if we agreed to allow each of them a relatively short period of transfer to Northern Ireland - say up to six months. This will, I know, not be operationally very attractive to our two prison services but it would honour the letter of our commitment to grant temporary transfer and would provide a short term opportunity for easier family visits without giving any impression that early release is on the way.

It would not be open to us to delay decisions deliberately for presentational advantage, so it would be difficult to stagger the decisions which have already been outstanding for many months (our current explanation for the delay is that there are unresolved legal difficulties, but once it becomes clear that we are dealing with individual cases that explanation will no longer be available). The actual transfer of prisoners to Northern Ireland would, given the necessary security arrangements, be staggered over many months.

We are under strong pressure to resolve the outstanding applications as quickly as possible and are likely to face the risk of judicial action to force our hands unless we resolve the present uncertainty very quickly. As I say, I would prefer to announce a return to the pre-1992 policy in respect of terrorist prisoners and to accompany that by short term transfers for those for whom legitimate expectations were created by the earlier announcement.

But if colleagues take a different view I believe that we must make the necessary amendment to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill. Ideally that should be done at report in the House of Commons, which would mean tabling amendments by the 8 April, but since it is not going to be possible to resolve the policy before then I would, exceptionally, have to press the business managers to allow us to amend the Bill during its passage through the House of Lords. It would be a pity to have draw attention to the issue in this way at what is a sensitive time. We would have to rely on cross party support for the 1992 policy and stress that the effect of the provisions was to ensure that, while prisoners were allowed to serve their sentences nearer home, they would not be released a day earlier than if they had not been transferred.

CONFIDENTIAL

A copy of this letter goes to the Prime Minister, to members of EDH, to the Attorney General and to Sir Robin Butler.



Yours faithfully

pp MICHAEL HOWARD

(Approved by the Home Secretary and signed in his absence)

The Rt Hon Sir Patrick Mayhew QC MP
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
Whitehall
London SW1