

Removed from  
FO 371/2645

C 1303

R.M.M.

Viscount Halifax,  
WASHINGTON.

(from Sir A.  
Cadogan)

Nothing to be written in this margin.

kel  
1/2

Minutes.

(10<sup>th</sup> February, 1941.

MOST SECRET.

Dear Edward,

Further to your telegram to the Foreign Secretary of 8th February regarding the approach by an emissary of Dieckhoff concerning the H matter, I have been instructed to pass on the following guidance.

All matters regarding H must be managed under the strictest diplomatic protocols, as we ordered Sam to inform the <sup>instructed</sup> emissary last November. As we all agreed, the emissary was ordered not to contact you directly, so as to confuse their assessment of the situation, and to prevent your compromise should there be a mistake. We do not believe the opposition would intentionally leak as it will end their whole operation, and we certainly would not as we are not supposed to know - but mistakes do happen.

Both Winston and Anthony agree that if any further approach is made, feign anger and walk away. For our part we have informed Sam to tell the emissary that any further attempt to <sup>influence you</sup> ~~elicit your co-operation~~ will result in an immediate end to negotiations.

I need hardly emphasize how dangerous a failure during the coming sensitive stage could be. Please destroy this telegram after digesting the content.

Yours ever  
AB

S E C R E T  
Papal Nuncio.  
Memorandum.

Removed from  
FO 371/2699

192

On 14 November 1940 the Papal Nuncio in Madrid visited the Ambassador. At this meeting he informed Sir Samuel that he had been requested to communicate the following peace offer on the behalf of the German Government representative the Ambassador met last July at the home of Beigbeder (APA representative Haushofer), when the last round of peace offers were made.

The Nuncio informed the Ambassador of the German Government's sincere wish to end the hostilities, and that he had been asked to hand the following details for transmission to a party who would be willing to act upon them:-

- (1) A confidential meeting as soon as possible in Switzerland between the representatives who are prepared to negotiate, to arrange a more formal conference at a later date.
- (2) Once the conference details have been agreed, then a meeting to take place between to parties to discuss Poland, guarantees, non-aggression pacts, disarmament, colonies, frontiers, the transfer of populations, and an end to hostilities.

The views of the German Government on the subjects detailed in (2) were as follows:-

The negotiating parties to meet on neutral territory under the stewardship of a neutral state, such as Switzerland or the United States of America.

Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France would be independant free states, able to choose their constitution and government; but opposition to Germany must be excluded and assurances of non-retaliation given. Germany would withdraw her military forces, would not claim military concessions in these countries, and is prepared to negotiate a form of reparation for damage inflicted during conquest.

All aggressive weapons to be destroyed and then armed forces reduced to correspond with the economic and strategic requirements of each country.

Germany requests a return of her former colonies but would advance no other territorial claims. South-West Africa, might not be claimed. Germany might consider the payment of an indemnity for improvements effected in the colonies since 1918, and the purchase of property from present owners who might desire to leave.

The political independence and national identity of "a Polish state" to be restored, but the territory occupied by the Soviet Union is to be excluded from discussions. Czechoslovakia would not be prevented from developing her national character, but is to remain under the protection of the Reich.

Greater European economic solidarity should be pursued, and the solution of important economic questions solved by negotiation and national European agreement.

The Nuncio added to these details that the APA representative had informed him that Hitler's desire for peace was based on the principal that he wished there to be "no victor or vanquished" stigma applied to any of the negotiating parties, and that any agreement reached would have to be validated by a plebiscite in all countries affected by an agreement.

The Ambassador was informed that the Head of the German negotiating delegation wished for a meeting at the earliest opportunity to discuss the offer.

At the end of the meeting the Nuncio informed the Ambassador that a negotiated conclusion to the European conflict would have the full support of his Holiness the Pope, and that he had been informed that the Vatican would be willing to participate if further mediation were required.

G.A.H.

17th November, 1940.

Removed from  
FO 371/26991

2 of 2

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET).

Decypher. Capt, Hillgerth (Madrid)

D.	3.17 p.m.	17th December, 1940.
R.	5.45 p.m.	17th December, 1940.
		17th December, 1940.

kkkkkkkkkk

17 DEC 1940

*J*

SECRET.

Further to my meeting with Gen. Vigon this morning I can confirm that a safe arrangement for the carriage of my Minister over dangerous territory has been concluded. Gen. Vigon was most helpful and confirmed that both the arrangements for the 20th and return on 21st have been cleared with the relevant parties, and so there should be no problems.

F.O. REG 131

Removed from  
FO 800/868

1888

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

Decypher. Mr. Thomas (Bremen) 24th May, 1945.  
D. 2.50 a.m. 24th May, 1945.  
R. 4.45 a.m. 24th May, 1945.

jj jj jj jj

No.163.

SECRET

Attn. Robert Bruce Lockhart.

Further to my orders we successfully intercepted H.H. last night at Luneberg before he could be interrogated. As instructed action was taken to silence him permanently. I issued orders that my presence at Luneberg is not to be recorded in any fashion and we may conclude that the H.H. problem is ended.

copy to JM  
R B L  
25/5

FOREIGN OFFICE  
REGISTRY

Removed  
FO 800/868  
288

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

PERSONAL & SECRET

Dear Bruce,

Further to our meeting yesterday morning, I have been giving some serious thought to the little H situation.

We cannot allow Himmler to take to the stand in any prospective prosecution, or indeed allow him to be interrogated by the Americans. Steps will therefore have to be taken to eliminate him as soon as he falls into our hands.

Please give this matter some thought, as if we are to take action, we will have to expedite such an act with some haste.



John W. Wheeler-Bennett

10th May, 1945

Sir Robert Bruce-Lockhart, K.C.M.G.,  
Political Intelligence Department,  
Bush House,  
W.C.2.

I agree, I have arranged for  
Mr. Ingram to go for a fortnight

R B L  
12/May/45

SECRET

FO 800/868

30/8

BRITISH LEGATION,  
STOCKHOLM.  
3rd March, 1943.

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL.

Dear Bruce Lockhart,

I thought I would send you this brief letter direct to you as the subject matter is extremely delicate and I felt it best not to involve anyone else at this time.

I was invited to Marcus Wallenberg's home last evening where, to my surprise, he presented a visiting German named Karl Langbehn, who revealed he was Himmler's agent. Langbehn wanted to know under what circumstances H.M.G. would treat with Himmler as an alternate leader of Germany, and repeatedly referred to the 'Himmler Solution.'

Langbehn revealed he will return in a fortnight should we wish to take the discussions further.

I am not sure whether anything is to be gained from this contact, which I find rather distasteful. Please let me know what you wish me to do.

*Yours sincerely  
Victor Mallet.*

Sir Robert Bruce-Lockhart,  
Political Intelligence Department,  
Bush House,  
W.C.2.

*I think the P.I. should  
see this  
W. Strong 1213*

Removed from

FO 800/868

488

BRITISH LEGATION,  
STOCKHOLM.  
8th June, 1943.

PERSONAL AND SECRET.

Dear Bruce,

Further to my last letter, I have again been approached by Marcus Wallenberg to meet a German emissary. This meeting took place last night, and the discussion was most interesting.

Marcus's German was quite forthright and introduced himself as the right-hand of Himmler in all matters of foreign affairs, and was empowered on Himmler's behalf to enter into negotiations with us to conclude a peace in the west on the understanding that H.M.G. would recognise the legitimacy of Himmler as the new leader of Germany.

Of course, I stated that this undertaking was beyond my authority to grant, but that I would refer back to London for guidance. I was informed that the German will return in four weeks for another meeting, by which time he expressed the hope that H.M.G. would be willing to concede that continuing the war was a disaster for Europe, and that support of Himmler is the best means of restoring peace to the continent.

*Yours sincerely*

*Victor Mallet*

Sir Robert Bruce-Lockhart,  
Political Intelligence Department,  
Bush House,  
W.C.2.

Received 1/21

FO 800/1868

598

BRITISH LEGATION  
STOCKHOLM.  
24th January, 1944.

PERSONAL AND SECRET.

Dear Bruce,

Developments here are progressing very slowly. Yesterday I had another meeting with W.S. at the home of M.W. It seems that H.H. cannot be persuaded to act independantly and launch his bid for power; he is just too cautious. W.S. does, however, believe that he would be prepared to act in concert with a third party's attempt. He further stated that H. would be prepared to accept a third party coup attempt and step in at the last moment as the man of the hour, and seize power.

This all seems highly Machiavellian to me, but it could, I am sure, be turned to our advantage. W.S. has departed for further instructions, but is keen to advance the negotiations now that a move to oust Hitler has in theory been agreed upon. I have agreed to meet W.S. again on 17th February, so please advise me what our stance should be at this development.

*Yours faithfully*  
*Victor Mallet*

Sir Robert Bruce-Leckhart,  
Political Intelligence Department,  
Bush House,  
W.C.2.

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FO 800/868  
698

BRITISH LEGATION  
STOCKHOLM  
27th October, 1943.

M O S T   S E C R E T .

MEMORANDUM.

On 26th October, 1943, I, His Majesty's Ambassador in Sweden, met with W.S., the emissary of Heinrich Himmler, at the home of Marcus Wallenberg. During this meeting W.S. passed to me a six point peace proposal, which I was informed emanated directly from his superior, Himmler. The six points are as follows:

1. There must be an immediate cessation of the air war by the Allies.
2. The Allies must renounce their intent to invade western Europe and make clear their wish to prevent any further useless sacrifice of lives.
3. Germany will install a new provisional government, which will immediately evacuate all the occupied territories of north, west, and southern Europe.
4. Germany is to be permitted a permanent defensible line in the east along her current strategic position.
5. Germany is to be permitted to retain Austria and the Sudetanland, but will restore the sovereignty of Poland.
6. Russia is to be excluded from all negotiations with Britain and America. If peace is to be made with Russia, Germany will enter into separate negotiation with her at a suitable time.

I am not sure of the value of these proposals, but assured W.S. that I would pass them onto H.M.G. for consideration. My own opinion is that having come so far now in this conflict a separate peace concluded with Himmler will be of no value whilst Hitler holds power in Germany, and I told W.S. this. He agreed with me but was very cryptic in his reply, stating that not all great men last forever, and that whilst Hitler's sun was setting, it was Himmler's that was rising.

Wallenberg seemed most concerned to gain my assurance that I would pass this peace proposal to a sympathetic person in London, which I assured him I would do.

Please let me know by the usual channel what our reply to this peace proposal is to be.

Generated from  
FO 800 868  
788

P.I.D., Bush House,  
W.C.2.

MEMORANDUM

MOST SECRET

10th August, 1943.

Dear Bruce,

As the process of the Mallet negotiations proceed, we must endeavour to keep Himmler's man in Stockholm firmly on the hook. We have come too far now to let this very tasty fish just swim away. If we are to accomplish our desire of political turmoil in Germany, then I feel sure that a few more tantalising pieces of bait may see our objectives achieved. Further to our discussion yesterday, I will ask Crossman if B.B. will sanction the release of some further sensitive information to keep our fish well and truly hooked.



Robert Bruce-Lockhart,  
Political Intelligence Department,  
Bush House,  
Aldwych.

*Robert Bruce-Lockhart*

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FO 800/868

8 of 8

12th June, 1945.

~~SECRET~~

Dear Ingrams,

Further to our conversation yesterday afternoon, I have been pondering the Himmeler development, and have had some thoughts on the matter at hand.

We must endeavour at all cost to keep knowledge about the Himmeler peace approach from the Americans. They may well reject an appeal from Himmeler, but we cannot presume that our cousins will take this course. I therefore feel it prudent to instruct Mr. Ballet to proceed cautiously with these negotiations, and if in so doing we can precipitate political instability in Germany, then we could consider it a job well done.

Perhaps you could give some thought to the matter of how we can turn this peace appeal to our advantage.

sgn R.B-L.

Ingrams, Esq.,  
Political Intelligence Department,  
House,  
W.C.P.

Removed from

CAB 127/206

1 of 2

Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square House,  
Berkeley Square,  
W1.

28th February, 1941.

Dear Minister,

I have been in deep contemplation ever since the matter we discussed yesterday with the P.M., and feel I must put my concerns to you before we take any further action.

Leeper's assessment on Saturday was pretty close to the mark, and his conclusion that despite being unable, probably, to win in Europe, we could win a world war has, of course, been bandied about for the last month or two. However, what Winston now proposes is a truly terrible thing, and I am not sure my conscience will allow me to participate.

I have always maintained that in this war body-line bowling of the Hun is justified, and the Messrs HHHH Operation, once we took it over, was intended to fulfill that function, but I do not believe we can be morally justified to use it to cause the suggested end result.

I feel we must have another meeting to discuss where we are going to take this matter, and I would appreciate your opinion. Can I suggest a joint car again next Saturday?

Yours Ever,

H.D.

Mr. A. Eden,  
Foreign Office, SW1.

Removed from  
CAB 127/205  
242.

~~16~~ 5

COPY.

SECRET

9th. August, 1940.

Dear Hugh,

I am writing to apologise for the delay in sending you a copy of the minutes of last week's meeting. As you know Brogan wanted to look into the supply question of French N. Africa before appending his assessment.

You may be interested to know that following Ingram's B.P. suggestion, I took the idea to the P.M. who felt the German leadership was now ripe for exploitation. I am sure the key to this B.P. lays within their recent attempts to find an accord. Ingrams and Crossman are going to look into the idea, as any below the belt Ops we can initiate at this critical time can only help.

I hope to send a copy of Brogan's report to the Minister by next week. Perhaps you, too, could read it and make some suggestions.

H.T.N. Gaitskell, Esq.,  
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

*Rex*

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION  
MALET ST., W.C.1.

27 May, 1945.

*My dear Top*

Further to the good news of the death of Little H, I feel it is imperative that we maintain a complete news black-out on the exact circumstances of this most evil man's demise. I am sure that if it were to become public knowledge that we had a hand in this man's demise, it would have devastating repercussions for this country's standing. I am also sure that this incident would complicate our relationship with our American bretheren; under no circumstances must they discover that we eradicated 'Little H', particularly so since we know they were so keen to interrogate him themselves.

I am of the opinion that the special S.O.E./P.W.E. Committee and team can now be dissolved, even though Mallet is still negotiating with W.S. in Sweden. Perhaps you could let me know your opinion on this matter.

*Brendan Bracken*

The Rt.Hon. the Earl of Selborne,  
Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square House,  
Berkeley Square,  
W.1.

*Removed from*

*HS 8/944*

*of 3*

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MS 8/944 2 of 3

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION  
MALET ST., W.C.1.

27 January, 1944.

*My dear Top*

Further to our conversation on the telephone this morning on the 'Little H' matter, I am sure that this latest development can be turned to our advantage. Now that Victor has managed to extricate from W.S. the fact that H.H. is prepared to move against the Nazi leadership in his own interests, it can only be a matter of time (maybe just a few months) before we can see political chaos erupting in the Fatherland.

Perhaps we could meet for lunch later this week to discuss the matter.

*L*

*Brendan Bracken*

The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Selborne,  
Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square House,  
Berkeley Square,  
W.1.

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HS 8/944

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION  
MALET ST., W.C.1.

5 November, 1943.

*My dear Top*

Further to my recent memo to you on this matter, I feel it pertinent to let you know of a sudden development in the matter of 'Little H'. Victor has in the last few days reported on a most interesting meeting with W.S. at the home of Wallenberg. At this meeting W.S. passed to Victor the draft of a six point peace plan from H.H. The points raised are of interest and reveal much to us about H.H.'s inner thinking on peace, and in so doing reveals to us about how desperate the top men of the Nazi regime believe their military situation to be. Of course H.H.'s proposal is unrealistic, even if we had the slightest intention of making a deal, but nevertheless it places us in a unique position to precipitate chaos in Germany at a moment of our choosing. I have passed Victor's report on the six points to Bruce for his consideration, and I am sure he will contact you about this matter in due course.

*Brendan Bracken*

The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Selborne,  
Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square House,  
Berkeley Square,  
W.1.

Removed from  
FO 794/19.

28 MAR 1941 <sup>YBS</sup>  
British Embassy,

MADRID.

Personal & Secret

26th March, 1941.

*Dear Alex*

I am sending you this note by the first available plane, as I have now had a further meeting with Haushofer at the home of Baigbeder. I understand he is here at his superior's insistence, and it was evident during our meeting that he and his kin are now becoming most agitated by the lack of progress.

During the course of our conversation H asked why Edward had not yet made any move, etc.. I explained the complexities of the situation, which would make any action a long process. H understood completely, but responded that his superior has insisted on a meeting with a close representative of the man of influence on neutral territory. After I pointed out that this was out of the question, H informed me that it has already been arranged for their Head of AO to journey anywhere for a confidential meeting, if it would resolve the impasse.

There is undoubtedly an urgency on their part now, and their demands are unrealistic if not dangerous, but I am also convinced we shall have to facilitate some sort of meeting if the matter is not to fail.

*Yours ever*

*Samuel Hoare*

The Honourable  
Sir Alexander Cadogan,  
G.C.M.G., K.C.B.


Received from

FO 898/14  
194

Dear Rex,

I thought I should send you this short note concerning the HD matter. I have rarely seen Winston so annoyed as when he received HD's letter yesterday. It has thrown the whole matter in turmoil, but I believe we can keep HD on side long enough to conclude the matter at hand.

I would appreciate first hand news of any problems with HD, as I believe BB has been given the go ahead to reduce him once the operation has reached its conclusion.



2nd March, 1941.

SECRET 2131  
898/14  
20/4

MOST SECRET

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Leeper  
From: Mr. Veigt

Mr. Ingrams has passed on your enquiry concerning the accident of yesterday morning on the Douglas to Lanark road between a car driven by HRH the Duke of Kent, and a coal lorry.

I can confirm that neither the Duke, or his passenger, Buccleugh, were injured, and in view of Lanark's close proximity to the events of last weekend, steps have been taken to ensure the incident remains unreported by the press.

SV

12.5.41.

FO 898/14

384

W.S.-A.C.

Sir Alexander  
Cadogan.

(from W. Strang)

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

*J  
Cag  
RA  
3/6*

Minutes.

28th April, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Dear Sir Alec,

Further to our discussion concerning the H matter last week, I am writing to inform you that I attended a meeting with HRH the Duke of Kent last Friday.

After I explained a little of the situation he seemed most willing to assist in this most delicate affair. However, before placing himself at our disposal he has requested that either you or the Foreign Secretary clarify one or two details of his task. Also, he wishes his acquaintance, Buccleugh, to be present, as he has met the visiting gentlemen concerned, whilst he has not. I agreed in principal to these two requests as I felt he might not agree to participate otherwise.

Perhaps you could let me know when it will be convenient for you to meet with HRH, and I shall then make the necessary arrangements.

*Yours  
W Strang*

SECRET

FO 898/14

484

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

SECRET.

MR. LEEPER.

Mr O'Neill has now finished his liaison with MI.5 over the matter of the parachutists. He attended several of the interrogations, but they are astutely sticking to their story of being sent to rescue our recent acquisition, in the vain hope, I suspect, of believing such a tale will save their skins. However, as we all know their intentions were significantly different, we must be thankful that Mr. E. was saved from their obvious intentions. Mr O'Neill is of the opinion that they have no useful information and can now be duly dispatched.

I do not believe that these men can be turned or otherwise used, and agree with Mr O'Neill, but if you have any other wishes, please let me know.

*G. Hill*

8th June, 1941.

*I see no reason to keep these men  
Yes - MI.5 can conduct their usual services  
but notify Sir R Vassittant first.*

*R. Leeper 16/6*



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50 371/60508

FROM BERNE TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

opkinson. D. 7.10.p.m. 12th March, 1946.

March, 1946. R. 7.10.p.m. 12th March, 1946.

kk kk kk

ition Mr. Kirkpatrick.

Further to your instructions of 8th March, K. Haushofer visited on 10th March.

After interrogation it was apparent the gentleman knew  
ing further on the subject in question. In response to  
instructions the problem concerning this man and the IMT  
now been removed.

Report to follow.

Removed from

FD 71/26542

292.

9

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

Cypher telegram to Mr. Kelly (Berne)

Foreign Office 22nd January, 1941. 3.25 p.m.

No. 160.

kkkkkkkkkk

Your telegram No. 136 of January 18th.

The Foreign Secretary acknowledges receipt of your information.

To confirm or deny presence of the Ambassador to Spain might compromise his future work. You may be assured that if matters relate to Anglo Swiss relations you will be informed.

Please refrain from enquiry if such an instance comes to your attention again.

Removed from  
FO 371/2874:  
1 of 3

~~CA~~  
11/1/39

CONFIDENTIAL

THE HAGUE  
3rd December, 1939

TO: J.D. Taylor,  
Foreign Office,  
Whitehall, S.W.1.

-----

D.H.

Following a meeting with my contact in the G.S. yesterday he informed me that he had recently heard of an incident that might well be of interest to us concerning an American engineer named Charles Bedaux, a wealthy industrialist trading in Holland.

Beck informed me that the G.S. have been interested in this man for some time, that his Dutch business, Internationale Bedaux M.i.j., is run on a dubious tax avoidance basis, and he uses it to gain access to their more sensitive industries. He travels frequently around Holland and lately has used Holland as his route to Germany, especially since the declaration of September 3. He makes frequent visits to the German Hague Embassy, and has also been seen in the company of Anton Mussert. The most interesting piece of information that Beck divulged to me is that on November 9, their M.A. to Berlin was delivering a note from de With to the Reich Chancellery, when he recognised Bedaux coming out of the building. He approached B., who he's met before, intending to speak, but B. ignored him, got into an official car (a Luftwaffe vehicle) and was driven off.

Beck says the G.S. are aware B.'s Dutch companies are linked to several British firms, and that he has close connections to several leading British subjects, so he thought the information might be of value to us.

D. Hopkinson.

fs

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FC 37/28741  
243

PM  
Cadeyem

I returned WC see this 13.7.  
~~DHE~~

Decypher.	Maj. J. Smith	(The Hague).
		21st February 1940.
D.	9.20 p.m.	21st February 1940.
R.	11.15 p.m.	21st February 1940.

No. 736.

b b b b b b b b b b b b

IMMEDIATE & URGENT .

Following for Col. Vivian.

Saw Walbach again this evening. He informed me that Bedeaux is visiting Z-B on an almost fortnightly basis and that he is also crossing the frontier, travelling by train to Cologne, just as often. W has had an opportunity to see the transcribed information that B. brings verbally, and says it is of the best quality - defense material, strengths, weaknesses and so on.

Davis suggests stopping B. permanently, but if we do that, will the leak find another courier, one we do not know of? At the moment we know of B.'s (? group omitted: existence) and to some extent can keep tabs on him. Suggest we contact the F.S.P. at Arras, and ask them to observe who B. is associating with in Paris. I do not know if we dare inform Ronin at the D.B., for there is little doubt from what W. has told me that B.'s source is with the B.E.F., for he was recently in London to attend an A.W.C. meeting.

Can you send me some pointers on our policy with regard to B.. Do we keep watching him, or follow Davis' line?

Seen!

22 FEB 40

Lad to FH.

RR - 11

WV  
22/2

Removed from

to 371/28741

342

~~VIGAN~~  
~~FINCH~~

~~COOGAN~~

~~JRK~~  
~~15/4~~

Decypher. Maj. J. Smith

(The Hague).  
3rd April 1940.

D. 9.45 a.m.

4th April 1940.

R. 10.20 a.m.

4th April 1940.

No. 1026.

SS SS SS SS SS SS SS

SECRET & VERY URGENT.

Following for Col. Finch.

Received an urgent message from Walbach requesting a meeting at the usual place. He informed me that Z-B's agent Bedeaux is still bringing information of great importance, and asked why we have not stopped him. I think W. fears that B. might one day bring information exposing him. The Abwehr have placed a man named Protze in the Embassy, and W. fears P.'s purpose is to tighten security.

W. has said that Z-B accidentally referred to B.'s source as "Willi", and thinks this might be part of the man's name. Also, Z-B has on more than one occasion hinted that B.'s source is an important person with the B.E.F.!! B. should be stopped. Please refer to my message of 12 March and advise.

17 MAY 40

I believe the  
P.M. should see this  
B.

MI 15-15

MP 4

4/1/40

27 JUL 40 Thank you for getting  
this to me. Sincerely.

Removed from

NO 200/3036A

To James  
FSP

29 DEC 39

D.M.O. & P.  
A.

H.V.O./---

SECRET.  
& CONFIDENTIAL.

TO: D.M.O. & P.,  
The War Office,  
Whitehall,  
London, S.W.1.

Dear Dick,

I fear I may have something of a problem here with HRH's ability to keep important matters confidential. As you are aware I received a communique from James of the F.S.P. earlier in the month concerning some US engineer who he feels is a bad sort.

Purvis came to see me this morning to tell me that HRH had put on a Christmas do yesterday to which he had been invited. It was apparently quite a lavish affair, with even Gen. Sikorski in attendance as well as a member of PETIBON'S staff - BLONC. HRH chatted and mingled superbly as he always does, and introduced Purvis to that man Bedeaux. Bedeaux asked him what he thought of Fort Vaux. Apparently he'd served there in the World War, and thought it had been too badly damaged ever to be of use again. Purvis was horrified, and for a moment thought BLONC had heard what Bedeaux was saying. He excused himself and beat a hasty retreat, lest the Yank compromise all our hard work.

But, surely the point is, how did Bedeaux know Purvis & HRH had been to Vaux - unless, HRH told him. This begs the serious question, is HRH's value to us outweighed by his inability to keep a confidence. Do you want me to inform James that we've come across this American, or shall I leave you do it? Please let me know by the next plane.

*R. Howard-Vyse*

France.  
28th December 1939.

Major-General,  
No.1 (Howard-Vyse) Military Mission.

Removed from  
HC 208/609

17 DEC 39

Cypher telegram to Maj.-Gen. Howard-Vyse (B.M.M. No.1  
Vincenne.)  
F.S.P. London. 17th December, 1939. 11.20 a.m.

No. 5268 (r)

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Following from Col. James for Maj.-Gen. Howard-Vyse.  
Begins.

Further to my communication at beginning of month,  
I would request that you inform Maj.-Gen. HRH the Duke of  
Windsor that it has come to our notice that his acquaintance  
Mr. C.E. Bedaux is believed to be engaged in conduct  
incompatible with his status as a citizen of a neutral  
state. HRH is therefore requested to cease all activity  
and contact with this gentleman immediately.

Our F.S.P. office with the B.E.F. currently report  
he is not in France at the moment. He made a sudden  
departure on the night of the 10th December, and we do  
not know where he has gone. If anyone at your M.M. should  
hear of him, please inform me or our office at Arras  
immediately.

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