

2765

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

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FILE TITLE:

RELATIONS

SERIES

POLAND

PART:

1

PART BEGINS:

8 JUNE 2001

PART ENDS:

8 FEBRUARY 2002

CAB ONE:

PART 1 CLOSED

Labour Administration

PREM 49/2765

CONFIDENTIAL

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PART /

CLOSED

8 FEBRUARY 2002

Series : **POLAND**

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Part : **1**

Date	From	To	Subject	Class	Secret
21/05/2001	Poland/HMA	FCO	Leszek Miller, Chairman SLD	R	0
08/06/2001	Poland/PM	PM	(H) Election victory congratulations	U	0
17/06/2001	FA/PS	FCO	(M) Gothenburg European Council: Prime Minister's Contacts with Nor	R	0
26/06/2001	FCO	FA/APS	Proposed Visit of Polish President and Prime Minister	R	0
26/06/2001			UK/Poland Seminar, London, 26 June 2001: Poland's progress toward	U	0
13/07/2001	FA/APS	FCO	Proposed visit of Polish President and Prime Minister	C	0
18/07/2001	Poland/HMA	FCO	Proposed Visit of Polish President and Prime Minister	R	0
26/07/2001	Poland/HME	FCO	Evening with SLD leaders: atmospherics	C	0
01/08/2001	Poland/HME	FA/APS	Poland: Media: Interview with the Prime Minister	U	0
06/09/2001	Poland/HMA	FCO	Miller visit to UK 2 Nov	C	0
06/09/2001	Poland/HMA	FCO	Ministerial visits	C	0
18/09/2001	Poland/HMA	FCO	Leszek Miller: Poland's next PM	C	0
21/09/2001	FCO	FA/APS	Polish elections - message from the PM	C	0
24/09/2001	FA/APS	FCO	(T) Polish elections Tel conversation with Leszek Miller	C	0
24/09/2001	PM	Poland/PM	(H) congrats re election	C	0
28/09/2001	Telegram/IN		Poland: A Week in Politics	R	0
05/10/2001	FCO	FCO	Enlargement : Poland	U	0
09/10/2001	Poland/HMA	Poland/HME	Call on Leszek Miller, 9 October	R	0
12/10/2001	FCO	FA/APS	Polish Elections, 23 September: Message to the outgoing Polish Prim	U	0
16/10/2001	FCO	FA/APS	Draft letter to outgoing Polish Prime Minister. Jerzy Buzek	U	0
18/10/2001	Poland/HMA	Poland/HME	Miller Visit to UK	R	
18/10/2001	Poland/PM	PM	Four Year Term in Office Coming to an End	U	0
22/10/2001	PM		Letter of Thanks to the Outgoing Polish Prime Minister-Professor Jerz	U	
22/10/2001	Poland/HME	FCO	UK Visit by Leszek Miller, 2 November	R	0
25/10/2001	Poland/HMA	FA/APS	Prime Minister / Leszek Miller : Polish Economy	R	0
01/11/2001	FCO	FA/APS	Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism, 6 November	U	
01/11/2001	FA/APS	PM	Meeting and Lunch with Polish Prime Minister	R	
01/11/2001	EU/PS	PM	Meeting with the Polish Prime Minister: 2 November: EU Issues	U	
01/11/2001	FCO	FA/APS	Call by Leszek Miller, Polish Prime Minister, 2 November	U	0
01/11/2001			The future of Europe : Bringing Europe closer to its Citizens: a Polish/	U	0
01/11/2001	Poland/Ambo	PM	Letter from President of Poland - Declaration of the Warsaw Conferen	U	
02/11/2001			Joint Press Conference with Miller	R	0
02/11/2001	FA/APS	FCO	(M) Discussions with Polish Prime Minister: 2 November: EU Issues	R	
02/11/2001	FA/APS	FCO	(M) Discussions with Polish Prime Minister: 2 November: Bilateral an	R	
05/11/2001	PM	poland/President	(H) Letter of support for conference on combatting terrorism in Warsa	U	
05/11/2001	Portugal/HME	FA/APS	President Kwasniewski of Poland	R	
08/11/2001	EU/PS	FCO	Visit of the Polish PM - free movement of workers	C	
09/11/2001	PM	Poland/PM	(H) - congrats and EU accession	C	
16/11/2001	Poland/HMA	EU/PS	Prime Minister message to Miller: FMOP	C	
19/11/2001	Poland/HME	FA/APS	Summary of record of Roger Liddles call on Minister Zemke, Polish M	C	
29/11/2001	FCO	FA/APS	Polish Prime Minister's Telephone Call to Prime Minister	U	
29/11/2001	Cab Off	DTI	Barecelona Preparations: Joint Working with Poland	U	
30/11/2001	FA/APS	PM	Telephone conversation with Leszek Miller	U	
30/11/2001	FA/APS	FCO	(T) Telephone conversation with Polish Prime Minister	C	
30/11/2001	FCO	FCO	EU/Poland: Polish minister for Europe's call on Mr Hain	C	
05/12/2001	Poland/HMA	FA/APS	Nobel Prize for the Pope	R	0
05/12/2001	Poland/HMA	FA/APS	Kwasniewski Visit to UK, May 2002	R	0
05/12/2001	FCO	FA/APS	Poland and free movement of Capital	C	
10/12/2001	PM	Poland/PM	12 Year Transition period on the purchase of Polish land	U	0
21/12/2001	Poland/HMA	FA/APS	Polish media reports of Leszek Miller's visit to Russia	C	
11/01/2002	Poland/HMA	Poland/HME	Diplomatic Jottings, 9 January	R	

Series : **POLAND**

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Date	From	To	Subject	Class	Secret
14/01/2002	FCO	FA/APS	Poland: Prime Minister's telephone call to Miller 15 January	U	
15/01/2002	FA/APS	PM	Telephone conversation with Leszek Miller	U	
15/01/2002	FA/APS	FCO	(T) Telephone Conversation with Polish Prime Minister	R	
18/01/2002	Poland/PM	PM	(H) Wprost Man of the Year Award 2001	U	
24/01/2002	FCO	FA/APS	Proposed visit of Polish president		
31/01/2002	FA/APS	FCO	Proposed Visit of Polish President	R	
06/02/2002	FCO	FA/APS	Polish Tragedy - Draft Message from PM	U	
08/02/2002	FA/APS	FCO	Message to Polish PM	U	
09/11/2002	poland/President	PM	Warsaw Conference held on 6th November	U	
06/12/2002	FA/APS	FCO	Letter from President of Poland	U	

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From: Michael Tatham
Date: 8 February 2002

SIMON McDONALD
(by fax: 7270 2144)

MESSAGE TO POLISH PM

Can it be recast as follows:

I was deeply upset to learn of the explosion at the Jas-Mos mine earlier this week. I send my condolences to the relatives and friends of those killed and to those miners injured in the accident. This must have been a great shock for the local community, and for Poland as a whole. My thoughts are with you as you come to terms with this tragedy.

Can issue by telegram. No signed original.

Michael Tatham

MICHAEL TATHAM

6 February 2002

Told FCO to
issue as amended

file



Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Michael ^{apress}

Polish Tragedy

...

As promised, I enclose a short message which the Prime Minister may like to send Mr Miller.

Yours
Simon

(Simon McDonald)
Principal Private Secretary

Michael Tatham Esq
10 Downing Street

**DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER**

I was deeply upset to learn of the explosion at the Jas-Mos mine this morning. I send my ^{deeper condolences} sympathy to the two injured miners, to their families and to the relatives and friends of those killed. It must have been a great shock for the local community, and for Poland as a whole. My thoughts are with you as you come to terms with this tragedy.

and to the two
injured miners.

[Bruce Bucknell
CNWED, 270 2362]

I was deeply upset to learn of the explosion at the Jas-Mos mine this morning. I send my condolences to the relatives and friends of those killed and to those who were injured in this accident. This must . . .

7270
2144

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 January 2002

Dear Mark

PROPOSED VISIT OF POLISH PRESIDENT

Thank you for your letter of 24 January.

We agree that it would be worth the Prime Minister hosting a working lunch for President Kwasniewski in May. We have identified 1300-1430 on either 20 or 21 May as possible slots. I have passed these dates by telephone to Michael Pakenham who will pursue with Kwasniewski's office.

Our inclination is to wait until closer to the time before deciding whether the Prime Minister should attend a business event in London with Kwasniewski. In the meantime planning for this event should proceed on the basis that Prime Ministerial involvement is a possibility, not a certainty.

I am copying this letter to Sir Stephen Wall and Michael Pakenham (Warsaw).

Yours ever

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Michael Tatham'.

MICHAEL TATHAM

Mark Sedwill
FCO

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SW
EL
DM
Jlo

24 January 2002

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Michael,

Proposed Visit of Polish President

I wrote on 26 June last year about the proposed visits of the Polish President and Prime Minister. We advised putting off a visit by President Kwasniewski until the Spring of this year to allow for an earlier visit by Miller. You agreed with this in your reply of 13 July.

Miller visited in November, and we are now being pressed again by the Poles to find a date for a visit by Kwasniewski. As I noted in my letter of 26 June, we see merit in a visit by Kwasniewski. He is only 48, remains Poland's most popular politician and will be important in persuading the Polish voters to vote in favour in the referendum on EU accession. He will be President until 2005.

The second half of May would be ideal for the Poles. We suggest a short working lunch, to cover EU issues, Russia/Ukraine and the bilateral relationship.

We have steered the Poles away from their idea of a major conference to be opened jointly by the Prime Minister. Kwasniewski will bring a party of senior business figures and we have encouraged the Poles to work with the CBI and/or Mansion House on an event to promote business links with the UK. They would, of course, be delighted if the Prime Minister were able to put in a brief appearance at this. UK/Poland trade is now about £2.5 billion a year (50% more than with Russia) and growing rapidly.

I am copying this letter to Sir Stephen Wall and Michael Pakenham (Warsaw)

Yours aye,

(Mark Sedwill)
Private Secretary

Michael Tatham Esq
10 Downing Street

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Warszawa, dnia 18 stycznia 2002r.


PREZES RADY MINISTRÓW
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ

Szanowny Panie Premierze, Drogi Tony

poczytny tygodnik polski „Wprost” opublikował list gratulacyjny Pana Premiera w związku z przyznaniem mi przez redakcję tytułu „Człowieka Roku 2001”. Przyznane wyróżnienie sprawiło mi radość. Drugą radość sprawiły mi Pańskie słowa uznania i sympatii, które odczytuję także jako, adresowany do mojego kraju i narodu, dowód szacunku i przyjaźni. Serdecznie dziękuję za okazaną życzliwość.

Rozpoczęty rok będzie doniosłym okresem dla współpracy międzynarodowej i postępującego procesu integracji europejskiej. Przed Polską stoi zadanie zamknięcia negocjacji akcesyjnych do Unii Europejskiej, co wymaga, zarówno od krajów kandydackich jak i członkowskich, wzmożonego wysiłku i dialogu. Cieszę się, Szanowny Panie Premierze, że w osiągnięciu tego celu znajduję zrozumienie i partnerów.

Z szanem



Jego Ekscelencja
Pan Tony BLAIR
Premier Zjednoczonego Królestwa
Wielkiej Brytanii i Północnej Irlandii
Londyn



The Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to the Court of St James's
London


Mr Roger Liddle
Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

4 February 2002

Dear Roger

Further to the recent copy of the letter of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, Mr Leszek Miller, to the Rt. Hon. Tony Blair MP, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, regarding the title of the Man of the Year 2001 conferred upon the Polish Prime Minister by the WPROST weekly, enclosed please find the original of the letter. I would be very grateful for your passing it on to the addressee.

Yours sincerely


Stanisław Komorowski

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

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From the Private Secretary

15 January 2002

Dear Mark

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH POLISH PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister spoke by telephone to Leszek Miller this afternoon.

Wprost Prize

The Prime Minister congratulated Miller on this award. Miller thanked the Prime Minister for his letter of congratulation which had been prominently reported in the Polish media.

Russia

The Prime Minister said he had thought it might be useful to discuss Russia ahead of Putin's visit to Warsaw. He and Putin had held good discussions at Chequers just before Christmas. The Prime Minister said he believed Putin's basic objective was to give Russian policy an outward and westward orientation. We should encourage that trend. Putin attached particular importance to the NATO/Russia relationship. We were aware that some allies had reservations about this but we believed this was a strategically important initiative. It would not prejudice NATO's independence or give the Russians any kind of veto.

The Prime Minister said that Putin was also keen for Russia to enter into a new and different relationship with the EU, in particular because of the implications of enlargement. The Prime Minister welcomed the fact that relations between Poland and Russia were becoming closer – this would be an important part of an overall strategy for encouraging Russia's westward orientation.

Miller said he shared the Prime Minister's analysis. He had just returned from Washington where he had held good discussions with Bush and Rumsfeld, both of whom had asked for his assessment of Putin. Miller believed that Putin's current approach was strategic, not tactical. His goal was closer Russian relations with the West. He had calculated that Russian power and influence in the world was best realised by constructive engagement with the West, rather than by adopting a sulky

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position of nuclear power isolation. The West needed to respond imaginatively and to stop thinking of Russia in terms of a threat. He attached a lot of importance to warming up Poland's relations with Russia. He had visited Moscow in December and met with Putin and Kasyanov. Putin's visit to Warsaw would be a further step in thickening up the relationship.

NATO enlargement

Miller said he had been asked about this in Washington. His message was that enlargement was a question of "when", not "if", and it should be an independent decision for NATO.

EU

The Prime Minister said he hoped the UK and Poland could work closely together on future of Europe issues. Once our respective governmental representatives to the Convention had been chosen, it would make sense for them to meet. Miller welcomed this suggestion and said he would provide us with the contact details of all three Polish representatives once they had been chosen. Miller mentioned his idea of a joint article on the future of Europe. He would be happy to supply a first draft (in English). The Prime Minister encouraged him to do so.


Gripen

The Prime Minister said he expected Miller had come under a lot of pressure in Washington last week to choose the F16. We were grateful for the way in which the Polish Government was sticking scrupulously to an impartial tender process.

At the end of the call, Miller offered to phone later in the week to brief the Prime Minister on his talks with Putin.

I am copying this letter to Michael Pakenham (Warsaw) and Andrew Allberry (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever



MICHAEL TATHAM

Mark Sedwill
FCO

From: Michael Tatham
Date: 15 January 2002

PRIME MINISTER

cc: Jonathan Powell
Stephen Wall
David Manning
Danny Pruce

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH LESZEK MILLER

As part of our campaign to build up a close relationship with Poland and between you and Miller, we have arranged a short phonecall between the two of you at 1300 today. Putin is about to visit Warsaw and the thinking is that beforehand Miller would welcome hearing from you about your Chequers talks.

On Putin, you could welcome Miller's close and growing relationship with Putin (the previous Polish government was very hostile to Russia). It is vital that as many western leaders as possible build close relations with Putin to reinforce his westward orientation. Poland, because of its geography and history, will have a particular role to play here.

Worth stressing the importance Putin attaches to NATO/Russia. Miller, unlike Orban, is basically relaxed about our proposals though it might be worth adding a note of reassurance - no vetoes etc. Miller would probably welcome any personal advice or impressions you wanted to offer on Putin.

Miller may mention Kaliningrad, a point of joint Russian/Polish concern. You can sound receptive and say that you recognise an imaginative approach will be needed as Polish and Lithuanian EU accession becomes a reality.

Miller was in Washington last week and will have come under a lot of pressure to choose the F16. So worth mentioning Gripen and thanking Miller for sticking scrupulously to an impartial tender process.

On EU matters, officials are taking forward Miller's suggestion of a joint article on the future of Europe. Of the two tricky accession issues, the free movement of persons chapter has now been closed. On land purchase, we are ready to join an EU consensus which would probably be manageable for the Poles. They now need to work on reluctant partners (principally the Dutch).

We arranged for a message from you to be published in the Polish media congratulating Miller on being chosen by an influential Polish newspaper as their "man of the year". He may thank you for this (so sound as though you know what he's talking about).

Michael Tatham



MT
cc SW
JPO
RL
FC
BAP

British Embassy
Warsaw

Aleje R62 1
00-856 Warszawa

Tel.: (0048-22) 6281001-5
ext. 4211

Fax: (0048-22) 6217161
e-mail: info@britishembassy.pl

From the Ambassador

Michael Pakenham

14 January 2001

Michael Tatham Esq
No.10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

Dear Michael,

POLAND: PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CALL TO MILLER
15 JANUARY

Summary

1. Aside from Putin/Russia, a good chance to plug Gripen, and bilateral initiatives on Future of Europe and Lisbon Agenda. Defensive line in case Miller raises land purchase in EU negotiations.

Detail

2. First, many thanks for producing the letter for Miller's Man of the Year award. The magazine reproduced it in full. And Miller said publicly he appreciated it more than all the other tributes he had received from abroad (including Schroeder and Jospin). In short, an all-round coup.

3. I promised to let you have some thoughts on the non-Putin/Russia points the Prime Minister might raise with Miller during their telephone call tomorrow: see Annex. Miller will take it, as you proposed, at 1300 hours London time tomorrow/1400 local; the number to call is: 00 48 22 627 0404. They will also provide an interpreter.

Yours ever

Michael

Michael Pakenham

ANNEX: PRIME MINISTER/LESZEK MILLER TELEPHONE CALL,
15 JANUARY

SPEAKING NOTES

1. Wprost Prize

- Congratulations again. Glad my message went down well.

2. Gripen

- Expect you had a lot of pressure in Washington last week to choose F16. I know you will choose the aircraft best suited to Poland's requirements.
- Trust you will take into account Gripen is technically more advanced. And financial package is much better for Poland.

[Despite intense lobbying during his visit to Washington last week, Miller and his Ministers are sticking scrupulously to the tender process, for which they deserve encouragement.]

3. EU

- Keen to take forward joint article you suggested on Future of Europe [Martin Donnelly to pursue in Warsaw at end-January].
- Want our Convention Delegates, when named, to meet soon. [Poles yet to reveal hand, not much thinking so far.]
- Ready to launch joint initiative on Lisbon Agenda. [item for Melanie Johnson visit to Warsaw in March.]

Defensive Only: EU Accession Negotiations

- Welcome new impetus you have given Poland's accession negotiations. Closing Free Movement of Persons was a big step forward. Laeken confirmed that Poland is on track to join in 2004. In our joint interests that there should be no delays to this timetable.
- As I wrote earlier, I want to be helpful on transitional periods for land purchase. Understand Margaret Beckett discussed yesterday in Warsaw with your colleagues. UK ready to join EU consensus. Up to Poland to convince reluctant partners, especially Dutch.

[Still key political issue in Poland. No UK interest to protect by rejecting Polish bid, which seems acceptable to Germans but not Dutch.]

0044 20 72702152

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Date: 11 January 2002

cc: By fax: Michael Tatham, No.10
John Macgregor, Director
Wider Europe
Sir John Ramsden,
Hd/CNWED
Michael Davenport
Dominic Meiklejohn
Alexandra Davison
Anna Jackson
Alicia Clyde
Anna Tourvas
Monika Gadzala
Iza Van den Bossche

MT

om

JP

JSW

RL

FC

KK

JB

DHM

DIPLOMATIC JOTTINGS, 9 JANUARY

Summary

1. Shares in UK remain high with President, close colleagues and senior Ministers. Renewed activity across a wide diplomatic front already in prospect, two-way visits, and EU-related contacts.

Detail

2. Warsaw saw two large events on the evening of 9 January: the Wprost award to Leszek Miller of their "Man of the Year" prize; and Kwasniewski's annual reception for the Corps. At both, many of Warsaw's Great and Good – or at least the political class – were on parade.
3. I had several long and very friendly chats with the President, and with Jolanta Kwasniewska. The most substantive elements were:
 - They were both looking forward keenly to their end-March visit to London, to attend the Rostropovich event at the Palace.
 - Thereafter, he hoped that we could soon fix dates for the end-May visit for talks with the Prime Minister, etc. (Majkowski, head of his overseas team, fussed to me about the need to do this sooner rather than later – he was still keeping open most of the second half of May for us, but he was coming under increasing pressure to yield dates to others. I ducked and wove.)
 - He was well aware of the conflicting pressures on the MRCA buy. Having agreed with me that scotch was far better than bourbon, he acknowledged that the same could true of a preference for European aircraft over US. The crucial factor would be economic, and the offset proposals. He was making this clear to everyone, including the Government.

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- He reaffirmed his support for some of Poland's fat cats, around whom a certain bad smell is beginning to be detectable, and especially Gudzowaty. But equally he did not want to become too closely associated himself (recommending that I play tennis on the Gudzowaty court but ducking an invitation there himself - he was very keen to try out the new Residence grass court as soon as the weather improved).
- 4. I congratulated Miller on the Wprost award and he in turn gushed over the message he had had from the Prime Minister. He told the television interviewers that of all the foreign messages he had had (from a range of EU and other Ministers), that from Tony Blair had been the most welcome (high marks to you/No.10 for fixing this, which also was given splendid play in Wprost itself). He also looked forward to a possible talk with the Prime Minister at the beginning of next week, following his own return from the US and before Putin came here. On the MRCA, I said I assumed he would not take any decisions in the next few days - he acknowledged this with his usual broad smile, and another of his slightly off-colour references. Leszek Miller's wife Alexandra was charming (with a new and very chic hairdo, and an elegant outfit); Mimi is trying to get her to lunch at the Residence next week.
- 5. I went over some of the Margaret Beckett ground with Deputy Prime Minister Kalinowski, and with his wife who is now coming to our dinner. He spoke warmly about the forthcoming talks, and also about the prospect of his visit to the UK later in the year.
- 6. Deputy Prime Minister Pol, with his wife, was much warmer than earlier. He promised to set up a meeting soon (now arranged for next week); spoke keenly about the need for greater cooperation with us on his Infrastructure portfolios; and reacted well to the possibility of a contact with John Prescott (whose message when the Government took office he remember well and much appreciated).
- 7. I have already recorded by telegram what Deputy Prime Minister Belka told me about the 9 January meeting of the Government with the Bank/Monetary Council. While Miller referred to two dogs sniffing each other up, Belka looked like a dog with two tails.
- 8. I also had some words with Wlodek and Basia Cimoszewicz, who confirmed that he would like to find suitable dates for a visit to London before Easter, which I agreed with Andrzej Byrt to pursue when his office can make these available. Cimoszewicz looked somewhat subdued, but the Kwasniewski and Miller circles are not in any case his natural habitat.
- 9. With others of the Warszawka, I pursued the following points:
 - Lunch to be fixed a deux with Siwiec, National Security Advisor to Kwasniewski, probably on 6 February.
 - An early meeting a deux with Oleksy which we have already been pursuing, to talk EU issues.
 - An early meeting also with Adam Rotfeld on one of his periodic returns from Stockholm, where he is still trying to run SIPRI until Alyson Bailes takes over in June.
 - Much satisfaction from both Iwinski and Jaskiernia that we may finally have cracked dates to suit both sides for the SLD/New Labour Working Group visit. Iwinski

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
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promised to let me have an immediate read-out on the Putin visit next week. He also pooh-poohed any idea that the Poles were worried our bilateral relations were going "too well" (so much for idle MFA gossip).

10. As for fellow diplomats:

- de Laiglesia (Spain) said that he had agreed with Cimoszewicz on an EU HOMs lunch before the end of this month. He also explained what Aznar had in mind for the candidate countries under the Spanish Presidency: full participation, though not necessarily the right to speak, during the Barcelona agenda item at the first Summit, with EU leaders then continuing the rest of the agenda without them; but no participation in the Seville Summit, much of which would no doubt be devoted to enlargement.
- Staffansson (Sweden) confirmed that Miller would be in Stockholm on 28 January, when the Swedes would lobby him hard on Gripen.
- Weiss (Israel) said he was very keen to meet George Weidenfeld here in March, and welcomed the prospect of being involved in the programme.
- Razov (Russia) will – sadly – be leaving soon, but will brief me on Putin before then.


Michael Pakenham

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The Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to the Court of St James's
London

Mr Michael Tatham
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

JSW
DM
JTB
AL/Fc
AC
PWS

File

URGENT

21/12/01

Dear Michael,

With reference to our conversation, I am sending the Polish media information about the most important points of the recent visit of Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller to Moscow.

As you are certainly aware, a representative of the British Embassy in Warsaw has already been briefed, upon my suggestion, by Tadeusz Iwiński Minister of State in Prime Minister's Office (who accompanied the Prime Minister to Moscow) on aspects of the visit not reported by the media.

Yours sincerely

Stanisław Komorowski

Stanisław Komorowski
Ambassador

Polish media reports of Leszek Miller's visit to Russia

21/12/01

I. Meeting Miller-Putin (attended also by Igor Ivanov and Head of Gazprom A. Miller)

- The Polish Prime Minister declared that development of economic and political relations with Russia is one of the Polish Government's priorities;
- Both confirmed the political will to develop Polish-Russian relations;
- Miller declared the will to continue the political dialogue with Russia on security matters and welcomed the rapprochement NATO-Russia ("good and forward looking");
- L. Miller confirmed that Poland is keen to be a transit country for exported Russian goods, but stated that all controversial aspects concerning the imports of Russian natural gas would have to be treated and solved on a broader basis. A special working group has been set up to solve these issues before 15 January 2002 (before Putin's visit to Warsaw on 16-17.01);
- Both stressed the large trade deficit in economic relations (3 billion USD - caused by important part played by Russian gas and oil in Poland's imports) and declared the will to contribute to more balanced economic relations;
- L. Miller declared Poland's support for Russian's accession to WTO.

II. Meeting Miller-Kasyanov

- Prime ministers signed a Bilateral declaration on financial, commercial and R&D co-operation which will constitute the basis for future contracts and regional co-operation
- Both agreed to meet regularly, twice a year.

III. Economic aspects of the visit:

- Marek Pol (Deputy prime minister and minister for infrastructure) stated that Poland supports "the friendly transit" of Russia's natural resources to the West. In the same time Poland expects "a friendly opening" of Russian market for Polish goods, companies and investments, especially in the framework of "Russian federal programs". Poland is hoping to participate in modernising the Gusiev-Gołdap border point with the Kaliningrad Region, in building a power station in Kaliningrad, in upgrading the Elbląg-Kaliningrad expressway; as well as setting food processing businesses in Kaliningrad;
- During the Polish-Russian Business Forum a preliminary agreement on creation of a special economic zone in the vicinity of Moscow's Sheremietievo Airport has been signed;
- Miller stated, in the context of plans of building a gas pipeline from Russia through Poland and Slovakia (bypassing Ukraine) that "economic factor is more important than the political one".

DCO to file

In  Inbox
of flat



bc FCO TEL
HMA

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

10 December 2001

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Leszek,

When we spoke by telephone on 30 November I promised to get back to you on the question of a twelve year transition period on the purchase of Polish land.

I am following this dossier closely and, as I said when we met in London last month, I will try to help. I know that your Europe Minister, Danuta Hubner, has been discussing this issue in some detail with my Minister of State for Europe, Peter Hain. They have agreed on some follow-up work and I will be in touch further once this work has been completed and assessed.

Yours ever
Tony

His Excellency Mr Leszek Miller

AS

MT 20/12/01

Matrix.



POLAND

(AMBASSADOR OF)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 December 2001

Dear Mark

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT OF POLAND

I attach a letter to the Prime Minister from President Kwasniewski, setting out the results of last month's Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism. I would be grateful for advice and, if necessary, a draft reply.

Yours ever

Michael Tatham

MICHAEL TATHAM

Mark Sedwill
FCO

5 December 2001



Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

File
MT
JPS
Press

Dear Michael

Poland and Free Movement of Capital

Your minute of 30 November asked for advice on how to handle Miller's request to the Prime Minister for help in securing EU agreement to a 12-year transition period on the purchase of Polish land.

We have now closed the Free Movement of Capital chapter, under which land purchase arises, with all Central European candidates bar Poland and Romania. Where candidates have asked for a transition period on the purchase of land, the EU has agreed this for a maximum of 7 years. This was a significant concession given that it is a Single Market issue. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria closed the chapter on this basis.

We have been careful in the negotiations to ensure that where candidates face the same problem, they are granted by and large the same solution. To do otherwise risks unravelling the negotiations with other candidates and setting back the whole process. The Hungarians and others have made it clear that they are watching carefully to see what we agree on land with the Poles, and say they will reopen the chapter if Poland gets a longer transition period.

It would be hard to justify a more generous solution for Poland this far ahead of the endgame negotiations without good arguments on our side. So the Poles need to make a convincing case. If they could produce an objective argument as to why their situation on land purchase differs from that of other candidates, we would be better placed to support their request for a longer transition. They may be able to do so. We understand that they are not seeking to ban land purchase during the transition period, unlike Hungary, but to maintain a permitting system. If they can show that this is a legitimate system, mirroring those operated in some existing Member States, then they will have a case to make. The Poles also seem to think that price differentials between Polish land and land in eg Germany is greater than for other candidates. If true – and there are



some doubts here – that could also provide a basis to give Poland a different solution.

Danuta Hübner, Poland's new Europe Minister, discussed the issue of land purchase at some length with Peter Hain on 27 November. Mr Hain encouraged Hübner to produce some facts and figures that could provide an objective basis for giving Poland a longer transition period than other candidates. Hübner agreed to revert. Our Embassy in Warsaw is in touch with her office and the negotiating team, who have undertaken to provide us with some arguments.

We recommend that we wait to see what evidence they provide. We shall then be in touch with further advice on how we should respond.

Your ever
Simon

(Simon McDonald)
Principal Private Secretary

Michael Tatham Esq
10 Downing Street

Michael

5 December 2001



Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

MT
CSW
JPa
Press

Lyra U needs a short reply

2012 'I'm following the lead, but I want
to be clear. Now that's done

Dear Michael

Miller's demand - Peter Hain & people
who are in the. Look forward to the following they
agreed

Poland and Free Movement of Capital

Your minute of 30 November asked for advice on how to handle Miller's request to the Prime Minister for help in securing EU agreement to a 12-year transition period on the purchase of Polish land.

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We recommend that we wait to see what evidence they provide. We shall then be in touch with further advice on how we should respond.

Yours ever
Simon

(Simon McDonald)
Principal Private Secretary

Michael Tatham Esq
10 Downing Street

0044 20 72702152

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f MT
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SW
JB
Press

Date: 5 December 2001

cc: By faxlock:
Michael Tatham, No.10
Sir John Ramsden,
Hd/CNWED
John Macgregor, Director
Wider Europe

Michael Davenport
DA
Sara Hunt

DHM

KWASNIEWSKI VISIT TO UK, MAY 2002

1. Following the recent minuting I spent half-an-hour today with Majkowski (head of the President's International Department) to try to take forward our planning. The following points emerged:
 - He was reasonably relaxed about not getting a firm proposal on dates for another couple of months at least. He showed me the President's diary for next year and the second half of May looked encouragingly empty. But the sooner we could tie something down, the better.
 - We agreed to think in terms of a total of a two-day visit focussed on "Polish Days in the UK". Majkowski thought Kwasniewski would want to bring a group of a dozen or so key Polish businessmen with him, together with the Ministers of the Economy and perhaps Defence.
 - The main commercial focus should be on an event organised eg by the CBI or the City, with a lunch eg at the Mansion House, designed to expose the opportunities of Poland to British business/industries/financial circles. Kwasniewski would make a speech and respond to questions but not attend the whole event, which might go under the title of the "British-Polish Business Forum". Two months should be sufficient to organise such an event.
 - The other key element would be the talks at No.10 when Kwasniewski would want to focus on:
 - the EU negotiations at their crunch point
 - NATO enlargement before Prague

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- bilateral relations, especially trade and investment
 - the defence industry (Smajdzinski might contribute, or visit the UK beforehand)
 - Wider Europe, including Polish border issues to the East and UK help over Kaliningrad
 - some cultural event/gala concert with a Polish flavour.
-
- It would certainly be good to have some ideas up our sleeve for a military element to the visit, whether to Pindar or some other impactful site.
 - There would be no need for a call on the Prime Minister during the private visit to the Rostropovich event at the Palace in March.
2. All in all, a useful exchange, on the basis of which we can continue to develop our ideas, and the President's team now seem to be well onboard for the sort of programme we would like to offer; I did underline to him the dangers of setting a date too far in advance, and he accepted this with good grace. We shall need to touch base with Komorowski in London, not least to suppress any more ambitious ideas he may still have. I will talk to John Ramsden about this; it might be better coming from me, having had the direct contact here.

Michael Pakenham
Michael Pakenham

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ACT 2001

PREM 49/2765

LETTER DATED 05/12/2001

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MT

cc JPO

~~cc JPO~~British Embassy
Warsaw

PR

From the Ambassador
Michael PakenhamAleje R62 1
00-556 WarszawaTel.: (0048-22) 6281001-5
ext. 4211Fax: (0048-22) 6217161
e-mail: info@britishembassy.pl

5 December 2001

Michael Tatham Esq
No.10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

By faxlock

Dear Michael,

NOBEL PRIZE FOR THE POPE

1. You may remember that when we had a few words at No.10 in October, you mentioned that some thought was being given elsewhere (by Francis Campbell) to a joint nomination, by the Prime Minister and President Kwasniewski, of the Pope for the Nobel Peace Prize. You wondered how this might go down in Warsaw; and, if well, how it could be pursued. We agreed that I would first take very discreet soundings of the President's people.
2. I duly did so today when I saw Majkowski, head of his International Department (other aspects reported separately). He said he had heard nothing to suggest thought had been given to this earlier by Kwasniewski or anyone else at the Chancellery. But he could see the advantages, and a joint Blair/Kwasniewski bid seemed to be attractive to him. The next step should be to sound the Papal Nuncio here, Bishop Kowalczyk (whom I know very well and with whom I have discreet discussions) for a possible Vatican reaction. If the Papal authorities thought this could be a good runner, then Kwasniewski would certainly be more interested in pursuing it.
3. I do not want to get too far ahead of any thinking in London. If you would like me to talk to Kowalczyk, I am happy to do so. Meanwhile I have

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underlined to Majkowski the need for great discretion, and the totally unformed nature of our own thinking, which stops well short of being any sort of formal proposal. He has accepted this. If you would prefer me quietly to drop the subject, that too I am happy to do. One other thought, however. When (Lord) Gordon Slynn was here for a big EU legal event a couple of weeks ago, he mentioned that he would pursue with No.10 the prospect of Cherie Booth coming to Warsaw to be the keynote speaker at a major seminar organised by the Slynns Foundation on EU legal issues next year. If indeed she were to come, and I understand she is keen to do so, then such a visit might be another opportunity to take forward, very discreetly, the possibility of a joint nomination. All that said, I also understand that His Holiness's health continues to decline slowly. If'twere well done etc.

Yours ever
Michael

Michael Pakenham

Cc: John Macgregor CVO Esq, Director Wider Europe, FCO

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FAO

R L

Alison Kerr, Cab Off

From: Bruce Bucknell, CNWED
Date: 30 November 2001

cc: Alex Ellis, EUD(E)
Richard Wood/Steve Fisher, EUD(I)
Alison Kerr, Cabinet Office
Christine Baxter, DEFRA
Jim Bellingham, DTI
Andrew Gurney, HMT
Dominic Meiklejohn, Warsaw

Reference: ENP022/001/2001

To: Caroline Rees

SUBJECT: EU/POLAND: POLISH MINISTER FOR EUROPE'S CALL ON MR HAIN

1. You and I sat in on Danuta Hübner's call on Mr Hain on 27 November. Apologies to all for the delay in circulating this record.

EU Accession

2. Hübner said it was unthinkable for Poland that it might not be in the first wave – it would be psychologically devastating. The government was accelerating its efforts in order to guarantee its place and to do so on merit – it was irksome to hear other candidates say Poland was holding them back or might get a free ride.

3. Mr Hain welcomed and encouraged this approach. We wanted to help Poland to be in the first wave. But it was right that there were no free places. The news that Poland had (that morning) provided the necessary assurances on pharmaceuticals for us to close the **Company Law** chapter on 28 November was a major step forward.

Free Movement of Capital

4. Hübner said the reduction of the transition period Poland was requesting on the **purchase of land** from 18 to 12 years was a major change. It had elicited a sharply hostile response from the anti-EU contingent in the Sejm. Poland understood the Presidency might break this down presentationally to a formula of 7+3+2, with additional evidence and justification needed to extend the transition period beyond the initial 7 years. This would be a step too far for the government given the domestic climate. Mr Hain said we wanted to help where we could but we needed an objective argument, based on technical considerations, to justify a longer transition period than other candidates. Hübner suggested that the price differentials for land between Poland and eg Germany were greater than for other candidates. Mr Hain invited her to give us some facts we could look at.

Taxation

5. Hübner said the Polish Ministry of Finance had done some calculations based on the draft position on **cigarette excise duty** for the Czechs. They had concluded that to reach the new *acquis* levels by 2008 would mean an increase of 80% to 90% in the cost of their most expensive brand and an increase of up to 200% in the cost of the cheapest. This was too much. They would need to reflect further on the implications for Poland. She implied it was unlikely they could close this chapter this year.

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Agriculture

6. Hübner said the Commission had made clear that negotiations should be based on the current *acquis* and the existing financial framework. This seemed sensible even if it meant it was unclear what the future of the CAP would be. There would not be reform proposals before the French elections and Poland did not want the negotiations held up while we waited for them. She reported that Lord Whitty had set out some UK thinking on CAP reform earlier at DEFRA. But she looked forward to hearing more of our ideas.

Referendum

7. Hübner noted that **support for EU membership is falling**. The result could be close. There were two views on the timing of a referendum: either leave it until autumn 2003, in the hope that some MSs would have ratified (and the European Parliament) showing the Polish public that the Union wanted them in; or do it soon after signature of the Accession Treaty, to seize the enthusiasm of the moment and before doubts set in. The former view was predominating.

8. Poland would not have a separate referendum on the **Single Currency** as it was already part of the *acquis* for candidates. The aim of previous finance ministers is entry in 2006 but this would depend on economic criteria. Poland needed a period of economic stability.

9. Mr Hain explained how the government is trying to create a new language on the EU in Britain. The security argument following the 11 September attacks is striking a cord in Britain. (He also welcomed the Polish contribution of 300 troops to Afghanistan.) Hübner agreed but noted that individual Poles tended to ask: "what will the EU mean for me?"

Future of Europe

10. Hübner was keen that Poland be properly represented in the Convention. This would underline the message that Poland's future lay in Europe. Mr Hain noted UK wants the candidates to be closely involved. Exact details of representation would be sorted out at Laeken. Hübner hoped Mr Hain could soon visit Poland to help kick off the debate on FoE. Mr Hain hoped to visit in February.

Bruce Bucknell
Visegrad Section
CNWED
Tel: 020 7270 2362
Fax: 020 7270 2152

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

file
SECRET

From the Private Secretary

30 November 2001

Dear Mark

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH POLISH PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister had a brief telephone conversation with Leszek Miller early this morning.

Miller came to the point very quickly. He had spoken to the Prime Minister in London about his willingness to come down to a 12-year transition on land purchase. This had caused very serious political problems in Poland. A motion of no confidence had been tabled against one of his Ministers. Nationalist parties were doing their utmost to exploit the issue. He was now hearing that the Commission were suggesting fixing the transition period at 10 years. This would be disastrous for Poland. It was essential that the transitional period was 12 years. This was extremely important and domestically sensitive for him.

The Prime Minister said he understood the seriousness of this issue for Poland. He would look into this and see if there was any scope to help. He would be in touch.

Miller thanked the Prime Minister for his helpful letter on free movement of people. A formal reply expressing his gratitude was on its way to us.

Comment

I would be grateful for quick advice on how to handle this request. The Prime Minister's inclination will be to respond helpfully in so far as this is possible given the negotiating complexities.

I am copying this letter to Tom Scholar (HMT), Bernadette Kelly (DTI), Andrew Allberry (Cabinet Office), Michael Pakenham (Warsaw) and Sir Nigel Sheinwald (UK Rep Brussels).

Yours ever

Michael

MICHAEL TATHAM

Mark Sedwill
FCO

✓ faced 29/11

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The Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to the Court of St James's
London

The Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA


30 November 2001

Dear Prime Minister,

I take this opportunity to pass on herewith the letter of the President of the Republic of Poland, Mr Aleksander Kwaśniewski, together with its unofficial translation.

Yours sincerely

Stanisław Komorowski



cc.: Sir John Ramsden, Bt ; Head of Central and North West European
Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Duty Clerk
MT
cc JPO
SW
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AW
AC
rees



Prezydent
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

Warszawa, 9 listopada 2001 r.

Jego Ekscelencja
Pan Tony Blair
Premier Zjednoczonego Królestwa
Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii Północnej
Londyn

Szanowny Panie Premierze,

Chciałbym bardzo serdecznie podziękować Panu Premierowi za życzenia oraz za wsparcie, jakiego udzielił Pan w swoim posłaniu do Uczestników Warszawskiej Konferencji ws. Zwalczania Terroryzmu. Jednocześnie mam zaszczyt poinformować Pana Premiera o wynikach Warszawskiej Konferencji, która odbyła się w stolicy Polski 6 listopada 2001 roku.

Ataki z 11 września 2001 roku na Nowy Jork i Waszyngton dowiodły, jak realne jest zagrożenie ze strony międzynarodowego terroryzmu. Ugodziły one nie tylko w Amerykę, ale także w poczucie bezpieczeństwa całej wspólnoty międzynarodowej. By nie powtórzyły się nigdy więcej, wymagają zdecydowanej i szybkiej reakcji.

Świadomi powyższych zagrożeń i wyzwań, prezydenci i ich przedstawiciele 17 państw Europy Środkowej, Wschodniej i Południowo-Wschodniej, uczestniczący w Warszawskiej Konferencji, zgodnie uznali, że ich kraje nie mogą stać na uboczu. W związku z tym została przyjęta wspólna *Deklaracja* w sprawie walki z terroryzmem oraz *Plan Działań* w tej dziedzinie. Dokumenty te pozwalam sobie przekazać w załączeniu.

Istotą tych dokumentów jest, z jednej strony, potępienie międzynarodowego terroryzmu, całkowicie lekceważącego życie niewinnych ludzi, a z drugiej – podjęcie wszechstronnych działań mających na celu zwalczanie tego zjawiska oraz wspieranie wszelkich niezbędnych akcji, mających na celu wyplenienie organizacji terrorystycznych, aby nigdzie nie miały one bezpiecznego schronienia.

Uczestnicy Warszawskiej Konferencji zwrócili szczególną uwagę na fakt, iż walka wydana międzynarodowemu terroryzmowi jest walką ludzkości z barbarzyństwem. Musi dotyczyć zarówno eliminacji jego objawów, jak i usuwania jego źródeł. Nie może mieć przy tym tylko wymiaru militarnego; musi obejmować także sferę polityczną, gospodarczą, finansową, współpracę służb wywiadowczych i służb bezpieczeństwa oraz skoordynowaną kontrolę ruchu osób i towarów.

Jednocześnie z całą stanowczością Uczestnicy Warszawskiej Konferencji podkreślili, że w żadnym wypadku nie może być ona utożsamiana z walką z islamem i ludźmi wyznającymi tę religię, ani też nie może być wykorzystywana przez jakiekolwiek siły do przeciwstawiania sobie różnych religii i cywilizacji.

Informując o Warszawskiej Konferencji i przesyłając przyjęte przez nią dokumenty, wyrażam głębokie przekonanie, że jednocząc siły zwyciężymy w tej bezprecedensowej i – być może – długotrwałej walce z terroryzmem.

z wyrazami głębokiego nacisku
sraz myślni

Aleksander Kwaśniewski

Aleksander Kwaśniewski

Declaration of the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism November 6th, 2001

We, the Heads of State¹ of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, have gathered in Warsaw, November 6th, 2001, and have exchanged views on our common experience of the 20th century, including the successful struggle to regain freedom, liberties and to enjoy transformation to democracy and prosperity. We pledge to stay united with other countries in condemning the covert and hideous attack on September 11th, 2001, against the United States, in which thousands of innocent people of different nationalities were killed or injured. We stand by the American nation, just as they supported us in our struggle for freedom.

We express our denouncement of international terrorism's utter disregard for innocent life.

We want to stress that fight against international terrorism we see as a war between humanity and barbarism, and not between different religions or cultures.

We strongly believe that this attack against the United States of America was an assault on basic freedoms and security of all the people of our world.

We, the Heads of State of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, being responsible for the security and freedom of our people, firmly pledge to implement various ways and means to fight terrorist activities in our regions or elsewhere and to support any necessary action to stamp out terrorist organisations, so that there are no safe havens for terrorists anywhere.

We unconditionally support the action being taken against terrorism in all its aspects within the framework defined by the United Nations and by other international organisations, in particular by the European Union which, by the means of the so far proclaimed documents unequivocally denounced any acts of international terrorism perpetrated against any nation. In particular we call upon all states to implement fully the requirements of UNSCR 1373 and 1333 and to ratify the 12 international conventions relating to terrorism.

We strongly encourage international organisations such as the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe and NATO to take necessary measures to assist in full implementation of relevant international conventions relating to international terrorism and pledge as member states to actively contribute to those efforts. In this respect we share position of the European Union, expressed *inter alia*, in the

¹ In person or through the plenipotentiaries.

Conclusions and Action Plan of the Extraordinary European Council of September 21st, 2001, that far greater co-operation in international fora is needed to fight international terrorism. We welcome NATO's efforts among Allies and their Partners to develop capabilities to defend against terrorism. We welcome the OSCE and the Council of Europe contributions to the fight against terrorism by resort to those Organisations' specific expertises. In order to harmonize our efforts in this field we have agreed to and adopted the „Action Plan” enumerating concrete spheres of co-operation our countries will pursue.

Our specific aim is to provide a regional dimension to the comprehensive worldwide efforts against this scourge of the 21st century. Nations of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe stand united in their fight against terror - as long as it takes - by means of close co-operation with the United States, acting in concert with the rest of international community. Terrorists do not share values of democracy or freedom or justice as we do. In coalition we will be able to bring to account all those responsible for terrorist attacks, to better target terrorists organisations, their financial, communication and logistic networks and those who instigate, support, finance, train, equip and harbour them.

We must redouble our efforts in fighting international terrorism and devote more attention to study its sources. We do believe that existing regimes of export control, including arms and dual use items, can be implemented more efficiently, as well as far greater co-operation on non-proliferation issues is needed. We will ask our national agencies to take adequate steps in this respect, also in such fields like, for example, aviation, maritime security, law-enforcement and terrorist-financing. To promote mutual co-operation in the suppression of international terrorism we declare readiness to enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, and to undertake other necessary measures in support of operations against international terrorism.

Enhancement of security measures is extremely urgent. Furthermore we believe that in many cases national legislation should be modified in order to strengthen institutions responsible for security matters (such as police, special services, immigration, etc.), while individual liberties also have to be protected. Democracy cannot imply that the state attacked by terrorists shall be defenceless. It has its inherent right to individual and collective self-defence.

Having met in Warsaw, we have initiated discussion on various methods to achieve this goal, using all the instruments at our disposal, both as individual states and as members of multilateral organisations. We believe that the swift enlargement of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will make the fight with international terrorism more efficient. We have agreed to review the development and implementation of all initiatives accepted today at the Warsaw Conference at its next stage to be held next year, the venue and modalities of which will be determined in due course.

Our states and peoples fully identify with the efforts – political, military, economic, humanitarian and others - undertaken by the United States of America and its friends and allies, as we are the United States' friends and allies in the broad counter-terrorism coalition. Without hesitation we give our utmost support for the U.S.-led operations against terrorist targets.

Being resolved to make the counter-terrorism coalition strong and united, being convinced that the counter-terrorism coalition must be made as broad and efficient as possible in its diplomatic, financial, economic, law-enforcement, intelligence and military co-operation, the unity of our world is indispensable for the successful struggle with the cancer of international terrorism.

Once again, taking this opportunity, we convey our expressions of condolence and sympathy to the American people who suffered immense tragedy. At this difficult time, in the name of solidarity we stand united with the American nation. People around the world watched the shocking scenes from America realising that what happened to the US could happen anywhere else. Terrorism menace has no limits. These atrocities were targeted not only against the United States but also against the whole humanity. We are convinced that being strong together we shall defend all basic values of our world.

Democracies, open, free and plural, shall prevail.

* * *

The following states participated in the Conference:

*Republic of Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Republic of Bulgaria
Republic of Croatia
Czech Republic
Republic of Estonia
Republic of Hungary
Republic of Latvia
Republic of Lithuania*

*Republic of Moldova
Republic of Poland
Romania
Republic of Slovakia
Republic of Slovenia
Ukraine
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia*

The Conference was also attended by high representatives of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey the United States of America, and European Union (Presidency and Commission), United Nations, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, as observers.

Action Plan of the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism November 6th, 2001

We, the Heads of State¹ of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe participating in the Warsaw Conference on November 6th, 2001, hereafter referred to as the Participants, are determined to strengthen and unite our efforts in solidarity with the United States of America, other members of the North Atlantic Alliance and all those, who consider international terrorism as paramount threat of the 21st century. We have decided to give our full political support to this Action Plan.

The Participants have discussed proposals of activities and initiatives of regional co-operation to be implemented in the fight against international terrorism. They support the efforts undertaken by NATO and the EU, and express their readiness and commitment to co-operate to the fullest extent possible. They have also agreed to recommend to their Governments and strongly support the initiatives and instruments (intelligence, police co-operation, elimination of terrorist financing sources), as follows:

1. Express interest in deepening co-operation enabling them to provide quick and effective information exchange on possible sources of international terrorism and on terrorist threats, and to make a better use of contact points established at international institutions or the services of liaison officers;
2. Accept and promote the use of forms and methods in the struggle against international terrorism in accordance with the EU regulations and UNSC resolutions:
 - a) **in the area of legislation, institutions and economy:** adoption of procedures and instruments (compatible or identical with EUROPOL procedures and focusing on adoption of the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force – FATF and Egmont Group) to combat money laundering (co-operation between appropriate treasury and custom institutions), drug trafficking (co-operation of police and other state services), and increasing the level of international co-operation of these services,
 - b) **in the area of exchange of information and intelligence:** strengthening of the co-operation among countries of anti-terrorist coalition on bilateral and multilateral bases. In addition to existing bilateral mechanisms of co-operation, we shall examine and analyse together the terrorists activities, including the means of joint gathering verifying and exchanging

¹ In person or through plenipotentiaries

information and archive resources, and contribute to establishment of a uniform definition of „international terrorism”. Participants shall share their experience and knowledge regarding countries or groups suspected of being involved in international terrorism,

- c) **in the area of the movement of persons, goods and information:** on the basis of current EU proposals, elaboration of uniform methods of passport control and customs clearance (co-operation between border and immigration services and police), including protection against illegal migration and movements of the extremist groups through the territories of the Participants' states,
 - d) **in institutional sphere:** making a better use of the existing co-operation frameworks, such as SECI Regional Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime and other multilateral institutions;
3. Agree to consider the convocation of a Conference on Tolerance and Education on Multiculturalism. The long term objective of this Conference is to map and co-ordinate the activities of academic institutions and NGOs that concentrate on race tolerance;
 4. Agree to consider the idea of creation the International Research Institute on Terrorism;
 5. Relying on existing UN and other institutions, Participants shall consider the establishment of the Aid Foundation for victims of terrorism all over the world, which may also support research on terrorism. We shall exchange information about its activities;
 6. Participants shall exchange their experiences in the area of anti-terrorist units and rescue teams training. While taking note of the existing international antiterrorist training courses, we have agreed to consider the establishment of the Training Centre for such units and teams from countries participating in the Warsaw Conference. The program of the Centre would be based upon experiences of the specialised anti-terrorist units of EAPC and OSCE countries;
 7. Participants shall implement a system to monitor the problems of international terrorism. Authorised persons and institutions shall review and report to their Heads of State and relevant authorities on a regular basis about the progress on combating international terrorism.

PRIME MINISTER ✓

From: Michael Tatham
Date: 30 November 2001

cc: Jonathan Powell
Stephen Wall

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH LESZEK MILLER

Leszek Miller has asked to speak to you and we have arranged for this to happen during the car journey to Northolt.


He is calling to lobby before the next Ministerial on enlargement on 12 December at which he wants to close the chapters on free movement of capital (boils down to land acquisition) and persons.

On capital, the Poles want a 12 year transition on land purchase, the EU is reluctant to move beyond the 7 year transition agreed with other candidates. This is unlikely to be cracked at the forthcoming meeting. So the best thing is to encourage Miller to produce arguments and figures justifying a longer transition than the other candidates.

It ought to be possible to close the chapter on free movement of persons, unless the Poles decide to link this chapter to capital. You should encourage Miller not to do this. He needs to demonstrate progress by Laeken. Miller was delighted with your letter implying there would only be a 2 year transition period in the UK for Polish workers.

The Poles are a bit freaked by Vedrine's comment about including Bulgaria and Romania in the first wave. If Miller raises this, you could say that we do not think this is realistic (nor do the Romanians and Bulgarians).

You should congratulate Miller on reinvigorating Poland's accession preparations. He has taken difficult decisions recently on the Environment and Company Law chapters.



MICHAEL TATHAM

020 7270 0036



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS
Telephone 020 7270 0177 Facsimile 020 7270 0112
e-mail: Martin.Donnelly@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk

Martin Donnelly
European Secretariat

John Alty
DTI

29 November 2001

Dear John

BARCELONA PREPARATIONS: JOINT WORKING WITH POLAND

When Danuta Hubner, Polish Europe Minister, called at No.10 earlier this week we discussed joint working on the Lisbon strategy.

We agreed that your visit to Warsaw next month offered a good opportunity to discuss a joint approach to the priority issues for Barcelona. In the light of that meeting we agreed to work together in advance of Barcelona, with a view to some public statement of shared UK and Polish priorities which might be approved by our two Prime Ministers.

One area which would be worth exploring is the development of energy networks. Poland is strategically placed in relation to gas exports from Russia. It would be helpful to agree a common approach to the development of open networks after enlargement, and to work closely with the Poles on our wider energy liberalisation agenda.

If you agree it might be worth pursuing this in more detail when you are in Warsaw.

I am copying this letter to Mara Goldstein (FCO), Anthony Vinall (UKRep), Ivan Rogers (HMT), Roger Liddle (No.10) and Michael Pakenham (BE Warsaw).

Yours ever

Martin

MARTIN DONNELLY

Top: PD (RL)
CAS
FAIR
FAIR (MT)
ELPS

29 November 2001



Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

Butler
Dear Michael,

Polish Prime Minister's Telephone Call to Prime Minister

... I enclose, as requested, briefing for Prime Minister Miller's telephone call to the Prime Minister tomorrow.

Yours aye,

Mark

(Mark Sedwill)
Private Secretary

Michael Tatham Esq
10 Downing Street

**SPEAKING NOTE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE POLISH
PRIME MINISTER, 30 NOVEMBER**

Points to make

- Congratulations on progress made in the negotiations since you took over. Constructive engagement on the difficult Environment and Company Law chapters has led to good results.
- Appreciate your domestic difficulties on purchase of land by foreigners. We want to help. To do so, we need good arguments to justify giving Poland a longer transition period than other candidates. Your Europe Minister, Mrs Hubner, mentioned that the difference in price between Polish and EU land was greater than for other candidates. It would be helpful to have figures. Also understand that the new system you will be introducing to control land purchase by foreigners will be less restrictive than in other candidates. It would be helpful to have more details. Member States and the Commission will need details of your legislation before they can agree a deal on land purchase.
- This may continue to be a difficult issue. I hope it will not prevent you closing the Free Movement of Persons Chapter, on which I have tried to help on access to UK labour markets. Effectively, we expect that there will only be a 2-year transition period for Polish workers. Not sure that member states will see a balance between this and the 12 years transition period you want for the purchase of land.
- If you close Persons before Laeken, that would get you to 20 of the 31 Chapters. Risk that if you do not maintain momentum in the negotiations, you might be perceived as falling behind. Not what either of us want.

- Understand well the difficulty of keeping public opinion with you as you negotiate your terms of entry with the EU. The key will be to manage expectations, and not to dramatise issues on which it will be hard for the EU to make big concessions. When you have concluded negotiations, the prospect of Polish accession, both in historical and financial terms, should help you win a referendum.

- *[If raised]* I want to be absolutely clear - we do not expect Bulgaria and Romania to be in the first wave of accessions; their own accession dates are for 2007, not 2004. Nor do we want to delay the enlargement timetable which the EU agreed at Gothenburg. So we do not support the "political approach" for membership of the first wave recently suggested by some. We have no preconceived ideas about who should be in the first wave. Each country should be treated on its merits. We want you in the first wave. As I said in my speech in Warsaw last year, there are no guaranteed places.

- *[If raised]* The agreement reached in the Company Law chapter on the protection of Intellectual Property Rights for pharmaceutical products is a fair one which reflects European standards.

Background

1. Miller will telephone the Prime Minister tomorrow as part of a Polish ring-round to encourage member states' support for Poland closing two more chapters at the Ministerial enlargement meeting on 12 December.

- i) Free Movement of Capital: EU rules allow EU citizens to buy land in other member states. But Polish history makes foreigners buying land an emotive issue. The EU has agreed with most candidates a 7-year transition period before the single market applies. Miller's government wants 12 years, compared to the 18-year request of its predecessor. But even this "concession" has attracted fierce domestic criticism. In a parliamentary debate on 29 November on an Opposition motion of no confidence on this issue, the Deputy Speaker called the Foreign Minister a sewer rat for shortening the request. But it is hard for the EU to agree a longer transition period for Poland than for others without some objective justification. The Poles offer two justifications; firstly that Polish land is

much cheaper compared to German land than is the case for e.g. the Czech Republic. The second is that they allow foreigners to purchase land already, under certain conditions, whereas e.g. Hungary has a blanket ban. However, the Polish government will soon tighten the conditions for foreign ownership of land.

It is unlikely that the Poles will be able to close this chapter this year. It will be much easier to give them the longer transition period in the enlargement end game at the end of next year.

- ii) Free Movement of Persons: We had hoped that the Prime Minister's letter would have helped Poland close this chapter soon. But, unfortunately, the Poles are linking it again to Capital. By doing this, they risk kicking both issues into the end game, rather than just Capital.
- 2. Miller will also raise public opinion on enlargement, in part to justify special treatment for Poland on Capital. He has immediate political difficulties with his coalition partner who is one of several representatives in parliament of the large rural vote. The key point is that public opinion will not be truly tested until Miller puts the terms of accession to a referendum in 2003. No one knows what those terms will be but, even on a conservative estimate, Poland will get 10 times more EU money than it does now. That, combined with the historic significance of Poland becoming an EU member should be strong arguments in a referendum campaign. Until then, the government must avoid exaggerating expectations or picking fights they can't win.
- 3. Miller may also express concern at a comment by the French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, at a recent EU Foreign Ministers meeting that if the EU took a political approach to enlargement it might as well include Romania and Bulgaria in the first wave. The Poles, erroneously, think we share this approach. We do not because it would delay enlargement. Vedrine was expressing irritation that the Commission so obviously favours a big first wave of 10 candidates, irrespective of whether they are ready. If Poland made the first wave whilst being clearly not ready, there would be some force to Vedrine's arguments. So it is important that Poland makes progress in the negotiations and on the ground in preparing for membership. We are helping e.g. through 23 secondees under the EU twinning programme.
- 4. It would be worth congratulating the Poles on closing the Company Law chapter this week. The main issue was an important one for the UK - the protection of Intellectual Property Rights on pharmaceutical products. The deal is acceptable to the UK industry, which has substantial interests in Poland. Domestic Polish reaction has been muted, although some Poles have claimed that the agreement will cost 800 million Euro. The basis of this figure is nonsense as it assumes that the alternative to the EU deal would be no rules at all to protect Intellectual Property.



FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

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Warsaw

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To: No. 10

Attn: Roger Liddle

Fax No.....: (0044-20) 7930-7919

From.....: Tim Simmons

File ref.....:

Date: 19 November 2001

No. of Pages....: 3 (including header)

cc

**SUMMARY OF RECORD OF ROGER LIDDLE'S CALL ON MINISTER ZEMKE,
POLISH MOD**

1. Please find attached a copy of my minute of 16 November on the above subject.

From: Tim Simmons

Date: 16 November 2001

HMA,
cc: Roger Liddle, No.10,
Bruce Bucknell, CNWED

DA

SUMMARY OF RECORD OF ROGER LIDDLE'S CALL ON MINISTER ZEMKE, POLISH MOD

1. Roger Liddle paid a 20-minute call on Minister Zemke on 15 November. Zemke was accompanied by Colonel Ratajczak, whose name badge described him as "Koordynator w Pionie Ministra". The discussion concentrated on Afghanistan and on dealing with Russia.

Polish Troop Contributions to Anti-Terrorist Coalition

2. Zemke confirmed that small bodies of Polish troops were ready to go to Afghanistan. The government had allocated supplementary funding for this enterprise and these had already been transferred to the Polish MoD. There were two remaining issues to resolve: transport arrangements and the use of ground bases. On the former, the Poles lacked transport aircraft and would have to rely on their allies. As for ground bases, they would rather use other countries' bases but had a logistics unit ready just in case they had to create their own. Overall, practical arrangements were going well.

3. The main preoccupation now was preparing public opinion for deployment of Polish troops on the ground. Opinion polls showed that although 70% of Poles supported UK/US action against terrorism, around 60% would oppose direct Polish participation in the campaign. Public presentation needed careful handling. Earlier in the week, Zemke had joined the Prime Minister and Szmajdzinski to meet members of the Sejm Defence Committee. At this 3-hour meeting, Miller had stressed that Poland must take her NATO obligations very seriously and would comply. Zemke expected some opposition parties to make a fuss but he believed Platforma Obywatelska would support the government.


Russia and NATO

4. Roger Liddle asked how Zemke thought NATO should respond to Putin's readiness to get closer to NATO. Zemke said that it was vital not to isolate Russia. Poland believed that the more contact there could be with NATO countries, the better for all and especially for the security of Poland. Ratajczak added that Putin had played his hand superbly since September 11, exploiting the opportunity to establish a new partnership with the USA. Thereby Putin had both bolstered Russia's image as an international power and gained a freer hand in Chechnya. Zemke added that the West still needed to be very cautious with Russia, however. Earlier this year he had been in a

Polish delegation invited to inspect a Proton missile production plant. This had been the first ever such invitation. The contrast between Russia's public position and the evidence in the plant had been striking: whereas Russia claimed to be able only to produce 1 missile per quarter, Zemke had seen a slick production line working simultaneously on 6 missiles side by side. The barracks and facilities had been decrepit, but the machine tools were 21st century high tech. So don't trust them!

Ukraine

5. Zemke confirmed that Polish-Ukraine relations were still a top priority, notwithstanding the shifting landscape post-11 September.



Tim Simmons
DHM

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British Embassy
Warsaw

From the Ambassador
Michael Pakenham

Aleje R62 No. 1
00-556 Warszawa

Tel.: (0048-22) 6281001-5
ext. 4211

Fax: (0048-22) 6217161

e-mail: info@britishembassy.pl

16 November 2001

Sir Stephen Wall
No. 10 Downing Street

Dear Stephen,

PRIME MINISTER MESSAGE TO MILLER: FMOP

1. Given your success, together with the FCO, in shifting Whitehall on this crucial-to-Poland issue, I owe you a quick read-out of how it went down here.
2. I delivered the Prime Minister's message to Miller's Private Office on Friday 9 November, and by the following afternoon we learned that it had already been discussed between Miller and his EU team. Jan Kulczyk (Poland's second richest man!) came to dinner that evening, and told me he had come straight from a meeting with Miller who brandished the Prime Minister's letter and said how pleased he was with it.
3. The next day, Sunday, I saw Miller at the President's reception for Poland's National Day, and he told me how grateful he was to the Prime Minister for the letter and the shift in the British position which he attributed to Tony Blair personally. I endorsed this.
4. On Wednesday this week Miller gave a large press conference about the prospective shifts in Poland's negotiating position. During this he referred specifically to a valuable message from the Prime Minister on FMOP, which proved the British willingness to help following his own visit to London the previous week. These references were picked up and published across the media. Finally, Miller repeated to me yesterday in the margins of his briefing to EU Ambassadors (my Telno 281) how grateful he was to the Prime Minister, and that he was writing to that effect.

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5. In short, the Prime Minister's message had an immediate, and valuable, effect upon both Polish thinking about the negotiations and in the public debate here. There are of course quite tight limits to the extent to which we can unilaterally ease the Poles over the succession of awkward stiles pre-accession. But there is no doubt that they do look to us, for a variety of reasons, as especially helpful. This should give us the opportunity not only to seek flexibility in return (e.g. pharmaceuticals), but to be able to give them straight-from-the-shoulder advice when we see their negotiating tactics or strategy going wrong.

6. As you know, Danuta Hubner, on whom Miller will continue to rely for the technical details, will be in London in the week after next. Obviously her meeting with Peter Hain will be important, and it is good that you will be able to spare her some time. If the proposed drop-in on Jack Straw can be arranged, so much the better. Thereafter, as you will see from a longish and more comprehensive telegram I shall be sending next week, the next step could be a visit to London by Cimoszewicz in the New Year, bracketed by several EU-related trips out here including Margaret Beckett and Patricia Hewitt, and of course Peter Hain in January. So there will be plenty of room for contact. But the role of the Prime Minister will as always remain crucial, just as will the part played by Leszek Miller.

Yours ever
Michael

Michael Pakenham

Cc: Kim Darroch Esq, Director EU, FCO
John Macgregor Esq, Director Wider Europe, FCO

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Unofficial translation

The President
of the Republic of Poland

Warsaw, 9 November 2001

The Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, MP
Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
London

Dear Prime Minister,

I wish to sincerely thank you, Prime Minister, for the good wishes and the support lent in your message to the participants of the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism. At the same time, I have an honour to inform you about the outcome of the Warsaw Conference held in Poland's capital on 6 November 2001.

The attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001 confirmed the reality of the threat posed by international terrorism. Not only did they come as a blow to America but also undermined the sense of security of the entire international community. They call for a decisive and swift reaction if their recurrence is to be prevented once and for all.

Aware of the above threats and challenges, the Presidents and their representatives from seventeen states of central, east and Southeast Europe who attended the Warsaw Conference jointly agreed that their respective countries cannot stand aside. In this connection, a joint *Declaration* and an *Action Plan* on fighting terrorism were adopted. I take the liberty of attaching hereto these two documents.

The essence of the documents is on the one hand to denounce international terrorism which completely disregards life of innocent people and on the other, to take comprehensive measures to fight this phenomenon and to support all necessary actions to root out terrorist organisations so that they find no safe haven.

The participants of the Warsaw Conference particularly highlighted the fact that the fight waged against international terrorism is in fact the fight waged by mankind against barbarity. It must include equally the eliminating of symptoms of terrorism and eradicating its sources. Moreover, it cannot be limited to the military dimension alone, it must also cover political, economic and financial domains, as well as co-operation of intelligence and security forces and co-ordinated control of the movement of persons and goods.

At the same time, the participants of the Warsaw Conference emphatically stated that on no occasion can this fight be equated with the fight against the Islam and its followers, nor can it be used by any forces to antagonise various religions and civilisations.

While providing the information about the Warsaw conference and conveying its documents, I also wish to express my profound belief that through the concerted effort we shall win this unprecedented and possibly long-lasting struggle against terrorism.

With the assurances of my highest consideration and friendship,

(-) Aleksander Kwaśniewski



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Pravda 10.11.01

CC HMA
FCO

9 November 2001

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Leszek,

I was delighted to meet you last week and welcomed the chance to cover such a wide range of issues in such depth and openness. As we discussed, you begin your term in office at an exciting and challenging time for Poland. I continue to support wholeheartedly your aim of bringing Poland into the EU in 2004, and the UK will do what it can to help. Your recent closure of negotiations on the difficult issue of environment is a big step forward. I know you are planning others to follow.

We spoke about the Free Movement of Persons. In particular, you were concerned that as many Member States as possible should limit transition arrangements on Polish workers to the minimum of two years. The UK successfully argued for this flexibility to be included in the EU position. It reflects our conviction that both we and other Member States should be able to open our own labour markets as soon as conditions allow. This remains our intention. Following the two-year minimum transition period, and in light of developments in our respective labour markets (which we both hope will be positive), we expect to end transition arrangements, apply the *acquis* and therefore give Polish workers the full free movement provided under the Treaties.

VB

Jack Straw has also made clear that, nearer the time of accession, we will look constructively at the possibility of using national measures to open our markets more widely to Polish workers. I have asked officials here to be in touch with their counterparts in Warsaw about possible bilateral arrangements in the interim. In particular, we will look for ways to ensure that Poles are able to participate in a range of new schemes to be announced shortly for overseas workers.

I hope this will help you in your efforts to close negotiations on the free movement of persons. I share your view of the importance of using the next few weeks to make rapid progress in other areas eg on Company Law. This will provide the best possible platform from which Poland can set out next year on the last steps towards our shared goal of Poland's accession to the EU.

Yours ever
Tony

Mr Leszek Miller

MATRIX



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
020 7930 4433

From Sir Stephen Wall

8 November 2001

Dear Mark,

VISIT OF THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER

When the Polish Prime Minister was here last week, Tony Blair agreed to write to him on the issue of the free movement of workers which, as you will have seen from Michael Tatham's record, was the one issue where he was looking for movement from us.

As you know, there is a key meeting of the Polish cabinet this weekend to determine their position in negotiations and we can expect to see some movement from them on questions of concern to us, like free movement of capital. But Miller needs something on the other side of the balance.

- / The Prime Minister wants to respond positively to Mr Miller, and I enclose a draft of the letter which he proposes to send tomorrow morning (Friday) in order to get to Miller before the meeting of the Polish cabinet. The language on free movement of workers is very conditional and gives us all the let-outs we need. The advantage of giving the Poles the statement now is that they are likely to accept our caveats without demur. If we wait to make such a statement to the end of the accession negotiations, we are likely to come under pressure to go further.

I am copying this letter to Hilary Jackson (Home Office) and Nick Couling (DWP).

FAXED

Yours ever,

J S WALL

Mark Sedwill
FCO

**DRAFT LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER
TO POLISH PRIME MINISTER**

I was delighted to meet you last week and welcomed the chance to cover such a wide range of issues in such depth and openness. As we discussed, you begin your term in office at an exciting and challenging time for Poland. I continue to support wholeheartedly your aim of bringing Poland into the EU in 2004, and the UK will do what it can to help. Your recent closure of negotiations on the difficult issue of environment is a big step forward. I know you are planning others to follow.

We spoke about the Free Movement of Persons. In particular, you were concerned that as many Member States as possible should limit transition arrangements on Polish workers to the minimum of two years. The UK successfully argued for this flexibility to be included in the EU position. It reflects our conviction that both we and other Member States should be able to open our own labour markets as soon as conditions allow. This remains our intention. The UK will make a statement at the time of signing the Accession Treaty with Poland that following the two-year minimum transition period, and in light of developments in our respective labour markets (which we both hope will be positive), we expect to end transition arrangements, apply the *acquis* and therefore give Polish workers the full free movement provided under the Treaties.

Jack Straw has also made clear that, nearer the time of accession, we will look constructively at the possibility of using national measures to open our

markets more widely to Polish workers. I have asked officials here to be in touch with their counterparts in Warsaw about possible bilateral arrangements in the interim. In particular, we will look for ways to ensure that Poles are able to participate in a range of new schemes to be announced shortly for overseas workers. Poland and other new Member States will have priority access to these programmes.

I hope this will help you in your efforts to close negotiations on the free movement of persons. I share your view of the importance of using the next few weeks to make rapid progress in other areas eg on Company Law. This will provide the best possible platform from which Poland can set out next year on the last steps towards our shared goal of Poland's accession to the EU.

0044 20 72702152

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British Embassy
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5 November 2001

Michael Tatham Esq
No.10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AAcc: PM
Events
UK
press

Via faxlock

PostNet Notes 7693	To: Michael Tatham Esq
	Fax: 02078399044
	From: BE Warsaw via CNWED/FCO
	Date: 06 November 2001 Pages: 3

Dear Michael,

PRESIDENT KWASNIEWSKI OF POLAND

1. First of all, can I thank you – and all the support team at No.10 – for making the Miller visit to London last week such a success? As you will see from other reporting, it played very well publicly here, and confirmed our position as very much one of Poland's best friends in the West. It also underlined the crucial role we and they have to play in the next fifteen months of negotiations on enlargement. As always, your patience and good sense over the arrangements were a huge boon to the rest of us here.
2. Which may be an ungrateful way of moving into the next phase. I realise that setting a date for a visit by President Kwasniewski to London early next summer is probably as far from your mind as anything could be. But when I last mentioned it, you did agree to mull over the possibilities. You do not need me to re-hash the arguments in favour: Poland as an important country (see your record of the Prime Minister's views post-Miller); Kwasniewski as a key figure, particularly on the foreign side; the Prime Minister's own proposal of a return visit when he was here a year ago, avidly accepted by Kwasniewski and periodically resurfaced by his people; overall interest, both Polish and British, in promoting the image of Poland in the UK. As we have discussed in the past, in order to create a decent programme we shall need some months of preparation. Hence the desire to get at least a date pencilled

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into your diary which we can then use as leverage to start the Polish machinery going.

3. When I last spoke to Kwasniewski's people, in the margins of the Foreign Secretary's visit last week, they said that they thought something in the second half of May would suit his own diary very well. In fact, we are probably only talking about a possible day or two during that period since it would – I assume – need to be around the middle of the week, and the Prime Minister will already have a number of engagements which would prevent him giving attention to the Polish President. In other words, can you identify now somewhere in the diary which would provide for, say, talks and a lunch at No.10 during this timescale? I could then nail down the President's diary and we could take the planning forward from there.
4. One other thought, which I should mention but which would not pre-empt the need for this sort of substantive planning.

And
Kwasniewski himself has asked me whether, when they are in London, there would be any chance of calling on the Prime Minister. I have pointed out that this is Easter Week and the Blairs may well be away. There is no obvious need to fit this into the diary. Equally, if the Prime Minister were in London and willing to give Kwasniewski an hour this would be extremely bien vu. But it would not, at least in Polish eyes, take the place of the substantive two-day event with Blair participation on which they are now in counting.

5. Postscript. It was splendid that you were able to get a message from the Prime Minister to Kwasniewski for his terrorism conference here tomorrow. One tiny point: the shorter form of Alexander is not Aleks, but Olek. I do not know which the Prime Minister has used in the past, but Olek is the name by which the President is normally known to his friends and

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PREM 49/2765

LETTER DATED 05/11/2001

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colleagues. One final tiny point: Miller spells his first name Leszek (not Leschek as in the German version – despite his Germanic sounding surname!). Thank you again for all the records, in any case.

Yours ever
Michael

Michael Pakenham

Cc: John Macgregor Esq CVO, Director Wider Europe, FCO
Sir John Ramsden, Head/CNWED, FCO

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

SECRET
MASTER

5 November 2001

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Aleks

I would like to offer you my full support in your conference on 6 November in Warsaw, on combating terrorism.

The terrible events of 11 September were a direct attack on the freedoms and values we all share. Thousands died that day. Amongst them were hundreds of citizens of European states.

The nations of Europe have responded with resolution. There is no doubt of our determination to stand and work together, alongside the United States, to defeat the scourge of international terrorism.

We need an effective Europe-wide response. The European Union has adopted a far-reaching package of measures. I welcome the decision of others to associate themselves with these measures, so as to maximise their effectiveness.

Your conference will send a very important signal that Europe is united across the broadest possible front. I applaud this initiative and send my very best wishes for a successful occasion.

Yours ever
Tony

His Excellency Mr Aleksander Kwasniewski

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

File

faxed via Comca to
Moscow, Kiev + Ukrep
on Disct to Warsaw.
3/11/2001

From the Private Secretary

2 November 2001

Dear Mark

**DISCUSSIONS WITH POLISH PRIME MINISTER:
2 NOVEMBER: BILATERAL AND OTHER ISSUES**

The Prime Minister held discussions with Leszek Miller during a meeting and lunch today. Separate letters record the discussions on EU issues and Afghanistan/terrorism. Over lunch the Prime Minister and Miller also discussed a number of other subjects.

Bilateral Relations

Miller thanked the Prime Minister for his warm remarks about the bilateral relationship in his doorstep statement. Miller was very conscious of the historic ties between the UK and Poland. He described staying with an English family in Canterbury last year and noticing a picture of a Spitfire on their wall; the Spitfire had a Polish sign on its wing. The Prime Minister said Poland's contribution during the Second World War was well remembered in the UK (there was a brief discussion about the inaccuracies of recent film depictions of the Enigma story). The Prime Minister said he was also conscious of the large and successful Polish community in the UK. At the church he attended near Chequers, the Sunday service was followed by a Polish Mass.

Russia

Miller said Poland had suffered throughout its history from being caught between Russia and Germany. He now hoped it could begin to prosper from its location. Miller welcomed the Prime Minister's efforts to build a strong relationship with Russia. It made sense to see Russia as a partner rather than a threat. He asked for the Prime Minister's assessment of Putin.

The Prime Minister said he was convinced Putin was committed to Russia orientating itself towards the West. Putin would need Western support if his

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efforts were to be successful. That would require imaginative thinking about the current structure of our relationships with Russia. Poland would certainly have an important role to play here. A particular challenge was in persuading Putin that NATO did not represent a threat to Russia. Putin had to contend with a great deal of old thinking from within his political-military establishment.

Miller said he would be visiting Russia in the second half of December and there were plans for Putin to come to Warsaw in January. He wanted to build a warm relationship with Russia. Poland would soon become the eastern border of the EU. Miller acknowledged the need to apply strict Schengen standards at Poland's eastern border but he hoped to avoid creating a new dividing line in Europe. It was important to preserve cultural, commercial and human movement across this border.

Kaliningrad

Miller said that Kasyanov had proposed a meeting in Kaliningrad of the Prime Ministers of Russia, Poland, Ukraine and Belarus to discuss Kaliningrad. Miller wondered whether he should suggest that an EU representative should attend. Stephen Wall said this would be a good idea. Chris Patten, the responsible Commissioner, had been very active and imaginative on the subject of Kaliningrad. Miller did not expect the Russians to have any problems with EU participation.

Ukraine

Miller said the situation in Ukraine was difficult, but he wanted Poland to step up its bilateral relations with the government there. The Prime Minister said we recognised the strategic significance of Ukraine and wanted to work closely with it. The Deputy Prime Minister had visited Kiev last month. But we had (at best) mixed impressions of the Ukrainian Government's commitment to serious reform. Stephen Wall added that we had not found Ukraine to be very responsive to our attempts to build up co-operation on specific issues.

Miller conceded that the government in Ukraine left a lot to be desired. It behaved in a heavy-handed way towards the political opposition. It had made little progress on economic reform. And organised crime was a real problem. Nevertheless, it was important to make every effort, as with Russia, to draw Ukraine towards the West. Poland would be very active in this respect. Kwasniewski and Kuchma had a good personal relationship. Miller also had a

strong personal interest in Ukraine: his son had married a Ukrainian woman and he had a six year old granddaughter who was half-Ukrainian. In his conversations with his daughter-in-law's family he had been struck by how difficult life was for ordinary people in the Ukraine.

Miller said the SLD was working closely with the Ukrainian Left. It might be useful to involve the Labour Party in this work, given the strong links already existing between the Labour Party and the SLD. It would be possible to add a Ukrainian dimension to the next Labour Party/SLD meeting in Poland. The Prime Minister said his Special Adviser on Europe, Roger Liddle, took a keen interest in Ukraine and would be the right person on the UK side to take this suggestion forward.

Rotch Energy

Miller said he recognised the importance of attracting as much foreign investment as possible to Poland. He welcomed Rotch Energy's interest in the Gdansk oil refinery. He was ready to support this, but his government was awaiting confirmation from Rotch Energy that they had enough resources to finance the deal (comment: could DTI follow up with Rotch Energy to ensure this is in hand).

Gripen

The Prime Minister mentioned his strong personal commitment to BAES/Saab's bid to provide fighter aircraft to Poland. Gripen was an excellent product. The Hungarians had chosen it and we hoped the Czechs were about to do so. It would be excellent if we could persuade Poland to follow suit.

Miller said tender procedures had just started. He was familiar with the detail of the Gripen offer which he had discussed with BAES in London and with Saab in Sweden. He knew that Polish Airforce pilots were keen to have Gripen and that there was an attractive offset element built into the package. He asked why the RAF did not use Gripen. The Prime Minister said this simply reflected the fact that the RAF did not have the requirement for this type of aircraft at the time Gripen was developed.

Miller said he had no doubts about the strengths of the Gripen proposal. But, speaking frankly, there were two difficult dimensions. The first was political. He was under strong pressure from the US to buy the F16. The Prime

Minister said he appreciated that the US lobbied hard. For all that we were close allies, the competition on such matters was fierce. Nevertheless, it made sense to take such decisions on the basis of technical criteria, rather than on political grounds. Considerations of inter-operability and developing a competitive European aerospace industry also needed to be taken into account. The Poles should not feel overly intimidated by US pressure – the Hungarians had chosen Gripen and their relations with the US had not been critically affected. Iwinski pointed out helpfully that General Electric had a big stake in the Gripen proposal.

Miller said the second constraint was economic. It was an expensive requirement and difficult to justify to the public at a time of fiscal restraint. It was possible that the purchase would need to be postponed for 2-3 years until the economic situation was easier. Miller said he would keep the Prime Minister closely informed and updated on his government's approach to the fighter aircraft tender.

Domestic Politics

Miller said his right wing predecessors had left him a very problematic inheritance. Difficult decisions had been shirked and there was a lot of catching up to do. He was determined to act quickly and take difficult decisions at once. The Prime Minister said the current stability of the UK economy was in large part down to difficult decisions taken early in his first term. It was important for incoming governments quickly to acquire a reputation of economic credibility. This would help in terms of investment, currency stability and the financial markets.

I am copying this letter to Peter Watkins (MOD), Bernadette Kelly (DTI), Andrew Allberry (Cabinet Office), Michael Pakenham (Warsaw), Sir Roderic Lyne (Moscow), Roland Smith (Kiev) and Sir Nigel Sheinwald (UKRep Brussels).

Yours ever

Michael

MICHAEL TATHAM

Mark Sedwill
FCO

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10 DOWNING STREET
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*forward to UKREP +
Disc via Com +
Wesley*

cc Poland

From the Private Secretary

2 November 2001

Dear Mark

**DISCUSSIONS WITH POLISH PRIME MINISTER:
2 NOVEMBER: EU ISSUES**

The Prime Minister held discussions with Leszek Miller during a meeting and lunch today. This letter records the discussion on EU issues (which took place mainly during the meeting, with the lunchtime discussion covering other issues).

The Prime Minister began by stressing his personal commitment to EU enlargement. There were problems to overcome, but he was confident there was an unstoppable momentum within the EU behind enlargement. He looked forward to Poland joining the European Union as soon as possible.

Miller said his aim was to complete Poland's accession negotiations by the end of 2002. Poland had so far closed 17 chapters, but the hardest issues still lay ahead. The previous government had deliberately shirked difficult decisions. The key problems related to capital movement (the land purchase issue), the free movement of people (Poles being able to work in other Member States) and agriculture. Miller said he was convening a meeting of his government on 15 November which would take crunch decisions on Polish negotiating positions; he hoped the outcome would send a clear signal that Poland was moving forward.

Miller pitched hard for flexibility from the UK on FMOP. He recognised that the Germans and Austrians would take full advantage of the scope for a seven year transition period. But other Member States (Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland) had said publicly that they would either not apply a transition period at all or would do so only for two years. It would help the Polish Government a great deal if the UK could indicate publicly that it took a similar position. The Prime Minister said he was aware of the sensitivity of this issue. We had not taken a definitive position yet, but he would look at the issue carefully and see if we could be helpful.

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Miller then turned to the issue of land purchase. This was also a sensitive issue in Poland. Many people in western Poland feared that Germans would buy up vast tracts of Polish land. Miller did not believe these fears were grounded but they were a political reality. Just as Schroeder needed domestic political cover, so too did Miller. He had to take careful account of domestic opinion, not least because of his intention to put the terms of Poland's EU accession to a referendum in 2003. The previous Polish government had overbid on this dossier, but Miller was prepared to reduce the Polish demand to a 12 year transition period (with no transition on investment).

Miller said he also hoped we could be understanding of Poland's position on agriculture. Poland had modest demands – simply equal treatment with no discrimination. He accepted that later, once Poland was within the EU, CAP reform would be necessary. Stephen Wall said we understood why the issue of equal treatment on CAP was important but in reality the more significant battle for Poland would be over SCF. Poland and the other new Member States would have to contend with those Member States (eg Spain, Portugal, Ireland) which stood to lose out from enlargement and would be seeking generous phasing out packages. This was the area where it really made sense for the Poles to apply their energies. Roger Liddle added that SCF was also more important for Poland in that these receipts would contribute more directly to its development needs.

Miller summed up by saying that his aim was to reach clear negotiating positions on key dossiers at the government meeting on 15 November. This would provide a clear mandate for Poland's negotiating team. Miller wanted to ensure that by the time of the Laeken Council Poland was firmly positioned in the first wave pack. He was quite clear there was no alternative for Poland to EU membership. But it would not be a straightforward task to persuade public and political opinion that the terms of accession adequately protected Poland's interests.

The Prime Minister thanked Miller for his exposition: this helped him understand the domestic background in Poland and in particular the significance of the referendum. The Prime Minister said he would speak frankly. Most people, himself included, believed that enlargement would not look right if Poland was not part of it. Put more simply, Poland ought to be in the first wave. That was probably a majority view in the EU. But this political headwind carried its own problems because ultimately membership depended not on political goodwill, but on meeting an exacting set of conditions. EU members would get very anxious if they felt the political case for Polish accession was undermining

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the Polish Government's readiness to take difficult negotiating decisions. It was important that the Poles approached the EU negotiations in a determined and vigorous way. They should not simply count on political arguments prevailing.

Miller acknowledged this. He was prepared to take tough decisions. He would certainly need to do this on economic policy. He had inherited a big deficit and would have to apply a very restrictive fiscal policy. This would all feature in his budget next year. Meanwhile unemployment was at 16%. He was determined to address these issues at once so that he stood a chance of improving the economic situation before the next set of elections in four years time. The Prime Minister said this was the correct approach on its own merits, but it would probably also have the additional benefit of increasing EU flexibility. Member States and the Commission would be more inclined to be helpful if they could see that Poland was straining every sinew in its accession efforts and economic reform programme.

Miller expanded a bit on his referendum plans. He wanted negotiations to end in 2002. He hoped Member States would make good progress on ratification during 2003 so that by the time the choice was put to the Polish people in the autumn of 2003 there was the strongest possible sense of momentum and destiny behind the accession package. Miller said he was uneasy about the trend in Polish opinion towards EU membership: four years ago 75% of Poles favoured EU membership; now the figure was down to 55-60%.

The Prime Minister said he thought there were two strong arguments to deploy in favour of EU membership. The first was the economic case. The facts showed that every country that joined the EU became more prosperous as a result. This was particularly striking in the case of countries such as Portugal, Spain and Ireland. Short-term pain on economic reform and conforming to the *acquis* would be rewarded by long-term prosperity. The second argument related to the debate on the institutional future of Europe. The Polish public needed to be reassured that joining the EU would not lead to a loss of national identity. The Prime Minister attached a lot of importance to further European integration taking place on the basis of increased co-operation between nation states, rather than further development of a centralised Europe. Poland would have an important voice in this debate, including in the Convention (where the UK had argued hard for the active involvement of candidate countries). He was glad the UK and Poland were already working closely together on these issues and he welcomed the joint paper that would issue today.

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Miller said he shared many of the Prime Minister's views on the future institutional shape of the EU. He recalled the Prime Minister's speech in Warsaw last year (and thanked the Prime Minister for having been the first to commit publicly to a 2004 target date for enlargement). Poles felt strongly about their national identity and this was a factor in popular concerns about EU membership. A Europe of nation states was easier for Poland than a federal superstate. His views were closer to the Prime Minister's than to Joschka Fischer's. He suggested that he and the Prime Minister at some point prepare a joint article setting out their common thinking.

Miller said he also had to contend with the influence of the Catholic Church. Most of the Bishops were in favour of EU membership but to a lot of the more traditionally-minded parish priests, the EU represented a moral and cultural threat.

The Prime Minister said the future of Europe debate represented a major challenge for the EU. He was firmly in favour of further integration but this had to be on the right basis. One of the problems for the EU was that its default setting was towards more centralised bureaucracy. That was not the best way forward. It was a recipe for increasing the distance between the European political class and the European public. In most member states there was a paradox that the more EU integration took place, the more this needed to be rooted in a structure of nation states if the public were not to feel unsettled.

Miller asked about the level of concern among existing member states over the practical implications of enlargement. The Prime Minister said attitudes varied in different countries. SCF recipients clearly had vested interests engaged. And in Germany and Austria there was a degree of ambivalence based on (probably exaggerated) concerns about a sudden influx of labour. In the UK, the public broadly accepted that enlargement was a good thing which served Europe's economic and political interests. This had demonstrably been the case with previous enlargements, including the admission of countries that at the time had been poorer than existing members (eg Spain and Portugal). Stephen Wall said that at the time of Spanish accession there had been huge concerns about an influx of Spaniards into the UK; in fact sixteen years later far more British people lived in Spain than vice versa.

Miller commented that, even allowing for Schroeder's electoral pressures, German concerns over FMOP were exaggerated. The Prime Minister said that the degree of economic and social dislocation caused by rapid German unification

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was a powerful influence on their current approach. He agreed that German fears were probably more imaginary than real, but they created a political reality that Schroeder could not ignore. From his own conversations with Schroeder, the Prime Minister was convinced Schroeder wanted Poland to be part of the first wave. But it was important to bear in mind some of the psychological undercurrents in German politics. There was a deep-rooted perception in Germany that they were always the ones being asked to make sacrifices on behalf of Europe. This became more difficult for German politicians to deal with as new generations emerged and public attitudes became less conditioned by the past.

As the meeting ended, Miller returned to his requests for UK flexibility in the accession negotiations. These were very important in helping him to steer Poland successfully into the EU. If Poland's EU accession were credited to the left-wing in Poland, this would hugely strengthen the left's position in Polish politics. The Prime Minister repeated that he would consider Miller's requests carefully and get back to him quickly.

Miller said he had to find the right kind of language and messages to communicate the benefits of EU membership to the Polish people. He had been struck by a schoolgirl telling him that she could not wait for the day when Poles were able to join the EU nationals immigration channel on arrival in EU airports.

Comment

The Prime Minister enjoyed this meeting and was struck by the potential for finding common ground with Poland on EU issues. He is also convinced of the logic for making a big political investment in Poland given its future importance as a large Member State.

It would be helpful to have a detailed assessment (with Embassy input) of Miller's views on future of Europe issues. We are aware that he has sent different signals to other audiences. Is he really as on-message as he indicated in this meeting? Miller's suggestion of a joint article is one which we might wish to take forward in due course.

The Prime Minister would like to write to Miller soon (and certainly before the government meeting on 15 November to which Miller referred) on FMOP. The Prime Minister's instinct (based on his understanding that none of our internal assessments to date have pointed to the likelihood of a major influx

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of labour from new member states) is to take a forward position in this letter. I would be grateful for advice and a suitable draft, cleared as appropriate with other Government Departments.

I am copying this letter to Hilary Jackson (Home Office), Neil Couling (DWP), Andrew Allberry (Cabinet Office), Michael Pakenham (Warsaw) and Sir Nigel Sheinwald (UKRep Brussels).

Yours ever

Michael

MICHAEL TATHAM

Mark Sedwill
FCO

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 November 2001

Dear Mark

DISCUSSIONS WITH POLISH PRIME MINISTER: 2 NOVEMBER

The Prime Minister had an hour's talks with Leszek Miller this morning followed by a lunch. Miller was accompanied by Iwinski during the talks, with the Ambassador joining the lunch. Stephen Wall, Roger Liddle and I were present on our side during the talks. Jonathan Powell replaced Roger Liddle at the lunch.

My three following letters report discussions on the following topics:

- EU issues: enlargement and the future of Europe
- Afghanistan/terrorism
- Bilateral and other issues.

I am copying this letter to Peter Watkins (MOD), Bernadette Kelly (DTI), Hilary Jackson (Home Office), Neil Couling (Department for Work and Pensions), Andrew Allberry (Cabinet Office), Michael Pakenham (Warsaw) and Sir Nigel Sheinwald (UKRep Brussels).

3/11
Yours ever

Michael

MICHAEL TATHAM

Mark Sedwill
FCO

JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH MILLER

- Delighted to welcome Leszek Miller to London.
 - His visit after only 2 weeks in office shows the **strength of the Anglo-Polish relations**. Jack Straw was also in Warsaw last week.
 - Deep historic links. Poland a **important NATO ally**. Bilateral trade of £2bn a year. Large Polish community in UK.
 - We are also both **strong allies of the US**. Like EU, Poland **pledged full support** for action being taken by US in response to 11 September.
 - I briefed Leszek on my **visit to the Middle East**, and Jack Straw's visit to Moscow.
 - Also discussed **Europe's role in fighting terrorism**. EU is crucial. Since 11 September, EU countries agreed to create a European Arrest Warrant and a common list of terrorists. Poland fully associated itself with these measures.
 - **Expanding EU essential** for Europe's future security and prosperity.
 - Britain a **firm champion of re-uniting Europe**. In Warsaw last year, I called for EU enlargement in 2004. Important Poland is part of this.
 - Will continue to **help Poland's preparations**. Given over £100m in last 10 years..
 - As future EU members also important Poland is involved in the **debate on Europe's future** EU has launched. Launched a joint paper today.
-

MEDIA POINTS – DEFENSIVE

- **Free Movement of Labour – Will UK make national concession?** UK worked hard in EU to minimise transition period. Have promised to look carefully and constructively nearer time at whether we can go further on a national basis.
- **Taxation** – we are looking at the Commission's latest proposals for a 2 year transition period. This will need to be supported by effective measures to tackle tobacco smuggling.
- **Transport** – UK wants to see full liberalisation. Must treat candidate countries on their own merits. If they meet EU standards, they should have access to the EU road haulage market.
- **Free movement of Capital** – Commission made clear they cannot support the Polish request for an 18-year transition period on purchase of land. If Poland produces new position, we will of course give it careful consideration.

- **NATO enlargement: Balts?** Want to see successful NATO enlargement. Too early to speculate on Prague outcome. But no one doing more than UK to help Balts and others with their practical preparations for NATO membership.
- **Rotch** – connections with Hinduja brothers? Only rumours. Reputable City and Polish banks are supporting the deal. Investment good for Poland. Hope more UK companies will follow.

(Background: rumours circulated months ago that the Hinduja brothers were associated with Rotch's bid.)

- **Enigma** – a slur on Poles? Film nothing to do with HMG.
- Pay tribute to vital contribution of Polish intelligence agents to victory in WWII.

(Background: Poles are upset at the portrayal of a Pole as a traitor in the recent Enigma film. Poles were instrumental in cracking the Enigma code).

- Welcome work of **Anglo-Polish Historical Committee**. Report due 2002, on all aspects of Polish wartime intelligence effort.
- No discrimination faced by Poles at **entry ports**. Bona fide visitors warmly welcome. All complaints carefully examined.

(Background: Complaints about the high number of Poles refused entry at ports. Few have found to be justified).

- **Au pair** scheme constantly under review. But no current plans to extend the scheme to Poland.

(Background: for historical reasons some CE countries can send au pairs to the UK but not Poland).

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INFO PRIORITY MINSK, VILNIUS, KIEV, WHIRL, ACTOR
INFO PRIORITY NATO POSTS, EU ENLARGEMENT POSTS

SUBJECT: POLAND: YOUR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER IN WARSAW,
30 OCTOBER

SUMMARY

1. Warm, productive first meeting with Miller. Main focus on EU accession. Miller determined to complete negotiations by end-2002, grateful for UK support. Special emphasis on need for flexibility from all sides in interpreting deal on Free Movement of People, looking for generous UK interpretation. Preview of 2 November meeting in London with Prime Minister, with emphasis on EU issues, relations with Poland's neighbours and bilateral links. Miller very positive on Rotch investment, more neutral but not negative on Gripen.

DETAIL

2. You had three quarters of an hour last night with Leszek Miller, the new Polish Prime Minister. You said that the Prime Minister was looking forward to seeing him later this week in London, and he responded with enthusiasm.

3. He identified, and you went over much of this ground in detail with him, the following subjects for that discussion:

- Bilateral, economic co-operation, Miller would be interested to hear how we could improve access to the British labour market, and a greater presence in Poland for British capital and investment. This needed to be focused on areas of high technology and modern production techniques;
- The EU accession negotiations, with special reference to the Free Movement of People;
- The international situation, including threats from terrorists. He would be looking for greater engagement with the UK, and more joint activity within the NATO framework;
- Relations with the neighbours, especially Russia, not least for commercial/energy reasons. Poland and the UK could work together to improve both their political relations with Russia and their presence in Russian markets;
- Wider bilateral relations including exchanges between students, scientific experts and other professionals - he was grateful for our help in making our archives available.

4. In the EU discussion, Miller reaffirmed his determination to complete the negotiations by the end of next year, thus allowing Poland - after a referendum the following year - to enter the Union in 2004, the date identified by the Prime Minister a year ago in Warsaw. It would indeed be "strange" if Poland were not part of the first wave. You repeated our eagerness to see Poland in that first wave, which would also allow them to play a full part in the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2003. Miller was grateful for our support to date and hoped we would be able to help even more in future.

5. He outlined the political and economic problems in a number of areas. The first concerned the Free Movement of People. Thanks to Germany and Austria, the seven-year transitional period was now a given. But he and his Government would look for maximum flexibility from the other Member States, to interpret the 2+3+2 basis in the most generous way possible. He very much hoped that we would be able, at some stage, to indicate a readiness on a national basis to drop the barriers to Free Movement after the minimum two-year period. He would look forward to discussing our approach with the Prime Minister later this week.
6. You emphasised that we had indeed achieved some flexibility, as the result of pressure on other Member States. It was now up to individual nations to decide how to apply this. For our part we would want to take our decision later, in the light of the outcome of the whole negotiations and the likely make-up of the new Union. Miller repeated that German/Austrian fears of a flood of Poles moving into their labour markets after accession were grossly exaggerated.
7. You also touched on our position on Company Law/Pharmaceuticals, where you emphasised that we had already reached our bottom line in negotiations. As for CAP and Structural Funds, these were matters for later debate.
8. On counter-terrorism responses, you referred to your recent talks in Washington with the US authorities. Both they and we were grateful for the moral and practical support the Poles had offered. As former Ministers of the Interior, you and Miller had a very clear idea of what needed to be done.
9. Moving to bilateral relations, you picked up Miller's references to increasing economic links in high-tech areas. There were two particular cases where the UK could indeed help the Poles: the offer of Gripen for the multi-role combat aircraft; and the Rotch bid to purchase the Gdansk Refinery. You and your colleagues were keen to know where the Government of Poland stood.
10. Miller reacted briskly. The two projects were of a different nature. The Gdansk Refinery bid was a "very interesting project". There were many good arguments to complete the deal shortly, and he might have something conclusive to tell the Prime Minister this week. As for the MRCA, this was more complex. The Government was continuing to study the possibilities. The British Aerospace offer on offset was very interesting, but needed further consideration. He would also want to talk to the Prime Minister about this. He noted your comment that Gripen, following the Hungarian and - probably - Czech decisions, would now be a true NATO-operated fighter.
11. As your discussion developed, Miller became much warmer and more relaxed; he was even ready to try out his English. There is no doubt about his enthusiasm for his meeting with the Prime Minister later this week, nor of his determination to take a grip personally of the EU dossiers. He is clearly looking for some movement on our part, even marginal, on Free Movement of People, which will help him sell the likely deal to his own public opinion. The Department will want to consider how to play this in the context of his meeting at No. 10. His relatively bullish approach to the two leading UK commercial interests (Rotch and Gripen) was striking. His answers were a good deal more positive than we would have had from his predecessor a month ago, or might have expected from his team over the summer. But on Gripen there is clearly still some way to go.
12. Your talks over dinner with Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz are being reported separately by the Private Secretary from Moscow.

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FM WARSAW
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Cabinet Office for Tatham, Wall & Liddle

SUBJECT: POLAND: PRIME MINISTER MILLER IN LONDON, 2 NOVEMBER: SCENE-SETTER

SUMMARY

1. Clear themes, following your visit. Miller looking forward to substantive talks on: EU negotiations, international issues/terrorism, Russia and other neighbours, and bilateral relations (including UK commercial interests). Thoughts on how to develop personal relations in this first meeting between two Prime Ministers.

DETAIL

2. Leszek Miller's coalition Government is up and running. It won a big majority in a Parliamentary vote of confidence on its programme and has popular support for now. But Miller and his team face real challenges, including how to revive an economy with short-term problems (unemployment at 16%, potential 2001 budget deficit - without the remedial action he has in hand - rising to 10% of GDP). The need to impose tough measures and to speed up the EU accession negotiations means that the glow of office will soon wear off. But at the moment he rides high, with poll ratings smartly up (around 50% approval) since last month's elections.

Prime Minister Leszek Miller

3. Miller has achieved his ambition to become PM. This is already reflected in a new gravitas, although his cutting sense of humour was still much in evidence in the Parliamentary debate last week on his programme. Miller's pragmatism has also been much in evidence in endorsing his Cabinet. He has chosen a balanced and competent team, who compare favourably with their predecessors. He still remains most at ease with old colleagues from pre-1989, including his foreign policy adviser Iwinski who will accompany him to London.

4. On international issues, Miller is still testing the ground. His guiding principles remain the need for Poland to be in the first wave of EU accession, the key role of the US, and the need to improve relations with Poland's Eastern neighbours. He strongly supports the current action in Afghanistan. Domestically, restoring economic growth is at the top of his agenda. He is open to new ideas, but remains cautious by nature. His English is improving (with help from us).

AGENDA ISSUES

5. Your long meeting with him last night confirmed his enthusiasm about his London trip, and his wish to deepen links between us. He is grateful for our EU help so far, but looks to us for continued support over the tricky year ahead of negotiations. He made some suggestions to you (my telno 265), which Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz later developed and to which the Prime Minister will want to respond. Miller was clear that he looked forward to a substantive exchange in this area. In addition, as

he told you, he will want to tackle international issues, including terrorism and relations with Poland's Eastern neighbours; and bilateral cooperation - he has points to put to the Prime Minister on both the Rotch bid to buy the Gdansk refinery and on the Gripen bid for Poland's new fighter aircraft: both are billion dollar-plus contracts on which decisions by the new Government are expected shortly.

MESSAGE FOR MILLER

6. The briefing pack for No.10 already covers this ground, and UK positions, fully. After your talks last night, we are now set to launch on Friday our joint paper on the Future of Europe. At the press conference with Miller, there will be no doubt be references to counter-terrorism actions. Here are some suggestions for the approach which could help to deepen the personal relationship with Miller:

- We share many common values and political goals: democracy, economic growth, greater fairness in society, industrial modernisation, education, the information society. Two factors are crucial: the type of EU we want to see in future, with the proper balance between sharing and preserving national powers; and the importance of strengthening links to the US. We both agree there can be no question of choosing between them;

- The New Labour Government has set in place policies to meet the domestic and global challenges of the 21st century, just as SLD will have to do. The new economic environment offers real opportunities. But it imposes costs too, sometimes on those least able to bear them. To be competitive in the global economy requires tough decisions and political courage;

- The events of 11 September have strengthened the argument for early EU enlargement. Poland's absence from the first wave would be a matter of deep regret for us, and a disaster for her; she cannot afford to fall further behind. Success will be due mainly to Polish efforts. We in London understand the size of the problems you face. You can count on our support;

- Post-negotiations, the next task will be a referendum. You will want to sustain the present political consensus. But now is also the time to start preparing public opinion, especially with more information on the benefits (including outline CAP/SCF numbers);

- Poland's regional position will be of growing importance. Your special knowledge and experience will be invaluable in expanding our outreach to the East. Putin can be a positive factor, and there is much more to be done in trade with Russia;

- As you have said, infrastructure will be a crucial target for improvement. UK companies have much to offer, not least in roads and transport. And UK business/financial services want to be more engaged (Rotch, BAE Systems). We will encourage them - so should you;

- It is not easy to convince sceptical electorates. But our re-election in June shows you can sustain political support while pursuing a reform agenda. Your election result provides a solid basis for the changes you need to pursue. We want to help, as Government and as Party.

PAKENHAM

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POLAND'S NEXT PRIME MINISTER: A PORTRAIT OF LESZEK MILLER

SUMMARY

1. Miller, an enigmatic ex-Communist, has led his SLD Party to a dominant position. No ideologue, his political views are those of a European Social Democrat. A tough operator with highly political instincts, he faces no present threats. But the road ahead will be rocky, especially early on. For the UK, he is a real opportunity.

DETAIL

Miller's background

2. Born in 1946 near Łódź of a single parent family. He graduated from a technical high school to become an electrician in a linen factory until the mid-1970s. He rose in the Communist Party, steadily but without sparks joining the Politburo in 1988. After 1989, he co-founded the successor Social Democratic Group and after service in the 1993-1997 Government as Labour Minister, Head of the Cabinet Officer and as Interior Minister, he won the SLD leadership in 1997. Most Poles now see Miller as a credible Premier, even if they respect rather than like him.

Miller's style and beliefs

3. Politics is Miller's dominant interest. He is no deep thinker, but he has prepared hard to become Prime Minister. No natural orator, he has brushed up his presentation skills and he continues to work on his English. His sharp sense of humour makes him good company when relaxed. Unlike President Kwasniewski, he has not tried to cultivate an image as a unifying figure. He arouses antagonism on the Right, who see him as an unreconstructed ex-Communist, and he responds in kind.

4. For Miller, politics is about power. His core themes are greater fairness in society, enlarged equality of opportunity and the faster modernisation of Poland. From this stems his support for EU membership. He is not driven by old-style "European" ideals but because he sees clear benefits for Poland and SLD. Similarly, he supports the market economy while remaining nervous of the human cost of reforms. As Prime Minister, he will be essentially pragmatic.

Party leader

5. He takes a close interest in party management, and relies heavily on a close circle of mostly ex-Party advisers who help him to maximise control over SLD at all levels. There are no immediate threats to his dominance nor obvious focal points yet for future opposition. But his control is not absolute.

Miller as Prime Minister

6. Unlike Buzek, he understands how the machinery of Government works. Presentation of policy will be important to him as will its political impact. Lacking a detailed grasp of most complex dossiers he prefers to give a broad steer and then to allow subordinates to put policy into effect. This makes for a collegiate style, so long as his colleagues remember who is boss.

7. When crunch decisions are required he will rely quite heavily on his close circle of aides. But his acute political antennae allow him to feel confident in taking tough decisions. And he understands that

taking decisive but unpopular decisions goes with the job. His overriding aim is to lead the first Democratic Polish Government to secure a second term. So the impact on domestic politics will always be at the front of his mind. And with a serious budget deficit to face and the crucial phase of EU negotiations ahead, he knows his honeymoon with the electorate is likely to be short. His first year in office could well be the hardest.

8. The relationship between Miller and President Kwasniewski, with their different personalities, will also be important. They recognise they must co-operate, with Miller much the more powerful but Kwasniewski working to redress the balance, especially in foreign policy. Both will give high priority to demonstrating Poland's strong support for the US in the aftermath of recent events.

Miller and Britain

9. Miller has a genuine personal interest in better ties to the UK. Not just because of our EU position, role in NATO and closeness to Washington. He admires us as a country developing new ideas on the evolution of social democracy. This is reinforced by Miller's warm appreciation for the Prime Minister's personal popularity and electoral success. He wants to be close to, and seen as close to, Tony Blair.

10. Crucially, Miller shows no signs of the old Polish suspicions about the UK and no hang-ups about past history. On the contrary, the chances of a genuine strategic partnership between London and Warsaw are now better than any time since the War.

Private Life

11. He is married to Aleksandra with an adult son and a granddaughter on whom he dotes – he celebrated his election victory by spending the day with her at the zoo. He is a big Beatles fan, follows football closely, has an eye for the ladies, and freely admits in Catholic Poland to being an agnostic.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH POLISH PRIME MINISTER

CHECKLIST

EU enlargement – see separate sheet

Future of Europe

- Delighted to launch Polish-British Paper on “Bringing Europe Closer to its Citizens”
- Want to work with Poland beyond enlargement on whole range of EU business.

Afghanistan/Counter-terrorism

- Thanks for offer of military support. Humanitarian aid also vital.
- Welcome Central Europe conference (6 Nov) on terrorism. Will send a message of support.

Russia

- Welcome improvement in Polish-Russian relations: thoughts on Russia-handling?
- Need pragmatic solutions for Kaliningrad. Welcome your efforts.

Ukraine

- Ukraine matters. No new barriers after EU enlargement. Trilateral UK/Pol/Ukraine projects.

NATO enlargement

- Look forward to invitations. Hope Poland will encourage aspirants to reform.
- Must prepare 2002 Prague Summit carefully inc. NATO/Russia relations and internal NATO reform.

Economy

- Difficult economic inheritance. Prospects? Willing to help on eg PPP and labour market flexibility
- Want to boost UK/Polish trade and investment. “Poland Days” in London?
- Hope you can endorse the Rotch Energy Ltd bid for Refina Gdansk

Defence

- Committed to strong defence relations.
- If you decide to buy new MRCA, commend Gripen. Strong financial and offset package

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH POLISH PRIME MINISTER

CHECKLIST - EU Enlargement

- Want Poland in the first wave. Time short. We decide next year which candidates are ready. There are no guaranteed places. Next few months vital for enlargement - and Poland.
- Welcome your commitment that Poland can conclude negotiations by the end of next year. Impact of your agreement with coalition partners? Key priorities?
- Welcome your commitment to economic reform, including labour market and industrial restructuring. Vital key present and future member states drive this agenda forward over the coming years - there is no alternative.
- Support your strategy to settle quickly many issues to clear way for budget issues next year (CAP, structural funds). Glad you have now closed environment. A real breakthrough. Important to keep up the momentum.
- On company law, recognise the sensitivity of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. We and partners have gone a long way with our industry. What we have agreed with Hungary and the Czech Republic represents a real bottom line.
- We are keen to offer practical support. Bilateral Action Plan We have also bid for 12 EU twinning projects this year ranging from agriculture to JHA.

If time

- Understand coalition agreement emphasises Poland must participate fully in the CAP. We share that aim. Unlikely to happen on accession, because Berlin agreed not to give candidates direct payments. To do so would breach the EU's budget ceilings.
- Our aim: Poland to participate in a CAP that is economically and financially sustainable, and benefits consumers and producers. CAP reform essential to deliver this.
- Structural Funds need to be concentrated on the neediest parts of the EU. Must be a substantial shift of funds towards the candidates away from the existing Member States.
- On Free Movement of Workers, we worked hard to achieve flexibility in the EU's position. Pleased we won agreement that Member States can lift restrictions after just 2 years. Now looking at how we can be helpful to Poland by using this flexibility.
- **[If needed];** premature for UK to make a decision on national liberalisation measures 3 years before accession. We want to minimise any transition and be as constructive as possible. We will review this nearer the time when we can use the most up-to-date facts and figures.
- Tobacco excise duty difficult issue for UK. 1 in 4 cigarette packets are smuggled. Appreciate you are asking for a shorter transition period [2 years] than some other candidates. We will look positively at the Commission's proposed transition period for two years. It would need to be supported by effective measures to tackle tobacco smuggling.
- Will seek as liberal regime as possible for cabotage. Ideally no transition period at all in line with Single Market. If necessary, will seek a compromise whereby Germany and Austria, as border countries, are entitled to a transition but no other members states impose restrictions.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH POLISH PRIME MINISTER

BACKGROUND

Future of Europe

1. The Future of Europe discussion at Ghent concentrated on process, rather than the substance of the 2004 IGC topics. There is agreement on the principle of a Convention to prepare the IGC. We have persistently called for accession candidates to have equal representation in the Convention. This has been agreed.

2. Officials have drafted a British-Polish Paper on "Bringing Europe to its Citizens", seeking to set out some common approaches (copy attached). The Prime Minister and Miller can note this during their meeting November and give it a public launch. The new Polish administration has yet to make a substantive statement on the Future of Europe.

Terrorism

3. Popular support and cross-party backing for coalition action in Afghanistan remains firm. The Poles - as NATO allies - have offered military support (chemical/biological teams, a de-mining platoon and logistical support) but discussions on possible Polish contributions are at a preliminary stage. The Poles have suggested that they might sell some of their old Warsaw Pact equipment to Anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan - the US is sceptical. The Poles have limited extra resources to backfill US contingents in the Balkans: the 860 Polish troops in Kosovo and Bosnia already lack equipment to conduct full peace-keeping duties.

4. President Kwasniewski has organised a Conference on Terrorism for Central and Eastern European Countries in Warsaw on the 6 November. The Poles understand why the Prime Minister will not be able to attend as guest of honour. We are in touch separately about a message from the Prime Minister.

5. The Poles have associated themselves fully with all of the EU's efforts in the fight against terrorism. As a candidate for EU membership Poland will be obliged to adopt any new EU anti-terrorist measures introduced before their accession, including the measures agreed by the EU Justice & Home Affairs Ministers on 20 September.

Russia

6. President Kwasniewski visited Moscow from 14-15 October. This consolidated the improvement in Russian-Polish relations over the last year, putting an end to the cool period after Poland's entry into NATO. It is the latest of a number of high-level visits which have gradually moved towards normalising relations. The final seal will be a visit by Putin to Warsaw, now planned for 16-17 January, to coincide with the anniversary of the liberation of Warsaw.

7. Miller may raise Kaliningrad with which Poland shares a border. We want pragmatic solutions to the problems of Kaliningrad's status as a future enclave of the EU (eg on the flow of people and goods). This should be possible within the acquis provided the Russians are reasonable in their demands and push reforms forward in Kaliningrad. We want to involve the Poles in drawing up EU policy. Kwasniewski and Putin have apparently agreed to meet in Kaliningrad itself, in the first half of next year, with the Presidents of Lithuania, the Baltic Council, and the EU Commission. We could ask about this.

Ukraine

8. The UK firmly supports a strengthened relationship between Ukraine and EU/NATO, but the depth of those relationships will depend on Ukraine's commitment to democratic standards and fundamental economic reforms. The Poles worry that a new barrier will be erected between the enlarged EU and the "new neighbours". We are starting to push the Commission and other Member States to think about how the EU can relate to the "new neighbours" after the next enlargement.

9. HMG works with Poland to aid Ukraine's development. We have funded a series of trilateral projects, using FCO money (£270k this year) and Polish expertise aimed at the Ukraine. This is appreciated by President Kwasniewski, who has expended much effort in trying to reorient Ukraine towards the West (and has a good relationship with President Kuchma).

NATO

10. The new Polish Government is positive on NATO enlargement. They have argued in favour of inviting all three Baltic States as well as Slovakia and Slovenia at Prague, and do not rule out inviting Bulgaria and Romania too. While accepting it would be impossible to defend the Baltic States, they argue that it would be a serious error not to invite them to join at Prague. Privately, they believe that Russia will not respond badly to Baltic enlargement, especially as Russian relations with Estonia and Lithuania have improved of late. As the Foreign Secretary found during his recent visit to the Washington, the tide within the Senate is running in favour of Baltic inclusion in the next round.

11. The Poles claim that Putin told Kwasniewski that it was now crucial to have a higher quality of relations between NATO and Russia. Poland has traditionally been wary of Russian intentions. However, the Poles are particularly concerned about talk that Russia might one day be a member of NATO. Kwasniewski described this as "a dream" when he was in Moscow. We need to underline the importance of continuing the dialogue and ignoring some of Putin's mischievous rhetoric about Russian membership.

Defence relations - Gripen

12. Defence relations are deep. We have a civilian advisor in the Polish MoD who is well regarded by the new Defence Minister (Jerzy Szmajdzinski). We have an annual UK/Poland/Ukraine exercise (Cossack Steppe).

13. The Poles wrote to the Defence Secretary in November 2000 asking for a proposal 'for acquisition of loan for use fighters'. BAe (with Saab) submitted proposals in December 2000 - 16 'loan for use' Gripen fighters from Swedish Air Force inventory with training, logistic support and training weapons.

14. The Poles issued the first of a two-stage tender process in April. The new government is now taking forward the tender process. The US is lobbying the new government hard, as the fighter programme is the largest in Central Europe. Hungary has just decided to buy Gripen over the US F-16 proposal, which should help Gripen's chances in Poland (given the need for interoperability with NATO). Miller is expecting the Prime Minister to raise this.

Economic relations

15. We have done much to help Poland reform since 1989. We contributed £100 million in aid through the Know How Fund and successor programmes since 1989, though DfID programmes are due to end by March 2003. We have a small but high profile Action Plan to help with EU enlargement. This is focussed on building public administration capacity. We have already offered

to send an expert on PPP to Poland before the end of the year. Arguably Poland needs more advice on labour market reforms to tackle unemployment.

16. Commerce is booming - two-way trade exceeded £2bn in 2000, and has recorded increases of over 10% per annum for the last 3 years. But France (Telecom and Vivendi) is the largest investor. UK is 5th but would be higher if the Rotch deal (see below) goes ahead. During the Prime Minister's visit to Warsaw last year, President Kwasniewski mooted the idea of coming to London to promote business in a "Poland Day" in London.

Rotch

17. Rotch Energy leads an international consortium about to invest \$1.1 billion in the purchase and modernisation of the Gdansk refinery, currently owned by Poland's second largest oil company. Rotch is now in exclusive negotiations with the Polish Government for the acquisition of 75% of the shares. Wieslaw Kaczmarek, new Polish Treasury Minister, has stated publicly that he can recommend the Rotch deal provided that financing can be made available. Rotch has secured the financing for the investment from leading international and Polish banks. We await final approval from the Polish government. Miller is briefed and appears supportive.

18. Rotch's investment will help the refinery to satisfy EU standards. It will also ensure growth and employment in the region - Rotch would be the single largest employer on the Baltic coast. For the UK, the investment will create a strategic foothold into the Polish Energy sector. It will be one of the UK's largest investments in Poland, and place UK as the 4th largest investor in Poland.

Bilateral issues

19. Are generally excellent. Travel is the main bone of contention as Poles claim they are discriminated against at ports of entry - nearly 3% are turned back.

20. Historical gripes over World War II have loomed surprisingly large in the relationship because of the large community of (aging) expatriate Poles in Britain. A feeling that Poland's contribution to the intelligence war has been undervalued remains a live issue. We set up, with the previous Polish government, an "Anglo-Polish Historical Committee" of officials and academics to find and evaluate records of British-Polish intelligence co-operation during WW2. The committee is on course to produce, as planned, a joint report by June 2002.

Bringing Europe closer to its Citizens: a Polish/British contribution.

1. Our major challenges are to keep an enlarged Europe functional and raise social acceptance for European institutions. There is a need for better governance. Civil societies change at a global scale, and governments and supra-national institutions lag behind.
2. The European Union needs a clear mission statement, an answer to the question of why Europeans need the EU. The achievements of the post-war integration of Europe are today being taken for granted. We should aim for an EU that delivers real benefits to the people of Europe, addressing the priorities they want addressed; and does so in a way that has their consent and support.
3. Institutional changes should serve policy goals and strengthen the legitimacy of the institutions. Discussion should not begin with rigid concepts. The four topics identified at Nice are a good point of departure. Further topics are being debated. All the Nice topics are inter-linked and cannot be discussed in separation. The peoples of Europe, in the member states and the applicant countries, should be fully involved in this debate.
4. The EU's underlying principles should be efficiency, legitimacy, and transparency. The next IGC should consider how to simplify the EU Treaties and make them better understood by ordinary people.
5. A final division of competencies between the EU and its member states is not possible or desirable. It must not put limits on the future development of the Union. What is desirable is to establish what is best done at European level and what should be done at national level, and improve the mechanisms to give effect to these principles.
6. The European Union is a law-based community. This law has to be made more comprehensible and accessible to the citizens. Redundant laws should be abolished. The acquis should be kept under constant review. There could be merit in this being conducted by a Chamber drawn from national parliaments. National MPs would thus be more closely involved in shaping and monitoring EU policies. MEPs should be more closely involved with national parliaments.

7. Many citizens of Europe feel alienated from the EU's institutions. This problem equally concerns all institutions of representative democracy. A goal of EU policy makers should be to enhance a sense of belonging (of the citizens) and responsibility (of the politicians and officials). The language of European integration needs clarity, since the language itself is a major source of alienation.
8. Greater efficiency can be achieved through:
 - putting into practice the principles of good governance;
 - well-balanced deregulation;
 - extension of the scope of QMV
 - redefinition of the role of the Presidency, e.g. by introducing 'team presidencies';
 - streamlining the European Commission and strengthening its independence.
9. Legitimacy can be strengthened through:
 - Enhancing the role of the European Council - Europe's democratically elected leaders - in setting the EU's strategic agenda
 - Full respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
 - establishment of a chamber composed of national MPs to monitor subsidiarity;
 - delivering what the people of Europe want – more and better jobs, enhanced prosperity, safety from terrorism, a cleaner environment, etc
 - improving the decision-making capacity of the Council of Ministers.
10. Transparency can be increased by:
 - using clear and simple language about Europe
 - making as many EU documents as possible available to the public
 - the Council taking legislative decisions in public.
11. Britain and Poland will work together, and with other European partners, to build a modern EU for the 21st century on these lines.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH POLISH PRIME MINISTER

BACKGROUND

EU Enlargement

1. Poland's **elections** brought mixed results for their EU aspirations. Leszek Miller's Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which has named EU accession as one of its two principal goals, won 41%. There is a large majority in Parliament, and a smaller one in the country as a whole, in favour of EU membership. The Government will press ahead, although the presence of the Peasants' Party in the coalition is likely to make its position on agriculture even tougher. The Poles have closed 18 of the 29 chapters that are open, leaving them in joint 8th place. Their budget crisis is a constraint on investment in preparations for membership. All Ministries are facing across-the-board cuts in spending. But the economic essentials remain healthy, and the markets stable.

2. Poland poses a dilemma in the enlargement process: it is politically difficult to envisage a first wave of enlargement without Poland, but to include Poland if it is clearly not ready will affect the real and perceived success of enlargement. Verhofstadt, who visited Poland on 22 October, wants Laeken to acknowledge that Poland is on track. He encouraged Poland to try to sign up to EU deals reached with other candidates on free movement of workers (transition period of up to 7 years) and the purchase of agricultural land (again, a transition period of up to 7 years). But he came away from his visit struck by the firm negotiating line taken by the new Polish government and its assumption that more flexibility was required of the EU than of Poland.

CAP

3. Is a big issue for the Poles. 25% of their working population works in agriculture and related activities, albeit producing 5% of GDP. The fact that the SLD has had to take on the Peasants' Party as coalition partners will not make the new government any easier to deal with on the CAP. Their coalition agreement says Poland should participate fully in the CAP. In other words they must be entitled to direct payments (the compensation paid to EU farmers for cuts in support prices). The financing deal for enlargement until 2006, agreed at Berlin, does not make provision for the acceding countries to receive direct payments. Giving such payments to them would blow the budget. The best outcome is gradually to introduce direct payments for the acceding countries, after 2006, but at the same time wind them down for the EU15 so that within a decade all farmers in an enlarged EU are treated equally ie none of them will receive direct payments. A key UK priority is to secure agreement on CAP reform so that winding down direct payments will become possible.

SCF

4. Is also likely to be a big issue for the Poles. All of Poland, and most of the regions in the other accession countries, will be eligible for Objective 1 structural funding. In view of the need to keep the overall spending within limits, this implies a substantial reduction of spending in existing Member States. This will require a fundamental review of the SF post 2006. Spain tried before the summer to seek guarantees that they would continue to receive generous support from the EU budget after the existing financing arrangements run out. They were rebuffed by budget disciplinarians, including us. It would be indefensible to keep funding the Madrid metro at the cost of failing to help rebuild infrastructure of Eastern Europe. The Commission's likely solution will be to propose a substantial increase in the Community budget for the structural funds. This will not be in the UK's interests – we pay in c 75% more than we get out. The answer is to keep tight control of the overall SCF budget, and focus it where it is most needed.

Pharmaceuticals

5. Poland is the only candidate in negotiations, apart from Romania, yet to close the Company Law chapter. Their problem relates to the protection of intellectual property rights for

pharmaceuticals. The EU, following a UK, French and Italian initiative, reached a deal with the other candidates which have serious pharmaceutical industries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia). The Poles contest a key element in the deal struck with others.

6. The EU introduced Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPCs) in the 90s to extend the patent life of pharmaceuticals. The EU pharmaceutical R&D industry claim this arrangement is key to their remaining competitive. Hungary and the Czech Republic agreed that SPCs should apply for products for which market authorisation has been granted from 1 January 2000. Poland's latest position is that this should apply from 1 July 2002. We, the French and Italians disagree. The Poles say that we will damage their pharmaceutical industry, which is ripe for privatisation, and increase the cost of pharmaceuticals, thus putting more pressure on the budget and on citizens' pockets. But Hungary and the Czech Republic face the same problems.

7. The situation is complicated by the recent introduction of Polish national legislation which removes data exclusivity – which contravenes the Europe Agreement. During his meeting with Jack Straw (30 Oct) Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz gave the impression Poland would accept the EU position on SPCs in return for securing a transition period on registration of pharmaceuticals and leeway to phase data exclusivity back in gradually (but before accession).

Cost benefits

8. The figure of **1bn euro** is Poland's entitlement to aid under the three separate aid programmes designed to help countries prepare for membership. In practice, actual receipts may well be below this figure. We cannot say what the budgetary position of Poland will be post-accession - the key budgetary chapters are yet to be negotiated. However, Poland will be a substantial net beneficiary from the EU budget upon accession.

9. There is an estimate of 12 bn euro which comes from the German institute DIW. But this assumes that Poland receives CAP direct payments in full and that there is no CAP reform in the intervening period. In practice this won't happen. Without any CAP direct payments, Poland's receipts would be in the order of **10bn euro**.

Free Movement of Workers

10. During his meeting with Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary Cimoszewicz was seeking a UK commitment to state its intention on opening its labour markets when we sign the accession treaties (end 2002/early 2003) rather than just at accession (mid 2004). They appear to be looking for a statement that we would limit our own transition period to the minimum length of 2 years, rather than the 5, or even 7 years that are possible under the EU position. Mr Straw remained open on this. We actively pushed for the flexibility in the EU position and are looking at how to maximise this. Currently, we offer Polish nationals a number of routes to take employment or self-employment in the UK. In particular through our Work Permits system which is a fair and transparent way of ensuring that UK employers have access to overseas workers to meet the needs of the UK economy. Moreover the European Community Association Agreement with Poland provides a right of establishment in the EU, including the UK, for Polish nationals who wish to run a business here.

Free Movement of Capital

11. The EU has agreed in principle to a transition period of 7 years on the purchase of land and 5 years on the purchase of secondary residences for candidate countries seeking concessions. This has been agreed with Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Malta. The Poles are officially still seeking an 18-year transition period on the purchase of land. But we have heard the new Government may be preparing to reduce this much closer to 10 years with a view to closing the chapter quickly and that this will not apply to purchase of land for investment purposes. This would be a major step forward.

Tax

12. The Poles have requested transition periods on introducing VAT on books (which we can accept) and raising tobacco duty to EU levels. We understand their position on tobacco - raising duty will be unpopular and encourage smuggling through Poland's Eastern border - but tobacco smuggling is also a significant problem for the UK. To address this, we have been seeking to raise the EU minimum rate (ours is one of the highest in the EU). This was agreed at Coreper on 30 October. Poland is not the only candidate to want transition periods and we are not the only Member State with concerns. As the candidates' western neighbours, Germany or Austria would be most effected by any transition periods. The Paymaster General's view is that we should oppose a transition period, but if Germany and Austria move, we should review our position. The Commission has proposed a 2-year transition period for Poland - in effect, what they are asking for. Given the agreement to raise the cash minimum, we may be able to consider short transition periods if they are accompanied by measures that target smuggling (eg a limit on the number of cigarettes an individual can export). .

Transport

13. Cabotage is the carrying out of haulage journeys that begin and end within one country by hauliers from a second country (eg Dutch hauliers doing a journey between Berlin and Bremen). Germany and Austria have called for a transition period on cabotage by candidate country hauliers in EU15 states: they fear that their road hauliers will be undercut. We will be pushing for as liberal a regime as possible. One solution may be to limit transition period to Germany and Austria, on the basis that this is almost exclusively a concern for countries bordering the EU. .

Twinning

14. The Foreign Secretary wrote to colleagues on 28 September, drawing attention to the importance of providing practical assistance to the Candidates through twinning. The UK is involved in bids for 12 Polish twinning projects in the 2001 round (of the 34 available); only Germany have bid for more. These bids were in areas such as Structural Funds, JHA and Agriculture. Competition is fierce. The Poles are expected to take decisions on Member State bids in the next 2 weeks. We are already involved in 18 twinning projects in Poland from previous rounds, several of which have recently been completed. There are 9 UK civil servants working as Pre-Accession Advisers in Poland.

The Future of Europe: Bringing Europe closer to its Citizens: a Polish/British contribution.

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1 November 2001



Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Michael, *cc SW DM JRO oia oia
RL
FC
press
OUP*

Call by Leszek Miller, Polish Prime Minister, 2 November

Leszek Miller is having talks and lunch with the Prime Minister on 2 November. There will be a joint door-step before lunch. Miller had a 45 minute meeting with the Foreign Secretary in Warsaw on 30 October.

Political Background

Miller's government is a coalition, dominated by his own Party (the Centre-Left SLD), which includes the small left-wing Union of Labour and the Peasant Party. The coalition has a secure majority and faces a deeply-divided opposition. Miller himself is now the dominant political figure in Poland, although President Kwasniewski, with whom he has not always seen eye-to-eye, will continue to have a significant role in foreign policy.

Miller's core objectives are to improve the economic situation and to secure Poland's place in the first wave of EU enlargement. He judges that both are essential to win a second term. He is also keen to establish himself quickly on the international scene - he visited Berlin on 24 October for talks with Schroeder who said the next wave of EU enlargement must include Poland.

Objectives

The main objectives of this visit will be to discuss EU enlargement, related economic matters, and international issues, especially terrorism and Russia. Miller is not a details man. He prefers to set the strategic agenda and rely on others for detailed implementation. So, while he will be well-briefed on the big picture, he is not at ease with detailed discussions of specific EU dossiers, for example.

EU

EU enlargement will be the central topic. The Prime Minister should reassure Miller that we remain keen supporters of Polish first-wave entry. But it is up to them to win their place. Under the Buzek Government Poland fell behind. Miller's team now has an opportunity to progress quickly. We will do what we can to help: we will look positively at



new Commission proposals that offer Poland help on taxation and we will work for a liberal EU position on transport. But on pharmaceutical patents we have gone as far as we can and hope the Poles can close the company law chapter soon. Miller will want a bilateral commitment from the UK on free movement of Polish workers, ideally that we will make a statement when we sign the Accession Treaty about limiting our restrictions on workers to the minimum 2-year period. The Prime Minister might signal that we will be as helpful as we can without commitment.

We have agreed a joint paper on the Future of Europe with the Poles. The Prime Minister might ask Miller about the state of debate on Europe in Poland, as the recent elections saw a swing away from pro-EU parties.

Economy

Miller's domestic preoccupation. Growth is currently only 2%, unemployment is over 16% and the Government faces a budget deficit of 10-11% of GDP (without remedial action). We are already offering assistance on developing public-private partnerships. The Prime Minister could also stress the advantages of labour market flexibility.

Miller wants more British investment. Britain is the 5th largest investor (France is the largest). President Kwasniewski mentioned visiting London to promote Poland when the Prime Minister met him in Warsaw. Miller may also ask about access to the UK labour market (eg more work permits). The Prime Minister might flag up the Home Secretary's Highly Skilled Migrants Entry Programme, and offer to share details of this and other new migration policies as they emerge.

Afghanistan

Poland is firmly behind the current military action. Miller will want to hear about the Prime Minister's visit to the Middle East and his thoughts on next steps. The Prime Minister should welcome any concrete support Miller can offer (the Poles have already made informal offers of support to the US). He should also update Miller on our national measures and planned EU actions in counter-terrorism policy. President Kwasniewski is chairing a meeting of Central European leaders in Warsaw on terrorism on 6 November. We are in touch separately about a message from the Prime Minister for the meeting.

Regional

Miller will be keen to talk about Russia. He wants closer economic and political relations but not at the expense of Poland's security interests. He will be keen to explore areas for enhanced co-operation with Russia. The stability of the Ukraine is also a key Polish strategic interest. The Prime Minister might mention the success of the ongoing trilateral co-operation between us, Poland and Ukraine.



NATO


The Poles favour a big enlargement including the Baltic States. The Prime Minister could reiterate that it is too early to take decisions far ahead of the November 2002 Prague Summit. Miller might also ask about potential Russian NATO membership: our line is that it should not be ruled out but is a long way off. Meantime we should make a step-change in the relationship.

Bilateral

Miller will expect the Prime Minister to lobby for Gripen - latest generation technology with an offset package would create new jobs. He might also mention the planned investment by a consortium led by Rotch Energy in the Gdansk Refinery, which requires the new Government's approval.

Miller has been impressed by the Prime Minister's electoral success and regards the Labour Party as the source of most innovative social democratic thinking in Europe. So he will probably raise SLD/Labour Party links.

... I enclose media points for the doorstep, the report of the Foreign Secretary's meeting
... with Miller on 30 October, a scene-setter, a pen portrait of Miller, a checklist, and background briefing.

Yours age,


(Mark Sedwill)
Private Secretary

Michael Tatham Esq
10 Downing Street

From: Stephen Wall
Date: 1 November 2001

PRIME MINISTER

cc: Jonathan Powell
Alastair Campbell
Jeremy Heywood
David Manning
Roger Liddle
Michael Tatham
Sir Richard Wilson
Sir Nigel Sheinwald
Hon Michael Pakenham
Martin Donnelly

**MEETING WITH THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER: 2 NOVEMBER:
EU ISSUES**

Enlargement

The Poles have closed 18 of the 29 chapters which are open in the enlargement negotiations. This puts them eighth out of the ten countries likely to be in a first wave. They are back markers.

The Poles think that the world owes them a place in the first wave because of history. They are also stubborn negotiators. For understandable domestic reasons, they are tempted to hold back on settling difficult issues, like free movement of people and land purchase, until they see the size of the EU's cheque on the CAP and the Structural Funds. The danger for them is that if all the other candidates are meanwhile settling, the Poles will find themselves either having to try to delay the whole enlargement (not easy if countries ranging from Cyprus to Hungary are battering at the door) or settle for the terms which the other candidates will already have negotiated. So our main message to Miller has to be

of our strong support for Polish entry coupled with advice to stick to the road map and to settle chapters now rather than wait until the endgame.

Miller will no doubt set out his own very real difficulties: he does not have an overall majority in his parliament and has had to have the Peasants party in his coalition. Unemployment is running at 16%. The potential budget deficit this year could rise as high as 10% of GDP.

Against this background, I doubt if Miller will find general statements of political support quite enough. He will want to use his visit to make progress on some of the specific areas of difficulty between Poland and the UK in the enlargement negotiations. These are primarily:

- (i) Free movement of workers. There is a deal on the table which other candidates can accept whereby there would be no freedom of movement for two years. Thereafter, existing member states could limit freedom of movement for three years with a possibility of a further two years on top of that for any member state that has particular difficulties. The Poles are looking, as a price of acceptance, for statements from as many member states as possible that they would open their borders after the minimum two years. The Scandinavians and the Dutch have given that assurance. We have not. Even the Germans do not really expect an influx of Polish workers. Nor do we. But we have not felt very brave *vis-à-vis* British public opinion. If you felt able to say that in the circumstances that exist now you believe that we should be able to allow freedom of movement after two years, that would be a political plus. We could always review the situation nearer the time if necessary.

- (ii) Pharmaceuticals. We have reached a deal with the other candidates (including those who have large pharmaceutical industries) designed to protect intellectual property rights of our own pharmaceutical producers. The Poles refuse to accept this. In particular, they want to limit the application of so-called Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPCs) which were introduced in the EU in the 1990s to extend the patent life of pharmaceuticals. UK, France and Italy have been saying to the Poles that they must accept the deal on offer (and accepted by) the other candidates. This is not an area where we should compromise.

- (iii) Tobacco duty. The Poles want a transition period so that they do not have to raise their duties on tobacco to EU levels straightaway. We have resisted, fearing tobacco smuggling. Germany and Austria take the same position (with rather more justification given their geographical proximity). This week, the EU has agreed to raise its own minimum rate of tobacco duty. This gives us a bit of flexibility. So you can say to Miller that, in the light of the EU agreement, we are prepared to look again at this issue provided that any transition period is accompanied by measures that seriously target smuggling.

- (iv) Transport. Germany and Austria have called for a transition period on cabotage by candidate country road hauliers in the EU15. They fear that their road hauliers will be undercut if the Poles can take on haulage business hitherto reserved to their own nationals. Our own DTLR have been nervous about the possible impact of a more liberal regime on our own domestic market. This is frankly knee-jerk protectionism. The

Polish haulage industry is notoriously inefficient and no Polish haulier is going to be able to compete with UK hauliers for business within the UK. So, if Miller raises this issue, you can say that we want a liberal regime.

In sum, we should come out of the meeting having stood firm on pharmaceuticals but having shown willingness to move on free movement of people, transport and tobacco duties.

CAP and Structural Funds

Negotiations with the Poles and other candidates on the CAP will start next year under the Spanish Presidency and may be a show-stopper. The Poles (who have a quarter of their population in agriculture) want full access to direct payments, the payments to farmers which compensate them for loss of market support regimes. If they got this from the word go, it would break the financial ceilings agreed at Berlin. We want transition periods, ie that the Poles do not get direct payments for a number of years, during which time we would hope to negotiate a CAP reform package that would diminish the prevalence of direct payments within the CAP overall. Our scenario has always been:

- End 2002: conclude enlargement negotiations.
- By mid-2003: agree on CAP reform.
- 2004: candidates join the EU.

This now looks optimistic because of French opposition to early moves on CAP reform and Commission cold feet. We may, therefore, end up having a massive negotiation on CAP reform, Structural Funds and the abatement when the Berlin ceilings come due for review in 2005. But none of this changes our message to the Poles, which is that direct payment from day one are unaffordable. There will have to be transition periods and the longer term solution is radical CAP reform, which will be in their overall interest provided that it is equitable as between all member states, given that it will reduce costs to consumers and tax payers.

The Poles are eligible for about 1 billion euros worth of aid before enlargement. The kind of Structural Fund package they will get after enlargement will not fall due until the post-Berlin negotiations in 2005, by which time we hope they will be members. If Miller asks about Poland's Structural Fund expectations, we can say that after enlargement Poland will qualify for Objective 1 funding. Some sort of wind-down deal will have to be done for countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece, who are significant beneficiaries now. But the balance of funding should clearly be tilted radically towards the new, poorer member states. You may need to make clear that, while we favour reallocation, we do not favour significant increases in the overall budget and certainly no increase in the overall budget ceiling.

Future of Europe

We organised a joint seminar in London on the Future of Europe between ourselves and the last Polish government. The result is the attached joint

/ Polish/British paper, which we kept in play through the elections so that you could promulgate it with Miller. Our press office will be giving out copies (it pretty much endorses our view of the future development of the EU) and it would be good if you could refer to it in your doorstep with Miller.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Shan' or 'Shan Wall', with a stylized, looping initial.

STEPHEN WALL

Bringing Europe closer to its Citizens: a Polish/British contribution.

1. Our major challenges are to keep an enlarged Europe functional and raise social acceptance for European institutions. There is a need for better governance. Civil societies change at a global scale, and governments and supra-national institutions lag behind.
2. The European Union needs a clear mission statement, an answer to the question of why Europeans need the EU. The achievements of the post-war integration of Europe are today being taken for granted. We should aim for an EU that delivers real benefits to the people of Europe, addressing the priorities they want addressed; and does so in a way that has their consent and support.
3. Institutional changes should serve policy goals and strengthen the legitimacy of the institutions. Discussion should not begin with rigid concepts. The four topics identified at Nice are a good point of departure. Further topics are being debated. All the Nice topics are inter-linked and cannot be discussed in separation. The peoples of Europe, in the member states and the applicant countries, should be fully involved in this debate.
4. The EU's underlying principles should be efficiency, legitimacy, and transparency. The next IGC should consider how to simplify the EU Treaties and make them better understood by ordinary people.
5. A final division of competencies between the EU and its member states is not possible or desirable. It must not put limits on the future development of the Union. What is desirable is to establish what is best done at European level and what should be done at national level, and improve the mechanisms to give effect to these principles.
6. The European Union is a law-based community. This law has to be made more comprehensible and accessible to the citizens. Redundant laws should be abolished. The acquis should be kept under constant review. There could be merit in this being conducted by a Chamber drawn from national parliaments. National MPs would thus be more closely involved in shaping and monitoring EU policies. MEPs should be more closely involved with national parliaments.

7. Many citizens of Europe feel alienated from the EU's institutions. This problem equally concerns all institutions of representative democracy. A goal of EU policy makers should be to enhance a sense of belonging (of the citizens) and responsibility (of the politicians and officials). The language of European integration needs clarity, since the language itself is a major source of alienation.
8. Greater efficiency can be achieved through:
- putting into practice the principles of good governance;
 - well-balanced deregulation;
 - extension of the scope of QMV
 - redefinition of the role of the Presidency, e.g. by introducing 'team presidencies';
 - streamlining the European Commission and strengthening its independence.
9. Legitimacy can be strengthened through:
- Enhancing the role of the European Council - Europe's democratically elected leaders - in setting the EU's strategic agenda
 - Full respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
 - establishment of a chamber composed of national MPs to monitor subsidiarity;
 - delivering what the people of Europe want – more and better jobs, enhanced prosperity, safety from terrorism, a cleaner environment, etc
 - improving the decision-making capacity of the Council of Ministers.
10. Transparency can be increased by:
- using clear and simple language about Europe
 - making as many EU documents as possible available to the public
 - the Council taking legislative decisions in public.
11. Britain and Poland will work together, and with other European partners, to build a modern EU for the 21st century on these lines.

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From: Michael Tatham
Date: 1 November 2001

PRIME MINISTER

cc: Jonathan Powell
Stephen Wall
David Manning
Roger Liddle
Tim Livesey

MEETING AND LUNCH WITH POLISH PRIME MINISTER

You have two and a half hours with Leszek Miller tomorrow: talks, doorstep with media (short statements each, no questions) and lunch. You'll need to greet Miller at the door. Stephen, Roger and I will be with you for the meeting and Jonathan will join us for the lunch. Miller understands English but does not speak it with confidence and will use an interpreter.

We had initially planned for these talks to take place in Sedgefield and be combined with a constituency visit. Miller is not at all put out at the change of plan (necessitated by this week's travel) but he may mention this.

We have cultivated Miller carefully while he was in opposition (you saw him briefly in the House last year after a PMQs). We need to invest a lot in this relationship (hence 2½ hours today) – when Poland accedes it will have as many votes in the Council as Spain. So we have done well to get Miller here early. Apart from (inevitably) Germany, this is his first foreign visit since taking up office. Michael Pakenham is building up a strong personal relationship with Miller – it would help him if you could mention to Miller that you know Michael well and think highly of him.

Miller's main priority will be EU enlargement on which Stephen has done a separate note. He will also be looking for a read-out from you on terrorism (the military campaign and your recent travels). The Poles are solidly part of the coalition – they are making the right noises politically and have offered military support (chemical/biological teams and a demining platoon). They are also associating themselves with EU anti-terrorist efforts. The Polish President has organised a Conference on terrorism for the Central and East European states next week. We are arranging for you to send a message.

The Poles retain an Eastward focus despite their EU ambitions. They are concerned that EU membership should not close down their commercial and other links with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. And they worry about finding

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- 2 -

themselves on the edge of a new dividing line in Europe. Miller would be interested in hearing your assessment of Putin. We are doing some trilateral projects with Poland and Ukraine (FCO money to pay for Polish experts to advise Ukraine) which you can point to as evidence of our commitment to helping Ukraine and avoiding new dividing lines etc.


Two commercial interests to mention. Gripen (BAES/Saab) is bidding against the US F16 in a Polish tender for fighter aircraft. As well as Gripen's technical merits, you can point up the interoperability arguments: the Hungarians have already plumped for Gripen and there is a good chance the Czechs will do so.

And Rotch Energy are leading an international consortium ready to invest over \$1 billion in the Gdansk oil refinery. Final approval for the deal is awaited from the Polish Government.

For the doorstep you only need to say a few words covering:

- Welcoming Miller to London
- Warmth of the bilateral relationship, evidenced by Miller's visit so early in his term of office
- Shoulder to shoulder on fighting terrorism
- Strong support for EU enlargement on the timescale agreed at Gothenberg. UK and Poland already working together on EU issues (joint paper on bringing Europe closer to its citizens). Extensive programme of assistance for Poland's EU accession preparations.

Miller is a big fan of the Beatles. Fiona has arranged an inspired present for him – a copy of the lavish new Beatles anthology, personally inscribed by Paul McCartney. Miller will be chuffed. For maximum effect, you should hand this over personally at the end of the lunch.



MICHAEL TATHAM

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CHECKLIST FOR MILLER MEETING

EU enlargement

- Strong support for Polish membership. Hope to see Poland in first wave in 2004. That will require a determined Polish effort.
- Stick to roadmap. Settle chapters now, not in end-game. Cannot allow perception to take root that you are slipping behind others.
- **Free movement of workers:** difficult issue for both of us domestically. But if current conditions stay unchanged, would be inclined to allow freedom of movement in respect of UK after 2 years.
- **Pharmaceuticals:** do not see any scope for compromise.
- **Tobacco duty:** prepared to look again at this provided any transition period accompanied by tough Polish measures to combat smuggling.
- **Road haulage:** favour a liberal regime.

CAP reform/Structural funds

- **CAP reform:** direct payments from day one unaffordable. Will have to be transition periods. Long-term answer is radical and equitable CAP reform, reducing costs to consumers and taxpayers.
- **Structural funds:** do not favour increases in overall budget. But clearly balance of funding should tilt significantly to new member states.

Terrorism/Afghanistan

- Value your practical and political support. Europe and NATO need to remain solid and united even (especially) when going gets tough.

Russia/Ukraine

- Importance of engaging with Putin.
- Ukraine a big challenge for EU. Welcome our cooperation on joint assistance projects.

Commercial

- Strong support for Gripen. Excellent product. Powerful case on interoperability grounds.
- Rotch Energy investment in Gdansk oil refinery.

1 November 2001



London SW1A 2AH

Dear Michael,

Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism, 6 November

The Polish President Kwasniewski is hosting a conference in Warsaw on 6 November, for Heads of State and Government of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The aim is to provide a forum to denounce the 11 September terrorist attacks and to consider a range of practical measures to fight terrorism. These include financial, customs and intelligence co-operation.

The Prime Minister was invited, but is unable to attend. The US President is sending a message of support (via videolink) to the Conference. A message from the Prime Minister to Kwasniewski would play well in Warsaw, and would be read out in the Conference. I attach a draft message.

Yours ever,

(Mark Sedwill)
Private Secretary

Michael Tatham Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KWASNIEWSKI

President Aleksander Kwasniewski

I would like to offer you my full support in your conference on 6 November in Warsaw, on combating terrorism.

The terrible events of 11 September were a direct attack on the freedoms and values we all share. Thousands died that day. Amongst them were hundreds of citizens of European states.

The nations of Europe have responded with resolution. There is no doubt of our determination to stand and work together, alongside the United States, to defeat the scourge of international terrorism.

We need an effective Europe-wide response. The European Union has adopted a far-reaching package of measures. I welcome the decision of others to associate themselves with these measures, so as to maximise their effectiveness.

No-one has suffered more from the actions of the Taliban than the people of Afghanistan. Our priority will soon be to help in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The European Union has risen to this challenge – 316 million euros of aid has been pledged in the past year. We will work hard with the Afghan people and the UN to build a stable Afghanistan.

Your conference will send a very important signal that Europe is united across the broadest possible front. I applaud this initiative and send my very best wishes for a successful occasion.

*[Anjoum Noorani
CNWED, 270 2364]*

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British Embassy
WarsawFrom the Ambassador
Michael PakenhamAleje Róż No. 1
00-556 WarszawaTel.: (0048-22) 6281001-5
ext. 4211

Fax: (0048-22) 6217161

e-mail: info@britishembassy.pl

25 October 2001

Roger Liddle Esq
Policy Unit
No.10 Downing Street
London

By faxlock

Dear Roger,

PRIME MINISTER/LESZEK MILLER: POLISH ECONOMY

1. In the margins of a breakfast meeting today with the British Chamber of Commerce (a considerable coup for us), Leszek Balcerowicz emphasised to me how much he hoped that in their meeting next week the Prime Minister would be able to impress some economic realities on Miller.
2. As you know, Balcerowicz has for the past twelve years been one of the leaders - indeed, fathers - of the Polish "economic miracle". After two spells as Finance Minister and leader of the Freedom Union in Government, he became President of the National Bank last autumn. He remains the key economic figure, at least until Marek Belka, his replacement at the Finance Ministry, gets up a head of steam behind his own approach. Balcerowicz is not a political friend of Miller: different Parties; different histories; different mindsets. His determination to squeeze inflation out of the Polish economy and lay the basis for long term growth, even at the expense of excessively high interest rates and short term economic pain, have earned him a good deal of criticism across the left and among some of Miller's own people. So attributing a message to Balcerowicz will not mean a warm reception by the present Government. If anything, the opposite. Nonetheless, he does know his economic onions, and he is widely respected in Poland, and abroad.

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3. We shall be offering further advice on how best to handle Miller, early next week. But I thought I would drop you this note now so that you and Michael Tatham can reflect on how – if at all – the Prime Minister wished to play this sort of card. The reason for doing so, without Balcerowicz's name attached, is of course that the recipe is, in Poland's present circumstances, very sensible. The main bone of contention is not among the points below: Balcerowicz's commitment to driving inflation down and keeping it there, against the Miller/Belka wish to see cuts in very high real interest rates, a decision which falls to the independent Monetary Policy Council, chaired by one Leszek Balcerowicz. I do understand, however, that in contrast to a majority of his Council colleagues, Balcerowicz has already pronounced in favour of big cuts eg four or even five points.
4. Balcerowicz's basic message, which he hoped Miller would receive at No.10, runs as follows:
- i. Structural reforms remain essential for Poland. The new leadership must think in terms of the medium and long term, encouraging the economy to grow steadily.
 - ii. These reforms must include reform of the labour market – perhaps his key message for Miller just at present – and continued privatisation. It is crucial to cater for the large influx to the labour market of the product of the 1980s - baby boom years. Balcerowicz argues that had the proper policies been put in place in 1993 (when he was in opposition and Miller was part of the then SLD Government) then unemployment would not now be at 16% but at 7%.
 - iii. PPP has an important part to play in Poland (I have followed up with the Treasury your pointers on bringing a team out here in December). Poland must drop the "socialist myth" that infrastructure must be reserved to the public sector.

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- iv. More competition is crucial, and the Government cannot afford to create new monopolies, notably in the energy sector.
- v. Decisions to allow early EU enlargement must not be deferred for "secondary economic reasons". The message must go from all leaders – EU and candidate countries – that accession will be good for business and for growth, in addition to the historical/moral dimension.

Yours ever

Michael

Michael Pakenham

Cc: Michael Tatham Esq, Policy Adviser to PM, No.10
Sir Stephen Wall, No.10
Sir John Ramsden, Head/CNWED, FCO
Creon Butler Esq, Chief Economist, FCO

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Date: 25 October 2001

cc: DHM

Monika Gadzala
Bruce Bucknell, CNWED

Michael Davenport

BALCEROWICZ AT BPCC BREAKFAST

1. In the end, a bit of a coup for the Chamber (despite the mix-up over arrangements and Balcerowicz's initial outburst). A splendid turnout, and lots of good questions. It would be helpful to have a short account of Balcerowicz's main points, to which the following might be added:
 - Over breakfast beforehand he told me in sharper terms than he used publicly how opposed he was to the proposed tax on capital. This would cut down on growth for purely short-term reasons. It was also unjust, impacting much more on the poor than on the rich.
 - He dismissed as fairly idle chatter the current talk about Poland joining the Euro even before the EU. His deputy, Bratkowski, who was making much of the running on this, was an excellent economist, but it was not in the realm of political reality. In any case, it was far from clear what attitude the EU itself would take to such ambitions. As you remember, in his public comments he spoke of a minimum transition period to the Euro of two years after Poland achieved membership.
2. I am writing separately to London on what he said about the Prime Minister's line with Miller on the economy.

Michael Pakenham
Michael Pakenham

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DHM

UK VISIT BY LESZEK MILLER, 2 NOVEMBER

1. I had another meeting this morning with Iwinski (who later today will be nominated as the Minister in Miller's office responsible for all the international dossiers) and Biszryga, clearly outranked. I underlined the need, now we have a firm date, to get the logistics sorted out. I needed the name and contact details of someone in Miller's office with whom we could deal directly, and with whom No. 10 can be in touch, as necessary. Iwinski promised to let me have this later today.

2. We covered a number of detailed points:

- i) The programme, as set out in our earlier paper which Miller approved, still seems a good working basis. The themes are fine, although they may in the end need some tweaking;
- ii) Miller will be accompanied by a very small team (three or four at the most) of whom Iwinski will be a part;
- iii) As for the necessary interpretation, Iwinski suggested that we use Magda Fitas, with whom Miller had worked in the past and who had the confidence of everyone including the Embassy. I said I would explore this. Magda is, on the face of it, a very good choice, though London will have views. A few hours later I saw Magda at the President's Palace, who confirmed that she had been "booked" by Miller. She thought that the Polish side would pay for her and that she would travel on his plane;
- iv) Iwinski confirmed that Miller plans to fly direct by Polish aircraft to Teeside Airport (the DA will want to touch base with his contacts about the details), and to return to Warsaw by around 2000 hours that evening;

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- v) There would certainly be a small television crew on board (three people maximum). We would need to discuss media arrangements, including a possible pool from London of Polish representatives, plus anyone else No. 10 wished to organise;
- vi) As for the official announcement of the visit, the Polish side are keen not to have it swamped by the pre-publicity for the Miller/Cimoszewicz visit to Berlin on 29 October. Given the Straw visit here on 30 October, this seems to point to a formal announcement the following day i.e. Wednesday 31 October. We need to agree a brief form of words.

3. This is going reasonably smoothly. We do need an admin contact in Miller's office, and we also must establish with No. 10 how much they wish to do directly or through us. I mentioned the possibility of using MFA Protocol to Iwinski, but he did not bite, perhaps knowing that Miller had already told me he preferred to deal directly with us and not through the MFA. Nonetheless, we need to find some way of keeping the latter informally in the loop.

MP

Michael Pakenham

22 October 2001

Cc: DA
Michael Davenport
Dominic Micklejohn
Alicia Clyde
John Ramsden, CNWED) by Airtech
Michael Tatham, No. 10)

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Dec 9/01

22 October 2001

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Jerzy,

Thank you for all the help and co-operation that you have given me in the last four years; our two countries now enjoy close relations as never before.

Your legacy is clear. In the last four years Poland has taken several important steps towards a new place at the centre of European affairs. As Prime Minister, you successfully led Poland into NATO. In your relationship with the United States, you have injected new life into the transatlantic dialogue. And you have overseen real progress in Poland's preparations for EU membership. I look forward to seeing Poland take its place at the European Union table soon.

I know that you will share the wish to see your successors complete the task that you have started. I send you my best wishes for the future.

Yours ever
Tony

His Excellency Professor Jerzy Buzek

unofficial translation

PRIME MINISTER
OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND
JERZY BUZEK

Warsaw, 18 October 2001

Dear Prime Minister, Dear Tony,

The four-year term of my office is coming to an end. Let me, on this occasion, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Poland and on my own behalf, extend sincere thanks for your co-operation during this period.

Let me take this opportunity to thank you again for your support for Poland's membership of NATO and her early accession to the European Union. I can recall with satisfaction your genuine interest in matters linking Poland and Great Britain, which you have demonstrated on several occasions, also during our talks.

I hope that the Polish participation in European integration institutions will contribute to breaking the last barriers in our contacts, as well as to successful development of our bilateral relations.

Please accept my assurances of my highest consideration.

Jerzy Buzek

His Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, MP
Prime Minister
of The United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
London

No need for a reply
(PM has already written
to Buzek on his departure
from office).

file

Michael
Will you confirm copy?
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MS/Ken
CC/SSW
MO
ME
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SW
CCMT
JP
DM
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Press

PREZES RADY MINISTRÓW
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ

JERZY BUZEK

Warszawa, 18 października 2001 r.

Wspaniały Panie Premierze, Drogi Tony.


Czteroletnia kadencja kierowanego przeze mnie rządu dobiega końca.

Z tej okazji pragnę, w imieniu własnym oraz całego rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, złożyć Panu podziękowania za naszą współpracę w tym okresie.

Przy tej okazji jeszcze raz dziękuję za pańskie poparcie dla członkostwa Polski w NATO oraz szybkiego wstąpienia Polski do Unii Europejskiej. Z satysfakcją wspominam szczere zainteresowanie sprawami łączącymi Polskę i Wielką Brytanię, którego dowody okazywał Pan wielokrotnie również podczas naszych rozmów.

Liczę, że polski udział w europejskich instytucjach integracyjnych przyczyni się do zniesienia ostatnich barier w naszych kontaktach, jak również do pomyślnego rozwoju naszych stosunków dwustronnych.

Proszę przyjąć wyrazy mojego wysokiego szacunku.



Jego Ekszelencja

Pan Tony Blair

Premier Zjednoczonego Królestwa

Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii Północnej

Londyn

0044 20 72702152

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DHM

*Michael T.**Plse let me know
what's happening on this*

MILLER VISIT TO UK

*MAT**cc: JPB**DM**KK**Press**ELV**20**10*

1. When I called again on Miller today, he confirmed that he would be delighted (see my telegram) to accept the invitation to Sedgefield on 2 November. He asked that we now start to fix the details with Iwinski, who would be the senior official in his office dealing with international affairs, and with Party matters (something of a mixed blessing, though at least he speaks decent English and will faithfully reflect Miller's views).
2. He asked whether I would be there in Sedgefield, and I said this would depend on the Prime Minister; I did not expect to be there. With a very broad smile he said that his Ambassador would certainly not be there.
3. I will try and touch base with Iwinski tomorrow. A meeting will be needed early next week, to tie down the logistics, along the lines of arrangements already discussed with No. 10. We also need to give thought to media handling, the timing of any announcement, and how best to play this important event in Poland. For the moment, it should remain classified, not least for the obvious security reasons.

Michael Pakenham

18 October 2001

Cc: Michael Tatham, No. 10
John Macgregor, Director Wider Europe
Dominic Meiklejohn

*David M**1 hour.*

Kate Garvey and I are taking forward. There'll be 3 elements to the visit:

- talks
- working lunch
- constituency visit.

Michael Pakenham

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MT
cc: JPB
DM
KK
Press
ELV

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Michael Pakenham


18 October 2001

Cc: Michael Tatham, No. 10
John Macgregor, Director Wider Europe
Dominic Meiklejohn

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Message from the Prime Minister to the outgoing Polish Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek

...October 2001



Jerzy Buzek
Warsaw

Thank you for all your help and co-operation that you have given me in the last four years; our two countries now enjoy close relations as never before.

Your legacy is clear. In the last four years Poland has taken several important steps towards a new place at the centre of European affairs. As Prime Minister, you successfully led Poland into NATO. In your relationship with the United States, you have injected new life into the transatlantic dialogue. And you have overseen real progress in Poland's preparations for EU membership. I look forward to seeing Poland take its place at the European Union table soon.

I know that you will share the wish to see your successors complete the task that you have started. I send you my best wishes for the future.

[Bruce Bucknell]
[CNWED]
[7270 2362]

12 October 2001



R: slb
DM

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Michael

Polish Elections, 23 September: Message to the outgoing Polish Prime Minister

Mark Sedwill wrote to you on 21 September, covering a draft letter from the Prime Minister to the new Prime Minister of Poland, Leszek Miller. This issued on 24 September.

The new government has now been formed. It is a coalition of three parties, and (as expected) Miller is the Prime Minister. The Deputy Prime Minister has already written to the new Polish Deputy Prime Minister, and the Foreign Secretary is writing to both the incoming (Cimoszewicz) and outgoing (Bartoszewski) Foreign Ministers.

I enclose a draft letter from the Prime Minister to the outgoing Polish Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek, as I promised in Mark's letter of 21 September.

Your web
Simon

(Simon McDonald)
Principal Private Secretary

Michael Tatham Esq
10 Downing Street

12 October 2001

MATRIX



f a:slb
DM

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

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Your ever
Simon

(Simon McDonald)
Principal Private Secretary

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10 Downing Street

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[Bruce Bucknell]
[CNWED]
[7270 2362]

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Date: 9 October 2001

cc: Michael Davenport
Dominic Meiklejohn
Peter Harris
Joanna Hanson
By faxlock:
John Macgregor, Director Wider
Europe
Michael Tatham, No.10

DHM

CALL ON LESZEK MILLER, 9 OCTOBER

1. I had fifteen minutes today one-on-one with the Prime Minister-Designate, passing Oleksy and Janik as I was going in. While he has taken on a new air of gravitas, there were still lots of jokes and smiles; he also looked very tired.
2. I started by thanking him for his message to the Prime Minister yesterday which had been much appreciated. He said he meant every word about strengthening cooperation with the UK. I then gave him the attached proposal for a programme for 2 November in the UK. In principle, it appealed very much but he was still deeply worried that he would not be able to get away. He expected the Government to receive its vote of confidence by around 25 October. But his first need was to focus on all the domestic issues (budget, unemployment, lesser appointments, etc). He had foreseen using the long weekend of All Saints to get stuck into this. Hence his reluctance to commit to 2 November in Sedgefield. If it were not possible, what was the alternative?
3. I underlined once more the Prime Minister's wish to have the earliest possible opportunity to go over this important ground with him. The constituency visit would be far the best moment for this. Otherwise, we would look for another time, but if found it would have to be shorter, in London and therefore more hectic, and less satisfactory for both sides.
4. Miller said he should be able by the end of this week to let me have a firm answer, one way or the other. Meanwhile he would be grateful if I could keep this ball in the air. He would telephone me on Monday.
5. We also spoke briefly about terrorism and Afghanistan. He underlined his determination that Poland should play its full part, in support of the US and

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UK, and in direct action when/where necessary. We need have no doubts on that score. I highlighted our cooperation with the Poles across the board – both military, special services, and diplomatic contacts. He welcomed all this. His own plans to change the structure of the intelligence services would not affect on-the-ground cooperation. He was not going to interfere with this valuable work with us and the Americans. It was the management structure that needed alteration.

6. He also welcomed my references to working very closely with his key Ministers with foreign responsibilities, ie Cimoszewicz, Belka and Smajdzinski. This was exactly what he wanted.
7. All in all, friendly and forward-looking. But we need to wait a few more days before we can go firm on a meeting with the Prime Minister. When I am in London I will explore fall-back positions with No.10.

MP

Michael Pakenham

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OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER TO UK, FRIDAY 2 NOVEMBER

(All timings speculative)

- | | |
|------|---|
| 1130 | Arrive Sedgefield, Parliamentary Constituency of Tony Blair, near Durham |
| 1230 | Working meal in restaurant |
| 1400 | Continued talks |
| 1500 | Constituency visit to eg high tech factory, re-skilling centre, Secondary School EU Project |

Issues for discussion:

- i. Transatlantic relations, between new EU and US.
- ii. Security and counter-terrorism: to include European defence, NATO enlargement and bilateral cooperation.
- iii. Relations with Eastern neighbours, particularly Russia (to include Kaliningrad).
- iv. EU enlargement and accession negotiations – timing, respective positions, further consultations, UK support.
- v. Future of Europe exercise.
- vi. (If time allows) Balkans developments.
- vii. Bilateral trade and investment issues.
- viii. Respective approaches to management of Social Democrat parties in Europe, at start of 21st century, to include Party-to-Party links.



British Embassy
Warsaw

Chancery

Aleje Róż No. 1
00-556 Warszawa

Telephone: (0048-22) 6281001-5
Facsimile: (0048-22) 6217161

Chancery@Warsaw.mail.fco.gov.uk

<http://www.britishembassy.pl>

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Fax No.....: faxlock

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File ref.....:

Date.....: 9 October 2001

No. of Pages....: 4 in total

CNWED: Please ensure the following is passed to Michael Tatham @
No.10 and John Macgregor today. Thanks.

MX
ce. MB
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AR

File

0171 270 3514

From: Alex Ellis

Date: 5 October 2001

cc: PS

PS/Mr Hain

Dominic Meiklejohn, Warsaw (by fax)

Francis Campbell, No 10

John Bourne, Cabinet Office

Simon Featherstone, EUD(E)

Sir John Ramsden, CNWED

Julian King, UKRep

Enlargement Section, EUD(E)

FC
cc: RL
JSW
MT
JPO

Kim Darroch

ENLARGEMENT: POLAND

1. Poland will come to the fore at Ghent. Verhofstadt will want blessing for his messages when he visits Warsaw on 22 October. The background is uneasy - either a minority SLD government or a coalition which probably includes the Peasants' Party, who will make the Poles even tougher negotiators on CAP reference yields, hectareage, etc and more resistant to CAP reform. Meanwhile the Government will be trying to halve a deficit of 11% of GDP. Not the most auspicious circumstances in which to cut deals and buy off domestic interest groups in order for Poland to catch up with the front runners in terms of chapters closed (they have been caught up or overtaken by most of the Helsinki group) and make progress in implementation e.g. on the environment.
2. But there is an upside - a new government determined to drive towards early enlargement. Most likely HOSG will concentrate on that, and want Verhofstadt to go to Warsaw with a positive message.
3. We also need to prepare the Foreign Secretary for his visit a week later. But what can we offer, besides warm words? There are two chapters on which the Poles could move quickly to closure - company law and taxation - and over which we have some influence.
 - i. Taxation: the Poles want a two year transition period for raising their excise duty for cigarettes to the EU minimum rate. Almost every candidate has bid for a transition period (in some cases rather longer), and this is becoming a cause celebre, raised with us by every candidate, and most recently by Verheugen with the Foreign Secretary. We won't be able to kick it into the end game, if we are serious about the road map - tax is for this Presidency, and the candidates are getting edgy.

We, along with Germany and Austria, are the main opponents of a transition period. There are good technical arguments against one (risks of smuggling, protection of health), firmly advocated by the Paymaster General although Mr Hain clearly made some headway with her. But, as Roger Liddle noted after his visit to the Czech Republic, the political arguments point the other way. Rapidly rising prices are one of the main enlargement-related fears of electorates in the candidate countries, all of whom will vote on enlargement in referenda. And there are an awful lot of smokers in Eastern Europe. I am sending you separately a table quantifying the effect on

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cigarette prices in the candidates of moving to the EU minimum excise rate – 100% increase for Slovakia, 70% increases in Hungary and Czech Republic.

I doubt that our opposition to a transition period is sustainable; and we won't be able to sit on this issue until the end game. So should we make an early offer, and gain political credibility (slightly tarnished over FMOP, about to be more so if/when we end up supporting transition periods for road hauliers) and more besides (see below)? Or do we do our usual trick having the concession dragged out of us slowly?

I think we should offer a two year transition period, early, to all the candidates who have requested one. HMT Ministers will not like it and will want something in return. One possibility would be a proviso that the transition period will not be lengthened if the EU minimum excise rate increases between now and accession (as we hope it will). There is another possible deal, elsewhere in the negotiations.

- ii. Company Law: We should balance generosity on taxation by asking them to agree to the deal on the table on the protection of intellectual property rights for pharmaceuticals (on which only Poland is holding out), but rearranged in such a way as to give them cover to close the chapter without any significant new concession. This would have to be cleared with our industry, and with our remaining allies (France, maybe Italy). If balanced by an offer on tax, it might be enough for the Poles. If they pocket the tax offer but reject this one, I don't see much downside. Given the size of our industry's interests we are not going to budge much on company law.

4. If you and others agree, then we will have to decide how to take this forward. One possibility would be for the PM to signal at Ghent that we want to be creative where we can; and then prepare the Whitehall ground, with No 10's help, for the Foreign Secretary to be able to go Poland bearing a gift – with a price tag.

Alex Ellis

Alex Ellis
European Union Department (External)
WH243
Tel: 020-7270 2022

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MDDPAN 5123

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FM WARSAW

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 231

OF 281459Z SEPTEMBER 01

INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR, CABINET OFFICE, DEFRA, DTI

INFO IMMEDIATE EU ENLARGEMENT POSTS, EU POSTS, HM TREASURY, KIEV

INFO IMMEDIATE MINSK, MODUK, MOSCOW, NATO POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE WHIRL

SUBJECT: POLAND: A WEEK IN POLITICS

(Pw)

*✓ we shd try to
get closer & help.*

SUMMARY

1. Political scene still murky after election surprises. Much political manoeuvring, but to little effect so far. Parties drawing up battle lines for coalition talks next week.

DETAIL

2. Last weekend's election results surprised both the Parties and the pollsters. But at least Harold Wilson has been proved right. A week ago Leszek Miller and his SLD dominated the future. He had already announced the inner Cabinet, his Finance Minister-to-be Belka had set out the economic strategy, and a majority government was odds-on. A week later, 16 seats short of a mandate, he and his Party are frantically searching for a coalition or Parliamentary deal which will not throw their programme and Cabinet into disarray.

3. It is too soon to describe with confidence what went wrong, what caused the last-minute reverses, and how the future Polish Government - as yet unknown, though Miller as Prime Minister remains a safe bet - will perform. The current manoeuvring could last for several weeks yet. But some elements are already clear:

- It was a bad result for Poland.
- The political class stands rebuked by the voters.
- Frustration, apathy and bloodymindedness are widespread among all those untouched by the economic and political advances of the past decade.
- Parliament has lost a lot of established talent and experience (eg Prime Minister Buzek and ex-Foreign Minister Geremek); their replacements will not fill their shoes.

4. Miller met the Peasant Party, Law and Justice, and Samoobrona yesterday. He will meet the League of Polish Families today, and the Civic Platform on Monday. President Kwasniewski, who tells

PAGE 1

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his own staff he has no idea where it will all end, but who will play a crucial role in determining the outcome, also met the leaders of the Peasant Party, Samoobrona, Law and Justice, and the League of the Polish Families yesterday. So far the talks have covered operational points for the new Parliament, not coalition options. The possibility of another round of elections was also discussed with Kwasniewski. But there appears to be no support for that at present.

Options

5. Miller needs to win a vote of confidence in himself and his Government at the new Sejm's inaugural sitting by 19 October. And he wants to win it comfortably if he is to govern with authority. But there are no obvious or easy partners for SLD. The hard right Law and Justice Party and the extremists of the League of the Polish Families have ruled out cross-party co-operation, leaving:

- Civic Platform, the largest group in the Sejm after SLD and a motley collection of the centre-right: closest in terms of programme to SLD, and Miller's preference. In public the Platform has repeatedly ruled out joining a coalition with SLD, or supporting a minority government. In private, there may be scope for a deal or some Platform components may be brought to defect.

- Peasant Party (PSL): a previous uncomfortable SLD/PSL coalition has left a SLD averse to another. PSL has not ruled out a coalition, but has set tough conditions which run counter to some of SLD's plans. They will not want Belka at Finance, and their EU stance is highly unsound.

- Samoobrona/Self Defence, represented in the Sejm for the first time: ambivalent about joining a coalition, but essentially still recovering their breath from Sunday's surprise result.

Effect on the budget

6. Poland's state budget has a projected deficit of 3.5-4% of GDP this year. The new Government needs sooner rather than later to change economic and fiscal policy to stabilise the deficit and begin to correct it. No Party matches the SLD plan unveiled by Belka last week. The Civic Platform opposes the tax rises favoured by SLD. PSL supports the imposition of an import tax (opposed by SLD), to avoid seeing a rise in VAT on agricultural goods and produce. Samoobrona's policy is more extreme, arguing for constraints to the role of the independent Monetary Policy Council. But there is probably room for compromise all round.

EU Negotiations

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7. Four of the six Parties in the new Sejm have various degrees of reservation about Poland's EU accession. PSL's prime concern is a generous deal, which they doubt will happen, for Poland's farmers. Samoobrona is a work in progress. At the moment Lepper, the lead figure, is opposed but most people believe he can be bought off. On the hard/extreme right, the LPR is a lost cause, but Law and Justice redeemable at a price. The Civic Platform would be by far the most comfortable partner for SLD from an EU perspective: both favour Poland's speedy accession.

8. Further comment on EU angles follows next week.

PAKENHAM

YYYY

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file (SCO-in matrix).



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

10/24/01
et 1.

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 September 2001

Dear Leszek,

I offer you my warmest congratulations on your election victory. I have valued the excellent relationship we have developed in the Party framework and look forward to developing this further as you take over as Prime Minister of Poland. As you know, I hope you will be able to visit us soon.

As I said in Warsaw last autumn, the United Kingdom wants Poland in the European Union as soon as possible. At Gothenburg, the EU set an ambitious objective of seeing the first candidates join in time to participate in the 2004 European Parliament elections. This ambitious timetable leaves us all with no time to lose. Progress in the next few months will be important for Poland, as for all candidates, to show that you are ready for EU membership. We will do all we can to help your preparations.

The recent terrorist attacks on the USA were an attack on civilisation and I very much welcome your speedy condemnation of these outrages. I believe that it is vital for the world community to stand together against terrorism at this time. I hope you will join us, in the UN and other fora, in pushing for a concerted and united response to recent events. This is one of several security issues on which we must work together. And I shall certainly value our talks on

JC

relations with your Eastern neighbours, notably Russia but also other key countries in the region.

Yours ever
Tony

Mr Leszek Miller

21 September 2001

he



cc FAPS
EU/PS
(For Info)

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Michael,

Polish Elections, 23 September: Message from the Prime Minister

The Polish elections take place on Sunday, 23 September. Leszek Miller's SLD are far ahead in the polls and will win. The main uncertainty is whether they will have an overall majority in parliament. We should have a better idea of this early on 24 September.

In theory, the new government cannot assume office until it has won a vote of confidence in parliament. The new parliament is currently scheduled to meet on 22 October. Apart from the terrorist attacks on the United States – which Miller condemned in forceful terms on several occasions – the elections are also being overshadowed by a domestic financial crisis. The budget deficit is running at nearly 10%. Emergency spending cuts are needed. Miller's government will also be immediately faced with some tough decisions on the EU accession negotiations. President Kwasniewski will therefore be under pressure to convene parliament sooner, and quickly to appoint Miller as Prime Minister. This will be easier if Miller wins an overall majority.

... The uncertainty as to when Miller actually takes office is no reason to defer sending an early message of congratulations. I therefore enclose the text of a draft message to go from the Prime Minister on Monday, 24 September as soon as it is clear that Miller and the SLD have won. The message is not suitable for public release referring as it does to arrangements already in hand for Miller's visit. We suggest that the public line be that the Prime Minister has sent Miller a warm letter of congratulation, and looks forward to an early meeting.

We will write again with a message to the out-going Prime Minister Buzek (who will remain as interim Prime Minister) after the official results have been announced. I am copying this to Sir Stephen Wall.

Yours truly,
[Signature]

(Mark Sedwill)
Private Secretary

Michael Tatham Esq
10 Downing Street

SKP 21/9/01

Message of congratulations from Tony Blair to Leszek Miller

I offer you my warmest congratulations on your election victory. I have valued the excellent relationship we have developed in the Party framework and look forward to taking this forward as you take over as Prime Minister of Poland. As you know, I hope you will be able to visit us soon.

As I said in Warsaw last autumn, the United Kingdom wants Poland in the European Union as soon as possible. At Gothenburg, the EU set an ambitious objective of seeing the first candidates join in time to participate in the 2004 European Parliament elections. It was right that we did so – twelve years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time that we put behind us the divisions that scarred our continent for so much of last century. But this ambitious timetable leaves us all with no time to lose. Progress in the next few months will be important for Poland, as for all candidates, to show that you are ready for EU membership. We will do all we can to help your preparations.

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[Bruce Bucknell]

[CNWED]

[Tel: 7270 2362]



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

File
added to DCO
In Box
propt 1

From the Private Secretary

24 September 2001

Dear Patrick

**POLISH ELECTIONS: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH LESCHEK
MILLER**

The Prime Minister spoke briefly by telephone to Leschek Miller shortly after 1300 today.

The Prime Minister congratulated Miller on his party's election victory. It had been an impressive result. We looked forward, as soon as possible, to the UK and Poland working together as partners within the EU. In the meantime we would continue providing support to Poland's EU accession preparations. The Prime Minister said he hoped Miller would be able soon to visit the UK. His office would be in touch about dates. Miller thanked the Prime Minister for his call. He was very pleased with the result. He looked forward to visiting the UK soon ("maybe next month, maybe December").

Comment

This call gives the Embassy in Warsaw a peg to revert to Miller's office about the 2 November date we have provisionally offered for an inward visit.

I am copying this letter to Michael Pakenham (Warsaw) and Andrew Allberry (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

MICHAEL TATHAM

Patrick Davies
FCO

0044 20 72702152

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British Embassy
Warsaw

From the Ambassador
Michael Pakenham

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00-556 Warszawa

Tel.: (0048-22) 6281001-5
ext. 4211

Fax: (0048-22) 6217161
e-mail: info@britishembassy.pl

18 September 2001

Sir John Kerr
Permanent Under-Secretary
FCO

Dear John,

LESZEK MILLER: POLAND'S NEXT PRIME MINISTER

1. I am sending by telegram some thoughts on where Miller and the next Polish Government will come out in their domestic and external policies; I am also sending by telegram a brief pen-portrait of Miller himself. The enclosed paper covers in greater detail Miller's character and his likely handling of Poland over the next four years. The events of a week ago in America will increase the pressure on Miller, notably in handling the incipient budget crisis in the face of economic uncertainties elsewhere. On the crucial US test of "for us or against us", he will stand firmly by Washington's side.
2. I am indebted for much of this material to Robin Barnett, who will be returning to London next month, and to Simon Thomas, who has just left us for New York. Over the past three years this Embassy has made a particular effort, starting in John Macgregor's time, to cultivate the Opposition; and Robin and Simon have played a special part in that.
3. It is particularly good news that we already have plans for early contact between Miller and the Prime Minister. The Secretary of State's visit may be too brief to fit in a Miller contact, but we will do our best. Over the next few months, as the new Government here settles down, we will look for ways to put other Ministers in touch with their new Polish colleagues, in London or here.

Yours ever
Michael
Michael Pakenham

Cc: John Macgregor Esq, Director Wider Europe, FCO
Sir John Ramsden, Head/CNWED, FCO
Sir David Manning, No.10 Downing Street
Michael Tatham Esq, Senior Policy Adviser, No.10 Downing Street
Roger Liddle Esq, Policy Unit, No.10 Downing Street
HMAs: EU Posts
Washington
Moscow
UKDEL NATO

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POLAND'S NEXT PRIME MINISTER: MILLER THE MANSummary

1. An enigmatic ex-communist, Miller and his SLD Party now dominate Polish politics. They are respected more than loved, and need to prove themselves. Miller's style relies on low-key but wide-ranging control, helped by a group of trusted and long-time aides. His relations with President Kwansiewski will be key to how Poland and its external relations are run. No ideologue, his approach to policy squares largely with European social democracy. A tough operator, modern by Polish standards, he faces no present threats to his dominance. But the road ahead is strewn with rocks. The budget crisis will be his first big test, the EU negotiations are next in line, plus links to Russia. For the UK he offers a big dividend. And he thinks the same of us.

Detail

2. Leszek Miller will be the next Prime Minister of Poland after the elections on 23 September. He leads his political opponents by almost 40 points in the polls. His background, appearance and record do not explain to such dominance. And his character remains an enigma. A cynical opportunist, likely to revert to his communist roots? Or a genuine convert to social democracy? A Wizard of Oz, sheltering behind his screen of control? Or a self-confident strategist, with no need to wear his heart on his sleeve?

Miller's Background

3. In three words, non-descript and undistinguished. Born in 1946 in the centre of Poland (where he spent his early political years in Lodz), he was abandoned at an early age by his father – a sensitive issue, and Miller avoids mention of it. He went straight from school to an electrician's bench in a factory, and by the early 1970s had become active in the Party: for so many young so-called communists the only/best route to success in life. He was soon selected to work with the central Party Youth Movement, with others like Kwasniewski. This was the period of the reformer Gierek, and ideology had already been discarded in favour of survival in power. Miller showed no signs of dissent. No hard-liner, he was loyal to the Party even after the rise of Solidarity. By and large, he kept his head down.
4. Not a key figure in the Jaruzelski era of the 1980s, he eventually rose to be Party Secretary of a small region, joining the Polit-buro in 1988 just as Communism began to collapse. He participated in the 1989 Round Table Talks which returned democracy to Poland. Thereafter he co-founded, with Kwasniewski, the successor Social Democratic Group which evolved into the SLD. As its first Secretary-General, he proved a skilful organiser and got much credit for SLD's election win in 1993 (despite being implicated in

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a scandal over Communist Party funds). In the 1993-97 Government he served as Labour Minister, Head of the Cabinet Office and lastly as Interior Minister. He used the latter post to build a strong Party network loyal to himself, one of his tools in winning the leadership after SLD lost the 1997 election.

5. By the time the Buzek Government imploded this year he had become a dominant figure in Polish politics and the undoubted successor as Prime Minister; the man to whom most of Poland looks, mostly without much enthusiasm, to get them through the tough years ahead. But his life until now has left three big impressions: control, caution and some self-doubt owing to his lack of formal education.

Miller's Style

6. When asked about sports, he names "the sport of politics"; in truth his dominant interest, although he does dote on his granddaughter. His married life is happy and undemanding, with his only child, a son, undergoing training in the US (partly to try and get him away from some dubious business associates in Poland). Though no Mitterrand, he enjoys the company of pretty girls; and he scores very well among female voters. He has no deep intellectual bent, nor is he known to read widely; he remains a devoted fan of the Beatles. His personal appearance is always neat, his hair carefully arranged, and no hint of the traditional Polish moustache. His sharp sense of humour can make him good company when relaxed or with people he trusts. Like many Poles he has not fully caught up with political correctness. He has a fund of reasonably funny stories, some of which would be decided flops in the District of Columbia.
7. He is no natural orator, and still comes across as rather dry. But he has brushed up his presentation skills, and his delivery is now less wooden. He is particularly fond of interspersing his speeches – and conversation – with anecdotes, folksy and at times pungent. He continues to work on his English, with discreet help from us. He is respected, if not liked, by most Poles across the political spectrum. Crucially, even the voters who do not much like him now see him as a credible Prime Minister. But he is still capable of arousing strong antagonisms on the Right, especially among those who see him as just another reconstructed ex-Communist who has changed his policies but not his stripes. These harsh feelings are quickly reciprocated by Miller, who can bear a grudge with the best of them. Unlike Kwasniewski he is not a unifying figure and his personal style is not calculated to win over his opponents. Not that that seems to worry him much.

Miller's Beliefs

8. It is tempting to say he is not a man of principle, except for the accretion of power. But that is too pat. Apparently he has no guiding ideology, nor does he seem keen to project a vision of his own. After the collapse of Communism, he helped to rebuild his new Party on the centre-left, but with many attributes of a central-right group. His key dogma is the lack of dogma; he has great faith in Deng's colourless cat. Politics, in his view, is about power. There is no attraction nor opportunity in Opposition.

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9. Driven to define his approach, he would mention the following:

- greater fairness in society
- enlarged equality of opportunity
- the faster modernisation of Poland.

It is no coincidence that he has been so impressed by New Labour, and not merely because of electoral success. Getting out the vote, and keeping the Party together remain key interests. But the focus on problem-solving is just as important.

10. From this approach stems his support for EU membership: not because he is driven by old-style "European" ideals but because he sees clear and greater benefits for Poland and SLD by that route. He favours the market economy, while remaining nervous of the human costs of reforms. He wants his Party to be a broad church, since only then can an overall majority be achieved. But not so broad that he can readily accept the Church itself. Privately he is anti-clerical, though he pursues reasonable relations with the Church for fear of alienating a solid block of voters. In short, his beliefs are expressed in his policies. He has been cautious so far. Life itself as Prime Minister will drive him forward, and he will respond to rough weather with agility and determination. But he will not mind if bits of ideological baggage get lost overboard in the process.

Party Leader

11. Despite his now tender image, he can be a tough behind-the-scenes operator. His position in the party is strong, based on respect more than affection. He takes a keen interest in Party management, working to maximise control at all levels. He relies heavily on a close circle of advisers, many of them dating back with him to the youth movement. Key SLD positions are also filled by his people whom he uses – especially Secretary-General Janik – to do some of his political dirty work; he is ready, however, when necessary to enter the fray himself and impose his will. He knows the value of public image; smart suits are now the order of the SLD day, and their PR operation is modern and slick by Polish standards. One key task of the 26-year old press spokesman Tober is to project the leader in the best light.

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13. His position in the Party was not always as strong as today. Even recently, he has had reverses, for example when his troops last year disobeyed the order to let Balcerowicz through as Governor of the Central Bank. But there have been no repeats since then. Outsiders like to speculate about a new threat to his dominance. But there is nothing

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solid in sight for the moment. If things turn ugly for him as the Government inevitably loses popular support, former Prime Minister Cimoszewicz and former Economy Minister Kaczmarek (who ran against him for the leadership in 1997) may become focal points of opposition; both are hot tips for slots in his Government and neither is in a position to mount a real challenge.

14. In management and policy-making the key players in his team – apart from some of the senior Ministers to whom he will not be so close – will be: (English-speaking), Iwinski, Bisztyga, Konarski and Tober; and the non-English speaking Janik, Oleksy and Nikolski, who will probably head his Private Office. It will be a court strong on loyalty but less sure on policy details. Another important though not key figure will be Marek Pol, as leader of the small Labour Union Party, the coalition partner to SLD. It will not be an independent force in its own right, but Miller will need to keep him sweet, probably as a Deputy Prime Minister.

Miller and Kwasniewski

15. The two will never be close, given their different characters: one a machine operator, the other a politician with charisma but less grip. They have known each other a long time, sharing the same apartment building during their Party days. And they recognise they must work together. If Miller wins an overall majority, his far greater constitutional power and his grip on SLD will give him a big edge. But Kwasniewski's outreach to the country and international profile will somewhat redress the balance. There will be inevitable tensions: on dealing with the immediate budget problems; on policy towards the Eastern neighbours; as the result of Kwasniewski's post-Presidency ambitions – he will not slide out of public life in his early 50s but will look perhaps for some senior international appointment; and between the two teams of advisers – it will not be Elysee against Matignon, but rivalries will flair on occasion. Whatever informal deal is reached between the two leaders, it will involve a significant role for Kwasniewski in foreign policy, beyond his strict constitutional powers.

Miller as Prime Minister

16. His style stems from his nature as a political animal. Unlike Buzek, he is well-prepared for the job, having an intimate understanding of how the Government machinery works. Presentation of policy will be more important to him than his predecessor. Nor has he any intention of repeating what he sees as one of the present Government's key errors, in becoming disconnected from the electorate. So he will stay in close touch with the SLD grass-roots, and take a keen interest in the political impact of policy.
17. On policy-formation and implementation, he will have both strengths and weaknesses. Lacking a detailed grasp of complex dossiers, he now prefers to give a broad steer to his subordinates, and then to leave them to put the decided policy into effect. This makes for a collegiate style and when it works, it works well. But it also relies on the colleagues remembering who is boss. His own awareness of his lack of expertise in key areas – especially economics, the EU and defence – means that he will be ready to listen to those he regards as competent.

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18. Even if his ego can be surprisingly fragile at times, his acute political antennae will also allow him to feel confident in taking the tough decisions. But when this crunch arrives, it is unclear how sure his hand will be on the tiller. Perhaps his deepest problem: the knowledge that his electoral triumph reflects not a great Polish yearning for SLD in power, but a profound rejection of the alternative. This will play into all his tactics, starting with the budget and looking to the local elections next year.

Key Policies

19. Warsaw telegrams no 214 and 215 contain an outline of likely SLD policies in government. They will evolve once Miller and the new Government have seen the books. On the domestic side, he has a special interest in law and order, intelligence and regional government issues, and in labour relations; in other words, those where his previous experience makes him most comfortable. But, as he already recognises, he will face his biggest and first test – what he has described as “stormy weather at the start” – on the budget. This, even before the WTC/Pentagon atrocities and their impact on the global economy. So far he has been reluctant to show his hand, and his key advisers are remaining pretty silent as well. Inevitably, there will need to be a new mix of cuts and increased revenue, which the new Finance Minister will have to devise. He will rely on the underlying strength of the Polish economy to carry the country through the early months, recognising that his honeymoon period will in any case be unusually short.
20. On the external side, Miller does not yet feel at ease. Most of the early issues will be seen through a domestic prism. He will rely on his Foreign Minister (either of the present candidates – Cimoszewicz or ex-Ambassador in Washington Kozminski – will make a good fist of the job), but also his kitchen cabinet, who have ideas of their own and two former Ambassadors on the team. His first and most important area for focus will be the EU accession negotiations. While he is not strong on the detailed dossiers, he knows that success here is both a vital national interest and key to his political future. Not only will it change Poland fundamentally. Achieving membership before the next election in 2005 will boost his chances of a second term. Within the EU he is personally close to Schroeder, but less so to Jospin, Germany being a cut above France in his eyes.
21. His second priority will be better relations with Russia, more for economic than political reasons. The old communist links count for nothing now. He remains strongly pro-NATO and was a vocal supporter of action in Kosovo, despite opposition from his backbenchers. He sees no reason to choose between good relations with the US or Europe; while feeling undervalued by the Clinton team, he sees the Bush Administration (with whom he forged new bonds during the June visit here) as better partners. He also will want to project Poland as a key US ally in Europe. In response to the terrorist attacks on America, he will be among the strong backers of whatever the US leadership decides to do. Policy on defence spending will inevitably be effected by the budget issues, and in any case will be driven by his assessment of the wider political picture.

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Miller and Britain

22. Another key priority will be strengthened relations with the UK, both at Government and Party levels: after a bad patch, the latter links are now good, though still thin. There is no doubt from our private contacts with him and his people that Miller has a genuine personal interest in better ties to the UK; and that this is not just the usual courtesy of a Prime Minister-in-waiting. Why?

- Because he sees us as one of the three key EU players, alongside Germany and France.
- Because he respects our role in NATO, our commitment to credible defence, and our unique closeness to Washington.
- Because he is impressed by our Prime Minister's personal popularity and electoral success. He wants to be close, and seen as close, to Tony Blair; and he will drive SLD to learn from No.10 and Millbank.
- Because, he sees most of the new ideas on the evolution of social democracy in Europe emanating from London: for example, the emphasis on education, and the post-industrial economy.
- Because he respects British pragmatism and he likes our common-sense approach to problem-solving; very much his own style.

23. There will be potential obstacles:

- He still has some doubts about the effects of the UK approach on present-day Poland in transition – he has declined to be tagged as a Third Way supporter.
- Events in his first phase will encourage him to focus on his nearest big neighbours, Russia and Germany.
- The EU negotiations may go sour, and the UK bear our share of criticism, perhaps more so because of our declared strong support for the Polish case.

24. However, Miller shows no signs of the old Polish suspicions about the UK, and no hang-ups about our previous history, from 1939 onwards. On the contrary, the chances of a genuine strategic partnership between London and Warsaw are now better than at any time since the War. There will be no want of effort in Warsaw to develop this.

British Embassy Warsaw
18 September 2001

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British Embassy
Warsaw

From the Ambassador
Michael Pakenham

Copy Jonathan Powell

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6 September 2001

John Macgregor Esq CVO
Director, Wider Europe
FCO

By faxlock

Dear John,

MINISTERIAL VISITS

1. This is the sort of letter which I feel, reluctantly, compelled to write, but you will wonder why. But I did want to put on the record the very real sense of disappointment here, in all Sections of the Embassy and the British Council, that the most the Private Office are prepared to offer of the Foreign Secretary's time between now and mid-2002 is the (literally) flying stop-over en route to Moscow at the end of October. It is ironic, perhaps, that No.10 have responded so positively to the prospect of the new SLD Government, making a special effort to free up the Prime Minister's diary, whereas on our side of Downing Street it has proved so difficult to wring more out of the schedule. Perhaps the strictures the PUS directed towards the No.10 Private Office before the summer break have had some sort of reverse effect.
2. The reason for arguing for more time/attention to Poland are so familiar to you – you could write them in your sleep, and no doubt often did – that I will not repeat them now. The Foreign Secretary has already seen/will be seeing all of his EU colleagues on a very regular basis as part of the Brussels merry-go-round. But beyond them, and of course the Premiership contenders in Washington, Moscow and a handful of other capitals, the Poles among the rest of the Europeans do deserve somewhat better treatment than they have had in recent years, from FCO Ministers: - Robin Cook the last in 1997; and

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little sign of non-FCO visits from the rest of Whitehall at Cabinet level, despite the shopping list which we put to the Department back in May.

3. I know the pressures, constraints and conflicting demands. But I felt I should put on paper the sense here that there is, once more, a real risk of missing the next SLD bus. As you will have seen, the Americans (Bush), the French (Chirac and Jospin) and the Germans (Schroeder several times) have already been making their numbers with the incoming Government. The Prime Minister's meeting with Miller will be our important signal. But if the Foreign Secretary is unable to get here – or only comes again for a few more hours as part of a mega-tour in the middle of next year – then we cannot blame the Poles for drawing the apparently obvious conclusion. Enough said, and enough eggs sucked.

Yours ever
Michael

Michael Pakenham

Cc: Sir John Ramsden, Head/CNWED, FCO

bcc: Roger Liddle, NO.10



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From the Ambassador
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cc. { David Manning
Stephen Wall

We have 2 Nov. set
aside in the diary.

Michael Pakenham

MT

c: RL
FL

6 September 2001

Sir John Ramsden
Head/CNWED
FCO

Dear John,

MILLER VISIT TO UK, 2 NOVEMBER

1. Since I was calling today on other business on Wlodzimierz Konarski, one of Miller's closest advisers on the foreign affairs/defence front, I took the opportunity to lodge the invitation of a visit to the UK on Friday, 2 November. (Konarski, an ex-Ambassador and defence specialist, who visited London at our invitation in June, came to the dinner for Miller at the Residence in July. He is evidently close to the top of the SLD, and, I judge, speaks with some authority on Miller's behalf.)
2. Referring back to previous talks I had had with Miller about strengthening links after his election, I said that the Prime Minister wanted to have more substantive discussion than they had in Warsaw last October. I had therefore been instructed to invite Miller to visit the UK on Friday, 2 November. It was probable that this would involve a trip to the Prime Minister's constituency in Sedgefield, a very special invitation which until now had only been extended to Chirac. The purpose would be to hold a range of discussions on current issues, and also to establish a closer one-on-one relationship. Konarski quickly picked up the special nature of the offer being made. Despite Miller's election schedule he hoped to get back to me very soon with an answer.
3. He did however have one immediate question: how would such a visit play into the proposed visit by the President to London? In other words, he implied, was Miller likely to be over-shadowed by a major Kwasniewski

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event shortly afterwards? I told him that, as we had already informed the Polish Ambassador in London and the MFA here, we saw both events as highly desirable but of a different nature. In any case, the Kwasniewski visit, with its heavy emphasis on public presentation and the promotion of Polish economic/cultural interests, would take a substantive period to organise. This meant that we envisaged it somewhere towards the end of the first half of next year. Konarski was evidently relieved, and pleased at this news. But he advised me to ensure, now I was back from leave, that the President's own people knew this. Until now we had thought it best to rest upon the messages you and we have delivered to Polish officials. But in the light of Konarski's advice I will now talk to the Palace myself.

4. As Robin Barnett is reporting separately, Miller was feted in Paris yesterday at the highest levels (Chirac and Jospin). Our invitation to him is well-timed; there may be a slight problem with All Saints' Day (1 November is a national holiday here), but Konarski did not seem to think so.
5. In addition to EU matters he envisaged the talks having a heavy element of policy towards Russia, and the other Eastern neighbours. In Miller's view Britain and Poland – and the US – had special roles to play in this area which the French and Germans were either not capable of, or not willing to perform. Miller would certainly want to hear from the Prime Minister about the latter's relations with Putin and assessment of future Russian (and US) policy. In that context I mentioned that we hoped that the Foreign Secretary would visit Warsaw at the end of October, prior to a long-standing visit to Russia. This would enable us to pick Polish brains, as well as set out our own approach. Konarski said that he had already heard (from MFA sources) of a possible visit by Jack Straw, which would be welcome to the new SLD Government.

/6. So ...

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6. So far, so good. We will try to extract a positive response from Miller as soon as possible. And we are quietly alerting the MFA to the Foreign Secretary's plans. I expect to see the two SLD candidates for Foreign Minister shortly, and will mark their cards as well.

yours ever
Michael

Michael Pakenham

Cc: Michael Tatham Esq, No.10 Downing Street
Roger Liddle Esq, Policy Unit, No.10 Downing Street
Mark Sedwill Esq, PS/SofS, FCO
John Macgregor Esq, Director Wider Europe, FCO ✓

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1 August 2001

Mr Michael Tatham
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

by fax (2 pages)

cc:info

file



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Dear Mr Tatham -

POLAND: MEDIA: INTERVIEW WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

I understand that the Ambassador spoke to you in June, and together you agreed the Prime Minister should do a written interview for the Polish newspaper "Trybuna". The Ambassador is now away on his summer leave, but I should like, if I may, to pursue the idea further.

Trybuna is a centre-left daily, with very close links to the SLD – the social democratic party who are certain to win September's elections and form the next government. Indeed, it was the party's secretary general who put the idea of an interview to the Ambassador over lunch. So an interview with the Prime Minister would mean not only an excellent media opportunity for the UK, but also another feather in the cap in our increasingly important relations with the SLD.

The list of proposed questions, which I received from the newspaper's editor this morning, is attached in translation. Perhaps you would be kind enough to arrange for me to be sent some answers in due course.

Yours ever

Simon Thomas
Political Secretary

Simon.Thomas@fco.gov.uk

QUESTIONS FROM "TRYBUNA"

[Unofficial translation from the Polish original]

1. The press has called you "the wizard of Downing Street". What magic did you use to make the Labour Party win twice in a row for the first time in history?
2. The turnout in this year's election was lower than in 1918. How can you explain this?
3. William Hague chose to make saving the British pound his key election issue. Will you take the UK into the European Monetary Union and replace the pound with the euro?
4. You once said that you could be labelled neither as a socialist nor a Thatcherite. And the press also encouraged voting for Blair – the only reliable conservative. How, then, would you label yourself?
5. According to the press, you manage your party as if it were a company. Marketing and PR have replaced ideology. You started your career in major politics fighting successfully to remove Clause 4 – the intention to nationalise the economy – from the traditional Labour Party's programme. What do you understand by the ideology of the Left?
6. At the Congress of the Socialist International in Malmo you said, "Change or you will disappear." What were the changes you had in mind?

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26 July 2001

Sir John Ramsden Bt.
Head
Central & North West European Department
FCO

by airtech fax

Handwritten notes:
✓
cc: mior
n or
PC
~~cc: mior~~

Dear John -

EVENING WITH SLD LEADERS: ATMOSPHERICS

1. The Ambassador hosted a small and informal barbecue last night for Leszek Miller and senior members of his entourage. We will produce other records of conversations on e.g. the SLD's economic plans (including the e-economy) and what was said on the military adviser post. However, this letter tries to capture some of the atmospherics of the evening, to let you know the kind of people we will be dealing with come September.

The guest list

2. The away team consisted of Miller, Jerzy Szmajdziński (one of SLD's deputy chairmen and the likely next defence minister), Wiesław Kaczmarek (another deputy chairman and likely next economics/infrastructure minister), Włodzimierz Konarski and Jan Bisztyga (respectively Miller's advisers on defence and foreign affairs), and Michał Tober (party Press Spokesman).

Miller

3. "No one, not even the President, gets two hours of Miller's time," said Bisztyga in an aside to the Ambassador at the beginning of the evening. Two-and-a-half hours later Miller was still enjoying his last glass of wine in the Residence garden. Over the last three years, through our continuing dialogue with SLD, our personal cultivation of Miller the man, Miller's visits to the UK, and our funding of his language training, the embassy has built up a

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relationship of trust with the SLD leader. Yesterday evening, he was just about as relaxed as he gets, equally happy to share his jokes and Chinese proverbs as he was to tell us his personal political opinions.

4. But Miller is never 100% off guard. Though he gets pretty close when a drink is thrust in his hand and is surrounded by people he trusts, there is always a side of him which remains closed to outsiders. Even those who will be his most senior ministers and advisers when he forms a government are not privy to his innermost thoughts, and though they joke together, there is no question of how one-sided the relationship is. Konarski, though relaxed about being frank with Miller, was told that if he didn't stop talking so much he might not be invited again. It was said jokingly, but Konarski was silenced.

5. Miller's state of relaxation also depends on the theme of the conversation. He feels happy exchanging jokes, flattering the ladies, and talking about the meat of Poland's internal politics and social conditions. But he's nervous – his hands shake under the table – on topics such as foreign affairs and the EU, where he's not sure of the substance, and when the conversation gets too intellectual. Deep down, maybe he thinks he is an electrician operating in modern politics, and he seems wary of being shown up as a man of limited education or experience of the world by those around him.

Konarski & Bisztyga

6. Closest to Miller and most relaxed with him was Konarski. Early on in the evening Konarski, Miller and Bisztyga disappeared off into a corner for two or three minutes to thrash something out in a whisper. They said they had been discussing developments in US/Russia relations, but in fact they were talking party lists for the election. The three men worked in the Communist Party Central Committee together in the eighties, and Miller is likely to keep them close after the election.

7. Konarski's speciality is defence and international security. He is a former senior diplomat with extensive experience, including a key role at the arms control negotiations in Vienna. As you know, he visited London recently with Szmajdziński. Konarski was very impressed with his visit, and in a wider context with Mr Blair. He was full of praise not only for the way the PM had turned around the Labour Party, but also for the way he built international relationships. Konarski mentioned Mr Blair's early visit to St. Petersburg as an example. With Blair and Miller at the top, he said, we had "a chance to do something with bilateral relations that has not been done since the war."

8. Bisztyga is not quite so close to the leader as Konarski, but remains one of Miller's inner circle nonetheless. He was in Miller's political cabinet during the last SLD government, when the future leader was Minister of Labour. He served as ambassador in Athens and in London. He is currently Miller's main source of advice on Northern European and Trans-Atlantic foreign affairs.

9. However, advisory rather than ministerial roles are likely for these two. At 61, Konarski is standing down from parliament in these elections, and his health is not what it might be. And Bisztyga, who may turn out to be more butler than adviser, is too synonymous with old hard-line Communism to be acceptable in Miller's new social-democratic SLD – Bisztyga's name even used to feature in anti-government poetry published by the underground in the eighties. His style has not changed much.

Szmajdziński

10. Szmajdziński is not in the inner circle – partly because his allegiances are split between Miller and the President, his old friend and regular tennis partner – but he got along fine with the others. On the whole, he is a relaxed operator and looked at ease in the company.

11. Szmajdziński is less naturally outgoing than, say, Bisztyga, but he's a thinker. When he and Konarski appear as a double act (as they did in London), it's easy to be drawn to Konarski and think that he calls the shots. In truth, he's a hard nut to crack. But my gut feeling about Szmajdziński is that he's simply the quieter man, and a much better listener. For example, we talked at length about an idea for a reform of national service (students would do their service part time while at university) proposed to him by some students from Szczecin.

12. Interestingly at least two of the guests referred to Szmajdziński as the future defence minister. Although the news comes as no surprise in itself, Miller has always refrained from letting on who will get the top jobs, and it was good that they should feel relaxed enough to talk about it with us.

Kaczmarek

13. The one man who did not come across as relaxed, however, was Kaczmarek – though it's hard to tell with him: his default state is bristling. Bruce identified him as hard work from his recent visit to the UK. But the truth is that he's not a natural politician. He is an engaging interlocutor when you're talking about the details of energy privatisation or telecommunications monopolies, but he hates small talk and the tedious slog of being a politician. Which put him at odds with the other guests. He was happy to talk business with the embassy crowd, but was not much interested in the jokey charm of his leader. He alone in the SLD crowd seemed unfazed by Miller, and was the only one to leave before his boss.

14. The truth is that he is a die-hard cynic and not one of the SLD brotherhood. But he knows his stuff, and he will deliver. And it is with exactly these kind of experts that Miller wishes to fill his government.

15. Monika Gadzała and Dominic Meiklejohn will report separately on the substance of conversations with him.

Tober

16. I will write separately on Michał Tober, SLD's 27 year old press spokesman. He lives and breathes politics and has made it in the party by putting a few noses out of joint and, much more importantly, through his steadfast loyalty to Miller. Miller in turn owes a lot to Tober, a young lawyer who truly understands what looks good in the media, and how to use them to SLD's best advantage. At the moment, none of the other parties on the Polish political scene have anything quite like him – he is perhaps Poland's first proper spin-doctor.

The President

17. Though he was not present, President Kwaśniewski was still very much part of the evening. Apart from speculation as to whether he might enjoy a set or two on the Residence's grass tennis court, there were also a number of gentle jokes at his expense –



mostly about how Miller would get his own way when he came to power. The comparison was made to the role of The Queen – who was constitutionally head of state, but left the running of the country to the Prime Minister. The President would have it much easier, said Miller, with a friendly government to work with. The President may not be so sure.

Summary

18. Overall, we could not be better positioned with the incoming government. (We even hedged our bets for a coalition and had PSL leader Kalinowski round to lunch the same day!) Konarski said that after the elections we would have the chance to “do something that hasn’t been done since the war” on bilateral relations. Overstated perhaps, but the groundwork is there. The next step will be an early visit to London post-election for Miller to meet the Prime Minister. When the Ambassador mentioned this quietly to him, Miller agreed this would be an excellent idea.

Yours ever

Simon Thomas
Political Secretary

Simon.Thomas@fco.gov.uk

cc (by airtel fax): John Macgregor, Director Wider Europe
Joanna Hanson, CEEARG
Bruce Bucknell, CNWED

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British Embassy
WarsawFrom the Ambassador
Michael PakenhamAleje R62 No. 1
00-556 WarszawaTel.: (0048-22) 6281001-5
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18 July 2001

Sir John Ramsden
Head/CNWED
FCO

By airtech

Dear John,

PROPOSED VISIT OF POLISH PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

1. Following Michael Tatham's letter of 13 July, I spoke today to Staszek Komorowski, the Polish Ambassador in London, as I had promised to do when we discussed the various possible visits a few days ago. The reason for talking to him today was that he will very shortly be seeing Kwasniewski here in Poland, for a review of Anglo-Polish relations, and the issue of the visit is sure to arise.
2. Drawing on Michael Tatham's letter, I said that I knew that No.10 were keen to make a success of a substantive visit by the President to London, for the commercial and public diplomacy reasons discussed with the Prime Minister in Warsaw last year. But it was clear that there would be insufficient time, apart from other complications, to organise such a visit for this autumn, as Komorowski had originally proposed. Instead, we should look for a high-profile event roundabout the early spring. For that purpose, I thought that together we should aim to find a suitable date with our authorities before the end of this year, and preferably by the late autumn.
3. Komorowski was grateful for this heads-up, and not inclined to cavil overmuch. (He had earlier told me that he recognised we might well want to encourage an early visit to London by Miller, once the election was out of

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the way.) But he did need a formal response from the FCO to the approach he had earlier made to you. He would be able to draw, in talking to Kwasniewski, on what I had told him. But he hoped the Department would give him the definitive answer – namely, that the November dates he had proposed were not a runner – very shortly. I undertook to alert you to this need, which I hope you will be able to follow up before he leaves London some time next week.

4. I have also had a chance to cast a couple of flies over Miller about an early post-election visit to London. The idea is well lodged with him, and I expect it to come up when he brings half-a-dozen of his closest advisers/future Ministers to a barbecue at the Residence next week. It should be a good occasion, in any event, to conduct some bilateral business.

Yours ever

Michael

Michael Pakenham

Cc: Mark Sedwell Esq, Private Secretary, FCO ✓
 John Macgregor Esq, Director Wider Europe ✓
 Michael Tatham Esq, Senior Policy Adviser, No.10

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Senior Policy Adviser

13 July 2001

Dear Mark

PROPOSED VISIT OF POLISH PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 26 June about the proposed visits of the Polish President and Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister believes that Poland should be a priority in our Europe strategy. He would certainly want to see Miller (assuming he is indeed the next Prime Minister) as soon as possible after the Polish elections. I agree that we should include an invitation to visit London in the Prime Minister's message of congratulations and that we should have some dates up our sleeves to offer Miller.

It makes sense to pace our high-level Polish visits. So if Miller comes in the autumn, we would favour delaying Kwasniewski until the Spring of 2002. That would also allow time to prepare the kind of ambitious conference which the Poles seem to have in mind. We are happy with the holding line suggested in your letter and will aim to agree a clearer sense of timing once the new Polish Government is in place.

I am copying this letter to Sir Stephen Wall (Cabinet Office) and Michael Pakenham (Warsaw).

Yours ever

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Michael Tatham'.

MICHAEL TATHAM

Mark Sedwill
FCO

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UK/POLAND SEMINAR, LONDON, 26 JUNE 2001: POLAND'S PROGRESS TOWARDS EU ACCESSION

Agenda

1. Stocktake of Poland's progress: opening remarks from Jaroslav Pietras and Sir Stephen Wall:
2. Priority areas for Poland: the difficult chapters.
 - (i) Environment. *5 closed/few transition periods / 2-4 per country / Dimer - require transition of nature.*
 - (ii) Agriculture.
 - (iii) Competition Policy.
 - (iv) Regional Policy.
 - (v) Justice and Home Affairs.
 - (vi) Financial and Budgetary Provisions.
3. Progress in the negotiations under the Belgian Presidency.
4. Implementation: judicial and administrative reform.
5. UK assistance to Poland in its accession preparations.

*modifying negotiating position
longest period ever for any applicant
since EU established
intensive legislation over last year*

From: Alex Ellis

Date: 22 June 2001

cc: Kim Darroch (with attachments)
John Bourne, CO (with attachments)
Roger Liddle, No.10
Sir John Ramsden, CNWED
Simon Featherstone, Caroline Rees,
Andrew Price, EUD/E
Dominic Meiklejohn, WARSAW
Julian King, UKRep

Sir S Wall

STEERING BRIEF FOR PIETRAS VISIT

1. You know Pietras. By all accounts he will keep his job after the election, and perhaps even become the Chief Negotiator; Kulakowski is well known not to hit it off with Miller. Pietras will be accompanied by his private secretary Tomasz Nowakowski, M.Kisieleska, (Deputy Head of Chief Negotiator's Secretariat) and Mr A.Michonski (Deputy Head of the EU Dep at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), plus Ambassador Komorowski, DHM Beata Kolecka and Mr Piotr Kozerski, Commercial Counsellor-Minister; on our side you will be accompanied by John Alty, Rebecca Lawrence, Lesley Pallett, Andrew Lawrence DEFRA (agriculture) and Philip Stamp DEFRA (environment), Kim, Roger Liddle, John Bourne and me. The background paper and your letter of invitation are at A.
2. Pietras will be coming on a high from a day in Sussex at the European Institute and a low after spending an hour (rightly) being told to take a walk by Dept of Health and DTI in his bid to secure a better deal on pharmaceuticals than the Hungarians and Czechs (only Poland and Romania have yet to close this chapter). Poland will not agree to apply Supplementary Protection Certificates (which increase the length of a patent by up to 5 years) retroactively to all patents taken out since 2000 (the EU originally offered 1993). Neither will Poland agree to a "specific mechanism" to prevent parallel imports (eg medicines exported by UK producers to new Member States at low prices being re-packaged and exported back to UK consumers at higher prices).
3. You and Kim will see him and the Ambassador (plus their private secretaries) at 1000. Then the ensemble will appear at 1030 for 1 1/2 hours, followed by lunch for those who can make it with the Polish Ambassador. I attach a CVs of Pietras and the Ambassador and a fact sheet on Poland plus the latest (pre-Gothenburg) monitoring report on Poland.
4. The purpose of the meeting is to establish where the Poles need to do the most work to catch up with others, both in the negotiations and on the ground, and to show where we can help. There are a few strategic messages which we need to deliver, some no doubt in your private session:

- (i) Gothenburg, combined with the road map (attached) sets the framework; closure of negotiations with those who are ready by the end of 2002 and accession by the 2004 EP elections – as the PM proposed last Autumn in Warsaw. Despite the downplaying of this by some, the EU has a good history of sticking to its deadlines. You might play up our role in the Gothenburg conclusions.
- (ii) We want Poland in the first wave. But, repeating the PM last Autumn, there are no guaranteed places. The negotiations are cracking on (Poland is in danger of relegation from “chapters closed” Premiership; not only are they behind the Luxembourg six, by the 27 June deputies they will be equal with Latvia and behind all the other likely members of a big bang). Chapters are being closed on tricky issues – the Swedes agreed with at least one candidate Common Positions on 6 of the 9 chapters due to be tackled under the Belgian Presidency (Transport, Energy, Taxation, Fisheries, Financial Control, Customs union). Of course, the Poles are still pretty confident that they'll be in the first wave. But they won't want the odium of causing delay as a consequence. So they should draw the conclusion that they need to catch up.....
- (iii) We understand the difficulties for Poland in making great leaps forward during the campaign for the legislative elections on 23 September. But we hope that they will continue to make progress both on the ground and in the negotiations (they hope to close the energy and taxation chapters in July). It is also important that the election campaign does not force the likely incoming government to make statements which will make their lives more difficult in the enlargement negotiations after the election (eg on the length of transition period for the purchase of agricultural land – Poland wants 18 years, the EU has closed with the Czech Republic and Hungary on 7 years). Miller is right to say that 90% of his hard decisions will have to be taken in the first month of his government – too late to influence the Commission's November progress report, but soon enough to influence Member States' reaction to it.
- (iv) Poland is special – because of its history, because of its size. But the EU will not cut it much slack (and can't admit that it might until the dying moments of the negotiations). Yes, it is less of a price taker in the negotiations than Estonia or Slovenia. But the EU operates by precedent. A deal it agrees with one candidate it will not abandon for Poland, not least because all the others who have swallowed the deal will come back and ask for more as well. Nor will the EU be bulldozed. The Poles are second to none in their ability to put member states' backs up – you might convey a sense of what works in EU negotiations eg the Christoffersen style rather than the Schoenfelder; they've got to move quicker, and work more cleverly with the Presidency and the Commission to cut deals which can then be sold to the Member States. The Hungarians are the masters at this. Polish insistence on knowing what their receipts will be on accession rings hollow when they still have so much to do to get to the end game.

5. Dominic Meiklejohn's letter of today sets out Pietras' initial reactions to our paper. That he finds it tough is, as Julian has observed, symptomatic of the problem. Pietras is right to observe that there isn't much margin for discussion (if “discussion” means “negotiation”) - there isn't. But that's the point.

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6. In the main session, you might introduce the team and ask Pietras to make an opening intervention. Then you might turn to the FCO to set out how far and fast the negotiations have moved, and what we think Gothenburg means. You might then invite departments to go through the main tricky chapters, in the order in the agenda but majoring on environment and JHA (both due for closure in the Belgian Presidency). That discussion will probably also cover prospects for the Belgian Presidency and implementation.

7. On environment, the Poles have reduced their transition periods and produced an enormous programme showing how they will implement the acquis. But DEFRA tell me that this still sweeps some things under the carpet eg it says that, in the context of the Nitrates Directive, Poland has no Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (ie heavily polluted water courses). That is not credible. All Member States have NVZs, and Polish agriculture can't be that clean. Another problem is the environment Ministry, which is one of the poorest performers amongst the Polish Ministries.

8. On JHA, the problem will be knowing where to stop (you might encourage Lesley Pallett to focus on only a few issues). One key issue is borders; the Poles know the problems well (the border with the Ukraine is long and porous, not surprising given the large number of Poles living on the other side of it; no-one likes working at the "Russian front", pay, training and equipment are poor). They are getting their act together, helped in part by an HO secondee last year. Vitorino was quite upbeat after a recent visit.

9. The HO are less impressed by the Poles in their fight against organised crime. They don't think the Poles have got their act together – not enough police, poorly trained, no focussed intelligence gathering, EUROPOL.

10. HO may also raise judicial reform. We do not want to ask more of Poland than the acquis require. But it is hard to define exactly what that is; and in any case, an efficient, effective and independent judiciary might be considered a pre-requisite for many parts of the acquis, not just for JHA.

11. On competition, the main issue in the negotiations is the special economic zones for which the government has already given inward investing companies long term tax breaks. Poland has asked for a transition period until 2017, to allow them to continue to honour these breaks (indeed, in their dreams they would offer breaks to new companies as well). Member States are hard line. This is core acquis. The DTI do not dismiss the possibility of a (short) transition period. But we should give no hint of that at the moment. The other difficulty the DTI may raise is the lack of a clear restructuring plan for the steel industry. Without one, the suspicion will be that subsidies will be too high.

12. You might let Pietras kick off on agriculture. John Bourne is clearing your script. There is parallelism with a point about false friends in the Structural and Cohesion Funds context (see below). France is cosying up to Poland on the CAP. But you can bet that the French will be tougher than anyone else when it comes to eg quotas and reference periods/acreage.

13. On regional policy, our main concern is that the Poles don't have systems in place which can handle funds worth up to 4% of GNP. They know that - they haven't even

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PREM 49/2765 LETTER DATED 22/06/2001

managed to get accreditation for their SAPARD paying agency, which is supposed to handle far smaller sums. But nor have all the candidates bar Estonia and Bulgaria. Again, it is Poland's size which will be the problem.

14. The other key point to get across will be that the Poles should not think that Spain will be their ally. They have to realise that despite the Commission's efforts to the contrary, there will be a fixed cake rather than a much bigger one post 2006, because the budget disciplinarians will put their foot down, so, the fight will be not so much be over the size of the case as over the share of it.

15. Which brings us on to the Financial and Budgetary Provisions. The Poles will know before they sign the Accession Treaty their net contribution until 2007. They may ask to know what they will get after that. But there are obvious risks to them in advancing the negotiations on the next financial perspective before the enlargement negotiations are closed, the most obvious one of which is that they will not have a vote; so their influence on the outcome will be minimal, and the most likely result will be a tight overall settlement. The budget disciplinarians will be tough, with France and Italy to the fore given the size of their share of enlargement financing, with Spain making sure they get some of the cake which Poland might think is theirs. The Poles need look no further than Nice to imagine how well their interests will be protected. They may be tempted to walk away from the table. But would they really say no to enlargement? They will say that they need a good result to sell enlargement to their public. For the reason above, that means not opening the post 2006 FP negotiations until they are in.

16. There are a few specific points that might come up (I would not expect a serious session on pharmaceuticals).

(a) Tax, which the Poles hope to close in July. The main two issues are

- (i) the Polish request for a three year transition period before reaching the EU minimum excise duty on cigarettes. They claim to have persuaded the Austrians and Germans. Let's see. Our line might be that we will be no more or less tough than other Member States. The Poles may say that this is not really our problem – we are so far way. HM C and E would beg to differ. Austria may be playing a double game; as I mentioned, they would happy to establish the principle of transition periods in this area, as they may well return to the charge to get one for the EU in relation to Hungary if the EU does not agree the Commission's proposal to increase the minimum level of excise on cigarettes.
- (ii) A transition period for a super reduced (3%) VAT rate on books. We have a permanent derogation, and so should sound supportive.

(b) Transport. The Commission are angling for transition periods for road haulage cabotage (Polish companies operating solely in Germany), at German request. The Poles will see this as another example of the EU giving them the obligations but not the rights of membership. We are liberalisers (and have a very liberal regime already with the CEE countries). So you can sound supportive, but should avoid any hint that we will win the day – the Germans will probably get something.

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(c) FMOP and FMOC. See Dominic's letter. Again, we have to emphasise that the deal on the table (see attached extracts from the FMOP Common Position for Hungary: I'm still looking for the one on Capital) is the best we can do. The Poles may ask for our views on a national declaration on FMOP intentions between accession and the two year review. You will have to steer them off this path. And they will almost certainly hang tough for a longer transition period than the 7 years on offer on the purchase of agricultural land. But, again, it would be hard for us to unpick these deals, and not in our national interest to do so.

(d) Energy: To quote from the brief for John Alty, this should be one where the Poles can make progress soon. They have just withdrawn their request for a transition period on gas liberalisation, and they have produced what looks as though it could be a reasonable implementation plan for their transition period request on the minimum level of oil stocks they must hold.

17. So overall, your message is going to be tough. We want to help (and the paper shows where we are helping). But the EU is clearer when enlargement will happen, and reaching agreed positions with some candidates on some core issues. Poland is lagging behind.

18. You could end by noting our help under twinning and our desire for more – see the attached letter from Graham Styles.

Alex Ellis
European Union Department (External)
WH243
Tel: 020-7270 2022

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EU ENLARGEMENT: POLAND'S PROGRESS TOWARDS EU ACCESSION

Introduction

1. The pace of negotiations has picked up under the Swedish Presidency. The Swedes have stuck to the road map (EU common positions on all the chapters slated for their Presidency have been agreed) and gone beyond it in some areas (eg by bringing forward discussion of food safety and transport). At Gothenberg, the EU concluded that "Provided that progress towards meeting the accession criteria continues at an unabated pace, the road map should make it possible to complete negotiations by the end of 2002 for those candidate countries that are ready. The objective is that they should participate in the European Parliament elections of 2004 as members."

Current State of Play

A. Meeting the Copenhagen Criteria

2. The UK agrees with the Commission's assessment (in its 2000 Progress report) that:

- Poland fulfils the political criteria (though the actions taken so far on judicial reform and tackling corruption need "to be continued and intensified").
- Poland should meet the economic criteria "in the near term, provided it continues and completes its present reform efforts". Poland's economic track record compares well with most other candidates.

3. Poland aims to have adopted the acquis in full by the end of 2001. The UK view is that good progress is being made in passing the necessary legislation. The Commission's Annual Monitoring Report confirms this. Poland is closing the gaps in legislative transposition (in the key areas of agriculture; environment; transport; JHA and energy) which the Commission identified in its 2000 Progress Report. The Progress Report for 2001 is likely to focus on those areas of the acquis not yet fully transposed.

4. As for most of the candidate countries, Poland's biggest challenge is to develop the capacity to implement and enforce the acquis. We would expect the Progress Report for 2001 to note improvements in administrative capacity in several fields (intellectual property; JHA; agriculture; regional policy; and social and employment standards), but also the need for further improvement. Eg, how does Poland compare with other candidate countries in Agriculture and Environment? The Commission's Annual Monitoring Report highlights the need to strengthen administrative capacity in these two areas in particular. Line ministries and inter-departmental co-ordination have particularly important roles to play here.

B. Accession Negotiations

5. Poland closed 3 chapters under the Swedish Presidency, and has now closed 16 of the 31 chapters of the acquis. Slovenia, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary and the Czech Republic have closed between 19 and 22 chapters. Of the candidates that opened negotiations in 2000, Lithuania and Slovakia have both closed 17 chapters; Malta has closed 16; Latvia 15; Bulgaria 10 and Romania 6.

6. The UK notes that, in those chapters that have already been provisionally closed, all the candidates - including Poland - will need to ensure that they meet the commitments they made in

order to close the chapter, and develop the administrative capacity to implement the acquis to a satisfactory standard. In Poland's case, particular attention needs to be given to the Financial Control chapter.

Unresolved Issues

A. The Difficult Chapters

7. There are six chapters where closure will be especially difficult, mainly because they:

- (i) contain issues which are politically sensitive, both for the EU and for Poland; and
- (ii) relate to parts of the acquis that are particularly difficult to implement, not least for Poland given its size.

(i) Environment (closed with 4 candidates):

8. The UK welcomes the acceleration in legislative alignment (eg Acts on Waste and Environmental Protection). Poland should now look to pass the Water Act. The UK agrees with the Commission that implementation and enforcement require increased attention (eg on the Waste Framework and IPPC Directives), and that all new investment should comply with the acquis. The UK is encouraging the EU to show flexibility on implementation given the high cost (\$35 billion) of implementing the environment acquis in full in Poland. There are ten requests for transitional periods. The UK will support the EU looking favourably upon those requests for which there are no significant implications for the Single Market, and that are backed up by clear and credible implementation strategies and financing plans. Poland's implementation plan was an important step forward. The plan will be looked at carefully by Member States. Subject to their assessments, and to Poland's response to requests for further information, we think Poland could close this chapter under the Belgian Presidency.

(ii) Agriculture

9. Poland should look to maintain momentum and press ahead with legislative alignment, particularly in the veterinary sector. Key decisions on administrative structures have been taken. Continued progress on implementation, particularly in relation to IACS and the Common Market Organisations, will be important. Poland has made many transitional period requests. Shortening the list would help to accelerate progress. The most difficult ones for the EU to address relate to the veterinary *acquis*. It will be important for Poland to demonstrate that it has the administrative capacity to police any transitional arrangements.

(iii) Competition Policy

10. The UK welcomes the adoption of much of the secondary legislation in respect of the new State Aids Law. The UK and other Member States will now focus on the administrative capacity of the new State Aids office and the establishment of an enforcement record. They will also look for the continued strengthening of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection. Poland has made a number of transitional period requests, one of the few countries to do so. Competition policy is a core single market issue, where we doubt whether the EU will show much, if any, flexibility, especially on the request to retain tax breaks for companies in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) until 2017.

(iv) Regional Policy

11. The whole of Poland (with the possible exception of Warsaw) will almost certainly qualify for objective one (highest level) structural funding. The message for all candidates holds true for Poland: work should continue on strengthening regional administration and financial management systems in order to be able to implement effectively the Community's regional aid programmes.

(v) Justice and Home Affairs:

12. The UK welcomes Poland's good progress. Poland should look to press ahead with legislative alignment (eg on the trafficking of drugs by sea). Poland should also look to strengthen law enforcement by raising standards of policing and upgrading judicial training. The main priorities are to combat organised crime (eg by setting up a National Criminal Information Centre); money laundering (eg by setting up the Financial Intelligence Unit); illegal immigration; trafficking in people; and drug production and misuse. Further work will also be needed (eg on infrastructure and on training the many new border guards) to ensure that Member States are confident that Poland is ready to manage a significant part of the EU's external border.

(vi) Financial and Budgetary Provisions

13. All the candidates have asked for their contribution to the EU budget to be phased in over time. Poland wants it phased in over five years starting with a 10% contribution in the first year of accession. The EU will need to assess the impact of these requests on the EU and Member States' budgetary positions. The effects will depend, inter alia, on the outcome of negotiations in the Agriculture and Regional Policy chapters. Consideration will also need to be given to Polish receipts from the pre-accession aid programmes at the time of accession.

B. Key Negotiating Challenges for Poland under the Belgian Presidency

14. The UK view is that the other seven chapters (of the thirteen that remain open) could be closed relatively quickly if Poland were to reconsider the number and length of its transitional period requests and provide supporting information.

- (i) Fish (closed with 8 candidates): It would be helpful to have a clearer picture of Poland's problems. The UK view is that if Poland were to provide the information requested, not least a timetable for adopting the *acquis*, this chapter could be closed very quickly.
- (ii) Company Law (closed with 10 candidates): The UK notes that the EU position on pharmaceuticals has been widely accepted by other candidates (including Hungary and the Czech Republic). The EU has already shown a considerable degree of flexibility. The EU position will not change.
- (iii) Free Movement of Capital (closed with 7 candidates): Poland has the longest request for a transitional period on the purchase of agricultural land by foreigners (18 years). The UK notes that the Czech Republic and Hungary have already accepted the 7 year transitional period offered by the EU. The UK judges that the EU has no scope for further flexibility.
- (iv) Free Movement of Persons (closed with 2 candidates): The EU common position allows those Member States who need to protect their labour markets to impose restrictions on Polish workers for up to 7 years, but leaves flexibility for others to introduce free movement after just 2 years, and to liberalise their markets through national legislation from accession.

The UK worked hard to secure this flexible outcome. It is a vast improvement on the original proposals. There are strong objective arguments against any form of transitional period. But there is no political scope for further changes to the EU's position.

- (v) Taxation (closed with Hungary): Poland should reconsider its request for a transitional period on the introduction of higher minimum rates of tax on tobacco products. The request would cause trade distortions in the Single Market and may increase the incidence of fraud and the smuggling (into the UK) of cigarettes and other tobacco products. This is a key single market question on which the EU has little or no room for flexibility.
- (vi) Energy (closed with 4 candidates). The UK welcomes Poland's detailed plans for the transitional period on oil stocks and the withdrawal of the request for a delay in opening up the gas market, and hopes that Poland will make good progress on this chapter under the Belgian Presidency. The UK is a strong advocate of energy market liberalisation.
- (vii) Transport (closed with Cyprus): The UK welcomes the provision of road investment plans and the withdrawal of the transitional period request on occasional passenger services. The negotiability with the EU of the remaining transitional period requests will depend on clear plans for Poland implementing the necessary restructuring programmes. The UK is arguing strongly in Brussels that there should be no restrictions on opening up the EU transport market (including on cabotage) to the new members.

HMG
United Kingdom
June 2001

UK BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO POLAND ON THE DIFFICULT CHAPTERS

Twinning (General)

The UK is involved in 16 twinning projects in Poland (not including two from the 1998 round which were successfully completed recently). Only two other Member States are involved in more projects than the UK. More than 20% of the UK's overall twinning programme is focused on Poland. There are 8 UK Pre-Accession Advisers (PAAs) currently working in Poland on twinning projects; four more will arrive later this year to begin new projects. The UK hopes to increase its presence in Poland during the 2001 twinning round.

Environment

The UK is participating in two environmental twinning projects in Poland, and shall be bidding for a third in the 2001 twinning round. The UK is also providing bilateral support (eg for small businesses on environmental management) and assistance (eg to the National Fund for Environmental Protection on the preparation of ISPA applications).

Agriculture

The UK is the lead Member State in the 1999 twinning project on CAP implementation. The UK PAA is working with the Intervention Board. The UK is involved in rural development projects (through the Know How Fund) to develop producer marketing groups. The UK also hosts study visits to enable Polish officials to see how the UK implements the CAP. Polish and UK agriculture ministry officials meet regularly under the auspices of the UK/Poland Agriculture Working Group.

Competition Policy

The DTI and other British departments have ongoing contacts with the Ministry of Economy, Office of Competition and Consumer Protection and the Telecoms and Energy Regulators. The UK would look sympathetically upon requests from Poland for help in implementing and enforcing EU state aids and competition policy,

Regional Policy

The UK was a lead partner in a 1998 Twinning project on structural fund administration. The UK will continue to provide advice on this via its involvement in three regional twinning projects (in Gdansk, Pomorskie and Swietokrzyskie). The projects will develop regional administrative staff, who will receive training from UK experts on preparation, implementation and operation of structural funds programmes. The UK hopes to bid for a twinning project to develop ESF implementation in the 2001 round.

JHA

The UK has led one twinning project (from the 1998 round) on organised crime and border management; is acting in a junior capacity in two other projects and hopes to bid for at least one JHA twinning project in the 2001 round. In addition, the UK will be receiving a study visit in late July to discuss the implementation of the Schengen Information System. It is also likely that the UK will wish to participate in the Belgian Presidency's proposal to second teams to work with the candidate countries on border issues.

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26 June 2001



File

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

MATRIX

See Annex, JPS
mc
KK
CS/TK

Proposed Visit of Polish President and Prime Minister

You asked for advice on how to handle the request by the Polish Ambassador for a visit by President Kwasniewski to London this autumn, versus our wish to invite Leszek Miller, presumed next Polish Prime Minister, soon after the September General Election.

First Miller. Assuming the SLD falls short of an overall majority, a new Polish coalition government should be formed by mid-October. Miller should be able to make his first overseas visits by late October/November. We expect him to give a high priority to London, and should try to make this one of his first destinations. We suggest including an invitation in the Prime Minister's letter of congratulations and then following fairly quickly with a proposed date.

Miller had also hinted at a visit to London before the Polish elections to Robin Cook in Berlin in May. Pre-election visit would be ill-timed. We are, however, continuing to encourage possible members of the SLD ministerial team to make low-profile visits to London to discuss policies and administrative reform.

Kwasniewski still matters. He is still the most popular politician in Poland and his powers are real: he chairs the National Security Council, appoints the most senior officers in the Armed Forces, sends his own "minister" to Cabinet and can veto any legislation including the budget. He is an important and influential voice in the domestic presentation of Poland's case for EU membership (more important as the hardest decisions, and the referendum, come).

Pressure for a visit by President Kwasniewski is coming from him and his staff, not just the Ministry and Ambassador. The reference point for the visit is Kwasniewski's talk with the Prime Minister in Warsaw last October. They might be concerned that the end of cohabitation will lower his profile; he is likely to be travelling quite vigorously in Europe. It is not in our interest that London should be altogether omitted.

Kwasniewski's original proposal was to come to London for a major Polish-organised conference designed to raise Poland's profile as a future EU and business partner. The Poles have not developed their thinking beyond talk of a seminar which the Prime Minister and Kwasniewski together could open. We have been telling them informally that such a high-profile event would need a longer lead-time, but that we

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would expect to have an early contact with the new government about it after the Polish elections. This will do as a holding line, but only that. We shall consult you in due course about a Kwasniewski visit, possibly in Spring 2002, if they (and we) can sort out a suitable event as a peg for it.

I am copying this letter to Sir Stephen Wall (Cabinet Office) and Michael Pakenham (Warsaw).

*Yours age,
Mark*

(Mark Sedwill)
Private Secretary

Ms A Wechsberg
10 Downing Street

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File



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 June 2001

Dear Mark

**GOTHENBURG EUROPEAN COUNCIL:
PRIME MINISTER'S CONTACTS WITH NORTH EUROPEAN LEADERS**

The Prime Minister had brief exchanges with a number of Central European leaders at the pre-lunch drinks in Gothenburg on the last day of the European Council.

He had a good talk with the Czech Prime Minister, Milos Zeman, and his Foreign Minister, Jan Kavan, particularly on the progress on enlargement and the politics within the EU. The only specific point raised by the Czechs was to complain about heavy-handed American lobbying for military aircraft sales. Kavan described it as worse than blackmail. Zeman said the pressure was unreasonable. They both assured the Prime Minister that they would stick to Gripen.

The Polish Prime Minister, Buzek, was very up-beat after President Bush's visit and he had a friendly exchange with the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister also had brief words with the Presidents of Latvia and Estonia though there was no substance that I was aware of.

I am copying this letter to Michael Pakenham (Warsaw), David Broucher (Prague), Julian Miller (MoD), Christopher Meyer (Washington) and to Richard Abel (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

J. Sawers

JP JOHN SAWERS

Mark Sedwill
FCO

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MASTER

The Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to the Court of St James's

London

Sir John Ramsden, Bt
Head of Central European Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London SW1A 2AH

HT
u/nex

12 June 2001

Dear John,

I enclose herewith an unofficial translation of the congratulations sent to the Rt. Hon. Tony Blair from the President of the Republic of Poland, Mr Aleksander Kwaśniewski together with a telegraphic message of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Professor Władysław Bartoszewski, which has been sent to the Rt. Hon. Jack Straw, MP, on the occasion of his appointment to the office of Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

I would be grateful if you could pass them on to the Addressees.

Yours sincerely

Stanisław Komorowski

0044 20 72702152

(unofficial translation)

President
Of the Republic of Poland

Warsaw, 8 June, 2001

The Rt. Hon. Tony Blair
Prime Minister of The United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Dear Prime Minister, *Dear Friend,*

Please accept my sincere congratulations on the occasion of the Labour Party's victorious re-election.

Gaining such a significant electoral support is your unquestionable personal success. It constitutes a proof of confidence that your fellow citizens place in you and in your party and also an evidence of their support for the Party's programme and its achievements till now.

The experiences of your country in regard to realisation of the bold and innovative programme of social reforms proposed by the Labour Party are exceptionally valuable for all European leaders who are confronted - on the threshold of the 21st century - with unprecedented challenges in all fields of public life.

I keep in memory the numerous meetings we have had so far. They were occasions for the creative exchange of views and an inspiration for further actions. I hope to be able to have more such occasions in the future.

I believe that traditional friendly relations between the Republic of Poland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will develop further, with the benefit to our nations, for the sake of peace, stability and prosperity of the united Europe. I will continue giving my special attention to attaining this objective. The perspective is realistic all the more there are historic ties of friendship and co-operation existing between our countries. Recently, these bonds have been reinforced by Poland's membership in NATO. We also expect that thanks to support from our friends in the European Union, and your country among them, we shall win a new platform of co-operation within the European Union.

I wish you, Prime Minister, good health and every success in your further work for the benefit of the citizens of the United Kingdom and the whole Europe.

Your sincerely,

Aleksander Kwasniewski

(unofficial translation)

President
of the Republic of Poland

Warsaw, 8 June, 2001

The Rt. Hon. Tony Blair
Prime Minister of The United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Dear Prime Minister, *Dear Friend,*

Please accept my sincere congratulations on the occasion of the Labour Party's victorious re-election.

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I wish you, Prime Minister, good health and every success in your further work for the benefit of the citizens of the United Kingdom and the whole Europe.

Your sincerely,

Aleksander Kwaśniewski



Prezydent
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

Warszawa, 8 czerwca 2001 roku

Jego Ekscelencja
Pan Tony Blair
Premier Zjednoczonego Królestwa
Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii Północnej

Szanowny Panie Premierze,

drogi Przyjacielu,

Z okazji ponownego zwycięstwa wyborczego Partii Pracy składam Panu najlepsze gratulacje.

Zdobycie tak znacznego poparcia wyborców jest Pana niewątpliwym osobistym sukcesem. Jest dowodem zaufania, jakim współobywatele obdarzyli Pana i kierowaną przez Pana partię, a także poparcia dla jej programu i dotychczasowych osiągnięć.

Doświadczenia Pańskiego kraju na drodze realizacji śmiałego, nowatorskiego programu społecznego zaproponowanego przez Partię Pracy są niezwykle cenne dla wszystkich przywódców europejskich, konfrontowanych - na progu XXI wieku - z bezprecedensowymi wyzwaniami we wszystkich dziedzinach życia publicznego.

Zachowuję w pamięci nasze liczne dotychczasowe spotkania. Były one okazją do twórczej wymiany poglądów i inspiracją do dalszego działania. Liczę na ich kontynuację.

Wyrażam nadzieję, że tradycyjnie przyjazne stosunki między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Zjednoczonym Królestwem Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii Północnej będą się nadal owocnie rozwijać z korzyścią dla naszych narodów, w imię pokoju, stabilności i pomyślności zjednoczonej Europy. Jest to perspektywa, urzeczywistnieniu której zamierzam nadal poświęcać znaczną uwagę. Jest ona tym bardziej realna, że oba nasze państwa łączą historyczne więzi przyjaźni i współdziałania. W ostatnim okresie dodaliśmy do nich członkostwo Polski w NATO. Oczekujemy także, że korzystając ze wsparcia naszych europejskich przyjaciół, w tym i Pańskiego kraju, zyskamy nową platformę współpracy w ramach Unii Europejskiej.

Życzę Panu, Panie Premierze, zdrowia i sukcesów w dalszej pracy na rzecz obywateli Zjednoczonego Królestwa i całej Europy.

z najlepszymi życzeniami oraz przyjaźnią

Aleksander Kwaśniewski

Aleksander Kwaśniewski

unofficial translation

Mr
cc: JS

Warsaw, 18 June, 2001

PRIME MINISTER
OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND
JERZY BUZEK

Dear Prime Minister, Dear Tony,

On the second assumption of your duties as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, I wish to extend sincere congratulations on behalf of the Polish Government and on my own behalf.

I would like to express our best wishes for success and personal satisfaction of your noble service to the British Nation and to international community.

The tradition of our contacts makes me confident that in any difficult matter Poland can always count on a genuine solidarity and support of your Government.

I am convinced that further in our efforts to join the European Union as soon as possible, your Government and the people of the United Kingdom will provide us with as strong support as ever.

With best regards,

Jerzy Buzek

His Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, MP
Prime Minister
of The United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
London

PREZES RADY MINISTRÓW
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ

JERZY BUZEK

Warszawa, 18 czerwca 2001 r.



Salonowy Panie Premierze, Tony Tony


Z okazji powtórnego objęcia przez Pana zaszczytnej funkcji Premiera Zjednoczonego Królestwa Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii Północnej pragnę przekazać, w imieniu rządu polskiego oraz własnym, serdeczne życzenia i gratulacje.

Życzę Panu Premierowi wielu sukcesów oraz osobistej satysfakcji w szlachetnej służbie Narodowi Brytyjskiemu oraz społeczności międzynarodowej.

Tradycja naszych kontaktów pozwala mi być pewnym, że Polska może zawsze liczyć na autentyczną solidarność i pomoc Pańskiego rządu w trudnych sprawach. Jestem przekonany, że także w staraniach o jak najszybsze wejście Polski do Unii Europejskiej wsparcie ze strony Pańskiego rządu oraz społeczeństwa Wielkiej Brytanii dla polskiej sprawy będzie niezmiennie silne.

Pozostaję z wyrazami głębokiego szacunku,

Z poszanowaniem



Jego Ekscelencja

Pan Tony Blair

Premier Zjednoczonego Królestwa

Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii Północnej

Londyn

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