

Prem 19/1951/2

Part 2 of 2

Michael Ward

I was Russian spy, says MI5 man's wife

by Simon Freeman and
Barrie Penrose

A RETIRED Oxford don, the wife of one of Britain's most distinguished professors of law, has reopened the controversy about Soviet penetration of the British security services and political establishment. Mrs Jennifer Hart, married to Professor Herbert Hart, a former principal of Brasenose College, Oxford, says that she was recruited to spy for the Soviet cause shortly before joining the Home Office in the late 1930s.

Mrs Hart, a former history don at St Anne's College, Oxford, says that she has told her story for the first time in an effort to quell suspicions that she had passed secret information to Soviet agents while working in Whitehall. But her statement leaves unanswered the question of whether Herbert Hart, a senior MI5 officer during the war, whom she married in 1941, knew of her activities.

Mrs Hart will not say whether she ever told her husband about her communist beliefs and her role as a "sleeper" in the Home Office - the term used in espionage circles to describe an agent who only begins spying after establishing an impeccable reputation.

Mrs Hart has even admitted that she recommended one young man to MI5. "I saw a lot of the MI5 people and got on very well with them," she says. "I think they trusted me implicitly. One day, the head or the deputy head of MI5 said - I think this was in May 1940 - that they were desperately short of people and did I know any bright young men? I recommended someone who got in at once. They were very pleased with him. I could have easily recommended someone who either was or had been a communist."

Mrs Hart told the Sunday Times yesterday that her communist controllers had wanted her to wait before leaking material. "You don't rush into the Civil Service and start giving secrets away," she says. "It's commonsense." Mrs

Floud, later a Labour MP, who committed suicide in 1967 after being interrogated by MI5 about his KGB connections. Floud had just been offered a junior ministership by the then Prime Minister, Harold Wilson.

Mrs Hart supported the communists in the 1930s because she was "desperately worried", like many people about the rise of fascism and unemployment in Britain. "I was called a secret member so I never saw a party card and was told not to associate with members of the Communist Party."

Having taken the Civil Service entrance examination Mrs Hart was encouraged by her communist controllers to work at a major office of state. She says: "They said that I ought to go into something where I would be useful to them." The Civil Service Commission was also keen to use the high flying Jennifer in a key role.


She ended up in the department dealing with telephone tapping and mail intercepts - work which involved her with MI5's surveillance of political extremists, including communists. Mrs Hart says she had several controllers, including one man, a central European, whom she found "creepy" and who enjoyed taking her for long walks on Hampstead Heath.

None of this, says Mrs Hart, was glamorous or enjoyable. Her motives, even now, seem confused. And although she admits to her recruitment as a mole she insists, paradoxically, that she never really intended to become a spy. "It was all very vague and not as tight as people might imagine," she says. "But I agree that most British communists then didn't disapprove of leaking material."

Mrs Hart was eventually interrogated by MI5 in 1967 - the year that Floud committed suicide and began to discover the full extent of the Soviet penetration that began in the 1930s.



Jennifer Hart as a young wife and, below, as she appears in the TV programme



Hart has told her story in detail on BBC2's programme *Time-watch*, due to be screened on July 27.

The cast of characters in Mrs Hart's bizarre story reads like a *Who's Who* of top British spies. For example, her husband, Herbert worked alongside Anthony Blunt in MI5. At one stage Mrs Hart had the same Soviet controller as Burgess and Maclean - like Blunt, members of the Cambridge spy ring.

Like many Communist sympathisers in the 1930s Mrs Hart was intellectual and middle class, her father was the distinguished international lawyer Sir John Fischer Williams.

Jennifer Hart was first recruited as a spy by Bernard



Open-air communion in Oxford yesterday

Trongs, says Canterbury

ion that this happiness could be a ty for the whole world.

iblical Christianity, he said, claimed that men and women do not grow to their full until they surrender their own rights in ice of the love of God and neighbour". "joy and fullness of life is the gift of which comes to some of those, like the poor mentioned in St. Matthew's gospel, modern man would count most."

s contrast, said the archbishop, there was ange to all Christians to take up the Movement's example of "a great ary effort to our country and culture". procession of priests in matching white as moved out from the polychromatic in gothic of Keble College to take part in ice. The Oxford Movement prepared the a revived affection, in parts of the of England, for ritual and gothic ure. Its admirers then and now have en interested in reunion with Roman ism. The movement came effectively to in 1845 when one of its leaders, John ewman, went over to Rome.

Two ways to

18 JUL 1983

cutting dated 19

see DONT
PUS

MI5 wife denies passing secrets to Russia

By ALAN COPPS

MR S JENIFER HART, the wife of a former MI5 officer, who has admitted being recruited as a Soviet spy before going to work in the Home Office in the late 1930s, claims she never passed on secret information.

A former history don at St Anne's College, Oxford, Mrs Hart's part in the Soviet penetration of the British establishment has not been revealed until now.

She says she has made a statement to quell suspicions that she gave away secrets.

She admits that at the Home Office she had access to confidential documents about the British Communist party, but says she was never required to pass on the information.

Mrs Hart, now retired, has been married since 1941 to Prof. Herbert Hart, a former principal of Brasenose College, Oxford, and an internationally-respected authority on law.

During the 1939-45 War he was a senior MI5 officer and worked alongside Anthony Blunt, the Soviet agent who became Surveyor of the Queen's Pictures, and who was stripped of his Knighthood in 1979.

Mrs Hart's confession is likely to renew the controversy over Soviet penetration of Oxford and Cambridge in the 1930s.

Her story will be broadcast in the BBC 2 programme "Timewatch" on Wednesday week. It does not make clear, however, whether her husband knew of her activities.

Rise of Fascism

At their home in Oxford yesterday, Prof Hart said: "As a matter of principle I don't speak to anyone from the Press." His wife was not at home, he said.

In the programme Mrs Hart, whose father, Sir John Fischer Williams, was also a distinguished international lawyer, says she was recruited as a secret member of the Communist party in the 1930s, when like many others she was "desperately concerned" about the rise of Fascism.

She was not given a party card and was told not to associate with other members. She was chosen as a "sleeper" — an agent who is trained to begin

Telephone tapping

At the Home Office she was assigned to a department dealing with telephone tapping and intercepted mail and met a lot of MI5 people involved in surveillance of political extremists including Communists.

Mrs Hart at one time had the same Soviet controller as Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean, the two diplomat members of Blunt's Cambridge spy ring who later defected to Moscow.

She claims she was recruited by Bernard Floud, who later became a Labour MP. He committed suicide in 1967 after being interrogated by MI5. It was then that Mrs Hart was eventually interrogated.

She says she broke off contact with her controls after becoming disillusioned with the Soviet Union because of the Stalinist show trials and the Nazi-Soviet pact.

New spy questions for Thatcher

Mr Ted Leadbitter, Labour MP for Hartlepool, whose House of Commons question led to the exposure of Anthony Blunt, is planning more spy questions for the Prime Minister. He is convinced there are still Soviet "moles" active in the British Secret Service.

He is demanding more information about a former Oxford don who worked in intelligence during the Second World War and now admits to being a Russian spy.

He also says he has copies of "secret Cabinet documents" which were leaked to Germany and Japan in 1940.

Mr Leadbitter's moves follow an admission by Mrs Jenifer Hart, a former history don at St Anne's College, Oxford, that she was recruited by the Russians before joining the Home Office in the later 1930s.

Mrs Hart, whose husband, Professor Herbert Hart, worked

with Mr Blunt in MI5, says she passed no secrets to the Russians because "I was not required to".

She tells of her life as a Soviet spy in *Timewatch*, a BBC television programme, to be shown on July 27. In a statement released by the BBC she says: "Although, after a time, I did see very secret things about the British Communist Party. I was never tempted to give anything away and I did not ever give anything away because I was not required to."

Mrs Hart worked in the Home Office department handling tapping telephones and intercepting mail. At one point she had the same Soviet controller as the spies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean.

Mr Leadbitter is not satisfied with Mrs Hart's statement and is pressing for a Government statement about her activities

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DAILY MAIL
18 JUL 1983

Cutting dated 19

MP TO QUIZ MAGGIE ON NEW SPY REVELATIONS.

By STEWART PAYNE

THE MP who exposed traitor Anthony Blunt is to raise the issue of Soviet 'sleeper' Jenifer Hart in the Commons.

Mrs Hart, a retired Oxford history don whose husband worked with Blunt in MI5, has confessed that she was recruited to spy for Russia in the late 1930s.

She worked for a time in the Home Office department dealing with tapping telephones and intercepting mail and, at one point, had the same Soviet controller as spies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean.

But she said she passed on no secrets because she was a 'sleeper' whom the Soviets wanted to reach high office before sending on information.

Last night Mr Ted Leadbitter, Labour MP for Hartlepool, said he was not satisfied with Mrs Hart's explanation, released by the BBC who are documenting her activities in a forthcoming edition of the Timewatch programme.

He said: 'I want to know for sure — would she have divulged information if asked and had she been doing it even though not asked? We have to be clear about the words she is using.' He said he would be tabling questions 'in the near future' as well as writing to the Prime Minister.

'Desperate'

He also plans to ask about claims that highly secret war-time Cabinet papers dealing with Britain's Naval tactics were leaked to the enemy in 1940.

He said that he was sent a copy of the documents a week ago by an informant who claimed that they had been leaked to Germany and Japan.

He added that his source was 'desperate' that action should be taken. The informant had brought the matter to the attention of Mrs Thatcher 'but had received no satisfaction.'

Mr Leadbitter said he could not link the two matters. 'I am still checking on the authenticity of the information I have been given', he said.

18 JUL 1983

cutting dated 19

USSR
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Whitehall 'knew secret facts about Communists'

RECRUITED to spy for the Soviet Union before the last war, former Home Office civil servant Jennifer Hart yesterday said that in Whitehall she had been privy to "very secret things about the British Communist Party."

Her statement, issued in a BBC briefing notice about a forthcoming televised interview with her, was immediately used by right-wing Labour MP Ted Leadbitter as an excuse for a further bout of Soviet spy mania.

Ever since his questions to Mrs. Thatcher led to the uproar over Anthony Blunt, the Hartlepool MP has been keen to get his teeth in again.

He would be putting down questions in the Commons this week, he said last night. He was convinced there were still moles in Whitehall.

"A source who is desperate that action should be taken" had given him secret Cabinet documents on naval deployment which had been leaked to "the enemy" and he wanted to know what was up.

Ms. Hart, a former history don at St. Anne's College in Oxford, says that she was recruited as a Soviet agent before starting to work at the Home Office in the late '30s. Her husband worked in MI5.

She worked in the department dealing with phone tapping and the interception of mail. "After a time I did see very secret things about the British Communist Party" but "I was never tempted to give anything away."

Cutting dated 18 JUL 1983 19

New spy quiz for Maggie

PREMIER Margaret Thatcher is to be pressed to give full details about Russian spies in Britain's secret service.

Labour MP Ted Leadbitter, whose Commons questions led to the exposure of Buckingham Palace adviser Anthony Blunt, is convinced there are still Soviet moles active in MI5.

He says he wants a fresh Government statement about spying activities.

His move follows a confession by former Oxford history don and Home Office worker Jennifer Hart that she was recruited by the Russians in the late 1930s.

Mrs Hart, whose professor husband Albert worked with Blunt in MI5, reveals her spying role in a BBC-TV programme, Timewatch, to be shown on July 27.

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Purvis

MISB
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P. 1117

NEW SPY SHOCKS TO COME, SAYS MP

By RICHARD ELLIS

BRITAIN could soon be rocked by a new series of spy scandals, an MP warned last night.

Labour's Ted Leadbitter hit out after yet another Russian mole was unearthed. He said: "There are more skeletons left — and some still in high places. There has been a cover-up."

The MP claimed to have copies of secret documents which could expose another Red spy.

Mr Leadbitter's warning came after Jenifer Hart, the wife of a former top MI5 officer, confessed to being a Soviet agent in the Thirties.

Hart worked in a sensitive post at the Home Office during the war... but she denies passing secrets to the Russians.

The former Oxford don says she was a "sleeper" recruited to feed information to her Soviet spymasters when she reached a high position of trust.

Clear

But she claims she broke off the deal with her Kremlin bosses after becoming disillusioned with Russia.

In an interview to be screened by BBC 2's Time-watch programme on July 27, Hart says: "Although I did see various secret things I was never tempted to give anything away."

Hart, wife of senior MI5 officer Herbert Hart, was recruited by the Soviets while studying at University in the same era as spies Kim Philby and Guy Burgess.

During an interrogation by M15, after which (for unconnected reasons) he committed suicide, Floud named another person whom, he claimed, he had himself approached to join the Soviet spy network—a young Communist sympathiser called Jenifer Fischer Williams. This was shortly before she obtained an appointment in the Home Office, where she worked in the department dealing with M15 requests to the Home Secretary for permission to tap telephones and intercept mail.

As a result of this allegation, Miss Fischer Williams (now Mrs Herbert Hart, wife of the former Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford) was interviewed by M15. She told her questioners that by the time she entered the Home Office department dealing with 'tapping' requests she had become totally disillusioned with the Soviet Union, and all its doings, and that she had committed no offence.

When I telephoned Mrs Hart in Oxford last week she told me, after 24 hours' reflection, that she was unable to help me with my inquiries into the matter. I have no evidence to suggest that she was anything other than the innocent victim of circumstance.

She did, however, furnish the M15 interrogators with information about the friendship between Proctor and Burgess which eventually led to Proctor's being interviewed by the Service.

EXTRACT from: "A MATTER OF TRUST : MI5 1945-1972

by Nigel WEST published in December 1982


Another of those associated with Floud was Jenifer Hart, wife of Herbert Hart, the Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, and himself a wartime MI5 officer. Mrs Hart was one of the five daughters of a prominent international lawyer, Sir John Fischer Williams, and had worked in the Home Office. She in turn had come to MI5's attention after being denounced by Mrs Flora Solomon, the Marks & Spencer executive who had offered proof of Philby's duplicity in 1962.

Mrs Hart had never made any secret of her strong leftist sympathies and, when interviewed by MI5, denied ever having committed an offence. She did, however, confirm that she had been a member of a Fabian-style discussion group of civil servants. One of their number was Sir Dennis Proctor, the recently retired Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Power.

Furnival Jones had authorized an interview with Sir Dennis at his home in the South of France, but the results had been inconclusive. He admitted having been a member of The Apostles, the intellectual group of the Cambridge Left (which, incidentally, numbered Blunt, Burgess and Long amongst its members), while he was up at King's, and also agreed that he might have inadvertently provided Burgess with useful information, but he too categorically denied having committed an offence.

The dilemma facing the Director-General in 1967 was complex. Neither Mrs Hart nor Sir Dennis constituted a threat to security.

THE	
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ARCHIVES	

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Rem 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1951</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Letter dated 4th of July 1983</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 20 June (AO83/1755) about the book which Mr. Rupert Allason is writing on the work of the Secret Intelligence Service.

The Prime Minister has agreed that you should discuss with Mr. Cecil Parkinson whether an approach might be made by him to deter Mr. Allason from persevering with this book.

The Prime Minister also agreed that you should put in hand as a matter of urgency a study of the United States legislation which makes it an offence to name individuals as being concerned with intelligence organisations, with a view to seeing whether we could not introduce similar legislation in this country.

In addition, she has asked whether it can be discovered who is giving information to Mr. Allason and whether sanctions can be applied to prevent them from doing so.

FERS

22 June 1983

S E C R E T

1) Who is looking
and what are
the chances?
me

SECRET

Prime Minister

18

Agree that Mr. Parkinson should
speak to Mr. Allason?
and that Sir Robert Armstrong
should put in hand a study of
possible legislation to deter this sort of
publication?
FERB

Ref. A083/1755

MR BUTLER

Unlikely

You will remember that Mr Rupert Allason, under his pen name Nigel West, wrote two books on the Security Service, as a result of which he has become a "recognised expert" on the subject. 21.6.

2. Mr West is now writing a book on the work of the Secret Intelligence Service. He has submitted the first part of the book, covering the period 1909-40, to the Secretary of the D Notice Committee.

3.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

4. But I fear that this may not be sufficient to deter Mr West or his publishers. We have been advised that it would be fruitless to contemplate legal action under the law as it now stands. The question is whether there is any other kind of action open to us to discourage Mr West.

5. As the Prime Minister will know, Mr West has political ambitions to be a Conservative Member of Parliament, and was a candidate in the recent General Election. He presumably has not abandoned these ambitions. This leads me to wonder whether an approach made to him through political channels, asking him to abandon his plans to publish books on the SIS, might have some effect upon him. Such an approach could be made by the Prime Minister herself, as Leader of

SECRET

the Conservative Party; but perhaps that is flying too high, particularly given the risk that Mr West will defy the approach. If the Prime Minister preferred, I should be very happy to discuss with Mr Cecil Parkinson, as Chairman of the Conservative Party, whether an approach might be made by him.

6. This new book, together with the Bloch book, raises the question whether we ought to consider the possibility of fresh legislation to deter publications of this kind. I understand that the United States Government has recently passed legislation making it an offence to name individuals as being concerned with intelligence organisations. I should like to put in hand as a matter of urgency a study of this legislation, with a view to seeing whether we could and should introduce similar legislation in this country.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

20 June 1983

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17 Security



J. Nursaw

LEGAL SECRETARY.

LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
LONDON, WC2A 2LL

21 January 1983

F E R Butler Esq
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
LONDON S W 1

Dear Robin, ^{FERB}

I refer to your letter of 21 December to John Halliday. I have had a number of enquiries from the Duty Clerk asking for a response to that part of your letter which records that the Prime Minister asked the Attorney to consider arguments which she might use in the House of Commons on the question of a Select Committee on Security. I have explained that the Attorney has spoken to the Prime Minister about this and is under the impression that no further action by him is necessary. He first discussed the problem with the Security Service and I have a note of the conclusions which were then reached. If you wish to have something further in writing, I will arrange this but I wonder if the lead ought not to come from the Home Office.

*Yours sincerely,
John Nursaw*

SECRET

SECRET

16

2:6 AM

Security Lab 2
P42.



ccs HO-S/S
HO-PUS
CO
D6/SS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

18 January 1983

Dear Tim,

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your letter of 14 January conveying the Attorney General's decisions about prosecution of Mr Martin and Mr West in respect of Mr West's book on the Security Service and action against those who have given information to Mr West for his forthcoming book on the Secret Intelligence Service and the Special Branch.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely,

Robin Butler

J Nursaw Esq CB
Law Officers' Department

SECRET

Secretary
Clerk
Blunt



Lie AH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

The Prime Minister has seen
and noted your minute of 17 January
to me (A083/0151) about the book
"After Long Silence" written by
Mr Michael Whitney Straight.

F.R.B.

18 January 1983

AH

Prime Minister

For information.

Ref. AO83/0151

FC RB

MR BUTLER

17.1.
ms

The Prime Minister will probably remember that the lead which led to Anthony Blunt's confession in 1964 was a statement by an American, Mr Michael Whitney Straight, towards the end of 1963 that he had been recruited by Mr Blunt as an agent of the KGB when he was at Cambridge before the war. In his book "Their Trade Is Treachery" published in 1981, Chapman Pincher stated that it was information given by an American which led to Blunt's confession. The description of the American made him readily identifiable as Mr Straight, and Mr Straight subsequently admitted publicly that the reference was to him.

2. Mr Straight has now written an autobiography called "After Long Silence" which will be serialised in the Observer and will subsequently be published both here and in the United States. Mr Straight says that he has written his book "to explain myself to my children and grandchildren". The Security Service have seen the manuscript. The book is well written and is a unique account of an American's experience of the Cambridge of Blunt and Burgess, who are extensively mentioned in it. It also deals with Mr Straight's later involvement with politics and journalism in the United States.


3. The book contains no information which is not already known to the Security Service or which might be regarded as particularly damaging to the interests of the Security Service.

RWA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

17th January 1983

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <u>Crem 19</u> PIECE/ITEM <u>1951</u> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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ATTORNEY GENERAL

✓ M.H.
7.1.

PRESSURE FOR PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF THE SECURITY SERVICES

You discussed this morning with the Director General of the Security Service and BS how the Government might respond to Parliamentary pressure for some control over the Security Services to be given to, say, a specially constituted Select Committee. This note records the conclusions which were reached but does not attempt to set out the detailed argument.

The majority of MPs would no doubt agree that ^{if the existing arrangements have to be changed} the oversight of the Security Services must be given to persons who can be trusted and that a specially chosen Select Committee would be necessary. However, some MPs would not find that a satisfactory solution and would argue that there should be full Parliamentary control. The argument against that is partly the impossibility of keeping any secrets when they have to be shared with so many people and partly that there may well be MPs who cannot be trusted with secrets of this kind. Recent elections in Northern Ireland have shown that there is a risk that Members could be returned to Parliament whose loyalties might lie with subversive groups in whose activities the Security Services were interested. If the House as a whole cannot act as watchdog, the question is whether a Select Committee could be appointed so to act.


There is no positive vetting of MPs and for many reasons it would not be right to introduce it. All that we have at present is a system under which Prime Ministers are informed of matters which might affect their decision about the appointment of particular Members to ministerial office. That system only works because there is an individual to receive the information in the strictest confidence, to form a judgment of its relevance and to act upon it. If the

/membership

membership of a Select Committee is to be under the control of the House, it would be impossible to operate any form of warning because each Member of the House would have to be supplied with the information about his colleagues. The conclusion is, therefore, that there could be no way of ensuring that the membership of a Select Committee did not include persons about whose suitability there would be real cause for doubt. A Select Committee nominated by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition is a theoretical possibility because those two persons could be briefed in confidence but such a Select Committee would not have the confidence of those who criticise the existing system. If they are not satisfied with the control exercised by democratically elected Members who have been appointed to ministerial office, they are hardly likely to regard as satisfactory an arrangement under which a supervisory role was conferred on a number of other Members selected by establishment figures.


Whatever the system, it would be vital that secret information went no further than the members of the Select Committee. This would mean that other Members would have to take on trust the decisions of the Select Committee because they would not know the evidence which the Committee had seen. It would also pose very real difficulties because members of the Select Committee would not be able to have copies of documents, nor would their secretaries or research assistants be able to assist them in this work.

The point was made that the American system was devised to meet a very different constitutional arrangement under which those exercising ministerial control were not members of the elected legislature. Apparently there had been considerable difficulties in ensuring that documents provided to the Security Commission were seen only by members of the Commission and not by their staffs.



J NURSAW

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Em 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1951</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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SECURITY.

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2.6 AA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

FURTHER PUBLICITY
ABOUT THE SECURITY SERVICE

Thank you for your minute of
23 November (A082/0235), which I have
shown to the Prime Minister. She has
noted its contents.

F.R.B.

24 November 1982

9

SECRET AND PERSONAL

MR. BUTLER

Prime Minister

2

12

ms

Further Publicity about the Security Service

Thank you for your minute of 19th November. ^{with FERB?}

2. I am afraid that it arrived with me too late for there to be any chance of effecting the exchange of letters between the Treasury Solicitor and Mr. West's solicitors. This was in any case a highly technical exchange, in which the sort of expression of view suggested would have been a little out of place. That does not, of course, prevent the Prime Minister expressing the view if and when she is invited to comment on the book, or on the articles in the Sunday Times to which the book is giving rise.

3. I reported by telephone to the Prime Minister on 20th November that there had been a number of developments during the course of 19th November. Mr. Barry Penrose of the Sunday Times had that morning approached Mr. Graham Mitchell, the former Deputy Director General of the Security Service who retired in 1963 and was the subject of an in-house investigation. Mr. Penrose showed Mr. Mitchell a number of extracts from Mr. West's book; and it was clear from Mr. Mitchell's subsequent reports to the Security Service that Mr. Penrose had a copy of an unexpurgated typescript of the book. The Court Order on the basis of which the injunction was renewed required Mr. West not only not to publish or cause to be published the original manuscript but also to use his best endeavours to ensure that it was not otherwise published. His solicitors were therefore immediately contacted, and it was made clear to them that Mr. Penrose's possession of an unexpurgated version of the manuscript was regarded as a serious breach of the Court Order (which could lead to proceedings for contempt of court). The Editor of the Sunday Times was also approached. He was at first inclined to resist representations that he should not publish material which Mr. West had agreed to exclude from the book; but, once it was made clear to him that the Treasury Solicitor was

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

prepared to go to the court for an injunction on the Sunday Times
before publication of the issue of 20th November, the Editor under-
took not in that issue, or subsequently, to publish any of the
excluded material.

ReA

Robert Armstrong

23rd November 1982

SECRET AND PERSONAL



211 A14

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

FURTHER PUBLICITY ABOUT
THE SECURITY SERVICE

The Prime Minister has seen your secret and personal minute of 18 November (A082/0167). She has noted the contents of your minute and has commented that she would want to make clear when the book is published that its publication will be damaging to the Security Service. She would like also to make this point in the exchange of letters which concludes the agreement.

F.R.B.

19 November 1982

AH

Ref. A082/0167

PRIME MINISTER

*In the letter - 1
hope we can make it
clear that publication
of the book will be
damaging. not*

Prime Minister

*It appears that the
Treasury Solicitor has made the
best of a bad job.*

F.E.R.B.

12.11.

Further Publicity about the Security Service

I sent you a minute (reference A09682) on 8 October about a proposed new book by Nigel West (otherwise Rupert Allason) on MI5 between 1945 and 1972. That minute proposed that we should seek an immediate injunction and subsequently seek to negotiate with Mr West for the removal from the manuscript of as much of the damaging material as possible. Mr Butler's minute of 11 October gave your agreement (subject to confirmation, subsequently obtained, that the Home Secretary and the Attorney General were content) to this course of action. This minute reports the outcome of the negotiations that have ensued.

2. Despite his initial public statements when the injunction was granted, Mr West has in fact proved to be reasonably co-operative. No doubt his and his publishers' desire to publish in time for the Christmas market and the delay and cost of further legal proceedings - quite apart from uncertainty over their outcome - have been a factor. The surviving text will still be an unwelcome and damaging publication, not least because it will be clear that it could not have been written without help and information from former members of the Security Service. But the amendments which West has accepted - subject to one or two final points which should be resolved within a few days - do remove the most damaging material, including virtually all that which has not previously become public in some form. In particular, the names of those not previously identified as members of the Security Service would be deleted. The Treasury Solicitor and the Legal Adviser to the Security Service consider that the changes agreed are the best that we are likely to achieve.

3. Once an agreement is reached with Mr West, it will be embodied in a court order which would refer to a text showing agreed amendments and deletions which would, for obvious reasons, not be published. The injunction would then be withdrawn, on terms, and any subsequent breach of the court order would be punishable as contempt of court.

4. What remains, although it contains little that is entirely new, will still be damaging, particularly as publication will be in the aftermath of the Prime case. Mr West has adopted the technique of the investigative journalist: he has gathered together material previously published in a variety of different ways and at various times over many years, has made good gaps in the published material with his own conjectures (some of them confirmed by incautious comments from former members of the Service whom he has approached), and has assembled the result in a manner that produces the impression of an authoritative and comprehensive history of the Security Service, with the damaging implication that much of the information comes - as, in fact, it does - from "inside" sources. Nevertheless, because Mr West can point to other published references for so much of his material, it is most unlikely that we could achieve anything further by pursuing civil proceedings under an injunction for breach of confidence. I should also add that there remain several remarks about the personal lives of individuals, for example Sir Roger Hollis, which are likely to give offence to relatives and friends and could add to the controversy.

5. In deciding upon the course for which I sought your approval last month, we decided in effect to make the best of a bad job: to accept that there was very little prospect of preventing publication altogether, and to try to get as much as possible of the most damaging material removed. The Treasury Solicitor has had greater success in this than many of us had expected; in particular, Mr West has accepted that the agreement reached should also cover the text to be published in the United States. On balance, I consider that, provided that the outcome of the final points under negotiation is satisfactory, an agreement with Mr West will represent the least damaging course of action open to us.

6. We shall need to consider what we say when the book is published. Mr West will no doubt seek to portray an agreement as implied authorisation by the authorities when the book appears. Although an exchange of letters would be necessary to conclude the agreement, this would have to be kept as short and as formal as

possible in order to preserve our freedom to comment on the book when it appeared. I think that you would have to say that the withdrawal of the injunction and the agreement on which that was based in no way implied authority or approval for issue of the book as published, that the injunction had been concerned only with issues of breach of confidence, and that its withdrawal carried no implication that the Government regarded the book itself as accurate or its publication as being consistent with the national interest.

7. One of the most worrying aspects of this case, especially as Mr West has other similar books in view on the SIS and on the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, has been the willingness of a few ex-members of the Security Service, for whatever motive, to talk to Mr West and the way in which he has used this as a key to obtaining confirmation or further information from others. The Security Service are planning to write to former senior members of their Service to warn them of Mr West's investigative techniques and to re-emphasise the dangers - and possible legal consequences - of saying anything at all in response to an approach. I shall suggest that similar action should be taken in the other services concerned.

8. I understand that the Attorney General has considered the possibility of an exemplary prosecution. If Mr West amends the book as we required, it would clearly not be possible to proceed against him. The Attorney General has further concluded that it would not be in the public interest to prosecute Mr Martin (who was the source of much of Mr West's more damaging information) because he drew the attention of the Security Service to the fact that he had supplied Mr West with this information, and in effect made it possible to take out an injunction against and reach an agreement with Mr West.

9. The Attorney General agrees that an agreement with Mr West on the basis described in this minute is the best outcome that we are likely to achieve. The Treasury Solicitor is expecting to conclude an agreement with Mr West tomorrow morning. I will provide further briefing on what you might say about the book when it is published, nearer the time.

in view of the public - action of the book - it will be dangerous to the Security Service


10. I understand that Mr West, under his real name of Rupert Allason, has ambitions to stand as a Conservative candidate for Parliament. His desire to stand well with the leadership of the Party may have had something to do with his readiness to co-operate with the Treasury Solicitor in this affair. I do not know whether it would be possible to suggest to him that his political fortunes would have better prospects if he stopped investigating the security and intelligence services and publishing books of this kind. Such suggestions might in any case be ineffective, given that Mr West is acquiring something of a reputation and a considerable amount of money as a self-appointed "expert" on these matters.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

18 November 1982

THE	
NATIONAL	
ARCHIVES	

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Item 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1981</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Minute dated 15th of October 1982</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>KE</i> <i>18/05/23</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

FURTHER PUBLICITY
ABOUT THE SECURITY SERVICE

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 8 October (A09682) about an issue concerning further publicity for the Security Service.


The Prime Minister is content with the action proposed in paragraph eleven of your minute, provided that it is confirmed that the Home Secretary and the Attorney General are also content. She has additionally asked whether it is practicable to make any arrangements to ensure that Martin does not leave the country while a decision is being considered about criminal proceedings.


I am copying this minute to Mr Halliday (Home Office) and Mr Nursaw (Law Officers' Department).

R.R.B.

11 October 1982

THE	
NATIONAL	
ARCHIVES	

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Rem 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1951</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Minute dated 8th of October 1982</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>AC</i> <i>18/05/23</i>
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DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>prem 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1951</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Note dated 30th of September 1982</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>AC</i> <i>18/05/23</i>
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Secret

16

7

Ref. A07894

MR. WHITMORE

*the letter**the**ms**cc to Security
Exposure of Leo Lang*

As can be seen from the Security Service's background note on Chapman Pincher's latest article in the Daily Mail today, the article is inaccurate and distorted, and in so far as it is accurate says nothing that was not known.


2. The Prime Minister clearly cannot get into the business of discussing the details of the article and confirming this and denying that. I therefore recommend that, if she is asked about the article, she should say:

"There is nothing in the article which would cause me to alter or add to the various statements, speeches and answers I have given in this House on these matters."

R. Night

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

*(drafted by Sir R Armstrong
9 signed on his behalf)*23rd March, 1982



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Prem 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>1951</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Article dated 23rd of March 1982</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>AG</i> <i>19/05/93</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 March 1982

Dear Nicholas,

You recently sent my Private Secretary a copy of the letter which you had received from Mr. Morris of Berkhamsted, who wished to know the outcome of the investigation into Mr. Chapman Pincher's sources to which I referred in an answer which I gave in the House on 27 March.

The investigation was completed some time ago. Its findings were reported to the Attorney General, who came to the conclusion that the investigation had been full and thorough, and that there was no scope either for further investigation or for other action.

Yours sincerely

Nicholas Lyell, Esq., Q.C., M.P.

—


DSG

Ref. A07603

MR PATTISON

1. CAW. *Yes.*
Content? *in 24*
 2. *1450,*
G.R.
at type for PM
cc Y.G.
MAP 24/2.

- In your minute of 10th February you asked for a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr N Lyell, MP who has received a letter from one of his constituents asking about the enquiry which the Prime Minister said she would set up into the sources of Chapman Pincher's information, in response to a question about this from Mr Cryer in the House of Commons on 27th March.
- 2. The Attorney General minuted the Prime Minister on 17th July about the investigation into Chapman Pincher's sources. He said in his minute that it was impossible to take the investigation any further. Sir Robert Armstrong minuted Mr Whitmore on 23rd July about the report explaining that Peter Wright was almost certainly Chapman Pincher's primary source for the Hollis affair, that Wright was in Australia and could not be extradited for an offence under the Official Secrets Act, and would probably be unlikely to risk a visit to this country because of the risk of prosecution.
- 3. I attach a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Lyell, which reflects the situation which has emerged from the investigation. This has been cleared with the Home Office, the Law Officers and the Security Service.



D J WRIGHT

24th February 1982

DRAFT LETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO MR N LYELL, MP

You recently sent my Private Secretary a copy of the letter which you had received from ~~your constituent~~ Mr Morris of Berkhamsted, who wished to know the outcome of the investigation into Mr Chapman Pincher's sources to which I referred in an answer which I gave in the House on 27th March.

The investigation was completed some time ago. Its findings were reported to the Attorney General, who came to the conclusion that the investigation had been full and thorough, and that there was no scope either for further investigation or for other action.

Home Minister

From The Tutor for Admissions

Received in CF 23/6/82

KEBLE COLLEGE
OXFORD
OX1 3PG

Security

Telephone 59201

tel
23in

Sir Roger HOLLIS papers 18/2/1982. No

Mr.

file

Dear Mr Thatcher

John Patten has passed to me a copy of
your letter of Feb. 11th to him concerning my letter to Sir
Roger Hollis. May I thank you for this, which will bring
comfort to the whole family

Yours sincerely

Adrian S Hollis (A.S. HOLLIS)

~

CONFIDENTIAL



Security

26 AH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

SIR ROGER HOLLIS

I showed the Prime Minister your further minute A07380 of 9 February 1982 about the letter from Dr Adrian Hollis which Mr John Patten MP had passed on to her, and she has accepted your advice that there is no need to mark the letter to Mr Patten "Private and Confidential".

I attach a copy of the letter which has now gone to Mr Patten.

JWH.

11 February 1982

AH

CONFIDENTIAL



File AH

cc C.O.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 February 1982

Dear John.

Thank you for your letter of 26 January, enclosing a copy of Dr Hollis's letter of 18 January to you.

I much regret the distress caused to Dr Hollis and his family by the continuing publicity for the allegations made about Sir Roger Hollis.

I have, of course, seen and made inquiries about the various articles and letters that have been published since I made my statement in the House of Commons on 26 March 1981. Nothing has happened or been published which would lead me to alter or qualify what I said in that statement.

Dr Hollis asks about the allegation that "in May 1974 an official warning that Sir Roger Hollis might have been a Soviet agent for the whole of his twenty-seven years in the Security Service was given to security chiefs of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand". There was indeed a gathering of high level officials from those countries at that time, but according to our records the subject of Sir Roger Hollis was not raised at the meeting. There was no reason why

AH

it should have been: the security authorities concerned had all been told in 1971 or 1972 of the outcome of the investigation of the case.

Y
Lous ever

Ray aut

John Patten Esq., MP

FILE

ds

N. LYELL MP

24/2

MR. WRIGHT
CABINET OFFICE

I attach a copy of a letter which we have received from Mr. Nicholas Lyell M.P., covering one from his constituent Mr. E.H. Morris of 340 High Street, Berkhamsted.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. Lyell, to reach us by 24 February.

M A PATTISON

SW

10 February 1982

Thank you for your recent letter which enclosed a copy of one from your constituent Mr. E.H. Morris. I will place your letter before the Prime Minister and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

M A PATTISON

Nicholas Lyell, Esq., Q.C., M.P.

10.2.82

From NICHOLAS LYELL, Q.C., M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

celk

8/10/2

Dear Principal Private Secretary,

I enclose a letter from my constituent
Mr. E.H. Morris which is self-explanatory.
I would be very grateful to know how matters
stand so that I can reply to him.

Yours Sincerely,

Nicholas Lyell

Principal Private Secretary,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1.

MORRIS

240, High Street,
BERKHAMSTED,
Herts. HP4 1HT.

E.H.Morris.

C.I.Morris.

A.N.Morris.B.Sc. (Hons)

Model Railway Specialists

R.Lyell Esq. M.C. M.P.

House of Commons.

London. W.C.1.


4/2/81

Dear Mr Lyell,

Following publication of Chapman Finchers book during 1981, and the subsequent furore in the House, the F.M. said she had set up an enquiry into the sources of his information.

I would like to hear whether this enquiry ever got work, or was it a bit of cosmetic, and if it has what conclusions it came to, and whether the conclusions will ever be announced in the House.

Yours sincerely



E.H. Morris.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. WHITMORE

Prime Minister.

The revised letter to John Patten
is attached for your signature.

In the light of Sir Robert Armstrong's
advice do you want to mark it
No 'Private + Confidential'? If you do, I will
not have the sentence crossed out by the 10th.

I minuted you on 8th February with a draft reply to the letter which the Prime Minister had received from Mr. John Patten, MP about the letter which he had received from Dr. Adrian Hollis.

2. I should be content with the alteration which the Prime Minister proposes to make in the draft reply.

3. Looking at the draft again in the light of that alteration, I think that perhaps we need to be a little more specific about "the investigation". I suggest that we should talk about the "investigation of the case", which was the phrase used in the Prime Minister's statement of 26th March.

4. For convenience I attach a revised draft.

X. 5. The Prime Minister suggested to me this morning that it might be prudent to mark the letter (like Mr. Patten's own letter) 'Private and Confidential', and to add a sentence saying: "I have marked this letter 'Private and Confidential', but I should have no objection to your passing a copy of it to Dr. Hollis".

6. I should have no objection to this course, if the Prime Minister strongly preferred it. But it would of course detract somewhat from the value of the letter to Dr. Hollis, if he were not able at least to quote it to other members of the family and close friends. One or two other people - including a former Director General of the Security Service - have expressed to me the wish that the Prime Minister could make a further statement to counteract Chapman Pincher's continuing allegations. I have said that, while the Prime Minister would no doubt respond if a Question were raised in the House of Commons, I should not wish to advise her to take the initiative: that would only be to give new prominence to Chapman Pincher's allegations. If there is to be no Question in the House of Commons - and there appears to be no rush to follow up the article which Chapman Pincher published in The Times in December - then the reply to Mr. Patten is, or could be, an oblique way of conveying to those who want to hear it that the Prime Minister still sticks to what she said on 26th March.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7. Perhaps the acid test is whether, if a Question were asked in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister would be prepared to Answer it in the terms of the draft reply to Mr. Patten. If she would be so prepared - and I see no reason why she should not - then there need be no reason for marking the reply to Mr. Patten 'Private and Confidential'.

8. I have consulted the Deputy Director General of the Security Service (in the absence of the Director General). The Security Service agree with this advice. They assure me that the statements in the draft letter cannot be challenged; and they would see some advantage in not restricting the letter in a way which might inhibit Dr. Hollis from telling other members of his family and former colleagues of his father what it said.

RA

Robert Armstrong

9th February 1982

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
JOHN PATTEN Esq., MP

Thank you for your letter of 26th January, enclosing a copy of Dr. Hollis's letter of 18th January to you.

I much regret the distress caused to Dr. Hollis and his family by the continuing publicity for the allegations made about Sir Roger Hollis.

I have, of course, seen and made inquiries about the various articles and letters that have been published since I made my statement in the House of Commons on 26th March 1981. Nothing has happened or been published which would lead me to alter or qualify what I said in that statement.

Dr. Hollis asks about the allegation that "in May 1974 an official warning that Sir Roger Hollis might have been a Soviet agent for the whole of his 27 years in the Security Service was given to security chiefs of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand." There was indeed a gathering of high level officials from those countries at that time, but according to our records the subject of Sir Roger Hollis was not raised at the meeting. There was no reason why it should have been: the security authorities concerned had all been told in 1971 or 1972 of the outcome of the investigation of the case.

Prime Minister

The draft reply to Mr Patten
has been typed for your signature
and is immediately below Sir Robert
Armstrong's minute. RLS:gi

Ref. A07352

MR WHITMORE

--- I attach a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to the letter which she has received from Mr John Patten, MP about the letter which he received from Dr A S Hollis, son of the late Sir Roger Hollis.


2. The draft reply has been agreed with the Home Office and the Security Service.

3. In his letter, Dr Hollis refers particularly to the allegation by Mr Chapman Pincher that in May 1974 the security authorities of certain allied countries were given an "official warning" that Sir Roger Hollis might have been a Soviet agent. As his authority for this, Mr Pincher quotes Mr Kaplan, the present Canadian Solicitor General. What Mr Kaplan has said is that the Canadian security authorities were warned "in the mid-seventies". It is Chapman Pincher who has put that together with the May 1974 meeting, about which he learnt from other sources; and I understand that, when he asked Mr Kaplan to confirm that he had in mind the May 1974 meeting, Mr Kaplan did not reply.

4. The allegation is certainly untrue as it stands. All the security authorities concerned were told about the outcome of the investigation into Sir Roger Hollis two or three years earlier, in 1971 and 1972. There was a gathering in May 1974, but the subject of Sir Roger Hollis did not come up at the meeting. It may be that one of the British representatives at the meeting said outside the formal proceedings that the Hollis investigation might be about to be reviewed; but, if that happened, there is no record of it.

5. As Dr Hollis has made a point of this, and indeed Mr Pincher has relied a good deal on it, we have thought it right to deal with the point in the reply to Mr Patten.

6. Mr Patten's reply was marked 'Private and Confidential'. We have prepared the reply in a form in which Mr Patten can send it on to Dr Hollis. Dr Hollis himself may well want to make some use of it; if he does, we believe that no harm will result.



ROBERT ARMSTRONG

8 February 1982



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 26 January, enclosing a copy of Dr. Hollis's letter of 18 January to you.

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Dr. Hollis asks about the allegation that "in May 1974 an official warning that Sir Roger Hollis might have been a Soviet agent for the whole of his 27 years in the Security Service was given to security chiefs of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand". There was indeed a gathering of high level officials from those countries at that time, but I am advised ~~there~~ ~~is no record that the subject was~~ that no such warning was given at that meeting. The subject of Sir Roger Hollis was not raised at the meeting, and there was no reason why it should have been: the security authorities concerned had all been told in 1971 or 1972 of the outcome of the investigation.

According to our records the subject of Sir Roger Hollis was not raised at that meeting.

John Patten, Esq., M.P.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear John

Thank you for your letter of 26 January, enclosing a copy of Dr. Hollis's letter of 18 January to you.

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John Patten, Esq., M.P.

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
JOHN PATTEN ESQ MP

Thank you for your letter of 26 January, enclosing a copy of Dr Hollis's letter of 18 January to you.

I much regret the distress caused to Dr Hollis and his family by the continuing publicity for the allegations made about Sir Roger Hollis.

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John PATTEN

vb


SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Sir Roger Hollis

I should be grateful for your advice on how the Prime Minister might reply to the attached letter from Mr. John Patten, MP, with which he has sent a letter from Dr. A.S. Hollis, son of the late Sir Roger Hollis.

CAW

29 January 1982





File AH

B/E
to MAP

3/2/82

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

"THEIR TRADE IS TREACHERY"

I have shown the Prime Minister
your minute A07249 of 26 January 1982
about the paperback edition of Chapman
Pincher's book "Their Trade is Treachery",
and she has taken note of it.

JAW.

27 January 1982

AH

JOHN PATTEN, MP



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

26th January, 1982

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON. SW1

Dear Prime Minister:

I have recently been approached by Dr. A. S. Hollis, the Tutor for Admissions of Keble College, Oxford, concerning certain allegations made by Mr. Chapman Pincher against his father, the late Sir Roger Hollis.

I enclose his letter to me, together with some newspaper extracts. You will see that Dr. Hollis asks me to see if you will be prepared to issue any further statement following that which you made in March, 1981. I also enclose a copy of my reply to him.

Needless to say, I fully appreciate the extreme sensitivity of the issue, and will of course not send my constituent a copy of this letter. I am of course perfectly content to pass on to Dr. Hollis that you have nothing further to add, if that is what you wish me to do.

Yrs. ever, John.

JOHN PATTEN, MP



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

26th January, 1982

Dr. A. S. Hollis,
Keble College,
OXFORD.
OX1 3PG

Dear Dr. Hollis:

Thank you so much for your letter of 18th January, 1982.

As a member of the Government, I am, by Parliamentary convention, not able to table a Parliamentary Question (this is the same whichever Party is in power); in any event, I do not believe that that would be the appropriate course of action or would produce the most informative answer.

It seems best if I approach the Prime Minister directly; I have written to her today and I will write to you again as soon as I have a reply.

Yrs. sincerely,
John Patten

From The Tutor for Admissions

KEBLE COLLEGE
OXFORD
OX1 3PG

Telephone 59201

January 18th, 1982.

Dear Mr. Patten.

As you may remember, in March 1981 you most kindly offered to help in any way you could over the allegations made by Chapman Pincher against my father, the late Sir Roger Hollis, in articles and a book. On March 26th, 1981, the Prime Minister cleared my father of these allegations in a Parliamentary statement. Now the less, they have persisted. In particular, family and friends have been distressed by a report that in 1974 Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the USA were warned that my father might have been a Soviet agent (the present Canadian Solicitor General is said to have confirmed that his country did receive such a warning). Chapman Pincher is currently making much of this (two specimens enclosed), and will no doubt continue to do so in a paper-back version of his book which is due out soon.

In view of what the Prime Minister said in March, we find it very hard to believe that any such warning should have been sent. Accordingly, I would very much appreciate it if, on the family's behalf, you could ask the Prime Minister, whether by a Parliamentary Question or a letter (leaving the choice to your judgment), if anything has happened or been published since March 26th, 1981 which might lead her to qualify her statement or to change her mind. We would also be grateful if you can ask specifically whether the story about the warning is true.

Yours sincerely, Adrian S. Hollis (A.S.HOLLIS).

SECRET

Prime Minister.

5

RM

26/02,

Ref. A07249

MR WHITMORE

The paperback edition of Chapman Pincher's book, "Their Trade is Treachery", which gave rise to the Prime Minister's statement of 26 March 1981, is due to be published on 4 February 1982.

2. I attach a note by the Security Service about the new edition. Although the book has been considerably rewritten, it contains no significantly new information about penetration cases, and it adds no further weight to the case against Sir Roger Hollis.

RM

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

26 January 1982

SECRET

THE	
NATIONAL	
ARCHIVES	

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>Prem 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>1981</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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7 January 1982
Policy Unit

PRIME MINISTER

Security

Michael Ivens sent me the attached letter from Chapman Pincher. It is self-explanatory, and I am therefore passing it to you without further comment.

OK

JOHN HOSKYNS

*Please pass to
Sir Robert Armstrong
ms*

Message done.

ms

11.1.82

Summerpage Limited

Telephone
Cranleigh 5656

H. Chapman-Pincher
Church House
16 Church Street
Kintbury, Nr. Newbury
Berks. RG15 0UR
Tel. (04885) 8855 or 397

Lowerhouse Farm
Ewhurst, Surrey
GU6 7SQ

14.12.81

Dear Michael,


Thank you very much for your Yorick piece and for all your marvellous support over so many years. I think there is no doubt that I am winning this one. I enclose a Times article in case you missed it. Also a Mail piece about missing documents. Neither has yet produced any response in Parliament so the conspiracy of silence continues. You may have noticed, however, that a young man who calls himself Nigel West (real name Rupert Allason) is pushing pieces knocking the Hollis suspicions. He is being put up to this by Sir Martin Furnival Jones^{*}, the D.G. of MI5 who succeeded Hollis and was recommended by him and, I suspect, by Sir Dick White who recommended Hollis for the top job. So both have a huge professional interest in keeping the lid on the case and maintaining the fiction that Hollis was cleared.

You will see that I have avoided blaming Margaret for misleading the House. She read from a brief prepared by others who concocted it. I suggest that if you write anything further in Yorick you should underline this. You might also suggest that, in her own interests, Mrs T should get a first-hand account of the Hollis Affair from one or more of the men who did the investigations. There is one who would be only too happy to do this and I know that Jonathan Aitken has written to her suggesting this but, no doubt, the Cabinet Office has objected and given her the wrong advice. As I say in The Times she has been pushed out on to a dangerous limb from which she could be sawn off any day. I think my discovery that the White Commonwealth and the Americans were warned as late as May 1974 that Hollis might have been a spy has half sawn through the limb. She should take steps to ease back off it. Perhaps you can encourage her to do so.

** now retired*

All best wishes to you and your excellent staff

Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Chapman', with a long, sweeping horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Chapman Fincher

Prem 19/1951

Newspaper cutting inside

AS someone who has spent a lifetime investigating Spies and Spycraft there is very little that astonishes me any more.

Yet even my eyes blinked when I heard the Prime Minister admit in the Commons this week that no records prior to 1964 exist anywhere of immunities and inducements offered to spies to secure their confessions.

I doubt if the Prime Minister realised the sensational implications of what she was saying. We have a Civil Service which everyone knows clings almost obsessively to all of its past records.

All the decisions of our present Government and their Civil Service advisers, and of governments and Civil Servants long since past, are carefully preserved.

Yet without any reason being given, we are now told that excluded from all of this is our Secret Service.

And that means that even Mrs Thatcher cannot really tell us what went on during those terrible years of deceit and betrayal which we are at last beginning to learn about.

She does not, for example, know—and I am here happy to inform her—that even Kim Philby, that most monstrous of traitors, was assured in 1963, that he would be granted immunity from prosecution if he assisted MI5 with a full confession of his activities on behalf of his real masters, the KGB.

This assurance had the backing of the then Attorney-General, Sir John Hobson, despite the fact that the authorities knew full well that Philby had been an accessory to the murder of many anti-Soviet agents working for Britain and America.

Warned

The KGB was not prepared to allow Philby to accept the offer and had a senior man on the spot to ensure his escape to Russia.

There is also strong evidence that a high-level spy in MI5, the counter-espionage agency, believed by some intelligence officers to be the Director General, Sir Roger Hollis, had warned the KGB in advance that the immunity offer was going to be made.

Full records of the Philby interrogation were lodged in the registries of MI5 and MI6, the Foreign Intelligence Service. Are they missing from both?

Records are the life-blood of any security or intelligence service. Taxpayers have, unknowingly, spent huge sums to modernise the MI5 and MI6 registries where millions of case records and dossiers on suspects and organisations are kept.

When a long-serving spy is caught, it is necessary to back-track over many years. This cannot be done if old records are unavailable.

In any organisation, documents have to be 'weeded' at intervals so that those of no possible value can be eliminated, but records of lasting importance seem to be missing.

Igor Gouzenko, the Russian cipher clerk who defected from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa in 1945, has revealed to me that



ILLUSTRATION: DAVID ACE

The MI5 chief who destroyed vital files

By Chapman Pincher

In 1972 and 1973 he was questioned about information he had given about a Russian spy code-named 'Elli' who, he claimed, was working in MI5 during the war.

The British security officers who 'questioned' him, and showed him photographs, were trying to establish the identity of the man who had interviewed him on behalf of MI5 early in 1946 and had put in a false report.

This man is known with certainty to have been Hollis, who may have been 'Elli'—but Gouzenko was left in no doubt that MI5 had no documentary record of the fact.

By what can hardly be coincidence, certain documents

about the early interrogation of Gouzenko have also disappeared from the Canadian records.

Mrs Thatcher may be told that many documents had to be destroyed because of their sheer volume when the MI5 and MI6 registries were computerised during the 1960s.

But in my researches for my book, *Their Trade Is Treachery*, serialised by the *Daily Mail*, I came across many instances where Hollis had ordered the destruction of documents on a suspiciously selective basis.

One set involved a high-ranking Naval officer who became

an Admiral and was deeply suspected of being a Russian spy. This is what happened:

In 1961 Anatoli Golitsin, a KGB officer, defected to the CIA and revealed that two Soviet spies were operating in the British Admiralty. One of them proved to be John Vassall, a clerk in the office of the Civil Lord.

The MI5 Investigators also identified a senior Naval officer who had served on the diplomatic staff in Moscow as being possibly responsible for the leakage of secret NATO documents to which Vassall had no access. Hollis refused to allow the officer to be interrogated and declared the case closed.

Vassall was eventually held responsible for all the leakages and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

Later, when Vassall was questioned in prison, the MI5 men became sure that he had not betrayed the NATO documents, but by then Hollis had ordered the destruction of all the papers concerning the suspect Admiral, who is now dead.

Throughout a long career with MI5, a senior officer called Guy Liddell kept office diaries which he dictated each evening. When he left in 1953 he handed them in as an official record and these were stored in the Director General's safe under the code name 'Wall-flowers'.

Shortly before Hollis retired at the end of 1965, he ordered the diaries to be destroyed. Fortunately an MI5 officer who deeply suspected his motives intercepted them and, without Hollis's knowledge they were saved.

I have been assured that, before leaving, Hollis ordered the destruction of tape recordings and transcripts of more than 200 hours of MI5 interviews with Anthony Blunt so that only the summaries remain on file.

Weeded

He also destroyed material evidence concerning the investigation of his deputy, Graham Mitchell, who had been cleared by an internal inquiry in 1963.

My most recent inquiries reveal that Hollis was notorious among his officers as a destroyer of records, and they regarded this as highly suspect. He also abstracted records and held them for years in his office safe.

The 'weeding' situation in MI6 headquarters was equally incredible. A senior MI6 officer called Colonel Charles 'Dick' Ellis had been suspected of being a spy by MI5 from the early 1950s, but MI6 refused to believe they could be harboring another Philby.

So after Ellis returned from a brief retirement in Australia in 1954 he was employed by MI6 'weeding' Secret Service files.

In 1960, he confessed to having spied for Germany during the war and because he spied for money is believed to have been recruited by the Russians who were in a position to blackmail him. Hollis ruled that Ellis should not be prosecuted and he was allowed to continue on full pension.

What Ellis 'weeded' in the way of leads to KGB activities could be of enormous consequence. Recently I saw a handwritten letter from him to a friend in which he had boasted of inserting documents into some MI6 files.

Mrs Thatcher has made it clear that she deplores the way Hollis dispensed virtual immunities and inducements to spies like Leo Long and Charles Ellis without informing the Government.

She has assured Parliament that no Director General will be able to do that again.

She should now give an assurance that steps are being taken to prevent the destruction of documents on the say-so of any MI5 or MI6 officer who might, himself, be a spy.

Hollis: how the Prime Minister was misled

In March this year the Prime Minister confirmed in Parliament that Sir Roger Hollis, the former Director-General of MI5, had been deeply suspected of being a Russian spy but had been cleared by two separate inquiries. This clearance was so at variance with the evidence of those who had investigated him over seven years that I have spent the intervening eight months trying to discover who had been misled. Was it myself through the evidence against Hollis which I disclosed in my book, *Their Trade is Treachery*? Or was it Mrs Thatcher through the statement prepared for her (by Cabinet office and Home Office officials, with assistance from MI5), in direct response to my book? I am now in no doubt that it was the Prime Minister who was misled.

The first alleged clearance resulted from an internal inquiry by MI5 (the Security Service) with assistance from current and past officials of MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service). MI5 chiefs led by Sir Martin Furnival Jones, a solicitor, decided to close the case against Hollis with a judgment that, though his innocence could not be proved, there was no evidence which could have incriminated him in a British court of law. He was, therefore, judged to be cleared of suspicion.

This secret decision, which was not promulgated to those investigating officers who had produced the evidence, was taken in 1972. Yet I have now established that in May 1974 an official warning that Hollis might have been a Soviet agent for the whole of his 27 years in MI5 was given to security chiefs of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand so that they could take remedial action, even at that late stage,

against any damage which he might have inflicted on them.

It was considered necessary because Hollis had been deeply involved in setting up counter-espionage organizations in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and he had had close links with the CIA and FBI. No Whitehall official or politician was told about this warning but the Solicitor General of Canada, Mr Robert Kaplan, has recently confirmed that Canadian security received it "in the mid-1970s" and took what remedial action it could, an admission which has embarrassed Whitehall.

A few weeks after the warning Mr Stephen de Mowbray, one of the officers involved in the Hollis inquiries, was so incensed with what had occurred inside MI5 that he went to see the Prime Minister, then Harold Wilson. Instead he saw the Cabinet Secretary, Sir John Hunt (now Lord Hunt of Tanworth), who was so impressed by his allegations that he recommended a further inquiry by Lord Trend, his predecessor. Wilson concurred.

Lord Trend did no more than review the previous internal inquiry, interviewing witnesses and examining old files. People who have read his secret report confirm that no effort was made to secure any new evidence, though I believe that crucial new information might be available if the Government wished to obtain it. Lord Trend consulted former MI5 and MI6 chiefs who had been party to the original "clearance" and was impressed by their view that if Hollis had been a spy for so long there would have been clinching evidence from a defector or some other source.

In fact one reliable defector, Igor Gouzenko, had reported in 1955 that Soviet

military intelligence had a spy inside MI5 in England for whom Hollis is a near perfect fit. A would-be defector called Volkov had also told of a spy in what now seems to have been MI5 though his information was at first interpreted as applying to Philby, who was in MI6.

Mrs Thatcher's statement, which revealed that Lord Trend had agreed with the original clearance, has been analysed by some of the former investigating officers. They have found at least six areas where it is grossly at variance with the facts as they knew them. The statement was worded to give the impression that all the events I described in my book were very old when in fact Hollis was not interrogated until 1970 and was still being investigated in 1975, two years after his death.

It indicated that the inquiries leading to the suspicion of Hollis arose from routine investigations after the defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1951. In fact they were undertaken because so many MI5 operations in the 1950s and 1960s went so seriously wrong that they could be explained only if there was a high-level spy still in the organization.

The statement compounded this misleading suggestion by saying that the case against Hollis was based on "certain leads that suggested, but did not prove, that there had been a Russian Intelligence service agent at relatively senior level in British counter-intelligence in the last years of the war (my italics)".

This innuendo that the only leads pointing to Hollis dated from 1945 and before is so opposed to the evidence that I wrote to Lord Trend. I knew that he had examined leads which had arisen in the 1960s and his reply indicates

the MI5 mole controversy



Sir Roger Hollis: new evidence if the Government had wanted it

that he is not prepared to be associated with the restriction of them to "the last years of the war".

Mrs Thatcher also told Parliament that "each of the leads pointing to Hollis could also be taken as pointing to Philby or Blunt". Blunt left MI5 in 1946 and Philby left MI6 in 1951. So this was clearly an attempt by the officials who prepared the speech to lumber Blunt and Philby with penetrations achieved by the KGB long after they had ceased to have access to secret information.

The MI5 investigators and others associated with the Hollis inquiries have no hesitation in calling this part of the statement a fabrication. Philby and Blunt were always agents of the KGB while the evidence indicates that the suspected spy in MI5 was working for the GRU — Soviet military intelligence, which operates independently.

The Prime Minister's statement said the MI5 clearance was challenged by "a very few of those concerned". While few may have chal-

lenged it, many disagreed with it. The so-called Fluency Committee which made the original investigations and concluded that Hollis was the prime suspect consisted of seven experienced officers. This was replaced by a permanent section, K7, set up to investigate possible penetrations of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, the radio-intercept agency, and involving about a dozen officers who had not served on the Fluency Committee. Independently they recommended that Hollis should be interrogated in the belief that he might break down and confess.

This interrogation was carried out by Mr John Day of Section K7 under the tightest secrecy because there were high-level fears that a leak to the Russians might result in Hollis's defection, with appalling international consequences. Day was so unimpressed by Hollis's defence of his innocence that he supported de Mowbray in challenging the decision to close the case. It was the decision that Hollis should be given an umpire's verdict of "Not out" that was

supported by "a very few of those concerned."

Mrs Thatcher's assurance that no evidence had been found which "incriminated" Hollis was also true of Fuchs, Blake, Maclean, Philby, Blunt and Long, against whom all the evidence was circumstantial or so secret that it could not be used in a British court unless they voluntarily confessed. To cast further doubt on my Hollis disclosures, the briefers ensured that the Prime Minister would smear my book as being "inaccurate and distorted."

Since then there have been a number of confirmations. My disclosure that Blunt was "blown" by an American, now known to be Mr Michael Straight, has been confirmed by Straight himself. The London woman who "blew" Philby has been identified as Mrs Flora Solomon. My account of Blunt's confession, including his naming of Leo Long, who was clearly described in the book, has been fully justified. The revelation that Tom Driberg, later Lord Bradwell, the Labour MP and Labour Party chairman, had been recruited by MI5 to penetrate the Communist Party and later spy on MPs was dismissed as laughable but has been confirmed by a former woman officer of MI5. Critics were quick to discount my statement that Gouzenko had indicated an MI5 spy with the code-name "Ellie", but the unexpected release of his original testimony has confounded them. There will be further confirmations as inquiries continue.

The analysis of Mrs Thatcher's statement to Parliament leaves me in little doubt that it was an Establishment concoction intended to bury the horrific Hollis Affair and anything connected with it. No doubt the officials who prepared it convinced themselves that they were acting in the best national interest, but all the Prime Minister needed to have said was that Hollis had been suspected, had been investigated and that the case remains unproven. Instead she was induced to go out on a limb from which she might be sawn off any day, for it is far from impossible that proof that Hollis was a spy might still emerge.

SECRET

MR. PATTISONSir Roger Hollis

In his minute of 10th December to Mr. Whitmore, Sir Robert Armstrong reported the likely appearance in The Times of an article by Chapman Pincher about the Hollis case. This article appeared in The Times of 12th December. I attach a copy of a note prepared by the Security Service which comments on the article. As the note makes clear, there is little in the article which is new and much which is a distortion of the facts.


2. In his article, Chapman Pincher also refers to correspondence with Lord Trend. I attach copies of an exchange of correspondence between Lord Trend and Mr. Pincher which took place in August this year. As you will see, Lord Trend (with the agreement of Sir Robert Armstrong) chose not to become involved in a detailed debate with Mr. Pincher about the nature of his inquiry. We are not aware of any other correspondence between Lord Trend and Mr. Pincher which would have allowed Mr. Pincher to write as he did in his Times article.

3. Mr. Pincher's reference to having "spent the intervening eight months trying to discover who has been misled", with the implication that he had done so in the interests of national security, is disingenuous. It is known that Mr. Pincher has been working on a paperback edition of his book and no doubt hoped that he would be able to include new material or allegations in this version (rather as Andrew Boyle succeeded in doing with the paperback version of "Climate of Treason"). As the Security Service note makes clear, it does not seem as if Mr. Pincher has succeeded in this end. We do not know when the paperback version will appear but this Times article appears to be something of a "pot-boiler" intended to keep interest alive, in the knowledge that the appearance of the paperback version is unlikely to be heralded with news of new revelations.

SECRET

SECRET


4. Sir Robert Armstrong recommends that if the Prime Minister is asked about the article this afternoon, she should say that she has nothing to add to the statement which she made to the House on 26th March.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'D. J. Wright', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

D. J. Wright

15th December 1981

SECRET



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>prem 19</i>	Date and sign
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LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD OX1 3DR

FROM THE RECTOR.

RJA

CABIN
A 5251
13 AUG 1981
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

12th August, 1981

Dear Mr. Pincher,

Thank you for your letter of 6th August. I think that, in reply, I can only confirm that, so far as the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament was concerned with my own part in the matter in question, it had, of course, my full agreement.

Yours sincerely,

Derek Fildes

Chapman Pincher, Esq.,
Church House,
16 Church Street,
Kintbury,
Nr. Newbury,
Berks, RG15 0TR.

Telephone
Kintbury (04885) 8855
or 397

Church House
16 Church Street
Kintbury, Nr. Newbury
Berks. RG15 0TR

6.8.81

Dear Lord Trend,


I am completing the paperback version of my book Their Trade is Treachery and wish to ensure that any inaccuracies in the first edition are rectified.

The changes and expansions I have made take full account of your decision-unknown to me before - that you had decided that Sir Roger Hollis had not been an agent of the Russian intelligence service, as the Prime Minister told Parliament. I understand that you are also on record as saying that you agree with all that the Prime Minister said, concerning your inquiry, to Parliament. I would welcome your confirmation of this because I am anxious not to misrepresent your findings in a book which is to have world-wide distribution.

The part of the Prime Ministerial statement which worries me - and others - is the paragraph indicating that each of the leads on which the case for investigating Hollis was based could also be taken as pointing to Philby or Blunt. The evidence presented in my book, much expanded in the paperback, indicates that much of it eventuated after 1951, by which time both Blunt and Philby were out of the picture.

I appreciate the sensitivity of the situation but I do not wish to attribute that view to you without giving you the opportunity to say whether it also your opinion or not.

Yours sincerely,


Chapman Vincher

SECRET

Prime Minister.

3

Ref. A06887

MR. WHITMORE

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Sir Roger Hollis

I have heard from the Security Service that a delicate source has revealed to them that The Times may shortly carry an article by Chapman Pincher about the Hollis case. From what they know of the proposed article, it seems to be largely a rehash of Pincher's book and the press articles which he has written about Hollis, and is intended to keep up interest in the Hollis case and other spy cases in preparation for the forthcoming launch of the paperback version of Pincher's book. The article is expected to question whether the Prime Minister was misinformed when she said in her 26 March statement that all of the leads involved in the investigation of Sir Roger Hollis could be explained by reference to Blunt and Philby. Pincher may say that there were at least seven people involved in the investigation of Sir Roger Hollis who rejected this conclusion.

In naming de Mowbray Pincher will say that the Trend inquiry was called for because Sir John Hunt had been very impressed with de Mowbray's line and that in the light of this he thought a further inquiry was necessary. The article is also expected to be critical of the way in which the Trend inquiry was conducted.

2. From what we know of the proposed article, it does not seem likely to contain anything new and it should be possible to refer any inquiries which result from it in either the House or from the press to what the Prime Minister had to say on 26 March.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Prime Minister.

10th December 1981

The article appeared in last Saturday's Times. A copy is attached.

I have selected the more interesting passages. The only new point is the revelation that Pincher has been in touch with Lord Trend and the allegation that Lord Trend did not go along with the much in your statement that certain leads suggested that there had been an RIS agent or a relatively senior in the case (but, in conclusion, not the same).

SECRET

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OF THE PUBLIC ACCESS ACT

Item 19/1951

Minute dated
10.12.81

Chapman Pincher reopens the MI5 mole controversy

Hollis: how the Prime Minister was misled

In March this year the Prime Minister confirmed in Parliament that Sir Roger Hollis, the former Director-General of MI5, had been deeply suspected of being a Russian spy but had been cleared by two separate inquiries. This clearance was so at variance with the evidence of those who had investigated him over seven years that I have spent the intervening eight months trying to discover who had been misled. Was it myself through the evidence against Hollis which I disclosed in my book, *Their Trade is Treachery*? Or was it Mrs Thatcher through the statement prepared for her (by Cabinet office and Home Office officials, with assistance from MI5), in direct response to my book? I am now in no doubt that it was the Prime Minister who was misled.

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against any damage which he might have inflicted on them.

It was considered necessary because Hollis had been deeply involved in setting up counter-espionage organizations in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and he had had close links with the CIA and FBI. No Whitehall official or politician was told about this warning but the Solicitor General of Canada, Mr Robert Kaplan, has recently confirmed that Canadian security received it "in the mid-1970s" and took what remedial action it could, an admission which has embarrassed Whitehall.

A few weeks after the warning Mr Stephen de Mowbray, one of the officers involved in the Hollis inquiries, was so incensed with what had occurred inside MI5 that he went to see the Prime Minister, then Harold Wilson. Instead he saw the Cabinet Secretary, Sir John Hunt (now Lord Hunt of Tanworth), who was so impressed by his allegations that he recommended a further inquiry by Lord Trend, his predecessor. Wilson concurred.

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In fact one reliable defector, Igor Gouzenko, had reported in 1945 that Soviet

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The statement compounded this misleading suggestion by saying that the case against Hollis was based on "certain leads that suggested, but did not prove, that there had been a Russian Intelligence service agent at relatively senior level in British counter-intelligence in the last years of the war (my italics)".

This innuendo that the only leads pointing to Hollis dated from 1945 and before is so opposed to the evidence that I wrote to Lord Trend. I knew that he had examined leads which had arisen in the 1960s and his reply indicates



Sir Roger Hollis: new evidence if the Government had wanted it

that he is not prepared to be associated with the restriction of them to "the last years of the war".

Mrs Thatcher also told Parliament that "each of the leads pointing to Hollis could also be taken as pointing to Philby or Blunt". Blunt left MI5 in 1946 and Philby left MI6 in 1951. So this was clearly an attempt by the officials who prepared the speech to lumber Blunt and Philby with penetrations achieved by the KGB long after they had ceased to have access to secret information.

The MI5 investigators and others associated with the Hollis inquiries have no hesitation in calling this part of the statement a fabrication. Philby and Blunt were always agents of the KGB while the evidence indicates that the suspected spy in MI5 was working for the GRU — Soviet military intelligence, which operates independently.

The Prime Minister's statement said the MI5 clearance was challenged by "a very few of those concerned". While few may have chal-

lenged it, many disagreed with it. The so-called Fluency Committee which made the original investigations and concluded that Hollis was the prime suspect consisted of seven experienced officers. This was replaced by a permanent section, K7, set up to investigate possible penetrations of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, the radio-intercept agency, and involving about a dozen officers who had not served on the Fluency Committee. Independently they recommended that Hollis should be interrogated in the belief that he might break down and confess.

This interrogation was carried out by Mr John Day of Section K7 under the tightest secrecy because there were high-level fears that a leak to the Russians might result in Hollis's defection, with appalling international consequences. Day was so unimpressed by Hollis's defence of his innocence that he supported de Mowbray in challenging the decision to close the case. It was the decision that Hollis should be given an umpire's verdict of "Not out" that was

supported by "a very few of those concerned." Mrs Thatcher's assurance that no evidence had been found which "incriminated" Hollis was also true of Fuchs, Blake, Maclean, Philby, Blunt and Long, against whom all the evidence was circumstantial or so secret that it could not be used in a British court unless they voluntarily confessed. To cast further doubt on my Hollis disclosures, the briefers ensured that the Prime Minister would smear my book as being "inaccurate and distorted."

Since then there have been a number of confirmations. My disclosure that Blunt was "blown" by an American, now known to be Mr Michael Straight, has been confirmed by Straight himself. The London woman who "blew" Philby has been identified as Mrs Flora Solomon. My account of Blunt's confession, including his naming of Leo Long, who was clearly described in the book, has been fully justified. The revelation that Tom Driberg, later Lord Bradwell, the Labour MP and Labour Party chairman, had been recruited by MI5 to penetrate the Communist Party and later spy on MPs was dismissed as laughable but has been confirmed by a former woman officer of MI5. Critics were quick to discount my statement that Gouzenko had indicated an MI5 spy with the code-name "Elli", but the unexpected release of his original testimony has confirmed them. There will be further confirmations as inquiries continue.

The analysis of Mrs Thatcher's statement to Parliament leaves me in little doubt that it was an Establishment concoction intended to bury the horrific Hollis Affair and anything connected with it. No doubt the officials who prepared it convinced themselves that they were acting in the best national interest, but all the Prime Minister needed to have said was that Hollis had been suspected, had been investigated and that the case remains unproven. Instead she was induced to go out on a limb from which she might be sawn off any day, for it is far from impossible that proof that Hollis was a spy might still emerge.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

2

Ref. A06191

MR. WHITMORE

*This is on Security
Committee File*

*original filed in -
Security: Security
Committee: April 5*

I understand that the Prime Minister is likely to receive during the course of this month a report from the Security Commission on the reference which she announced in her statement in the House of Commons on 26th March on the Hollis affair.

2. On security procedures the main recommendation seems likely to be a review of classification procedures designed to ensure that Departments do not over-classify documents, and thus to reduce the number of posts whose occupants need to be positively vetted. The need for the positive vetting and normal vetting procedures will be confirmed, and the procedures adopted in the security and intelligence services broadly approved, with some minor changes proposed.

3. As an example of over-classification, the Security Commission will, I understand, suggest that it is not necessary to classify a document as Confidential merely because it contains a reference to the existence of a Cabinet Committee.

4. Perhaps the most difficult recommendation is likely to be that the Government should discontinue the policy of non-avowal of the SIS (and of the SIGINT activities of GCHQ).

5. The report will be classified Secret, and the first thing we shall have to do will be to decide whether it is to be published, unexpurgated or expurgated, or whether the Government should publish simply a list of its findings and recommendations. The previous report of this kind - the Radcliffe Report in 1961 - was published in ^{an} expurgated version. I understand that the Security Commission are critical of that procedure, and would not be likely willingly to agree to go along with the publication of an expurgated version. Normal procedures would require the Prime Minister to inform the Leader of the Opposition as well as the Chairman of the Security Commission of any expurgations the Government proposed to make. Publication may cause some

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embarrassment; but nonetheless I am sure that the aim should be if at all possible to publish in full.

6. I am making arrangements for the preparation of considered advice to Ministers on the question of publication and on the responses to the Commission's recommendations. I think that the aim should be to make a statement on the Government's decisions at the time when the report (or a summary of its findings if that is the way things go) is published.

7.

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ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

3rd December, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL



file AH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

GOUZENKO

The Prime Minister has seen and noted your minute AO5750 of 19 October 1981 about recent press articles about Sir Roger Hollis and the Russian defector, Gouzenko.

JWH.

21 October 1981

AH

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.

Ref. A05750

MR. WHITMORE

JMJ

19x.

Gouzenko

I attach a background note on the press articles which appeared at the end of last week on Sir Roger Hollis and the Russian defector, Gouzenko. This has been prepared by the Security Service and is for the Prime Minister's background information only. It should not be drawn on in replying to questions. Should the Prime Minister be pressed to comment on this matter or on the press articles during Question Time tomorrow, I recommend that she should go no further than the following:

"I have nothing to add to the statement which I made to the House on 26th March. The material referred to in the press articles in question has been available to the security authorities in this country for many years, and was fully analysed and assessed in the inquiries referred to in my statement".

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

19th October, 1981

SECRET

Background Note

The recently released transcripts of the hearings of the Canadian Royal Commission on Espionage in 1946 include references to GOUZENKO's recollection of having been told of a Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) spy, codenamed ELLI, who had been active in the UK during the War. He learnt of this spy whilst working in the GRU's Central Cypher Office in Moscow at that time. GOUZENKO has been questioned about this lead on many occasions, both by the Canadian Security Authorities and by the Security Service. The first occasion on which he was questioned by a Security Service officer was in November 1945, by HOLLIS.

2. The ELLI lead was extremely vague and has never been resolved. Contrary to statements made by Chapman PINCHER in the Daily Mail in August of this year and in Friday's press, the ELLI lead was never considered relevant during the investigation of HOLLIS in the early 1970s, mainly on the grounds that ELLI was a GRU agent who "had something Russian in his background", whereas such suspicion as there was of HOLLIS related to his possibly having been an agent of the KGB. The further interviews with GOUZENKO by a Security Service officer in 1972 about the ELLI lead were in no way connected with the investigation of HOLLIS and the reports which were discussed with GOUZENKO on those occasions were mainly those compiled in 1945 by Canadian Security officials. Although the Canadian reports were undoubtedly confused and in some respects misleading, the report submitted by HOLLIS after his interview with GOUZENKO at that time was for the most part entirely accurate and in accordance with what GOUZENKO has subsequently insisted he said. It should be added that during the 1972 interviews GOUZENKO was not told who were the authors of the various earlier reports discussed with him. The papers relating to the ELLI lead were amongst those examined by Lord Trend in 1974/75 at the time when he was considering the HOLLIS case.

3. The references by PINCHER in Friday's press to further impending revelations in connection with the HOLLIS case presumably refer to the paperback and US editions of PINCHER's book "Their Trade is Treachery" which it is understood are shortly to be published.

19 October 1981

SECRET

Ref. A05737

MR WHITMORE

c Mr Gaffin

Prime Minister's Secretary
We shall be getting
defensive briefing for
questions on Tuesday, but
I am sure you will be
advised to add nothing to
the 26 March statement. MAF 16/1

You will have seen the piece by John Best and Peter Hennessy in today's Times about the testimony given to a Canadian Royal Commission on espionage in 1945 by Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet defector.

2. I am assured that we knew that this material was going to be made public.

3. It is, of course, completely familiar, and has been for a long time. The identification of "Elli" with Sir Roger Hollis is purely speculative, and believed to be unfounded speculation. All the relevant material was fully assessed in the thorough enquiries into the Hollis case, and there is nothing new in what has been published today.

4. I suppose that the Press Office's line on the record will be that they never comment on security matters. I think that they could add unattributably and by way of background something on the following lines: "There is nothing to add or change in the Prime Minister's statement of 26 March. The material referred to in today's article has been well known to the security authorities here for many years, and was fully analysed and assessed together with all other relevant material in the course of the inquiries described in the Prime Minister's statement".

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

16 October 1981

PART I ends:-

~~CAN to RTA~~

~~26.4.81~~

~~(5)~~

Ld. Trent to C. Pincher 12.8.81

PART 2 begins:-

RTA to CAN

16.10.81

A05734

