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FILE TITLE:

NATO

SERIES

FOREIGN POLICY

PART:

2

PART BEGINS:

28
NOVEMBER 2001

PART ENDS:

14 March 2002

CAB ONE:

Labour Administration

PART

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PART

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Series : **FOREIGN POLICY**

File Title : **NATO**

Part : **2**

Date	From	To	Subject	Class	Secret
11/03/2002	US /HMA	FCO	The US view of NATO	R	
14/03/2002	FA/APS	FCO	Invitation to Riga Summit for NATO Candidates	U	

Series : FOREIGN POLICY

File Title : NATO

Part : 2

Date	From	To	Subject	Class	Secret
28/11/2001	Russia/HMA	FA/PS	NATO/Russia	C	
29/11/2001	Telegram/IN		Moscow 580 - NOSEC:NATO/Russia: Risk of Unravelling Crawford	C	
29/11/2001	Russia/HMA	FA/PS	Conversation with Condi Rice	C	
30/11/2001	Telegram/IN		UKDEL NATO 672 - NATO/Russia: NAC Discussion, 30 November	C	
01/12/2001	FA/PS	FCO	Telephone conversation with Condi Rice: Russia/NATO	C	
03/12/2001	FA/PS	FCO	Conversation with Condi Rice	C	
03/12/2001		PM	Joint FCS-SS/MOD Letter - NATO:Enlargement and the Run up to Pr	R	
04/12/2001	Canada / PM	PM	(H) New NATO-Russia cooperation	U	
06/12/2001	Telegram/IN		UKDEL NATO 687 - NATO Foreign ministers Meeting 6/7 December;	R	
06/12/2001	Telegram/IN		Telno 682 UKDEL Nato, Russia/Nato: Quad Political Directors Meeti	S	
07/12/2001	Canada/Hcom	FA/PS	NATO/Russia	U	0
11/12/2001	FA/APS	FCO	NATO/Russia : Letter from Canadian Prime Minister	U	0
12/12/2001	FA/PS	Canada/Hcom	NATO/Russia	U	0
19/12/2001	FA/APS	PM	Lord Robertson	C	
20/12/2001	FA/APS	FCO	(T) Telephone Conversation with NATO Secretary-General	C	
20/12/2001	PM	Canada / PM	(H) Nato and Russia	U	
21/12/2001	Cab Off	FA/PS	Nato: Russia	C	
07/01/2002	FCO	FA/APS	Annual report in 2001	C	
10/01/2002	FCO	US /HME	Nato-Russia: Paper for Close Allies	R	
10/01/2002	FCO	FA/PS	Nato-Russia	R	
11/01/2002	Telegram/IN		Washington 42: NATO Enlargement: US Views on Romanian Memb	R	
11/01/2002	FCO	FA/APS	Call on the Prime Minister by Lord Robertson : 15 January	C	0
11/01/2002	ukdel/Nato	FCO	NATO/Russia - paper for close allies	C	
14/01/2002	Cab Off	FA/PS	NATO/Russia	C	
14/01/2002	Cab Off	FA/PS	Russia/NATO - The Road to Reykjavic	R	0
15/01/2002	FA/APS	FCO	(M) meeting with NATO secretary general	C	
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18/01/2002	Cab Off	FA/PS	Russia/NATO - the road to Reykjavic	C	
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22/01/2002	ukdel/Nato	FCO	Call on NATO Secretary General	R	0
24/01/2002	LP	FCS	United Nations Act 1946	U	
24/01/2002	FCO	ukdel/Nato	Nato Issues	R	
24/01/2002	Canada / HC	FA/PS	NATO-Russia	C	
25/01/2002	Cab Off	FCO	NATO/Russia	R	0
26/01/2002	Telegram/IN		Tel 108 - NATO/Russia - US views	C	
28/01/2002	FA/PS		To Condi Rice - NATO-Russia	R	
30/01/2002	ukdel/Nato	FCO	NATO/Russia	C	
01/02/2002	Telegram/IN		Tel 30 - NATO/Russia	C	
11/02/2002	ukdel/Nato	FCO	Chief of Staff Shape; Director of the International Military Staff	C	
19/02/2002	ukdel/Nato	FCO	France and NATO	R	
21/02/2002	FCO	FA/PS	NATO Russia	C	
21/02/2002	FCO	FCO	France and NATO	C	
22/02/2002	FA/PS		To Sergei Prikhodko: the kremlin: NATO-Russia relations	C	
26/02/2002	FA/PS	Cab Off	NATO Satellite Communications Systems	R	
01/03/2002	France/HMA	FA/PS	Lord Robertson	C	
05/03/2002	Telegram/IN		no 70: Permreps lunch, 6 march: Enlargement	C	
06/03/2002	FCO	MOD	UK/NATO southern region conference, 14-15 March	C	
08/03/2002	Telegram/IN		no 331: NATO issues: Us views	C	
11/03/2002	Latvia/Pres		Dear Colleague - Riga 2002	U	



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

cc DCO

From the Private Secretary

14 March 2002

Dear Simon

INVITATION TO RIGA SUMMIT FOR NATO CANDIDATES

The Prime Minister was handed the attached letter during today's meeting with the Baltic Prime Ministers. I would be grateful for a draft reply.

Yours ever

Signed : Francis Campbell
14/03/2002

FRANCIS CAMPBELL

Simon McDonald
FCO

**SUBJECT
MASTER
Filed:**



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LATVIJAS REPUBLIKAS MINISTRU PREZIDENTS
Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia

36 Brīvības Blvd., Rīga LV-1520, Latvia, tel. +371 7082800, fax +371 7286598

Riga, 11 March 2002

MM-1/68

Dear Colleague,

It is my privilege to invite you to participate in the International Summit of NATO aspirant countries, the so called Vilnius Group. "Riga 2002: The Bridge to Prague" will be held in Latvia on 5-6 July this year. For two days Riga will be the center of a celebration of freedom, independence and democracy. Events will include a variety of cultural performances throughout the city, formal proceedings and informal activities interacting with the people of Latvia and experiencing the vitality that Riga and the region offers.

We have commitments to attend from President Aleksander Kwasniewski and the Prime Ministers of the NATO aspirant countries. We are hopeful that Prime Ministers and senior level representation from throughout Europe and North America will come to Riga. We are also inviting academics, NGO leaders and leading foreign policy analysts. The focus of the Summit will be an interactive participatory discussion on Euro-Atlantic and European integration issues.

I am hopeful that this meeting will distinguish itself both in format and in how we move forward together in framing the issues and steering the debate on the matters that will be ripe for decision in Prague and Copenhagen later this year.

Your meaningful presence and participation would ensure that the values and ideals we all share will be at the core of the process of Euro-Atlantic integration and, ultimately, the decisions that will be made.

Looking forward to your positive reply.

Sincerely Yours,

Andris Bērziņš

The Rt.Hon. Tony Blair MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

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British Embassy
WashingtonFrom the Ambassador
Sir Christopher Meyer KCMG3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008-3600

11 March 2002

Telephone: (202) 588-6512
Facsimile: (202) 588-7860
www.BritainUSA.comStephen Wright Esq CMG
DUS
Defence and Intelligence
FCO*for you**DM 18/3*
cc: JG
AW
MR

Dear Stephen

THE US VIEW OF NATO

Summary

1. The war on terrorism, and the related US concern about WMD, has served to reinforce this Administration's view that NATO's future utility for military operations is likely to be limited. This does not mean that the US is about to lose interest in the Alliance: there is support across the board here for the roles it performs. But we need to be realistic about how the US, particularly post-enlargement, will want NATO to operate.

Detail

2. Following on from the correspondence on France and NATO launched by John Holmes last month, I thought it was time to draw the threads together on how the US, post-11 September, views NATO. This comes with two caveats: views on NATO inevitably vary across the Administration – what follows is our assessment of where the centre of gravity currently lies; and this is something of a moving target – views could easily be affected in either direction in the weeks and months ahead, depending on developments e.g. in Afghanistan.

3. The starting point, as with so much else, is the war on terrorism. Everyone here was deeply grateful for the swift invocation of Article 5 on 12 September. But while the US has not wavered since then from the view that it is "at war", it has come to realise that its European

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Allies, with the possible exception of the UK, are not. Continuing involvement of some European allies in Afghanistan OEF operations, coupled with more general political support, is welcomed. But in looking ahead the US can see perfectly well that there are different threat assessments, and a different level of commitment to tackling terrorism and WMD. It is significant that there was no mention of a role for NATO not only in the State of the Union address, but also in the 11 December Citadel speech (a far more detailed exposition of the President's approach to the war on terrorism) - and no real attempt has been made in the wake of European criticism of the former to correct the impression that this was a deliberate oversight. The nature and tone of the European rhetoric post-axis of evil speech has clearly not helped to generate a corrective. Despite Powell's attempts to downplay the impact, it seems clear that Bush, Rice and Rumsfeld all took the criticism badly.

1. This growing awareness of the difference in European perspective of the threats posed by terrorism and WMD would probably in and of itself have affected Administration views of NATO. But there are in addition other reinforcing factors which are leading the US to the conclusion that it is unlikely to want to use the Alliance qua NATO as the organising principle for future military operations of any significance:

- NATO's procedures and decision-making processes are seen as too cumbersome and slow for the kind of military operations which the US is likely to want to undertake in the future, either with allies or on its own. Rightly or wrongly, the myth about the constraints imposed on the Kosovo air campaign is deeply held in this Administration - not just in the Pentagon - and even more so on the Hill. The assumption that a NATO operation per se requires constant NAC oversight is considered intolerable in the modern war-fighting age. Even if the procedures can be improved, US concerns about intelligence sharing militate against NATO operations per se. Loose coalitions of the willing, backed, by all means, by NATO political support, are likely to be a much more comfortable model for the US in the future.

- Impending enlargement will simply exacerbate this factor, and make NATO even less user-friendly for military operations

- The US assumes that as the threats it now faces emanate from outside Europe, most, if not all, its future military operations will be, in NATO terminology, out of area. French unwillingness to allow NATO to move in this direction is regarded by most here as sufficient grounds for not trying to do so (though there is a contrary view, determined to have this issue brought to a head)

- The US no longer believes (if they ever really did) European rhetoric about capabilities. In the past, evidence of the extent of the gap (and it has of course been very wide for a long time)

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tended to prompt debates about burden-sharing. The difference this time is that the US - both the Administration and the Hill - seem to have concluded that it is not even worth getting mad at us - since all this would achieve is another set of undeliverable promises to do better. Meanwhile, it is impossible to understate the importance of the psychological impact here both of the success of the Afghan campaign and of the increase in US defence spending post-11 September relative to that of its European allies. This in turn is spawning a view which equates in effect to "he who pays the piper...". Put another way, if European allies want a determining say in the conduct of military operations, they will need to pony up the requisite military capabilities.

5. None of this is meant to imply - and I do not think the Administration would think this for a second either - that the US no longer regards NATO as important. It is clear from the work they have already set in hand that they want the Prague Summit to be successful. We can be confident that they will strive for positive outcomes in the three areas they have identified as the major goals: enlargement, NATO/Russia, and capabilities. They will also continue to support a NATO role in the Balkans, despite occasional attempts to speed up its withdrawal. Most in the Administration can see the value that NATO's presence there brings not only for the region itself but also for the transatlantic relationship.

6. More generally, the US continues to see value in NATO:

- As the pre-eminent organisation for completing the post-Cold War vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
- for political support, and legitimacy, in pursuit of common US/European security and defence goals;
- as a forum for raising Allied awareness of the terrorist and WMD threats (though even here some question whether this is worth the effort)
- as a vehicle to promote military interoperability, including via training, exercises, common standards and doctrine
- as a mechanism to apply pressure to improve European capabilities (even if the Administration has little confidence that Europeans will deliver, this serves as a useful safety valve for any Congressional griping)
- Because of what SHAPE can offer in terms of operational planning, force generation etc.

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7. This Administration's outlook towards NATO also has implications in two other respects:

- There is on the whole less theology around than was the case under the Clinton Administration. This has, for instance, helped the US to feel comfortable with a looser set of arrangements for the EU/NATO relationship than the Clinton team would have liked. It is noticeable that it is we, who pride ourselves on being ever pragmatic, who have had to spend time and effort pointing out to the US the potential institutional risks involved in the EU taking over in Macedonia. More generally, this team is more relaxed about the EU taking more responsibility for European security. They are also readier to think radically about e.g. command structures

- Against this, one dogma has taken hold firmly: the US doesn't do peacekeeping. As far as NATO is concerned, exceptions are made for SFOR and KFOR, since they predated Bush. But the Macedonia model - which in US eyes was in itself based on the highly attractive E Timor experience - is seen as the template for any future NATO peacekeeping-style operations: the European Allies provide the forces on the ground, with US enabling support as appropriate. This could of course change if the US commits to contributing to future international security arrangements in Afghanistan. But the almost total lack of debate here on the merits of a "no peacekeeping policy" suggests that this view will be very hard to shift.

Conclusion

8. What policy conclusions ought we to draw from this?

- We shouldn't panic. The transatlantic bond which NATO represents is not about to be cast aside. But we should recognise that the US is becoming (more?) schizophrenic towards NATO: still very supportive of it for both political and military reasons, but not likely to be keen for it to undertake military operations of any significance. If this is the shape of things to come, we need to adjust our own approach accordingly - assuming, that is, that we for our part still see merit in NATO having a serious military dimension. We need to take heed of what the US paper on involving NATO in ISAF (our telno 277) noted - that a one-time NAC authorisation for a coalition of the willing, with SHAPE directed to support the lead-nation, is one thing. An operation which requires multiple NAC decision points along the way is something else.

- We need to be realistic about what we say about capabilities. No one here believes that Europe will increase defence spending. Few believe that the Headline Goal exercise will deliver anything substantial - though the US will over time become ever more comfortable with the notion that USDP is an instrument which allows the Europeans to do peacekeeping while the US

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can concentrate on war-fighting (there have been some here who have seriously thought that ISAF would be a good challenge for ESIP). We need therefore to find visible ways to demonstrate that as NATO Allies we are taking the terrorist and WMD threats seriously, and that we are adjusting our defence spending priorities accordingly.

- We need to continue to encourage the US to see NATO as a worthwhile forum for addressing terrorist and WMD threats, and support initiatives to that end; and to inculcate within the Alliance the notion that "out-of-area" is a truly outmoded concept post-11 September.

- We need to work with the grain of the growing US readiness to think non-theologically about NATO. We ourselves have been arguing for some time that NATO is going to have to adapt in the wake of another round of enlargement. We should accept that in practice this will mean a looser organisation, less focussed on traditional Article 5-type business, but still carrying considerable political weight, capable of planning serious operations and assembling force packages for them, and retaining a valuable role in promoting transatlantic interoperability and European capabilities.

Christopher Meyer

Christopher Meyer

cc: Simon Webb Esq, Policy Director, MOD
Sir Michael Jay, KCMG, PUS, FCO
Sir David Manning KCMG, No 10
Peter Ricketts Esq, CMG, Political Director, FCO
William Ehrman Esq CMG, Director, International Security, FCO
Sir John Holmes KCMG, Paris
Sir Emyr Jones Parry KCMG, UKDEI, NATO
Sir Nigel Sheinwald KCMG, UKREP Brussels
Sir Paul Lever KCMG Berlin
Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, CDS, MOD

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 NATO ISSUES: US VIEWS
 From: WASHINGTON



TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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 OF 080507Z MARCH 02
 AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
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 INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, CABINET OFFICE, ACTOR, WHIRL

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MODUK FOR POLICY DIRECTOR, DGISP, NEPG
 SUMMARY

1. The US regard the Balts and Slovenia as very strong candidates, Slovakia as problematic, Bulgaria and Romania as promising. They agree we must try to work round the Russian MFA on NATO/Russia, but are still cautious about discussing peacekeeping. DoD confirm their scepticism on Russia, but show more enthusiasm over Ukraine than NSC or State. US and UK views are close on new NATO/ESDP capabilities.

DETAIL

2. Thomson (Sec Pol) and Lee (MOD) discussed NATO issues with Bradtke (State), NSC (Volker), Brzezinski (DOD) and Hill staffers. Thomson noted recent concerns in Europe that transatlantic ties had frayed. (Brzezinski argued by contrast that NATO's image in the US had been rejuvenated.) This would change as we got closer to the Prague Summit. There was broad agreement in the Alliance on the three US pillars for Prague - New Members, New Relationships and New Capabilities. We were disappointed by lack of US interest in modernising NATO's internal workings, which was also needed. With work in hand on the first two items Capabilities was most important. Lee set out the linkage to EU work in progress on the Headline Goal: we must build on the momentum and ensure EU/NATO work was connected.

NEW MEMBERS

3. Bradtke said the recent tour of applicant capitals had confirmed US interest in a large wave of enlargement at Prague. Slovenia and the Baltics were very strong candidates. Slovakia was problematic because of Meciar. Bulgaria and Romania had lots of problems, but were firmly committed and had much potential. The US saw political and practical difficulties in UK interest in a graduated approach.


NEW RELATIONSHIPS

4. Thomson reiterated the case to offer Russia a relationship that clearly superceded the PJC. He provided copies of Manning's talking points with Rice that would urge her to engage with Prikhodko as a way to get around less constructive MFA attitudes. It was important for all Allies to show we were imaginative and forward-leaning, eg on peace support operations - which were already on the PJC agenda.

5. Bradtke (echoing separate comments from Volker) said Gusarov's response to NATO proposals could not have been better calculated to confirm the sceptics on NATO/Russia. He agreed we must work around him not offer more carrots - for which there would be no US support. There was concern in Congress as well as DoD on discussing PSOs with Russia: any NATO proposals must be clear and specific. Thomson suggested close allies might agree a list of projects to propose. Bradtke said this might be more feasible than going back to Gusarov.

6. Brzezinski agreed we must achieve progress before Reykjavik, but confirmed DoD scepticism. Russia was raising internal and external

File: NATO/Pres. in
mu.
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expectations, risking a repeat of the PJC disappointment. We should start with practical ideas for cooperation, not rushing to get it right as Gusarov said. We must not let Russia demand, nor make Clinton's mistake of trying to use NATO to shape Russian domestic politics. Thomson agreed Russia was demandeur. But we too had an interest in ways to leverage the chances of a new Russian approach.

7. Bradtke and Volker were cautious on giving Ukraine a Membership Action Plan. The US did not want to discourage Ukraine and was keen to show NATO cared about reform there. But Kiev must consider what MAP involved and whether this was what it wanted. Volker feared a MAP for Ukraine could adversely affect Senate debate on enlargement.

8. Brzezinski by contrast was enthusiastic. Giving Ukraine a MAP was crucial to maintaining the Open Door policy, and determining how far east Europe extended. Despite current political and mil-mil problems with Ukraine, MAP was an opportunity to influence its place in Europe and relations with Russia positively. But a rebuff would be noted by opponents of reform in Ukraine and by Russia. Thomson said giving Ukraine a MAP would create a sense of Ukrainian entry to NATO itself soon after. Would we treat Russia the same? We agreed we should respond positively, but were not sure how best to do so.

NEW CAPABILITIES

9. Bradtke said US work was aimed at developing a package for Grossman to take to NATO capitals in April. New command structures were an important element, but difficult. The US were considering a European Mobility Command (on which Lee and Thomson noted potential institutional tensions), better coordination of Special Forces and a successor to DCI focussed on better mobility, sustainability, etc. We must ensure Europeans remained able to fight alongside the US. Brzezinski said we needed a smaller number of urgent and immediate goals, but admitted the US had made little progress on the details.

10. Lee and Thomson agreed. The lesson of the Headline Goal was that targets must be readily comprehensible. Interoperability must be the central unifying principle, eg through secure communications. We must get the presentation right too for European audiences eg the reduced collateral damage as well as greater effectiveness of PGMs. We must link ideas on Command Structures to new US national plans.

BRENTON

Sent by WASHINGTON on 08-03-2002 05:07

Received by No10 on 08-03-2002 05:36

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6 March 2002

Lu pu

Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall KCB OBE ADC FRAes RAF
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
Ministry of Defence
Room 208
Old War Office Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

Stephen J L Wright
DUSS

Dear Tony.

UK/NATO SOUTHERN REGION CONFERENCE, 14-15 MARCH

1. I am looking forward to attending the NATO Southern Region Conference with you next week. John Shepherd and his team have done an excellent job of putting the arrangements in place and we look well set for a stimulating discussion.
2. I attach the final agenda and list of participants. I am grateful to Emyr Jones Parry for agreeing to chair and to those who have agreed to open the sessions. This should be no more than a short scene setting overview of the issues (five minutes maximum), with a premium on the personal insights of the speaker.
3. As food for thought on the Maghreb and European security issues which underlie much of the conference, I enclose a short paper prepared by John Shepherd's team. Naturally it looks particularly at the opportunity for us to work more closely with the Italians, but we can draw on it for our more general discussion of Mediterranean security.

James Lindsay
Stephen

Stephen Wright
Deputy Under-Secretary of State

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Cc: Simon Webb, Policy Director, MoD
Ian Lee, Director European Policy, MoD
Air Cdre Dick Lacey, Director NATO Policy, MoD
Lt Gen Kevin O'Donoghue, NATO UKMILREP
Rear Admiral Rob Stevens, SBO Italy, Naples
Rear Admiral A Dymock, DCOMSTKFORSTH, Naples
Admiral Sir Ian Garnett, Chief of Staff, SHAPE

Tony Brenton, Washington
Edward Oakden, Madrid
Robert Chatterton-Dickson, Security Policy Department, FCO
HMAs: UKDel NATO, Rome, Lisbon, Paris, Athens, Ankara

Cc (for info): Sir David Manning, 10 Downing Street
William Ehrman, Director International Security, FCO
Alan Goulty, Director Middle East and North Africa, FCO
John Macgregor, Director Wider Europe, FCO
David Richmond, UKRep Brussels

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Attachment
dated 6 March
2002

UK NATO SOUTHERN REGION CONFERENCE 2002

AGENDA

Chairman: Sir Emyr Jones Parry, UK Permrep, NATO

Thursday 14 March

1400-1545

1. The view to NATO's south

Opened by:

Christopher Prentice, Head NENAD

Rear Admiral R P Stevens, SBO Italy (Naples)

- Outlook in North Africa/ Middle East – instability, population growth, water scarcity, Islamic extremism etc
- New threats: WMD/ missile proliferation, terrorism
- UK/ Allied interests: preserving oil supplies; preventing population movements, drugs, crime
- NATO's role; institutional advantages/disadvantages
- NATO/ AFSOUTH capabilities

1600-1800

2. The US dimension

Opened by:

Tony Brenton, Minister Washington

Rear Admiral A C Dymock DCOMSTRKFORSOUTH Naples

- US regional objectives/ priorities post 11 September
- US commitments post Defense Review
- US and AFSOUTH effectiveness: can we get Washington engaged?

2030 Dinner

Guest of Honour: General Rolando Mosca Moschini (Chief of the Italian Defence Staff)
who will speak at the beginning of dinner.

Friday 15 March

0900-1030

3. Turkey, the Aegean and South East Europe

Opened by:

Peter Westmacott, HMA Ankara

Simon Webb, Policy Director MoD

- Prospects for Turkey
- Prospects for Greece/Turkey: bilateral; Cyprus
- Operational issues: ESDI/ Berlin +
- Balkans: regional approach/ how do we extract NATO?
- NATO enlargement: at Prague (Romania/ Bulgaria)?
longer term (Albania/ Macedonia/ Croatia/ FRY)?
- Implications for the region of enlargement/ exclusion

1045-1200

4. NATO Modernisation: Issues for Prague

Opened by:

Stephen Wright, DUSS, FCO

Admiral Sir Ian Garnett, CoS SHAPE

- Capabilities: replacement for DCI. Improving southern performance
- Modernisation: Civil Budgets – can we get the south to pay more
- Regional HQ structures: 3rd tier HQs; HRF(L)s; AFSOUTH
- What are our key deliverables?

1200-1245

5. Final Session

Led by Air Chief Marshall Sir Anthony Bagnall, VCDS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ACCEPTED</u>
Sir David Manning Adviser to PM	NO
ACM Sir Anthony Bagnall VCDS	YES
Simon Webb MOD Pol Director	YES
Air Cdre Dick Lacey MOD Dir NATO Pol	YES
Ian Lee MOD Dir Eur Pol	YES
Stephen Wright FCO DUS	YES
William Ehrman FCO Dir Int Security	NO
Alan Goulty FCO Dir ME&NA	NO
John Macgregor FCO Dir Wider Europe	NO
Sir Emyr Jones-Parry NATO UK Perm Rep	YES
Lt Gen Kevin O'Donoghue NATO UKMILREP	YES
RAdm Rob Stevens SBO Italy (Naples)	YES
RAdm A C Dymock DCOMSTKFORSTH Naples	YES
Ad Sir Ian Garnett CofS SHAPE	YES

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ACCEPTED</u>
Sir John Holmes HMA Paris	YES
Edward Oakden DHM Madrid	YES
David Madden HMA Athens	YES
Peter Westmacott HMA Ankara	YES
Dame Glynne Evans HMA Lisbon	YES
Tony Brenton Minister Washington	YES
David Richmond PSC Rep UKRep Brussels	NO
Robert Chatterton Dickson (SecPol notetaker)	YES
Stephen O'Flaherty Cabinet Office	YES

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NON-PAPER

SECURITY CHALLENGES ON NATO'S PERIPHERY (ITALY /
MAGHREB)

Aim

1. To explore how we might make a reality of aspirations emerging from the first NATO Southern Region Conference in March 2001 to develop a fuller dialogue with Italy on the range of Mediterranean political and security issues. This might lead to agreeing joint approaches to exploit opportunities and manage threats.

Context

2. Italy is seeking EU partners for joint work on the Maghreb. In the past year it has developed bilateral cooperation on this with the French and Spanish (eg through joint meetings of ambassadors to the region), which shows signs of developing into trilateral cooperation in time.
3. Italy and the UK both have significant political, economic and security interests in the Mediterranean. We are both involved in a range of bodies which bring together states from both sides of the Mediterranean: in particular, we are both members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (whose Barcelona Declaration prioritises co-operation on terrorism and international crime, among other issues); and we are both fully involved in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.
4. The UK, of course, has its own interests in the Mediterranean. As the UK Ambassador to NATO noted at the NAC Brainstorming on 3 October on the Mediterranean Dialogue, "security in Europe is increasingly linked to security instability in the Mediterranean" and the Mediterranean is a vital strategic area in which the UK has had a centuries' long interest; therefore, it is politically important for the whole of NATO, not just the littoral states, to be engaged. That said, in bilateral meetings, UK Ministers clearly need to be prepared to discuss Italian as well as UK priorities. This has not always been the case eg we sometimes run the risk of not focusing enough on Italy's western Mediterranean priorities.
5. The Maghreb ought to rank higher in Italy's list of foreign policy priorities. It is a vital source of energy supply, a modest but potentially significant export

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market and an important source of immigration (needed for seasonal labour on which many Italian businesses depend, but also a threat because in the last decade the Maghreb has been a nursery for violent fundamentalism).

6. Italy often appears to play an unproductive or even minimal role in the formulation of policy on the Mediterranean e.g. during the Euro-Med Ministerial on 5/6 November 2001, Italy was not recorded as saying anything worthy of note. But the fact remains that Italy is an important EU Mediterranean power and geographically is strategically well placed to exert a positive influence on southern Mediterranean states.
7. The surprising lack of Italian political engagement in the Maghreb might partly be because the region attracts less attention and is perhaps inherently less interesting than the Arab/Israel issue in its various forms. Part of the rationale for working with the Italians on the Maghreb would be to encourage them to channel more of their efforts into an area where they could play a useful niche role and where their national interests are more directly involved than is the case with the MEPP.
8. Italian disengagement may also be due to a post-colonial factor ie a reflex reaction that Algeria and Morocco and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Tunisia, are still countries where France should have a pre-eminent role, while Italy gets on with its special relationship with Libya. It is worth exploring whether there is scope to work with Italy in the Maghreb, an area where, in the past, we have done little bilaterally together, but which is increasingly an Italian priority.

Italian foreign policy in the Maghreb

9. It is difficult to define a clear Italian Maghreb policy. This is because Italy has tended to deal with the Maghreb states individually and only recently has shown signs of taking a more holistic approach. Italian involvement varies considerably from one state to the next e.g. a strong presence in Tunisia compared to relative weakness in Morocco. Italy is very conscious that - with the exception of Libya, where it is jealous of its historical role giving it primacy among EU member states - it plays second fiddle to France and has Spain breathing down its neck.
10. Under the centre-left Italian government Ministers regularly visited the Maghreb, particularly Libya; ex-Foreign Minister Ruggiero went to Libya in the autumn, and Berlusconi emphasized Italy's engagement in the region during his 5 February keynote foreign policy speech to parliament. Some commentators

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suggest Berlusconi's team may be less interested, but the Italian MFA is placing a new emphasis on the region after the strong focus on central and south-east Europe in recent years. The Annex details bilateral relations with each of the four main Maghreb countries (Italian relations with Mauritania are not covered as they are significantly less developed).

11. When Italy does strategically consider the western Mediterranean, it considers the Maghreb less affected than the rest of the region by the situation in the Middle East and sees the potential for it as a point of regional stability – although clearly it does not play this role at present (eg the Western Sahara, Algerian Civil War and Qadhafi are all points of disruption). The Maghreb is also an uncomfortable neighbour at times: many Al Qa'ida fighters are of Maghreb origin; the only post WWII missile strike on an EU country was when Libya hit an Italian island in 1986, which partly accounts for Italian enthusiasm for US Missile Defence; and illegal immigration from the region has posed big political and social challenges over the last few years.
12. Commercially, the Maghreb represents opportunities for Italy. On 18 February, the Industry Minister launched a new department specifically to promote trade with the Mediterranean-rim countries. The Italians are also focussed on the Toledo European Council, which will consider a plan to create a Mediterranean free trade zone. But at present the Maghreb only accounts for 8.2% of Italian exports outside the EU, and of the big Italian companies, only ENI is involved in the Maghreb. Italian SMEs are also underrepresented ie only 650 in Tunisia (compared to 8,000 in Romania). On the other hand, Italy is heavily dependent on the Maghreb for its energy: Algeria provides 40% of its gas and Libya 30% of its petrol. And although trade with Tunisia is healthy in both directions, overall, Italy is concerned about its big trade deficits with Algeria (4.7 beuro) and Libya (5.4 beuro).

Security issues in the Maghreb

13. Security issues offer scope for joint UK/Italy work in the light of 11 September. Al Qa'ida recruited in the Maghreb. Algeria, in particular, has long been a source of both Islamic fundamentalist fighters and during the nineties provided battle experience for many would-be terrorists. Training camps in Libya (though not Al Qa'ida ones, as far as we know) are documented. Tunisia still provides a window on the MEPP, despite Arafat no longer being in residence. Mauritania was one of the few states to maintain support for Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War (though probably more due to political ineptitude than anything else).

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Conclusions

14. We would be starting from a low base, and the challenges of working with Italy bilaterally should not be underestimated; but if we are serious about UK interests in the Mediterranean and developing a fuller dialogue with Italy, we might start by:

a) considering the scope for someone senior to act as "Mediterranean Champion", given that FCO departmental structures make it difficult to think of the Mediterranean region as a whole;

b) producing a joint FCO/MOD strategy paper with a view to getting Italian buy-in later. This might include joint work on:

- ways of drawing Libya further into the international community eg discussing how to handle Qadhafi;
- the role played by Maghreb-origin Islamic fundamentalists in Al Qa'ida and international terrorism more widely; and how to support Maghreb governments efforts to nip fundamentalist terrorism in the bud;
- how to develop the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (MPC) and other fora bridging the two sides of the Mediterranean; and
- Justice and Home Affairs eg immigration from the Maghreb via Italy to the UK (the logical extension of the Blair/Amato initiative?).

c) closer bilateral cooperation between UK and Italian embassies in the Maghreb in consideration/reporting of political and security issues.

An early visit by senior FCO/MOD (eg NENAD/MENARG/DIS) officials to explore some of these ideas with Italian counterparts would be useful.

**British Embassy, Rome
February 2002**

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ANNEX

ITALY'S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH MAGHREB COUNTRIES

- **Libya:** an ambivalent, even schizophrenic, Italian approach. Strong support for Libyan rehabilitation into the international community and building on the bilateral reconciliation of 1998 with intense cultural cooperation eg hundreds of scholarships annually. Excellent commercial/economic relations – Libya is Italy's most important Arab trade partner. But continuing political difficulties due mainly to Italy's colonial role. Qadhafi still seeks 'compensation' while Italy argues that the agreement with King Idris (1956) settled this.
- **Tunisia:** excellent relations. Italy sees Tunisia as its gateway to the region. Italy has invested huge efforts in commercial and political cooperation and is now Tunisia's second biggest export and import market; but the balance (500 meuro) is in Italy's favour. Fishing is an important sector. Italy tends to gloss over human rights problems in Tunisia (preferring to confront them through the EU). It focuses instead on trade and building joint action against illegal immigration (the readmission agreement of 2000 drastically reduced the number of Maghreb illegals attempting to enter Italy). 50,000 Tunisians live in Italy; 4000 Italians in Tunisia. Ciampi visited last October.
- **Algeria:** Italy takes a prudent approach, supporting President Bouteflika's government in the hope of bringing stability. Ciampi received Bouteflika in Rome before the 2001 G8 meeting – the Algerian President's first visit to a western country since his election (in 1999). Italy has worked actively for an EU/Algeria Association Agreement. An Italo-Algerian commission meets to promote trade, but commercial and political efforts have not been as productive as expected. 20,000 Algerians live in Italy; 1,000 Italians in Algeria.
- **Morocco:** good but relatively insubstantial relations. Despite a raft of agreements signed when King Mohammed VI visited in 2000, and healthy cultural cooperation, Italy is only the fifth largest exporter to Morocco. Immigration is a key part of the political relationship – the 150,000 Moroccans are Italy's biggest foreign community. A bilateral readmission agreement is about to come into force.

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PERMREPS' LUNCH, 6 MARCH: ENLARGEMENT
From: UKDEL NATO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 70

OF 051721Z MARCH 02

INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR, BRATISLAVA, BUCHAREST, LJUBLJANA, MODUK

INFO IMMEDIATE NATO POSTS, RIGA, SKOPJE, SOFIA, TALLIN, TIRANA

INFO IMMEDIATE VILNIUS, WHIRL

SIC A3A

SUMMARY

1. Secretary General and US Ambassador brief on their tour of candidate countries. Similar impressions show **Baltics best placed to receive invitations at Prague; Romania and Bulgaria problematic; Slovenia satisfactory but complacent; Slovakia satisfactory but Meciar dependant; and FYROM and Albania no-hopers.**

DETAIL

2. The Secretary General reported on his recently completed tour of candidate countries. Only Albania and some in FYROM had not expressed confidence in receiving an invitation at Prague. Slovenia was the only country which might need a referendum. Bulgaria had focussed on the risk of double rejection. Generally the MAP had been successful. **The Secretary General had not pulled his punches, arguing that countries should modernise or miss out on an invitation.** Romania had produced the most impressive presentations, and the best inter-departmental co-ordination. Defence reform had featured significantly in each country. Bulgaria's defence expenditure, at 2.75% of GNP, was the highest.

3. Lord Robertson said that he had put the questions which nations would not be prepared to ask - stability of democracy, corruption, sustainability of defence expenditure? He had encouraged the countries to answer these questions in their initial presentations at 19+1 in Brussels. He had found most countries concerned about the Russian dimension and NATO/Russia developments. The Baltics had been particularly neuralgic. This emphasised the need to explain developments to the candidates. He concluded by asking how a new MAP round could be exploited without raising the bar to entry. He appealed for nations to eliminate defence related visits to and from candidate countries between Reykjavik and Prague.

4. Burns (US) reported on his tour of the 9 countries. The US delegation had found the MAP process to be successful, permitting leverage on the candidates. They had taken a robust questioning line, focussing on the key criteria: the level of defence expenditure (arguing that for the US 2% of GNP was a test of commitment), the treatment of minorities and corruption, inter-operability, public support for membership, and control of arms exports. The Baltics had been the most impressive and best placed to succeed. The Slovenes had achieved a lot, but had manifested complacency, in particular arguing that there could be no increase in defence expenditure above 1.5% GNP until NATO guaranteed an invitation. In Slovakia, Meciar had dominated an otherwise good performance. The opposition parties had promised Burns that they would, post election, only join a government which excluded Meciar. Burns added that, after careful consideration, the US had publicly set out their opposition to Slovakian

Prime Minister

Latest views of George Robertson
and the US on which
Central Europeans may be
ready to join NATO.
Decisions at the Prague
summit in November.
7 out of 9 may get in.



Matthew Rynoff
7/3

membership if Meciar held office. He thought this was already paying dividends for the opposition, and recommended that the larger European nations do likewise.

5. The Romanian and Bulgarian visits had exceeded (albeit low) expectations. The Romanians had been particularly impressive, well briefed and committed. They had offered a pledge of a military and anti-corruption package, to be implemented by 1 September. The US had encouraged the Bulgarians to do likewise; their response had been lacklustre. Lord Robertson interjected that the Bulgarian President, a titular figure, had long trained to be Prime Minister, while the Prime Minister had a life time's training to be king. Burns agreed that FRYOM and Albania could not receive invitations at Prague, but the door should remain open to them.

6. Colleagues welcomed the assessments, and agreed that long term prospects should be taken into account, as well as short term assessments. There was strong support for a continuation of the MAP, open also to further applicants. Few colleagues emphasised the need to apply maximum leverage, as Burns had argued. Most accepted the need not to endorse now the chances of individual countries. De Franchis (Italy) noted that NATO was facing new threats which would require new commitments by existing members. Asking the same of the candidates was not to raise the bar for entry. I agreed that we should eschew clientism. The UK favoured a MAP for post Reykjavik, running through Prague to the signature of accession protocols. This would permit all 9 candidates to be treated equally, And if Bulgaria and Romania received invitations at Prague, they would have longer to demonstrate sufficient progress. It would also offer a more elegant way of handling those not invited.

7. Oymen (Turkey), as host, concluded that short and long term prospects should be considered; that commitment to the US criteria was relevant to decisions at Prague; that NATO should continue its open door policy; and that the MAP process should continue.

COMMENT

8. I have now floated how MAP 4 can provide a framework for a robust accession process. But there is much to do to persuade Allies of the need for rigour, as we are finding out already as MAP 3 draws to a close.

JONES PARRY

Sent by UKDEL NATO on 05-03-2002 17:21
Received by No10 on 05-03-2002 18:08

0144513343



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sirjohn.holmes@fco.gov.uk

BY FAX (3) file.

1 March 2002

Sir David Manning KCMG
Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister
and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Dear David,
LORD ROBERTSON

Lord R has a difficult
relationship with the French
Administration. He asked me
to take soundings - the answer
is clear.

1. You mentioned on the phone the possibility that Lord Robertson might see Chirac or Jospin when he is in Paris on 12 March. I mentioned this to de la Sablière when I saw him on 1 March. His reaction was clear, immediate and negative (unlike his usual waffly style). The President would not be available because of his campaign commitments. No doubt something would be possible after the elections.
2. De la Sablière did not bother checking Chirac's diary, and his reaction and body language conveyed that Lord Robertson was about the last person Chirac would agree to see, for electoral and wider reasons. In the circumstances I see little point in repeating the exercise with Jospin or Vedrine.

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3. We already knew there was a problem between the French and Lord Robertson. But this reaction suggests it is worse than I at least had realised. I am trying to check what really lies behind all this. We need to do something serious about it after the elections.

4. We have been in touch separately with Jon Day in Lord Robertson's office about this, so the latter should be in the picture.

Yours ever

John Holmes

cc by e-mail:

Peter Ricketts Esq, Political Director, FCO
Stephen Wright Esq CMG, DUS, FCO
Simon Webb Esq, Policy Director, MOD

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From: David Manning
Date: 26 February 2002

TOM MCKANE


NATO SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Thank you for your minute of 25 February.

As you know, I spoke to de la Sabliere this morning saying that we would support a joint UK-French industry bid to meet the NATO satellite communications requirement. I also gave him advance notice that the Defence Secretary will be writing to his French counterpart today to inform him about the decision on Skynet V. This would indicate that the contract would go to the Paradigm consortium, which would in turn involve Alcatel. I wanted de la Sabliere to be one of the first to hear the good news.

De la Sabliere said it was indeed good news. He was delighted.

I should be grateful if you would copy my minute and yours more widely in Whitehall as necessary. A copy should also go to our Embassy in Paris.



DAVID MANNING

RESTRICTED - COMMERCIAL

Handwritten: FAXED



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister,
and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat

Handwritten: Trevelyan
22 February 2002

Handwritten: Leon Linggi,

NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Thank you for your letter of 8 February and for letting me have sight of 'Russia-NATO relations: a new quality'.

As you know, the discussion in NATO has taken longer than you and I had hoped. However, NATO now has a good set of ideas to put forward, taking in many of the points in your helpful paper. Lord Robertson is writing in parallel to President Putin to give him the details.

The Prime Minister is pleased with the way this is now coming out. He thinks it will meet the requirement which he and the President set you and me when we met in Moscow, ie a real step change in the relationship between Russia and NATO, and a starting point for the development of a co-operative structure for addressing security issues in common.

Obviously your people will need to take a close look at NATO's proposals, and then discuss them further with us so that we can work towards a conclusion with which everyone is happy. I know that we both think that we need to get quick agreement on process, so that work on substance can start at Twenty as soon as possible. We believe it would be helpful to use NATO ideas on process as a starting point. Our aim is to get work underway at Twenty well before the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in May at Reykjavik. We think we are likely to make best progress initially if we focus on practical work together on specific issues. Sergei Ivanov suggested a good initial agenda and NATO has been looking at how to implement this quickly. Many of the ideas in your paper are

compatible with our own thinking. We have given Sergei Ivanov's people some ideas for bilateral projects to get started quickly.

We have made a good deal of progress within a relatively short time and are within sight of achieving the goal laid down in December. Fresh thinking has been needed on all sides. You and I need to stay in close touch as discussion progresses and the Reykjavik Ministerial draws closer. Perhaps I might phone you in a day or two so that we can discuss next steps.

*Best wishes
yours very
David*

DAVID MANNING

Mr Sergei Prikhodko
The Kremlin

RESTRICTED



Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 February 2002

Rec
22/2

DM
cc JTB
ISW
MT
✓ AM

Dear David,

Ms Lile

NATO Russia

... On 20 February, the NAC agreed texts prepared in NATO as the basis for the new NATO-Russia Council (copy enclosed). We now need to give a strong message to the Russians on the importance of taking work forward on the basis of the NATO texts, and to encourage them to focus on moving quickly to joint work on substance based on practical co-operation on specific projects.

At your meeting on 18 February, you requested:

- ✓ - a draft letter from you to Prikhodko; *dispatched*
- ✓ - a speaking note for you to use with Prikhodko in a follow-up telephone call;
- a speaking note for the Prime Minister to use with Putin.

... I enclose drafts, agreed with the Embassy in Moscow.

I am copying this letter to Sir Roderic Lyne (Moscow) and Sir Emyr Jones Parry (UKDEL NATO).

*Yours ever,
Patrick*

(Patrick Davies)
Private Secretary

Sir David Manning KCMG
10 Downing Street

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NATO CONFIDENTIAL

SG(2002)0169

18 February 2002

Silence Procedure ends:

13.00hrs on Wednesday, 20 February 2002

To : Permanent Representatives (Council)
From : Secretary General
Subject : **NATO Proposal on enhancing relations with Russia**

1. Attached you will find the NATO proposal on enhancing relations with Russia, as approved by the Political Committee on 18 February. The package contains the following three elements:

- Draft Statement by Foreign Ministers of NATO Member States and Russia (Annex 1);
- NATO-Russia Council Organisational Arrangements and Rules of Procedure (Annex 2); and
- Intra-Alliance Understanding on the NATO-Russia Founding Act, With Respect to the Organisational Arrangements and Rules of Procedure for the NATO-Russia Council (Annex 3).

2. **Unless I hear to the contrary by 13.00 hours on Wednesday, 20 February 2002**, I will assume that the Council has approved the proposal. Subsequently, at the meeting of the PJC Chair at 15.00 hrs on 20 February, I will hand to Ambassador Kislyak a letter to Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to which the text of annexes 1 and 2 will be attached.

(Signed) George Robertson

Encl. 3

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

**Draft Statement by Foreign Ministers
of NATO Member States and Russia
Reykjavik, 14 May 2002**

1. Today we embark upon a new era of partnership between NATO Allies and Russia, and resolve to enhance our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against new common threats and risks to our security. We reaffirm the goals, principles and commitments set forth in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, in particular our determination to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.

2. Building on the Founding Act and recalling our decision of 7 December 2001 to create a new council bringing together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at twenty, today we have established the NATO-Russia Council. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work together as equal partners in areas of common interest. The NATO-Russia Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action between the member states of NATO and Russia. It will operate on the principle of consensus, and its members will bear joint responsibility for the implementation of its decisions.

3. The NATO-Russia Council will replace the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council as the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia. It will focus on all areas of mutual interest identified in Section III of the Founding Act, including the provision to add other areas by mutual agreement. The work programmes for 2002 agreed at our last meeting in December 2001 for the PJC and its subordinate bodies will continue to be implemented under the auspices and rules of the NATO-Russia Council.

4. The NATO-Russia Council will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defence Ministers twice annually, and at the level of Heads of State and Government as appropriate. Meetings of the NATO-Russia Council at Ambassadorial level will be held once a month, with the possibility of more frequent meetings as needed. A Preparatory Committee will meet twice monthly, or more often if necessary. The NATO-Russia Council will be chaired by the Secretary General of NATO. The NATO-Russia Council may establish committees or working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate.

5. Under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council, military representatives and Chiefs of Staff will also meet; meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, and also monthly at military representatives level. Meetings of military experts may be convened, as appropriate.

6. In the coming months, NATO Allies and Russia will continue to intensify their cooperation in areas including the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence building measures, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies.

7. We have tasked our ambassadors to report to us at our next meeting on their progress in implementing this decision and pursuing initiatives for joint decision and joint action.

NATO RUSSIA COUNCIL ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE

I.

1. The NATO-Russia Council, established according to the provisions of the "Statement by Foreign Ministers of NATO Member States and Russia" issued in Reykjavik on 14 May 2002, and building on the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, will function according to those provisions and to the following organizational arrangements and rules of procedure.
2. The NATO-Russia Council is composed of all NATO member states and Russia, hereafter referred to as the Members.

II.

1. Meetings of the NATO-Russia Council at Ambassadorial level will in principle take place once a month in Brussels, in accordance with an agreed calendar or, in addition, as required and agreed. NATO member States will be represented by their Permanent Representatives to NATO or their delegates and Russia by its Representative to the NATO-Russia Council or his delegate. A representative at the appropriate level from the respective capital could take the seat of the Representative. The NATO Secretary General may be represented by his Deputy. The Representatives will be supported by their political, military and defence advisers.
2. Extraordinary meetings of the NATO-Russia Council at Ambassadorial level will take place in addition to its regular meetings, at the request of any Member or the NATO Secretary General and at short notice. The party requesting an extraordinary meeting will at that time indicate the nature of the issue it proposes to be discussed.

3. The NATO-Russia Council will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defence Ministers twice annually.
4. Additional meetings of Foreign Ministers or Defence Ministers may be agreed by the NATO-Russia Council as and when circumstances warrant.
5. Meetings of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Heads of State and Government may be agreed as appropriate.
6. Under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council military representatives of members of the NATO-Russia Council will in principle meet monthly in Brussels, in accordance with an agreed calendar, or, in addition, as required and agreed. Meetings of Chiefs of Defence/Chiefs of General Staff will take place no less than twice a year. The NATO-Russia Council will provide political guidance to the meetings of military representatives, which will keep the NATO-Russia Council informed about their work, including the results of the meetings of Chiefs of Defence/General Staff, and give advice on military matters. The Chairman of the meetings of military representatives will be represented at the meetings of the NATO-Russia Council.
7. The meetings of the NATO-Russia Council will not be open to the Press unless otherwise agreed.

III.

The NATO-Russia Council may establish committees or working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate. They will be chaired by appropriate representatives of the International Secretariat, and will work under the direction of the NATO-Russia Council, which they will keep informed about their activities. Committees and working groups operating under the auspices of the PJC are transferred under the authority of the NATO-Russia Council. Organisational Arrangements and

Rules of Procedure of the NATO-Russia Council apply to these subordinate bodies.

IV.

1. Delegations will have one seat at the table, arranged in English alphabetical order, and six seats behind, unless otherwise agreed.
2. Annual work programmes for approval by Foreign Ministers, as well as the agendas for the regular meetings of the NATO-Russia Council will be established by consensus for each meeting by the Preparatory Committee described in V.1, one week in advance on the basis of proposals submitted to the International Secretariat no later than ten days in advance of the meeting. In case of urgency, additional items may be agreed up to three days ahead of the meeting. These same timelines, as well as the principle of consensus, will be applied by the Council's subordinate committees and working groups, including the Preparatory Committee, in the setting of their own agendas.
3. The NATO-Russia Council will take all decisions by consensus; the absence of any objection will be understood as consent. Such decisions will be reflected in a decision sheet issued by the NATO Executive Secretariat in consultation with the joint group described in VI.1. The Members will bear joint responsibility for the implementation of the Council's decisions.
4. Discussions in regular or extraordinary meetings will not extend to the internal matters of either NATO, NATO member states or Russia.

V.

1. The NATO-Russia Council will be chaired by the Secretary General of NATO, and supported by a Preparatory Committee comprised of the political advisors of the Members, chaired by an appropriate representative of the NATO International Secretariat.

2. The Preparatory Committee will meet twice monthly, or more often as necessary, and will be responsible for the preparation and follow-up of meetings of the NATO-Russia Council, including the coordination of current business between the meetings. The Preparatory Committee will supervise the preparations and follow-up of meetings with the support of the joint group described in section VI.1 by:

- ♦ scheduling meetings of the NATO-Russia Council,
- ♦ issuing agreed agendas,
- ♦ preparing the working documents for the NATO-Russia Council.

3. Communications addressed to the NATO-Russia Council will be forwarded to the Secretary General. The Secretary General will ensure the distribution of such communications to all Members of the NATO-Russia Council.
4. The Chairman of the NATO Military Committee will chair meetings of the military representatives and the Chiefs of Defence/General Staff.
5. Other procedural issues may need to be decided later.

VI.

1. The work of the NATO-Russia Council will be supported by a joint group, set up from designated members of the NATO International Staff and designated staff members of the Russian Mission to NATO.

The International Secretariat and Russia will each identify an officer responsible for the work of the joint group.

2. Documents will be established and circulated under the reference " NATO-Russia Council".
3. The NATO-Russia Council is built on the principle of transparency, the implementation of which, including the information policy, needs to be further discussed by the NATO-Russia Council.

VII.

1. The languages of the NATO-Russia Council and of the subordinate committees or working groups will be English, French and Russian.
2. Interventions made in any of these three languages shall be simultaneously interpreted into the others. Interpretation between the official NATO languages and from Russian into the official NATO languages will be provided by the International Secretariat. Interpretation from the official NATO languages into Russian will be provided by the Russian side.
3. Decision sheets will be drawn up in the three languages.
4. If documents related to the work of the NATO-Russia Council are to be issued this will be done in the three languages.

VIII.

The modalities of sharing among the participants the common costs incurred by the implementation of the above arrangements from the first meeting of the NATO-Russia Council on will be further discussed by the Council.

IX.

The NATO-Russia Council will consider changes to the Organizational Arrangements and Rules of Procedure whenever it is deemed necessary.

**INTRA-ALLIANCE UNDERSTANDING ON THE NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT
WITH RESPECT TO THE ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL**

1. The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Statement by Ministers of NATO Member States and Russia issued in Reykjavik on 14 May 2002, annexed to the Founding Act, are politically binding documents.
2. The North Atlantic Council is the principal venue for consultation among NATO members as well as for agreement on policies bearing on security and defence commitments of the Allies, in particular on those under the Washington Treaty. NATO's fundamental objectives remain as set out in the Washington Treaty, under which provisions NATO will maintain its prerogative of independent decision and action at 19 on all issues consistent with its obligations and responsibilities. Provisions of the Founding Act and its annexes and of the Organizational Arrangements and Rules of Procedure cannot be construed as giving a right of veto to Russia on Alliance decisions and actions nor as affecting in any way the primacy of the North Atlantic Council in this regard.
3. It is understood that in paragraph 17 of the Founding Act the term "in any way" comprises "at any stage."
4. The NATO-Russia Council will comprise all NATO member States and Russia. Decisions in the NATO-Russia Council will be made by consensus among NATO member States and Russia.
5. Extraordinary meetings will take place at the request of any NATO Ally or Russia. Such meetings can also be requested by the Secretary General, in his capacity of Chairman of the NATO-Russia Council. Allies will consult prior to exercising their

right to call an extraordinary meeting pursuant to Section II, paragraph 2 of the Rules of Procedure.

6. Meetings of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence and meetings of the Chiefs of Defence/General Staff with Russia will normally take place after the regular biannual NATO meetings at those levels. A proposal to hold a Ministerial meeting at a different time or venue or to hold a meeting of Heads of State and Government will be determined on the basis of consensus among Alliance members and Russia.
7. Allies will in principle always consult prior to reaching agreement on which individual items, including new substantial proposals, should be placed on the agenda of the NATO-Russia Council and its subordinate committees and working groups, and whether and to what extent pre-coordination of substantive positions within the Alliance is necessary. In discussing joint initiatives or joint decisions in the NATO-Russia Council and its subordinate bodies and working groups, they will take into account agreed Alliance policies or positions, insofar as they exist. Allies may also consult, as necessary, on any subject at any stage during the course of consultations with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council and its subordinate committees and working groups. Any Ally or the Secretary General will be entitled to request such consultations. The consensus of Allies will be required to retain an item on the agenda of the NATO-Russia Council and its subordinate committees and working groups. Allies will consult within the Alliance prior to exercising their individual right to withhold consensus on the adoption of any agenda item. In this context, Allies will refrain from discussing the concerns of any Ally outside Alliance fora.
8. This IAU will apply to any subjects raised in the NATO-Russia Council under "Any Other Business".

9. The issue of how to inform other partners, and in particular those invited to become members of the Alliance, will have to be addressed as a matter of priority in the appropriate fora.

DRAFT LETTER FROM SIR DAVID MANNING TO SERGEI PRIKHODKO

NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Thank you for your letter of 8 February and for letting me have sight of 'Russia-NATO relations: a new quality'.

As you know, the discussion in NATO has taken longer than you and I had hoped. However, NATO now has a good set of ideas to put forward, taking in many of the points in your helpful paper. Lord Robertson is writing in parallel to President Putin to give him the details.

The PM is pleased with the way this is now coming out, and thinks it will meet the requirement which he and the President set you and me when we met in Moscow - ie a real step change in the relationship between Russia and NATO, and a starting point for the development of a co-operative structure for addressing security issues in common.

Obviously your people will need to take a close look at NATO's proposals, and then discuss them further with us so that we can work towards a conclusion which everyone is happy with. I know that we both agree we need to get quick agreement on process, so that work on substance can start at Twenty as soon as possible. We believe it would be helpful to use NATO ideas on process as a starting point. Our aim is to get work under way at 20 well before the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in May at Reykjavik. We think we are likely to make best progress initially if we focus on practical work together on specific issues. Sergei Ivanov suggested a good initial agenda and NATO has been looking at how to implement this quickly. Many of the ideas in your paper are ~~very~~ compatible with our own thinking. We have given Sergei Ivanov's people some ideas for bilateral projects to get started quickly.

We have made a good deal of progress within a relatively short time and are within sight of achieving the goal laid down in December. Fresh thinking has been needed on all sides. You and I need to stay in close touch as discussion progresses and the Reykjavik Ministerial draws closer.

Perhaps I might phone you in a day or two so that we can discuss next steps

MANNING-PRIKHODKO SPEAKING NOTE

NATO-RUSSIA: RUSSIAN PAPER

General points

- ② • Allies have now tabled detailed proposals with your delegation in Brussels, and Lord Robertson has written in parallel to President Putin. Believe our ideas offer a structure delivering the step change in NATO-Russia relations we all want to see. Prime Minister plans to discuss with President Putin tomorrow.
- ① • Grateful for 'Russia-NATO relations: a new quality': constructive contribution, with many points of convergence with NATO thinking.
- ③ • Know you agree we now need to work together to reach quick agreement on process to allow work on substance to start at Twenty without delay. We do believe it would be helpful to use NATO ideas on process as a starting point.
- ④ • NATO working in parallel on proposals for practical work together (eg peace support operations, Civil Emergency Planning, Search and Rescue, airspace management). Close to many of the ideas in your paper. We should be looking to move quickly on possible 'easy wins'.
- Important to get the process off on the right foot. Key is to develop habits of co-operation and joint work as the basis for ongoing process of transformation.
- ⑤ • Should be possible to have new partnership in place by Reykjavik as Ministers have agreed. This is important to both Allies and Russia.

(If raised): response to the Russian paper

- Allies will be responding collectively. Reactions to paper represent my personal views, not the official Alliance position.
- Understand that you would prefer to follow the legal-type format of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Believe this would delay the process, which we both want to move ahead as quickly as possible.
- NATO itself, as well as individual Allies, has a role in this process. Twenty will be operating within a NATO framework, including chairmanship by Secretary General and services of the IS/IMS.
- Welcome that paper does not envisage continuing parallel existence for the PJC, and explicitly refers to the new Council picking up elements of the PJC Work Programme (eg Search and Rescue at sea). We too envisage PJC being phased out quickly, but have heard different suggestions from Russian representatives in Brussels.

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(If raised) NATO Safeguards

- At times, the Alliance will need to discuss sensitive issues before engaging with the Russians. But as we accumulate positive experience, we anticipate that recourse to prior coordination of positions will diminish.

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PRIME MINISTER-PUTIN SPEAKING NOTE

NATO-RUSSIA

General points

- NATO has been working hard since the start of the year on implementation of commitment to transform the Russia-NATO relationship. Proposal now tabled with your Delegation in Brussels. You will have received a parallel letter from George Robertson.
- Believe our ideas offer a structure delivering the step change in NATO-Russia relations we all want to see. Should aim to have work under way at Twenty well before your meeting in May with George Bush. Important to Allies and to Russia to implement new partnership soon.
- Know that your people have put forward Russian ideas. Welcome this constructive contribution. Suggested areas for practical work between Allies and Russia are close to our own thinking.
- Shared priority now must be to reach quick agreement on process to allow work on substance to start at Twenty without delay. Suggest that we are most likely to achieve this by using NATO ideas on process as a starting point.
- NATO also working on proposals for practical work together (eg peace support operations, Civil Emergency Planning, Search and Rescue, airspace management). Close to many of the ideas in your paper. We should be looking to move quickly on possible 'easy wins' to help develop habits of co-operation and joint work.
- Our overall objective must be to finalise transformation by the Prague Summit in November. Should think imaginatively about how we use this.

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Pr.75

FROM: P F Ricketts
Political Director

DATE: 21 February 2002

cc: PUS
Mr Ehrman
Mr Thomson, Sec Pol Dept
Ms Pierce, EUD(B)
Sir J Holmes, Paris
Sir C Meyer, Washington
Sir E Jones Parry, UKDEL NATO
Sir N Sheinwald, UKREP Brussels
Sir P Lever, Berlin
Sir D Manning, No.10
Mr Webb, MOD
CDS, MOD

✓ DM
cc: MT
SW
RL
PC
JMH

Mr Wright

FRANCE AND NATO

1. John Holmes's stimulating letter of 19 February to you invited views on the prospects for (and benefits of) French re-integration into the military structure.
2. My own view is that, whatever the benefits of bringing the French back into the integrated structure, the prospects for doing so are close to zero. I have watched the French attitude to NATO pretty closely from various London vantage points over the last five years. And I have discussed re-integration specifically with Errera a couple of times recently. I think that the failure of the 1996 initiative killed the idea stone-dead for Chirac. I cannot believe that a President Jospin would want to revive it, given the attitudes to NATO on the French left.
3. That is John Holmes's call rather than mine. But I am struck from my recent talks with Errera by a number of strands in his analysis of NATO:
 - that many in the Pentagon are losing interest in NATO as a military structure. The French point to the lack of a role for NATO following the Article 5 invocation on Afghanistan, and the latest Pentagon doctrine that the mission defines the coalition rather than the reverse;
 - more generally, and this is a theme brought out in John Holmes's letter, that NATO is destined to decline in the Darwinian struggle between international organisations, as EU/ESDP gathers force and the


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transatlantic voltage increasingly flows down other wires (EU/US, ad hoc coalitions). Errera at least sees NATO evolving gradually into a large, soft security organisation on OSCE lines.

4. Given that analysis, I cannot see why the French would see any benefit in re-joining the military structure, and hence giving it a new lease of life. Nor do I believe that we could exercise any useful leverage on them, e.g. by suggesting that they would miss out on a decent share of new command posts in the re-designed NATO structure unless they re-integrated.

5. I hasten to add that I do not share the French analysis of the future of NATO as a military organisation. On the contrary, the prospect of having to pursue high intensity military operations in unexpected places and varying combinations of countries will put a higher premium on the inter-operability and standard operating procedures which the NATO structure has fostered throughout Western armed forces. But I do not think the French will see it like that, and I doubt therefore that it is worth devoting a lot of effort to devising a package in the hope of attracting them back in.



Peter Ricketts

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① copy to Tim McKee **RESTRICTED**

② *File per*

21/2

19 February 2002

Stephen Wright
DUSS
FCO

Dear Stephen,

FRANCE AND NATO

SUMMARY

1. France gets more from NATO than it puts in. Reintegration in the Military Structure would help interoperability of forces and might encourage a more responsible French attitude to collective defence. But France has little incentive to rejoin – and we have few arguments to counter this lack of interest. Given the precedents there are dangers in making further concessions to the French without a clear French commitment to rejoin.

DETAIL

2. John Holmes' letter of 19 February asks whether it is worth further effort to bring the French into the integrated military structure and, if so, how this can be achieved. He sets out the political factors which would influence the outcome of any serious consideration in Paris. This letter examines the case from NATO's perspective; the advantages of reintegration; and levers which might help bring it about.

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3. At the end of 1995, when serious thought was last given to France's reintegration in the IMS, Chirac argued that reintegration would only happen if NATO first pushed through a package of adaptation measures involving the better positioning of France in NATO and greater "Europeanisation" of the organisation. The deal fell through when it became clear that the US would not give up CINCSOUTH to the Europeans. The French decision was also influenced by France's failure to get Romania into the first wave of NATO enlargement.

4. In the expectation that France would reintegrate, the Alliance granted the French a number of concessions. The most significant was a return to full membership of the Military Committee, with corresponding privileges and responsibilities, even though France has no right to this membership. Almost all NATO business is conducted at 19. Bodies dealing with defence planning and nuclear issues, in which the French do not participate, have little influence and almost no decision making powers.

5. Since 1997, the French have continued to expand their influence within the IMS, despite not being a formal part of it. Commanders of French Military Missions attached to NATO HQs are normally included in the HQ's Command Groups. France has just secured the (2 star) command of Logistics, Armament and Resources at NATO HQ, and provides the (3 star) commandant of the NATO Defence College. They have bid for the new 2 star post as Head of the NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow. France provides around 60 officers to HQs (including 37 at SHAPE) as Voluntary National Contributions (VNCs). The French tend to ask for senior posts in key areas to send their VNCs. They also tend to dine "a la carte" from the NATO military common funded programmes (the NATO Security Investment Programme and the Military Budget).

6. But there is scant evidence that this increase in profile and influence has resulted in greater commitment to the organisation. There has been a number of recent examples of unhelpful French behaviour which may belie their argument that they fully support the concept of collective defence.

- refusal to allow SHAPE to undertake preliminary planning for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan;
- insistence that NATO has no role in civil emergency planning in the face of the new terrorist threat;
- reducing the scope of possible joint co-operation between NATO and Russia (while in bilateral contacts urging Moscow to turn first to the EU);
- in the recent NATO exercise (CMX02), blocking planning for pre-emptive strikes against WMD capabilities in the (fictional) aggressor against Turkey;

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- within NATO working groups, attempting to limit the scope of NATO's military involvement with the EU in crisis management, and to delay the development of a routine military working relationship between NATO and the EU.

7. I recognise in John's analysis the factors which drive French attitudes. Errera's perception of the US and NATO influenced his approach to ESDP co-operation with NATO, much jaundiced by his experience here as Ambassador. The recurring theme was of a dominant US and the steamroller of NATO stunting European growth. But more realistic, and indeed favourable, opinions of NATO are to be found in the French MOD, and in more impartial observers. NATO's unique transatlantic dimension is a real advantage, and can on occasion help corral the US. However caution about NATO is not necessarily anti-US, but in its positive mode stems from a wish to see European foreign policy flourish with an essential defence component. Even so, too often the French approach lacks the maturity to see the benefit of working with NATO, to profit from its assets, and avoid expensive duplication; Galileo is a good example.

8. There are clearly benefits if France reintegrated in the IMS. The main reason would be the symbolic nature of a renewed political commitment to NATO at a time when France is looking increasingly towards ESDP as the provider and guarantor of Europe's security needs. From the military perspective, reintegration should lead to greater harmonisation of doctrine, training and procurement and might encourage a more responsible attitude to collective defence. But judging from past experience, it is not self-evident that simple reintegration in the IMS would lead to greater French commitment to NATO. And, short of a sea-change in attitudes, in both France and the US, it is difficult to identify the pressure points. After all, France is now able to have its cake and eat it. Why reinvigorate NATO when, as many believe, France prefers it to waste away, giving ESDP a chance to prove itself?

9. What carrots and sticks could be available? The biggest carrot is the one which nearly did the trick in 1995/6 - Europeanisation of NATO HQs. The debate on structural reform is well underway. We should promote a streamlined structure which would give the French one of the European HQs - on condition that they rejoin the IMS. Members of the US Mission do not exclude the possibility that the US might be ready to offer AFSOUTH on these terms, provided suitable alternative command arrangements can be made for the Sixth Fleet. But there are potential risks here too: Europeanisation of NATO HQs may reinforce the sense of a two part Alliance: the US on one side of the Atlantic, "Europe" on the other with possible implications for the transatlantic link.

10. The biggest stick would be expulsion from the MC which France rejoined under false pretences - a step which was never formally approved by the NAC (the NAC only ever agreed to a temporary arrangement). At the moment, it is politically inconceivable that we should propose this option. But, together with other Allies, notably the US, we should put up more resistance to the incremental increase in senior French military appointments.

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11. Given its present advantages, it is unlikely that France could be enticed or bludgeoned into reintegration. John appears to rule out a President Jospin pursuing reintegration. But 2002 could open up an opportunity if Chirac is elected and if, as part of NATO enlargement, the Command Structures are to be revisited. But instinctively I feel this is too soon. It may be that the development of ESDP, provided that it is in close harmony with NATO, could open up a better, more straightforward NATO/EU relationship. There is a big common agenda - how to tackle terrorism, enlargement, capabilities, ESDP, Balkans and so on. If we could get to a stage where each institution instinctively looked to the other and worked together closely as a matter of habit, French prejudice might be reduced and the advantages of NATO become more apparent. It is in that context, and on a slower timescale, that I could imagine real French interest in reintegration.

*Yours ever**Emyr Jones Parry*

Emyr Jones Parry

cc: Sir Michael Jay KCMG, PUS, FCO
Sir David Manning KCMG, No 10
Peter Ricketts Esq, CMG, Political Director, FCO
William Ehrman Esq CMG, Director, International Security, FCO
Sir Christopher Meyer KCMG, Washington
Sir John Holmes KCMG, Paris
Sir Nigel Sheinwald KCMG, UKREP Brussels
Sir Paul Lever KCMG BERLIN
Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, CDS, MOD
Simon Webb Esq, Policy Director, MOD

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11 February 2002

Stephen Wright
DUSS
FCO

1. Copy (e-mail?)

Sir J. Manning

Tan McKenna

Tim Drummond

Bob Cooper OBE

Dominic Terrey, Afgh. Unit

Cat. Officer

2. Adam Thomson (Sec for D)

This makes us along a bit. The gather
reaction from the. We may want to reply.

**CHIEF OF STAFF SHAPE; DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY STAFF**

1. Kevin O'Donoghue joined me for lunch today with Admiral Sir Ian Garnett, COS SHAPE, and Vice Admiral Sir Paul Haddacks, DIMS. A useful discussion covered the following points.
2. I drew on the telegraphic traffic and our discussion on 8 February to brief on the current UK concerns on Afghanistan. Our priority was to persuade Turkey to take over lead nation status. The team in Ankara today would be followed up by the Foreign Secretary's visit tomorrow. Hopefully we would then be on course to transfer responsibility to the Turks. The UK would retain some 300-500 troops in theatre. Plan B would be to find another lead nation, and Plan C would be to stay longer ourselves.
3. Post the next roulement, it was up for discussion whether NATO in some form should be involved. The range of options was wide, with Karzai arguing for an extension of ISAF to principal cities of Afghanistan. We sought views on the possible NATO dimension. Ian Garnett was confident that SACEUR would want any NATO participation to involve the A Team, with SACEUR having overall responsibility, answerable to the NAC. Any multiplicity of ISAF arrangements would necessitate some overarching headquarters, for which there was a limited capability. NATO was the obvious candidate, with the ARRC high up the list. MOD's views on the use of the ARRC were acknowledged.

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4. We also speculated whether NATO could provide a discreet contribution, acting as a service provider, with someone else carrying out the headquarters function. The question of political authority and overall command function were immediately identified as issues. An informal arrangement to assist an operation not in the name of NATO itself might be easier to negotiate, but the wiring would have to identify the political authority and the overall commander would need links to NATO. Ian speculated that a minimum of 40,000-50,000 troops would be necessary if forces were generated according to tasks in, say, 5 capitals. As with the continuation of the existing ISAF, finding lead nations would not be easy. But assuming their availability, and without a NATO badge per se, an arrangement might be negotiable. Paul Haddacks added that this would be easier if the operation were time limited, with a clear end state; a contributors' committee configuration might be appropriate.

5. We discussed operation Amber Fox in Macedonia in the light of the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Caceres. We agreed that the preferred outcome was a NATO rollover for 6 months. After that, much would depend on the mission. An ESDP operation would be much easier if limited to a monitoring role; cf the EU police operation in Bosnia.

6. On terrorism, Paul Haddacks argued that NATO should clarify whether defensive and/or offensive capabilities would be necessary. This should involve the amendment of the Strategic Concept. Ian Garnett thought that the existing AOR should be replaced by an AOI or AOIs. Article 5 hung like an albatross round the neck of NATO. Of course it was an essential element of the Concept, but the balance between Article 5 and crisis response operations/other work was wrong. As a result, NATO was not playing to its strength - the capacity to deploy a CJTF rapidly in theatre. The command structure reflected this skewing. Arrangements should be updated, with far more emphasis on delegated responsibility.

7. I suggested that Prague should commit itself to fighting terrorism, and identify precise outputs. Moreover, in that context Heads could task proposals for a revised command structure. In this way the functions of NATO could be re-orientated without the hassle of redrafting the Strategic Concept. Ian Garnett thought NATO's primary responsibility was to define threats to the Euro-Atlantic area and then to preserve the security of that area against these threats. Combined with an obligation to come to the aid of those threatened or attacked, this amounted to the core function of NATO. It could also represent a basic vision: NATO lacked a clear idea of where it would be in 2012.

8. In agreeing with much of this intervention, I argued that the outline statement for Prague could go on to set out criteria which should influence the revised structures. These would include Ian's suggestions of maximum flexibility and deployability and a greater use of commercial assets. Paul Haddacks noted that the out-sourcing of capabilities was affected by the common cost argument; those elements currently fell to member nations when



provided by them. He added that Heads of Government might also task a redesign of the command and control structures based on the minimum military requirement needed to deliver the roles envisaged for NATO 2012 and beyond - picking up Ian's point that it was necessary to bring resources and policies together. It was also the case that amending the command structures had so far been thwarted by those benefitting who argued that the 1998 arrangements must first be implemented before they could be assessed and if necessary amended.

9. We will follow up these points in future reporting.

Signed: Emyr Jones Parry

Emyr Jones Parry

cc: Peter Ricketts, Political Director, FCO
William Ehrman, Director International Security, FCO
Adam Thomson, SecPol, FCO
Simon Webb, Policy Director, MOD
Brian Hawtin, MOD
Air Cdr Dick Lacey, MOD
Int: JF, NB, MilRep

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NATO/RUSSIA
From: UKDEL NATO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 30
OF 011251Z FEBRUARY 02
INFO PRIORITY ACTOR, CABINET OFFICE, KIEV, MODUK, MOSCOW
INFO PRIORITY NATO POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, WHIRL

SIC A3A
SUMMARY

1. Discussions within the Alliance moving in the right direction, but slowly. A deal is emerging. US position pivotal, but not consistently helpful despite the best efforts of the Delegation here. Russia eager to engage at 20 as soon as possible, and concerned about status of decisions taken at 20. Recommendations on tactics and lobbying.

DETAIL

2. We have been active at all levels and with all Delegations in pushing the case for rapid movement on the NATO-Russia dossier. Our focus has been on the practical approach, keeping to a minimum structural and procedural wrangles. We have emphasised the benefit to all NATO Allies and Russia of establishing a new body which reflects the common desire for an enhanced and effective NATO-Russia relationship.

3. After several rounds of discussion in the Political Committee, the key elements of a deal on mechanisms for the new NATO-Russia Council are emerging. Most of them reflect UK ideas circulated to the PC on 15 January after consultation here with Close Allies:

- a single Council replacing the PJC, chaired by the Secretary General and prepared by a PC at 20;
- Council to be formally established at the Reykjavik Ministerial in May through a Joint Declaration;
- topics for discussion at 20 to be agreed first at 19;
- agenda to cover substantive areas identified in Section III of the Founding Act - initial agenda to focus on concrete projects which can produce quick results;
- 19 to agree safeguards which underline NATO's prerogative of independent action, and allow any Ally to bring a subject under discussion at 20 either for Allied coordination or for removal from the agenda altogether.

4. The IS will issue today three papers for discussion at the PC on 4 February: elements for a Reykjavik Joint Declaration; draft rules of procedure for the new Council; and proposals for an amended Intra-Alliance Understanding on safeguards to be agreed by the 19.

5. The main point of Intra-Alliance contention is the degree to which agenda items for the new Council should be prepared at 19. The UK line, strongly supported by Italy and with backing from Canada, Spain, Norway, Portugal and Greece, is that once the Alliance has taken a decision on which agenda items should be discussed at 20, there should be a presumption against routine prior coordination, while accepting that any Ally could insist on it if a national interest was at stake. The US and the new Allies

Prime Minister

Worth a quick read to get a sense of the progress being made and the points still at issue.

Michael

But with paper
intelligence management
we should get over

X

1. ~~AM~~

To see PM,
comment.

2. Re.

are arguing that systematic coordination of Alliance positions will be needed on some agenda items before discussion at 20, and that the NAC should decide which items on a case-by-case basis.

6. The French have proposed a "mixed agenda" divided into subjects for consultation/cooperation (where Allies would agree a prior common position) and joint decision/action (where no prior coordination will take place). My French colleague presented this as requiring a conscious decision at 20 to move from one category to the other. The US and German Ambassadors, at a Close Allies meeting on 29 January, agreed with me that the French proposal imposed an unnecessary rigidity on the handling of subjects in the new Council. The French Ambassador did not put up a convincing defence.

7. Allies have agreed to accelerate their work. We and the US have been pushing hard for this. Most Allies agree that, not least because of the risk that the Russians themselves would come forward with proposals which will be difficult for some Allies to accept, we should engage with them as soon as possible. When he called on me on 30 January, Kislyak (Russian Ambassador) warned that unless there is early engagement with the Russians, both sides will produce incompatible position papers which will be difficult to reconcile.

8. I explained to Kislyak our vision of how the new Council would work, with a new approach from both sides and a determination to achieve results through consensus. Safeguards were needed - for all of us. It should be accepted by all that if we were not able to reach the point of joint decision, any of the 20 could take an item off the agenda for further reflection. For the Allies, the NAC's prerogative to take decisions would remain. President Putin had made clear Russia had no problem with that. But this was not our starting point; both the Allies and Russia had strong vested interest in making the new process work. The aim was to agree converging policies which stood scrutiny. Kosovo was a case in point. If we put historical recriminations behind us, there was no reason why we could not achieve a joint approach, leading on to joint action.

9. Kislyak agreed with this approach, but expressed concern that some Allies were saying that, under the new arrangements, they might not be bound by a decision taken at 20. This was sending a negative signal to those in Moscow who were sceptical about the prospects of the new mechanism working. It was important to reach an understanding that neither side would do anything to undermine any joint decisions. Joint decisions implied joint responsibility for implementing them. I agreed. Decisions agreed by the new Council would be politically binding, and there should be an understanding that both sides would stick to their commitments.

10. The forthcoming IS papers should help clarify the issues. UK objectives should be:

- On structures, to establish quickly the Council at 20 to replace the PJC. (The Russians argue that it may be necessary to keep the PJC for a transitional period to deal with subjects which are not covered by the new Council.);
- to make a reality of operating at 20 by reducing to a minimum Alliance prior coordination, and by working the issues at 20 rather than bringing them back to 19;
- on substance, to continue consideration with Close Allies, and in particular the US, of our list of areas suitable for joint projects, three or four of which could produce easy wins in

Ambassadorial meetings at 20 before Reykjavik;

- to reach agreement at 19 as soon as possible on draft Reykjavik Declaration and rules of procedure to put to the Russians, and to ensure that subsequent negotiations are held directly with the Russians, heading off some Allies' desire for the IS to act as go-between.

11. This suggests that we should get across the following key messages:

FOR ALL NATO POSTS:

- Our common objective is to make a new start, creating a new Council which would enhance Euro-Atlantic security. This is not just a wish to respond together to the new security threats facing the international community since September 11, but a determination to establish a strategic framework which will facilitate the handling of enlargement, the ABMT issue and other areas of contention in the past.

IN WASHINGTON:

- Our aim is to establish a positive working method which will foster a consensual approach. Recognise the need for safeguards. No question of a Russian veto on action by NATO. Allies should be given an opportunity for prior coordination, but imposing rigid requirements on the Alliance and adding more layers of discussion at 19 than already exist in the PJC would send the wrong signal about the new relationship at 20;

- Close Allied Delegations at NATO should quickly agree on list of possible joint projects for circulation in the PC within the next two weeks.

IN PARIS:

- Grateful for continued support post Anglo-French Summit. But believe French proposal for mixed agenda will impose unnecessarily rigid mechanism for discussion. Subjects should evolve through consultation/cooperation at 20 to possible joint action/joint decision;

- Close Allied Delegations at NATO should quickly agree on list of possible joint projects for circulation in the PC within the next two weeks.

IN WARSAW, PRAGUE AND BUDAPEST:

- Your caution understandable. But new vital NATO-Russia relationship will benefit us all. Working constructively with Russia serves all our interests;

- Russia's past performance and the new climate mean that we should end the PJC. Experience shows that it does not work;

- A repainted PJC will not produce the new strategic relationship which is within grasp.

IN ROME AND OTTAWA:

- Grateful for strong support. UK working well with Italian and Canadian Delegations at NATO. We should keep up the pressure.

IN MOSCOW:

- Recent contacts useful in helping us understand Russian approach. Looking forward to Gusarov's visit to London;
- UK and Russia are working closely together to meet the shared objective of creating a new Council which will serve to enhance Euro-Atlantic security;
- Alliance should complete its preparatory work speedily;
- At 20, we will all need to work constructively to achieve common objectives. Substance is the key to opening up genuine prospects for joint action. We should identify a small number of key projects which can produce quick results in the run up to Reykjavik;
- All of us at 20 will have to abide by decisions taken by the 20. Consensus is the key safeguard for any nation in the 20.

Contact: Paul Arkwright, UKDel NATO Brussels, telephone 00 322 707 7517.

JONES PARRY

Sent by UKDEL NATO on 01-02-2002 12:51
Received by No10 on 01-02-2002 13:32

WED 30 JAN 02 09:42

PG.02

*Copy to Mr McKane**her file on*
for
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From: Emyr Jones Parry
Date: 30 January 2002

cc: Peter Ricketts, Political Director,
FCO
Adam Thomson, Sec Pol Dept.
FCO
David Manning, No 10
Simon Webb, MOD

2. MT
8

To: Paul Arkwright

SUBJECT: NATO/RUSSIA

1. von Moltke (Germany) hosted last night's Close Allies meeting.
2. We quickly agreed on the need to get on with it, and to give every support to the Political Committee effort to prepare a draft of the final basic document covering the new Council. We then concentrated on one issue, the French argument that work at 20 should be divided into two categories – issues suitable for consultation and cooperation, and areas where joint action could be envisaged. D'Aboville (France) argued for a clear distinction. Pushed to justify the two categories, he offered contradictory arguments. Firstly the necessary decision to go to joint action would require more senior consideration on the Russian side, thereby bringing issues to the political fore, and therefore making agreement more likely. It was also important, as a safety net for NATO, that this decision should preclude a drift, without proper consideration, to joint action.
3. The three of us dumped on the idea. I took as an example the PJC's effort in October to agree a text on the Kosovo elections. A repeat of that at 20 would involve a prior decision at 19, followed by debate at 20 on the elections, and if there were converging objectives, the process would naturally lead to a common statement of the 20. At no stage would a procedural decision facilitate the process, rather it would severely hamper it. D'Aboville tried to argue that the differentiation was between consideration in a sub-Committee at 20, and eventual consideration at Ambassadorial level. Again he made no headway with his arguments. Subsequently, Burns (US) told me that he has instructed the US representative on the PC to come out strongly against the French idea.


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4. We discussed the UK paper on possible projects at 20. It was well received. D'Aboville asked for further time to consider the content. Burns said that it was under consideration in Washington, and he envisaged identification of "easy wins" ie those projects which could most readily be the basis for initial work at 20. It was agreed that we would revert, identify the promising areas, as well as those which were offside, and draw up a strategy for carrying this forward.
5. Colleagues also confirmed their agreement to my suggestion that we meet weekly on the morning before the PermReps' lunch.



Emyr Jones Parry

UK RESTRICTED - PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister,
and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat

28 January 2002

Sam Condi

NATO-RUSSIA

When we spoke on Saturday, I promised to let you have a copy of the list we have prepared of possible projects at 20 for the new NATO-Russia Committee. I stress that the paper is not firm policy, and does not have Ministerial endorsement. But you said that you would be interested to see how our minds are turning.

As you know, we think we should be ambitious in our approach if we are to make the Committee at 20 a success and encourage the Russians to take a new, more constructive attitude to NATO.

*Best wishes,
yours ever.
Sam*

DAVID MANNING

Dr Condoleezza Rice
The White House

UK RESTRICTED - PERSONAL

1. Peace Support Operations

- NAC has already agreed to development of a generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations by the PJC Working Group on Peacekeeping, to be done at 20.
- This could lead to the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces. Joint planning is the crucial step forward.
- Possibilities:
 - Enhanced Russian participation in successor to Task Force Fox in Macedonia (Russian presence might help bring additional pressure to bear on Macedonian hard-liners).
 - NATO-Russia peacekeeping operation in support of a Moldovan/ Transdneistrian political settlement (perhaps in OSCE framework).

2. Developing Interoperability

- Interoperability is fundamental to improved NATO-Russia ability to work together on peace support operations. NATO could offer enhanced joint training, exercises and exchanges, going beyond what is already available to Russia through PfP.
- Early work to implement US suggestion of Integrated Training Centre to be located in Russia for training troops from NATO, Russia and PfP nations.
- NATO could offer tailored NATO-Russia programme of assistance with defence modernisation: initial focus on areas of particular NATO strength (eg logistics), and where Russia has useful capabilities to offer (eg airlift). Emphasis on mutual benefit.
- Russian participation in NATO exercises before Reykjavik (eg Balkan reinforcement exercise Dynamic Response in May).

3. Increased Mil-Mil contacts

- NATO could propose immediate intensification of mil-mil contacts: increased Russian presence at SHAPE (necessitated anyway by the activity outlined above); Russian liaison officers in NATO HQs; opening of the NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow. Expanded relationship would depend on Russia not exploiting it for intelligence purposes.

4. Counter-Terrorism

- Joint NATO/Russia projects could include:
 - Joint assessment of the threat of terrorist acts to KFOR and SFOR;
 - Exchange of information on national legislation to combat terrorism;
 - Co-operation on detection of and protection from CBRN weapons.
- Bilateral dialogue with Russia on CT is likely to remain our main channel for intelligence exchange. But there may be scope for enhanced dialogue and possible exchange of information and assessments.

5. Airspace management

- US proposal for Air Sovereignty Operations Centre (ASOC), managing NATO and Russia airspace 'from Vladivostok to Vancouver'.

6. WMD Proliferation

- NATO WMD work focussed in the WMD Centre (which has a staff of 7). Russia could second a specialist as part of thickening the dialogue. Russian expertise could add particular value in eg consequence management; protection of civil populations.
- Russia could, as an alternative, nominate an expert to attend meetings on ad hoc basis.
- Co-operation on medical surveillance and treatment against biological agents for both deployed forces and populations.

7. Civil Emergency Planning

- A potentially fruitful area for enhanced co-operation. Topics could include exercises, disaster relief preparedness and training.
- Russia already meets the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) on a regular basis. This could be adapted into work at 20.
- NATO could accept the Russian invitation to participate in a disaster relief exercise at Noginsk in autumn 2002.

8. New Threats (Missile Defence)

- Potential to build on the NATO-Russia dialogue on Theatre Missile Defence; eg through joint assessment of the threat to deployed forces; joint exercises and training. Possibility of joint work towards inter-operability of systems.

9. Search and Rescue at sea

- Framework document to be signed soon between Russia and NATO. Russia has participated in NATO Submarine Emergency Rescue Group (SMERG).

10. Arms Control and CBMs

- Work programme already established to look at nuclear CBMs. Netherlands hosting seminar on nuclear weapons safety and security in first half of 2002, with presentations by UK, US, France and Russia. NATO and Russia working on follow-on issues.

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NATO/RUSSIA: US VIEWS
From: WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 108
OF 260126Z JANUARY 02
INFO PRIORITY NATO POSTS, MOSCOW, MODUK, CABINET OFFICE
INFO PRIORITY ACTOR, WHIRL

SIC A3A
SUMMARY

1. Hadley (Deputy National Security Adviser) says the US take our point on the need for early progress on substance and a positive tone on NATO/Russia; and undertakes to repeat this internally. We should leave NATO Missions to work out the details. Hadley insists DoD are on board for a new relationship with Russia, notwithstanding their (proper) concern to ensure NATO's continued effectiveness.

DETAIL

2. I raised NATO/Russia with Hadley on 25 January, handing over the speaking note and list of areas for cooperation provided by Sec Pol. Recalling Putin's remarks at Chequers on the importance of progress, I said we must now put the onus on Putin to rise to the occasion. We all agreed on the need for safeguards to preserve NATO's ability to function. But it was important also to strike a positive tone.

3. Hadley said immediately that, after the Manning/Rice discussion earlier this week, they had got our message. Rice had subsequently set out two guidelines internally: that we needed to get detailed arrangements agreed soon; and that further work must be handled in a positive spirit. All the time that we were discussing process and safeguards the tone inevitably sounded grudging. (Comment: similar to Gusarov's line to Altenberg - Arkwright's e-mail of 25 January.) We therefore needed positive presentation and to sort out substance.

4. Volker (NSC) said he had passed all this to Burns - by phone, as this was "easier" than a formal message - and that Burns and Jones Parry had subsequently agreed they could resolve in practice most of the procedural issues. Hadley asked Volker to repeat the message.

5. Hadley said we also needed concrete ideas for cooperation, and to get one or two underway pre-Reykjavik: the US were working up proposals. He instructed Volker to feed UK ideas into that process.

6. Hadley noted that some people were suggesting DoD were grudging participants in this process. This was untrue. DoD were, rightly, concerned to ensure NATO's continued effectiveness (a sign, Hadley suggested, of their commitment to a continued NATO military role). But they were also fully on board with the concept of "helping bring Russia into the West". Hence their ideas for work at 20 on airspace management and a joint training centre. I said we liked such ideas.

7. Hadley ended by commenting that the US wanted the same kind of relationship with Russia as they had with France - not, as he had told me last year, the kind they had with the UK: he had mispoken.

MEYER

Sent by WASHINGTON on 26-01-2002 01:26
Received by No10 on 26-01-2002 02:43

11 Jonathan Powell
21 Prime Minister

Looks a bit more promising.

David, 28/1

✓

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CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 020 7270 0050

Tom McKane

Defence and Overseas Secretariat

TO7257

25 January 2002

Robert Deane (By fax)
Deputy Head of Security Policy Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Room 306
Downing Street East SW1

Dear Rob,

NATO/RUSSIA

Damian Leader from the US Embassy called on me today to talk about NATO/Russia. Since he had earlier in the week called on you with the same purpose I will not repeat all the points he made. I explained to him that while we regarded safeguards as important, we must not allow an argument about safeguards to divert attention from the main objective which is to put the Alliance's relations with Russia onto a new footing. As you had predicted, Mr Leader was receptive to this message, but he no doubt represents a more positive brand of thinking than some others.

2. The purpose of this minute, however, is to report what he said about NATO, the Prague Summit and counter-terrorism. Commenting on Senator Lugar's remarks at dinner on 20 January, he said that had discussed his ideas with a number of officials in Washington before his visit to Europe. Washington had yet to take a position on the idea that efforts to defeat international terrorism should become the focus of the Prague Summit and a major new mission for NATO, but they had been more than content for Lugar to float his ideas around Europe in order to elicit reactions. I said that we would be giving the idea some serious consideration over the coming weeks and would no doubt want to discuss them with the US thereafter.

3. I am copying this to David Manning (No 10), Peter Ricketts, William Ehrman and Adam Thomson (FCO), Simon Webb and Brian Hawtin (MOD), John Freeman (UK Del NATO) and Ailie Saunders (Cabinet Office).

Yours,
Tom

TOM MCKANE

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Canadian High Commission



Haut Commissariat du Canada

Macdonald House
1 Grosvenor Square
London W1K 4AB

January 24, 2002

Sir David Manning
Private Secretary Foreign Affairs
10, Downing Street
London SW1A 2AS

Dear *David,*

Here is a letter from Prime Minister Chrétien on the topic of NATO - Russian cooperation on which they had been corresponding. I think it warmly closes the loop on their exchanges, but expects continued close contact on the file on the part of officials to obtain the results we jointly wish.

On another point - Mr. Blair and Mr. Chrétien will both attend the Stockholm Governance Summit in February. Prime Minister Chrétien would welcome a bilateral encounter in the margins - I am told that around breakfast on Saturday, February 23 might be an option. Perhaps we can be in touch on this.

Yours sincerely,

Amicalmont
Jeremy
Jeremy K. B. Kinsman
High Commissioner

cc: Foreign and Commonwealth Office:
Sir Michael Jay, Permanent Under-Secretary
Nicholas Armour, Head, North America Department
Peter Ricketts, Political Director



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

January 18, 2002

Tomy
Dear Prime Minister;

Thank you for your letter of December 20, 2001 proposing continuing joint efforts to promote a lasting transformation of the NATO-Russia relationship.

I am pleased that the objective of a new partnership with Russia has been resoundingly endorsed, but much work remains in order to formalize this relationship in time for the Reykjavik Ministerial in May, 2002.

I look forward to our continued cooperation on this important subject.

Yours sincerely,

*Amicalment,**Jean Chrétien*

The Right Honourable Anthony Blair
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
10 Downing Street
London, United Kingdom



RT HON ROBIN COOK MP

LEADER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

2 CARLTON GARDENS

LONDON SW1Y 5AA

TEL: 020 7210 1025

Our Reference: PC/JS/01

24 JAN 2002

DN
cc: CS
JP
MT
AW

Dear Foreign Secretary,

UNITED NATIONS ACT 1946

We should consider amending the United Nations Act 1946 to remove the need for UN Resolutions to be implemented through Orders in Council. Colleagues are reminded of the importance of attendance at Privy Council meetings.

This week we have, at FCO's request, had to convene an emergency meeting of the Privy Council to give effect to UN Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan. I understand the importance of the United Kingdom giving a lead in these matters, and I do not question the policy of immediate implementation; but one seriously has to question a mechanism that required three Ministers to rearrange their diaries at less than two days notice to travel to Sandringham for a piece of business that lasted rather less than half a minute.

I suggest therefore, that the time has come to consider whether section 1 of the United Nations Act 1946 might be amended to allow for UN Security Council resolutions to be implemented either by Order signed by the Secretary of State or (given the need to involve Derry Irvine's people in respect of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands) by an Order "of" (rather than "in") Council. Whatever arrangements are arrived at they should ensure that they do not cause such disruption to Ministerial schedules as has occurred this week.

Until such time as we are able to make these changes I should like to reinforce the general principle that the Privy Counsellor Ministers of any Department that requests an emergency Council meeting should attend the Council themselves. It was, of course, good that Liz Symons was able to attend on behalf of FCO. But where, as in this case, a Department has more than one Privy Counsellor among its Ministers, it is not unreasonable to expect them to bear the disruption caused by the need to deal urgently with their business. I am grateful that on this occasion Tessa Blackstone and Harriet Harman were able to step into the breach.



I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, to Derry Irvine and other Cabinet colleagues, to Tessa Blackstone Liz Symons and Harriet Harman, and to Sir Richard Wilson.

Yours sincerely,



PP **ROBIN COOK** (*Approved by the Leader
and signed in his absence*)

The Rt Hon Jack Straw MP
Foreign Secretary



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Pr.23

Foreign &
Commonwealth Office
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24 January 2002

File per
cc: MT
AW
prem

Sir Emyr Jones Parry KCMG
UKDEL NATO

Dear Emyr,

NATO ISSUES

1. Many thanks for your letter of 22 January on your talk with Lord Robertson. Thank you for following up these points so quickly.
2. On Macedonia, the debate in the EU is also moving in the direction of continuing Amber Fox as a NATO operation for now, and considering the possibility of an EU-led operation (using NATO assets and capabilities – even the French accept this) later in the year. That at least gives us more time to work out the important conditionality we discussed.
3. On NATO enlargement, we will send you further guidance for Perm Reps' lunch on 29 January. I am copying your letter with this to Peter Gooderham in Washington and would be grateful for anything more he can tell us about shifts in the Washington mood (I will be in Washington with the Foreign Secretary on 31 January/1 February, and will take soundings then).
4. On the question of France and NATO, I raised this with Errera in the course of a long private talk with him in Paris yesterday. He was adamant that there was no question of France re-joining the integrated military structure: that debate had been killed by the failure to reach a deal in 1996. There was no political support from any side in France for re-visiting that. Indeed, the French thought that the present incoherence of US policies towards NATO (conservative on NATO/Russia, keeping NATO at arm's length from Afghanistan, seeking to pull back on their engagement in the Balkans) was gradually strangling the Alliance and that there

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was no incentive for France to change her traditional stance. Of course that is a characteristic French view: but the conclusion on France having no interest in re-joining the IMS struck me as plausible (but John Holmes, to whom I am also copying this, is better placed to say).

Yours ever,
Sida

for Peter Ricketts

cc:

Sir D Manning, No.10

Mr Webb, MOD

MA/CDS, MOD

Sir John Holmes, Paris

Mr Gooderham, Washington

Mr Thomson, Sec Pol Dept

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2.

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United Kingdom
Permanent Representative
on the North Atlantic Council

OTAN/NATO
Autoroute Bruxelles Zaventem
1110 Brussels

Tel: 00 32 (0)2 707 7526
Fax: 00 32 (0)2 707 7548

22 January 2002

Peter Ricketts
Political Director
FCO

Dear Peter

CALL ON NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

1. As foreshadowed in UKDel NATO telno 9, I called on Lord Robertson this morning. We ran quickly through a number of points.
2. On Macedonia, I underlined the arguments against the first military outing for ESDP but noted the prevailing currents of opinion and the discussions between Political Directors yesterday. Lord Robertson was surprised that the French were still pushing strongly. I said that if an EU operation were favoured, it would first involve an extension of Amber Fox. We would then need to make sure that NATO was plugged into the operation, and that it was an EU operation using NATO assets as we had always understood that definition. The Secretary General strongly agreed, and accepted that SACEUR and SHAPE would have to be involved constructively from the beginning. He will tackle General Ralston.
3. On enlargement, I set out our approach to ministerial meetings this autumn, and the wish for a joint Foreign and Defence Ministers meeting before Prague. It was vital that the Alliance should now address the preparation for Prague. What tasking was necessary to get the NATO house ready for enlargement? What were the generic conditions which should be applied to all the aspirants, and what were the specific conditions for each? The Secretary General responded positively. He wanted a fundamental debate at the PermRep's lunch on 29 January. He sensed that the mood in Washington was shifting. Concerns about Bulgaria and Romania exemplified this. He had cautioned the US not to take Baltic membership as axiomatic. The situation in Estonia, for example, had changed. A more critical approach was necessary. Lord Robertson added that the Swedish Defence Minister had told him

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yesterday that NATO needed to deliver a coherent message to the Baltic states. At the moment they were getting conflicting messages. There was a market for positive conditionality. I agreed and encouraged him to argue in that sense.

4. Lord Robertson noted that in the context of internal reorganisation, changes to the IMS would inevitably give more responsibility to the French Assistant Secretary General. The French therefore stood to gain. He recalled that Ron Asmus had yesterday spoken to him nostalgically of the near miss with French membership of the IMS in 1996. Yet they had been given many privileges without having joined. So, I concluded, the French - despite their obstruction in many areas and having already been given much - now stood to profit further. Where was the pay-off? Lord Robertson speculated that US thinking on command structures and one Supreme Commander might open up the possibility for an overall deal. I asked him whether realistically he thought we could tackle command structures. He replied that the force structures could not be implemented without changes to the command structure. Moreover, it was essential to make the changes necessary for enlargement. He had been struck recently how important Valencia was to Spain, yet the Madrid command was really a nonsense.

5. On the above issues, the Secretary General and I agreed that a more permanent close Ally role was essential. We will both work on this.

Yours ever

Emyr

Emyr Jones Parry

cc: Simon Webb, Policy Director MOD
MACDS
Sir David Manning, No 10
Int: JF, PA, NB

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Tom McKane

*Let's discuss. Perhaps the NATO group
Jp12 meets to focus on Nato/Russia? Lugar's
Nato/Russia Sprint*

*DM
CJB
JJM
AW
MT
AC/GS*

SIR DAVID MANNING

cc Simon Webb
Stephen Wright
William Ehrman
Sir Richard Wilson
Julian Miller
Tom McKane
Peter Gooderham

MOD
FCO
FCO
Cabinet Office
Cabinet Office
Cabinet Office
BE Washington

*as well as Nato/Russia in
the run up to Prague.*

Jan 24/

SENATOR LUGAR: DINNER ON 20 JANUARY

1. Simon Webb and William Ehrman have recorded relevant points from yesterday's dinner, which you were originally asked to host, with Senator Lugar and his team. You might find it useful to have my impressions of the main themes which arose from the conversation.

NATO Russia

2. We had been briefed to expect a fairly aggressive performance, especially from Ron Asmus, on the British approach to Russia/NATO. In the event Asmus seemed to have been told by Lugar to play it cool. Not that this was difficult, since there was much common ground between us. Lugar and his advisers readily agreed that the moment to remodel relations with Russia had to be seized. Support for Putin at the working level within the defence and security apparatus was limited. Lugar, who has developed a wide range of contacts within the military-scientific community, spoke with authority on the low morale and desperate lack of resources in the Russian armed forces and related scientific areas. Initially, under Putin, the security atmosphere and monitoring of US teams working on Nunn/Lugar implementation had deteriorated. This was now much better. Putin was clearly focused on Russia's need for stable long-term relations with the United States and the West. Resources and debt repayment obligations were the key. "For Putin everything now has a price".

3. Against this background, the American team did not linger on the variants for decision and referral mechanisms at 19 or 20. The key point was to prevent Russian control of essential NATO decision-making processes. With that caveat we did not have difficulty in identifying projects for meaningful discussion at 20.

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Indeed, it was wholly consistent with Lugar's current priority (see below) to focus NATO and the Russians (together) on counter-terrorism and WMD.

4. Senator Lugar's main purpose in visiting Europe was to deliver a speech on "NATO's Role in the War on Terrorism" to NATO Ambassadors in Brussels on 18 January. This speech, a copy of which is attached, informed much of our evening's discussion. The underlying thought is that, post-11 September, the debate on NATO has, or should have, moved on. Enlargement is now a given, at least for seven. The Russians have acquiesced and previous hesitant members, eg Germany, are changing their line. We should not be too rigid about capabilities since the new agenda demands a wider range of skills, in some of which even the weaker candidates (eg Romania with their special force capabilities) may be well placed. In effect, the new NATO relationship with Russia is also a given. The new, and most important, challenge therefore lies in making NATO relevant to the intertwined agendas of counter-terrorism and counter- WMD proliferation. NATO must have answers and a credible action plan ready for Prague, if it is to remain relevant in the eyes of US policy makers.

5. These thoughts are expanded upon in the speech and I will not develop them here. But our dinner discussion brought out two points worth noting. Senator Lugar had not been impressed by the response from Ambassadors in Brussels, and subsequently with interlocutors in Berlin, on partners' plans for improving capability. He had met a lot of talk especially from the Germans about resource constraints and what he referred to as "narrow national" agendas. In his perception the gap which was opening up between the resources and capabilities now available to the United States on the one hand and its allies on the other risked becoming unmanageable. Secondly, Lugar's proposed systematic identification and pursuit of the counter-terrorist and counter-proliferation agendas very much included plans for applying the same, and better, inspection and auditing techniques, used under Nunn/Lugar in the Former Soviet Union to India and Pakistan. However, difficult, this work had to be done. Perhaps Russia would help in persuading India to cooperate.


JOHN SCARLETT

21 January 2002

NATO'S Role in the War on Terrorism

Senator Richard G. Lugar

Brussels, Belgium

January 18, 2002

Introduction

There are moments in history when world events suddenly allow us to see the challenges facing our societies with a degree of clarity previously unimaginable. The events of September 11th have created one of those rare moments. We can see clearly the challenges we face -- and now confront what needs to be done.

September 11th forced Americans to recognize that the United States is exposed to an existential threat from terrorism and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. Meeting that threat is the premier security challenge of our time. There is a clear and present danger that terrorists will gain the capability to carry out catastrophic attacks on Europe and the United States using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

In 1996, I made an unsuccessful bid for the Presidency of the United States. Three of my campaign television ads, widely criticized for being far-fetched and grossly alarming, depicted a mushroom cloud and warned of the existential threat posed by the growing danger of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist groups. I argued that the next President should be selected on the basis of being able to meet that challenge.

Recently, those ads have been replayed on national television and are viewed from a different perspective. The images of those planes crashing into the World Trade Center on September 11th will remain with us for some time to come. We might not have been able to prevent the attacks of September 11th, but we can draw the right lessons from those events -- now.

One of those lessons is just how vulnerable our societies are to such attacks. September 11th has destroyed many myths. One of those is the belief that the West was no longer threatened after the collapse of communism and our victory in the Cold War. Perhaps nowhere was that myth stronger than in the United States where many Americans believed that America's strength made us invulnerable.

We know now that we are all vulnerable -- Americans and Europeans. The terrorists seek massive impact through indiscriminate killing of people and destruction of institutions, historical symbols and the basic fabric of our societies. The next attack could just as easily be in London, Paris or Berlin as in Washington, Los Angeles or New York. And it could or is even likely to involve weapons of mass destruction.

The sober reality is that the danger of Americans and Europeans being killed today at work or at home is perhaps greater than at any time in recent history. Indeed, the threat we face today may be just as existential as the one we faced during the Cold War, since it is increasingly likely to involve the use of weapons of mass destruction against our societies.

We are again at one of those moments when we must look in the mirror and ask ourselves whether we as leaders are prepared to draw the right conclusions and do what we can now to reduce that threat – or whether it will take another even deadlier attack to force us into action.

What Needs to be Done: The Lugar Doctrine

Each of us recognizes that the war against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction must be fought on many fronts – at home and abroad. And it must be fought with many tools – political, economic and military. President Bush is seeking to lead a global coalition in a global war to root out terrorist cells and stop nation states from harboring terrorists.

The flip side of his policy is one that I have spent a lot of time thinking about: namely, the urgent need to extend the war on terrorism to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Al-Qaeda-like terrorists will use NBC weapons if they can obtain them. Our task can be succinctly stated: together, we must keep the world's most dangerous technologies out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people.

The events of September 11 and the subsequent public discovery of al-Qaeda's methods, capabilities and intentions have finally brought the vulnerability of our countries to the forefront. The terrorists have demonstrated suicidal tendencies and are beyond deterrence. We must anticipate that they will use weapons of mass destruction in NATO countries if allowed the opportunity.

Without oversimplifying the motivations of terrorists in the past, it appears that most acts of terror attempted to bring about change in a regime or change in governance or status in a community or state. Usually, the terrorists made demands that could be negotiated or accommodated. The targets were selected to create and increase pressure for change.

In contrast, the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States were planned to kill thousands of people indiscriminately. There were no demands for change or negotiation. Osama bin Laden was filmed conversing about results of the attack which exceeded his earlier predictions of destruction. Massive destruction of institutions, wealth, national morale, and innocent people was clearly his objective.

Over 3,000 people from a host of countries perished. Recent economic estimates indicate \$60 billion of loss to the United States economy and the loss of over 1.6 million jobs. Horrible as these results have been, military experts have written about the exponential expansion of those losses had the al-Qaeda terrorists used weapons of mass destruction.

The minimum standard for victory in this kind of war is the prevention of any of the individual terrorists or terrorist cells from obtaining weapons or materials of mass destruction.

The current war effort in Afghanistan is destroying the Afghan-based al-Qaeda network and the Taliban regime. The campaign is also designed to demonstrate that governments that are hosts to terrorists face retribution. But as individual NATO countries prosecute this war, NATO must pay much more attention to the other side of the equation – that is, making certain that all weapons and materials of mass destruction are identified, continuously guarded, and systematically destroyed.

Unfortunately, beyond Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, Nunn-Lugar-style cooperative threat reduction programs aimed at non-proliferation do not exist. They must now be created on a global scale, with counter-terrorism joining counter-proliferation as our primary objectives.

Today we lack even minimal international confidence about many weapons programs, including the number of weapons or amounts of materials produced, the storage procedures employed, and production or destruction programs. NATO allies must join with the United States to change this situation. We need to join together to restate the terms of minimal victory in the war against terrorism we are currently fighting – to wit, that every nation that has weapons and materials of mass destruction must account for what it has, spend its own money or obtain international technical and financial resources to safely secure what it has, and pledge that no other nation, cell or cause will be allowed access to or use of these weapons or materials.

Some nations, after witnessing the bombing of Afghanistan and the destruction of the Taliban government, may decide to proceed along a cooperative path of accountability regarding their weapons and materials of mass destruction. But other states may decide to test the U.S. will and staying power. Such testing will be less likely if the NATO allies stand shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. in pursuing such a counter-terrorism policy.

The precise replication of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be possible everywhere, but a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency and safety can and must be established in every nation with a WMD program. When such nations resist such accountability, or their governments make their territory available to terrorists who are seeking weapons of mass destruction, then NATO nations should be prepared to join with the U.S. to use force as well as all diplomatic and economic tools at their collective disposal.

I do not mention the use of military force lightly or as a passing comment. The use of military force could mean war against a nation state remote from Europe or North America. This awesome contingency requires the utmost in clarity now. Without being redundant, let me describe the basic elements of such a strategy even more explicitly.

(*) And with counter strikes
w. wmd

f.

NATO should list all nation states which now house terrorist cells, voluntarily or involuntarily. The list should be supplemented with a map which illustrates to all of our citizens the location of these states. Through intelligence sharing, termination of illicit financial channels, support of local police work, diplomacy, and public information, NATO and a broader coalition of nations fighting terrorism will seek to root out each cell in a comprehensive manner for years to come and keep a public record of success that the world can observe and measure. If we are diligent and determined, we will end most terrorist possibilities.

Perhaps more importantly, we will draw up a second list that will contain all of the states that have materials, programs, and/or weapons of mass destruction. We will demand that each of these nation states account for all of the materials, programs, and weapons in a manner which is internationally verifiable. We will demand that all such weapons and materials be made secure from theft or threat of proliferation using the funds of that nation state and supplemented by international funds if required. We will work with each nation state to formulate programs of continuing accountability and destruction which maybe of mutual benefit to the safety of citizens in the host state and the international community. This will be a finite list, and success in the war against terrorism will not be achieved until all nations on that list have complied with these standards.

The Nunn-Lugar program has demonstrated that extraordinary international relationships are possible to improve controls over weapons of mass destruction. Programs similar to the Nunn-Lugar program should be established in each of the countries in the coalition against terrorism that wishes to work with the United States and hopefully its NATO allies on safe storage, accountability and planned destruction of these dangerous weapons and materials of mass destruction.

What Role for NATO

If this conference had taken place before September 11th, I would now deliver an eloquent statement about the importance of continuing NATO enlargement and trying to build a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. In a speech preceding the remarkable call by President Bush in Warsaw for a NATO which stretched from the Baltics to the Black Sea, I listed Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Bulgaria as strong candidates for membership consideration and I visited five of these countries last summer to encourage continuing progress in meeting the criteria for joining the Alliance. After ten years of hands-on experience in working with Russian political, military, and scientific leaders to carefully secure and to destroy materials and weapons of mass destruction in cooperative threat reduction programs, I anticipate that a new NATO-Russian relationship could be of enormous benefit in meeting the dangerous challenges which we must now confront together. In many ways, September 11th has strengthened my conviction that both of these efforts are critical.

But they can no longer be our only major priorities. As important as they are, neither NATO enlargement nor NATO-Russia cooperation is the most critical issue facing our nations today. That issue is the war on terrorism. NATO has to decide whether it wants to participate in

How does this work when faced with demand for information? How do we prove a negative?

this war. It has to decide whether it wants to be relevant in addressing the major security challenge of our day. Those of us who have been the most stalwart proponents of enlargement in the past have an obligation to point out that, as important as NATO enlargement remains, the major security challenge we face today is the intersection of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction.

If we fail to defend our societies from a major terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction, we and the Alliance will have failed in the most fundamental sense of defending our nations and our way of life – and no one will care what NATO did or did not accomplish on enlargement at the Prague summit. That's why the Alliance must fundamentally rethink its role in the world in the wake of September 11th.

At the Washington summit in the spring of 1999, NATO heads of state made a bold statement. They stated that they wanted NATO to be as relevant to the threats of the next 50 years as it was to the threats of the past five decades.

The Alliance invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history in response to September 11th. But, NATO itself has only played a limited, largely political and symbolic role in the war against terrorism. To some degree, Washington's reluctance to turn to NATO was tied to the fact that the U.S. had to scramble to put together a military response involving logistics, basing and special forces quickly – and it was easier to do that ourselves. Since it was the U.S. itself that was attacked, we were highly motivated to assume the lion's share of burden of the military role of the war on terrorism and we had the capability to do so.

But U.S. reticence to turn to NATO was also tied to other facts. Some Americans have lost confidence in the Alliance. Years of cuts in defense spending and failure to meet pledge after pledge to improve European military capabilities has left some Americans with doubts as to what our allies could realistically contribute. Rightly or wrongly, the legacy of Kosovo has reinforced the concern that NATO is not up to the job of fighting a modern war. The U.S. *did* have confidence in a select group of individual allies. But it did not have confidence in the institution that is NATO. And the fact that some military leaders of NATO's leading power didn't want to use the Alliance it has led for half a century is a worrying sign.

Some of us in Washington did suggest to the Administration that it could and should be more creative in involving NATO. Senator Joseph Biden and I, for example, wrote an "op-ed" suggesting a number of tasks the Alliance could assume in the war on terrorism. But I am not here to second-guess the President and his national security team on these issues. Whether we should have used NATO more is a question best left to future historians. The strategy the US employed in Afghanistan worked, and I congratulate the Administration for that success.

The key issue is: where do we go from here? Will we – Americans and Europeans – now decide to prepare NATO for the next stages in the war against terrorism? If not, how should we organize outside of NATO to meet the military challenges of the war on terrorism? What do we

want NATO to look like in three to five years? How do we launch that process between now and the Prague summit next November?

Washington's "Schools of Thought"

You will not find a single American answer to these questions. Indeed, as I listen to the Administration and my colleagues around Washington, I hear very different views. One school of thought holds that NATO should simply remain the guarantor of peace in Europe. With successful integration of all of Central and Eastern Europe into the Alliance, they see NATO's next priority as trying to integrate Russia and Ukraine into European security via the new NATO-Russia Council. They accept the fact that NATO is likely to become more and more a political organization such as the OSCE but one with at least some military muscle. They consider any attempt to give the Alliance a military role beyond Europe "a bridge too far." If all NATO does is keep the peace in an increasingly secure Europe, that's enough.

A second school thinks NATO as it is currently constituted is about the best we can do. It does not want to take a big leap forward either with regard to NATO cooperation with Russia or with respect to new missions such as a war against terrorism. This school would be willing to enlarge to some additional countries but is much more cautious about NATO-Russia cooperation. It is willing to work with allies on future missions, but on an ad hoc basis and not as an Alliance, lest a NATO framework create "war by committee" and coalition "drag" on the prosecution of hostilities. It prefers a division of labor whereby the U.S. focuses on the big wars and leaves peacekeeping in and around Europe to the Europeans.

A third way of thinking about NATO is to see it as the natural defense arm of the trans-Atlantic community and the institution we should turn to for help in meeting new challenges such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. With Europe increasingly secure, the Alliance needs to be "retooled" so that it can handle the most critical threats to our security. If that means it has to go beyond Europe in the future, so be it.

This last way of thinking about NATO's future is closest to my own for several reasons. First, I have always had a problem with the "division of labor" argument that assumes the U.S. will handle the big wars outside of Europe and lets Europeans take care of the small wars within Europe. It presupposes that the U.S. has less interest in Europe and that Europeans have less interests in the rest of the world. Both are wrong. We have interests in Europe and Europeans have interests in the rest of the world -- and we should be trying to tackle them together.

Second, the U.S. needs a military alliance with Europe to confront effectively problems such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. We can't do it on an ad hoc basis. We were willing to proceed more or less alone in Afghanistan. But we might not be so inclined next time, depending on the circumstances. What if the next attack is on Europe -- or on America and Europe simultaneously? The model used in Afghanistan would not work in those scenarios. Americans expect our closest allies to fight with us in this war on terrorism -- and they expect our leaders to come up with a structure that allows us to do so promptly and successfully.

This represents the position badly. Declined offer of help is closer to the truth. The coalition was hollow because Washington wanted it that way. This also badly underplays help UK gave.

Third, the problem we faced in Kosovo, and the problems we are encountering with respect to developing adequate military capabilities to meet the new threats, do not lead me to conclude that the answer is to reduce NATO to a purely political role. Rather, they are arguments to expand our efforts to fix capability problems so that NATO can operate more effectively in the future. Americans do not want to carry the entire military burden of the war on terrorism by themselves. Nor should we. We want allies to share the burden. The last attack may have been unique in that regard. We were shocked by attacks on our homeland. The US was prepared to respond immediately and to do most of the work itself. But what if the next attack is on Brussels, or on France and the US at the same time?

Finally, some of my critics have said: Senator, that is a great idea but it simply is not "doable". And it would be a mistake even to try because you might fail and that would embarrass President Bush and hurt the Alliance. I find it hard to believe that the US and Europe – some of the richest and most advanced countries in the world – are incapable of organizing themselves to come up with an effective military alliance to fight this new threat.

When NATO was founded, there were those who said it would be impossible to have a common strategy towards the Soviet Union. And in early 1993 when I delivered my first speech calling for NATO not only to enlarge but to prepare for substantial "out of area" activities, many people told me that what I was proposing ran the risk of destroying the Alliance. Those of us who believed in NATO enlargement stuck to our guns. We now have three new Perm Reps with us today, and a much more vital NATO as a result.

My view can be easily summarized. America is at war and feels more vulnerable than at any time since the end of the Cold War and perhaps since World War II. The threat we face is global and existential. We need allies and alliances to confront it effectively. Those alliances can no longer be circumscribed by artificial geographic boundaries. All of America's alliances are going to be reviewed and recast in light of this new challenge, including NATO. If NATO is not up to the challenge of becoming effective in the new war against terrorism, then our political leaders may be inclined to search for something else that will answer this need.

I believe that September 11th opened up an enormous opportunity to revitalize the trans-Atlantic relationship. It would be a mistake to let this opportunity slip through our fingers. Neither side of the Atlantic has thus far grasped that opportunity fully. It is a time to think big, not small. It is a time when our proposals should not be measured by what we think is "doable" but rather shaped by what needs to be done to meet the new existential threat we face.

In the early 1990s we needed to make the leap from NATO defending Western Europe to the Alliance assuming responsibility for the continent as a whole. Today we must make a further leap and recognize that, in a world in which terrorist threats can be planned in Germany, financed in Asia, and carried out in the United States, old distinctions between "in" and "out of area" have become utterly meaningless. Indeed, given the global nature of terrorism, boundaries and other geographical distinctions are without relevance.

At NATO's founding on April 4, 1949, President Harry S. Truman described the creation of the Alliance as a neighborly act taken by countries conscious of a shared heritage and common values, as democracies determined to defend themselves against the threat they faced. Those same values that Truman talked about defending in 1949 are under attack today, but this time from a very different source.

In 1949, Truman went on to say that the Washington Treaty was a very simple document, but one that might have prevented two world wars had it been in existence in 1914 or 1939. Protecting Western Europe, he opined, was an important step toward creating peace in the world. And he predicted that the positive impact of NATO would be felt beyond its borders and throughout the World.

Those words strike me as prescient today. Truman was right. NATO prevented war in Europe for fifty years. It is now in the process of making all of Europe safe and secure and of building a new relationship with Russia. That, in itself, is a remarkable accomplishment. But if NATO does not help tackle the most pressing security threat to our countries today – a threat I believe is existential because it involves the threat of weapons of mass destruction -- it will cease to be the premier alliance it has been and will become increasingly marginal.

That is why NATO's agenda for Prague has to be both broadened – and integrated. While NATO enlargement and deepened NATO-Russia cooperation will be central to the summit's agenda, they must now be complemented by a plan to **translate the fighting of terrorism into one of NATO's central military missions**. NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia cooperation should be pursued in a way that strengthens, not weakens, that agenda. This means that new members must be willing and able to sign up to new NATO requirements in this area, and that the new NATO-Russia Council must be structured in a way that strongly supports the Alliance in undertaking such new military tasks.

To leave NATO focused solely on defending the peace in Europe from the old threats would be to reduce it to sort of a housekeeping role in an increasingly secure continent. To do so at a time when we face a new existential threat posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction will condemn it to a marginal role in meeting the major challenge of our time.

That is why this issue has to be front and center on NATO's agenda before, during and after Prague. The reality is that we can launch the next round of NATO enlargement as well as a new NATO-Russia relationship at Prague, and the Alliance can still be seen as failing -- that's right, failing -- unless it starts to transform itself into an important new force in the war on terrorism.

I plan to work with the Bush Administration in the months and years ahead in an effort to promote such a transformation of the Alliance. I hope that the representatives of member states in the room today will join me in this effort.



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

January 18, 2002

Tony

Dear Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of December 20, 2001 proposing continuing joint efforts to promote a lasting transformation of the NATO-Russia relationship.

I am pleased that the objective of a new partnership with Russia has been resoundingly endorsed, but much work remains in order to formalize this relationship in time for the Reykjavik Ministerial in May, 2002.

I look forward to our continued cooperation on this important subject.

Yours sincerely,

amicalement,

Jean Chrétien

The Right Honourable Anthony Blair
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
10 Downing Street
London, United Kingdom

1. cc. { Adam Thompson, Sec Pol, FCO
Nick Arnson, NAID, FCO
High Commissioner Ottawa
Kyril Jones Parry, UK/NATO

2. file.



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THE PRIME MINISTER

18 January 2002

Dear George,

Thank you for your letter of 20 December giving your annual report on NATO in 2001. I welcomed the opportunity to discuss some of these issues with you earlier this week.

I agree with you that the year has been one of major achievement for the Alliance. The invocation of Article V, at your initiative, sent the strongest signal of solidarity with the US following the terrorist attacks of 11 September and made a real contribution to rallying the international coalition against terrorism. It was a striking example of bold and effective leadership. NATO has again made a crucial contribution to the international effort to preserve stability in the Balkans, and especially to defusing the threat of escalating violence in Macedonia by its quick preventive deployment.

In all these matters – and more – the Alliance and all the Allies owe you personally and your staff a very considerable debt. I would single out the enormous care and effort which you and Javier Solana, with others, have devoted to Macedonia as a model of conflict prevention. Together you averted what could easily have become a major conflagration. I hope you will continue to stay engaged; as we agreed on Tuesday the situation there remains very fragile.

Ch

You know my deep conviction: NATO is fundamental to our security. We therefore need to keep up the process of modernising and adapting the Alliance to face a rapidly changing world and unpredictable threats. You set out well the challenges facing us in the year leading up to the Prague Summit. I welcome the commitment made at the NATO leaders' meeting on 13 June to invitations being issued at Prague to aspirants who are ready to assume the responsibilities of membership. It is important for NATO's continuing effectiveness that new members bring real military capability to the Alliance and are able to contribute to collective security by the time they accede. We need to structure the process of enlargement in a way which encourages commitment by the aspirants to further reform. We have been working closely with all the aspirants on a bilateral basis to complement NATO's own efforts to help them prepare for membership.

I agree with you that enlargement must be accompanied by continuing modernisation if NATO is to remain effective. I strongly support your efforts under the 'NATO Plus' programme. Further progress towards a modern and transparent system of budgeting and prioritisation should help make clear the extent to which new resources are required. Equally fundamental are modernisation of NATO's military structures, real improvements in defence capabilities and effective force planning. I know that you have seen our proposals, summarised as 'NATO From Strength to Strength', and designed very much to support your own efforts to reform NATO's structures and processes. I hope that the theme of a renewed Alliance, going from strength to strength, will run through preparations for and the agenda at Prague.

I also agree that extra effort is needed on European Defence. The UK has always been a firm supporter, and we made good progress with Turkey at the end of last year on the participation issue. Agreement to the Ankara text is now necessary to open the way in NATO for the implementation of Berlin Plus.

The most immediate issue facing NATO for the New Year is its relations with Russia. I am convinced that Putin has made a strategic choice and that we were right to move fast to transform the relationship, with the potential of huge benefits for Euro-Atlantic security. I was pleased to be able to make my own contribution to the debate, and that the NATO and Russian Foreign and Defence Ministers Meetings endorsed work in the North Atlantic Council with a view to an operational relationship at 20 by the Spring Ministerials. We now need to move forward quickly, focusing on issues of immediate practical benefit to the Allies and Russia, without getting snagged on the obvious procedural and legal obstacles.

NATO has a busy year ahead as it prepares for Prague. But it can draw on the experience of a decade of transformation and renewal, and has formidable strengths – not least those of its current Secretary General. I look forward to working with you as the Summit approaches and hope we can stay in close touch in the meantime.

Yours ever,
Tony

The Rt Hon The Lord Robertson of Port Ellen

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DAVID MANNING

RUSSIA/NATO – THE ROAD TO REYKJAVIC

You called a meeting today with MOD and FCO officials to discuss the road ahead to Reykjavik. You emphasised that there was strong political interest in making the new Russia/NATO relationship work. The UK paper seemed fine. The IS paper also appeared to be on the right track. We should be wary of being overly influenced by the more cautious Allies and allowing them to water down proposals so that they become little more than a warmed up PJC.

2. Emyr Jones Parry confirmed that there was a lot of common ground in Brussels. Some Allies were very positive about UK ideas. But the French were unhelpful, and the Germans and new Allies cautious. The US mission, though positive about the IS paper generally, anticipated instructions that would press for discussions at 20 being cleared at 19 first. The Allies would need to resolve the 19 versus 20 issue. But a centre of gravity was emerging that appeared to be likely to be more cautious than forward learning.

3 Our strategy should be to counter this. As many projects as possible should be proposed for discussion at 20 in the expectation that there would be pressure to cut back. We needed to work fast to ensure a good outcome at Reykjavik. Time was short. The US Ambassador to NATO had suggested proposing a meeting of Ambassadors at 20 in Moscow before Reykjavic. You invited FCO to revise and expand on the projects listed in their Way Forward paper.

4. We agreed a key to the success would be to try to persuade the US to support our approach. The FCO should prepare a handling strategy. The Prime Minister might need to engage again soon with President Bush.


5. There would also be problems with the conservative Russian apparat. Russian officials lagged behind Putin and Ivanov. We would need to work up a NATO proposal to put to the Russians soon. The FCO should also prepare a paper on Russia handling. You would be willing to intervene with Prikhodko when the time was right, and ask the Prime Minister to speak to Putin.

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- 2 -

6. I am copying this to those who attended the meeting and to Tom McKane.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Ams', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

AILIE SAUNDERS

18 January 2002

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Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

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stephen.wright@fco.gov.uk

15 January 2002

Sir Emyr Jones Parry KCMG
UKDEL NATO

Stephen J L Wright
DUSS

Dear Emyr,

NATO IN 2001/02

1. Thank you for your annual review. Like your first impressions despatch it set out with admirable brevity and clarity the achievements of the Alliance over the last year, and the challenges facing it – and us – in the eleven months leading up to Prague.
2. The Delegation - and you personally – deserve much credit for the successes of the Alliance in 2001. The UK played the key enabling role in Task Force Harvest. The Prime Minister's initiative shaped NATO's ambitions for transforming relations with Russia. We finally made progress with Turkey on European Defence. And the Delegation secured commitment to serious reforms in the Civil Budget – which NATO may not want but desperately needs - while securing a settlement for 2002 well below what the Secretary General and other Allies were demanding. In all this, and more, your team played an exemplary role in promoting UK interests.
3. I agree with your analysis of the key challenges for 2002. Of these, I would highlight delivering progress on the new NATO/Russia relationship. This must be the first priority if a new structure meeting our objectives is to be operational by Reykjavik, which should also help to draw the sting of NATO enlargement to the Baltics. Rumsfeld's attitude is not encouraging and the newer Allies are clearly nervous. I think the key will be to focus first on areas where we can deliver quick progress towards practical work at 20. We must avoid allowing ourselves to be derailed by process or textual negotiation. I also agree that our priority on European Defence must be to reach early agreement on Berlin Plus. Turkey's agreement to the Istanbul text has shifted the spotlight to Greek obduracy at Laeken as the immediate challenge to achieving our preferred NATO-friendly ESDP

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what we want NATO to achieve at Prague and how we can bring this about. The principal elements we want to see the Summit agree include:

- An enlargement process which uses the period between invitation and accession to ensure that the new members can make a contribution to NATO as they join and maintains the incentive for reform. This means clear criteria, perhaps accompanied – as you suggest – by a phased approach. We also want to see firm NAC control of future applications to MAP;
- Comprehensive modernisation as set out in our ‘Strength to Strength’ agenda. NATO Plus is part of this, and we are looking urgently at how best to give Lord Robertson practical as well as moral support. But improvements to real military capabilities, and defence planning to make the best use of them, are even more urgently needed. And will Kujat’s arrival be enough to return the Military Committee to strength? Clear US leadership (so far lacking) will be essential for completing this agenda and overcoming the vested interests of some in the status quo;
- Renewed momentum on capabilities. At the very least Prague must launch a successor to DCI which has clear objectives and timelines, and has the greater ownership at senior levels in capitals needed to deliver new resources. Is there more HMG and UKDEL NATO can do on Allies’ (especially Germany’s) capabilities?
- Further streamlining and reducing third tier regional HQs. Our withdrawal of support for MND(C) and our targeted support for the HRF(L) HQs are steps in the right direction. Much more will be needed, especially in AFSOUTH, where the considerable UK investment (four two star officers, plus support elements) is not matched by influence within the Command Group. We also need the right outcomes on the future of SACLANT, perhaps considering in the process what dividend our down payment in converting the DSACEUR post to time-share has yielded.
- A new approach in the Balkans, where NATO’s successes in 2001 need to be matched by a more comprehensive long-term strategy. NATO’s work with the EU on Macedonia last year is a good starting point. Your suggestions for a comprehensive approach (your telno 718) are welcome. We will also need to tackle organised crime, as Charles Crawford suggests (his telno 6). We will be taking work forward rapidly on this. And we need to look at the aspirations of the countries themselves. All the Balkan states see (or will soon come to see) themselves as eventual candidates for NATO membership. Two (Croatia and the FRY, once it has got rid of the old top brass) could become credible quite soon. Whatever the difficulties of digesting the results of Prague, we must not appear to slam the door in their faces. And PfP elsewhere, including we hope soon in Bosnia, will continue to play a valuable role in promoting military reform and building confidence.

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- An addendum to the Strategic Concept setting out NATO's role on terrorism. NATO must demonstrably add value, while heading off activity in areas (such as CT co-ordination) where it risks duplicating the work of others. Creative thinking will be needed if we are to sustain the political impact without making NATO do too much or too little.
- 8. This is a formidable agenda. Getting agreement within the Alliance will not be easy. It will be essential to get the US engaged early in the year. Reporting from Washington indicates that inter-agency work on Summit issues is now starting, with Deputies being consulted by the end of this month. We must promote our key priorities energetically as US policy evolves. And we should stress to the Americans the importance for them and for NATO of real consultation among Allies. Allies in their turn will need to accept the need for radical change in NATO to reflect rapid change in the context of European security. We need to be able to show that issues like NATO/Russia and modernisation are opportunities not threats, and are driven by changes in the real world. It will be important that we use the May Ministerials to push forward on the pre-Prague agenda.
- 9. The Delegation will have a key role in all this. We will need continued creative use of the Close Allies mechanism to push forward NATO decision making, backed up as necessary by action from London and in the relevant capitals. And we will continue to aim for even closer team working between UKDEL, the FCO and MoD. The advent of Confidential Firecrest has been a major step towards seamless working. The advent of CHOTs in SecPol Department should bring us still closer to real joined-up working (though more work is still needed to make FCO and MoD IT fully compatible). This is important as the Delegation continues to play to its traditional strengths as a vital source of creative policy thinking and tactical advice. In the run up to Prague we will be relying on you and your team more than ever. For that reason we are working hard with Personnel Command to ensure early rectification of what I know are unacceptable staffing gaps in the Delegation.

Yours sincerely,
Stephen

Stephen Wright
Deputy Under-Secretary

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model. Although the focus for now is on the EU, we need NATO to continue with its own work of defining arrangements for co-operation with the EU.

4. Underlying this, as everything in NATO, is the attitude of the US. As you say, it is crucial to the future of the Alliance. On the positive side, the Administration have from the start been strong supporters of NATO in principle. Bush has set out a vision of an enlarged and more capable Alliance. The Administration did well with its consultation exercise on Missile Defence in May, which did much to blunt early criticism in Europe. Powell has stressed US appreciation for the rapid invocation of Article 5 in September. But in practice there have been negatives. The US have not done much to take up NATO's solidarity in their response to 11 September. We are at odds with some in Washington (especially the Pentagon) on NATO/Russia, elements of NATO/EU, many aspects of arms control, and key elements of our approach to NATO enlargement and NATO modernisation. It will be a major strategic challenge to influence the debate in Washington to bring Prague out the right way.
5. Differences of approach on these questions feed into a larger issue which will run well beyond 2002 but could crystallise in important ways this year: the wider US-Europe security relationship. On the EU side there is already pressure for an ESDP role in counter-terrorism and comprehensive arms control and disarmament, both of which risk encroaching on NATO's traditional turf. There is talk in Berlin and Paris of ESDP moving beyond the Petersberg tasks towards common defence. If the Americans do not want to accelerate the move towards a binary US-Europe relationship, inside NATO and perhaps ultimately outside it, they need to be more careful in their handling of the Alliance.
6. A key question shaping the US-Europe relationship is whether Europeans can restructure and fund their defence capabilities in ways which are relevant to modern challenges and impressive enough to make Washington want to have military (as well as political) allies. The omens are uncertain. The US campaign in Afghanistan has been another reminder of the gap between the US and even the best equipped of the Europeans. The Defence Capabilities Initiative has run out of steam, and the EU Headline Goal has still to deliver the goods. Germany is still under-performing as an Ally. The decision on A400M seems to be coming out the right way, but is only part of what is needed. And the economic position is hardly encouraging for European defence investment. Meanwhile, the emerging acquis on European Defence probably leaves the French too comfortable to enable us to bring them back into the Integrated Military Structure, although I welcome John Holmes' view (his telno 902) that we should look again at this after the French elections.
7. We need to find ways to handle these tectonic issues at the same time as the more immediate challenges you outline. Perhaps the best way to frame our views is to consider

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From the Private Secretary

15 January 2002

Dear Simon

MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

The Prime Minister held a brief meeting with Lord Robertson this afternoon.

ESDI

Lord Robertson said he had seen Aznar last week. Aznar was encouragingly focussed on the importance of getting the Greeks on board. There was a very short timeframe for doing this before Greece took over the ESDI Presidency in July (for the subsequent twelve months). The Prime Minister said he would encourage Aznar to be active on this dossier.

Lord Robertson said he had been briefed (by the Turks) that Simitis had asked in Washington for help in finding a facesaver. Lord Robertson's own view was that it would make a big difference if some way could be found in Greece of neutralising criticism from Karamanlis. Lord Robertson also alleged that France was playing an unhelpful role in reinforcing hardline Greek positions. It would be helpful if the Prime Minister could raise this at some point with Chirac.

US/Europe

Lord Robertson expressed concern about a possible downturn in US/Europe relations. There were a number of disturbing straws in the wind (US sidelining of NATO over Afghanistan, US walking back on the NATO/Russia initiative, US moves on SACLANT, rumours of troop reductions in Europe, worrying signals on Iraq). Lord Robertson thought the leading figures in the US Administration – Rice, Powell, even Rumsfeld – were all realistic. The problem was with figures one rung down – the likes of Crouch and Bolton – who were disproportionately influential in a busy and distracted administration.

Lord Robertson said this all added to the importance of strong signals from Europe on defence spending. He hoped the Prime Minister would bear this in mind during SR2002.

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NATO/Russia

Lord Robertson thought a major effort would be needed to increase levels of support for our proposals within the Alliance. He recommended that the Foreign and Defence Secretaries make this a feature of dialogue with their counterparts. The US were diluting the proposals, the French were neutral and the Germans wary. The Prime Minister commented that it would help if Putin could make clear to the US the importance he attached to this issue. In practice, it was the key to successful handling of NATO enlargement and a new strategic framework.

Enlargement

Lord Robertson said the objective should be to stay neutral on names and numbers for as long as possible. He would be pressing ahead with his internal reforms to prevent administrative paralysis on enlargement.

Macedonia


The Prime Minister thanked Lord Robertson for his persistent and effective work on Macedonia. Lord Robertson said the situation in Macedonia would need careful watching. Things were even more delicate than they seemed.

Afghanistan

Lord Robertson said he was hearing that many European contributors would want to withdraw from ISAF once the UK ceased to be framework nation. He believed it would be feasible at some point for NATO to take on the framework role but it would need plenty of preparation time (and France would need to be squared).

I am copying this letter to Peter Watkins (MOD), Andrew Allberry (Cabinet Office) and Sir Emyr Jones Parry (UKDel NATO).

Yours ever



MICHAEL TATHAM

Simon McDonald
FCO

Peter Mitchell
will follow up with paper & address on VS Russia
for psc
1/18/01

DAVID MANNING

cc Tom McKane

JPO handling.
DSH
MT

RUSSIA/NATO – THE ROAD TO REYKJAVIC

I have discussed the agenda for tomorrow's Russia/NATO meeting with Tom McKane, FCO and MoD. Their feeling is that the following might be a useful starting point for discussion on the way forward to Reykjavic:

- Stocktake of NATO meetings
- Projects for discussion at 20
- EU dimension
- The way forward
- Any other business

2. You might invite Emyr to bring us up to date with the picture in NATO. FCO will run through their view of possible projects for discussion at 20. It might also be an idea to review some of the ideas on Russia-EU security which were mooted before Christmas. On the way forward, we will need to address a timetable for the run up to Reykjavic, the scope for substantive discussions before then, ways of encouraging the US and Allies, and what, in particular, we say to the Russians.

3. FCO have provided copies of the final version of the UK paper discussed at 19 this week, the teleletter and IS paper which fell out of that discussion and the FCO list of projects for discussion at 20. I also attach an e-mail from John Freeman on the US position, as background to the discussion on the way forward.

4. This note without attachments will be circulated to Emyr Jones Parry and those attending tomorrow's meeting.

Ams
AILIE SAUNDERS

14 January 2001

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Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

17 January 2002

Ailie Saunders
Cabinet Office
by fax 270-0201

Security Policy Department
King Charles Street
London SW1A 2AH

Tel: 020 7270 3765
Fax: 020 7270 1401
E-mail: robert.deane@fco.gov.uk

Dear Ailie,

**NATO-RUSSIA; PAPERS FOR DAVID MANNING'S
MEETING ON 18 JANUARY**

As discussed, I attach the following papers as background for David Manning's meeting tomorrow:

- i. The UK paper circulated at the Political Committee on 15 January,
- ii. UKDel's report of the discussion at the Political Committee,
- iii. The IS paper, circulated earlier this morning, which seeks to map the road to Reykjavik, and
- iv. A draft list of possible areas for co-operation with Russia at 20 (which has not yet been fully cleared around Whitehall).

The key issues seem to me to be:

- Encouraging a more forward leaning and helpful US stance. The holding position adopted by the US Delegation (in the absence of instructions from Washington) has undermined momentum.
- Safeguards and pre-cooking of the agenda (para 3i. And para 5 of the IS paper). Some Allies are in favour of distinguishing between issues for 'consultation and co-operation (19+1)' and issues for 'joint decision and action (at 20)'. This is potentially unhelpful: it undermines the break with the PJC, and could make retrieving an issue from discussion at 20 more difficult. But many Allies (particularly the US) may not accept no pre-cooking. Is the best solution, no pre-cooking in general, but a safety clause allowing any Ally to ask for pre-discussion at 19 if key national interests are at stake?

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The timing of discussion with the Russians. The timetable in the IS paper (para 6) envisages NATO first talking to the Russians in Feb/March and no discussion of substantive issues until after Reykjavik. How hard do we want to push for early progress on the substance at 20?

Yes

Not

Robert Deane
Security Policy Department

cc: Stephen Wright,
Peter Ricketts,
William Ehrman,
Adam Thomson,
Robert Chatterton Dickson,
Brian Hawtin MOD,
John Freeman, UKDel (without attachments)

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NATO-RUSSIA: THE WAY FORWARD

1. PJC Foreign Ministers committed themselves on 7 December to forging a new relationship between NATO Allies and Russia by giving a new impetus and substance to the partnership. The common objective is to establish a Council which reflects the realities of a confident and cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, ready to face the challenges of the 21st Century. The PJC tasked Ambassadors to develop new effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action.

Safeguards

2. Decisions on which topics should be for discussion at 20 should be made at 19. NATO decision making is protected by the North Atlantic Treaty and the Founding Act. NAC primacy remains. The Alliance will always retain the prerogative of independent decision and action. Any Ally will be able to ask for pre-discussion at 19 on a case by case basis. The Alliance should agree guiding principles for the application of such a procedure. The options are pre-discussion as a matter of course (1) (ie the present arrangement as set out in the IAU); agreement that as a rule, pre-discussion should not be necessary, but can be requested if an Ally feels that key (2) national interests are at stake; and agreement to no pre-discussion on any subject. We (3) favour the second or third course in order to mark a clear change from current arrangements.

Structures

3. Time is short; we should agree quickly at 19 on the structures we wish to see in place. We envisage the new Council at 20:
 - Chaired by the Secretary General, Russians seated according to alphabetical order;
 - Meeting every two weeks at Ambassadorial level;
 - Prepared by the Political Committee at 20;
 - Using appropriate NATO committees, including those working on military issues, in new Council format, doing detailed work on specific agenda items.

Agenda

4. We will need an agreement on the broad criteria we use to identify subjects for the agenda. President Putin has identified two approaches, either of which would be acceptable to the Russians: fencing off areas where Russia will not take part in NATO consultations, then agreeing that all other subjects are open for discussion in the new

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Council; or identifying a small number of issues where NATO and Russia are already engaged and focussing on these at the initial stage. It is clear that some topics eg related to Article V should not be for discussion at 20.

5. The logical conclusion is to start work at 20 in a number of areas which have already emerged in the light of discussions within the Alliance and with the Russians. President Putin has proposed counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. Others possible topics include peace keeping and defence reform. Progress on these at 20 is achievable; we agree that identifying areas within these themes will help focus the debate – eg by looking at specific projects which would serve to reinforce our shared objectives. But these are illustrative and not intended to preclude discussion of any subject. Thereafter, we can expand the agenda in the light of experience. The safety valve of pre-discussion at 19 will continue to exist, but we believe that its use will decrease as both sides become more confident through the experience of working together at 20.

Timetable for Negotiations

6. Once the Alliance is itself clear on structures and safeguards, the Alliance position would be conveyed to the Russians by the IS. Thereafter, we propose meetings with the Russians to finalise agreements on structures. Then the PC at 20 would be tasked with reaching agreement on an initial agenda of 2 or 3 clearly defined areas for cooperation, consultation, joint decision and coordinated/joint action. We should aim for substantive progress at 20 on the initial agenda, in advance of Reykjavik, and formal approval of the new arrangements at Reykjavik.

Founding Act

7. We see no need to amend the Founding Act to which the Allies and Russia attach importance and which remains relevant. At a later stage, we could judge whether certain sections, notably section II which establishes the mechanisms of the PJC, need to be revisited. A written agreement formally establishing the new body may be needed (and is likely to be expected by the Russians). The precise form of this needs to be determined.

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Robert Deane

From: Patrick Moody Brussels
Sent: 17 January 2002 10:39
To: Robert Deane
Subject: FW: BRNAT; NATO/RUSSIA: POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 15 JANUARY

Importance: High

-----Original Message-----

From: Trad PC (Brussels UKDEL NATO)
Sent: 16 January 2002 14:32
To: Brussels UKDEL Tel Float
Subject: TEL: BRNAT; NATO/RUSSIA: POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 15 JANUARY

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TT MODAD MOSCO BEBER PARIS WASHI ROME
FM BRNAT TO FCOLN
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GRS N/C

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FM UKDEL NATO
TO TELELETTER FCO
TELELETTER NFR
OF 160822Z JANUARY 02
AND TO TELELETTER BERLIN, MODUK, MOSCOW, PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON

FROM Paul Arkwright, UKDel NATO Brussels
TO Robert Chatterton Dickson, Sec Pol Dept, FCO

SUBJECT: NATO/RUSSIA: POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 15 JANUARY

cc: Rebecca Hall, Eastern Dept, FCO
cc: C Garrett, CNWED, FCO
cc: Janet Gunn, ERG, FCO
cc: Tim Torlot, CTPD, FCO
cc: Roger Hutton Esq, NEPG, MOD
cc: R Belcher, DCEE, MOD
cc: Kathy Leach, Moscow
cc: Chanceries: Washington, Paris, Berlin, Rome

SUMMARY

1. Broad welcome for UK paper, including acknowledgement that we are seeking common ground. Only Hungary resisting strongly, but US position remains unhelpful. IS to prepare paper based on the UK ideas, and reflecting the PC discussion. Altenburg to meet Gusarov on 23 January.

2. Discussion of agenda for PJC meeting with Safonov on 28 January.

DETAIL

NATO/RUSSIA COUNCIL

As agreed, I introduced the UK paper, noting that it did not represent the ideal outcome for the UK. We would like a more ambitious approach. But we had drawn up a paper which we believed could attract a consensus on an issue where rapid progress was essential.

4. Norway, Greece, Canada, Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Belgium (most of whom we had softened up beforehand) said they were broadly content with the structure and substance of the paper. Specific comments were as follows:

Safeguards: on pre-discussion at 19, the majority was in favour of Option 2 (agreement that as a rule, pre-discussion should not be necessary, but can be requested if an Ally feels that key national interests are at stake). The Hungarians preferred explicit reference to the possibility of pre-discussion except where the Intra Alliance Understanding is waived on a case by case basis.

Structures: many Delegations thought that meetings every two weeks would be too frequent. Denmark proposed meeting "as necessary". The new Allies favoured continuation of PJC in parallel, at least until Reykjavik (and in Hungary's case beyond).

Agenda: Italy preferred Putin's more "revolutionary" approach - fencing off areas where Russia would not take part in NATO consultations, then agreeing that all other subjects were open for discussion. But there was a strong preference for our proposal to identify a limited number of themes, based on subjects already identified (eg counter terrorism and non proliferation). The US proposed on a personal basis handling some subjects at 19 + 1, and others at 20. France circulated a paper (by fax) proposing that the new Council distinguish between subjects for joint consultation and coordination, and others for joint decision and action.

Timetable for negotiations: With support from the new Allies, the US stuck to their previous position of agreeing everything at 19 first, then moving to 19 + 1, with no substantive work at 20 before Reykjavik. Canada and Spain urged rapid agreement at 19 on safeguards and structures. France thought subsequent discussion at 20 should start in February. Altenburg (ASG Political Affairs) said that his meeting with Gusarov had been confirmed for 23 January. He would be in listening mode, but would ideally put some agreed elements to the Russians.

Founding Act: no objection to UK suggestions. US said some in Washington were considering an Annex to the Founding Act agreed at Reykjavik

5. Altenburg summed up by noting agreement on the following:

- Time was pressing. We needed to engage the Russians soon;
- Parallel PJC and new Council structures were not desirable, although some favoured parallel existence during a test period;
- the Founding Act should not be revised; a new self standing agreement would be required.

Further work was needed on the safeguards/IAU issue; agreeing agenda items at 19 or 20; when to start discussions at 20; frequency of meetings of the new Council. The IS would reflect

and produce a new paper taking into account the UK and French contributions and the PC discussion.

PJC MEETING WITH SAFONOV, 28 JANUARY

6. The PC discussed IS ideas for the agenda for the PJC meeting on terrorism. All Delegations agreed that we should avoid a repeat of the 2 October meeting, and ensure there was substance to discuss on 28 January. It was agreed that agenda would include:

- Russian response to Allied threat assessment to NATO forces in the Balkans;
- Russian proposals for possible joint NATO/Russia diplomatic action in this area (Comment: proposals not yet received);
- Intelligence sharing between NATO Allies and Russia in combating the Al Qaida network in Afghanistan and Central Asia;
- Non proliferation of NBC weapons and components and their delivery systems to terrorist organisations and to countries supporting terrorism;
- Civil emergency planning for protection against terrorist attacks with NBC weapons.

7. Most Delegations did not object to the proposal for an exchange of national legislation on combating terrorism, but I pointed out that such an exchange would duplicate activity at the UN. I also resisted a proposal that the PJC agree to designate a subordinate body to follow up the agenda, noting that much of the work was already being taken forward in existing committees.

8. Altenburg pressed Delegations to participate at a high level. With the exception of the US, who confirmed the attendance of Taylor (US CT Coordinator), no Delegation had details of who would attend from capitals. (Comment: John Freeman is writing to William Ehrman on this point.)

COMMENT

9. The NATO-Russia Council discussion was encouraging. Our paper has helped Allies to focus on the difficult issues. Our inclusion of elements addressing some of the concerns of the cautious camp led to a number of them supporting our approach. The US remain without definitive instructions. Privately they tell us that they hope for something more constructive soon. Today's discussion is a reminder that only Hungary, and to a lesser extent the Czechs and Poles, share their reticence (although the Turks, previously one of the backmarkers, did not intervene today). Further lobbying in Washington should help to shift the US position.

Signed: ARKWRIGHT

YYYY

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17 January 2002

POLADS(2002)18

To : Members of the Political Committee

From : Chairman

ENHANCING NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS
THE ROAD TO REYKJAVIK
SIGNPOST 1

1. As promised at our 15 January meeting, attached you will find a new I.S. food-for-thought paper, drawing upon POLADS(2001)415, Political Committee discussion at our last two meetings, and relevant Allied written contributions.
2. The paper attempts to capture the common ground that has emerged thus far, and identify priority issues for further Committee consideration. This paper, as well as relevant national contributions, will be on the agenda for our 21 January meeting.

(Signed) Günther ALTENBURG

1 Annex

Action Officer: Paul FRITCH, EEPS/PA, ext. 4116
Original: English

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ENHANCING NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS
THE ROAD TO REYKJAVIK
SIGNPOST 1

Introduction: General Outline Taking Shape

1. Political Committee discussion on 7 and 15 January has identified substantial common ground among Allies on the principles that should underpin new NATO-Russia consultative/co-operative mechanisms. While much work still needs to be done, this discussion has also identified two distinct areas where we need to work toward consensus at 19:

- the formal structure and substance of the new council (i.e., agendas, preparation of meetings, frequency of meetings, seating arrangements, chairmanship); and
- the Allied approach to work in the new council (i.e., safeguards, pre-coordination, retrievability of issues, supremacy of the NAC).

2. Allies are also cognisant of the limited time available to meet the timetable set forth in the Ministerial tasking (*we intend that such cooperative mechanisms beyond the current format will be in place for, or prior to, our meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002*), and have thus called for a sharpened focus on the calendar of our work between now and Reykjavik, both internally and with the Russian side. In addition, a consensus has begun to emerge on the form of an agreement at Reykjavik (i.e., no renegotiation of the Founding Act.)

Formal Structure and Substance

3. With regard to the first set of issues, a good deal of consensus seems to exist among Allies. Taking into account Allied discussion at the 15 January meeting, as well as relevant Allied written contributions, the new structure could be along the following lines:

- a single council, which would replace the PJC, and would deal both with issues on which Allies began the discussion with pre-coordinated positions on substance (issues for "consultation and co-operation") and with issues on which Allies had agreed to de novo consideration "at 20" (issues for "joint decision and action") (note: while the new council would meet "at 20" in formal procedural terms, Allies would pre-coordinate their positions on any issues where they felt it necessary to do so, meaning that discussion of these items would essentially retain a "19+1" character);
- a mandate to deal with ("inherit") all substantive areas identified in Section III of the Founding Act, including the provision to add other areas by mutual

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agreement; Allies would, however, pre-coordinate their positions on all issues except those on which they had explicitly decided (at 19) to address "at 20" (note: this approach would give the new council a broad substantive mandate and continue the ongoing substantive work currently done within the PJC, while addressing the concerns of some Allies that the new council not become a "shadow NAC," empowered to deal with any issue before the Council);

- **chaired by the Secretary General**, with the Russian representative seated in alphabetical order;
- **meetings as needed** at the Ambassadorial level (initially once a month);
- **prepared by the Political Committee at 20**, meeting as needed (initially twice a month), which would, inter alia, formally agree on work programmes and agendas for Ambassadorial meetings;
- **using appropriate NATO committees**, including those working on military issues, in the new council format, to do detailed work on specific agenda items, subject to specific taskings.

Allied Approach

4. Similarly, a good deal of consensus has emerged on the principles that should underlie the Allied approach to work in the new council:

pre-coordination of topics: decisions on which topics should be for discussion at 20 should be made at 19 (specific procedures for identifying such topics need to be developed);

- **retrievability:** similarly, any Ally will be able to "retrieve" any issue under discussion at 20 for discussion/pre-coordination at 19 at any time;
- **prerogative of independent action:** NAC primacy remains; the Alliance will always retain the prerogative of independent decision and action;

5. Differences remain within the Alliance on the details of **how these principles will be implemented** in practice, in particular over the question of whether the "default" will be pre-coordination (i.e. the 19 would agree on a case-by-case basis to waive the existing Intra-Alliance Understanding) or work at 20 (i.e., an Ally or Allies would invoke the IAU on a case-by-case basis). These issues are, for the most part, however, matters for discussion and decision at 19 – the Russian side will have no role to play in deciding how and when the Alliance pre-coordinates its positions. Allies may wish to consider, therefore, whether a general framework concept on the formal structure of the new council might be presented to the Russian side in parallel with continuing Allied discussion of safeguards and application of the IAU.

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substance?

Calendar/Timetable for Negotiations

6. Keeping in mind the issues outlined above (and the Ministerial tasking "for, or prior to" Reykjavik, Allies might wish to aim for the following timetable:

January/February:

- agreement on the general principles of the Allied approach to work in the new council ("safeguards"), as outlined in paragraph 4;
- elaboration of the formal structure and substance of the new council (perhaps along the lines outlined in paragraph 3);
- provision of this general concept to the Russian side;
- identification of agenda items to be agreed at 19 for consideration at 20 and put forward by the Alliance for the agenda of initial meetings of the new Council.

February/March:

- discussion of the concept with the Russian side (initial contacts between ASG/PA and DFM Gusarov – possible subsequent discussion with the Russians in a 19+1 or 20 format to be decided by Allies);
- agreement at 19 on details of application of safeguards, pre-coordination, IAU.

March/April:

- approval of the concept by PJC Ambassadors;
- elaboration of rules of procedure for the new council, based upon the existing PJC rules of procedure;
- elaboration of draft joint declaration for PJC Foreign Ministers;
- elaboration (with the Russian side) of the agenda for the initial meeting of the new council.

May:

- adoption of the joint declaration by Ministers at Reykjavik;
- first meeting of the new council.

Form of the Document: Leaving the Founding Act Intact...For Now

7. Several delegations have stressed the importance of avoiding a renegotiation of the Founding Act. As indicated in the calendar outlined above, one approach might be to agree on a joint Ministerial declaration, separate from the Founding Act, creating the new council. As other delegations have pointed out, some sections of the Founding Act itself – particularly Section II on the PJC – might need to be revisited at some point. This might eventually be a project for the new council itself. Initially agreeing upon a free-standing document that leaves the entire Founding Act, including Section II, intact, however, might facilitate Allies' desire for a "test phase" for the new mechanisms. The PJC would essentially remain "in mothballs" – not in use, but not specifically abolished – until such time as the new council took a decision to amend Section 2.

Conclusion: Need for Sharpened Focus

8. In considering the issues discussed above, and the proposed calendar in paragraph 6, Allies may wish to focus discussion at the 22 January meeting of the Political Committee on the following questions:

- Can we reach early agreement at 19 on general principles, both on the structure and substance of the new body and on necessary safeguards?
- Can we distinguish between issues that need to be discussed with the Russian side and those that can be decided within the Alliance? If so, can we discuss with the Russians the general parameters of the new council in parallel with Allied discussion of the details of the Allied approach to work in the new body?

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Not
17.1.02

NATO/RUSSIA: PROJECTS AT 20

Peace Support Operations

- NAC has already agreed to development of a generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations by the PJG Working Group on Peacekeeping, to be done at 20.
- This could lead to the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces (see Annexe for possible NATO/Russia command structures).
- Possibilities:
 - Enhanced Russian participation in successor to Task Force Fox in Macedonia (Russian presence might help bring additional pressure to bear on Macedonian hard-liners).
 - NATO-Russia peacekeeping operation in support of a Moldovan/ Transdneistrian political settlement (perhaps in OSCE framework).

Developing Interoperability

Joint training/ doctrine

- Interoperability is key to improved NATO-Russia ability to work together on peace support operations. NATO could offer enhanced joint training, exercises and exchanges, going beyond what is already available to Russia through PfP (on the agenda for 2002).
- Early work to implement US suggestion of Integrated Training Centre to be located in Russia for training troops from NATO, Russia and PfP nations.
- NATO could offer tailored NATO-Russia programme of assistance with defence modernisation: initial focus on areas of particular NATO strength (eg logistics), and where Russia has useful capabilities to offer (eg airlift). Emphasis on mutual benefit.
- Russia participate in NATO exercises before Reykjavik (eg Balkan reinforcement exercise Dynamic Response in May).

More Mil/Mil Contacts

- NATO could propose immediate intensification of mil-mil contacts: increased Russian presence at SHAPE (necessitated anyway by the activity outlined above); Russian liaison officers in NATO HQs; opening of the NATO Military Liaison

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Mission in Moscow. Expanded relationship would depend on Russia not exploiting it for intelligence purposes.

Counter-terrorism

- Joint NATO/Russia projects could include:
 - Joint assessment of the threat of terrorist acts to KFOR and SFOR;
 - Exchange of information on national legislation to combat terrorism;
 - Co-operation on detection of and protection from NBC agents.
- NB: NATO is not the main forum for CT work (we see the UN and G8 as the main focus for multilateral activity, including with the Russians). We should agree with the Russians that NATO-Russia CT activity should not duplicate CT work already – and most appropriately – done in other bodies. Bilateral dialogue with Russia on CT is likely to remain our main channel for intelligence exchange. But there may be scope for enhanced dialogue and possible exchange of information and assessments.

WMD Proliferation

- NATO WMD work focussed in the WMD Centre (which has a staff of 7). Russia could second a specialist as part of thickening the dialogue. Russian expertise could add particular value in eg consequence management; protection of civil populations.
- Russia could, as an alternative, nominate an expert to attend meetings on ad hoc basis.

Civil Emergency Planning

- Russia already meets the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) on a regular basis. This could be adapted into work at 20.
- NATO could accept the Russian invitation to participate in a disaster relief exercise at Noginsk in autumn 2002.

New threats (Missile Defence)

- Potential to build on the NATO-Russia dialogue on Theatre Missile Defence; eg assessment of the threat to deployed forces. Scope for joint exercises.

Search and Rescue at sea

- Framework document to be signed soon between Russia and NATO. Russia has participated in NATO Submarine Emergency Rescue Group (SMERG).

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Arms Control and CBMs

- Work programme already established to look at nuclear CBMs. Netherlands hosting seminar on nuclear weapons safety and security in first half of 2002, with presentations by UK, US, France and Russia. NATO and Russia working on potential follow-on issues.

Airspace management

- US proposal for Air Sovereignty Operations Centre (ASOC), managing NATO and Russia airspace 'from Vladivostock to Vancouver'.

Annexe

Possible structure for joint NATO/Russia operations

Decision-making

- Allies and Russia would consult during an emerging crisis in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). In parallel, the NAC would consider at 19 whether to offer the Russians a joint operation. If there were consensus for this in the Council, and agreement by the Russians, the NRC would commission planning options.
- Planning would follow the same sequence - options, decision-making, Concept of Operation (CONOPS) and Operational Plan (OPLAN) - as for NATO operations. The NRC would decide by consensus at each point and would retain strategic oversight when the operation was launched.
- NATO's Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) would be the obvious source of planning, with expertise and experience of multinational operations. The Russian General Staff might also contribute. NATO-Russia Military Representatives could review the CJPS/Russia product and forward agreed military advice to the NRC.
- Russian officers could be integrated into the CJPS and the Integrated Military Staff via a NATO/Russia space with physical and electronic firebreaks (bearing in mind sensitivities of non-NATO EU members who have sought similar status).

Command Structure

- SHAPE would be the Strategic HQ, and Russian participation there would be increased. Russian might bid to provide a Deputy Commander for an Operation and for representation in the Joint Operations Centre (JOC). There would also have to be new arrangements for intelligence sharing (again, with firebreaks between NATO and NATO/Russia work).

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- Russia might bid to provide the Commander of an operation. This could be balanced by an allied Chief of Staff and/or Deputy Commander Operations. The decision would be influenced by, inter alia, the proportion of forces and assets committed. Russian led OSCE peacekeeping operations with NATO participation might be a possibility.
- Current practice in the Balkans offers precedents for joint work further down the command chain. In Bosnia and Kosovo the Russians are under separate command and units report to Russian commanders sitting alongside Commanders SFOR and KFOR and SACEUR. But in practise they co-ordinate their efforts with the NATO chain of command.

Issues for NATO

- A successful NATO/Russia operation would be a concrete expression of a new relationship. An equal military commitment should tie Russia more closely to jointly agreed political objectives. Russia would bring real capabilities and political influence in regions in which NATO is likely to operate.
- Allies would need clear ground rules. NATO's freedom of action could not be impeded. Agreed and well-defined political objectives and a clear and discrete mission would be important.
- Early operations would have to be at the lower end of the scale: joint decision-making would be too unwieldy to cope with war-fighting (depending on the war). Both sides would need to have a stake in the operation, and contribute a reasonable proportion of forces.
- An effective chain of command would be essential. Russian HQ posts could not compromise operational control. NATO might need to vet Russian officers.

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Robert Deane

From: John Freeman Brussels
Sent: 17 January 2002 11:53
To: Adam Thomson
Cc: Peter Gooderham; Robert Deane; Robert Chatterton Dickson; Alison Blake; Michael O'Neill; Emyr Jones Parry Brussels; Paul Arkwright Brussels; Patrick Moody Brussels; Nigel Brind Brussels
Subject: FW: NATO/Russia: US Views
Importance: High

Adam

As you know, US Mission here have been as helpful to us as they can on this subject in the absence of instructions. They were supportive in particular in terms of the NATO/Russia paper we introduced into the Political Committee (Paul Arkwright's report of which should be helpful background for tomorrow's meeting with David Manning, which Emyr is attending). But hitherto the US default option has always been Rumsfeld-sensitive rather than NATO/Russia enthusiastic. Peter's report of Fried's latest remarks (para 2 below) is particularly helpful if, notwithstanding their 19+1 in advance of 20-related anxieties, the US really would commit to working up 2-3 subjects at 20 in advance of Reykjavik. In my view efforts to push the US in this direction will be key. Others in the Alliance who are particularly reticent on this subject, notably the V3 and particularly Hungary, would of course be unlikely to sustain their road blocking or at least complicating tactics, if the Americans could be more positive.

John

-----Original Message-----

From: Peter Gooderham
Sent: 17 January 2002 00:02
To: Adam Thomson
Cc: Robert Deane; Robert Chatterton Dickson; Alison Blake; Michael O'Neill; John Freeman Brussels; Paul Arkwright Brussels
Subject: NATO/Russia: US Views

Adam

Fried (NSC) told me on Wed evening that he was hopeful that a cable of instructions would issue overnight to USDeL. On safeguards, the US position would be as Fried had predicted: all issues for the NRC to be first vetted by the NAC. If approved, a subsequent decision on whether discussion at 20 should be pre-cooked, based on loose guidelines, or entirely free. And a capacity for any Ally to haul an issue back to 19 if they so desired.

Fried said that the US hoped that discussion on 2-3 issues could be up and running by Reykjavik. The aim ought to be to build up quickly a good track record of work at 20, not least to fend off continuing sniping from the US domestic sidelines (e.g. from Asmus, as you will hear when he accompanies Lugar to London this weekend). But much would depend on the Russians performing constructively.

I said we continued to favour maximum predisposition to work at 20 without pre-cooking. We would want to ensure that any initial NATO position presented to the Russians sounded as positive as possible. But I thought we would welcome US willingness to envisage work on some issues prior to Reykjavik. This appeared to be an advance on earlier, less forward-leaning vibes we had been picking up.

Peter Gooderham

C. A. L. Sanders Gay Sox 0201

rebut to David Manning meeting

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R. Deane

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DAVID MANNING

cc Ailie Saunders


C: JB
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JH
MT.

NATO/RUSSIA

You may wish to glance at the attached letter from John Freeman in UKDEL NATO to get a flavour of the views of Close Allies about how to take forward work on NATO/Russia. (Ailie Saunders will pull together a briefing pack for your meeting on Friday, so there is no need to read the attachments to John Freeman's letter at this stage.)

2. The US in particular are focussed on **safeguards**. Clearly safeguards are important but we need to **guard against them becoming an objective in their own right**. If US ideas, as set out in the non papers enclosed with John Freeman's letter, were followed religiously, in particular the need for any topic for discussion to be prepared to the 'nth degree', there would be a risk that the new **Russia/NATO initiative** would be strangled at birth. Somehow we have to make it possible for the new **NATO/Russia Council** to discuss questions of topical interest as they arise.

3. My second thought is that all talk of extending the new **arrangements to include a European dimension** appears to be in danger of being lost. I have mentioned to the FCO that this should be on the agenda for your meeting on Friday. The FCO will provide two papers for discussions on Friday: the final version of the Political Committee paper and ideas for specific topics for discussion at twenty. The **European dimension** might be the third agenda item.



TOM McKANE

14 January 2002
Att

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Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 January 2002

cc: DM
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BUP.
✓
Dew Anna,

Call on the Prime Minister by Lord Robertson: 15 January

Lord Robertson is due to call on the Prime Minister on 15 January.

The meeting will be an opportunity for the Prime Minister to outline UK priorities on the principal NATO issues in the year leading up to the Prague Summit. He might want to focus especially on the need for rapid progress on developing a new NATO-Russia relationship and on European Defence, and the linked issues for Prague of NATO modernisation and NATO enlargement. On the latter we agree with Lord Robertson that it would be premature now to begin the debate about who should be invited to join the Alliance. But we see it as vital for NATO's continuing effectiveness that the process should encourage the aspirants to continue with reform before they accede to the Alliance.

... Lord Robertson's views on the year ahead for NATO were set out in his annual review letter to the Prime Minister of 20 December (enclosed). We agree with his analysis of the challenges ahead. The most significant point where we disagree is on the NATO Civil Budget, where Lord Robertson repeated his usual strong pitch for increased resources. We made clear in agreeing to a small increase in the 2002 Civil Budget that we need NATO to modernise the management of its existing resources before we can consider a significant increase. Civil Budget reform should be part of the wider modernisation we are urging for NATO in preparation for enlargement. Lord Robertson's 'NATO Plus' initiative to reform NATO Headquarters is a step in the right direction, but needs to be backed up by a wider programme. The UK's ideas for this have been set out in a paper ('NATO From Strength to Strength') endorsed by the Foreign and Defence Secretaries last year (also enclosed).
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A key factor on all these issues will be the attitude of the US. There is little sign so far that the Administration is getting to grips with the pre-Prague agenda, and on some issues (eg NATO-Russia) the attitude of some in Washington, especially Rumsfeld's Office (OSD), has been unhelpful. The Prime Minister could agree with Lord Robertson that his efforts and ours should be co-ordinated discreetly to ensure a complementary approach with the Americans as they begin to focus on the run-up to Prague.

...

I enclose a brief for the meeting. MOD and UKDEL NATO agree. I am copying this letter to Peter Watkins (MOD), Sir Emyr Jones Parry (UKDEL NATO) and Sir Christopher Meyer (Washington).

Yours ever,

Patrick

(Patrick Davies)
Private Secretary

Ms Anna Wechsberg
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH LORD ROBERTSON, 15 JANUARY

Objectives

- To agree with Lord Robertson on:
 - immediate priorities for this year;
 - an approach to the main Prague Summit issues in line with UK objectives;
 - tactics for handling other Allies, especially the US.

Points to make

- Agree with the analysis set out in your annual review. Complex of interlocking issues facing NATO. Getting them right crucial to future effectiveness of the Alliance.
- Need immediate progress on:
 - NATO/Russia: must move quickly to achieve operational relationship at 20 by May. Have to focus on issues of immediate practical benefit to the Allies and Russia, without getting bogged down in procedural and legal obstacles;
 - European Defence: EU agreement to Ankara text to open the way in NATO for the implementation of Berlin Plus. Rapid resolution to NATO wrangle over Security Agreement on the exchange of classified information between NATO and the EU;
 - Terrorism: agreement on the right NATO role. Know your staff working on this.
- In preparation for Prague we need work now on:
 - Agreement to structure process of enlargement in a way which encourages commitment by the aspirants to further reform after invitation. Aspirants need to know what is expected of them;
 - Commitment to continuing HQ modernisation. Agree that essential if NATO is to remain effective. 'NATO Plus' an excellent start. We will help you with budgetary and other HQ reform;
 - Wider reform of NATO's military structures, plus real improvements in defence capabilities and effective force planning. Our proposals ('NATO From Strength to Strength') intended to complement your efforts. Without progress here NATO's military credibility is at risk.

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- More immediately, better management of Civil Budget, including proper transparency and prioritisation, essential before we can consider significant new resources. Pleased you are getting to grips with this: should improve your ability to manage the organisation. We will be offering help with implementation.
- All this needs leadership by Allies, especially US. Not clear that US Administration as a whole yet focussed on how much needs to be done by Prague. We are working with them on this. Essential that our efforts and yours are complementary. We must keep in touch.

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LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
SECRETARY GENERAL

BOULEVARD LÉOPOLD III
B-1110 BRUXELLES

The Rt. Hon.
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen
SG(2001)1526

20 December 2001

In my first "annual report" last year, I said that I saw my primary responsibility as ensuring that NATO is able to guarantee the defence of its members and to strengthen the overall stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Both remain true. But the terrible events of 11 September have transformed the environment in which NATO seeks to fulfil these aims. And the prospect of another round of enlargement in 2002 is focussing attention on the Alliance's future structures and its means of doing business.

Combating Terrorism

NATO's achievements this year have been considerable. The invocation of Article 5 for the first time ever on 12 September was a political statement of the most profound importance, which led to significant practical involvement in the fight against terrorism. Meanwhile, this month's Ministerial meetings started the process of increasing NATO's current capability to help deal with the terrorist threat. We must make sure that the Alliance can respond as effectively to terrorism as it has to other threats.

Crisis Management in the Balkans

In the Balkans, NATO's engagement has been critical to continued political progress such as the recent elections in Kosovo. The handover to the FRY of the Ground Safety Zone in southern Serbia was a complete success despite widespread predictions of a bloodbath. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹, Task Forces Harvest and Fox have played a major role in defusing an escalating crisis that could have destabilised the country and the region. There has been close cooperation throughout with the EU, UN and OSCE, but NATO makes a unique contribution. At present, only the Alliance has the capability to sustain the large international operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, or to mount missions such as the weapons collection in FYROM quickly and successfully. But political progress remains fragile. We must not allow events elsewhere to take our collective eyes off the region which still carries the biggest risk of instability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

¹ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

Cooperation with Partners

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership proved its importance in the response to 11 September. It is the world's largest permanent coalition, 46 countries committed to common values and increasingly prepared to act politically – and sometimes, as in the Balkans, militarily – to uphold them. The Member Action Plan process, which prepares aspirant countries for eventual NATO membership, is already producing results. There is, however, a range of other less high profile activities which continue to help engage countries, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which do not want to join NATO yet are keen to strengthen bilateral and multilateral ties.

Cooperation Among Allies

Activities of this kind are representative of many areas of NATO work which have limited political visibility but are fundamental to Allies' security and defence. Collective capabilities such as the NATO AWACS aircraft now patrolling US airspace, collective defence planning and cooperation on issues as diverse as missile defence, civil emergency planning and military interoperability underpin our ability to operate effectively as an Alliance or individually as part of other organisations and coalitions.

A New Quality of Relations with Russia

Since 11 September, there has been a welcome further improvement in NATO's relationship with Russia. I am unsentimental about this relationship. If fine words are to be translated into effective action, we need a real shift of attitudes in Moscow. And we must not allow deeper relations with Russia to water down NATO's cohesion. But President Putin's approach has so far been constructive and realistic. If that continues, we may have the opportunity to transform our relationship into a genuine working partnership at 20. This month's Ministerial meetings have provided a good framework for putting this into practice.

ESDI

In other areas, important challenges remain. Despite increasing practical cooperation with the EU, there has been no final breakthrough on implementing the Berlin-Plus agenda. This poses major problems for both organisations. We must redouble our efforts to reach an agreement if we are to avoid unnecessary duplication and institutional competition, and achieve the complementarity and cooperation which was the object of this project. Failure would undermine our efforts to build up European military capabilities.

Defence Capabilities

Within NATO, we have toughened up the requirements for defence modernisation and broken the logjam on the important Alliance Ground Surveillance system. Yet the Defence Capabilities Initiative (like the EU's parallel Headline Goal process) is not delivering the practical military enhancements we had looked for. European Allies are coming under increasing political criticism as a result. Money is important.

But we also need stronger political commitment and a tighter focus if we are to make real progress, including in combating terrorism.

Enlargement

Enlargement poses equally fundamental challenges. It is too early to begin the debate on who the new members should be. To do so now would be destabilising internationally (including perhaps with Russia) and damaging to the Alliance's internal cohesion in the run-up to Prague. We cannot, however, delay consideration of the internal implications for NATO.

I will be blunt. Without action and extra resources now, NATO enlargement risks becoming a political and practical failure. We will not be able to convince our own domestic political and public opinion that the Alliance is ready, and accession will have to be delayed while we prepare meeting rooms, accommodation and staff support to cope with our enlarged membership. Many parts of my organisation are already stretched to the limit. Without reform and extra resources, this Alliance will simply not function beyond Prague. I am developing a package which I believe to be the minimum necessary to maintain the traditional ability of NATO and its people to deal effectively with current and future challenges. I count on your full support in this respect.

The Challenge of Prague


NATO has never been a one-size-fits-all organisation. It gains strength from its diversity. And it has an extraordinary ability to adapt to meet its members' needs. This year has seen that ability tested yet again. For all of us, 11 September was a tragedy. But our bonds have been strengthened as a result. My task for 2002, the year of Prague, is to ensure that an evolving Alliance can continue to meet its members' fundamental security needs in this new security environment.

*At the best,
As ever,
Gance*

The Right Honourable Tony Blair, M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
London

NATO from Strength to Strength

Developing the Agenda for Prague



A Paper by the United Kingdom

Prague: A Unique Opportunity

The North Atlantic Alliance has been outstandingly successful for more than 50 years. We want it to remain so.

The 1999 Washington Summit established an agenda – on capabilities, and on external and internal adaptation – designed to sustain the effectiveness of the Alliance well into the new millennium. The Alliance has proven (in Kosovo, and more recently in Macedonia) that it can take decisions very quickly and act effectively in crisis situations. In some of its areas of business, not least in capabilities, the Alliance has ground to make up.

We expect the November 2002 Prague Summit to take a further step towards achieving a Europe whole, free and at peace. We need to ensure that this Summit also energises the Alliance, to give it the capabilities, structures and processes it needs to retain its vitality as membership expands.

This paper is the UK's initial contribution to the debate on the agenda for Prague, and argues that:

- **We have a unique opportunity to re-tool NATO for the 21st Century. We cannot afford to miss it.**
- **The Alliance needs modernisation across the range of its activities. Otherwise, its effectiveness will diminish, and it will lose support on both sides of the Atlantic.**
- **Forthcoming Ministerials should give real momentum to developing a modernisation agenda for Prague.**

Guiding Principles

NATO is vital:

- To our defence, and that of our Allies.
- To our ability to manage crises.
- To security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Alliance faces a number of challenges:

- An unpredictable strategic setting.
- Making good capability shortfalls.
- Maintaining the Open Door, and the overall effectiveness of an enlarged Alliance.

NATO has the building blocks in place:

- The 1999 Strategic Concept.
- The Force Structure Review.
- Ministerial Guidance 2000.

The Alliance needs now to complete the transition from static, in-place Cold War-oriented forces, to the mobile, flexible, sustainable forces we need for the changed strategic setting and for the full range of Alliance missions. It needs also to continue to provide a model of democratic and accountable behaviour to the rest of the world, and to develop its ability to export these core values in the interests of Euro-Atlantic security. It needs to demonstrate its continuing relevance to the general public and hone its presentational activities accordingly. It needs to continue to work in partnership with the other international institutions contributing to global security and conflict prevention, including the EU and the UN. And it needs to continue to set Euro-Atlantic standards for military interoperability, defence reform and peacekeeping effectiveness.

Progress Since Washington

The Washington Summit continued the post-Cold War process of adaptation, but practical implementation has been mixed:

- Less than half of DCI-related Force Goals are being fully implemented across the Alliance, and less than 40% of DCI Decisions are at green.
- There has been a reduction from 60 HQs to 20, but an overall increase in costs; there are too many Commands, not sufficiently effective, especially in ACE; and the third level of the Command Structure is of limited utility and not fully staffed, with 1,000 posts which nations have bid for not currently filled.
- Working methods in the NATO bureaucracy - particularly staff development and business planning - have not kept pace with best practice elsewhere.
- NATO's defence planning system is not meeting the needs of the Alliance as well as it could.
- Technology transfer controls are a barrier to interoperability.
- There remains little prioritisation in common funded programmes: established programmes for which the requirement is weak can crowd out new programmes for which the requirement is strong.

We believe that Prague presents an opportunity to put right some of these shortcomings. We need to support Secretary General Lord Robertson in his efforts to lead change, and ensure that the Alliance is ready to meet its commitment to the Open Door at Prague.

A Vision for Prague

The agenda for Prague needs to cover the following areas:

A Blueprint for NATO's Future

- Reaffirmation of the Alliance's fundamental purpose and missions. In the UK's view, the five fundamental security tasks agreed in the 1999 Strategic Concept – Security; Consultation; Deterrence and Defence; Crisis Management; and Partnership – remain valid, and will do for the foreseeable future.

Enlargement -

- We welcome the launch of the next round of enlargement at Prague, which suggests that NATO will formally admit new members around 2004/05. Others will follow later, perhaps taking the Alliance within a decade to 27 or more.
- The impact of the last enlargement on the efficiency and effectiveness of the Alliance's conduct of business suggests that NATO needs to modernise to ensure its continued ability to function effectively with more than 19 members. Modernisation in the context of enlargement is vital to the continued credibility of NATO.
- We need also to ensure that decisions at Prague are informed by a robust assessment against the three Washington criteria: aspirants must be ready; the Alliance must be ready, and benefit; and further enlargement must be to the benefit of Euro-Atlantic security.
- Some initial thoughts on the process in the run-up to Prague are at Annex A.

Capabilities -

- We need to provide the capabilities our military commanders require to meet the tasks we set them. This means: adequate resources for defence across the Alliance; more effective use of resources to achieve capability improvements; a more effective European contribution; real interoperability - both hardware and doctrine - across the Alliance; and NATO and EU working together in crisis management.
- The DCI will have run its course by November 2002. A new way ahead on capabilities needs to be launched at Prague.
- We have a number of ideas, under the working title 'Capabilities Plus', for a follow-up programme to DCI - details are at Annex B.

Force Structures -

- We want militarily effective and affordable force structures, providing the right forces in the right timescales, and giving full effect to capability improvements; and we want the minimum number of High Readiness Force HQs to achieve FOC by end-2003, with full implementation by 2005.

Command Structures -

- We want efficient use of manpower, and a supporting command structure which is lean and effective and which properly supports the force structure for the agreed level of ambition. We need to highlight the cost and inefficiency of the current structure and the urgent need for reform.
- We need to build quickly on the outcome of the recent Command and Control (C2) Study to develop an overarching strategy to govern C2 for all future operations. The current Air C2 Concept of Operations study should offer early opportunities to rationalise Combined Air Operations Centres and reduce the Air Command and Control System programme.

Defence Planning -

- We need a defence planning system which delivers the capabilities NATO needs, with a fairer European share of the burden, best use of resources, and increased multinational defence co-operation.
- We have proposed a package of reforms, including:
 - An extended planning cycle.
 - A Biennial Defence Review Process reviewing force goals agreed the previous year.
 - Greater focus on capability shortfalls and multinational solutions.
 - Eliminating IS/IMS duplication of effort.
 - Enhanced output measurement.
 - Harmonisation of defence planning disciplines.
- Further details of the UK's proposals are set out at Annex C; these are currently being considered by NATO's Defence Review Committee.

Decision-Making and HQ Modernisation -

- We need improved procedures for efficient decision-making, and modern planning and business methods. The new HQ will be a catalyst for change, with greater inter-working between civil and military staffs.
- The Secretary General is already engaged with the issue. We need to agree practical ways to support him and 'NATO Plus'.
- Individual nations should be ready to offer advice based on their own experience. We have a number of proposals, set out at Annex D.

Resource Management -

- We want: prioritised programming and budgeting, with a strategy for resource allocation; output measurement; better integration across resource areas; and a modern Human Resources function for NATO HQ.
- We have already offered a number of proposals for more effective resource management; see Annex E. We also warmly welcome Canada's recent proposal for improved business planning in the Alliance.

Presentation -

- We need to examine how we can better present our roles, tasks and challenges to the general public, whose continued support is essential for the Alliance's vitality.

NATO from Strength to Strength: A Programme for Change

The programme set out above represents a substantial agenda for the next Summit. But it is essential that Prague gives us an overarching vision of where the Alliance is heading over the next decade and beyond. At base, this needs to encompass:

- **The way an enlarged Alliance is likely to map onto the future strategic setting.**
- **A strategy for improved capabilities.**
- **A coherent plan for maintaining and enhancing the Alliance's corporate effectiveness as it expands.**

This vision will only be possible if we establish strong leadership by likeminded Allies, particularly the US.

As the annexes to this paper make clear, we have a number of detailed proposals to discuss. We would welcome:

- **An early opportunity to brainstorm bilaterally with the US at expert level, with the objective of agreeing aims and tactics.**
- **Following that, a discussion with others with a commitment to modernisation before widening the debate to the Alliance as a whole.**
- **Establishment of modernisation as a key theme of September's Informal Defence Ministerial, and of subsequent Autumn Ministerials.**

NATO FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH

THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

1. Introduction

- The events of 11 September underline the need for NATO to have the ability to respond quickly and effectively to unpredictable threats. It must be clear in doing so that it is adding value to the international effort as a whole and not duplicating work done by other international organisations (UN, EU, G8 etc).
- NATO must ensure that its capabilities, force structures, command structures, defence planning, decision-making and resource management are as streamlined and flexible as possible.
- Specifically:

2. Strategic Guidance

- The Prague Summit will be the best opportunity to take forward the adaptation of NATO to confront new threats. We do not think the Strategic Concept as a whole requires revision; it already refers to new threats of terrorism. But it may be necessary to provide a short additional text reflecting the changed international environment and NATO's role in it.

3. Operational implications

- The Alliance needs to review and develop policy and military posture in areas such as force protection and non-proliferation where it has collective value to add. We do not think new NATO committees would help.
- We see attraction in flexible 'task forces', to be led by the Secretary General, and clearly focussed in duration and agenda on a particular issue.
- The Strategic Commanders will have an important contribution to make in reviewing our Force Goals and military preparedness.

4. NATO outreach

- The fight against terrorism provides a strategic opportunity to redevelop the relationship with Russia. We shall be putting forward ideas on this separately.
- NATO already has a functioning political and military relationship with the Central Asian countries through the EAPC and PfP. NATO needs to look for ways to manage the relationship more productively.

5. Internal machinery

Internal management areas relevant to terrorism on which NATO could focus include:

- Improving the output of the NATO WMD centre to reflect concerns raised by terrorist attack (eg through reviewing its output and improving the quality of staff);
- Increased focus on CBW preparedness;
- Updating the NATO Precautionary System to ensure that it is able to react quickly to unexpected events;
- Updating Civil Emergency Planning and refocusing it from Cold War to modern threats.

6. Presentation

- Media operations are an essential element in combating terrorism. NATO needs to ensure an effective, proactive approach which makes the most effective use of 24 hour media. Lessons have been learned from the Kosovo campaign and the current crisis has been well handled.
- We need to pay continuing close attention to our media handling and strategy, and to its effective delivery.

*Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Ministry of Defence
London*

October 2001

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United Kingdom Delegation
to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation
OTAN/NATO

Autoroute Bruxelles Zaventem
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11 January 2002

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NATO/RUSSIA: PAPER FOR CLOSE ALLIES

SUMMARY

1. General welcome for UK paper. US uninstructed but focused on safeguards. Germany and France generally supportive though the French hope we might make some amendments to our text. All agree we should introduce the UK text (revised or not) into the PC on 15 January. Grateful for instructions on revised text by early on 14 January.

DETAIL

2. As I agreed, I gave copies of our paper to my US, German and French colleagues at lunch today. I had given an advance copy to Nuland (US) though she had already received a readout from Bradtke (Peter Gooderham's e-mail of earlier today). I explained our thinking and wish to get something on the table so as to steer the Political Committee (PC) in the right direction and quickly. All three colleagues welcomed our contribution.
3. Mattei (France) said his delegation had also been giving thought to the way ahead and had prepared three papers on, respectively, a provisional schedule of work en route to Reykjavik, the overall concept, and on possible changes to existing agreements (copies attached). He was anxious that we should not send copies of the papers to our capitals as they represented delegation thinking only. I should be grateful therefore if you and copy addressees would protect his confidence. That said, Mattei thought it best to focus on the UK paper which had been approved in London and which was quite close to French thinking. He raised two points that he thought should be incorporated into our text: possibility of having a rotating chairmanship for the Council of all 28 member states and the need to elaborate an annual work programme dividing topics for the Council and subordinate bodies into two groups: those for consultation and cooperation and those for joint decision and action. With Nuland and Erdmann, I argued against a

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✓ rotating chairmanship which risked weak chairmanship and too great a separation a between the NAC and the new Council (common sense seems to me also that the French idea would tend to weaken the specifically NATO character of the NATO-Russia Council). Mattei made a not very determined effort to defend their thinking - mentioning in passing that it was D'Aboville's idea and not endorsed by Paris - saying it would help to draw a distinction between the NAC and the Council in a way that might make allies concerned about a Russian back door into NATO feel more comfortable. Nuland agreed on the annual work plan and seemingly so did Erdmann. I said I would see if we could get a reference to a work programme into the paper.

3. Erdmann said Berlin had had earlier close allies consultations (my letter of 20 December) very helpful in forming their views. These had been reflected in the German intervention at the Political Committee earlier in the week (Paul Arkwright's teletype of 8 January). He mentioned particularly the need to ensure that issues under discussion at 20 could be withdrawn. There were two procedural possibilities, either consensus at 19 to keep an issue in play at 20 or consensus at 19 to withdraw an issue. Berlin preferred the former. Mattei and I argued that an explicit procedure to this end was unnecessary. ✓ If we did not wish to continue discussing an item on the agenda we could not be made to do so, and in any case, given that we envisaged items for the agenda being agreed at 19 we could always ensure that any issue we no longer wished to discuss would not appear on the agenda at subsequent meetings. Nuland and Washington shared the German concerns but she thought that Mattei and my arguments were persuasive.
4. Nuland said she could only offer preliminary views, though she expected to receive detailed instructions towards the end of next week. She thought the UK paper was a very clear exposition of the main issues. On frequency of meetings, she thought it might be possible twice monthly. She hoped we might be able to put the safeguards paragraph in our paper higher up in the text; this would be the key part of the paper for Washington. Whilst she hoped Washington would agree to preparatory meetings in the PC at 20 (though some of her colleagues favoured preparation by the PC and for engagement at 20 only at Ambassadorial level) she was sure they would want to have preliminary discussion in the PC itself before going to 20. She agreed with the Germans on retrievability of issues at 20 and with the French on a differentiated annual work programme. Nuland underscored more than once that Washington would not agree to any discussions at 20 prior to agreement in the Alliance on structures and safeguards. They wanted to avoid any possibility of setting a precedent in any preliminary or dry run at 20 meetings which could "lock them down" in the future.

Nuland and Erdmann both opposed exploratory discussions between the Secretariat and the Russians. The Alliance first had to agree its initial position on mechanisms, safeguards etc which the US could then hand over in Moscow after which the Russians could send a team for discussion at 19 + 1 to finalise arrangements. I of course argued firmly in favour of moving to an at 20 format as soon as possible. All agreed on

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


retaining the Founding Act. Erdmann and Nuland favoured us concluding a freestanding agreement with the Russians for Reykjavik.

6. At the end of our lunch we agreed that we would introduce the UK paper into the Political Committee next Tuesday. But before then I would try to see how far we might reflect close allies' views through amendments to the text, which I would share with them on the afternoon of 14 January. But all three were comfortable with the possibility of us introducing the paper even if their views were not reflected in every particular. They thought the UK text would help to focus discussion in the right way.

COMMENT

7. We have now made some adjustments to the draft paper which we have incorporated into the revised version attached. We have reversed the ordering of paragraphs 2 and 3 in order to give a higher placement to safeguards and amended paragraph 6 on the timetable of negotiations, to take on board or to implicitly recognise that we would need a meeting with the Russians, effectively at 19 + 1, to finalise agreement on structures before we could move to working at 20. However we are still aiming to generate work at 20 before Reykjavik. This may well be a forlorn hope given US views, but we should try to keep up the pressure for moving as quickly as possible to 20. I should be grateful to know if you are content for us to introduce the revised text into the PC next Tuesday. If so, I would propose also to let the Canadians, Italians, Dutch and Norwegians have advance copies late on Monday. I would give a copy also to Lord Robertson's office.


John Freeman

cc: Peter Ricketts, Political Director, FCO
Stephen Wright, DUS Defence, FCO
William Ehrman, Director Int Security, FCO
Tom McKane, Cabinet Office

Brian Hawtin, DGISP, MOD
Adam Thomson, SecPol D, FCO
Robert Chatterton-Dickson, SecPol D, FCO
Simon Butt, Eastern Dept, FCO
Peter Gooderham, Washington

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Michael O'Neill, Washington
Simon Fraser, Paris
Jeremy Cresswell, Berlin
David Gowan, Moscow
Int: EJP, PA, NB, PM, MilRep, FP, PVD

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NATO-RUSSIA: THE WAY FORWARD

1. PJC Foreign Ministers committed themselves in December to forging a new relationship between NATO Allies and Russia by giving a new impetus and substance to the partnership. The common objective is to establish a Council which reflects the realities of a confident and cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, ready to face the challenges of the 21st Century. The PJC tasked Ambassadors to develop new effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action.

Safeguards

2. Decisions on which topics should be for discussion at 20 should be made at 19. NATO decision making is protected by the North Atlantic Treaty and the Founding Act. NAC primacy remains. The Alliance will always retain the prerogative of independent decision and action. Any Ally will be able to ask for pre-discussion at 19 on a case by case basis. The Alliance should agree guiding principles for the application of such a procedure. The options are pre-discussion as a matter of course (ie the present arrangement as set out in the IAU), agreement that as a rule, pre-discussion should not be necessary, but can be requested if an Ally feels that key national interests are at stake; and agreement to no pre-discussion on any subject. We favour the second or third course in order to mark a clear change from current arrangements.

Structures

3. Time is short; we should agree quickly at 19 on the structures we wish to see in place. We envisage the new Council at 20:
 - Chaired by the Secretary General, Russians seated according to alphabetical order,
 - Meeting every two weeks at Ambassadorial level,
 - Prepared by the Political Committee at 20;
 - Using appropriate NATO committees, including those working on military issues, in new Council format, doing detailed work on specific agenda items

Agenda

4. We will need an agreement on the broad criteria we use to identify subjects for the agenda. President Putin has identified two approaches, either of which would be acceptable to the Russians: fencing off areas where Russia will not take part in NATO consultations, then agreeing that all other subjects are open for discussion in the new

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Council; or identifying a small number of issues where NATO and Russia are already engaged and focussing on these at the initial stage. It is clear that some topics eg related to Article V should not be for discussion at 20.

- at
5. The logical conclusion is to start work at 20 in a number of areas which have already emerged in the light of discussions within the Alliance and with the Russians. President Putin has proposed counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. Other possible topics include peace keeping and defence reform. Progress on these at 20 is achievable; we agree that identifying areas within these themes will help focus the debate – eg by looking at specific projects which would serve to reinforce our shared objectives. But these are illustrative and not intended to preclude discussion of any subject. Thereafter, we can expand the agenda in the light of experience. The safety valve of pre-discussion at 19 will continue to exist, but we believe that its use will decrease as both sides become more confident through the experience of working together at 20.

Timetable for Negotiations

6. Once the Alliance is itself clear on structures and safeguards, the Alliance position would be conveyed to the Russians by the IS. Thereafter, we propose meetings with the Russians to finalise agreements on structures. Then the PC at 20 would be tasked with reaching agreement on an initial agenda of 2 or 3 clearly defined areas for cooperation, consultation, joint decision and coordinated/joint action. We should aim for substantive progress at 20 on the initial agenda, in advance of Reykjavik, and formal approval of the new arrangements at Reykjavik.

Founding Act

7. We see no need to amend the Founding Act to which the Allies and Russia attach importance and which remains relevant. At a later stage, we could judge whether certain sections, notably section II which establishes the mechanisms of the PJC, need to be revisited. A written agreement formally establishing the new body may be needed (and is likely to be expected by the Russians). The precise form of this needs to be determined.

INFORMAL AND PRELIMINARY VIEWS

NATO-RUSSIA new mechanism
Road to Reykjavik

(Provisionary schedule for the coming months)

First, Allies should agree with Russia on a conceptual approach to define a new mechanism. This should be done by March. Then, this agreement would be formalized in a joint Declaration which should be adopted by the Ministers at Reykjavik.

1) Elaboration of the concept

- January : definition of the concept in a document agreed at 19 (Political Committee)
- End of January / February : Presentation of the document to the Russian authorities by SGA Altenburg.
- February : discussion of the concept with Russia (Political Committee + Russia, without troika). The discussion would require several meetings with the Russians. Between those meetings, Allies would consult at 19.
- February / March : submission for approval to the PJC at Ambassadorial level.

2) IAU and Rules of procedure

- February / March : revision, as appropriate, of the IAU at 19 (Political Committee, NAC).
- March / April : elaboration, on the basis of the corresponding document adopted in July 1997 for the PJC, of the Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure for the new council at 20 (Political Committee + Russia, PJC at Ambassadorial level).

3) Joint Declaration

- April : elaboration of the draft Declaration, on the basis of the concept (Political Committee + Russia). The discussion would require several meetings with the Russians. Between those meetings, Allies would consult at 19.
- April / May : submission for approval to the PJC at Ambassadorial level.
- May : Adoption by the PJC Ministers at Reykjavik.

The joint Declaration would refer to the Founding Act.
Depending on its content, it could take the form of a Protocol to the Founding Act.
It could also lead, at Reykjavik or later, to some amendments to the Founding Act.

INFORMAL AND PRELIMINARY VIEWS

NATO-RUSSIA new mechanism
Concept to be discussed with Russians

(Food for thought)

A - Structures

A new council, committees and working groups at 20 would replace the PJC structure. The new council will continue the current work of the PJC. It will also take joint decisions and joint actions at 20. Existing working groups or committees under the auspices of PJC (including PJC-MR) would continue as bodies under the auspices of the new council. A Political Committee at 20 would be established on a permanent basis.

B - Chairmanship

Current troika system would be replaced by a new chairmanship.

The new council could be chaired by the Secretary General, or other possibilities could be envisaged. For subordinate bodies, it would be preferable in any case, for practical reasons, to have the Secretariat chairing committees and working groups.

NB : it may be useful to propose other possibilities than SG's chairmanship for the new council in order to underline a clear difference with the NAC and establish a firewall with the internal decision-making process of the Alliance. The Russians don't want to adhere to NATO (cf art. 5). It could be therefore justified to offer a separate table

C - Topics and procedures

1 - The new council would be competent for all areas currently listed in Founding Act, Section III. All these areas are potential subject for consultation and cooperation. But joint decisions and joint actions could be taken on a case by case basis for specific projects or topics defined in these areas through a percolating process described below.

2 - A distinction should be established in the annual work programs and in the agendas for meetings of the new council, and subordinate bodies, between :

- a- Topics for consultation and cooperation,
- b- Topics for joint decision and action.

Work programs and agendas of the new council would be prepared by the political committee at 20 on a consensus basis. Topics for joint decision or joint action would be put on the agenda of the new council only when a consensus has been reached in the course of consultation at political committee level.

The list of topics and their status ("a" or "b") in every work program could be revised during the course of the year, depending on progress achieved at working level (working groups and political committee at 20).

NB. Such a formula already exists in the present work program of the PJC Peace keeping working group where a distinction is made between joint "Papers" (item 1) and "Exchange of peacekeeping experience" (item 2). This incremental process is applicable in principle to the whole range of areas listed in the Founding Act. The distinction between issues "a" and "b" would be useful to remain coherent with the Founding Act and, at the same time, keep the necessary flexibility to move according to progress in substance.

D - Internal procedures

As stated in the Founding Act, "Provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action".

In connection with the new mechanism, Allies will in principle consult on the definition or revision of work programs of the new council before their adoption with Russia.

Such a general approach could be a basis for consultations with the Russians

INFORMAL AND PRELIMINARY VIEWS

NATO-RUSSIA new mechanism
Possible changes to existing documents

(Food for thought for internal reflections)

The implementation of the December Joint Declaration would require adaptations to some mechanisms put in place by the Founding Act. New organizational arrangements and rules of procedures would be also worked out for the new council, on the basis of those worked out for the PJC after the adoption of the Founding Act.

A - Changes to the mechanism put in place by the Founding Act :

1) The " NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council " (section II, paragraph 1) becomes a " *new council bringing together NATO member states and Russia* "

2) The mechanism of chairmanship is described in Section II, paragraph 11 of the Founding Act : " The PJC will be chaired jointly by the Secretary General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member States on a rotation basis, and a representative of Russia " . It could be adapted as follows :

- Either : " *The council will be chaired by the Secretary General of NATO.* "
- Or : " *The council will be chaired by a representative of one of its members States on a rotation basis.* "

The second option could be presented as an innovative gesture to the Russians. It could underline a clear difference with the NAC and establish a firewall with the internal decision-making process of the Alliance. The Russians don't want to adhere to NATO (cf art. 9). It could be therefore justified to offer a separate table answering to their request to be treated on the basis of parity and non-discrimination.

B - Changes to the Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure :

Comments refer to the document adopted in July 1997 for the PJC.

1) Committees and working groups

Section III gives the possibility to establish committees or working groups on an ad hoc or permanent basis. The establishment of a Political committee at 20 could be decided on a permanent basis in that framework. It could be stipulated, or not, in the revised document.

2) Chairmanship

The chairmanship arrangements outlined in Section V would be adapted to reflect changes described above. It supposes modifications to paragraph 1 and 2 and, if necessary,

Staffing arrangements

The Section VI outlining the "joint group" supporting the "secretariat" and set up from designated members of the NATO international staff, including the "mission to NATO", could remain as it is.

4) Work programs and agendas

The Founding Act describes in its Section II the process leading from consultation to joint decision and joint action "once consensus has been reached in the course of consultation". This percolating process could be precisised in a new Section IV of the present document for the document on Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure, based on the following:

A distinction should be established in the annual work program and in the agendas for meetings of the new council, and subordinate bodies, between:

A - Topics for consultation and cooperation,

B - Topics for joint decision and action.

The same distinction would be made in the agendas of the new council meetings and other joint bodies.

Work programs and agendas of the new council would be prepared by the political committee at 20 on a consensus basis. Topics for joint decision or joint action would be put on the agenda of the new council only when a consensus has been reached in the course of consultation at political committee level.

Work programs and agendas of the new council would be prepared by the political committee at 20 on a consensus basis. Topics for joint decision or joint action would be put on the agenda of the new council only when a consensus has been reached in the course of consultation at political committee level.

This incremental process¹ is applicable in principle to the whole range of areas listed in Section III of the Founding Act. The list of topics and their status (A or B) in every work program could be revised during the course of the year, depending on progress achieved at working level (working groups and Political Committee at 20).

5) Topics raised in "AOB"

Paragraph 3 of the IAU refers to the possibility of new issues or topics raised by Russia under "AOB". Part of this paragraph could be transfer in the document on "Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure" (Section IV) as follows:

Members of the new council may elect to raise under "AOB" any issue or topic, including topics that were not agreed as part of the agenda, for discussion and decision. They may not to engage in discussion of a particular topic if it does not concern peacekeeping.

¹ Such a formula already exists in the present work program on "Peacekeeping Working group where a distinction is made between joint "peacekeeping" and "exchange of peacekeeping experience" (item 2).

- Changes to the Intra-Alliance Understanding:

D — Designation of the new council

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Organisation
OTAN / NATO

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11 January 2002

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NATO/RUSSIA: PAPER FOR CLOSE ALLIES

SUMMARY

1. General welcome for UK paper. US uninstructed but focused on safeguards. Germany and France generally supportive though the French hope we might make some amendments to our text. All agree we should introduce the UK text (revised or not) into the PC on 15 January. Grateful for instructions on revised text by early on 14 January.

DETAIL

2. As I agreed, I gave copies of our paper to my US, German and French colleagues at lunch today. I had given an advance copy to Nuland (US), though she had already received a readout from Bradtke (Peter Gooderham's e-mail of earlier today). I explained our thinking and wish to get something on the table so as to steer the Political Committee (PC) in the right direction and quickly. All three colleagues welcomed our contribution.
3. Mattei (France) said his delegation had also been giving thought to the way ahead and had prepared three papers on, respectively, a provisional schedule of work en route to Reykjavik; the overall concept; and on possible changes to existing agreements (copies attached). He was anxious that we should not send copies of the papers to our capitals as they represented delegation thinking only. I should be grateful therefore if you and copy addressees would protect his confidence. That said, Mattei thought it best to focus on the UK paper which had been approved in London and which was quite close to French thinking. He raised two points that he thought might be incorporated into ours: the possibility of having a rotating chairmanship for the new Council (ie all 20 members not the SG) and the need to elaborate an annual work programme dividing topics for the Council and subordinate bodies into two groups: those for consultation and cooperation and those for joint decision and action. With Nuland and Erdmann, I argued against a

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✓ rotating chairmanship which risked weak chairmanship and too great a separation a between the NAC and the new Council (comment: it seems to me also that the French idea would tend to weaken the specifically NATO character of the NATO-Russia Council). Mattei made a not very determined effort to defend their thinking – mentioning in passing that it was D'Aboville's idea and not endorsed by Paris – saying it would help to draw a distinction between the NAC and the Council in a way that might make allies concerned about a Russian backdoor into NATO feel more comfortable.

Nuland agreed on the annual work plan and seemingly so did Erdmann. I said I would see if we could get a reference to a work programme into the paper.

3. Erdmann said Berlin had found earlier close allies' consultations (my letter of 20 December) very helpful in forming their views. These had been reflected in the German intervention at the Political Committee earlier in the week (Paul Arkwright's teletype of 8 January). He mentioned particularly the need to ensure that issues under discussion at 20 could be withdrawn. There were two procedural possibilities: either consensus at 19 to keep an issue in play at 20 or consensus at 19 to withdraw an issue. Berlin preferred the former. Mattei and I argued that an explicit procedure to this end was unnecessary. ✓ If we did not wish to continue discussing an item on the agenda we could not be made to do so; and, in any case, given that we envisaged items for the agenda being agreed at 19 we could always ensure that any issue we no longer wished to discuss would not appear on the agenda at subsequent meetings. Nuland said Washington shared the German concerns but she thought that Mattei and my arguments were persuasive.
4. Nuland said she could only offer preliminary views, though she expected to receive detailed instructions towards the end of next week. She thought the UK paper was a very clear exposition of the main issues. On frequency of meetings, she thought it might be possible twice monthly. She hoped we might be able to put the safeguards paragraph in our paper higher up in the text; this would be the key part of the paper for Washington. Whilst she hoped Washington would agree to preparatory meetings in the PC at 20 (though some of her colleagues favoured preparation by the PC and for engagement at 20 only at Ambassadorial level) she was sure they would want to have preliminary discussion in the PC itself before going to 20. She agreed with the Germans on retrievability of issues at 20 and with the French on a differentiated annual work programme. Nuland underscored more than once that Washington would not agree to any discussions at 20 prior to agreement in the Alliance on structures and safeguards. They wanted to avoid any possibility of setting a precedent in any preliminary or dry run at 20 meetings which could "lock them down" in the future.
5. Nuland and Erdmann both opposed exploratory discussions between the Secretariat and the Russians. The Alliance first had to agree its internal position on mechanisms, safeguards etc which the IS could then hand over in Moscow after which the Russians could send a team for discussion at 19 + 1 to finalise arrangements. I of course argued firmly in favour of moving to an at 20 format as soon as possible. All agreed on

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retaining the Founding Act; Erdmann and Nuland favoured us concluding a freestanding agreement with the Russians for Reykjavik.

6. At the end of our lunch we agreed that we would introduce the UK paper into the Political Committee next Tuesday. But before then I would try to see how far we might reflect close allies' views through amendments to the text, which I would share with them on the afternoon of 14 January. But all three were comfortable with the possibility of us introducing the paper even if their views were not reflected in every particular. They thought the UK text would help to focus discussion in the right way.

COMMENT

7. We have now made some adjustments to the draft paper which we have incorporated into the revised version attached. We have reversed the ordering of paragraphs 2 and 3 in order to give a higher placement to safeguards and amended paragraph 6 on the timetable of negotiations, to take on board or to implicitly recognise that we would need a meeting with the Russians, effectively at 19 + 1, to finalise agreement on structures before we could move to working at 20. However we are still aiming to generate work at 20 before Reykjavik. This may well be a forlorn hope given US views, but we should try to keep up the pressure for moving as quickly as possible to 20. I should be grateful to know if you are content for us to introduce the revised text into the PC next Tuesday. If so, I would propose also to let the Canadians, Italians, Dutch and Norwegians have advance copies late on Monday. I would give a copy also to Lord Robertson's office.

John Freeman

cc: Peter Ricketts, Political Director, FCO
Stephen Wright, DUS Defence, FCO
William Ehrman, Director Int Security, FCO
Tom McKane, Cabinet Office

Brian Hawtin, DGISP, MOD
Adam Thomson, SecPol D, FCO
Robert Chatterton-Dickson, SecPol D, FCO
Simon Butt, Eastern Dept, FCO
Peter Gooderham, Washington

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Michael O'Neill, Washington
Simon Fraser, Paris
Jeremy Cresswell, Berlin
David Gowan, Moscow
Int: EJP, PA, NB, PM, MilRep, FP, PVD

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NATO-RUSSIA: THE WAY FORWARD

1. PJC Foreign Ministers committed themselves on 7 December to forging a new relationship between NATO Allies and Russia by giving a new impetus and substance to the partnership. The common objective is to establish a Council which reflects the realities of a confident and cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, ready to face the challenges of the 21st Century. The PJC tasked Ambassadors to develop new effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action.

Safeguards

2. ~~Decisions on which topics should be for discussion at 20 should be made at 19.~~ NATO decision making is protected by the North Atlantic Treaty and the Founding Act. NAC primacy remains. The Alliance will always retain the prerogative of independent decision and action. ~~Any Ally will be able to ask for pre-discussion at 19 on a case by case basis.~~ The Alliance should agree guiding principles for the application of such a procedure. The options are pre-discussion as a matter of course (ie the present arrangement as set out in the IAU), agreement that as a rule, pre-discussion should not be necessary, but can be requested if an Ally feels that key national interests are at stake; and agreement to no pre-discussion on any subject. We favour the second or third course in order to mark a clear change from current arrangements.

Structures

3. Time is short; we should agree quickly at 19 on the structures we wish to see in place. We envisage the new Council at 20:
 - Chaired by the Secretary General, Russians seated according to alphabetical order;
 - Meeting every two weeks at Ambassadorial level;
 - Prepared by the Political Committee at 20;
 - Using appropriate NATO committees, including those working on military issues, in new Council format, doing detailed work on specific agenda items.

Agenda

4. We will need an agreement on the broad criteria we use to identify subjects for the agenda. President Putin has identified two approaches, either of which would be acceptable to the Russians: fencing off areas where Russia will not take part in NATO consultations, then agreeing that all other subjects are open for discussion in the new

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Council; or identifying a small number of issues where NATO and Russia are already engaged and focussing on these at the initial stage. It is clear that some topics eg related to Article V should not be for discussion at 20.

5. The logical conclusion is to start work at 20 in a number of areas which have already emerged in the light of discussions within the Alliance and with the Russians. President Putin has proposed counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. Others possible topics include peace keeping and defence reform. Progress on these at 20 is achievable; we agree that identifying areas within these themes will help focus the debate – eg by looking at specific projects which would serve to reinforce our shared objectives. But these are illustrative and not intended to preclude discussion of any subject. Thereafter, we can expand the agenda in the light of experience. The safety valve of pre-discussion ~~at~~ 19 will continue to exist, but we believe that its use will decrease as both sides become more confident through the experience of working together at 20.

Timetable for Negotiations

6. Once the Alliance is itself clear on structures and safeguards, the Alliance position would be conveyed to the Russians by the IS. Thereafter, we propose meetings with the Russians to finalise agreements on structures. Then the PC at 20 would be tasked with reaching agreement on an initial agenda of 2 or 3 clearly defined areas for cooperation, consultation, joint decision and coordinated/joint action. We should aim for substantive progress at 20 on the initial agenda, in advance of Reykjavik, and formal approval of the new arrangements at Reykjavik.

Founding Act

7. We see no need to amend the Founding Act to which the Allies and Russia attach importance and which remains relevant. At a later stage, we could judge whether certain sections, notably section II which establishes the mechanisms of the PJC, need to be revisited. A written agreement formally establishing the new body may be needed (and is likely to be expected by the Russians). The precise form of this needs to be determined.

INFORMAL AND PRELIMINARY VIEWS

NATO-RUSSIA new mechanism
Road to Reykjavik

(Provisionary schedule for the coming months)

First, Allies should agree with Russia on a conceptual approach to define a new mechanism. This should be done by march. Then, this agreement would be formalized in a joint Declaration which should be adopted by the Ministers at Reykjavik.

1) Elaboration of the concept

- January : definition of the concept in a document agreed at 19 (Political Committee).
- End of January / February : Presentation of the document to the Russian authorities by SGA Altenburg.
- February : discussion of the concept with Russia (Political Committee + Russia, without troika). The discussion would require several meetings with the Russians. Between those meetings, Allies would consult at 19.
- February / March : submission for approval to the PJC at Ambassadorial level.

2) IAU and Rules of procedure

- February / March : revision, as appropriate, of the IAU at 19 (Political Committee, NAC).
- March / April : elaboration, on the basis of the corresponding document adopted in July 1997 for the PJC, of the Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure for the new council at 20 (Political Committee + Russia, PJC at Ambassadorial level).

3) Joint Declaration

- April : elaboration of the draft Declaration, on the basis of the concept (Political Committee + Russia). The discussion would require several meetings with the Russians. Between those meetings, Allies would consult at 19.
- April / May : submission for approval to the PJC at Ambassadorial level.
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The joint Declaration would refer to the Founding Act.
Depending on its content, it could take the form of a Protocol to the Founding Act.
It could also lead, at Reykjavik or later, to some amendments to the Founding Act.

INFORMAL AND PRELIMINARY VIEWS

NATO-RUSSIA new mechanism
Concept to be discussed with Russians

(Food for thought)

A - Structures

A new council, committees and working groups at 20 would replace the PJC structure. The new council will continue the current work of the PJC. It will also take joint decisions and joint actions at 20. Existing working groups or committees under the auspices of PJC (including PJC-MR) would continue as bodies under the auspices of the new council. A Political Committee at 20 would be established on a permanent basis.

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Current troika system would be replaced by a new chairmanship.

The new council could be chaired by the Secretary General, or other possibilities could be envisaged. For subordinate bodies, it would be preferable in any case, for practical reasons, to have the Secretariat chairing committees and working groups.

NB : it may be useful to propose other possibilities than SG's chairmanship for the new council in order to underline a clear difference with the NAC and establish a firewall with the internal decision-making process of the Alliance. The Russians don't want to adhere to NATO (cf art. 5). It could be therefore justified to offer a separate table

C - Topics and procedures

1 - The new council would be competent for all areas currently listed in Founding Act, Section III. All these areas are potential subject for consultation and cooperation. But joint decisions and joint actions could be taken on a case by case basis for specific projects or topics defined in these areas through a percolating process described below.

2 - A distinction should be established in the annual work programs and in the agendas for meetings of the new council, and subordinate bodies, between :

- a- Topics for consultation and cooperation,
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Work programs and agendas of the new council would be prepared by the political committee at 20 on a consensus basis. Topics for joint decision or joint action would be put on the agenda of the new council only when a consensus has been reached in the course of consultation at political committee level.

The list of topics and their status ("a" or "b") in every work program could be revised during the course of the year, depending on progress achieved at working level (working groups and political committee at 20).

NB. Such a formula already exists in the present work program of the PJC Peace keeping working group where a distinction is made between joint " Papers " (item 1) and " Exchange of peacekeeping experience " (item 2). This incremental process is applicable in principle to the whole range of areas listed in the Founding Act. The distinction between topics " a " and " b " would be useful to remain coherent with the Founding Act and, at the same time, keep the necessary flexibility to move according to progress on substance.

D - Internal procedures

As stated in the Founding Act, " Provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action ".

In connection with the new mechanism, Allies will in principle consult on the definition or revision of work programs of the new council before their adoption with Russia.

Such a general approach could be a basis for consultations with the Russians

INFORMAL AND PRELIMINARY VIEWS

NATO-RUSSIA new mechanism
Possible changes to existing documents

(Food for thought for internal reflections)

The implementation of the December Joint Declaration would require adaptations to some mechanisms put in place by the Founding Act. New organizational arrangements and rules of procedures would be also worked out for the new council, on the basis of those worked out for the PJC after the adoption of the Founding Act.

A - Changes to the mechanism put in place by the Founding Act :

1) The " NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council " (section II, paragraph 1) becomes a " *new council bringing together NATO member states and Russia* ".

2) The mechanism of chairmanship is described in Section II, paragraph 11 of the Founding Act : " The PJC will be chaired jointly by the Secretary General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member States on a rotation basis, and a representative of Russia. " It could be adapted as follows :

- Either : " *The council will be chaired by the Secretary General of NATO.* "
- Or : " *The council will be chaired by a representative of one of its members States on a rotation basis* ".

The second option could be presented as an innovative gesture to the Russians. It could underline a clear difference with the NAC and establish a firewall with the internal decision-making process of the Alliance. The Russians don't want to adhere to NATO (cf art. 5). It could be therefore justified to offer a separate table answering to their request to be treated on the basis of parity and non-discrimination.

B - Changes to the Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure :

Comments refer to the document adopted in July 1997 for the PJC.

1) Committees and working groups

Section III gives the possibility to establish committees or working groups on an ad hoc or permanent basis. The establishment of a Political committee at 20 could be decided on a permanent basis in that framework. It could be stipulated, or not, in the revised document.

2) Chairmanship

The chairmanship arrangements outlined in Section V would be adapted to reflect changes described above. It supposes modifications to paragraph 1 and 2 and, if necessary, 5.

3) Staffing arrangements

The Section VI outlining the "joint group" supporting the council and set up from designated members of the NATO international staff and designated members of the Russian mission to NATO, could remain as it is.

4) Work programs and agendas

The Founding Act describes in its Section II the process leading from consultation to joint decision and joint action "once consensus has been reached in the course of consultation". This percolating process could be precised in a new Section (or in the present Section IV) of the document on Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure, based on the following:

A distinction should be established in the annual work program and in the agendas for meetings of the new council, and subordinate bodies, between:

A - Topics for consultation and cooperation,

B - Topics for joint decision and action.

The same distinction would be made in the agendas of the new council meetings and other joint bodies.

Work programs and agendas of the new council would be prepared by the political committee at 20 on a consensus basis. Topics for joint decision or joint action would be put on the agenda of the new council only when a consensus has been reached in the course of consultation at political committee level.

Work programs and agendas of the new council would be prepared by the political committee at 20 on a consensus basis. Topics for joint decision or joint action would be put on the agenda of the new council only when a consensus has been reached in the course of consultation at political committee level.

This incremental process¹ is applicable in principle to the whole range of areas listed in Section III of the Founding Act. The list of topics and their status (A or B) in every work program could be revised during the course of the year, depending on progress achieved at working level (working groups and Political Committee at 20).

5) Topics raised in "AOB"

Paragraph 8 of the IAU refers to the possibility of new issues or topics raised by Russia under "AOB". Part of this paragraph could be transferred in the document on "Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure" (Section IV) as follows:

"Members of the new council may elect to raise under "Any Other Business" issues or topics that were not agreed as part of the agenda. In that case, any member reserves the right not to engage in discussion of a particular topic if it deems it inappropriate."

¹ Such a formula already exists in the present work program of the Peace keeping working group where a distinction is made between joint "Papers" (item 1) and "Exchange of peacekeeping experience" (item 2).

- Changes to the Intra-Alliance Understanding :

The main "safeguards" are contained in the Founding Act (especially in Section II paragraph 6 which excludes any right of veto and any restriction to the right of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action). There could be a need to be more precise. Two possibilities could be considered in this regard :

1) The first option would be to keep the existing IAU and adapt it as appropriate

The IAU reiterates safeguards as well as other elements contained in the Founding Act. Its main value added remains, in practical terms, in its paragraph 7 which outlines the concept of intra-alliance consultation : "Allies will in principle always consult before, and as necessary, in the course of consultations with Russia in the PJG, in particular prior to reaching agreement on joint initiatives or joint decisions taking into account agreed Alliance policies or positions, insofar as they exist. Any Ally or the Secretary General will be entitled to request such consultations". This paragraph could be changed as follows in connection with the process outlined above for work programs :

" Allies will in principle consult on the definition or revision of work programs of the new council before their adoption with Russia. In the course of consultations with Russia, in particular prior to reaching agreement on joint decisions or actions, any Ally or the Secretary General will be entitled to request intra-Alliance consultations "

Some other editorial changes could be made to reflect the transformation of the "NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council" in a "new council bringing together NATO member states and Russia".

2) The second option would be to present safeguards, which are already known, to the Russians and ask them to make them subscribing to it.

Provisions of the existing IAU which are not in the Founding Act or in other documents agreed (as for instance the December NAC communiqué) would be transfer, at the maximum extent possible, in the joint document on Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure (as mentioned for instance in B 5). The IAU paragraph on intra-Alliance consultations (mentioned in C 1) could be also introduced in this joint document or, if necessary, in the NATO communiqué at Reykjavik.

Therefore it could be considered as a confidence building measure underlining progress made in NATO-Russia relations. Nevertheless, in case of this issue would be used by Russians as a stumbling block it could also raise interrogations if we were after returning to the IAU.

D - Designation of the new council

- Either : " NATO-Russia Council ",
- Or : " Council at 20 ",
- Or : " Euro-Atlantic Council " (EAC between the NAC and the EAPC).

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NATO ENLARGEMENT: US VIEWS ON ROMANIAN MEMBERSHIP
From: WASHINGTON

TO ROUTINE FCO
 TELNO 42
 OF 110237Z JANUARY 02
 INFO ROUTINE CENTRAL EUROPEAN POSTS, MOSCOW, NATO POSTS, MODUK

SIC

BUCHAREST TELNO 5 (NOT TO ALL)
 SUMMARY

1. The US are some way from firm decisions on individual applicants for membership. But their current view is that Bulgaria and Romania are behind the pack in terms of political credentials and in support among Allies. Most here expect them to stand or fall together. The US Ambassador in Bratislava is also ringing a quiet alarm bell.

DETAIL

2. In the light of TUR we touched base with US officials (Bradtke - State, Volker - NSC and Michel - OSD, as well as Hill staff) about latest thinking here on Romania's and Bulgaria's NATO candidacies.

3. All US officials commented that, beyond Bush's public commitment to a forward-leaning approach to enlargement, they were a long way from firm decisions on individual candidates. Volker noted that debate was likely to ebb and flow between now and November. There were some signs, for example, that Bulgaria was on a negative trend following their Foreign Minister's recent unsuccessful visit; while Romania had advanced slightly, with Iliescu behaving himself and the US Ambassador to Bucharest (currently in Washington for a HOMs conference) arguing privately that they deserved more credit. Other contacts however suggested Romania was still the back-marker.

4. But US officials were equally clear that Bulgaria and Romania were both some way behind the rest of the pack (excluding Macedonia and Albania, for whom no-one here advocates early admission). This was based not on military performance but on wider political factors - political stability, economic reform, sound market practices, etc. Burns, the US NATO PermRep (also visiting), had reinforced this judgement by reporting that there was insufficient support in the Alliance to admit either Bulgaria or Romania - an assessment that Araud (Quai) apparently shared when he saw Bradtke on 10 January.

5. Bradtke said work was underway on things the US might tell Sofia and Bucharest they needed to do to promote their cause. He said most in the Administration, including himself, believed that the two countries would have to stand or fall together. (Hill staff echoed this.) In his view, those who argued for differentiation tended only to strengthen the case for rejecting both (on the grounds that it would be politically harder to refuse one of seven suitors, and that the two countries' weaknesses were of a broadly similar nature).

6. Meanwhile, as a further sign of how US views may fluctuate, the 9 January Washington Times reported a speech by the US Ambassador in Bratislava apparently warning Slovakia not to re-elect Meciar: "The forming of the future government will influence whether Slovakia gets a NATO invitation or not. In 1998 Slovakia had a government that had different values than the Alliance. If the situation repeats itself there will not be an invitation." (Weiser went on to suggest that in this case Romanian entry to the EU would also be significantly delayed or would not happen.) Volker agreed that this seemed an unusually candid public message, but said it was useful to have exposed the importance of democratic principles in this way.

Stephen Wall
Rava G is interesting.
Michael

BRENTON

Sent by WASHINGTON on 11-01-2002 02:37
Received by No10 on 11-01-2002 04:02

02072701401
~~RESTRICTED~~**Foreign and Commonwealth Office****Fax Cover Sheet**David Manning

cc AS

Deputy Head

Security Policy Department

King Charles Street

London SW1A 2AH

shown at para 3.

Tel: 020 7270 3765

Fax: 020 7270 1401

E-mail: robert.deane@fco.gov.uk

I spoke to Peter Ricketts about this and said 'fine' with Recharge. At your meeting on 18 January the agenda might be: (1) Progress towards meetings devised in this note

(2) Topics for discussion by 20

(3) EU dimension

To: FCO will write with notes : Tom McKane

on (1) & (2) Jon Mullen Cabinet Office

Fax Number..... 10.1 : 0237

From..... : Robert Deane

Date..... : 10 January 2002

Pages to follow..... : This plus 2

Message:

Brian Hawtin

DGISP, MOD

7218 2498

URGENT: NATO-RUSSIA

As discussed at Peter Ricketts' meeting this morning, I attach a revised draft paper for UKDel to circulate to close allies tomorrow. The changes have been agreed with UKDel.

Please let me know if you are content.

Signed:.....

02072701401
RESTRICTED**NATO-RUSSIA: THE WAY FORWARD**

1. PJC Foreign Ministers committed themselves on 7 December to forging a new relationship between NATO Allies and Russia by giving a new impetus and substance to the partnership. The common objective is to establish a Council which reflects the realities of a confident and cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, ready to face the challenges of the 21st Century. The PJC tasked Ambassadors to develop new effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action.

Structures

2. Time is short; we should agree quickly at 19 on the structures we wish to see in place. We envisage the new Council at 20:
 - Chaired by the Secretary General, Russians seated according to alphabetical order;
 - Meeting every two weeks at Ambassadorial level;
 - Prepared by the Political Committee at 20;
 - Using appropriate NATO committees, including those working on military issues, in new Council format, doing detailed work on specific agenda items.

Safeguards

3. Decisions on which topics should be for discussion at 20 should be made at 19. NATO decision making is protected by the North Atlantic Treaty and the Founding Act. NAC primacy remains. The Alliance will always retain the prerogative of independent decision and action. Any Ally will be able to ask for pre-discussion at 19 on a case by case basis. The Alliance should agree guiding principles for the application of such a procedure. The options are pre-discussion as a matter of course (ie the present arrangement as set out in the IAU); agreement that as a rule, pre-discussion should not be necessary, but can be requested if an Ally feels that key national interests are at stake; and agreement to no pre-discussion on any subject. We favour the second ^{or third} course in order to mark a clear change from current arrangements.

Agenda

4. We will need an agreement on the broad criteria we use to identify subjects for the agenda. President Putin has identified two approaches, either of which would be acceptable to the Russians: fencing off areas where Russia will not take part in NATO consultations, then agreeing that all other subjects are open for discussion in the new Council; or identifying a small number of issues where NATO and Russia are already

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engaged and focussing on these at the initial stage. It is clear that some topics eg related to Article V should not be for discussion at 20.

5. The logical conclusion is to start work at 20 in a number of areas which have already emerged in the light of discussions within the Alliance and with the Russians. President Putin has proposed counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. Others possible topics include peace keeping and defence reform. Progress on these at 20 is achievable; we agree that identifying areas within these themes will help focus the debate – eg by looking at specific projects which would serve to reinforce our shared objectives. But these are illustrative and not intended to preclude discussion of any subject. Thereafter, we can expand the agenda in the light of experience. The safety valve of pre-discussion of 19 will continue to exist, but we believe that its use will decrease as both sides become more confident through the experience of working together at 20.

Timetable for Negotiations

6. Once the Alliance is itself clear on structures and safeguards, then we propose direct engagement with the Russians as follows:

- an ad hoc meeting of the PC at 20 for a preliminary exchange of views. This might best be held before Ambassador Altenburg's visit to Moscow in late January;
- an agreement in early February on the frequency of meetings of the PC at 20. The PC at 20 would be tasked with reaching agreement by the end of February on mechanisms and an initial agenda of 2 or 3 clearly defined areas for cooperation and coordinated/joint action;
- substantive progress at 20 on the initial agenda, in advance of Reykjavik;
- formal approval of the new arrangements at Reykjavik.

Founding Act

7. We see no need to amend the Founding Act to which the Allies and Russia attach importance and which remains relevant. At a later stage, we could judge whether certain sections, notably section II which establishes the mechanisms of the PJC, need to be revisited. A written agreement formally establishing the new body may be needed (and is likely to be expected by the Russians). The precise form of this needs to be determined.

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Washington

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20008

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08 January 2002

Adam Thomson
Sec Pol Department
FCO

Dear Adam

NATO/RUSSIA: US VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. Fried (NSC) confirms that emerging Administration thinking envisages NATO agreement on "safeguards" before work at 20 gets underway. But he readily accepts the case for moving quickly, and concentrating on specific, practical ideas.

DETAIL

2. Dan Fried (NSC Senior Director for Europe) took me through on 8 January latest US thinking on NATO/Russia. He had just come from an inter-agency meeting of Deputies where this had been discussed.

3. Fried said that he and his inter-agency equivalents (Beth Jones in State, JD Crouch in OSD, and Eric Edelman in OVP) had between them worked out a US approach, which Fried was confident was unlikely to be countermanded by their superiors. He characterised this as comprising a "defensive" aspect – determining safeguards to ensure NATO's continued "sovereignty" in the face of domestic political concerns and the nervousness of some Allies; and an "offensive" part, designed to seize the strategic opportunity which Russia's approach post 11 September offered.

4. On safeguards, Fried said that the Administration's "notional theology" was broadly as Volker had described to Michael O'Neill (his teleletter of 28 December). All issues for

consideration by the NRC would need to be decided by the NAC. In addition, the NAC would need to consider how to remit issues. Fried saw 3 options:

- Pre-cooking a set NATO position.
- Working on the basis of loosely defined "guidelines".
- No pre-cooking at all

5. In addition, once an issue had been remitted to the NRC there needed to be an understanding that it could always be pulled back to the NAC, and that this would not require consensus at 19 to achieve (otherwise, Fried said, there would also be a risk of e.g. a Greek or French veto).

6. Fried said these arrangements ought to be sufficient to guarantee the NAC's continued sovereignty over its agenda. In explaining these arrangements to the Russians – and Fried said that he had taken Russian Ambassador Ushakov through the thinking – NATO should make clear that the degree of pre-cooking of positions would depend heavily on Russian performance in the NRC.

7. On the offensive side, Fried confirmed that the US would want to avoid "theology". Ideas were now being worked up inter-agency on specific, practical areas of work 20, including in areas such as counter terrorism, non-proliferation, and search and rescue "out of area". Fried said that OSD had been given a green light to develop further their idea for an Air Sovereignty Operations Centre (ASOC), not least as a mechanism to generate a sense of ownership on the part of the sceptics in the Pentagon.

8. I said that you would no doubt find this exposition valuable. But Fried would know that we were keen to press ahead, not least to sustain the sense of momentum generated at the end of last year. We wanted to see a pragmatic approach taken. We too favoured identifying specific areas of work, and were working up ideas of our own.

9. Fried took the point about the need to press ahead. He said a cable of instructions to USDEL would issue next week. Burns, currently in Washington, was working hard to push the Administration forward. On process, Fried was keen that the US should work first with the UK, Germany, France, and Poland (getting Warsaw comfortable would be important for the US domestically) before rolling out thinking for Allies more generally.

COMMENT

10. As Michael O'Neill reported in TLUR, the need to build in what the US perceive to be adequate safeguards at the outset now appears to be well entrenched. If we can find a mutually agreeable way through this quickly, the way would appear to be open for constructive US engagement in identifying practical areas of work at 20. If our own ideas have been sufficiently well fleshed out, it would be well worth feeding them into the Administration as soon as possible.

02072701401

{Signed}

Peter Gooderham

cc: William Ehrman, Director International Security, FCO
Robert Chatterton-Dickson, Sec Pol Department, FCO
Roger Hutton, NEPG, MOD
Simon Butt, Eastern Department, FCO
Tony Crombie, Moscow
Paul Arkwright, UKDEL NATO
Mat Dawbarn, Berlin
Simon Fraser, Paris
Michael O'Neill

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Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

Security Policy Department
King Charles Street
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E-mail: robert.deane@sco.gov.uk

10 January 2002

Peter Gooderham
Washington

By e-mail



Dear Peter,

NATO-RUSSIA: PAPER FOR CLOSE ALLIES

I attach a short UK paper on the way forward on NATO-Russia which UKDel will circulate to Close Allies in Brussels tomorrow, Friday 11 January. This is a slightly revised version of the UKDel paper that I circulated to you and others in advance of Peter Ricketts' meeting this morning.

As discussed, could you please also feed into your interlocutors in Washington, with the aim of influencing the instructions that they are preparing for US Delegation next week?

Yours,

Robert

Robert Deane
Deputy Head
Security Policy Department

cc: Peter Ricketts
Stephen Wright
William Ehrman
Adam Thomson o/r
Robert Chatterton Dickson
Simon Butt, Eastern Dept
Paul Arkwright, UKDel
Tom McKane, Cabinet Office
Brian Hawtin, DGISP, MOD
Roger Hutton, NEPG, MOD

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1471 SEC POL DEPT

11-11-JAN-2002 10:22

NATO-RUSSIA: THE WAY FORWARD

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TO 902072700237

▲

11-JAN-2002 10:22 FROM SEC POL DEPT

Robert Deane

From: Peter Gooderham
 Sent: 11 January 2002 03:41
 To: Robert Deane; Peter Gooderham; Peter Ricketts; Stephen Wright; William Ehrman; Adam Thomson; Robert Chatterton Dickson; Simon Butt; Paul Arkwright Brussels; John Freeman Brussels
 Cc: Michael O'Neill
 Subject: RE: NATO-Russia paper for close allies (restricted)

Handwritten notes:
 Roger Hutton MON / Leg Sax.
 Tom McKenna C.O.
 Alice Sanders C.A.
 AT OK

Robert

We deposited copies of the paper with State (Bradtke), NSC (Volker), and OSD (Michel).

Bradtke told me he was grateful for the input. He was now preparing a draft cable of instructions for Burns, which he hoped Deputies would sign off on by next Wednesday. UK views would hold sway in this process - so our input was timely.

Bradtke acknowledged that the US had not exactly held a consistent view on the issue in recent weeks. An inter-agency position post-December NACs had still to be worked out. Bearing this in mind, he offered the following immediate reactions to your paper:

- Some in the Administration were not attracted to a set timetable of NRC meetings - they preferred a more ad hoc arrangement dependent on business.
- Some (i.e. DoD) were leery of military committee meetings, on the grounds that Russian performance in Chechnya required NATO to keep some distance from the Russian military. Bradtke for his part favoured a Vershbow idea of using a building-block approach to create over the medium-term a joint military capability.
- Prediscussion. This would be a key US concern. Bradtke reiterated the graduated approach Fried had set out to me earlier in the week. He saw two set of issues: those requiring discussion/consultation only; and those requiring actual joint decisions. The latter would be a harder sell in Washington. I stressed that we would push hard for no pre-cooking to be the default position for all issues at 20 (though we now accepted that there needed to be some safeguards built in). Bradtke pulled a face.
- Peacekeeping. Bradtke warned that this was a particularly sensitive issue on the Hill. Senate Democrats were arguing that had NATO accepted "at 20" prior to the Balkans crises it would have never been able to mount an operation. Bradtke himself did not buy the argument. But he warned that this would be a tough place to start.
- The US agreed on the need to dispense with the troika, and favoured giving the SG the Chair.
- For joint-decision issues, the US would want very concrete, case-by-case items: no "baskets" of issues. US ideas, still evolving, essentially comprised OSD proposals for an ASOC, a joint training centre, CEP, and CT (though this needed sharper definition). State for their part were pushing to add MD and the Vershbow idea (above).
- On process, Bradtke thought the US would want first agreement at 19 (in the PC, he assumed) on safeguards and an agenda, then ASG discussions in Moscow, followed by a report back to NATO before going firm. The US would not agree to any substantive work at 20 (he did not rule out e.g. drafting groups) before all this was pinned down. He also thought this would mean in practice no formal meetings at 20 before Reykjavik - and certainly no joint decision-making before then. Essentially, the US envisaged the May Ministerial as constituting the first gathering in the new format.
- On this last point, I said that we would be very disappointed if this became the US position. It would send a wholly negative signal to Moscow, and would threaten the good momentum built up post 9/11. It was an incorrectly narrow interpretation of the December NAC communiqué (Bradtke did not attempt to dispute this); and contrary to the enthusiastic attitude both Bush and Rice had displayed with their UK oppos.
- Bradtke did not discourage us from making these points equally forcefully at more senior levels. He was also quite relaxed about us circulating the paper at 4 on Friday.

Peter Gooderham

-----Original Message-----

immediate



10 DOWNING STREET

Robert

see letter below. We can
pursue with AI but

he obviously feels very strongly
about this.

? Do you want to talk to
him

OK

? Should we pursue or spend
less.

Chris.



CDM
20

7 January 2002

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Michael,

NATO: Lord Robertson's Annual Report for 2001

... Lord Robertson wrote to the Prime Minister on 20 December, giving his second 'annual report' on the Alliance (copy enclosed).

Lord Robertson highlights NATO's successes following 11 September, in the Balkans, and in developing co-operation with partners and among Allies. He also outlines the challenges facing NATO ahead of the Prague Summit in November, including developing a new relationship with Russia, European Defence, defence capabilities, and enlargement.

There is nothing in Lord Robertson's letter with which we would disagree. But he makes a strong pitch for reform of the Alliance in preparation for enlargement to be backed by extra resources. We made clear in agreeing to a small increase in the Civil Budget for 2002 that we saw improving NATO's management of its existing resources as a priority before we could agree to a future significant increase in the budget.

... I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister, setting out the UK position on the Prague agenda. It highlights our proposals for wide ranging reform of NATO, summarised in a joint FCO/MOD paper ('NATO from Strength to Strength') and endorsed by the Foreign and Defence Secretaries last year. MoD and UKDEL NATO agree.

Yours ever,

Patrick

(Patrick Davies)
Private Secretary

Michael Tatham Esq
10 Downing Street

I welcomed the opportunity to discuss some of these issues with you earlier this week.

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO LORD ROBERTSON

NATO 2001

Thank you for your letter of 20 December giving your annual report on NATO in 2001. I agree with you that the year has been one of major achievement for the Alliance. The invocation of Article V, at your initiative, sent the strongest signal of solidarity with the US following the terrorist attacks of 11 September and made a real contribution to rallying the international coalition against terrorism. NATO has again made a crucial contribution to the international effort to preserve stability in the Balkans, and especially to defusing the threat of escalating violence in Macedonia by its quick preventive deployment.

It was a striking example of bold and effective leadership.

In all these matters – and more – the Alliance and all the Allies owe you personally and your staff a very considerable debt. I would single out the enormous care and effort which you and Javier Solana, with others, have devoted to Macedonia as a model of conflict prevention. *Together you averted what could easily have become a major conflagration. I hope you will continue to stay engaged as we agreed on Tuesday the situation there remains very fragile.*

You know my deep conviction: NATO is fundamental to our security. We therefore need to keep up the process of modernising and adapting the Alliance to face a rapidly changing world and unpredictable threats. You set out well the challenges facing us in the year leading up to the Prague Summit. I welcome the commitment made at the NATO leaders' meeting on 13 June to invitations being issued at Prague to aspirants who are ready to assume the responsibilities of membership. It is important for NATO's continuing effectiveness that new members bring real military capability to the Alliance and are able to contribute to collective security by the time they accede. We need to structure the process of enlargement in a way which encourages commitment by the aspirants to further reform. We have been working closely with all the aspirants on a bilateral basis to complement NATO's own efforts to help them prepare for membership.

I agree with you that enlargement must be accompanied by continuing modernisation if NATO is to remain effective. I strongly support your efforts under the 'NATO Plus' programme. Further progress towards a modern and transparent system of budgeting and prioritisation should help make clear the extent to which new resources are required. Equally fundamental are modernisation of NATO's military structures, real improvements in defence capabilities and effective force planning. I know that you have seen our proposals, summarised as 'NATO From Strength to Strength', and designed very much to support your own efforts to reform NATO's structures and processes. I hope that the theme of a renewed Alliance, going from strength to strength, will run through preparations for and the agenda at Prague.

I also agree that extra effort is needed on European Defence. The UK has always been a firm supporter, and we made good progress with Turkey at the end of last year on the participation issue. Agreement to the Ankara text is now necessary to open the way in NATO for the implementation of Berlin Plus. *I shall have explained*

The most immediate issue facing NATO for the New Year is its relations with Russia. I am convinced that Putin has made a strategic choice and that we were right to move fast to transform the relationship, with the potential of huge benefits for Euro-Atlantic security. I was pleased to be able to make my own contribution to the debate, and that the NATO and Russian Foreign and Defence Ministers Meetings endorsed work in the North Atlantic Council with a view to an operational relationship at 20 by the Spring Ministerials. We now need to move forward quickly, focussing on issues of immediate practical benefit to the Allies and Russia, without getting snagged on the obvious procedural and legal obstacles.

NATO has a busy year ahead as it prepares for Prague. But it can draw on the experience of a decade of transformation and renewal, and has formidable strengths – not least those of its current Secretary General. I look forward to working with you as the Summit approaches, *and hope we can stay in close touch in the meantime.*

*[Robert Chatterton Dickson
Sec Pol Dept
7270 3506]*

ORGANISATION DU TRAITE
DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION

LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
SECRETARY GENERAL

BOULEVARD LÉOPOLD III
B-1110 BRUXELLES

The Rt. Hon.
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen
SG(2001)1526

20 December 2001

Jean Lemire

In my first "annual report" last year, I said that I saw my primary responsibility as ensuring that NATO is able to guarantee the defence of its members and to strengthen the overall stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Both remain true. But the terrible events of 11 September have transformed the environment in which NATO seeks to fulfil these aims. And the prospect of another round of enlargement in 2002 is focussing attention on the Alliance's future structures and its means of doing business.

Combating Terrorism

NATO's achievements this year have been considerable. The invocation of Article 5 for the first time ever on 12 September was a political statement of the most profound importance, which led to significant practical involvement in the fight against terrorism. Meanwhile, this month's Ministerial meetings started the process of increasing NATO's current capability to help deal with the terrorist threat. We must make sure that the Alliance can respond as effectively to terrorism as it has to other threats.

Crisis Management in the Balkans

In the Balkans, NATO's engagement has been critical to continued political progress such as the recent elections in Kosovo. The handover to the FRY of the Ground Safety Zone in southern Serbia was a complete success despite widespread predictions of a bloodbath. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹, Task Forces Harvest and Fox have played a major role in defusing an escalating crisis that could have destabilised the country and the region. There has been close cooperation throughout with the EU, UN and OSCE, but NATO makes a unique contribution. At present, only the Alliance has the capability to sustain the large international operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, or to mount missions such as the weapons collection in FYROM quickly and successfully. But political progress remains fragile. We must not allow events elsewhere to take our collective eyes off the region which still carries the biggest risk of instability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

¹ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

Cooperation with Partners

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership proved its importance in the response to 11 September. It is the world's largest permanent coalition, 46 countries committed to common values and increasingly prepared to act politically – and sometimes, as in the Balkans, militarily – to uphold them. The Member Action Plan process, which prepares aspirant countries for eventual NATO membership, is already producing results. There is, however, a range of other less high profile activities which continue to help engage countries, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which do not want to join NATO yet are keen to strengthen bilateral and multilateral ties.

Cooperation Among Allies

Activities of this kind are representative of many areas of NATO work which have limited political visibility but are fundamental to Allies' security and defence. Collective capabilities such as the NATO AWACS aircraft now patrolling US airspace, collective defence planning and cooperation on issues as diverse as missile defence, civil emergency planning and military interoperability underpin our ability to operate effectively as an Alliance or individually as part of other organisations and coalitions.

A New Quality of Relations with Russia

Since 11 September, there has been a welcome further improvement in NATO's relationship with Russia. I am unsentimental about this relationship. If fine words are to be translated into effective action, we need a real shift of attitudes in Moscow. And we must not allow deeper relations with Russia to water down NATO's cohesion. But President Putin's approach has so far been constructive and realistic. If that continues, we may have the opportunity to transform our relationship into a genuine working partnership at 20. This month's Ministerial meetings have provided a good framework for putting this into practice.

ESDI

In other areas, important challenges remain. Despite increasing practical cooperation with the EU, there has been no final breakthrough on implementing the Berlin-Plus agenda. This poses major problems for both organisations. We must redouble our efforts to reach an agreement if we are to avoid unnecessary duplication and institutional competition, and achieve the complementarity and cooperation which was the object of this project. Failure would undermine our efforts to build up European military capabilities.

Defence Capabilities

Within NATO, we have toughened up the requirements for defence modernisation and broken the logjam on the important Alliance Ground Surveillance system. Yet the Defence Capabilities Initiative (like the EU's parallel Headline Goal process) is not delivering the practical military enhancements we had looked for. European Allies are coming under increasing political criticism as a result. Money is important.

But we also need stronger political commitment and a tighter focus if we are to make real progress, including in combating terrorism.

Enlargement

Enlargement poses equally fundamental challenges. It is too early to begin the debate on who the new members should be. To do so now would be destabilising internationally (including perhaps with Russia) and damaging to the Alliance's internal cohesion in the run-up to Prague. We cannot, however, delay consideration of the internal implications for NATO.

I will be blunt. Without action and extra resources now, NATO enlargement risks becoming a political and practical failure. We will not be able to convince our own domestic political and public opinion that the Alliance is ready, and accession will have to be delayed while we prepare meeting rooms, accommodation and staff support to cope with our enlarged membership. Many parts of my organisation are already stretched to the limit. Without reform and extra resources, this Alliance will simply not function beyond Prague. I am developing a package which I believe to be the minimum necessary to maintain the traditional ability of NATO and its people to deal effectively with current and future challenges. I count on your full support in this respect.

The Challenge of Prague

NATO has never been a one-size-fits-all organisation. It gains strength from its diversity. And it has an extraordinary ability to adapt to meet its members' needs. This year has seen that ability tested yet again. For all of us, 11 September was a tragedy. But our bonds have been strengthened as a result. My task for 2002, the year of Prague, is to ensure that an evolving Alliance can continue to meet its members' fundamental security needs in this new security environment.

*At the best,
As ever,
George*

The Right Honourable Tony Blair, M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
London

CONFIDENTIAL

TO.7212

DAVID MANNING

cc: Ailie Saunders

*Now Pa. I shall
try to raise with Condi*

NATO: RUSSIA

1. Rob Dean from Security Policy Department phoned. The UK Delegation to NATO report that the US Delegation is operating in something of a vacuum, with very little by way of instructions from Washington. They do not expect to receive further guidance before a senior level meeting in mid-January. There is a danger of drift.
2. Rob Dean's thought, which I think is a good one, is that if you are speaking to Condi Rice to debrief on the Putin visit, you might take the opportunity to get her to agree that this initiative must not be allowed simply to expire as a result of lack of clear direction in Brussels.
3. I think that we ought to get together with FCO, MOD and perhaps UKDEL early in the new year to discuss a plan of action leading to Reykjavik.

Tom

TOM McKANE

21 December 2001

CONFIDENTIAL

File

In JCO (mbox)

ULB

cc: FCO
HMHC



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

99454

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 December 2001

Dear Jean,

Thank you for your letter of 4 December about the relationship between NATO and Russia.

I agree that the Russian response to the present crisis gives us an historic opportunity to put the Cold War divisions between east and west finally behind us. I know this view is widely shared, including by Lord Robertson, President Putin, President Bush and other NATO leaders. I welcomed the constructive ideas put forward by your Delegation in NATO and by others including the Germans, Italians and Americans, and was pleased to be able to add my own contribution to the debate.

I very much welcome the decision of NATO and Russian Foreign Ministers on 7 December to begin work on creating a NATO-Russia Council as the basis for a new relationship with Russia based on shared values and common interests. There is much detailed work to do if we are to reach our goal of implementing the new partnership in time for the Reykjavik Ministerial next May. I know our Delegations to NATO are already co-operating closely on this.

LT

We should stay in touch as work is taken forward in NATO. We may both need to engage politically to ensure that Russia and the Alliance achieve a fundamental and lasting transformation of their relationship. I will be making the same point to Vladimir Putin when he comes to London later this month.

On Afghanistan, I am glad that British and Canadian forces are likely to be operating together again soon, this time in the International Security Assistance Force for Kabul. This is a difficult mission for all of us, but one of obvious importance to the future of Afghanistan. I am grateful for your support.

Yours ever
Tony

The Right Honourable Jean Chrétien PC QC MP

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 December 2001

Dear Simon

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL

Lord Robertson spoke by telephone to the Prime Minister this morning. He raised three issues: ISAF, Kosovo and NATO/Russia.

ISAF

Lord Robertson took the view that it was essential to tie down the command relationship between CENTCOM and ISAF. ISAF needed to have an assurance of US engagement. He had had a disturbing conversation with Rumsfeld who had been ambiguous about the availability of US support once Operation Enduring Freedom had come to an end (Lord Robertson added that SACEUR thought OEF might end within two months). Lord Robertson urged the Prime Minister to pin down the US to providing support if necessary beyond the lifetime of OEF. We needed to be clear on the nature of the support and for how long it was available. He thought it might be useful for the Prime Minister to talk to SACEUR – this would help get the message into senior US military circles.

Lord Robertson said he would be ready to help in this area if that would be useful. The ARRC was potentially a formidable means of doing this but if NATO was to get involved allies would need plenty of warming up.

Lord Robertson also expressed unease about the assumption that Turkey would become the successor lead nation. Turkish forces were already heavily committed in their South Eastern regions. They were not particularly deployable. And Turkey had no great experience of expeditionary operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

Kosovo

Lord Robertson mentioned his unease at Haekkerup's reported absence from Kosovo until the end of February on delayed paternity leave. This was a dangerous period for UNMIK to be leaderless. He wondered if Ashdown was available as a possible stand-in.

NATO/Russia

Lord Robertson said progress was being made on the NATO/Russia initiative but it was not plain sailing. Within the Alliance, the new members were still highly suspicious of Russia, the Germans were far from being forward-looking and the US had walked back from their initial enthusiasm. On the Russian side there were plenty within the system who would remain dubious until they saw the colour of NATO's money. There would be a need to reenergise the arguments soon.


Comment

As you know, action is already in hand in respect of Lord Robertson's concerns about US support for ISAF. It will be important for FCO and MOD to keep in close touch with evolving US thinking on extraction/back-up capabilities (Washington telno1734).

Subject to your views, we do not think it makes much sense to think about attaching Lord Ashdown to UNMIK for a period of two months. But it would be worth checking with the UN that satisfactory arrangements are in place to cover the period of Haekkerup's paternity leave.

I am copying this letter to Peter Watkins (MOD), Andrew Allberry (Cabinet Office), Sir Christopher Meyer (Washington) and Emyr Jones-Parry (UKDel NATO).

Yours ever



MICHAEL TATHAM

Simon McDonald, FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Michael Tatham
Date: 19 December 2001

PRIME MINISTER

cc: Jonathan Powell
David Manning

LORD ROBERTSON

George Robertson wants to speak to you. We have set up a call for 0900 on Thursday while you are in the car.

George is het up because Rumsfeld implied to him at the NATO Ministerial that the US might not be able to provide an extraction capacity once their current forces in Afghanistan had left theatre.

You can reassure him that we are taking steps to bolt down the US on this point. Geoff Hoon has spoken to Rumsfeld who clarified that US support was a given, but would be 'over the horizon' once US forces had withdrawn from the Afghan theatre.

David has had two conversations on this with Condi. In the first she said "if anything happens, we shall be there in a flash. This is not because of what is written on a piece of paper, but because it's the British".

In the second, Condi said she could not say how long US troops would remain in Afghanistan but in any event the US commitment was absolutely firm and the Pentagon had been tasked to look at how the extraction guarantee would be provided.

Michael Tatham

MICHAEL TATHAM

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister,
and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat

12 December 2001

Dear High Commissioner

Thank you for your letter of 7 December covering a letter from Prime Minister Chretien to Mr Blair. I shall ensure this is seen by the Prime Minister. I expect him to reply shortly.

Best wishes

yours sincerely
David M.

DAVID MANNING

His Excellency Mr Jeremy Kinsman

JG



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Copied to DCU
for BU

From the Private Secretary

11 December 2001

Dear Simon

NATO/RUSSIA: LETTER FROM CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER

I attach a letter to the Prime Minister from Chretien concerning the NATO/Russia relationship. I would be grateful for a draft reply.

Yours ever

MICHAEL TATHAM

Simon McDonald
FCO



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

December 4, 2001

Tracy
Dear Prime Minister:

I am writing in response to your letter to Lord Robertson of Port Ellen concerning new NATO-Russia cooperation which was forwarded to me by your High Commissioner in Ottawa.

Canada is encouraged with the level of Russia's engagement in the global fight against terrorism. The spirit with which President Putin has offered his full cooperation presents an extraordinary opportunity to discard once and for all Cold War attitudes and suspicions, and embark on a new relationship. I concur fully with the point made in the November 13 Joint Statement of US President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin that the legacy of the Cold War has been overcome.

I would like to thank you for your support of the Canadian initiative to advance the relationship between NATO and Russia. On November 7, Canada circulated to North Atlantic Council Ambassadors a set of practical proposals to move consultations with Russia to an "at 20" format. This body would be a political/consultative forum, with the power to make decisions on the basis of consensus among 20 partners. The Permanent Joint Council, which instituted an unhelpful "19 versus 1" approach, needs to be adapted to a more cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.


The Right Honourable Anthony Blair
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
10 Downing Street
London, United Kingdom

- 2 -

Your paper complements our suggestions and advocates practical methods of enhancing cooperation and decision-making, while outlining proposed rights and obligations for NATO and Russia in a revitalized relationship. We are fully supportive of these expectations.

Canada wishes to pursue this initiative in close collaboration with the UK, the US and all other interested Allies. It remains our goal to launch a new process at the December NATO Ministerial meetings. Let us work together to foster a consensus amongst all Allies in the shortest time possible.

Yours sincerely,



Canadian High Commission



Haut Commissariat du Canada

CE:MT
MS
DH
Pres

Macdonald House
1 Grosvenor Square
London W1K 4AB

December 7, 2001

Sir David Manning
Private Secretary Foreign Affairs
10, Downing Street
London SW1A 2AS

Dear David,

I enclose a faxed letter from Prime Minister Chrétien to Prime Minister Blair. It is in response to a letter Mr. Blair sent to the Secretary-General of NATO proposing a NATO-Russia Council at 20.

Mr. Chrétien, in pointing out that Canada had already been pursuing an initiative at NATO along these lines, clearly welcomes the positions advocated by Mr. Blair, and urges us to work together to obtain an early consensus. As you know, the issue has been discussed by NATO Ministers in Brussels this week - there is clearly more work to be done.

Yours sincerely,

Jeremy K. B. Kinsman
High Commissioner

cc: Sir John Kerr
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

QR
He do a reply for JM

"Thank you for your letter of 7 December covering a letter from Prime Minister Chrétien to Mr Blair. I shall ensure this is seen by the Prime Minister and am confident that he will wish to reply shortly."

TJM

Michael F
May I have a
draft-ack from
10/12

RESTRICTED
NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING 6/7 DECEMBER: NATO-RUSSIA
From: UKDEL NATO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELNO 687
 OF 061800Z DECEMBER 01
 INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR, CABINET OFFICE, MODUK, MOSCOW, NATO POSTS
 INFO IMMEDIATE WHIRL

SIC A3A
 SUMMARY

1. Agreement to build a new relationship with Russia, with new mechanisms to be agreed by Reykjavik Ministerial. Canada, Italy, and France and UK emphasise need to grasp the opportunity imaginatively. Germans and Central Europeans still cautious. US resists explicit mention of a Council at 20 in the Communiqué, but is explicit about decision making at 20 in the meeting.

DETAIL

2. Lord Robertson said NATO's relationship with Russia was crucial. We needed new relations based on the logic of common interests, aimed at facilitating common responses to common threats. We should be able to agree on the goal of creating new mechanisms to work at 20 on issues of mutual concern without NATO losing its prerogative of independent action at 19. We had to be realistic, but the opportunity existed for a new page in the NATO-Russia relationship. Putin had promised a new Russian attitude and even agreed to promote NATO. He had said in Moscow "if this works it could change the world".

3. Powell (US) said Russian cooperation on terrorism gave the opportunity for a new relationship. This did not require renegotiating the Founding Act. Flexibility and substance were the key. NATO should work with Russia to create a mechanism for decision making at 20. The US supported the proposal for a NATO-Russia Council to decide and act jointly with Russia, while retaining the flexibility to act at 19. The new arrangement should be in place by Reykjavik or earlier: if it was in action by March Ministers could review the results at Reykjavik. It had to be clear that NATO retained the ability to act independently and Russia had no veto. NATO enlargement remained a decision for NATO alone. The "alliance with the Alliance" did not offer Russia membership or a path to membership; it was good that Putin recognised this. The NATO-Russia agenda should be practical and carefully chosen, eg CT, WMD, peace support operations, joint military exercises and civil emergency planning. In sum, the opportunity existed for a qualitatively different relationship. The Alliance should be bold and creative as well as realistic, and aim to challenge itself.

4. You said we agreed on the opportunity, hence the proposals put forward by the Prime Minister. We needed to test the relationship in practice and focus on tangible projects. Your recent visit to Moscow showed that there was a wide range of opinion on NATO in Russia: some there clearly hoped Putin would fail. We should make sure we could walk with the new relationship before we tried to run.

5. Manley (Canada) said the NATO-Russia relationship should be enhanced as Bush and Putin had agreed. There would be new obligations on Russia to compromise with NATO. Russia's new approach could strengthen Euro-Atlantic stability. If NATO did

not respond to Putin's overture, the possibility remained of an isolated, antagonistic Russia. The new arrangements should be in place by Reykjavik at the latest. Cem (Turkey) supported increased cooperation with Russia: Turkey had just signed a Eurasia Cooperation Plan with Russia.

6. Vedrine (France) said the Russian reaction to 11 September had been remarkable, a strategic decision by Putin to opt for partnership with the Western world. France agreed with the UK Prime Minister that NATO-Russia cooperation should go further, and a new body at 20 should work on substantive issues. Crisis management in the Balkans, theatre missile defence and the military aspects of counter-terrorism could be good issues with which to start.

7. Ruggiero (Italy) said the key was to encourage positive tendencies in Russia. Italy would be ready to host an event at the highest level before the Prague Summit to help establish a good climate for the enlargement decision. The Russia-NATO and enlargement processes were independent, but we should try to make them self reinforcing

8. Fischer (Germany) agreed that an opportunity existed, but we had to proceed with prudence and circumspection. Chechnya remained a problem, with major violations of human rights. Lord Robertson added that Georgia was also a problem given recent Russian incursions. Kavan (Czech Republic) said the new relationship needed to be driven by both sides. It was important to shield Alliance processes from changes in the Kremlin and in Russian foreign policy. Outside a carefully chosen agenda existing arrangements should continue to apply. The new relationship could contribute to a successful summit at Prague. Rotfeld (Poland) said Putin had to be supported, but Russian democracy was fragile and there was no consensus in Russia. A new set of symbols was needed to change negative Russian attitudes. It was also important that NATO did not neglect Ukraine. Ukraine had contributed positively to European security (eg with the final disposal of strategic weapon facilities) but there were also worrying signs (eg supplying arms to Macedonia). Martonyi (Hungary) said imaginative thinking on common decision making should be tied to consideration of the long term sustainability of the new arrangements.

COMMENT

9. The main manoeuvring preceded the meeting in the Communiqué drafting, where the US pulled back at the eleventh hour from an explicit mention of a "new NATO-Russia Council at 20". Despite this, the language is forward leaning and the process leading to the establishment of a new Council has been launched. Initial Russian reaction in the discussion of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) statement has been positive: the test will be the PJC itself on 7 December. But there will be much to do before Reykjavik to ensure allied and Russian support for a new forum as we have proposed, and to inject substance.

Contact details: Robert Chatterton-Dickson, SecPol Dept, FCO (tel 00 44 207 270 3506).

JONES PARRY

Sent by UKDEL NATO on 06-12-2001 18:00
Received by No10 on 07-12-2001 05:41

SECRET
DEDIP
FM UKDEL NATO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 682
OF 061657Z DECEMBER 01
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BERLIN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS

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cc: HT
PR
Pm

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS

SUBJECT: RUSSIA/NATO: QUAD POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING, 6 DECEMBER

Summary

1. French underline the need for serious NATO engagement with Russia, but warn against NATO/Russia discussion of areas outside NATO's ambit. US recall their domestic political difficulties.

Detail

2. Political Directors agreed that the preparations for a new Russia/NATO relationship were shaping up well, though how the Russians engaged in practice would be critical. Errera (France) underlined that NATO too had to recognise that Putin's wish to engage with the West was not just a tactical reaction to 11 September, and should be serious on its part about engaging with Russia. The present initiative had been hurried, and should not necessarily be seen as a one-time shot. It was wrong to see it purely as an exchange in which NATO was making concessions in return for certain changes in Russian foreign policy.

3. Jones (US) took the point. The US had helped hurry the initiative on in part because of the need to give Putin something from Crawford to show his domestic audience. But there were political difficulties in Washington, both from the Right and the Left. The Administration was trying to counter criticism by emphasising that what was on offer was based on commitments made by earlier administrations (ie at Washington in 1997), but this cut no ice with some in the Pentagon, who disavowed any commitment to the NATO/Russia Founding Act ("not our agreement").

4. There was some discussion of arrangements for discussion at 19 and at 20: it seemed logical to agree at 19 which issues should be discussed at 20, but not to pre-cook positions or insist on a meeting at 19 before every meeting at 20. Further work was needed on what issues these might be, how narrowly they should be defined, and whether they should be formally listed in any document. Errera resisted any suggestion that NATO/Russia consultations on counter-terrorism or civil emergency planning imply NATO lead responsibility for these over other organisations, especially the EU.

\. JONES

S E C R E T D E D I P

JONES PARRY

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CAOFF//MR COOPER 1
MOD//DUS (P) 1
[VIA RTD]

Canadian High Commission



Haut Commissariat du Canada

Canada

Macdonald House
1 Grosvenor Square
London W1K 4AB
U.K.

December 21, 2001

Copy file
Mr. Michael Tatham
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland
10 Downing Street
London

Michael,
Dear Mr. Tatham,

I enclose the original of the letter sent by Prime Minister Chrétien to Prime Minister Blair on December 4, 2001. An advance copy of the letter was provided earlier. This is for the record.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Charles".

Charles Court
Counsellor



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

December 4, 2001

Tracy
Dear Prime Minister:

I am writing in response to your letter to Lord Robertson of Port Ellen concerning new NATO-Russia cooperation which was forwarded to me by your High Commissioner in Ottawa.

Canada is encouraged with the level of Russia's engagement in the global fight against terrorism. The spirit with which President Putin has offered his full cooperation presents an extraordinary opportunity to discard once and for all Cold War attitudes and suspicions, and embark on a new relationship. I concur fully with the point made in the November 13 Joint Statement of US President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin that the legacy of the Cold War has been overcome.


I would like to thank you for your support of the Canadian initiative to advance the relationship between NATO and Russia. On November 7, Canada circulated to North Atlantic Council Ambassadors a set of practical proposals to move consultations with Russia to an "at 20" format. This body would be a political/consultative forum, with the power to make decisions on the basis of consensus among 20 partners. The Permanent Joint Council, which instituted an unhelpful "19 versus 1" approach, needs to be adapted to a more cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.

The Right Honourable Anthony Blair
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
10 Downing Street
London, United Kingdom

Your paper complements our suggestions and advocates practical methods of enhancing cooperation and decision-making, while outlining proposed rights and obligations for NATO and Russia in a revitalized relationship. We are fully supportive of these expectations.

Canada wishes to pursue this initiative in close collaboration with the UK, the US and all other interested Allies. It remains our goal to launch a new process at the December NATO Ministerial meetings. Let us work together to foster a consensus amongst all Allies in the shortest time possible.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Jean Chrétien". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

RESTRICTED



MT
SW
DM
JB
JHM
AC
Press
JB

PM/01/044

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister
The Foreign Ministers meeting took place today and yesterday.
Progress made on NATO/Russia
(see attached reporting telegram).

Michael Pathan

fiw

NATO: Enlargement and the Run up to Prague

Summary

1. The events of 11th September, the European Defence initiative, a further (probably large) wave of enlargement and the prospect of a new partnership with Russia are changing NATO. This minute summarises the positions we plan to take at the Foreign and Defence Ministers' meetings this month which will set NATO's course in the run up to the Prague Summit. We will:

- welcome the emerging consensus for a larger round of enlargement at Prague but ensure Ministers commission work to maintain NATO's post-Prague efficiency and effectiveness;
- press for measures to enable NATO to respond to unpredictable terrorist threats without duplicating work done by other organisations (UN, EU, G8 etc);
- keep up momentum on your initiative on NATO/Russia relations, seeking agreement to a new Russia North Atlantic Council to be fully implemented at or before the Spring Ministerials in May;
- support Lord Robertson's 'NATO Plus' initiative to modernise NATO.

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Enlargement

2. Nine countries are formally in the queue for NATO membership: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. President Bush's June speech in Warsaw was forward leaning on enlargement. President Putin has toned down his opposition: progress on the NATO/Russia relationship would help him with this. European NATO members, including the Germans who have been the most reserved, are now moving in the US direction. As many as seven aspirants (ie all except Albania and Macedonia) may therefore be invited to join at Prague.

3. Other countries, primarily in the western Balkans, can be expected to seek NATO membership in the future. Including more small, poor countries with very limited military capabilities would raise difficult issues. Consensus decision-making would become more unwieldy and the Integrated Military Structure more difficult to manage. Allies with effective forces, such as the UK, would carry a greater share of the burden of any future NATO operations, or risk deploying alongside the inadequately prepared forces from new members.

4. We therefore need to ensure that new members bring usable forces to the Alliance and can contribute to collective security. We want NATO to impose some conditionality on enlargement in terms of military improvement and ensure that new members commit themselves at the time of invitation to continued military reform. We can continue to press this point during the accession negotiations.

Modernisation

5. Enlargement reinforces the need for Lord Robertson's NATO modernisation agenda. But reform is anyway essential if NATO is to continue to



be effective in undertaking multilateral military deployments, such as those in the Balkans. We need to support Lord Robertson and encourage further defence reform by existing allies. ESDP's 'Headline Goal' is one useful tool. NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative is another, though results since the initiative was launched at the Washington Summit have not fulfilled early promise: a follow-up will be needed at Prague.

NATO-Russia

6. The new relationship with Russia could bring enormous gains in Euro-Atlantic security, as well as making NATO enlargement (particularly to the Balts) easier to handle. A joint approach in the Balkans could bring obvious early benefits, as could greater co-operation on WMD proliferation and counter-terrorism. We should extend the joint agenda as widely as possible. But we must safeguard NATO's ability to act without Russia as necessary. We aim to use the Ministerial meetings to begin establishing the new relationship with Russia.

The changing nature of the Alliance

7. We do not think the Prague Summit should reopen the Strategic Concept agreed at Washington. But NATO will need to acknowledge at Prague that the absence of a traditional external threat, the new partnership with Russia, and the increased focus on dealing with terrorist threats, change the context in which NATO operates, and NATO will need to continue to adapt, including structural changes. Although the Article 5 guarantee will remain important, particularly for some of the likely new members, the new threats of proliferation and terrorism, and crisis management and peace support operations are likely in the future to be the bread and butter of Alliance work.

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8. We are copying this minute to DOP colleagues, Emyr Jones Parry at UKDEL NATO, to Sir Richard Wilson (Cabinet Office) and to Sir Christopher Meyer (Washington), Sir Roderic Lyne (Moscow), Sir John Holmes (Paris) and Sir Paul Lever (Berlin).

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Geoff-Hoon".

(GEOFF HOON)

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Jack Straw".

(JACK STRAW)

3 December 2001

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

file

Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister,
and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat

3 December 2001

Adam Simon,

CONVERSATION WITH CONDI RICE

I spoke to Condi Rice today at 1600 hours. I raised Russia/NATO, drawing on conversations earlier in the day with Emyr Jones-Parry and Adam Thomson.

I said that I was concerned by reports that the US delegation at NATO was now resisting references to "NATO at 20" in the Declaration for this week's Ministerials. This seemed to mark a significant retreat on the forward leaning language agreed by the President and the Prime Minister. It would send a very bad signal to Putin who would think that we were not serious, and had been stringing him along. This could affect a whole range of business with Moscow, including work on the new strategic framework. I urged Condi to intervene rapidly.


Condi said that she would do so. She had been discussing this with Powell and Rumsfeld and would now return to the charge. She accepted that we must refer to "NATO at 20". She took the point that this was something that the President and Prime Minister had agreed together in Washington.

Comment

Condi was clear that she would check what is clearly an attempt by DOD/Pentagon to slow down the Russia/NATO initiative or even halt it altogether. Judging from my subsequent conversation with Emyr, it sounds as though she was as good as her word. For good measure, the Prime Minister raised this with Bush when he spoke to him earlier this evening. Bush also gave a reassuring reply.

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I am copying this letter to Peter Watkins (MOD), John Scarlett and Tom McKane (Cabinet Office), Sir John Kerr (FCO), Kevin Tebbit (MOD), Sir Christopher Meyer (Washington), Emyr Jones-Parry (UKDel, NATO), Sir Roderic Lyne (Moscow) and Jonathan Powell.

Yours truly,


DAVID MANNING

Simon McDonald
FCO

CONFIDENTIAL - PERSONAL

Le



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister,
and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat

1 December 2001

Simon Simon

**TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH CONDI RICE:
RUSSIA/NATO**

I spoke to Condi Rice today at 1300 hours. Among the subjects we discussed was Russia/NATO.

I said that I hoped that George Robertson's recent remarks were not causing a rethink in Washington over Russia/NATO. Condi said not: the President was still right behind our ideas. But it was clear that we had a lot of explaining still to do over the veto question. We needed to emphasise that the NAC would continue as normal at nineteen. I said that the point was that the Russia-NAC would replace the PJC, not the NAC itself. We would work at twenty where we could, but without prejudice to a full discussion at nineteen as required.

I asked how Condi saw next week's Ministerials. She thought that it was now too difficult to propose a first meeting at twenty. There was too much work to do with public opinion. But she hoped that the concept of working at twenty could be endorsed with a commitment to a meeting in the new format next year once the details had been worked out. She thought that this was as much as we could achieve at present without appearing to press too hard and apparently risking NATO's integrity.

Comment

Condi was reassuring about the President's continued support for a new Russia/NATO relationship. But it is clear that the Americans will not want to go further next week than securing endorsement for the idea of reform with a view to implementation next year. This may not be as fast as we would like, but it would still be a major advance if we could secure Ministerial endorsement for the

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- 2 -

concept of a Russia-NAC, particularly if this were accompanied by a commitment to a first meeting at next May's Ministerials.

I am copying this letter to Peter Watkins (MOD), John Scarlett and Tom McKane (Cabinet Office), Sir John Kerr (FCO), Kevin Tebbit (MOD), and to Sir Christopher Meyer (Washington), Emyr Jones-Parry (UKDel NATO), Sir Roderic Lyne (Moscow) and Jonathan Powell.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'D. Manning', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

DAVID MANNING

Simon McDonald
FCO

From: Swift Incoming Telegrams (Machine 1)
Sent: 30 November 2001 18:32
To: POLDIR
Subject: INFO: DD BRNAT/FCOLN 672: NATO/RUSSIA - NAC DISCUSSION, 30 NOVEMBER

Importance: High

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
DTGM: 301812Z NOV
Message To: FCOLN
MessageFrom: BRNAT

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FM BRNAT TO FCOLN
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GRS 980

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FM UKDEL NATO
TO DESKBY 301830Z FCO
TELNO 672
OF 301812Z NOVEMBER 01
AND TO DESKBY MOSCOW
AND TO DESKBY CABINET OFFICE, MODUK, WASHINGTON

SUBJECT: NATO/RUSSIA - NAC DISCUSSION, 30 NOVEMBER

FCO FOR RICKETTS
CABINET OFFICE FOR MANNING, NO 10
MOD FOR HAWTIN

SUBJECT: NATO/RUSSIA - NAC DISCUSSION 30 NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. We, supported by Canada, Italy, Norway press a forward line as in the Prime Minister's letter. Germany, Turkey and the Central Europeans remain more cautious. The US supports our lines but is constrained by tough instructions from Washington on red lines. Agreement for parallel taskings from the NAC and PJC to develop the relationship up to Reykjavik. No consensus on Ministerial meeting at 20 in December.

DETAIL

2. The NAC followed up the lunch discussion on Tuesday 27 November. I also met Burns (US) immediately afterwards to coordinate a forward position.

3. The Secretary General set out possible conclusions:

- there was general agreement on the wish to strengthen relations and to look at the form and substance of working at 20.

- development should be iterative and bottom up.

- there should be parallel taskings from the Foreign Ministerial NAC to the Council and from the PJC Ministerial supported by strong messages in the NAC communique and PJC statement.

13/12

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✓
Gen David Manning

1 I think the language for the Communique & Para 7 is on right lines. Are you content?

2 We should build on the two principles

- no veto; etc

- no pre-cooking, where we do decide to go for discussion @ 20.

1. A meeting 'at 20' next week seems to me a distraction: more important to get a real dialogue going over the months...

Robert Ricketts

1/2

- the meeting on counter-terrorism with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Safonov in January should be at 20 at Ambassadorial level.

- the Founding Act remained the cornerstone and provided some safeguards. But we would need to continue to work on safeguards, making clear that there was no veto or limitation on NATO action.

- Our signals, to Russia should be consistent and transparent, and be careful about raising expectations/causing embarrassment.

4. The UK (Freeman) spoke to the Prime Minister's letter. We had a historic opportunity which we must seize. We needed to change mindsets and therefore create a new body to replace the PJC and to find new ways and subjects to work on at 20. We should achieve this by Reykjavik. We were radical but not imprudent. We were clear that this was a two-way street which required a cooperative Russian approach. But we should commit to a forum at 20. Italy, Canada, and Norway supported this position. Spain, Denmark and Greece also supported a Ministerial at 20 next week.

5. Germany, the Central Europeans and Turkey were more cautious. Germany said that development should be iterative and concentrate on those areas which looked promising, eg new threats. We should assess progress by Reykjavik and then decide on further steps. They noted that the Russian MFA and NATO Mission had said that discussion at 20 on a subject precluded discussion at 19. The conditions set out in Prime Minister Blair's letter were important. There should not be a Ministerial at 20 next week.

6. The US expressed its strong support for the initiative. We must agree publicly to move forward. The PJC/Troika mechanism had not worked. Putin had shown he was looking for a new way. Development of a relationship should be prudent and step by step. Safeguards were important. We should not agree on an automatic list of subjects for discussion at 20 but take a more organic approach, using a preparatory body at 20 to work up ideas. There could be no Russian veto. France supported a pragmatic approach. We should not identify lists of issues, but start working on specific items at 20. We should reflect further at 19 and with the Russians.

COMMENT

7. I met Burns afterwards. He was pleased with the outcome of the meeting. The German position was softening. They and the Central Europeans would let the process start. He had had tough instructions from Washington on safeguards which he showed me (please protect). He did not intend to flinch and would take a forward position but would have to assure the doubters in Washington that there would be safeguards for NATO equities. We agreed language for the NAC communique, which the UK have now tabled in the drafting group:

BEGINS

Today we commit ourselves to forge a new relationship with Russia, working at 20 whenever possible, reflecting the areas of common interest between us. Our goal is to replace the PJC with a new NATO/Russia Council chaired by the Secretary General and supported by a preparatory group at 20 which generates the agenda.

NATO's fundamental objectives remain as set out in Washington. The Alliance believes that, consistent with the Founding Act, working with Russia offers us the opportunity to fundamentally transform Euro-Atlantic security. NATO itself will maintain its prerogative of independent action on any issue consistent with its

obligations and
responsibilities under the North Atlantic Treaty.

We task the Council in Permanent Session to develop arrangements, for the Allies and Russia to agree and implement at 20, which will establish as soon as possible new mechanisms for consultations, cooperation, joint decision making, and coordinated joint action.

ENDS

8. As came out in the German intervention, Kislyak continues to mischief-make, and to press his idea that "defence" would be addressed at 19, but for "security", the default setting will be at 20, and only at 19 if 20 failed. It is not surprising that this pushes the more cautious allies to want a prior discussion at 19 before subjects go to 20. We and the US have pressed hard for the filter to be at 20 without an automatic pre-discussion at 19. The red line on maintaining NATO's prerogative of independent action that the US have put into our draft language follows the Founding Act, and is consistent with Putin's statement that Russia is not seeking a veto. Any language short of this would kill support in Washington. It may be useful if Moscow could approach the President's office to underline the efforts we are making to deliver on the Prime Minister's ideas, and to put the record straight lest Kislyak make mischief that NATO is backtracking.

JONES PARRY

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29 November 2001

Sir David Manning KCMG
10 Downing Street
London SW1

BY FAX VIA COMCEN

Dear Sir David,

file per
10/12

CONVERSATION WITH CONDI RICE

1. Your letter of 28 November to Simon McDonald: I have commented (without reference to your letter) in my telegram 580 sent today. I hope the Foreign Secretary will have a chance to discuss all of this with Colin Powell before we abandon hope of a first meeting at 20 on 7 December, and before Powell comes to Moscow. The consequences if Bush wobbles off course on NATO would go considerably wider.
2. I am copying this letter to Simon McDonald, Christopher Meyer and Emyr Jones Parry.

Yours ever,


Roderic Lyne

for

Roderic Lyne

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SKP 29/11/01



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② copy to Jonathan Powell
John Scarlett
Jim McKean
me

28 November 2001

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file.

12/11

Sir David Manning KCMG
10 Downing Street
London SW1

By fax via Comcen

Dear David,

NATO/RUSSIA

1. Thanks for your note of Monday. And for seeing Governor Farkutdinov of Sakhalin. I would not have presumed to ask you to do so, and we must protect you from the swampy mass of Governors and the like; but it is important to keep Farkutdinov as an ally on Shell's \$10 billion project, and Shell are pleased.

2. I am delighted you are making time to see General Baluyevskiy. He is quite unlike any Russian/Soviet General I have met (even the decent ones). He has no side. He converses, not speechifies. He is no raving liberal or West-hugger (and wouldn't be a useful interlocutor if he was); but he is intelligent, and he listens. I had an excellent debate with him on Monday, with none of the negative vibes which discouraged Chris Donnelly.

3. If you haven't yet seen it, read George Robertson's crisp one-page summary (SQ(2001)1393 of 23 November) of his visit, and maybe show it to the PM. It is a testament to the timeliness of your excellent NATO paper.

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4. You will see that Sergei Ivanov has neatly answered the question for us, by accepting Hoon's invitation and proposing, not by chance, to stay until 22 December. The next task is to try to make sure the Putin family come, and keep out the stage army if we can. It is very interesting that No.3 in the military hierarchy is choosing to spend 5 days in the UK (Baluyevskiy), closely followed by No.1 for 3 days. Another sign that the PM's initiative has caught their attention. Don't they know there's a war on?

Yours ever,
Roderic

Roderic Lyne

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