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# 10 DOWNING STREET

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FILE TITLE:

SITUATION

SERIES

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

PART:

25

PART BEGINS:

27 APRIL 1999

PART ENDS:

28 APRIL 1999

CAB ONE:



~~PART CLOSED~~

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# PART CLOSED

DATE CLOSED	28/4/99
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Series : **FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

File Title : **Situation**

Part : **25**

Date	From	To	Subject	Class	Secret
27/04/1999	FA/APS	FCO	Visit to Macedonia and Romania	C	0
27/04/1999	FA/PS	PM	Visit to Macedonia	U	0
27/04/1999	Telegram/IN	FCO	Tel No: 502 - Kosovo - Russian/Hungarian Relations	R	0
27/04/1999	MOD	FA/PS	Kosovo: offer of assistance from United Arab Emirates	C	0
27/04/1999	Cab Off		Nato - legal basis for action on Kosovo	C	0
27/04/1999	FA/PS	DID	Kosovar refugees	R	0
27/04/1999	FA/PS	PM	DOP: Kosovo	C	0
27/04/1999	MOD	FA/PS	Kosovo	C	0
27/04/1999	Telegram/IN		Tel no 227 - Kosovo Refugees	R	0
27/04/1999	Telegram/IN		Tel no 181 Sarajevo - Bosnia and Herzegovina: Sandzak refugees	R	0
27/04/1999	MS/FCO	PUS/DTI	Advent Communications Ltd	R	0
27/04/1999	FCO	FA/APS	Kosovo: Bishop of London	U	0
27/04/1999	Cab Off	Cab Off	Kosovo: Overnight developments 26-27 April	C	0
27/04/1999	FA/PS	MOD	Kosovo/targetting	S	144
27/04/1999	FCO	FA/APS	Reply to letter from Crown Prince Alexander of Yugoslavia	U	0
27/04/1999	MOD	Ch.Staff	Response to ashdown letter	C	0
27/04/1999	FA/PS	FA/APS	Call to John Major?	C	0
27/04/1999	FA/PS	Cab Off	Kosovo: Communications	C	0
27/04/1999	Telegram/IN		Tel no 327 Bonn - Kosovo Refugees	R	0
27/04/1999	Telegram/IN		Tel no 458 Paris - Kosovo: French thinking on next steps: comment	S	0
27/04/1999	FA/PS	FCO	Kosovo: Regional strategy	R	0
27/04/1999		PM	We will not be supplying fuel to the FRY:Letter of reply from the Pres	U	0
27/04/1999	HS	PM	Kosovo: Evacuation of refugees to the UK	U	0
27/04/1999	Cab Off	PS/SOC	NATO - Legal basis for action on Kosovo	C	0
27/04/1999	MWP	PM	Kosovo- response to the minute from the Attorney General	C	0
27/04/1999	CST	MOD	Kosovo: financing the conflict	C	0
27/04/1999	Ch.Staff	SOC	Kosovo: Use of Intelligence	S	146
27/04/1999	HS	PM	Kosovo:Evacuation Of Refugees to the UK	C	0
27/04/1999	MOD	FA/PS	Kosovo - targetting	S	944
28/04/1999	Telegram/IN	FCO	Tel No: 77 - Kosovo: UAE Military Contribution	C	0
28/04/1999	FA/PS	HO	Kosovo: Evacuation of Refugees to the United Kingdom	U	0
28/04/1999	Telegram/IN	FCO	Tel No: 461 - kosovo: French Views on Ground Troops	R	0
28/04/1999	Telegram/IN	FCO	Tel No: 501 - Kosovo: Talbott	C	0
28/04/1999	Telegram/IN	FCO	Tel No: 166 - Kosovo: Demonstration at Thessaloniki Port	R	0
28/04/1999	Telegram/IN	FCO	Tel No: 326 - Macedonia: Terrorist Attack on Nato Troops	R	0
28/04/1999	Telegram/IN	FCO	Tel No: 341 - Kosovo: Database of Talking Heads: France	R	0
28/04/1999	Telegram/IN	FCO	Tel No: 311 - Macedonia: GAC Conclusions	R	0
28/04/1999	SS/DID	FA/PS	Kosovo Refugee Return: Quint Meeting	U	0
28/04/1999	MOD	FA/PS	Kosovo	S	961
28/04/1999	Telegram/IN	FCO	Tel no 55 - Kosovo: Foreign Secretary's conversation with the US/Fr	R	0
28/04/1999	SPad/PM	PM	Letters to Media Ops Room,NATO	U	0
28/04/1999	MOD	FA/PS	Montenegro: If Djukanovic is removed	S	0
28/04/1999	PM	AG	Kosovo	C	0
28/04/1999	FCO	FA/PS	Kosovo: Strategy on The KLA	C	0
28/04/1999	MOD	FA/PS	MOD brief to SACEUR on ground options for Kosovo 28/4/99	C	0
28/04/1999	FCO	FA/APS	Montenegro	U	0
28/04/1999	FCO	FA/APS	Reply from the Prime Minister to Prime Minister Georgievski of Mace	R	0
28/04/1999	FCO	FA/PS	Kosovo: Estimates of Casualties and Troop Deployments	S	0
28/04/1999	SS/DID	FA/PS	Kosovo Refugee Return: Quint Meeting	U	0
28/04/1999	FA/PS	FCO	Russian Peace Efforts on Kosovo: Talk with the Swedish Prime Minis	C	0
28/04/1999	DID		Update Briefing from DFID 34 28 April 1999	U	0



Series : **FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

File Title : **Situation**

Part : **25**

Date	From	To	Subject	Class	Secret
28/04/1999	FA/PS	FCO	Kosovo: US/Russian Talks	C	0
28/04/1999	Telegram/IN	FCO	Tel No: 501 - Russia: Kosovo: Talbott	C	0
28/04/1999	FCO	FA/PS	Kosovo: Estimates of Casualties and Troop Deployments	S	0
28/04/1999	FCO		Kosovo	S	0
28/04/1999	Ch.Staff	PM	Working Peers	C	0
28/04/1999	FA/PS	PM	Strategy on the KLA	C	0
28/04/1999	FA/PS	PM	Montenegro	U	0
28/04/1999	SS/MOD	FA/PS	Kosovo - Targeting	S	0
28/04/1999	FA/PS	FCO	Montenegro: Mr Ratko Knezevic	U	0
28/04/1999	Cab Off	FA/PS	Kosovar Refugees: Wednesday 28 April	R	0
28/04/1999	FA/APS	ms/cabinet office	Kosovo: Views of Ex-King Constantine of Greece	U	0
28/04/1999	FA/PS	FCO	Kosovo: Czech Position	U	0
28/04/1999			Operational Allied Force - Media Monitoring DCMC Media Monitoring	U	0
28/04/1999	Cab Off		Kosovo: Immediate assessment 28 April	TS	0
28/04/1999	FA/PS	FCO	Kosovo: US/Russian Talks	C	0
27/06/1999	FCO	FA/PS	Kosovo - supporting Montenegro	C	0



SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5/5/1M

*Prime Minister*

*Content?*

*N.B. X.*

28 April 1999

961

*cc: SP  
PB  
AC*

*Dear John,*

**KOSOVO**

**Summary**

If the Prime Minister agrees, the Defence Secretary will announce tomorrow that he is making available additional RAF aircraft for NATO operations against Serbia – four more Harrier GR7s, four more Tornado GR1s and a Tristar tanker.

**Detail**

As you know, SACEUR has requested additional strike and tanker aircraft to support Operation Allied Force. Following consideration of the likely length and intensity of the air campaign – we believe that we should plan on operations at or above the current rate until September, followed by a possible surge to coincide with ground operations, with sharply reduced rates of effort thereafter – the Defence Secretary proposes to offer four more Harriers, four more Tornados and an additional Tristar tanker. We would also seek to make arrangements to deploy the Tornado force forward from Germany - thus greatly increasing its rate of effort and freeing RAF VC10s tankers for more general NATO use. This reinforcement would be greatly welcomed by SACEUR and should be sustainable, in terms of aircraft and personnel, for a long campaign.

*not too late?  
early Aug  
should  
the time  
for G-F.*

*i.e. to  
Italy's East  
coast.*

John Sawers Esq CMG  
No 10 Downing Street

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Separately, officials are examining what immediate steps may need to be taken to ensure that sufficient stock of weapons, ammunition and spares are available for the operation. I shall write to you again when we have more details.

I am copying this letter to Andrew Patrick (FCO), Tom Scholar (Treasury) and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

*Yours,*  
*Tom*  
(T C McKANE)  
Private Secretary

SECRET



RESTRICTED

SOVO: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH THE  
From: FCO

TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO  
TELNO 55

OF 281957Z APRIL 99

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VIENNA, MODUK, ACTOR, WHIRL  
INFO IMMEDIATE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POSTS, PJHQUK, UKNMR SHAPE  
INFO IMMEDIATE HQMNSDW BANJA LUKA, 30 SIGREGTDET UKNIC  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKSC(G) RHEINDALEN, UKNIC SARAJEVO  
INFO IMMEDIATE 30 SIGREGTDET COMBRITFOR

SIC A2P/I9F

PJHQUK FOR J5 POL/OPS, HQMNSDW FOR POLAD  
UKNMR PERSONAL FOR DSACEUR, UKNMR AND D/POLAR TO SACEUR  
30 SIGREGTDET FOR POLAD AND COL EVERSON  
MODUK FOR BALKANS SECRETARIAT  
UKNIC SARAJEVO FOR DCOMOPS AND POLAD  
30 SIG REG COMBRITFOR G2 PLEASE PASS TO POLAD MR G DODDS

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

US/FRENCH/GERMAN/ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, 28 APRIL

#### SUMMARY

1. Agreement that further Quint discussion needed to add detail to key NATO demands. Foreign Secretary, Vedrine and Fischer broadly favour an early G8 meeting. Albright more hesitant. Albright says visit and search regime in the Adriatic will require threat of force.

#### DETAIL

2. The Foreign Secretary spoke to Albright, Vedrine, Fischer and Dini on 28 April. Mrs Albright briefed on Talbott's talks in Moscow. She argued that it was important for all in the Quint to reinforce with the Russians the fact that NATO's conditions were non-negotiable. The Quint should coordinate closely to reach a common view on the details of NATO's demands for withdrawal of Serb forces, the character of the international military force, and the character of the future administration.

3. The Foreign Secretary commented that he doubted that the question of the long-term political status would cause difficulty since none amongst the Quint was advocating independence. An interim administration would last some time. Fischer said that Ivanov appeared concerned, on this point, by the idea that NATO might dominate a lengthy interim administration in Kosovo. The Russians also appeared to be promoting the idea of an early referendum in the province, perhaps before all the refugees had returned. Fischer said that the Russians no longer seemed to be challenging the principles underlying the NATO demands but were examining carefully their practical consequences. It would be worth having a discussion amongst Quint Political Directors to clarify what we should say to the Russians on the detail. In the meantime, he and Dini (who were both seeing Chernomyrdin on 29 April) should stay in interrogative mode.

4. Mrs Albright said that we would need to think carefully about the level of forces the Serbs were allowed to retain. She understood that the Russians were talking in terms of the levels set out in the Rambouillet text. These were no longer acceptable to the United States, given what those forces had done since. The US position was that all Serb forces should withdraw. The Russians

Prime Minister

Robin a bit

too dove-ish and

even handed in all

this.


*JS*



also seemed, in terms of an international military presence, to be looking at some kind of armed version of KDOM. The Foreign Secretary emphasised the need for a serious military force, both to reassure refugees and also in order to carry through the demilitarisation of the UCK. The Foreign Secretary said that in slower time it would be important to work out the details of the interim administration. The UK was ready to host a meeting to discuss this.

5. The Foreign Secretary said that a Ministerial meeting (eg in G8 format) with the Russians might be useful in closing the gap between their position and that of the Quint. Albright said she was ready to contemplate this, providing we could be sure the meeting would be constructive. Vedrine argued for an early G8 meeting without too many pre-requisites. Fischer agreed. Albright thought that a meeting would only be sensible if we could be sure that the Russians would sign up to an international military presence. The Foreign Secretary argued against making this a pre-condition, since this was precisely the most difficult issue which the meeting would need to resolve. It would be important to invite both Chernomyrdin and Ivanov to the G8. Mrs Albright stressed that any G8 meeting would need clearly to move further than the agreement on principles that had been achieved at Oslo.

6. Mrs Albright referred to US proposals for a visit and search regime. The US appreciated the EU's early adoption of an oil embargo. She hoped the EU would also engage other non-EU states. The visit and search regime in the Adriatic would need a credible threat of force in order to work. That said, in the similar "Sharp Guard" operation at the time of the Bosnian conflict, force had never actually been used. The Foreign Secretary noted that if the EU/US and, for instance, members of the OIC, could all agree on an oil embargo, Russia would find itself uncomfortably isolated. Dini said that he would need to look carefully at the NATO proposals for visit and search as they would have considerable practical effect on Italian ports.



7. The Ministers agreed to speak again on the evening of 29 April. Dini and Fischer would debrief the others on their contacts with Chernomyrdin.

COOK

**Sent by FCO on 28-04-1999 19:57**

**Received by No10 on 28-04-1999 22:20**



# The New York Times

THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 1999

## DIPLOMACY

# Germans Seek To Separate Serb Leader From Support

By ROGER COHEN

BONN, April 28 — The German Government is pressing a Western diplomatic initiative aimed at isolating the Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, rather than dealing with him. The strategy is driven by the conviction that he will almost certainly be indicted by the international war crimes tribunal.

Germany, whose ties to Russia are close, was at the center of diplomatic activity today directed chiefly at securing Moscow's support for NATO's objectives in Kosovo, and thus reducing Mr. Milosevic's room to maneuver, Western officials said. No sign emerged today of any immediate breakthrough in the discussions that began on Tuesday with a visit to Moscow by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, but Western officials held out hope that Russia, Mr. Milosevic's chief if not enthusiastic supporter, might shift its position.

An eventual indictment of Mr. Milosevic would have enormous political repercussions because it would effectively make it impossible for Western governments to negotiate with him.

"The logic of the process is that there will be an indictment, and this is also the view of the Chancellor," said Michael Steiner, the chief diplomatic adviser to Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. "We don't need Milosevic for a solution."

It was not clear today whether the United States or other NATO allies supported the German position that Mr. Milosevic could be circumvented in the search for a solution to the Kosovo conflict.

Although Western leaders have stepped up their language against Mr. Milosevic — Jacques Chirac, the French President, has called him a "dictator" and both President Clinton and the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, have said peace in the Balkans appears incompatible with his rule — a possible agreement with him has not been formally dismissed by Western governments.

Mr. Steiner, a veteran Balkan diplomat, said, "If Mr. Milosevic is indicted, he cannot be the signatory to any accord. That is already a factor we have to take into consideration."

Mr. Steiner said that the allies had needed Mr. Milosevic's signature earlier this year at peace talks in France that eventually failed. "But we are no longer in the same game. We now need certain things to happen — Serbian troops out of Kosovo, and the Kosovar refugees back — but we are not necessarily in a signature game any more," he said.

At NATO headquarters, there were also clear signs today that a chief Western objective has become an attempt to fan the tensions between Mr. Milosevic and a traditionally hapless democratic opposition in Serbia in an effort to weaken the nationalist leadership that has held sway throughout the eight years of Yugoslavia's violent dissolution.


*AP*  
*The article*

*Clinton mentioned*  
*to you on this*  
*German position*

*JS*

*Top JS*

*JB*  
*PB*  
*AC*





Jamie P. Shea, a NATO spokesman, said that "the tide may be beginning to turn against President Milosevic," adding that the "unity based on fear" that has characterized Serbian society in recent years was fragmenting. "Beneath the permafrost, there are some green shoots of democratic recovery," he added.

It was not clear whether NATO was indulging in wishful thinking, or had solid evidence of a weakening of Mr. Milosevic's stranglehold.

But shortly after Mr. Shea spoke, Yugoslavia's Deputy Prime Minister, Vuk Draskovic, who recently called for "brave moves" by his Government toward compromise, was removed from office for speaking out of line.

Western officials said the aim of the talks in Germany today was, as one put it, to "bring Russia into line," and so eventually make it possible to pass a United Nations Security Council resolution buttressing at least the central points of NATO's aims, including the deployment in Kosovo of an international military force.

To that end, Rudolf Scharping, the German Defense Minister, met in Moscow with Russia's Balkan envoy, former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, while Mr. Schröder held talks in Berlin with the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Mr. Chernomyrdin is expected in Bonn on Thursday. Boris N. Yeltsin, the Russian President, has objected to the idea of an international military force in Kosovo and to the growing Western conviction that some form of protectorate will now be needed in the Serbian province.

But Mr. Chernomyrdin's planned visit to Bonn, and Mr. Annan's departure today from Berlin to Moscow, suggested that the Russian position may shift. "There are some indications that slightly raise hope for a political solution, but one should not overestimate this," Mr. Scharping said today.

Chancellor Schröder warned that the process will be long. "I urge those who expected to have the crisis resolved in a matter of days to have more patience. We are at the start of a political process, not at the end."

Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, also met with Mr. Annan today and said that Germany favored the adoption of a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which allows the Security Council to authorize military operations without the consent of the parties to the dispute.

Such a resolution on Kosovo could eventually provide the legal support for an international military deployment in Kosovo under what Western leaders have called "semipermissive" conditions — for example, in the event of a Serbian troop withdrawal from Kosovo but without a formal agreement from Belgrade.

But any Security Council resolution would be blocked without the Russian support now being persistently sought.

Mr. Fischer said that "if there was something to talk about," the West would have to "talk to those in power in Belgrade."

But he added that Mr. Milosevic had "waged ethnic war against large parts of his population using great brutality, and there is a court in The Hague responsible for all Yugoslavia." Mr. Fischer was referring to the International Criminal Tribunal set up in 1993 in The Hague to investigate "reports of mass killings" in Bosnia, among other crimes.

The Foreign Minister added that if an international force was deployed in Kosovo, the West would be in a position "to bring to light" evidence of war crimes committed as Serbian forces drove more than 500,000 ethnic Albanians from their homes. His clear implication was that Mr. Milosevic might be vulnerable.



Mr. Steiner said his conviction that Mr. Milosevic would eventually be indicted grew out of a meeting last week in Bonn with Louise Arbour, the Canadian judge who is the tribunal's chief prosecutor. Mr. Schröder also attended.

Ms. Arbour said in a telephone interview that the court had put on hold several investigations stemming from the Bosnian war in order to examine potential crimes in Kosovo "in something close to real time."

Several court investigators are now in Macedonia and Albania gathering information from refugees who have been driven out of Kosovo. The aim of current investigations is to document "crimes and the chain of command at the same time," Ms. Arbour said. She declined to confirm or deny whether an indictment of Mr. Milosevic is being prepared.

Mr. Milosevic, whose decade in power has coincided with wave after wave of violence, has always denied any knowledge of, or involvement in, war crimes.



**From: Anji Hunter**  
**Date: 28 April 1999**

**PRIME MINISTER**

**cc: Alastair Campbell (o/r)**

**LETTERS TO MEDIA OPS ROOM, NATO**

Alastair and I discussed the above and you may already have done it. If so please forgive me.

A number of people here dropped everything, at a moment's notice, to help out. Most of them have been absolutely amazing, working from 7am to midnight, and I believe their hard work is beginning to bear fruit in the media. It would be good if you could write hand letters to the following.

**UK**

**Jan Royall** (European Commission)

**Anne Shevas** (Scottish Office)

These two have been here from the beginning and without them none of it would have happened on the organisation/logistics/people-handling front.

**Bernard Gray** (Special Adviser to George R, MOD)

**Bruce Mann** (MOD)

**Andrew Mathewson** (MOD)

**Dominic Schroeder** (FCO, Bonn)

**Dominic Wilson** (MOD)

**Danny Pruce** (FCO)



USA

**Colonel P J Crowley** [Dear P.J.]

**Jonathon Prince** (Special Assistant to the President of the United States)

**Lee McClenny** (Director, Press Relations Office, State Department)

These are extremely high calibre, all on a par with AC.

NATO

**Peter Daniel** (Director of Information and Press, NATO)

He is Jamie's boss – a very calm and dignified Canadian, again without whom none of this would have been possible.

**Jamie Shea** (Spokesman)

**James Paver** (Second Secretary, UKDel, NATO)

He has been our main link with the UK delegation here at NATO, running around day and night for all of us.

There are about 8 or 9 other lesser mortals from Scottish and Welsh Offices, FCO and MOD who will be receiving typed letters that you should sign and do a postscript "Well done".

Monica .

pp **ANJI HUNTER**



SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5/5/1M

28<sup>th</sup> April 1999

962

cc: JP  
PB  
AC

Dear John,

**MONTENEGRO : IF DJUKANOVIC IS REMOVED**

Summary

Actions which NATO might take if Milosevic removed Djukanovic from power in Montenegro.

Detail

At this morning's DOP meeting the Prime Minister called for urgent work to be done on policy towards Montenegro. You confirmed that it would be helpful to have advice on the military action which NATO might take if Djukanovic were removed by Milosevic. This has not been seen by the Defence Secretary,

If Milosevic removed Djukanovic from power and put in place a Belgrade-friendly regime, NATO would have no further reason to hold back from attacks against VJ and FRY Navy targets in Montenegro – particularly since such forces could then more easily be used by Milosevic to reinforce units deployed to Kosovo. In practice, this would mean NATO airstrikes against:

- the FRY Navy anchored in Bar and Kotor Bay
- Fry Navy shore facilities and marine forces around Bar
- VJ headquarters, ammunition stores and barracks complexes throughout Montenegro

John Sawers Esq CMG  
No 10 Downing Street

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- VJ fielded forces and convoys
- Airfields and any remaining IADS facilities in Montenegro.

The arguments for exercising restraint in attacking port facilities and supply lines of communication running through Montenegro would also have been weakened. We might therefore also attack:

- bridges and tunnels on routes linking Montenegro to Serbia, both within Montenegro and in Serbia
- bridges and tunnels on routes between Montenegro and Kosovo
- port facilities in Bar/Kotor Bay (subject to any environmental constraints).

Finally, should Djukanovic declare independence before a take-over by Milosevic or resist military action by Serbia, NATO Allies might recognise the new state and agree to assist it in self-defence on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter. In this case, NATO would also attack:

- VJ units engaging MUP units loyal to Djukanovic
- VJ units reinforcing attacks against Montenegro from Serbia although the effect of such attacks by NATO would be unlikely to be decisive.

I am copying this to Andrew Patrick (FCO) and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

*Yours,*  
*Tom*

(T C McKANE)  
Private Secretary

**SECRET**



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

105550

28 April 1999

*Dean John*

*cc JPo  
PB  
Ac*

Kosovo: Strategy on the KLA

... Your letter of 26 April asked for a short note on how we might take forward our relationship with the KLA. This is enclosed.

I am copying this letter to Chris Deverell (Ministry of Defence) and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*

*Andrew Patrick*

(Andrew Patrick)  
Private Secretary

John Sawers  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTORNEY GENERAL

KOSOVO

Thank you for your minute. I understand that Lord Falconer has spoken to David Seymour, Legal Secretary to the Law Officers, Sir Franklin Berman, and Michael Wood from the FCO, Martin Hemming, Chief Legal Adviser to the MoD, and Iain McLeod from the Law Officers Department on this matter.

I am grateful to you for the confirmation of your earlier advice that there is a respectable legal basis for all the steps taken by us in the Kosovo conflict.

I am also grateful to you for re-iterating the basic principles which must be applied in determining whether UK forces can hit targets. These principles are that the object of the use of force is the relief of a humanitarian catastrophe, that any non-military targets attacked must be making an effective contribution to the military action and their destruction must offer a definite military advantage at the time of the attack, and that if there is a risk of civilian casualties, targets may only be attacked if the civilian consequences are not excessive in relation to the direct military advantage anticipated.



As David Seymour has confirmed to Lord Falconer, and I of course accept, these tests must be applied conscientiously on a case by case basis to each target selected. This is occurring, and will continue to occur.

In relation to the position of our NATO allies, they, like us, adhere to international law. I understand it is agreed amongst the lawyers that the UK can reasonably assume that its Allies have in place similar checks to satisfy themselves of the legality of their actions. That is the basis on which the UK has proceeded and will continue to do so. It was neither practical nor legally necessary for one ally to police the targeting of others. If the three tests are applied consistently by the UK to each target it resolves to attack, it will continue to act lawfully. Even if one of our Allies failed to comply with international law, there is a respectable case for concluding that the UK would not itself be in breach of international law.

I am grateful to you for your help in this matter and recognise that, as the terms of the campaign change, no doubt further legal issues will arise.

I am copying this minute to Robin Cook, George Robertson and Richard Wilson.

Tomy

28 April 1999



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**From: John Sawers**  
**Date: 28 April 1999**

**PRIME MINISTER**

**cc: Jonathan Powell**  
**Alastair Campbell**  
**Philip Barton**

**STRATEGY ON THE KLA**

Foreign Office paper as requested.

We're in danger of being too sniffy. We do not want to favour the KLA politically over other Kosovar parties. But we have to reckon on the KLA becoming vastly more popular after what has happened, and recognise that they are the only party with an army of sorts.

Giving practical help for the KLA could:

A

- increase our targeting information inside Kosovo;
- help us work out ways to get aid to IDPs in Kosovo;
- give us leverage over the KLA and moderate their behaviour;
- reduce the burden on NATO ground troops when it comes to pushing Serb forces out.

(A)

We do not want the primary task of an international force in Kosovo to be disarming the KLA. The idea that they will disarm after the experience of the last months is ludicrous; we shouldn't set ourselves up for failure. The focus should be on working with them, towards our shared goals, which will include new elections.

**CONFIDENTIAL**




CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

If you agree, we might also seek a minimalist interpretation of SCR 1160 (the arms embargo), asking Charlie Falconer to help with that, ~~and~~ find ways to provide non-lethal material and to cooperate over IDPs. We should also seek early meetings with the leadership to offer them help, but make clear what we need from them in terms of respect for democratic process, avoidance of organised crime/drugs etc. (We used similar strategies with the ANC and the PLO in the 1970s and 80s, to good overall effect.)

Overall, our starting point in a conflict like this should be that your enemy's enemy is your friend. We can sort out our differences later.



JOHN SAWERS



CONFIDENTIAL

KOSOVO: STRATEGY ON THE KLA

SUMMARY

Current policy is not to favour KLA but to encourage Kosovo Albanian political unity. KLA does contain unsavoury elements: KLA 'moderates' not yet put to test. SCR 1160 prevents arming/training. KLA goal remains independence: their strategy is to present themselves as NATO's ally. May be possible to use KLA to help IDPs, but they will use this to drive their agenda. Proposals for carrying forward our relationship with KLA should focus on intensifying political dialogue and working for a united Kosovo Albanian team to work with international community on preparations for transitional period.

DETAIL

Current Policy

- We have to date been careful not to align ourselves with KLA. Do not support their goal (independence) or methods.
- We maintain dialogue with KLA as part of effort to encourage Kosovo Albanian political unity. We accepted Thaqi (KLA) as leader of Kosovo Albanian Rambouillet delegation. KLA have the guns, but the extent of real support for them among Kosovars is unclear. We have not "recognised" Thaqi government. We maintain contacts with LDK etc.
- KLA contains unsavoury elements: unreconstructed Marxists, hardline nationalists etc. Links to drugs/crime. Also potentially more flexible figures such as Thaqi/Krasniqi who could develop into politicians. But latter's freedom of action constrained by hardliners. And KLA Rambouillet team's commitment to moderation has not been put to the test.
- UNSCR 1160 forbids supply of arms and related material to the FRY, and arming and training for terrorist activities there.
- Rambouillet Accords envisage disarmament and demilitarisation of KLA by K+120.

KLA Goals and Strategy

- KLA goal remains independence for Kosovo, despite signature of Rambouillet Accords.
- KLA strategy is increasingly to present themselves as representative of Kosovo Albanians as a whole, and as natural ally of NATO. To the extent they succeed, post-settlement KLA disarmament/demilitarisation (necessary for stability of Kosovo and safety/effectiveness of international military force) will be harder.

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Arms Supplies?

- Russians highly suspicious that West (particularly US) already breaching SCR 1160 and supplying KLA. Americans have told us that US government and its agencies are not supplying arms and have no plans to do so (this leaves open a possibility that some non-governmental US activities may be going on in this area).

Humanitarian/helping the IDPs

- Already talking intensively to UCK contacts in N. Albania about conditions inside Kosovo. Also at political level to Thaqi etc.

- Cabinet Office currently looking at options for helping IDPs. One option would be to task the UCK to carry supplies in. The Albanian President has suggested there is scope for NATO/KLA co-ordination to create a humanitarian supply corridor. This looks unrealistic.

- KLA could syphon off supplies, or sell them to buy arms, or use them to enforce IDP compliance with their wishes. Already some reports that KLA are coercing refugees into joining them, or taking goods/equipment from them. No reason for confidence that all KLA would play fair with IDPs. Small amounts of supplies could get through, but would not be the whole answer.

- It may be possible to send IDPs radios via the KLA, which could be used to signal locations. But this could infringe UNSCR 1160. Radio beacons may be a better option. These options only make sense if we go for airdrops - which remain a risky option.

Carrying forward our relationship with the KLA:  
Recommendations

- We should continue to encourage Kosovo Albanian unity, and not to promote the KLA or any other one group/party.

- To this end, we should intensify our political dialogue with Thaqi and other KLA leaders, to encourage them to work with non-KLA Kosovo Albanians, but also to make it clear that we envisage a significant role for them in a post-settlement Kosovo - which carries serious responsibilities. Their rising popularity among Kosovo Albanians alone should mean greater success at the ballot box when elections are held. (Conversely, if they behave anti-democratically, they may lose support or even find themselves banned.)

- We should encourage KLA to accept our political approach ('Rambouillet plus' interim solution with robust international role/military force). Regional states (particularly Macedonia) could drop their support for the NATO campaign if they concluded we were backing Kosovo independence.

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- This message could be delivered by the Foreign Secretary's Special Envoy for the Balkans (Mr Donnelly in co-ordination with Hill and Petritsch). We should also (perhaps via the EU

✓ Presidency) work for a meeting of the three main Kosovo Albanian groupings (KLA, LDK, LBD). The aim would be to build a unified team to work with OSCE/NATO and others on preparations for the transitional period.

*Surely not?* | - We should continue to make it clear that there will be KLA disarmament/demobilisation post-settlement. An international military force will provide a security guarantee.

- We should discuss with key allies (initially with the Americans) how to ensure the KLA will contribute to rather than disrupt a transitional administration (retraining as local police etc).

- We should also encourage information flow between NATO and the KLA on eg location of IDPs/Serb forces, without crossing the UNSCR or presentational red lines. We need to be wary of accusations that NATO is acting as the KLA's airforce.

- Subject to decisions on airdrops, we should explore the possibility of using the KLA to deliver radios/radio beacons to IDPs, subject to further legal advice on whether this would infringe UNSCR 1160.

[Tom Phillips, EAD: 270-3013]

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SECRET

**MOD BRIEF TO SACEUR ON GROUND  
OPTIONS FOR KOSOVO  
28 APR 99**

File

Prime Minister

Worth flicking through.

*John*

Can we simply keep an  
arm build-up so that we,  
at least are in place by end  
of July even if others aren't?

SECRET



# BACKGROUND

- PRESSURE OF WINTER REQUIRES DEPLOYMENT BUILD-UP TO BEGIN SOON
- UK WISHES TO PLAN ITS STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO BEGIN AS SOON AS ORDERED - OR POSSIBLY REINFORCE OUR CURRENTLY DEPLOYED FORCE GRADUALLY
- NATIONAL DEPLOYMENT DESTINATIONS AND DESIRED ORDER OF ARRIVAL SHOULD REFLECT STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - WHICH WE WISH TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY WE CAN

SECRET



# AIM

TO ILLUSTRATE IN BROAD STRATEGIC  
TERMS HOW A NATO FORCE  
MIGHT SECURE KOSOVO  
BY A LAND OPERATION LIMITED TO KOSOVO,  
BUT NOT EXCLUDING TRANSIT THROUGH SERBIA

SECRET



# CONTENT

## **INTEND TO COVER :**

- WHAT SIZE OF FORCE IS NEEDED
- WHERE SUCH AN OPERATION MIGHT BE MOUNTED
- WHEN IT MIGHT BE MOUNTABLE

## **WILL NOT COVER:**

- CONDUCT OF LAND CAMPAIGN ONCE OPERATION IS UNDER WAY

SECRET



# WHAT SIZE OF FORCE IS NEEDED

- NATO FORCES DEPLOYED MUST BE SUFFICIENT TO OVERMATCH THE ENEMY DECISIVELY IN ORDER TO MINIMISE CASUALTIES
- ENEMY FORCES LIKELY TO BE AROUND 80,000? TROOPS, BUT NOT ALL IN KOSOVO, IF FIXED ELSEWHERE
- SERBIAN ARMoured MOBILE DEFENCE, BASED ON:
  - A DEFENSIVE CRUST, USING NATURAL AND MAN MADE OBSTACLES
  - LOW LEVEL POSITIONAL DEFENCE
  - LONG TERM PARTISAN INSURGENCY

SECRET



# NATO FORCE STRENGTH

A CORPS OF FOUR DIVISIONS AND COMBAT SUPPORT (APPROX 100,000 TROOPS) SHOULD SUFFICE, SO LONG AS:

- HIS MILITARY CAPABILITY AND MORALE ARE DEGRADED CONSIDERABLY FROM THE AIR OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS
- HE IS KEPT DISPERSED AND UNABLE TO CONCENTRATE AGAINST US
- WE ATTACK HIM SUCCESSIVELY WITH CONCENTRATED FORCE
- WE ACHIEVE SHOCK BY SURPRISE AND OFFENSIVE ACTION

UK ANALYSIS OF RESISTANCE :

- IF US/BRIT SOLDIER = 1.0
- AND IRAQ = 0.18
- SERB = 0.35

-IN FALKLANDS WAR 10,500 BRITISH TROOPS DEFEATED 14,000 ARGENTINIANS WITH 145 BRITISH DEAD AND 600 ARGENTINE DEAD

SECRET



# WHERE

## **CRITICAL INGREDIENTS:**

- MINIMUM TRANSIT THROUGH SERBIA (FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY REASONS)
- SUFFICIENT SPACE TO ASSEMBLE FORCE
- OPPORTUNITY TO TRAIN AT FORMATION LEVEL, PREFERABLY IN THEATRE
- STRATEGIC PLAN THAT LEAVES SCOPE FOR SURPRISE AT OPERATIONAL LEVEL

SECRET



# AVENUES OF ADVANCE

AVENUE 1-  
FROM ALBANIA INTO KOSOVO DIRECT  
– APPALLING ROUTE  
– DIPLOMATICALLY RELIABLE

SECRET



**SECRET**  
**AVENUES OF APPROACH**





# AVENUES OF ADVANCE

## AVENUE 2 –

FROM FYROM DIRECT INTO KOSOVO

- BETTER ROUTE
- PREDICTABLE
- DIPLOMATICALLY UNRELIABLE (GREECE?)

SECRET



**SECRET**  
**AVENUES OF APPROACH**





# AVENUES OF ADVANCE

## AVENUE 3 - FROM FYROM INTO MORAVA VALLEY

- GOOD ROUTE
- LESS PREDICTABLE
- DIPLOMATICALLY UNRELIABLE
- SOME POLITICAL RISK

SECRET



**SECRET**  
**AVENUES OF APPROACH**





# AVENUES OF ADVANCE

## AVENUE 4 – FROM BULGARIA VIA NIS

- HIGHER RISK ROUTE ALONG UPLAND  
DEFILE AND BUILT UP AREAS
- POLITICALLY PROBLEMATIC

SECRET



# SECRET AVENUES OF APPROACH





## VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT

- FLEXIBLE
- POLITICALLY UNPROBLEMATIC
- SURPRISE
- LIMITED COMBAT POWER
- RISK- DEPENDS ON MORE  
DEGRADATION OF SERB AIR  
DEFENCE

SECRET



- THE PLAN MIGHT INVOLVE A  
COMBINATION OF SOME OR ALL OF  
THESE
- ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

SECRET



**SECRET**  
**ILLUSTRATIVE PLAN**





# IMPLICATIONS FOR MOUNTING

## AVENUE 1

- 1-3 ROUTES ACROSS BORDER

- TWO POSSIBLE PORTS:

### **DURRES**

- SMALL RORO ONLY

- TWO SHIPS PER DAY — INADEQUATE ON ITS OWN

### **BAR**

- IN MONTENEGRO

- SERB NAVAL BASE

- WOULD THEREFORE REQUIRE  
PRELIMINARY OP TO SEIZE AND  
NEUTRALISE SERB NAVY

SECRET



# IMPLICATIONS FOR MOUNTING

## AVENUES 2 + 3

- MAIN AND SUBSIDIARY ROUTES
- MAIN AND SUBSIDIARY PORTS

### **SALONIKA**

- ESTABLISHED PORT
- CAN TAKE FOUR BIG SHIPS PER DAY

### **VOLOS**

LESS GOOD AND FURTHER AWAY  
SMALLER PORTS AVAILABLE

- GOOD FOR AMMO SHIPS
- CANT TAKE BIG RORO

SECRET



# IMPLICATIONS FOR MOUNTING

## AVENUE 4

### BLACK SEA PORTS

- VARNA GOOD BUT LESS CAPACITY THAN SALONIKA

### TRAIN

- FROM GERMANY, SLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY AND
- ROMANIA (ROUTE PROVED TO SALONIKA)
- COULD TAKE 24 TRAINS PER DAY  
(.3 K LIMS EACH, OR 2 TO 3 SHIPS)
- CONSTRAINT WOULD BE AVAILABILITY OF ROLLING STOCK

SECRET



# SECRET AVENUES OF APPROACH





# WHEN

- FOR UK:
- FORCES NOT YET DEPLOYED ARE AT 30 DAYS NTM
- EQUIPMENT LOADING COULD BEGIN 15 DAYS FROM ORDER
- A CONTINGENT OF 40,000 REQUIRES 115 DAYS FROM ORDER TO ALL ARRIVED IN THEATRE IF:
  - shipping requisitioned by law
  - more arrival ports are used
  - requirements of other nations are ignored

SECRET



## CONCLUSIONS

- CAMPAIGN PLAN AND LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD DRIVE AVENUE SELECTION
- MULTINATIONAL STRATEGIC MOVE PLAN WILL DRIVE DEPLOYMENT TIME
- ANALYSIS NEEDED OF ENEMY DEGRADATION REQUIRED PRIOR TO GROUND CAMPAIGN
- IT CAN BE DONE

SECRET





Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

cc. JS  
JP  
AC  
JB

W. J. Arson  
28/4 - wait in  
Box 28/4

28 April 1999

f

Dean Philip

Montenegro

At this morning's DOP meeting, the Prime Minister asked for lines to take now and in the event of a Milosevic take-over of Montenegro, together with a draft message to President Djukanovic. I enclose drafts.  
...

Brian Donnelly is today in Sarajevo to meet the Serbian opposition leader, Djindjic. We hope that his meeting with Djukanovic can be set up very soon. The message has been drafted on the assumption that Mr Donnelly would be able to deliver it personally.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of members of DOP and to Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

Yours  
Andrew Patrick

(Andrew Patrick)  
Private Secretary

Philip Barton Esq OBE  
10 Downing Street



Typed up +  
put in box 28/4

SCANNED

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DJUKANOVIC

I am sending this message with Brian Donnelly as my Special Representative to Montenegro. I am delighted that, at this difficult and dangerous moment for you and for Montenegro, you have been able to make arrangements to meet him. I am also grateful to you for your letter of 26 April about Mr Knezevic. You will appreciate that this raises complex issues. I shall send you a fuller reply as soon as possible.

Our support for Montenegro and my personal admiration for your leadership remains undiminished. I understand your concern at NATO's campaign against Yugoslavia. We have seen to it that airstrikes against military targets in Montenegro have been kept to an absolute minimum. We shall continue to ensure that NATO takes Montenegro's interests fully into account. But it is for President Milosevic to take the decisions which can bring the campaign to an end.

I also recognise that the flow of refugees from Kosovo, together with economic sanctions against the FRY, are causing Montenegro additional pain. We are determined to compensate Montenegro for its losses. The European Union has already approved 13 meuro of budgetary support for Montenegro, and Britain is pressing for more assistance to be provided quickly. We also have other ideas for helping Montenegro's economy, which Brian Donnelly will discuss with you in greater detail.

I have asked Brian Donnelly to discuss with you all the options and to report to me personally on his return. We share your vision of the future of Montenegro and Yugoslavia and want to work with you in achieving it.

D M Landsman  
EAD, FCO

270 6384



## MONTENEGRO

### Line to take now

- Reports that Milosevic is continuing to destabilise the democratically elected and reformist government of President Djukanovic just demonstrate how far he will go to preserve his own power.
- Not content with ordering horrendous atrocities against countless Kosovo Albanians, Milosevic now turning on the people he calls the Serbs' brothers - the citizens of the FRY.
- The international community has underlined its support for democracy in Montenegro. Milosevic would be very foolish to take on Montenegro just when NATO is seriously degrading his military capability. Any move would have severe consequences.
- NATO is doing all it can to help Djukanovic by keeping airstrikes on Montenegro to a minimum. If Djukanovic were ousted, there would be no reason to show the same restraint. The VJ and installations in Montenegro would be liable to attack, as in Serbia.
- The EU has already pledged 13 meuros of new economic support for Djukanovic. We will continue to help in every way we can.
- Serb people should reflect urgently on what Milosevic is doing in their name. No future in modern Europe for a Yugoslavia under a man who behaves as Milosevic has. But we are ready at any time to stop our military campaign



and begin the task of reconstruction once there is a leadership in Belgrade which accepts our conditions and behaves like a responsible member of the international community.

(if pressed on how we would help if Montenegro were attacked, legal obstacles)

- NATO does not need to change its military objectives. We are already having a significant effect on Milosevic's military capability.

(independence)

- We have always supported the territorial integrity of the FRY. Djukanovic has not called for independence.  
Hypothetical question.

Line to take if Milosevic deposes Djukanovic

- Utterly condemn Milosevic's undemocratic takeover of Montenegro, which has so far valiantly resisted his perverted and destructive dictatorship. Pretexts for action clearly fabricated and entirely unacceptable.
- Demonstrates that his claims to be interested in a peaceful settlement in Kosovo are false. This is a man who wages war against his own citizens. Clear that NATO will have to continue action until he accepts the international community's demands.
- This strengthens our resolve even more to ensure that NATO prevails. Cannot stand by and let Milosevic use Montenegro to increase his callous acts against citizens of the FRY.



- Our clear goal is to see democracy restored in Montenegro, indeed to see democratic principles and values flourish throughout the FRY.

(IF DJUKANOVIC REMAINS IN MONTENEGRO AND DECLARES INDEPENDENCE, CALLS ON NATO TO JOIN IN COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE)

[Line would need to be agreed with Allies at the time. Would require policy and legal judgements about whether Montenegro fulfilled the conditions for statehood.]

(IF DJUKANOVIC GOES INTO EXILE AND CALLS FOR OUR SUPPORT)

[Ditto, though in this case it would be less likely that Montenegro could fulfil the criteria for statehood.]



covering RESTRICTED



Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

28 April 1999

London SW1A 2AH

GBs - (T)

*by fax?*

*cc: SS  
JP  
Pam*

*Dear Philip*

Reply from the Prime Minister to Prime Minister Georgievski  
of Macedonia

Prime Minister Georgievski of Macedonia wrote to the Prime Minister on 22 April about Macedonia's "ranking" in the Washington NATO Summit Communique.

...

I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister in the form of a telegram to post. As the Prime Minister plans to visit Macedonia next week, we would ideally like to issue the message as soon as possible.

*Yours ever*

*Andrew Patrick*

(Andrew Patrick)  
Private Secretary

Philip Barton Esq OBE  
10 Downing Street

covering RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

FM CO

TO IMMEDIATE SKOPJE

TELNO

OF 280936Z APRIL 99

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, MODUK, CABINET OFFICE

SIC

SUBJECT: MACEDONIA/NATO: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

SUMMARY

1. Instructions to deliver a message from the Prime Minister to Georgievski.

DETAIL

2. Please arrange for the following message from the Prime Minister to be delivered to Georgievski. There will be no (no) signed original.

BEGINS

Thank you for your letter of 22 April.

I am glad that I had the opportunity to meet President Gligorov, Aleksandar Dimitrov and Nikola Kljusev at the Washington Summit on 25 April in order to express my appreciation for all Macedonia is doing in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. */twt*

Let me reassure you that the order in which the Summit Communique mentions the countries interested in NATO membership is in no way a ranking of those countries. The Alliance is committed to taking in new members and to providing advice and practical assistance to help Macedonia and other countries interested in Alliance membership through the new Membership Action Plan which we announced in Washington.

We also declared in Washington our intention to establish a consultative security forum to bring together the countries of South Eastern Europe and NATO in order to enhance security for all the



countries in the region.

You are right to point out that Macedonia has given NATO enormous support. I am particularly grateful for all you have done to make UK Forces welcome in Macedonia.

that

many

I am looking forward very much to seeing you in Skopje on 30 May. That will be an important opportunity to discuss the full range of issues with you, and to see for myself the burden that Macedonia is carrying in this crisis.

ENDS

COOK

YYYY

YUGOSLAVIA MAIN


SARA HUNT EAD: 270 1414


NNNN

As you will know, I plan to visit Macedonia at the beginning of next week.

I want





DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <u>PREM 49</u> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <u>785</u> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract details:  <u>Letter dated 28 April 1997</u>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	 <u>29/07/22</u>
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**DFID** Department for  
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94 Victoria Street, London SW1E 5JL

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*From the Private Secretary*

John Sawers Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1A 2AA

28 April 1999

Dear John,

cc JPd  
Sawers  
PB  
AC

## **KOSOVO REFUGEE RETURN: QUINT MEETING**

### Summary

Further Quint meeting in Washington shows still only UK and US thinking seriously about handling refugee return. DFID will circulate list of key actions needed to get planning process moving.

### Detail

The German Development Minister hosted a further Quint meeting in Washington yesterday in the margins of the Spring Meetings of the World Bank and IMF. Most of the interventions dealt with either the present humanitarian position or longer-term reconstruction and economic development. All Ministers welcomed the UK paper from the 22 April meeting and believed that others should now be involved in these discussions. The Germans agreed to organise follow-up meetings. But only the UK and US interventions had any sense of urgency. Not surprisingly, the US stressed the need for coordination with NATO.

At the World Bank/IMF meeting yesterday to discuss Kosovo (UKDEL IMF/IBRD Teln 115), UNHCR said they were starting to plan for refugee return. But we have seen no details and know that they are still struggling to meet present demands. We have made further offers to strengthen their capacity very significantly. If taken up, this should help ensure adequate preparation. Rod Lyne is pursuing this urgently with Mrs Ogata.

John Vereker's group will report further on follow-up, as requested in Philip Barton's letter of 25 April. We need to keep pushing forward, though we are alive to the danger of diverting essential staff from their present humanitarian tasks. We are drawing up a list of the key actions which are needed to get the planning process moving.

I am copying this letter to Sherard Cowper-Coles



I am copying this letter to Sherard Cowper-Coles (FCO), Tom McKane (MOD), Tom Scholar (Treasury), Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office) and Roderic Lyne (UKMIS Geneva).

Yours Sincerely,  
AS

AS Anthony Smith  
Private Secretary



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*P. L.*  
*Sc. Colbr*  
*me.*  
**FAKED**  
*T. au 29/4/99*

From the Private Secretary

28 April 1999

*Dear Sheraz,*

**RUSSIAN PEACE EFFORTS ON KOSOVO:  
TALK WITH THE SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER**

The Prime Minister of Sweden telephoned the Prime Minister this afternoon to report on his visit to Moscow, where he talked to Chernomyrdin and Primakov about Kosovo. Persson said he had told the Russians that NATO was united and they should not try to look for divisions. Even Sweden 'understood' the need for the bombing. He had stressed the two points the Prime Minister had put to him in Washington: that Serb forces must withdraw from Kosovo and an international force with a NATO core should deploy there.

Persson set out the Russian response. Chernomyrdin, whom he had found in good shape and very focused, had accepted the requirement for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and paramilitaries. He had been more reluctant about withdrawing all the special police and the border guards.

The Russian line on an international military force had varied during the talks. Chernomyrdin and Primakov had initially described as 'impossible' the inclusion of major NATO elements and had favoured instead contingents from some NATO countries such as Greece, Turkey and, possibly, the Netherlands. But Chernomyrdin had later commented that he could see in front of him a NATO-led force, with Russia as a participant.

Persson added that the Russians were extremely well aware of the potential for them to come back internationally by means of a resolution of the Kosovo issue. But at the same time, they saw Kosovo as a question of principle which could not be linked with the IMF negotiations. (There had been a hint that Primakov viewed an alleged tightening of IMF conditionality as being linked to the Kosovo issue.) The Russians had been particularly concerned of the possibility of Russian volunteers going to fight on the Serb side. On the politics, they were keen to avoid a solution which would encourage the emergence of

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Kosovo type problems in the former Soviet Union. Primakov also displayed his discomfort at having to turn around mid-Atlantic at the outset of the conflict and then being rebuffed by NATO after his peace mission to Belgrade.

The Prime Minister thanked Persson for this read out. He thought that if Russia came behind the West's essential demands, then the chance of Milosevic crumbling would increase. He strongly favoured a diplomatic solution, and the stronger and more united the international community the more likely we were to achieve it. But he was worried about what we would find in Kosovo when we were finally able to enter. Quite possibly, tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians had been killed, perhaps even more. Public opinion may well not countenance any deal with Milosevic once that was known.

Persson said that both Primakov and Chernomyrdin had distanced themselves from Milosevic; Chernomyrdin had even said that Milosevic deserved to be put on trial for war crimes in The Hague. Persson added that the Russians were convinced that the civilian damage caused by NATO bombing in the FRY was also worse than they believed. All these factors pointed to the need for an early settlement. It would have to be a negotiated one. Milosevic enjoyed firm support among the Serbs and if there was not a reasonable negotiation, he would be followed by someone similar or worse.

The Prime Minister reiterated that there could be no room for manoeuvre on the need to get Serb troops out and a NATO led force in. But there might be more flexibility on the constitutional questions. He was prepared to consider a range of measures to protect eg Serb religious sites, and he sympathised with the Russian concern not to create a precedent which would destabilise parts of the Former Soviet Union.

Finally, Persson said the Russians had taken careful note of the Washington statement's reference to the bombing ending once Milosevic started to withdraw troops. A willingness by NATO to offer a pause in the bombing campaign at the start of withdrawal of Serb forces would be important. The Prime Minister said he did not rule that out.

### Comment

This was quite a helpful read-out from Persson. During the course of the discussion, Persson encouraged the Prime Minister to thicken up his own contacts with the Russian leadership. We can do that by telephone in the next two weeks.




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- 3 -

But it would be helpful to have early advice on whether Chernomyrdin is likely to come to the UK, and the pros and cons of a visit by the Prime Minister to Moscow.

I am copying this letter to Tom McKane (Ministry of Defence), Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office), Roger Bone (Stockholm), Andrew Wood (Moscow) and to Christopher Meyer (Washington).

*John Sawers*  


JOHN SAWERS

Sherard Cowper-Coles Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE  
CONFIDENTIAL

to OVI  
29/4



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 April 1999

*Dear Stewart*

### KOSOVO: US/RUSSIAN TALKS

I spoke to Sandy Berger this evening to ask him how Strobe Talbott was getting on in Moscow.

Berger said there was some evidence of Russian movement towards our position, but it was not yet clear whether they would be able to move to our position. The Russians were now talking about an international military presence in Kosovo and had asked Talbott a series of questions, the most important of which were:

- what exactly did we mean by withdrawal of Serb forces?
- what would be the nature of an international military presence?
- what sequence of events would we envisage?
- what would be our position on constitutional issues/interim arrangements in Kosovo?

Talbott would be at NATO on 29 April to brief the NAC. Rather than posing these questions to the NAC without prior preparation, Berger said he would prefer to agree a common position among the four close allies. The US would work up a draft paper and send it out to myself, Steiner (Germany) and Levitte (France) with a view to trying to develop a common position, which we could then pass to Solana and support in the NAC. In due course, the process could lead to a meeting of the G8.

I agreed with the process Berger proposed: it would be very messy to take these issues straight to the NAC. We already had a clear position on the international military presence. On withdrawal of Serb forces, we were very hard-line, though some would argue that Serb border guards would have to remain in order not to pre-empt the constitutional issues. (I gave Berger a flavour of Persson's account of Russian thinking – see separate letter). Berger agreed we had to be very cautious on that. I said we had more flexibility to offer

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- 2 -

on constitutional issues. On sequencing, I thought we could envisage an agreed process involving an en clair order from Milosevic to his troops to withdraw and the beginnings of implementation after which we could agree to a pause in the bombing to allow that to be completed. Berger agreed that we had to find a middle way between waiting for the last Serb soldier to leave before stopping the bombing and doing so on the basis of a promise alone.

Berger promised to try to get me the US draft paper at the end of business Washington time on Thursday.


Berger and I agreed that we should not be under any illusion that the Serbs would accept what we and the Russians agreed to. Russia's capacity to move Milosevic was extremely limited. But there would be advantage in getting a common position in the G8, especially if that could lead to a UNSCR setting out our requirements.

Berger commented that during the ninety-minute Clinton/Yeltsin telephone call on Sunday, Yeltsin had seemed to have only two talking points: he wanted a pause in the bombing to allow for negotiation, and he wanted to reintroduce the Gore/Chernomyrdin Commission, no doubt in order to do down Primakov.

**Comment**

It would be very helpful to have agreed FCO/MOD/Cabinet Office views on the four main Russian questions to hand when Berger's paper arrives. The best way forward might be for Michael Pakenham to convene a meeting on Thursday afternoon or first thing Friday morning. I should like to attend myself, given that I may have to negotiate the outcome with Berger and co.

I am copying this letter to Tom McKane (Ministry of Defence), Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office) and to Christopher Meyer (Washington), Andrew Wood (Moscow) and John Goulden (UKDel NATO).

*Yours ever,*  


**JOHN SAWERS**

Sherard Cowper-Coles, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SECRET

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TOP- JS

From: Emyr Jones Parry

Date: 28 April 1999

cc: PS  
PS/Mr Lloyd  
PS/PUS  
Mr Manning  
Mr Gomersall  
Mr Donnelly  
Mr Phillips, EAD  
Mr Cresswell, WED  
Sir Michael Jay, Paris  
Sir John Goulden, UKDEL NATO  
Mr Sawers, No 10  
Gen Sir Charles Guthrie, CDS  
Dr Buckley, MOD

JB  
B  
AC

Mr Ricketts

#### KOSOVO

1. I have gone over the ground with Errera, particularly on the question of ground troops, taking account of the helpful Paris telno 458.

2. Errera was encouraged by Talbott's account of his discussions in Moscow. We should continue to press the Russians to accept our position, particularly on troop deployment, and work together for a UNSCR which would cover the terms of a settlement. I agreed, but pointed out that this was the optimistic scenario - troop deployment either in response to a settlement or on the basis of Milosevic's acceptance of an imposed UNSC outcome. Errera said that without Milosevic's approval, a UNSCR would be essential. Moreover, the French military did not recognise the concept of a semi-permissive environment.

3. Our discussion showed little difference between us on tactics, objectives and targetting. I stressed the need to reduce the micro-management of SACEUR. On ground troops, Errera argued for a continuation of present action. There could be no question of waging war on Serbia: Chirac and Jospin had made clear that there could be no opposed entry into Kosovo. Errera went on to criticise the British public line. It did no good to be so hard, and fuelled expectations and concern. Political and military objectives should be consistent. We should not give the impression that we were preparing to invade Kosovo and Serbia. Nor should we undermine the air campaign.

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4. I responded robustly. Unopposed entry assumed either a Milosevic capitulation or his acceptance of a UNSCR, in turn requiring prior Russian approval. On any basis that was optimistic. But we should also take account of the time-scales for deployment in the different scenarios which I set out. If we assumed that it would take a month before decisions could be taken to draw down forces, the earliest deployment was probably August. Following that through, we faced the prospect of needing to accommodate substantial numbers of displaced persons and refugees throughout the winter. This was the optimistic scenario. It made a compelling case for beginning planning now on ground force deployment. I said CDS would be in Paris tomorrow and would cover the ground with his French colleagues.

5. Errera was struck by these practical arguments and said that he would ensure Vedrine and the French CDS were briefed.

*Emyr Jones Parry*

Emyr Jones Parry  
Political Director

SECRET



From: John Sawers  
Date: 28 April 1999

PRIME MINISTER

cc: Jonathan Powell  
Alastair Campbell  
Philip Barton

## STRATEGY ON THE KLA

Foreign Office paper as requested.

We're in danger of being too sniffy. We do not want to favour the KLA politically over other Kosovar parties. But we have to reckon on the KLA becoming vastly more popular after what has happened, and recognise that they are the only party with an army of sorts.

Giving practical help for the KLA could:

- increase our targeting information inside Kosovo;
- help us work out ways to get aid to IDPs in Kosovo;
- give us leverage over the KLA and moderate their behaviour;
- reduce the burden on NATO ground troops when it comes to pushing Serb forces out.

We do not want the primary task of an international force in Kosovo to be disarming the KLA. The idea that they will disarm after the experience of the last months is ludicrous; we shouldn't set ourselves up for failure. The focus should be on working with them, towards our shared goals, which will include new elections.



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- 2 -

If you agree, we might also seek a minimalist interpretation of SCR 1160 (the arms embargo), asking Charlie Falconer to help with that, and find ways to provide non-lethal material, and to cooperate over IDPs. We should also seek early meetings with the leadership to offer them help, but make clear what we need from them in terms of respect for democratic process, avoidance of organised crime/drugs etc. (We used similar strategies with the ANC and the PLO in the 1970s and 80s, to good overall effect.)

Overall, our starting point in a conflict like this should be that your enemy's enemy is your friend. We can sort out our differences later.



JOHN SAWERS



## KOSOVO: STRATEGY ON THE KLA

## SUMMARY

Current policy is not to favour KLA but to encourage Kosovo Albanian political unity. KLA does contain unsavoury elements: KLA 'moderates' not yet put to test. SCR 1160 prevents arming/training. KLA goal remains independence: their strategy is to present themselves as NATO's ally. May be possible to use KLA to help IDPs, but they will use this to drive their agenda. Proposals for carrying forward our relationship with KLA should focus on intensifying political dialogue and working for a united Kosovo Albanian team to work with international community on preparations for transitional period.

## DETAIL

Current Policy

- We have to date been careful not to align ourselves with KLA. Do not support their goal (independence) or methods.
- We maintain dialogue with KLA as part of effort to encourage Kosovo Albanian political unity. We accepted Thaqi (KLA) as leader of Kosovo Albanian Rambouillet delegation. KLA have the guns, but the extent of real support for them among Kosovars is unclear. We have not "recognised" Thaqi government. We maintain contacts with LDK etc.
- KLA contains unsavoury elements: unreconstructed Marxists, hardline nationalists etc. Links to drugs/crime. Also potentially more flexible figures such as Thaqi/Krasniqi who could develop into politicians. But latter's freedom of action constrained by hardliners. And KLA Rambouillet team's commitment to moderation has not been put to the test.
- UNSCR 1160 forbids supply of arms and related material to the FRY, and arming and training for terrorist activities there.
- Rambouillet Accords envisage disarmament and demilitarisation of KLA by K+120.

KLA Goals and Strategy

- KLA goal remains independence for Kosovo, despite signature of Rambouillet Accords.
- KLA strategy is increasingly to present themselves as representative of Kosovo Albanians as a whole, and as natural ally of NATO. To the extent they succeed, post-settlement KLA disarmament/demilitarisation (necessary for stability of Kosovo and safety/effectiveness of international military force) will be harder.



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Arms Supplies?

- Russians highly suspicious that West (particularly US) already breaching SCR 1160 and supplying KLA. Americans have told us that US government and its agencies are not supplying arms and have no plans to do so (this leaves open a possibility that some non-governmental US activities may be going on in this area).

Humanitarian/helping the IDPs

- Already talking intensively to UCK contacts in N. Albania about conditions inside Kosovo. Also at political level to Thaqi etc.

- Cabinet Office currently looking at options for helping IDPs. One option would be to task the UCK to carry supplies in. The Albanian President has suggested there is scope for NATO/KLA co-ordination to create a humanitarian supply corridor. This looks unrealistic.

- KLA could syphon off supplies, or sell them to buy arms, or use them to enforce IDP compliance with their wishes. Already some reports that KLA are coercing refugees into joining them, or taking goods/equipment from them. No reason for confidence that all KLA would play fair with IDPs. Small amounts of supplies could get through, but would not be the whole answer.

- It may be possible to send IDPs radios via the KLA, which could be used to signal locations. But this could infringe UNSCR 1160. Radio beacons may be a better option. These options only make sense if we go for airdrops - which remain a risky option.

Carrying forward our relationship with the KLA:  
Recommendations

- We should continue to encourage Kosovo Albanian unity, and not to promote the KLA or any other one group/party.

- To this end, we should intensify our political dialogue with Thaqi and other KLA leaders, to encourage them to work with non-KLA Kosovo Albanians, but also to make it clear that we envisage a significant role for them in a post-settlement Kosovo - which carries serious responsibilities. Their rising popularity among Kosovo Albanians alone should mean greater success at the ballot box when elections are held. (Conversely, if they behave anti-democratically, they may lose support or even find themselves banned.)

- We should encourage KLA to accept our political approach ('Rambouillet plus' interim solution with robust international role/military force). Regional states (particularly Macedonia) could drop their support for the NATO campaign if they concluded we were backing Kosovo independence.

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- This message could be delivered by the Foreign Secretary's Special Envoy for the Balkans (Mr Donnelly in co-ordination with Hill and Petritsch). We should ~~also~~ (perhaps via the EU

✓ Presidency) work for a meeting of the three main Kosovo Albanian groupings (KLA, LDK, LBD). The aim would be to build a unified team to work with OSCE/NATO and others on preparations for the transitional period.

✓ S. 2000. 7. - We should continue to make it clear that there will be KLA disarmament/demobilisation post-settlement. An international military force will provide a security guarantee.

- We should discuss with key allies (initially with the Americans) how to ensure the KLA will contribute to rather than disrupt a transitional administration (retraining as local police etc).

- We should also encourage information flow between NATO and the KLA on eg location of IDPs/Serb forces, without crossing the UNSCR or presentational red lines. We need to be wary of accusations that NATO is acting as the KLA's airforce.

- Subject to decisions on airdrops, we should explore the possibility of using the KLA to deliver radios/radio beacons to IDPs, subject to further legal advice on whether this would infringe UNSCR 1160.

[Tom Phillips, EAD: 270-3013]

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*P. J.*

**From:** John Sawers  
**Date:** 28 April 1999

**PRIME MINISTER**

**cc:** Jonathan Powell  
Alastair Campbell  
Philip Barton

**MONTENEGRO**

FCO paper attached, together with a letter just received from Djukanovic.

The lines on political and economic support in the FCO paper make sense, and you might endorse them.

But FCO thinking on independence is fuzzy. Djukanovic won't declare independence while in office as that would provide the basis for pro-Milosevic forces to launch a coup - they out-gun by about 10-1 the forces under Djukanovic's control. If he declares independence after being overthrown it won't help either, as we couldn't recognise it if he wasn't actually in charge, and we couldn't reinstate him without a ground force invasion.

The ideal would be to reverse the imbalance of forces so that Djukanovic gained the upper hand militarily. But that is not likely to happen soon. So we are pushed back onto political and economic support, plus the clear threat that we would hit Serb forces in Montenegro doubly hard if he is overthrown - there are lots of high value targets which MOD are keen to hit.

The most important step the UK could take for Djukanovic would probably be to respond positively to his letter requesting we drop customs charges against his close colleague, Knezevic. I will press FCO/Customs for a sympathetic response.

*[Signature]*



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Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

Top-JS  
cc JLB  
PB  
AC  
Bup

27 April 1999

London SW1A 2AH

*Dear Philip*

Kosovo: Supporting Montenegro

... I attach a paper on options for supporting Montenegro, as background for tomorrow's DOP discussion (the Cabinet Office paper will include key points and recommendations culled from this paper).

I am copying this letter to Chris Deverell (Ministry of Defence) and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever  
Andrew Patrick*

(Andrew Patrick)  
Private Secretary

Philip Barton Esq OBE  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

## OPTIONS FOR FURTHER SUPPORT FOR MONTENEGRO

1. This note suggests: (a) how we can help Djukanovic now; and (b) how we could react if Milosevic moves decisively against Montenegro.

Assistance now

2. Keeping airstrikes against targets in Montenegro to the minimum remains a vital way of maintaining domestic support for Djukanovic. Politically, we should also:

*But not  
easy - LOC  
have to be cut  
Podgorica Airport  
remains  
v. active.*

- continue to use public statements to bolster Djukanovic and warn off Milosevic (but without devaluing the currency);

- emphasise that Montenegro has a firm place in our vision for post-conflict Balkans;

- follow US example (Gelbard) by sending a senior emissary (perhaps our former Ambassador to Belgrade) to see Djukanovic in the region.

3. Montenegro also needs urgent economic support, to compensate for conflict-related losses and burden of Kosovar refugees. Following Gelbard's recent meeting with Djukanovic, the US will be exploring a range of measures. We should press for:

- follow-up to the robust 26 April GAC conclusions to speed up disbursement of EU aid (13 meuro approved under Pillar I for refugee-related budgetary support) and to agree quickly a CFSP Joint Action to provide (modest) financial help as a further gesture of political support (acknowledging the difficulty of monitoring spending);

- Commission engagement with US on their initiative to find new markets for Montenegrin products; and to revisit possible extension of trade preferences to Montenegro (difficult, as Montenegro is part of the FRY, and with the need to avoid leakage to Serbia, but it may still be possible to do something);

- US/French/German support for exploring with Croatia and (harder) Bosnia possible economic lifelines for Montenegro given the effective Serb blockade;



#### Contingency planning

4. Milosevic has so far eschewed an all-out attack on Djukanovic in favour of gradual efforts to undermine his control. This suggests that ousting Djukanovic may not be as easy as Milosevic might have hoped. Djukanovic has also behaved cautiously and does not appear to be contemplating a preemptive declaration of independence. But we need to consider our possible responses if Milosevic moved definitively against Montenegro. Milosevic has a range of options, including (broadly in ascending order of threat to Djukanovic):

- closing borders eg with Croatia and Bosnia (RS) and the Port of Bar, which would seriously weaken Montenegro's lifelines.
- attacking Kosovar refugees (and other minorities) in Montenegro, including with Serb and Montenegrin paramilitaries.
- using his supporters in Montenegro to provoke unrest and ultimately attacks on Montenegrin institutions/personalities.
- a declaration of Martial Law leading to a formal takeover.

5. While Montenegro remains part of the FRY, there would be no legal basis for intervention by third countries to reverse an internal coup. If Djukanovic declares independence, we would need to consider recognition of Montenegro provided it met our usual criteria, including having a government with effective control of its territory; we could then consider military action in collective self-defence of an independent Montenegro. But we should note that recognition would make it harder to resist an independent Kosovo. A more likely scenario is one in which Djukanovic leaves Montenegro and calls on our support from exile; in this case, we could give him strong political backing, but we would not have a legal basis for the use of force. Legal concerns notwithstanding, it is difficult to identify targets in Montenegro which NATO could usefully attack to support Djukanovic in circumstances short of a declaration of independence. The best option would be to extend targetting of lines of communication between Serbia and Montenegro which have a Kosovo-related justification.

#### Conclusion

6. We can offer continuing political and economic support (the latter will be particularly necessary to offset the EU oil embargo against the FRY). But if Milosevic goes for military options, our choices would be limited, particularly if Montenegro remains part of the FRY.



FILE

AOB



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*to all with attached*

From the Private Secretary

*cc: JS*

28 April 1999

*John Sawers*

### MONTENEGRO: MR RATKO KNEZEVIC

The Montenegrin Prime Minister, Mr Djukanovic, has written to the Prime Minister (copy attached), mainly about the case of Ratko Knezevic. The letter you are drafting will need to include a reference to Djukanovic's letter. The substantive reply will, of course, have to reflect the views of the various Government departments with an interest in this issue.

I should add that the State Department raised the Knezevic case with me when I was in Washington last week. Gelbard was very keen that Djukanovic should be able to use Knezevic as an international emissary on behalf of Montenegro (there are precious few able Montenegrins for such tasks). But Knezevic is unable to play such a role while he faces charges in the UK. Gelbard's strong wish was that we find a way to drop the charges.

In terms of providing practical support for Knezevic, I suspect this issue will be near the top of his list.

I am copying this letter to Tom Scholar (HM Treasury), Iain Macleod (Law Officers' Department), Tom McKane (Ministry of Defence) and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

*John Sawers*

JOHN SAWERS

Andrew Patrick, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



DA : MINISTAR. IND. POSLOVA RCG

N. TEL : +381 81 224670

28 Apr. 1999 10:36 P2



*Republika Crna Gora*  
*Predsjednik*

April 26, 1999

Top: JS  
ge: PB  
Ho  
AC17B

Dear Prime Minister,

Let me first express my appreciation for your profound understanding of the current situation in Montenegro and, in particular, my gratitude for the support that you have, in the present, extremely difficult circumstances, given to the leadership and the authorities of Montenegro in our efforts aimed at preserving peace and carrying on the reformist course. We have no dilemma that building a civil society based on democratic principles and the rule of law is the only path opening prospects for the future. On this path, which has never, I should say, been so brimful of numerous challenges and dangers, your continuing assistance is of utmost importance.

A particular reason for writing to you is, however, what has now become a delicate case of Mr. Ratko Knezevic, a Montenegrin citizen against whom there are pending proceedings of the UK Customs. Namely, Mr. Knezevic is charged with violating UK legislation relating to implementing the UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in regard of supplying, a couple of years ago, police uniforms and other equipment to the Montenegrin police.

Without questioning the need for respect of relevant international norms and regulations, I would, nevertheless, like to draw your attention to some circumstances which will, I hope, help towards a better understanding of the problem as a whole. This, in particular, as I understand, that the UK Customs have the authority to abandon the proceedings.

The Rt Hon Tony Blair MP  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1




Namely, an important segment of a comprehensive package of reforms that the Government of Montenegro initiated as early as in 1991 is the reform of the police and its transformation in conformity with the standards and practice of developed countries. This is, undoubtedly, still one of key issues in the process of democratic development in, I would say, all of the former Yugoslavia. In this regard I would like to stress that, at the time of supply of the police uniforms and equipment, it was very important to ensure conditions for clear distancing (including a visual distinction) in particular from those police forces in the territory of former Yugoslavia which were part of the war machine of nationalist regimes and were involved in serious human rights violations, especially during the war in Bosnia. Also, one should not underestimate the impact of this on the affirmation of the identity of a reformist policy of the Government of Montenegro, which carries an additional weight in the Balkan conditions.

I absolutely do not think that anyone, regardless of the level at which he discharges the affairs of the state, can or should be exonerated of responsibility for violating the law. Still, I believe I should bring to your attention the effort and contribution of Mr. Knezevic to the affirmation of a policy of peace, reform and partnership with the international community, while performing senior functions on behalf of the Government of Montenegro. I should add that Mr. Knezevic, among other duties, performed the duty of Head of the Trade Mission of Montenegro in Washington.

Finally, I would like to stress that a negative outcome of the proceedings pending against Mr. Knezevic would be used to further undermine the current Montenegrin policy, in particular under the present circumstances, when the propaganda and war machinery of the Belgrade regime are making use of all the means available in order to overthrow the democratically elected government in Montenegro.

I hope that the above facts provide grounds for considering abandonment of the UK Customs proceedings against Ratko Knezevic and I most kindly request your support and assistance.

Your sincerely,



Milo Djukanović





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WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5/5/1M(4 annex)

28<sup>th</sup> April 1999

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JP  
PB  
AC.

File  
Jr

Dear John,

**KOSOVO – TARGETING**

I am writing to confirm that earlier today the Defence Secretary approved a military radio communications site in Belgrade (BE 0251CA0291) for attack tonight by a single TLAM fired from HMS SPLENDID. The likely collateral damage is assessed to be high with low civilian and military casualties. You advised me that the Prime Minister would be content.

Yours,  
Jan

(T C McKANE)  
Private Secretary

John Sawers Esq CMG  
No 10 Downing Street

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Recycled Paper



FILE

AOB



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

to add - with  
attachedSUBJECT  
MASTER

Filed on 28 April 1999

From the Private Secretary

Dear Andrew,

**MONTENEGRO: MR RATKO KNEZEVIC**

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Yours ever,

**JOHN SAWERS**

Andrew Patrick, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



DA : MINISTAR. INO. POSLOVA RCG

N. TEL : +381 81 224670

28 Apr. 1999 10:36 P2



*Republika Crna Gora*  
*Predsjednik*

Top: JS  
cc: PB  
Jfo  
AC/7B

April 26, 1999

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./.

The Rt Hon Tony Blair MP  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1




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Your sincerely,



Milo Djukanović



  
JOHN SAWERS

JP

## KOSOVAR REFUGEES: WEDNESDAY 28 APRIL

SUMMARY

In general, the refugee situation is stable although a steady stream continues to cross the border. Camps in Macedonia full, but new site at Cegrane will help. UNHCR behind in their strategic planning for a worst case scenario. Next batch of refugees will arrive in the UK tomorrow. Thereafter, up to three flights a week beginning 10 May.

- MACEDONIA There is still a steady flow of refugees crossing the border. Existing camps are at full capacity although the situation should be alleviated when the new site at Cegrane comes on stream at the end of this week. At present, about 1,500 refugees are being evacuated by air from Macedonia each day.
- ALBANIA Refugees continue to trickle into Albania. The numbers in the Kukes area are reducing steadily, now helped by the fact that the Albanians are permitting refugees to drive south in their own tractors. Under present conditions, all the remaining refugees in the border area should have been moved to southern Albania and provided with shelter by the end of May. UNHCR is thinking hard about camp security, which remains a problem.
- UNHCR DFID has been in touch with the UNHCR about their planning for a worst case scenario. It is clear that, as yet, they do not have a credible plan for responding to a huge outflow of refugees over a short period. DFID has now made a firm offer to provide expert assistance with the UNHCR's contingency planning exercise.
- KOSOVO DFID remains in contact with the ICRC about the possibility of re-establishing a presence in Kosovo, and will pursue with them the idea of doing so in Pristina.
- EVACUATION TO THE UK There are no emerging problems with the refugees which arrived on Sunday. The next batch will arrive at East Midlands at lunchtime tomorrow. Thereafter, UNHCR has told us not to expect any next week, but to be ready to be take three flights in each of the following two weeks. There are no urgent medical evacuation cases in the pipeline, but MOD remains at 24 hours notice to airlift out high priority patients. The Home Office, in conjunction with DFID, has taken steps to ensure that we get our message across about the overall contribution which the UK has made in responding to the refugee crisis.

N. Gibbons

pp

BARRIE IRETON

28 April 1999





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

**STEPHEN WARD**  
**MINISTER OF STATE'S OFFICE**

---

**KOSOVO: VIEWS OF EX-KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE**

The Prime Minister has seen your minute to me of 27 April reporting Lord Janner's call on Lord Falconer to pass on King Constantine's view of the crisis in Kosovo. The Prime Minister is content for Lord Falconer to see King Constantine on his behalf.

I am copying this minute to Andrew Patrick (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

*Philip Barton*

**PHILIP BARTON**

28 April 1999

H





Minister of State  
Cabinet Office

Prime Minister

It would be useful for someone to see Constantine to try to set him straight. I assume you would be content for Charles to take this on? ✓ Philip

PHILIP BARTON

c: PS/Sir John Kerr 27/4

From: STEPHEN WARD  
APS/Lord Falconer  
Room 308, 70 Whitehall  
Tel: 270 0012  
Fax: 270 1257  
Date: 27 April 1999

44.3/6  
JS  
AC/JSB

### KOSOVO - VIEWS OF EX-KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE

At the suggestion of Sir John Kerr, Lord Janner visited Lord Falconer yesterday to pass on King Constantine's view of the crisis in Kosovo after they met at a reception on Monday.

King Constantine had expressed the view that NATO was the creator of the disaster in Kosovo. The Alliance's actions had given Milosevic the excuse and the opportunity for the ethnic cleansing and the Yugoslav public had now rallied round him. The introduction of troops would compound the disaster. King Constantine believed that NATO ground troops would suffer same fate as the Germans: the Serbs would attack them from the mountains.

King Constantine had said that Macedonians were hostile to the influx of Albanians into their country. Greece was the likely launch pad for ground troops to enter Kosovo and this would cause further unrest in Greece. NATO needed to make a gesture to counter the strong growth of anti-US feeling in the Balkans. King Constantine believed that NATO would have to deal with Milosevic, probably at a conference in Russia.

Lord Janner suggested that the Prime Minister should meet King Constantine. However, Lord Falconer suggests that this is not necessary and is prepared to see him himself, if the Prime Minister is content for him to do so.

Stephen Ward

STEPHEN WARD

yes





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 April 1999

*Dear Hilary,*

**KOSOVO: EVACUATION OF REFUGEES TO THE  
UNITED KINGDOM**

The Prime Minister was grateful for the Home Secretary's note of 27 April. The issue was raised at DOP this morning.

The Prime Minister is content with the plan put forward by the Home Secretary. He thinks it makes sense for us to adjust our public line to say that we are going to take more refugees from Kosovo and that the figure will run into thousands over the coming weeks (assuming that is the case).

I am copying this to Anthony Smith (Department for International Development), Andrew Patrick (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

**JOHN SAWERS**

Ms Hilary Jackson  
Home Office





*Prime Minister*

Top JS  
cc JFO  
PB  
AC

Prime Minister

### KOSOVO: EVACUATION OF REFUGEES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

You asked for a note on the United Kingdom response to the evacuation of refugees from Macedonia and other neighbouring countries.

2. The starting point is the policy which we agreed before my attendance at the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 7 April. That is that the overwhelming majority of evacuees will need to be looked after in the region so that they will be able more readily to return to their homes in Kosovo once the conflict is over. This is also the policy we have agreed with our European partners. We have, nonetheless, made it clear that we are willing and ready to accept some thousands of refugees from the region as a temporary measure. You may recall that I raised the possibility of saying, if we were pressed, that we would take up to 20,000 refugees. You preferred not to put a figure on the number we were prepared to take. I followed this line and, through an alliance with the French, managed to persuade the Council to adopt our approach. Your Private Secretary's letter of today records that you remain in favour of this policy.

3. We have said that we will accept refugees in response to requests by UNHCR on the basis of criteria agreed with them. Those criteria are:

- that the evacuation should be entirely voluntary;
- that family unity should be respected;
- that priority should be given the most vulnerable and to those with special needs;
- that consideration should be given to links with the country of evacuation; and
- refugees being medically fit to travel.



4. The first request from UNHCR to the United Kingdom to take refugees was received on 19 April. With your agreement we responded within an hour and the first planeload of refugees arrived in the country last Sunday afternoon. I can tell you now that the second planeload will arrive at East Midlands airport on this Thursday afternoon. We expect that it will be carrying a similar number of people, around 160, to the one which arrived a few days ago. Evacuees arriving in the United Kingdom under the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme will be granted permission to enter in line with close family members already in the United Kingdom, or will be given exceptional leave to remain for 12 months. This status provides access to the benefits system and the right to work.
5. I have asked the Refugee Council to take the lead in putting in place a special reception service for refugees arriving under this programme. Excellent arrangements had been made for the arrival of the refugees in Leeds/Bradford by the public services and by the voluntary organisations. This very successful operation received positive coverage in the media. The Refugee Council with its partner agencies (Refugee Action, Red Cross and Scottish Refugee Council) are identifying further accommodation across the United Kingdom, and we will be ready to respond to further recommendations for evacuations from UNHCR.
6. UNHCR have indicated that they will be making such recommendations. In order to facilitate the selection of further refugees on the basis of the agreed criteria, my Department is making arrangements to send a number of staff to work alongside UNHCR in the refugee camps and in the Embassy in Skopje. I will also be writing to you within the next day or so to seek agreement to the rhythm of flights which we should be aiming for, particularly once the Home Office team is in place.
7. On media handling, we have a strategy, agreed by the Cabinet Office and Verreker co-ordinating groups, which reflects policy aims and objectives, namely that the primary aim of the Government and UNHCR is to care for refugees in the region and that we will, and are, responding positively to requests to accept evacuees on a temporary basis.
8. This policy has been underlined at every opportunity, in press statements, briefings, media interviews and articles which have been prepared for use by national and regional media.
9. More specifically we have an agreed, detailed media handling plan to accommodate individual arrivals of evacuees to locations around the country. This was put into good effect at the weekend when the first Kosovans arrived at Leeds Bradford Airport.



10. As agreed, we have deliberately stayed away from committing ourselves to the unhelpful and meaningless numbers or quota game and, as opposed to some EU countries, have not set arbitrary targets or limits.

11. The numbers issue will of, its own accord, diminish as more and more people are airlifted to the United Kingdom. What will become more important will be our ability to maintain local public support in the areas accommodating evacuees.

12. To this end we are actively pursuing a steady flow of 'good news' local stories demonstrating community support and backing for the evacuees. This activity, generated by regional COI and co-ordinated by my press office, should be supported by Ministerial visits when good opportunities arise.

*John Row*

27 April 1999

*John - I'm sure but shouldn't we say  
we are going to take more & that the  
figure will run into thousands - if  
that is indeed the case.*





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

JC JB  
AC  
PB

From the Private Secretary

28 April 1999

Dear Sherard,

### KOSOVO: CZECH POSITION

Thank you for your draft letter from the Prime Minister to Lady Thatcher urging that she speak to the Czech Opposition leader, Vaclav Havel. In the event, the Prime Minister raised this issue in a telephone conversation with Lady Thatcher yesterday. She agreed immediately to speak to Havel.

It would be helpful to know if our Embassy in Prague picks up any reverberations from the Thatcher/Havel exchange.

Yours ever,

JOHN SAWERS

Sherard Cowper-Coles, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

14



① CL  
To Sean  
② FA/PS



✓ COS  
FA/APS  
AC/JSB

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

26 April 1999

London SW1A 2AH

*Sawers.*

*Dear John,*

Draft Letter from the Prime Minister to Lady Thatcher

... I attach a draft letter from the Prime Minister to Lady Thatcher, suggesting that the latter approach the Czech opposition leader about his lack of support for NATO operations in Kosovo.

The Foreign Secretary discussed this draft with the Prime Minister on the aircraft back from Washington overnight, and the Prime Minister said he was content with it, and that we should forward it to you.

*Yours ever,  
Sherard*

(Sherard Cowper-Coles)  
Principal Private Secretary

John Sawers  
10 Downing Street

SKP 26/4/99



for PM sig.

SCANNED

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO LADY THATCHER

I am concerned that support in the Czech Republic for what we are trying to do in Kosovo is not as strong as it should be.

At the NATO Summit this week, Vaclav Haval and others told me how a majority of Czechs were opposed to the NATO operation. This is worrying in a new member of the Alliance.

I want to do what I can to shore up support in the Czech Republic, and to minimise the difficulties which the Government faces over the NATO operation. One way of helping would be to reduce the pressure on the Government from the Czech opposition, led by Vaclav Klaus.

I wonder whether you would be prepared to use your links with Klaus, by speaking to him and explaining why the NATO operation, and a NATO victory, are both absolutely essential.

LG on file



AU + Bd 37

**UPDATE BRIEFING FROM DFID # 34 28 APRIL 1999****Key Developments**

- 2,200 new arrivals reported in Macedonia on 27 April
- UNHCR reports that the 3,500 arrivals there on 26 April had left camps seriously overcrowded

**New DFID Decisions**

- Radio 21 (formerly based in Pristina): \$150,000 to re-establish its staff and network of correspondents to begin production of news and information for Kosovar refugee population in the states surrounding Kosovo.

**Consolidated refugee figures from UNHCR**

New figures were not available at the time of compiling this update

COUNTRY	Total	Change since last update
Albania	365,500	
Macedonia	138,750	
Montenegro	63,800	
Bosnia	35,500	
Turkey	4,920	
Croatia	190	
Germany	10,000*	
Iceland	20	
Israel	100	
Norway	1,420	
Poland	630	
Belgium	680	
France	1040	
Switzerland	30*	
Austria	640	
Netherlands	600	
United Kingdom	160	
Spain	100	
Sweden	290	
Finland	160	
<b>RUNNING TOTAL</b>	<b>624,520</b>	

\* represents recent airlifts, not country totals

**Other refugee / IDP figures:**

Serbian government reports 50,000 refugees from Kosovo (unconfirmed). According to UNHCR in early 1999, the FRY was host to over 500,000 refugees from the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. According to ECMM the Montenegro government claims over 100,000 refugees - this figure includes refugees from the Bosnian and Croatian conflicts.

UNHCR note that 16,000 Sandjak Muslims have fled to Bosnia (included above). Bosnia also hosts 30,000 Croatian Serbs (not included).

Greece estimates 3,000 Kosovar refugees.

The German Government hosts approximately 170,000 Kosovars who arrived between 1995 and March 1999.



## Country updates

### Macedonia

Blace transit camp is at full capacity (2,500).

The need for children's schools in the camps remains. UNICEF chaired an education co-ordination meeting with interested agencies on 26 April. A new UNICEF supported school has been opened in Radusa camp and one is due to start in Bojane. Space for classrooms continues to be a critical problem in the over-crowded camps.

WHO are working on an epidemic preparedness plan with key medical NGOs.

### Albania

UNHCR reports that the government has changed policy on allowing refugees to drive tractors south. About 600 tractors have left Kukes so far. In order to encourage people to move south, UNHCR is organising recce visits by refugee elders and leaders by helicopter.

A humanitarian Information centre has been established in Tirana to try to improve co-ordination between NGOs, UNHCR and the Albanian Government. Around 100 NGOs are operating in Albania, which makes co-ordination difficult.

Shelters with a capacity of 55,500 are now available, and shelters to accommodate some 164,000 are under construction. The eventual planned total is 232,500 of which 154,700 are in tented camps. DFID field office staff continue to recce new sites.

Road congestion at Durres continues to delay entry and exit. The government is stationing Humanitarian Aid Commission officials permanently at the port to ensure tax-free import of humanitarian goods.

DFID assisted Radio Tirana programme "In the name of humanitarianism" has begun broadcasting. It includes news and a magazine section, topics include items on tracing and movement away from Kukes.

The Red Cross reports a huge demand for its phone services. There are two fixed phones, and two satellite phones are being taken to camps daily around Kukes.

This brief is prepared daily by the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) of the Department for International Development (DFID)

CHAD Hotline (during working hours) is 0171-917-0348 (fax 0171-917-0502)

The CHAD contact number (outside working hours) is 0171-917-0073 (fax 0171-917-0502)

Media enquiries should be made to DFID Press Office  
0171 917 0600 (24 hrs.)



**UNCLASSIFIED**

**OPERATIONAL ALLIED FORCE - MEDIA MONITORING**

**DCMC MEDIA MONITORING LOG NO 203**

**Day 36 Wed 28th April 0700--1000**

**Summary - emerging themes**

Serbia reports Nato strikes on Surdulica, a town 200 miles south of Belgrade, and 16 civilians killed (including 11 children). Nato has issued a statement acknowledging that while it may have inadvertently caused the damage, it does not target civilians and civilian casualties are an inevitable outcome of war. The intended target was a military barracks.

2000 refugees have arrived in Kukes on the Albanian border since last night. Most are women and children, with reports of groups of young men being taken away by Serb police and gunshots heard. Consistent accounts, but no independent confirmation.

**Lines to consider**

Will the intensification of the air war result in more civilian casualties?

**News Items**

BBC news showed a short interview with George Robertson, reacting to the Serb report of civilian casualties in Surdulica. Mr Robertson regretted any civilian casualties but stated that whilst NATO makes every effort to avoid them, the Serbs deliberately target civilians; he confirms that the pressure will continue until the Kosovans can go home safely

George Robertson also confirmed reports of information on dissension within the Yugoslav armed forces


NATO estimates of damage after 35 days of bombing were reported as:

- 70 out of 450 Yugoslav combat aircraft destroyed
- 9 out of 17 military airfields damaged
- 5 out of 9 major Danube bridges destroyed
- All railway lines to Kosovo cut

CNN reported NATO spokesman, Jamie Shea, as saying that we should take Serb claims of the extent of civilian casualties in Surdulica with a dose of salts. They claim 400 non-combatants in total killed to date since the conflict began. NATO has admitted 3 previous mistakes: 5 died when a missile struck the town of Aleksinac; 30 died when a missile struck a train; and 64 died as result of an air raid on a convoy of refugees.

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 49</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>785</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
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OF 280752Z APRIL 99

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INFO IMMEDIATE 30 SIGREGTDET UKNIC, UKSC(G) RHEINDALEN

INFO IMMEDIATE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POSTS, ACTOR, WHIRL, SNUFFBOX

INFO IMMEDIATE UKNIC SARAJEVO, KIEV, MINSK, BAKU, TBILISI

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PJHQUK FOR J5 POL/OPS, HQ MND(SW) FOR POLAD

UKNMR PERSONAL FOR DSACEUR, UKNMR AND D/POLAD TO SACEUR

30SIGREGTDET FOR POLAD AND COL EVERSON

MODUK BALKANS DIRECTORATE FOR BALKANS SECRETARIAT

UKNIC SARAJEVO FOR DCOMOPS

NOT FOR EU PARTNERS

SUBJECT: RUSSIA: KOSOVO: TALBOTT

SUMMARY

1. Chernomyrdin looking for room for manoeuvre in a renewed attempt to put pressure on Milosevic.

DETAIL

2. Talbott saw Ivanov and Chernomyrdin on 27 April, and spoke to the head of the Presidential Administration (Voloshin) as well as to Primakov, in the latter case by telephone. His substantive discussions were with Ivanov and especially Chernomyrdin. Primakov spoke somewhat acerbically but also as a man not directly involved in the problem, rather as he did to the Swedish Prime Minister (FCO telno 48 to Stockholm). Voloshin was mostly in listening mode and not apparently informed as to the details. The main point both Primakov and Voloshin stressed was that bombing would have to stop before any progress could be made (also the main theme of Chirac's hour long discussion with Yeltsin on 26 April).

3. According to the US Ambassador (who asked that this debrief be closely held), Ivanov concentrated on the nature of a post-conflict regime for Kosovo. He regarded as important Talbott's assurance that NATO remained committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, while achieving a broad and secure measure of autonomy for Kosovo. He appeared to be reaching for some kind of document, not necessarily a Security Council Resolution, which would agree a timetable and the means of implementing the general principles we had in common. He particularly stressed that Russia did not want Kosovo to become a permanent protectorate or ward of the international community, as had happened over Bosnia. But he had no concrete proposals to offer as to how this would be prevented.

4. Ivanov and especially Chernomyrdin were also concerned to discuss the nature of the international security force that would have to be introduced to underpin any settlement. Talbott insisted (and Chernomyrdin seemed to take the point on board, although Ivanov was more resistant) that a NATO core was an essential part of the deal. This was not because NATO wanted to take on an unwelcome

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share of the responsibility but because anything else would prevent the return of the Kosovars, yet risk the perverse result of allowing the KLA to re-establish itself and thereby ensure continued fighting. Chernomyrdin insisted that Milosevic had agreed in Belgrade to an international military presence. Its composition was now the issue.

5. Chernomyrdin was, secondly, after a clear understanding of the NATO position over what it would take for the bombing to stop. Neither he nor Ivanov pressed the idea that without a pause in the bombing, no progress could be made. Chernomyrdin's apparent aim was to prepare himself to speak further to Milosevic. Talbott stressed that Milosevic would have to be clear that bombing would start again if he did not fulfil any commitments he might make. Others of Talbott's interlocutors were apparently less pragmatic than Chernomyrdin who probed on the details underlining the NATO Washington Statement. Which Serbs, for example, would have to withdraw - all of them? He would have to be able to answer Milosevic when the Serb asked what will be left of Serb Sovereignty in the event of a settlement? Who would be in charge of the borders? And the local police?

6. The US Ambassador described Chernomyrdin's questions as part of an attempt to discover what, if anything, he had to work with, on Milosevic. Chernomyrdin said that we had to avoid a situation whereby Albanian forces would simply replace the withdrawn Serbs. Talbott assured him that disarming the Albanian side would be part of the package.

7. The overall sense of the meeting was that Chernomyrdin was raising questions because he saw it as his task to persuade Milosevic to buy into a solution, rather than because he wished to press the public Russian position. He, like Ivanov, underlined our general agreement with the Russians on the broad principles to underpin a settlement. Chernomyrdin attached value to Talbott's assurance that it was not our war aim to remove Milosevic, and that we were willing to reach a settlement with him once he was prepared credibly to accept the principles we had declared. Ivanov had left the strong impression that he hoped that enough of an outline could be in place over the next few days to enable the Russians to review the position and to decide where to go next. He, like Chernomyrdin, seemed to accept that any approach to the Security Council would have to be pre-cooked with us.

8. Chernomyrdin was vague as to his future plans. He wanted to return to Belgrade once he had something approaching a package (though not necessarily in closely defined form) which might help to move Milosevic. He was particularly interested in what we might mean, or be prepared to offer, to help the process of economic recovery, including in Serbia. He would be seeing Papandreou, Annan and the German Defence Minister. Talbott for his part agreed to keep in close contact. He was prepared to come back at any time. But no firm plans or dates were agreed. A wider Ministerial meeting was not to be ruled out.

WOOD

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FM ABU DHABI  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 77  
OF 280925Z APRIL 99  
AND TO PRIORITY MODUK  
INFO PRIORITY DIFID, TIRANA, UKDEL NATO, GULF POSTS

SIC: ACA/B6J/ZAC/EAD

MODUK FOR DMO, SEC(O), DOMA

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: UAE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

SUMMARY

1.Details of UAE interest in deeper military involvement in Albania and Kosovo.

DETAIL

2.When I took a delegation of visiting Members of Parliament to call on the UAE Chief of Staff, Shaikh Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ), he was asked to describe what the UAE were contributing to the humanitarian relief effort in Albania. MBZ said that they had just received permission from the Albanian authorities to rebuild the airstrip at Kukes. Work would start immediately. They were sending four or five Puma helicopters and were constructing a 400-bed field hospital. They intended to construct a relief camp to hold 10,000 and hoped to build a second for 5,000, possibly 10,000, near Tirana.

3.MBZ went on to say that the UAE had offered to the United States to send 8 to 12 Apache helicopters to Albania. They were also discussing with the United States, France and the British MOD participation in a peacekeeping force and the possibility of contributing troops to peace enforcement operations.

COMMENT

4.MBZ said that the UAE wish to commit troops to Kosovo relief went back 3 months when Shaikh Zayed had called for a map and instructed MBZ to make plans. MBZ is making no secret of his keenness that UAE forces should be as fully involved as possible in the NATO operation. This is already becoming known around Abu Dhabi.

NIXON

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FM SOFIA  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TELNO 103  
OF 280920Z APRIL 99  
INFO ROUTINE SKOPJE, BUCHAREST, TIRANA, UKDEL NATO  
INFO ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS

SKOPJE TELNO 311  
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: GAC CONCLUSIONS

Summary

1. Thrust of TUR no doubt entirely right. But reference to Bulgaria largely wrong.

Detail

2. Mark Dickinson argues in TUR that Macedonia's contribution to resolving the Kosovo problem is far greater than that of Bulgaria and Romania. He is clearly 100 per cent right.

3. He also, however, states that "almost everybody agrees that objectively Macedonia's performance on democratisation, economic reform, level of economic development, minority rights etc is far in advance of Romania/Bulgaria". This is nonsense:

(a) Bulgaria has an effective democracy, tested successfully in four general elections since 1990.

(b) On economic reform, Bulgaria's efforts over the last two years have won warm praise from the IMF, World Bank, EBRD etc (see DFID telno 81 to Sofia - not to all).

(c) On minority rights, the Bulgarians have repaired the damage done by Zhivkov's policy of Bulgarisation and absorbed the Turkish minority into the political mainstream.

(d) Finally, economic development: our figures suggest Bulgarian per capita GDP is certainly higher than Macedonia's.

4. In a nutshell, Macedonia deserves far more credit than Bulgaria over Kosovo. It can get this, without diminishing the efforts of its neighbours in other areas.

STAGG

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FM PARIS  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 459  
OF 280555Z APRIL 99  
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, EU POSTS, OSCE POSTS  
INFO PRIORITY CENTRAL EUROPEAN POSTS

YOUR TELNO 341 TO WASHINGTON

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DATABASE OF TALKING HEADS: FRANCE

SUMMARY

1. Three French talking heads.

DETAIL

2. French media coverage of Kosovo tends to use fewer talking heads than ours or the US. Richard (Defence Minister) has apparently asked former generals not to turn up as armchair pundits. Among those pundits we have noted as taking a broadly supportive line, including of NATO action, are:

- Jack Lang, Culture Minister under Mitterrand. President of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee (an influential position here). Interested in New Labour and in Britain. Was sent by the French government to Macedonia and Albania to see the refugee camps. In this and other respects, therefore, in something of a Paddy Ashdown role in this crisis. Good English. Contact numbers:

- Francois Heisbourg: ubiquitous French and English-speaking pundit on strategic affairs. Well known to the UK pol-mil community. Currently working in an advisory capacity for the French Prime Minister's office studying strategic aspects of European defence restructuring. Although generally sound, too independent-minded to be relied upon to trot out any given NATO message. Likely to ask difficult questions as much as to give the "right" answers; Contact number:

- Daniel Cohn-Bendit: leader of the May 1968 student protest in Paris, now converted into a German/French political figure, leading the Green party's list for the European parliamentary elections. Has supported the moral case for NATO action, which has not been true of all his Green colleagues (for example the Environment Minister here). Charismatic and telegenic, but not necessarily a wholly convincing or controllable spokesman. May well argue, as the centre-left press does, that the corollary of the moral imperative to defeat Milosevic is the eventual need to deploy ground troops. Adequate English:

JAY

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 326

OF 280559Z APRIL 99

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INFO ROUTINE ACTOR, WHIRL, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA DIST POSTS

SIC A2P/I9F

PJHQ FOR J5 POL/OPS

UKNMR PERSONAL FOR DSACEUR AND D/POLAD TO SACEUR

MODAD BALKANS DIRECTORATE FOR BALKANS SECRETARIAT

30 SIGREGTDET UKNIC FOR POLAD AND COL EVERSON

UKNIC SARAJEVO FOR POLAD AND DCOMOPS

30 SIG REG COMBRITFOR G2 PLEASE PASS TO POLAD MR G DODDS

SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: TERRORIST ATTACK ON NATO TROOPS

SUMMARY

1. Grenade attack on French base at Kumanovo. No casualties.

DETAIL

2. Two hand-grenades were thrown into the logistics area of the French base at Kumanovo from a car last night at about 2030Z. There were no casualties and little damage.

3. While this obviously represents a new development, the surprise to me is that the Serbs did not - or were not able to - mark their National Day with anything more spectacular or effective. In terms of public opinion here it was probably helpful.

DICKINSON

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**RESTRICTED**  
**KOSOVO: DEMONSTRATION AT THESSALONIKI PORT**  
**From: ATHENS**

TO DESKBY 281730Z FCO  
TELNO 166  
OF 281653Z APRIL 99  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MODUK  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA, TIRANA, SKOPJE  
INFO IMMEDIATE SOFIA, SARAJEVO, ANKARA, ACTOR, WHIRL

SIC 2AP/I9F  
PJHQUK FOR J5 POL/OPS, HQMNSW FOR POLAD  
UKNMR PERSONAL FOR DSACEUR, UKNMR AND D/POL TO SACEUR  
30SIGREGDET FOR POLAD AND COL EVERSON  
MODUK FOR BALKANS SECRETARIAT

**SUMMARY**

1. Personnel and equipment of second British Battle Group en route to FYROM, assaulted and turned back by demonstrators at Thessaloniki port. Assurance from Secretary General of Ministry of Public Order of future police protection.

**DETAIL**

2. A train, conveying 31 light-armoured vehicles and their drivers of the second British Battle Group, was prevented from leaving Thessaloniki port area at 2.30 am today. The vehicles, recently disembarked from Sea Centurion, were en route for FYROM. Approximately 100 protestors, grouped immediately outside the port area, inflicted damage with paint and stones. At the request of local police, who did little to prevent the demonstration, the train returned to the port area. The police subsequently dispersed the crowd. We understand from our Defence Attache, who was in the port at the time and witnessed the incident, that while the demonstration was going on, another convoy of equipment successfully got out of the port by another route.

3. Despite efforts to maintain a low profile with regard to NATO traffic in Greece, our allies (French, Germans and Dutch) have all experienced problems in conveying troops and military equipment through Thessaloniki. It appears likely that port workers sympathize with the anti-NATO demonstrators. Railway workers are now threatening to strike in protest and to examine every allied load to ensure that no offensive weapons are inside. We can expect an intensification of action by dock/railway workers in the run-up to the 1 May holiday.

4. I called this afternoon on Efstathiades, Secretary General of the Ministry of Public Order (PUS Equivalent), to draw his attention to the incident. Following a lengthy phone-call with the Chief of the Thessaloniki Police, he gave assurance that future convoys through Thessaloniki would get the full cooperation and protection of the local police.

5. We will take further action with the MFA tomorrow to reinforce our points and to obtain further political assurances of Greek cooperation.

MILLETT

**Sent by ATHENS on 28-04-1999 16:53**



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**RUSSIA: KOSOVO: TALBOTT**  
**From: MOSCOW**



TO DESKBY 281030Z FCO  
 TELNO 501  
 OF 280752Z APRIL 99  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK, CABINET OFFICE, PJHQUK  
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKNMR SHAPE, HQMND SW BANJA LUKA, SKOPJE  
 INFO IMMEDIATE 30 SIGREGTDET UKNIC, UKSC(G) RHEINDALEN  
 INFO IMMEDIATE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POSTS, ACTOR, WHIRL, SNUFFBOX  
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKNIC SARAJEVO, KIEV, MINSK, BAKU, TBILISI

SIC A2P/I9F

PJHQUK FOR J5 POL/OPS, HQ MND(SW) FOR POLAD  
 UKNMR PERSONAL FOR DSACEUR, UKNMR AND D/POLAD TO SACEUR  
 30SIGREGTDET FOR POLAD AND COL EVERSON  
 MODUK BALKANS DIRECTORATE FOR BALKANS SECRETARIAT  
 UKNIC SARAJEVO FOR DCOMOPS

NOT FOR EU PARTNERS  
 SUMMARY

1. Chernomyrdin looking for room for manoeuvre in a renewed attempt to put pressure on Milosevic.

#### DETAIL

2. Talbott saw Ivanov and Chernomyrdin on 27 April, and spoke to the head of the Presidential Administration (Voloshin) as well as to Primakov, in the latter case by telephone. His substantive discussions were with Ivanov and especially Chernomyrdin. Primakov spoke somewhat acerbically but also as a man not directly involved in the problem, rather as he did to the Swedish Prime Minister (FCO teln 48 to Stockholm). Voloshin was mostly in listening mode and not apparently informed as to the details. The main point both Primakov and Voloshin stressed was that bombing would have to stop before any progress could be made (also the main theme of Chirac's hour long discussion with Yeltsin on 26 April).

3. According to the US Ambassador (who asked that this debrief be closely held), Ivanov concentrated on the nature of a post-conflict regime for Kosovo. He regarded as important Talbott's assurance that NATO remained committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, while achieving a broad and secure measure of autonomy for Kosovo. He appeared to be reaching for some kind of document, not necessarily a Security Council Resolution, which would agree a timetable and the means of implementing the general principles we had in common. He particularly stressed that Russia did not want Kosovo to become a permanent protectorate or ward of the international community, as had happened over Bosnia. But he had no concrete proposals to offer as to how this would be prevented.

4. Ivanov and especially Chernomyrdin were also concerned to discuss the nature of the international security force that would have to be introduced to underpin any settlement. Talbott insisted (and Chernomyrdin seemed to take the point on board, although Ivanov was more resistant) that a NATO core was an essential part of the deal. This was not because NATO wanted to take on an unwelcome share of the responsibility but because anything else would prevent the return of the Kosovars, yet risk the perverse result of allowing the KLA to re-establish itself and thereby ensure continued fighting. Chernomyrdin insisted that Milosevic had agreed in Belgrade to an international military presence. Its composition was



how the issue.



5. Chernomyrdin was, secondly, after a clear understanding of the NATO position over what it would take for the bombing to stop. Neither he nor Ivanov pressed the idea that without a pause in the bombing, no progress could be made. Chernomyrdin's apparent aim was to prepare himself to speak further to Milosevic. Talbott stressed that Milosevic would have to be clear that bombing would start again if he did not fulfil any commitments he might make. Others of Talbott's interlocutors were apparently less pragmatic than Chernomyrdin who probed on the details underlining the NATO Washington Statement. Which Serbs, for example, would have to withdraw - all of them? He would have to be able to answer Milosevic when the Serb asked what will be left of Serb Sovereignty in the event of a settlement? Who would be in charge of the borders? And the local police?

6. The US Ambassador described Chernomyrdin's questions as part of an attempt to discover what, if anything, he had to work with, on Milosevic. Chernomyrdin said that we had to avoid a situation whereby Albanian forces would simply replace the withdrawn Serbs. Talbott assured him that disarming the Albanian side would be part of the package.

7. The overall sense of the meeting was that Chernomyrdin was raising questions because he saw it as his task to persuade Milosevic to buy into a solution, rather than because he wished to press the public Russian position. He, like Ivanov, underlined our general agreement with the Russians on the broad principles to underpin a settlement. Chernomyrdin attached value to Talbott's assurance that it was not our war aim to remove Milosevic, and that we were willing to reach a settlement with him once he was prepared credibly to accept the principles we had declared. Ivanov had left the strong impression that he hoped that enough of an outline could be in place over the next few days to enable the Russians to review the position and to decide where to go next. He, like Chernomyrdin, seemed to accept that any approach to the Security Council would have to be pre-cooked with us.

8. Chernomyrdin was vague as to his future plans. He wanted to return to Belgrade once he had something approaching a package (though not necessarily in closely defined form) which might help to move Milosevic. He was particularly interested in what we might mean, or be prepared to offer, to help the process of economic recovery, including in Serbia. He would be seeing Papandreou, Annan and the German Defence Minister. Talbott for his part agreed to keep in close contact. He was prepared to come back at any time. But no firm plans or dates were agreed. A wider Ministerial meeting was not to be ruled out.

WOOD

Sent by MOSCOW on 28-04-1999 07:52  
Received by No10 on 28-04-1999 11:34



**RESTRICTED**  
**KOSOVO: FRENCH VIEWS ON GROUND TROOPS**  
**From: PARIS**

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 461  
OF 281500Z APRIL 99  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VIENNA, ACTOR, WHIRL, CABINET OFFICE, MODUK  
INFO IMMEDIATE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POSTS, PJHQUK, UKNMR SHAPE  
INFO IMMEDIATE HQ MND SW BANJA LUKA, 30 SIGREGTDET UKNIC  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKSC(G) RHEINDALEN, UKNIC SARAJEVO

NOT FOR EU PARTNERS

SIC A2P/19F

PJHQUK FOR J5 POL/OPS, HQMNSW FOR POLAD  
UKNMR PERSONAL FOR DSACEUR, UKNMR AND D/POLAD TO SACEUR  
30 SIGREGTDET FOR POLAD AND COL EVERSON  
MODUK FOR BALKANS SECRETARIAT  
UKNIC SARAJEVO FOR DCOMOPS

MY TELNO 457  
SUMMARY

1. Jospin talks up risks of ground intervention, of which UK is seen as the leading advocate. Albanian President in Paris.

**DETAIL**

2. Jospin's 27 April statement to Parliament confirmed the new French emphasis we have picked up from contacts (TUR) on the risks of a ground intervention. Main points:

- NATO is determined. Milosevic must concede;
- President and government extremely reserved about ground intervention. Heavy risks, for French soldiers and the local civilian population. War would have to be extended to Belgrade. Risk of wider regional conflict. Would throw off course West's relations with Russia;
- Parliament would be asked to authorise such a deployment;
- Jospin will visit Macedonia and Albania on 30 April/1 May.

3. The French press has identified HMG and the Prime Minister in particular as the leading Alliance hawk. Liberation of 28 April claims the UK was alone at Washington in not opposing intervention.

4. Chirac and Jospin both saw Mejdani on 27 April. Chirac praised Albania's generosity towards the refugees and promised EU help for Albania in "overcoming its present difficulties".

JAY

**Sent by PARIS on 28-04-1999 15:00**  
**Received by No10 on 28-04-1999 17:05**



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

Top-JS

cc JB  
PB  
AC  
Bup

27 April 1999

*pa*

*Dean Philip*

Kosovo: Supporting Montenegro

... I attach a paper on options for supporting Montenegro, as background for tomorrow's DOP discussion (the Cabinet Office paper will include key points and recommendations culled from this paper).

I am copying this letter to Chris Deverell (Ministry of Defence) and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever  
Andrew Patrick*

(Andrew Patrick)  
Private Secretary

Philip Barton Esq OBE  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

## OPTIONS FOR FURTHER SUPPORT FOR MONTENEGRO

1. This note suggests: (a) how we can help Djukanovic now; and (b) how we could react if Milosevic moves decisively against Montenegro.

Assistance now

2. Keeping airstrikes against targets in Montenegro to the minimum remains a vital way of maintaining domestic support for Djukanovic. Politically, we should also:

- continue to use public statements to bolster Djukanovic and warn off Milosevic (but without devaluing the currency);

- emphasise that Montenegro has a firm place in our vision for post-conflict Balkans;

- follow US example (Gelbard) by sending a senior emissary (perhaps our former Ambassador to Belgrade) to see Djukanovic in the region.

3. Montenegro also needs urgent economic support, to compensate for conflict-related losses and burden of Kosovar refugees. Following Gelbard's recent meeting with Djukanovic, the US will be exploring a range of measures. We should press for:

- follow-up to the robust 26 April GAC conclusions to speed up disbursement of EU aid (13 meuro approved under Pillar I for refugee-related budgetary support) and to agree quickly a CFSP Joint Action to provide (modest) financial help as a further gesture of political support (acknowledging the difficulty of monitoring spending);

- Commission engagement with US on their initiative to find new markets for Montenegrin products; and to revisit possible extension of trade preferences to Montenegro (difficult, as Montenegro is part of the FRY, and with the need to avoid leakage to Serbia, but it may still be possible to do something);

- US/French/German support for exploring with Croatia and (harder) Bosnia possible economic lifelines for Montenegro given the effective Serb blockade;

But not  
easy - LOCs  
have to be cut,  
Podgorica Airport  
remains  
v. active.

I think we had seen  
Sandly



#### Contingency planning

4. Milosevic has so far eschewed an all-out attack on Djukanovic in favour of gradual efforts to undermine his control. This suggests that ousting Djukanovic may not be as easy as Milosevic might have hoped. Djukanovic has also behaved cautiously and does not appear to be contemplating a preemptive declaration of independence. But we need to consider our possible responses if Milosevic moved definitively against Montenegro. Milosevic has a range of options, including (broadly in ascending order of threat to Djukanovic):

- closing borders eg with Croatia and Bosnia (RS) and the Port of Bar, which would seriously weaken Montenegro's lifelines.
- attacking Kosovar refugees (and other minorities) in Montenegro, including with Serb and Montenegrin paramilitaries.
- using his supporters in Montenegro to provoke unrest and ultimately attacks on Montenegrin institutions/personalities.
- a declaration of Martial Law leading to a formal takeover.

5. While Montenegro remains part of the FRY, there would be no legal basis for intervention by third countries to reverse an internal coup. If Djukanovic declares independence, we would need to consider recognition of Montenegro provided it met our usual criteria, including having a government with effective control of its territory; we could then consider military action in collective self-defence of an independent Montenegro. But we should note that recognition would make it harder to resist an independent Kosovo. A more likely scenario is one in which Djukanovic leaves Montenegro and calls on our support from exile; in this case, we could give him strong political backing, but we would not have a legal basis for the use of force. Legal concerns notwithstanding, it is difficult to identify targets in Montenegro which NATO could usefully attack to support Djukanovic in circumstances short of a declaration of independence. The best option would be to extend targetting of lines of communication between Serbia and Montenegro which have a Kosovo-related justification.

#### Conclusion

6. We can offer continuing political and economic support (the latter will be particularly necessary to offset the EU oil embargo against the FRY). But if Milosevic goes for military options, our choices would be limited, particularly if Montenegro remains part of the FRY.





SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB AC

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

Top - JPo  
cc JS  
PB

943

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5/5/1K

27 April 1999

Dear Jonathan

**KOSOVO: FURTHER DETAILED COMMENT ON MR ASHDOWN'S VIEWS**

You should by now have received a letter from Tom McKane, enclosing a draft letter from the Prime Minister to Paddy Ashdown, in response to the latter's letter of 23 April.

As we discussed, I enclose a point by point commentary on Ashdown's letter. It was compiled at desk level here and in the FCO and is more forward leaning on a number of points than our public line. Nevertheless, I do not believe there is any security reason why the Prime Minister could not use any part of it in which he sees merit. However, you should note that the document as a whole is classified SECRET.

Yours ever  
Chris

(C M DEVERELL)  
Private Secretary

Jonathan Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

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Recycled Paper



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COMMENTARY ON ASHDOWN REPORT

Summary of Conclusions

2. It is said that we are winning this war. I have, as yet, seen no evidence for that and a great deal of evidence that Milosevic is not losing it. I am unable to say to what extent his forces have been damaged, especially on the ground in Kosovo – though I have a suspicion that this is less, and progressing less quickly than we like to believe.

(2) True that VJ and MUP operations not so far significantly impaired. But their sustainability has been degraded and deployed units in Kosovo are running very low on fuel. Restraints on Yugoslav forces imposed by Close Air Support are working to the benefit of the KLA. We believe that morale is beginning to suffer. However, the air campaign does need to be ratcheted up (better weather will help here) and the NATO strategic management needs to be improved. The UK is bringing influence to bear, but it is taking time.

3. What is clear, however, is that, after 30 days of war, we have yet to stop Milosevic taking any action that he wanted to take, or made him take any action that he did not want to take. He has retained the initiative in almost all areas. Describing his “peace overtures”, as signs of weakness are nonsense – they were always planned and widely predicted, not least by us. Similarly claims that his attempts to widen the conflict show he is under pressure is fanciful. He has not even begun to use the full capacity he has to disrupt our rear areas (he has not yet used terrorism against our bases, for instance) – which is one of the key aims of any successful war commander.

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(3) Accept that Milosevic retains tactical initiative on the ground in Kosovo. But he is being increasingly hampered, and he must now realise the strategic initiative lies with the Allies. Agree that his 'peace overtures' are not (yet) a sign of weakness – but they have been singularly unsuccessful. Lack of attempts to disrupt our rear areas may be an indication that he knows action would fail.

**4. Politics. Nevertheless, he is being successful at what he has already attempted. Hostility to NATO troops in Macedonia is rising, with regular and increasingly serious stoning of NATO soldiers and vehicles. The Macedonian Government, already fragile and getting more so, is demanding a higher price for supporting NATO. And in the key NATO supply port of Thessaloniki in Greece, feeling against NATO troops have caused orders to be recently issued that re-supply convoys should travel only at night.**

(4) Agree Macedonia under strain. Ministers have paid considerable attention to Macedonia. Washington meeting with Cook/Gligorov. Clare Short and Tony Lloyd have visited Macedonia recently. Further visits are in the pipeline. Agree need to show Macedonia its prospects for a close relationship with NATO improving; hence strong language in Washington summit declaration. Greece is cooperating with NATO: allowed second UK Battle Group to land at Thessaloniki this weekend.

**5. I am unable to gauge what damage we are doing to Milosevic's rear areas. But whereas political support in his rear areas appears to be, if anything hardening, political support in ours is weakening. This process is not helped by NATO's clumsiness in dealing with the relevant Governments, especially in Macedonia.**

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(5) Don't accept UK clumsiness; Macedonians tell us UK military contribution valued. NATO Summit language shows NATO's sensitivity to Macedonia.

**6. None of this is irrecoverable, but unless we can turn the tide and point out, again especially to Macedonia, which is our key rear area, why there is long term advantage to them in supporting NATO and Europe, there could be severe difficulty in persuading them to continue to provide the support the ground operation needs to remain operationally effective, in face of the short term problems, especially political and economic ones, which this is causing them.**

(6) NATO and EU are pointing out long term advantage to Macedonia in supporting NATO and Europe. NATO Summit language. 26 April GAC likely to express clear commitment towards Association Agreement (also for Albania). 27 April EU Ministerial Troika with FM of Macedonia. EU membership not currently on the cards given frailty of Macedonian economy; EU can provide funds and prospects, and is doing just that. [IFIs]: key is for Macedonia (and Albania) to receive medium-term economic assistance/debt relief to provide cushion against economic dislocation and protect existing structural adjustment strategy: UK working hard to achieve this.

**7. If Milosevic continues to win the battle for our rear areas, then it is not impossible to envisage a situation where the battle for Kosovo is lost and NATO forced to withdraw, without even a shot being fired.**

(7) Don't accept Milosevic winning the battle for rear areas. NATO's South Eastern Europe initiative designed to bolster support in that region.

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**8. Military.** There is uncertainty on the ground amongst our military about what they are being asked to do and what happens next. Their mission and make up remain based on Rambouillet, even though this has long been left behind us. Morale is high and the sense of determination very evident. But they know that an opposed ground operation, in one form or another, is now increasingly likely. They are not, however, equipped for this, have not been asked to plan for it, even as a contingency, and do not what their aim is or is likely to be. If the Rambouillet mission and posture has been overtaken by events (which they do know), what should they be preparing for now?

(8) Overt planning in KFOR, or indeed SHAPE, for an opposed ground operation is more than the Alliance can stand at the moment. NATO are updating plans for all options. An opposed operation would of course require a differently configured – and considerably larger – force. Agree that Rambouillet is effectively behind us, but to dump it conclusively at this stage would damage the chances of Milosevic agreeing to the NATO demands.

**9. Meanwhile, time ticks away and the Serbs continue to defensively strengthen ground, which already strongly favours the defenders.**

(9) Yes, time is ticking away. But assessment of VJ capabilities suggests that the balance may not be strongly in favour of the defenders.

**10. NATO has, at most, a month to make up its mind what it wants to do, if there is to be any prospect of a successful completion of a Kosovo operation if one becomes necessary, before next winter. NATO must also decide where any Kosovo ground operation would be mounted from. Macedonia has the right infrastructure, but the wrong politics. Albania**

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has the right politics but hopeless infrastructure. Both can be overcome, but not without a lot of that ought to have started already.

(10) Acknowledge that the decision-making window for a ground operation is very short. We need to move quickly: there is a lot to do. But we also need to keep the Alliance together.

11. NATO must also decide what its attitude to the KLA will be. I believe we should take a risk with them as I am now convinced that the moderates are, in the main in charge, that they have a clear if limited military utility and, crudely, that the more we are able sensibly to use them the more effective our air operations will be and the fewer casualties we will take when the ground action starts. At present there is a dangerous ambivalence about our approach to the KLA, which is confusing commanders, prevents us using the KLA effectively, is beginning to attract from them charges of betrayal which, could turn them back to radicalism.

(11) Not all the Kosovo Albanians support the KLA. And the KLA is prone to feuding, and not incapable of atrocities itself. NATO cannot be seen to be in alliance with them.

12. Finally NATO will have to decide which options it is prepared to allow its commanders to consider. The easiest entry into Kosovo would be through the Presovo valley. But this means going in through Serbia. Are we prepared to do this? What about Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary? And if so, do we want Belgrade? My own view is that we can fight the Serbs in Kosovo, but not in Serbia. I think to most Serbs Kosovo is no longer a homeland – it's a monument. Serbia proper, however, would be an entirely different proposition.

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(12) NATO is updating plans for all options.

**14. It was only because Milosevic shut the Albanian border last week that the little northern Albanian town of Kukes was not completely overwhelmed. If this had happened, we would have had the terrible spectacle of refugees dying in NATO's hands.**

**18. Milosevic has always used refugees as instruments of war. And in this battle, too, I see no clear yet that we are winning. War normally produces refugees as it's by-product. This is the first war in history that is being fought FOR refugees. And we have set ourselves an unforgiving measure for judging its success. If they don't go back, we have lost.**

(14 - 18) Agree Milosevic using Refugees as instrument of war. Scale of his ruthless ethnic cleansing in Kosovo beggars belief. Given scale, international community's response rapid – not overwhelmed. NATO played effective part in containing the problem. Yes new waves would mean new challenge. But food stocks in place in Kukes, and more could be brought up rapidly from Thessaloniki, and Italy if need be.

**15. UNHCR completely lost control of the situation in Macedonia about a week ago. Their performance here has been, by common consent, lamentable. There is a desperate need for proper co-ordination, especially of the NGOs. Had it not been for NATO's intervention in Macedonia, there would have been catastrophe here, too.**

(15) Yes were some initial problems on UNHCR front; they have now bumped up level of representation. DfID personnel on ground making a

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difference. Two-pronged DfID strategy – fill gaps where they can, while pressing UNHCR to improve their performance.

**16. There must also be concern about what will happen in the camps in a few months time, if there is no visible progress in Kosovo. These are not Somalis or Ethiopians. The Macedonian camps, in particular, contain the intelligentsia of Pristina, amongst the brightest and best in the Southern Balkans – Doctors, engineers, professors abound. But they are all being treated the same. Aid agency doctors, plumbers and engineers are doing things for them. They are not being allowed to do things for themselves. There is not a problem at the present. The patience and dignity with which the Kosovars are bearing their pain is almost unbearable to see. They all queue patiently and politely. There is courtesy, helpfulness and politeness for all. And almost no stealing. One aid worker said to me “this is the only refugee camp in the world where I can put down my shovel and still find it there a day later”**

**17. But what will this be like after two/three/four more months, when hope turns to despair and impatience?**

(16-17) Your personal account of camps moving. Answer to problem cannot be to disperse refugees to four corners of world; plays to Milosevic's agenda. UK has played a leading role in getting targeted aid to the refugees quickly - £20m spent so far. Aid provided directly, and through charities. UK troops established camps at Brazde an Bojane – shelter, medical facilities, food, sanitation for 32,000 people. Goal must be to get all refugees back to Kosovo quickly – what we intend to do. In the meantime, must make life in the camps bearable. Refugees will be encouraged to do more in the camps: saves money and gives them something useful to do. Some already are eg

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interpreters. But camp population is still quite fluid, and new arrivals must first be registered.

(21.4) NATO forces are embarking on a project to improve 500km of roads in Albania (essential supply routes).

Politics

**(21.7) recommendation – give Albanians help in kind** – this is already happening. DfID and others have flown in blankets and tents. Charities and other outside organisations will run many of the camps that are being built, under UNHCR supervision.

**(21.9) recommendation – we should be helping to strengthen and train the Albanian forces especially and urgently in the border areas.** We have already donated 20 Land Rovers, plus comms kit to the Albanian Police (including border police). UK police officers participating in WEU Police Training Mission in Albania. There are currently 5 UK officers in Albania: this will shortly increase to 20 (the largest national contingent on the ground). A team of WEU police officers are in Kukes advising the Police Directorate on all aspects dealing with the policing of the current situation. Arrival of AMF(L) will mean greater involvement with Albanian forces. Not something we can do on our own: but encouraging NATO to deepen PFP linkages.

**(23.1) recommendation – we must give Macedonia clear commitment on joining NATO.** Washington Summit language went as far as possible, giving clear perspective.

**(23.2) recommendation – NATO must show far greater sensitivity.** We understand the need, and will continue to urge others to show appropriate sensitivity.

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(23.3) **recommendation – NATO should make early statement of opposition to pan-Albanian nationalism and creation in the Balkans of ethnically pure states.** Washington Summit language reaffirmed NATO's support for territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries in the region.

(23.4) **recommendation – NATO/Europe must begin to map out view of post Kosovo Balkans.** Agree. (Comment: Prime Minister might wish to give Mr Ashdown paper on "Strategy for South East Europe").

(23.5) **recommendation – FCO should, without delay, issue a date for President Gligorov's visit to Britain.** FCO recommendation with Number 10 favours fixing a date soon.

(23.6) **recommendation – HMA Skopje should encourage Georgievski/Shala meeting.** We should support this.

Military

(27) **Recommendation: decide now on 'Plan B'.** Intend to intensify air war to avoid the need for any battles on the ground. NATO are updating plans for all options. Our military will have a role in that process. In the meantime a build up of forces in the region is continuing.

The KLA

(30.1 & 30.2 & 30.3) **Recommendation. We should clarify policy towards KLA and make them effective.** Policy towards KLA is clear: close political contact (as with others in Kosovo Albanian Political spectrum. Arms supplies/training forbidden under UNSCR 1160. Must not forget that not all

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Kosovo-Albanians support KLA, and that KLA rule might not be a liberal experience. One reason for "interim" approach to Kosovo problem.

Humanitarian

(32.3) **Take refugees to the aid.** Cannot force refugees to go south. Many want to stay close to their homes, and refuse to leave their tractors/trailers behind. Trying to move those we can – many thousand every day – and help those who remain.

(32.5) **UNHCR massively under performed.** UNHCR's performance is improving. DfID (and others) will go on pressing them.

(32.6) **Danger from disaffection of the intelligentsia.** Those with usable skills will be asked to help, as situation on the camps stabilises.

(33.1) **recommendation – NATO must insist UNHCR gets it act together.** Recognise UNHCR did not start well: now rising to the challenge better, but still room for improvement. NATO/UNHCR co-ordination now much better.

(33.2) **recommendation – NATO should continue to provide back up until UNHCR gets control.** NATO obviously will continue to support the humanitarian effort.

(33.4) **recommendation – an early priority is the co-ordination of NGOs.** Yes. UNHCR (present in all major capitals and on ground) should take the lead. UK will continue to press them. In Albania Government also plays a role, holding regular co-ordination meetings. Macedonians not getting a similar grip: more interested in moving refugees on.

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(33.5) **recommendation – we should let Kosovar Refugees do as much for themselves in the camps as is possible.** Yes. (See 32.6) But we must prevent camps being used for nefarious purposes – KLA R&R, training. Issue of policing needs sensitive handling.

(33.6) UK is taking lead on necessary International Co-ordination. Clare Short chaired a Lancaster House meeting on 22 April with representatives of US, French, German and Italian Development.

(33.7) Ministries to begin the process of planning for return of refugees. Agreement inter alia on full and early involvement of Kosovar people in planning and implementation phases, clear roles for and full preparation by the key agencies, strong links between military and humanitarian agencies. Quint countries will continue to work together on this planning but want to involve others to, including if possible the Russians.

**SECRET**



## Jonathan Powell

---

**From:** John Sawers  
**Sent:** 27 April 1999 18:17  
**To:** Jonathan Powell  
**Cc:** Philip Barton; Alastair Campbell  
**Subject:** RE: Major: Kosovo

I would phone him, rather than have him in. The fact is he won't add anything useful, and it is merely a damage limitation exercise - show he is taking counsel from his predecessors and neutralising the Tories. But better done now before it becomes an issue.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Jonathan Powell  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 27, 1999 5:22 PM  
**To:** John Sawers  
**Cc:** Philip Barton; Alastair Campbell  
**Subject:** Major: Kosovo

TB asks whether he should see John Major to talk about Kosovo. What do you think?

oh.

✓ PM  
Do you want to speak  
to Major?  
✓





Top - PB  
cc JPB  
Access

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

104699

27 April 1999

⑦

Dear Philip

Reply to Letter from Crown Prince Alexander of Yugoslavia

Thank you for your letter of 8 April to Lisa Farrington, enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister from Crown Prince Alexander of Yugoslavia about the situation in Yugoslavia.

... I enclose a draft reply as requested.

Yours ever  
Andrew Patrick

(Andrew Patrick)  
Private Secretary

Philip Barton Esq OBE  
10 Downing Street



DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS,  
CROWN PRINCE ALEXANDER OF YUGOSLAVIA

useful. } Thank you for your letter of 6 April about the situation in Kosovo. I found our telephone conversation on 16 April extremely informative and I share your sorrow at the pain being suffered by so many as a result of Milosevic's actions.

would immediate } Nothing would be better than for the FRY to be represented by a Government and a President prepared to work with rather than against the international community ~~and to~~ <sup>that</sup> bring ~~the consequent~~ benefits to the country. But our ~~best~~ immediate objective ~~is~~ to stop Milosevic's orgy of repression in Kosovo. ~~That~~ NATO will pursue with determination.

Milosevic has acted against the independent media, using the Kosovo crisis as an excuse to clamp down on liberal opposition and free speech. This is clearly the action of a dictator who fears that his people will discover the truth of the atrocities being carried out in their name. We are determined to counter Milosevic's strategy of hiding the truth.

We are in regular contact with President Djukanovic of Montenegro. EU Foreign Ministers have decided on a package of economic support to those hit by the crisis, including Montenegro. ~~President Djukanovic is in no doubt of our support for his political and economic reforms.~~ We have <sup>also</sup> warned Milosevic not to move against Montenegro. It is a matter of deep regret that NATO has had to strike targets in Montenegro. ~~We equally regret having to strike at all.~~ But targets in Montenegro, as in Serbia, all form part of the <sup>Milosevic's</sup> machine of repression.

We fully respect the role of the UN Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has been kept fully informed. The Co-Chairs of the Rambouillet and Paris talks briefed the Council on the outcome of both sets of negotiations. A debate in the UN Security Council on 26 March ended with a 12:3 vote against a Russian draft Resolution challenging NATO's action against Belgrade.

As you know, } NATO has clearly set out its conditions for a cessation of military action. Milosevic has to cease repression; withdraw army, police and paramilitary forces; agree to an international security force in Kosovo to give the refugees the confidence to return and <sup>the</sup> putting in place of a political framework for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords. NATO will suspend its action when Milosevic meets these conditions. <sup>from Kosovo</sup>



I am, of course, aware of the impact historical sensitivities have on politics in the Balkans. But no historical events can justify the actions of the FRY and Serbian security forces today. All today's inhabitants of Kosovo have an equal right to live together in peace and harmony.

D W Musgrave  
EAD, FCO

270 2412





Keith C. Hunter  
President & General Manager

**BHP Petroleum**

27<sup>th</sup> April, 1999

The Prime Minister  
The Right Hon. Tony Blair MP  
10 Downing Street  
London. SW1A 2AA.

*Dear Mr. Blair*

Thank you for your letter of 20<sup>th</sup> April 1999.

We share your concerns about the events unfolding in Kosovo, and will comply with your request not to supply fuel oil or crude to the Republic of Yugoslavia until further notice.

*Yours sincerely*

*K.C. Hunter.*





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FM MOSCOW  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 502  
OF 270921Z APRIL 99  
INFO IMMEDIATE BUDAPEST, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON  
INFO ROUTINE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POSTS, NATO POSTS, CE POSTS  
INFO ROUTINE MODUK, ACTOR, WHIRL, CABINET OFFICE

BUDAPEST TELNO 149

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: RUSSIAN/HUNGARIAN RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. Hungarian Embassy surprised by sharpness of Russian reaction to convoy incident. Working contacts continuing.

DETAIL

2. According to Szucs (Minister, Hungarian Embassy), Ivanov told the Hungarian Ambassador, Nanovfszky, on 11 April that Russia saw the delay in the convoy as an unfriendly step, and that it would take appropriate steps. A week later Nanovfszky was called in to the MFA to be told in harsh terms by the head of Third European Department (with responsibility for relations with FRY) that the Russian Ambassador to Hungary was to be recalled. A further week went by before this took place.

3. Szucs said the sharpness of the Russian reaction to the convoy incident had taken the embassy here by surprise. Since the early 1990s relations had developed pragmatically, but Nanovfszky considered they were worse now than at any time since 1956. The Hungarian Embassy's assessment was that Russia was using the convoy incident as a pretext to show it still had some muscle. The slow march of events proved that this was provocation on Russia's part. Russia was picking on Hungary as a target because it was a small country, a new member of NATO. The souring of relations with Hungary would stand as a warning to other NATO countries, but would not cost Russia dear.

4. Szucs said that so far only high-level political relations had been affected: working visits between ministries were continuing. However, some in the Duma (eg Shmakov, leader of the independent trade union movement) were threatening to call for a boycott of Hungarian goods. This would obviously cause more long-term damage to relations.

WOOD

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Minister of State  
Cabinet Office

From: Stephen Ward  
Assistant Private Secretary  
Room 308, 70 Whitehall  
Tel: 270 0012  
Fax: 270 1257  
27 April 1999

PPS/SIR RICHARD WILSON

c Sir Franklin Berman, FCO  
Michael Wood, FCO  
Martin Hemming, MOD  
Iain MacLeod, LSLO  
David Seymour, LSLO  
Philip Barton, No 10

#### NATO - LEGAL BASIS FOR ACTION ON KOSOVO

Sir Richard Wilson was present today at a meeting to discuss the issues raised in the Attorney General's minute to the Prime Minister of 23 April. Sir Franklin Berman, Michael Wood, Martin Hemming, David Seymour and Iain MacLeod were also present.

It was noted that there was a respectable legal argument for the use of force so far against Yugoslavia. The targets attacked by UK forces had so far all been justifiable. The basic principles which must be applied in determining whether UK forces can attack any particular targets were:

- (i) that the overall objective of the use of force can only be the immediate relief of an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe;
- (ii) civilian targets may only be attacked if they are making an effective contribution to military action and if their destruction offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances prevailing at the time of the attack;
- (iii) if there is a risk of civilian casualties or damage, targets may only be attacked if the civilian consequences are not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

It was agreed that these tests must be applied conscientiously on a case by case basis to each target selected. This is occurring and will continue to occur. The Attorney General was reported to be satisfied that each of the targets so far approved by him or the Solicitor General for attack by the UK met these three tests. Where authority to attack targets had been

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
**CONFIDENTIAL**

delegated, the Attorney General was satisfied that the underlying legal principles were understood and applied by those authorising or making the attacks by the UK.

✓ The UK can reasonably assume that its Allies have in place similar checks to satisfy themselves of the legality of their actions. That is the basis on which the UK had proceeded and will continue to do so. It was neither practical nor legally necessary for one ally to police the targeting of others. If the three tests were applied consistently by the UK to each target it resolves to attack it will continue to act lawfully. Even if one of our Allies failed to comply with international law there was a respectable case for concluding that the UK would not itself be in breach of international law.

Although this was not strictly a legal point for the UK, there was some concern about the acceptability of explanations that have been given by NATO and national spokesmen for attacks by non-UK NATO forces on certain targets which were on the face of it civilian in character. It was important that government spokesmen did not give explanations which were inconsistent with the legal justification for any attack particularly if the basis for the attack had not been ascertained.

It was agreed that legal issues would continue to arise as the campaign unfolded and it was important that departmental legal advisers and the Attorney General continued to be involved. It was also agreed that statements that the Attorney General had cleared targets must not give the false impression that he had cleared anything other than targets attacked by UK forces or by the US from the UK.



**STEPHEN WARD**

**CONFIDENTIAL**





Minister of State  
Cabinet Office

Top-JS  
cc JB  
JSM  
FB  
AC

PRIME MINISTER

27 APRIL 1999

**KOSOVO - RESPONSE TO THE MINUTE FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL**

The Attorney General minuted you on 23 April on the legal basis for action in Kosovo and the legal approval of individual targets.

I discussed this matter at a meeting on 26 April with Sir Richard Wilson, David Seymour, Legal Secretary to the Law Officers, Sir Franklin Berman, and Michael Wood from the FCO, Martin Hemming, Chief Legal Adviser to the MoD, and Iain McLeod from the Law Officers department. A copy of the minute of that meeting is attached for reference.

I also attach a self-explanatory draft replying minute for you to send to the Attorney-General.

**CHARLES FALCONER**



## DRAFT MINUTE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

## KOSOVO

Thank you for <sup>your</sup> helpful minute. I understand that Lord Falconer has spoken to David Seymour, Legal Secretary to the Law Officers, Sir Franklin Berman, and Michael Wood from the FCO, Martin Hemming, Chief Legal Adviser to the MoD, and Iain McLeod from the Law Officers Department on this matter.

I am grateful to you for <sup>the confirmation of your earlier</sup> ~~your~~ advice that there is a respectable legal basis for all the steps taken by us in the Kosovo conflict.

I am also grateful to you for re-iterating the basic principles which must be applied in determining whether UK forces can hit targets. These principles are that the object of the use of force is the relief of a humanitarian catastrophe, that any non-military targets attacked must be making an effective contribution to the military action and their destruction must offer a definite military advantage at the time of the attack, and that if there is a risk of civilian casualties, targets may only be attacked if the civilian consequences are not excessive in relation to the direct military advantage anticipated.

As David Seymour has confirmed to Lord Falconer, and I of course accept, these tests must be applied conscientiously on a case by case basis to each target selected. This is occurring, and will continue to occur.

In relation to the position of our NATO allies, they, like us, adhere to international law. I understand it is agreed amongst the lawyers that the UK can reasonably assume that its Allies have in place similar checks to satisfy themselves of the legality of their actions. That is the basis on which the UK has proceeded and will continue to do so. It was neither practical nor legally necessary for one ally to police the targeting of others. If the three tests are applied consistently by the UK to each target it resolves to attack it will continue to act lawfully. Even if one of our Allies failed to comply with international law there is a respectable case for concluding that the UK would not itself be in breach of international law.

I am grateful to you for your help in this matter and recognise that, as the terms of the campaign change, no doubt further legal issues will arise. ~~It is important that you and legal advisers continue to be involved.~~

TONY BLAIR





legid to ask?  
Re

Prime Minister

### KOSOVO: EVACUATION OF REFUGEES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

You asked for a note on the United Kingdom response to the evacuation of refugees from Macedonia and other neighbouring countries.

2. The starting point is the policy which we agreed before my attendance at the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 7 April. That is that the overwhelming majority of evacuees will need to be looked after in the region so that they will be able more readily to return to their homes in Kosovo once the conflict is over. This is also the policy we have agreed with our European partners. We have, nonetheless, made it clear that we are willing and ready to accept some thousands of refugees from the region as a temporary measure. You may recall that I raised the possibility of saying, if we were pressed, that we would take up to 20,000 refugees. You preferred not to put a figure on the number we were prepared to take. I followed this line and, through an alliance with the French, managed to persuade the Council to adopt our approach. Your Private Secretary's letter of today records that you remain in favour of this policy.

3. We have said that we will accept refugees in response to requests by UNHCR on the basis of criteria agreed with them. Those criteria are:

- that the evacuation should be entirely voluntary;
- that family unity should be respected;
- that priority should be given the most vulnerable and to those with special needs;
- that consideration should be given to links with the country of evacuation; and
- refugees being medically fit to travel.



4. The first request from UNHCR to the United Kingdom to take refugees was received on 19 April. With your agreement we responded within an hour and the first planeload of refugees arrived in the country last Sunday afternoon. I can tell you now that the second planeload will arrive at East Midlands airport on this Thursday afternoon. We expect that it will be carrying a similar number of people, around 160, to the one which arrived a few days ago. Evacuees arriving in the United Kingdom under the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme will be granted permission to enter in line with close family members already in the United Kingdom, or will be given exceptional leave to remain for 12 months. This status provides access to the benefits system and the right to work.

5. I have asked the Refugee Council to take the lead in putting in place a special reception service for refugees arriving under this programme. Excellent arrangements had been made for the arrival of the refugees in Leeds/Bradford by the public services and by the voluntary organisations. This very successful operation received positive coverage in the media. The Refugee Council with its partner agencies (Refugee Action, Red Cross and Scottish Refugee Council) are identifying further accommodation across the United Kingdom, and we will be ready to respond to further recommendations for evacuations from UNHCR.

6. UNHCR have indicated that they will be making such recommendations. In order to facilitate the selection of further refugees on the basis of the agreed criteria, my Department is making arrangements to send a number of staff to work alongside UNHCR in the refugee camps and in the Embassy in Skopje. I will also be writing to you within the next day or so to seek agreement to the rhythm of flights which we should be aiming for, particularly once the Home Office team is in place.

7. On media handling, we have a strategy, agreed by the Cabinet Office and Verreker co-ordinating groups, which reflects policy aims and objectives, namely that the primary aim of the Government and UNHCR is to care for refugees in the region and that we will, and are, responding positively to requests to accept evacuees on a temporary basis.

8. This policy has been underlined at every opportunity, in press statements, briefings, media interviews and articles which have been prepared for use by national and regional media.

9. More specifically we have an agreed, detailed media handling plan to accommodate individual arrivals of evacuees to locations around the country. This was put into good effect at the weekend when the first Kosovans arrived at Leeds Bradford Airport.



10. As agreed, we have deliberately stayed away from committing ourselves to the unhelpful and meaningless numbers or quota game and, as opposed to some EU countries, have not set arbitrary targets or limits.

11. The numbers issue will of, its own accord, diminish as more and more people are airlifted to the United Kingdom. What will become more important will be our ability to maintain local public support in the areas accommodating evacuees.

12. To this end we are actively pursuing a steady flow of 'good news' local stories demonstrating community support and backing for the evacuees. This activity, generated by regional COI and co-ordinated by my press office, should be supported by Ministerial visits when good opportunities arise.

*John Row*

27 April 1999

*THIS LETTER SHOULD ALSO BE COPIED TO MEMBERS OF DAP.*



CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

cc: JB  
Jfo  
Ac JB

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5/5/1M

*Prime Minister*  
*To note.*  
*JS*

27 April 1999

Dear John,

*I see & thank them*  
*Maybe we*  
*send you*  
*more from*  
*Muslim*  
*states*

**KOSOVO: OFFER OF ASSISTANCE FROM UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

Summary

The UAE have sounded us out informally over supplying a unit, to be placed under UK command, for operations in Kosovo. Military experts are discussing this in UAE now. If a formal offer of troops is made, we should welcome it and commend it to NATO as a helpful widening of the international coalition against Milosevic. The UAE may make a public announcement about an offer as early as today, 27 April. It is possible other Moslem states may follow suit.

Detail

The UAE armed forces Chief of Staff, Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ), has informally proposed, through Field Marshal Inge, the previous CDS, that the UAE should provide a unit for operations in Kosovo, to be placed in the UK chain of command. These soundings have been made informally to establish our likely reaction. MBZ has indicated that if we were to turn him down he would make a similar offer to the French. The Defence Secretary is clear that we should respond constructively to this approach both to protect our wider interests in UAE, and as a useful widening of the international coalition against Milosevic. Nevertheless, it will need to make sense in practical military terms and a small team from MOD was despatched to Abu Dhabi over the weekend to discuss how to match any potential offer with likely capability requirements in theatre. Our initial view is that any UAE force should only be deployed into theatre once the peace has been won.

John Sawers Esq CMG  
No 10 Downing Street

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The discussions in UAE are continuing today and it is possible that the UAE authorities will announce publicly that they have made an offer of troops as early as today. If they do, the Defence Secretary believes that we should welcome it as evidence of the international community's commitment to achieving a just settlement in Kosovo, and that we should commend it to NATO (who, formally, would need to issue the invitation to the UAE to participate even if the unit were placed under the UK chain of command).

It is possible that other nations may follow suit in the interests of Muslim solidarity with the Kosovo Albanians. We already have hints that the Jordanians are thinking along these lines. Again, provided any contributions make reasonable military sense, we should view such offers positively.

Finally, MBZ has asked that pending any formal offer, he would like this kept on as tight a rein as possible. Clearly, we should respect this wish.

A copy of this goes to Tim Barrow (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*

*Chris*

(C M DEVERELL)  
Private Secretary



The attached note replaces the earlier version circulated on 27 April. It differs only in that this version is set out formally as a note for the file, rather than being addressed to Sir Richard Wilson.



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Minister of State  
Cabinet Office

From: Stephen Ward  
Assistant Private Secretary  
Room 308, 70 Whitehall  
Tel: 270 0012  
Fax: 270 1257  
27 April 1999

NOTE FOR THE FILE

c Sir Richard Wilson  
Sir Franklin Berman, FCO  
Michael Wood, FCO  
Martin Hemming, MOD  
Iain MacLeod, LSLO  
David Seymour, LSLO  
Philip Barton, No 10 ✓

*file  
pms  
29/4*

NATO - LEGAL BASIS FOR ACTION ON KOSOVO

A meeting was held today in Lord Falconer's office to discuss the issues raised in the Attorney General's minute to the Prime Minister of 23 April. Sir Richard Wilson, Sir Franklin Berman, Michael Wood, Martin Hemming, David Seymour and Iain MacLeod were also present.

It was noted that there was a respectable legal argument for the use of force so far against Yugoslavia. The targets attacked by UK forces had so far all been justifiable. The basic principles which must be applied in determining whether UK forces can attack any particular targets were:

- (i) that the overall objective of the use of force can only be the immediate relief of an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe;
- (ii) civilian targets may only be attacked if they are making an effective contribution to military action and if their destruction offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances prevailing at the time of the attack;
- (iii) if there is a risk of civilian casualties or damage, targets may only be attacked if the civilian consequences are not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

It was agreed that these tests must be applied conscientiously on a case by case basis to each target selected. This is occurring and will continue to occur. The Attorney General was reported to be satisfied that each of the targets so far approved by him or the Solicitor General for attack by

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
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the UK met these three tests. Where authority to attack targets had been delegated, the Attorney General was satisfied that the underlying legal principles were understood and applied by those authorising or making the attacks by the UK.

The UK can reasonably assume that its Allies have in place similar checks to satisfy themselves of the legality of their actions. That is the basis on which the UK had proceeded and will continue to do so. It was neither practical nor legally necessary for one ally to police the targeting of others. If the three tests were applied consistently by the UK to each target it resolves to attack it will continue to act lawfully. Even if one of our Allies failed to comply with international law there was a respectable case for concluding that the UK would not itself be in breach of international law.

Although this was not strictly a legal point for the UK, there was some concern about the acceptability of explanations that have been given by NATO and national spokesmen for attacks by non-UK NATO forces on certain targets which were on the face of it civilian in character. It was important that government spokesmen did not give explanations which were inconsistent with the legal justification for any attack particularly if the basis for the attack had not been ascertained.

It was agreed that legal issues would continue to arise as the campaign unfolded and it was important that departmental legal advisers and the Attorney General continued to be involved. It was also agreed that statements that the Attorney General had cleared targets must not give the false impression that he had cleared anything other than targets attacked by UK forces or by the US from the UK.



**STEPHEN WARD**

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*b JP  
AC  
PB  
M Pakenham*

From the Private Secretary

27 April 1999

*Dear John,*

### KOSOVAR REFUGEES

I talked to David Bryer, Director of Oxfam about Kosovo today. He raised a number of concerns:

- (i) Co-ordination. This was still inadequate. UNHCR was used to co-ordinating with NGOs, but it was proving much more difficult co-ordinating NATO and Government agencies who are on the ground in Albania in large numbers.
- (ii) Refugees in neighbouring countries. Oxfam were concerned about the excessive control in camps in Macedonia where the activities of the Macedonian police and army verged on abuse. There was also a problem of registration of refugees who were not living in the camps. Not being registered meant they did not qualify for food rations and increased the burdens on their host communities.
- (iii) IDPs in Kosovo. The usual concerns. No pressure from Oxfam to interrupt the military campaign. They know we are looking for imaginative solutions and that palliatives such as the occasional airdrop did not address the problem.
- (iv) Refugees in the UK. Oxfam supported Government policy on encouraging refugees to stay in the region. I urged them to voice it more loudly. On the refugees already here, they were concerned that those arriving now were given privileged treatment compared to the nine thousand or so who arrived here after Belgrade's earlier waves of oppression and were stuck in the Home Office's backlog of cases?

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- 2 -

- (v) Winterisation. For the refugees to be able to return to their homes before winter, Oxfam thought the military campaign would have to be over by the end of July. That was unlikely. The refugees would not survive in the existing tented camps through a Balkan winter. More solid shelter would be essential and we would have to start soon to provide it. I set out the obvious drawbacks of planing for the refugees to stay in the camps long term. But Oxfam do have a point.
- (vi) DFID budget. You will be pleased to hear that Oxfam pressed very strongly that the costs to DFID should be met from the Reserve and not from cuts in other DFID aid programmes.

All of these issues will be familiar to you. But you might like to feed them into your working group on refugees and address the points, as appropriate, in your regular notes.

I am copying this to Andrew Patrick (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Chris Deverell (Ministry of Defence), Tom Scholar (H.M. Treasury), Hilary Jackson (Home Office) and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever.*



JOHN SAWERS

John Vereker, Esq., C.B.,  
Department for International Development.

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PRIME MINISTER

From: John Sawers  
Date: 27 April 1999

cc: Jonathan Powell  
Philip Barton


DOP: KOSOVO

Planning for Ground Forces. No word yet from the Americans. Shelton told Charles Guthrie that he had heard nothing from the White House on the idea.

Widening the air campaign. The paper proposes that we agree that Solana/SACEUR carry on clearing sensitive targets with the major NATO countries, giving the French a veto. This argument needs testing. The alternative – clearing each target only with the country whose forces will attack it – is the norm for coalition operations. The US have attacked some targets eg in Montenegro, despite French non-approval, and without France being able to do anything about it.

IDPs in Kosovo. I'm not convinced we have exhausted the options for getting help through to the IDPs. Their situation is clearly getting worse. The longer we remain inactive, the bigger the pressure to switch priority away from the military campaign. You might give this a further push.

Russian Peace Plan. Alastair said he was picking up rumours in Brussels of movement on a peace plan. Solana was talking of preparing ourselves to adjust our demands. No word yet from the Americans on Talbot's progress in Moscow.



JOHN SAWERS





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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

Top-JS  
cc-JB  
PB  
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Bup

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/18/5/5/1T

27 April 1999

Dear John,

KOSOVO

The paper for discussion at tomorrow's DOP meeting contains a passage on 'Widening the Air Campaign' on which we have subsequently received some important amendments from Sir John Goulden at UKDELNATO. I attach amended paragraphs incorporating these changes.


I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of DOP members and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever  
Chris

(C M DEVERELL)  
Private Secretary

John Sawers Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

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Recycled Paper



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Widening the Air Campaign

1. Phase 3 of the Phased Air Operation (wider military and MUP targets throughout FRY) has not yet been approved by the NAC but Solana has been given authority to approve specific attacks against high value military targets throughout the FRY, taking account of known national sensitivities. In practice, he requires SACEUR to square particular proposals with France before allowing attacks to proceed. The main French sensitivities appear to relate to attacks in Belgrade and Montenegro and against civilian infrastructure, where a number of SACEUR's proposals have been held up.
2. Using his authority to allow attacks against high value military targets. Solana recently authorised SACEUR to conduct attacks against state-controlled media facilities in Serbia. We do not know whether this was a blanket authorisation or on a case-by-case basis.
3. SACEUR regards the approval process as cumbersome and not conducive to operational security. He would like to have authority from the NAC to hit all military targets, subject only to specific approval by the nation whose forces are carrying out each attack. So far, however, we have judged that this would be more than the market would bear in the NAC.
4. There are two categories of target which have been largely avoided by SACEUR up until now because most Allies have not been in favour of attacking them – electricity generators and industrial sites. Some targets in these categories have been attacked on the grounds that they are directly related to the Serbian military effort – for example, an electricity distribution facility supplying the integrated air defence system and a car factory which repaired tanks. But without such a direct linkage (enabling Solana to approve them as high military value targets). Solana would need a new decision by the NAC before allowing such attacks to proceed. If Ministers wish to press for broader authorisation of attacks against these target categories, Sir John Goulden should be instructed to concert with other delegations to achieve the required outcome.

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FM UKMIS GENEVA  
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TELNO 227

OF 271811Z APRIL 99

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, CABINET OFFICE, DFID  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, PJHQUK, UKNMR SHAPE, HQMNSW BANJA LUKA  
INFO IMMEDIATE 30 SIGREGTDET UKNIC, UKSC (G) RHEINDALEN, WASHINGTON  
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, HOLY SEE, UKREP BRUSSELS  
INFO PRIORITY SOFIA, TIRANA, ATHENS, UKDEL VIENNA, ACTOR  
INFO PRIORITY WHIRL, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA DIST POSTS

PJHQ FOR J5 POL/OPS

UKNMR PERSONAL FOR DSACEUR AND D/POLAD TO SACEUR  
MODUK BALKANS DIRECTORATE FOR BALKANS SECRETARIAT  
30 SIGREGTDET UKNIC FOR POLAD AND COL EVERSON  
30 SIG REG COMBRITFOR G2 PLEASE PSAS TO POLAD MR G DODDS  
UKNIC SARAJEVO FOR DCOMOPS

SUBJECT: KOSOVO REFUGEES

SUMMARY

1. Outflow of refugees continues - big influx into Macedonia. Situation in Stankovic camps tense; serious health and sanitation concerns. Humanitarian evacuation programme speeds up. Appeal for funding to allow eastern European countries to take refugees.

DETAIL

2. UNHCR (Bijleveld - Director, Europe) and IOM (de Wilde - Programme and Fund-raising) held a joint briefing meeting on Kosovar refugees and the humanitarian evacuation programme on the afternoon of 27 April.

Albania

3. Over the past 24 hours 460 refugees had entered Albania from Kosovo and 500 from Montenegro. Within Albania, 2000 refugees had been moved south from Kukes. The total number of Kosovar refugees in Albania was now 365,500. UNHCR was extremely uncomfortable with the degree of militarisation in Kukes - its staff were concerned for their own security.

Macedonia

4. UNHCR confirmed that 3,460 refugees had entered Macedonia, largely via Blace and Lojane, in the 24 hours up to this morning. This had brought the total up to 139,100. A further 300 Kosovars were still in no-man's land on the Kosovo/Macedonia border. But immediately before the briefing UNHCR had been alarmed to hear of a further 2,000 refugees having walked out of the mountains at Lojane, and of the Macedonian police encouraging them onto buses for the already overcrowded Stankovic camps.

5. The key was therefore to relieve pressure on the Stankovic camps. Tension there was already very high: roads had been barricaded and refugees were threatening a hunger strike. Sanitation was very poor and UNHCR had serious medical concerns. There were already several cases of measles and conditions were ripe for the spread of this and other diseases. UNHCR was negotiating

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with the Macedonian government over moving more refugees to Cegrane as soon as possible; and allowing new arrivals at the Lojane border point to stay with host families. The evacuation programme (see para 10 below) had also speeded up.

**Montenegro**

6. There had been no major new arrivals in Montenegro so, given the outflow to Albania, the total number of refugees there had reduced to 63,800.

**Bosnia-Herzegovina**

7. UNHCR estimated that there were around 18,000 Sandjakis and 15,000 Kosovars in Bosnia.

**Serbia**

8. There was no new information from Serbia. The Government figure remains at 50,000.

**Total**

9. Setting aside those Kosovars already flown to other countries from Macedonia, but including the 2,000 new arrivals at Lojane, the total number of Kosovar refugees in the region was therefore 635,400.

**Evacuation**

10. UNHCR reported that 1,252 refugees were being flown out of Macedonia on 27 April. This number should increase over the next few days, with 1,859 departures scheduled for 29 April. In total, over 20,000 refugees had been flown out. IOM were currently filling about seven planes a day. This was near their capacity of eight plane-loads. But the Greek Government had just given permission for IOM to bus refugees to Thessaloniki airport and fly them from there (providing no overnight stop was involved !), once the Skopje slots were all taken.

11. Bijleveld thanked governments (he listed several, including the UK) for responding to UNHCR's plea to speed up the evacuation programme. But, given the state of the camps and the continuing influx of refugees, countries must continue to step up their efforts. De Wilde raised the issue of eastern European countries (such as Romania) which were willing to take refugees but could not afford to pay for their transport. He welcomed a donation of \$3.4 milion from Japan to support such movements; but said he was disappointed with the relatively little funding IOM had been offered by Western governments.

12. The Permanent Representative of Macedonia intervened to say that his country had already accepted 178,615 refugees (higher than the UNHCR figure) and that refugees now accounted for over 8 per cent of Macedonia's population. The economic and social life of the entire country had been disrupted. The consequences to Macedonia and its neighbours of the refugee situation could be catastrophic. All governments should meet their international obligations and their obligations as human beings and speed up humanitarian evacuation. The situation of those refugees living in the camps was dire. Rather than talking of a regional solution, governments should think of the psychological and social effects of telling the refugees they would be in these camps for another six months or

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more.

Visits

13. UNHCR said that Mrs Ogata would travel to New York next week to brief the Security Council.

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AW + Bd 18

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FM SARAJEVO  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 181  
OF 271543Z APRIL 99  
INFO PRIORITY FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POSTS, MODUK, PJHQ, HQ LAND  
INFO PRIORITY UKNMR SHAPE, HQMNSW BANJA LUKA  
INFO PRIORITY UKNIC SARAJEVO

SIC A2P/I9F

HQ MND(SW) FOR POLAD. HQ LAND FOR CHIEF G2 INT. UKNIC SARAJEVO FOR DCOMOPS

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 696 TO FCO

SUBJECT: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: SANDZAK REFUGEES

SUMMARY

1. Iranian account of reasons for Sandzak refugee flow wildly exaggerated.

DETAIL

2. Paragraph 7 of TUR records an Iranian claim that Sandzakis are subject to murder, beatings and torture. UNHCR here have no evidence for anything worse than low-level harrassment. Most Sandzak refugees (UNHCR reckon there are now 20,000 here, as against 15,000 Kosovars) seem to have fled FRY either because they believe Milosevic will turn his attention to them soon, or because they do not want to be conscripted for service in Kosovo.

3. Were the situation as the Iranians claim, we should by now have 5-10 times as many refugees from Sandzak.

HAND

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Foreign &  
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27 April 1999

London SW1A 2AH

Dr Kim Howells MP  
DTI  
1 Victoria Street  
LONDON  
SW1H 0ET

From The Minister of State

1. ~~JA~~ - I've told DTI that we would want  
this stopped one way or the other -  
they should let us know if there was  
any problem.

I agree.

JP

Dear Kim

2. file

PAB 28/4

ADVENT COMMUNICATIONS LTD

Advent Communications Ltd applied last year to sell mobile satellite communications equipment to the FRY for use by the state-controlled Serbian Television Broadcasting Service (RTS). I recommended that the licence be refused. Even at that stage it was important to prevent the export of equipment which Milosevic could use, via RTS, as a propaganda machine in order to sustain his repressive regime.

No 10 asked us to find a way to avoid giving a licence for the export of this equipment if at all possible. However, I understand that before this was possible your Department learned that the equipment was to be decontrolled under the Wassenaar Arrangements from 18 April. This effectively removes the equipment from our export control.

My concerns about the repressive regime in Yugoslavia have been fully justified by the horrific events we have witnessed in Kosovo which have - as Kofi Annan has said - provoked a universal sense of outrage against Milosevic's ruthless ethnic cleansing. At a time when so much international effort is being directed to limiting Milosevic's ability to prolong the conflict, including bombing RTS headquarters, I believe we should do everything in our power to prevent the export of this equipment. We have seen the lengths to which the regime in Belgrade has used television broadcasting to bolster internal support, and possession of mobile satellite communications equipment will enhance his ability to continue to do so.

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28/4



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I would therefore ask you urgently to examine how we can rapidly introduce a national control to prohibit the export to the FRY of a range of equipment including mobile satellite communications equipment. This will need to be agreed between the FCO's Non Proliferation Department and DTI officials.

I am copying this letter to Philip Barton (No 10).

*Regards,*  
*Tony*  
Tony Lloyd MP

RESTRICTED



**RESTRICTED**  
**KOSOVO REFUGEES**  
**From: BONN**

TO DESKBY 271700Z HOME OFFICE  
 TELNO 327  
 OF 271510Z APRIL 99  
 INFO PRIORITY FCO, PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS  
 INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, DFID, TIRANA, SKOPJE, MODUK  
 INFO PRIORITY ACTOR, WHIRL

Telcon Ramsey/Goldstein (Home Office)  
 Summary

1. Approximately 170,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees in Germany before latest crisis. Additional 10,000 airlifted since start of NATO action. Federal Government will continue to press for greater EU burden sharing.

Detail

2. According to Ministry of the Interior estimates, there were some 170,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees already in Germany before the beginning of April this year. Of these, about 80,000 arrived between 1995 and 1997; 30,000 in 1998; and 7,500 in the first three months of this year. The vast majority arrived by land. They are dispersed throughout Germany, often living with relatives or friends.

3. A further 10,000 refugees, mostly women and children, have been airlifted from the region since the start of NATO's air campaign. Planes were chartered from the Lufthansa subsidiary, Condor, by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. According to the Auswaertiges Amt, the majority volunteered to travel to Germany. Others were selected by UNHCR officials with the aim, wherever possible, of keeping families together. They are now being housed in reception centres throughout Germany. Those able to find alternative accommodation with friends or family are allowed to move. But they do not have the right to work or to seek political asylum.

4. The Federal Government remains committed to the strategy of keeping refugees as far as possible within the region. It has not ruled out increasing the number of places available in Germany. But public pressure on it to do so is limited. According to the Auswaertiges Amt, the Ministry of Interior is especially reluctant to increase the numbers in Germany until it is satisfied that EU partners have fulfilled their own commitments to take in refugees.

Comment

5. Germany has shouldered a disproportionate share of the refugee burden from the Balkans since the early nineties. It took in 350,000 from Bosnia alone. This generosity reflects Germany's relative proximity to the former Yugoslavia, the presence of a large resident gastarbeiter community as a magnet for other family members, and, above all, a sense of moral duty to atone for the past. Despite the numbers already in Germany, there is still enormous public sympathy for the plight of the Kosovo Albanians. But the government will be wary of placing a still greater burden on the local authority budgets which bear most of the cost of hosting refugees, if it has not first tried to persuade EU partners to do their bit. This issue already had a high profile last year: October's SPD/Green coalition agreement contains an explicit reference to the need for EU burden-sharing. Rightly or not, we can



Expect the Germans to continue to criticise those, including Britain, who have not, in their view, done enough.

LEVER

Sent by BONN on 27-04-1999 15:10

Received by No10 on 27-04-1999 17:49







AC10B  
35

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

27 April 1999

London SW1A 2AH

file  
R28  
27/4

Dear Philip

Kosovo: Bishop of London

You should be aware of a proposal from Lambeth Palace for a visit to Belgrade by a group led by the Bishop of London. While the visit has been put off for the time being, we should bear in mind the possibility of further initiatives on these lines.

The Bishop of London rang officials here on 22 April. He said that the Archbishop of Canterbury, having discussed the matter with the Ecumenical Patriarch, was minded to send a group to meet Patriarch Pavle in Belgrade next Tuesday, 27 April. The Archbishop wanted to make sure the channel of communication was still in working order, and to hear the Patriarch's assessment of the situation. They also wanted to see if there was a contribution they could make to humanitarian relief for refugees.

The Bishop said he was fully aware of the need not to be seen to be going as any kind of government representative. He would say no to any invitation to turn up in a TV studio. He was keen to know what we thought about such a visit.

We spelt out very clearly our formal consular advice; the fact that NATO bombing was continuing; and the lack of any UK consular presence in Belgrade. There was the risk - of which the Bishop was obviously aware - of the Serbs trying to use the visit for propaganda purposes of one kind or another.

The Bishop then expressed concern about the timing of his visit. Did it make sense to go at the present time, while the military campaign was clearly intensifying? We confirmed that NATO intended to press ahead vigorously with its air campaign. There had as yet been no indication of give on Milosevic's part, to encourage hope of an early diplomatic solution.

The Bishop called back later to say that he had decided not to proceed with the trip. He was grateful for the information we had given him and clear that we had not steered





him one way or the other. The reason for his decision was his own question mark about the timing and appropriateness of the visit. Nevertheless, the Anglican Church stood by to do what they could to get over the message that what was happening was not a row with the Serb people as a whole.

*Yours ever*  
*Andrew Patrick*

(Andrew Patrick)  
Private Secretary

Philip Barton Esq OBE  
10 Downing Street



five

From: John Sawers  
Date: 27 April 1999

PRIME MINISTER

cc: Jonathan Powell  
Philip Barton


VISIT TO MACEDONIA AND ROMANIA

Who should accompany you on your visit?

David Manning spent a week in Macedonia at the beginning of the crisis and knows the leadership well. He is available and could come.

Charles Guthrie has also said he would like to accompany you. It is always fun to have Charles along. I doubt it would be the best use of his time in terms of the overall war effort. The emphasis of your visit is political rather than military. It might be more helpful for Charles to follow up with a separate visit of his own to address purely military issues. Finally, Paddy Ashdown has suggested you have a one on one meeting with General Mike Jackson, and that won't be possible with Charles in tow.

Unless you see a valuable specific role for him, I suggest we plan on Charles following up your visit later rather than go with you.



JOHN SAWERS



CONFIDENTIAL - VISITS



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

file  
Barton  
(cc)  
Top form  
FRY  
C: Romania

From the Private Secretary

27 April 1999

Dear Andrew,

VISIT TO MACEDONIA AND ROMANIA

As you know, the Prime Minister has decided to visit Macedonia and Romania on 3/4 May. He will be accompanied by Mrs. Blair.

I have discussed possible programmes with Mark Dickinson in Skopje and Ann Jarrett in Bucharest. The resulting outline is enclosed. They are now trying to agree the details with their respective local authorities. The timings are therefore still tentative.

Mrs. Blair will accompany the Prime Minister on the visit to the troops (although he will want to see General Jackson on his own), the refugee camp and, if possible, the border lookout in Macedonia. She will not, however, attend the formal calls. Bucharest are looking into the possibility of her visiting Kosovar refugees in Romania also.

We will be in touch direct with our Embassies about an advance party, the delegation and other practical details.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Chris Deverell (Ministry of Defence), Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office), Mark Dickinson (Skopje), Christopher Crabbie (Bucharest), Sir John Goulden (UKDel NATO) and Sir Christopher Meyer (Washington).

Yours ever,

Philip

PHILIP BARTON

Andrew Patrick, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL - VISITS



**CONFIDENTIAL - VISITS**

**PRIME MINISTER AND MRS BLAIR'S VISIT TO MACEDONIA AND  
ROMANIA**

**OUTLINE PROGRAMME**

**Monday, 3 May**

0830	Depart Chequers
0900	Depart Northolt
1340 (local)	Arrive Skopje
	Visit troops
	Meeting with General Mike Jackson
	Visit Stankovac refugee camp (10-15 minute speech)
	Visit border lookout
	Calls on President Gligorov and Prime Minister Georgievski
2030	Depart Skopje
2250 (local)	Arrive Bucharest
	Overnight Hilton Hotel or State Guest House

**Tuesday, 4 May**

0900-1030	Calls on President and Prime Minister
1100	Speech to Romanian Parliament
1230	Depart Bucharest
1410 (local)	Arrive Northolt
1520	Arrive No. 10

**CONFIDENTIAL - VISITS**



CONFIDENTIAL

Top: FA/PS

cc COS  
FA/PS  
AC/DB

MR PAKENHAM

cc Mr Sawers  
Mr Fisher  
Mr Sanderson  
Mr Wood  
Mr Gozney  
Mr Gibbons

*Prime Minister*

KOSOVO:OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS 26-27 APRIL

**SUMMARY**

Weather continues to hamper air operations. Focus on political developments. Possible early signs of a split in Yugoslav leadership.

**Military**

All RAF offensive missions cancelled due to adverse weather conditions. RN SHAR continue Combat Air Patrol (CAP) sorties. COMUKTG to host maritime commanders conference in INVINCIBLE tomorrow to discuss board and search operations. An Apache helicopter has crashed near Tirana. It apparently hit a tree whilst on a training mission - the crew escaped with minor injuries. Six more Apache's arrived yesterday. Media report further air attacks on a TV transmitter and a series of explosions around Sombor near the Hungarian border and in Novi Sad.

**Political**

Initial thoughts from New York on the reform of the UN proposed by the Prime Minister in his speech in Chicago last week (**Flag A**). The Malaysian/Bahraini draft humanitarian SCR is on ice until it is considered that Milosevic is closer to accepting NATO's demands. Little chance seen of achieving UN support for oil embargo on FRY (**Flag B**). Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Draskovic has told foreign journalists that the Yugoslav army has taken control of the city's privately run television station, Studio B. This may be a reaction to his earlier charges that the Serb leadership was misleading the people. The ICRC have been told by Milosovic that they can go into Kosovo at anytime.

**Refugees**

Three thousand refugees crossed the Macedonian border while over 450 crossed into Albania.

*NMCC/*


**NIGEL CHAMBERS**

27 April 1999 (0700)

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SKP 27/4/99





DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PRGM 49</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>785</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Update dated 27 April 1999</i>	
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SECRET - PERSONAL

file



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

S-144 /99

From the Private Secretary

27 April 1999

Dear Tom,

**KOSOVO/TARGETING**

Thank you for your letter of 26 April, recording our conversation on targeting earlier today.

I think it would be right to continue to plan on the assumption that the Prime Minister is almost certain to agree to targets where collateral damage is assessed as high but civilian casualties remain low. However, as long as it does not inconvenience the military planning, I think it would be helpful for you and I to remain in touch about this so that I can keep the Prime Minister informed.

Yours ever,

**JOHN SAWERS**

Tom McKane Esq  
Ministry of Defence

SECRET - PERSONAL



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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 April 1999

*Dear Sherd,*

### KOSOVO: REGIONAL STRATEGY

The Prime Minister wants to follow up the progress made at the NATO Summit in building regional support for NATO's action against Milosevic. His central theme is that the aspirations of South East European countries for membership of the EU and NATO, and for economic and political development, will not be achieved as long as there is an out-of-control Serb nationalist infecting the entire region. NATO's success on Kosovo is an essential first step.

The Prime Minister plans to pay visits to the region, in which he will give speeches and talk privately to regional leaders on this theme. The first visit we plan is to Macedonia and Romania on 3/4 May. It would be very helpful if the Foreign Office could develop the themes in the material that you have already sent us on a South East Europe strategy. The first occasion for setting these out in public would be in speeches in Macedonia and Romania early next week, and some draft elements for those speeches would be much appreciated.

It would also be helpful to have, before the weekend, a summary analysis of the public and Governmental attitudes to NATO's action in each of the main neighbouring countries, including Greece.

Athens telno 156 set out the scale of the problem we face with Greek public opinion. The Greek Government remain supportive in private. But we shall need more than that if we are to reduce the risk of a Greek blockage in NATO (or the EU) and to secure reliable use of Thessaloniki to supply and reinforce our contingent in Macedonia. Whatever the difficulties, we need to make some headway with Greek public opinion, and some separate advice on how to pursue that would be helpful. Distinguishing between Milosevic and the Serb people will play an important part in this.

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


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- 2 -

I am copying this letter to Tom McKane (Ministry of Defence), Anthony Smith (Department for International Development) and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*


A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'John Sawers', with a horizontal line underneath.

JOHN SAWERS

Sherard Cowper-Coles, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <u>PR6M49</u> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <u>785</u> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <u>Letter dated 27 April 1999</u>	
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cc.  
LCL  
DMTop: JH  
cc: JS  
JH  
IB  
ac/GB

**CONFIDENTIAL - POLICY**  
Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, London, SW1P 3AG

Tom McKane  
Private Secretary to the  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
London SW1A 2HB

27 April 1999

Dear Tom —

**KOSOVO: FINANCING THE CONFLICT**

The Chief Secretary met the Secretary of State for Defence on 26<sup>th</sup> April to discuss financing the war in Kosovo. You, Liz Cassidy (MoD), Trevor Woolley (MoD), John Gieve (HMT), Peter Sedgwick (HMT), Tim Dowse (HMT) and myself were present for part of the meeting.

2. The Chief Secretary said that the Treasury's overriding concern was that there be no financial constraint on the progress and success of the conflict. He said that the departments had a common interest in being mutually helpful. He would like to be as helpful as possible, and hoped that the Secretary of State could reciprocate, in particular by easing pressure on the Reserve. To that end, he would like to agree clear groundrules with the Secretary of State on how to handle the financing of the conflict.

3. The Chief Secretary said that the Treasury would cover the net additional costs of the Kosovo operations from the Reserve. He noted that there would be scope for some savings to offset partially the gross costs of the Kosovo





### CONFIDENTIAL - POLICY

operations, partly through restructuring the department's programmes, for instance through exercises and training cancelled as a result of the Kosovo operations. He further added that MoD should consider their Departmental Unallocated Provision (DUP) as the first port of call for any costs arising out of the Kosovo conflict. Trevor Wolley said that MoD has not yet set up a DUP. The Chief Secretary said he would want to look at that issue further, not least because there were other departments involved in Kosovo operations whose DUPs would be the first port of call for additional spending.

4. The Secretary of State said that he was grateful for the agreement to access to the Reserve, and recognised that it was not a license to spend money. He further noted that the timing of the costs of the Kosovo operations would depend upon when suppliers presented their invoices, and asked for access to the Reserve for any of the additional costs of Kosovo that might fall in the next financial year.

5. Continuing, the Secretary of State said that the underspend in the previous financial year (1998-99) had largely been the result of improved internal financial management and delays on some large procurement programmes. It should not be interpreted as a barometer of spare cash, but as a sign of MoD's prudent exploitation of flexibility. The Chief Secretary noted these comments.

6. John Gieve said that the scope to pass bills forward from this financial year (1999-00) to next (2000-01) should be explored now. The Chief Secretary said that a deferral of costs might be the best option in the circumstances. The Secretary of State said that he would look at what he could do, although there were constraints on the scope for delaying payments on big procurement contracts.





### CONFIDENTIAL - POLICY

7. On replenishment of stocks used in the conflict, the Chief Secretary said that clearly in cases where there was an operational military need, stocks would need to be replenished rapidly. However, in other cases officials would need to discuss the level at which stocks should be maintained, and the most appropriate timescale for replenishment.

8. On burdensharing, the Chief Secretary said that fair arrangements for sharing the costs of the operation internationally was a key objective. The UK share of any Kosovo Force (KFOR) should be no greater than the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. The Secretary of State agreed and said that he hoped ultimately it would be less, since the UK currently bore a disproportionate share of SFOR. He was keen to cut back on Balkan commitments, since they threatened to overstretch the UK's military capabilities. He continued to plan on the basis of reducing the UK commitment to SFOR by the end of the year, while recognising that this depended on operational contingencies.

9. On announcement of the costs of the conflict, the Chief Secretary said that no further information should be released for the moment. It would be more convenient to update the announcement of costs incurred on a periodic basis, at intervals to be determined from time to time by the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury, and some time in arrears. The Secretary of State agreed on the basis that it was important for operational reasons to avoid releasing information on costs too rapidly or predictably. The Ministers agreed that officials should periodically agree a joint note recommending an updated announcement on costs, and further asked officials for a note on how the announcement of costs was dealt with in the Gulf War and in the Falklands War.



**CONFIDENTIAL - POLICY**

10. The Chief Secretary said that the current overall line on the costs of the conflict - that on any realistic scenario the costs were containable within existing spending plans - was credible and should be maintained. Ministers could, if required, reconsider this overall line in the light of any substantial developments.

11. The Ministers agreed that officials should agree the text of a minute for the Chief Secretary to send the Secretary of State formally recording the agreement that had been reached.

12. Finally, the Chief Secretary accepted an invitation from the Secretary of State to attend one of the daily 8.30 am MoD Kosovo meetings in the near future, to be followed by a more detailed briefing meeting on the Kosovo operations.

13. I am copying this letter to Jeremy Heywood (No. 10), Tom Scholar (HMT) and to Sebastian Wood (Sir Richard Wilson's office).

*Yours sincerely*  
*Jacob Nell*

**JACOB NELL****Assistant Private Secretary**



rec'd by fax  
Ge



Prime Minister

## KOSOVO: EVACUATION OF REFUGEES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

You asked for a note on the United Kingdom response to the evacuation of refugees from Macedonia and other neighbouring countries.

2. The starting point is the policy which we agreed before my attendance at the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 7 April. That is that the overwhelming majority of evacuees will need to be looked after in the region so that they will be able more readily to return to their homes in Kosovo once the conflict is over. This is also the policy we have agreed with our European partners. We have, nonetheless, made it clear that we are willing and ready to accept some thousands of refugees from the region as a temporary measure. You may recall that I raised the possibility of saying, if we were pressed, that we would take up to 20,000 refugees. You preferred not to put a figure on the number we were prepared to take. I followed this line and, through an alliance with the French, managed to persuade the Council to adopt our approach. Your Private Secretary's letter of today records that you remain in favour of this policy.

3. We have said that we will accept refugees in response to requests by UNHCR on the basis of criteria agreed with them. Those criteria are:

- that the evacuation should be entirely voluntary;
- that family unity should be respected;
- that priority should be given the most vulnerable and to those with special needs;
- that consideration should be given to links with the country of evacuation; and
- refugees being medically fit to travel.



4. The first request from UNHCR to the United Kingdom to take refugees was received on 19 April. With your agreement we responded within an hour and the first planeload of refugees arrived in the country last Sunday afternoon. I can tell you now that the second planeload will arrive at East Midlands airport on this Thursday afternoon. We expect that it will be carrying a similar number of people, around 160, to the one which arrived a few days ago. Evacuees arriving in the United Kingdom under the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme will be granted permission to enter in line with close family members already in the United Kingdom, or will be given exceptional leave to remain for 12 months. This status provides access to the benefits system and the right to work.

5. I have asked the Refugee Council to take the lead in putting in place a special reception service for refugees arriving under this programme. Excellent arrangements had been made for the arrival of the refugees in Leeds/Bradford by the public services and by the voluntary organisations. This very successful operation received positive coverage in the media. The Refugee Council with its partner agencies (Refugee Action, Red Cross and Scottish Refugee Council) are identifying further accommodation across the United Kingdom, and we will be ready to respond to further recommendations for evacuations from UNHCR.

6. UNHCR have indicated that they will be making such recommendations. In order to facilitate the selection of further refugees on the basis of the agreed criteria, my Department is making arrangements to send a number of staff to work alongside UNHCR in the refugee camps and in the Embassy in Skopje. I will also be writing to you within the next day or so to seek agreement to the rhythm of flights which we should be aiming for, particularly once the Home Office team is in place.

7. On media handling, we have a strategy, agreed by the Cabinet Office and Verreker co-ordinating groups, which reflects policy aims and objectives, namely that the primary aim of the Government and UNHCR is to care for refugees in the region and that we will, and are, responding positively to requests to accept evacuees on a temporary basis.

8. This policy has been underlined at every opportunity, in press statements, briefings, media interviews and articles which have been prepared for use by national and regional media.

9. More specifically we have an agreed, detailed media handling plan to accommodate individual arrivals of evacuees to locations around the country. This was put into good effect at the weekend when the first Kosovans arrived at Leeds Bradford Airport.



10. As agreed, we have deliberately stayed away from committing ourselves to the unhelpful and meaningless numbers or quota game and, as opposed to some EU countries, have not set arbitrary targets or limits.

11. The numbers issue will of, its own accord, diminish as more and more people are airlifted to the United Kingdom. What will become more important will be our ability to maintain local public support in the areas accommodating evacuees.

12. To this end we are actively pursuing a steady flow of 'good news' local stories demonstrating community support and backing for the evacuees. This activity, generated by regional COI and co-ordinated by my press office, should be supported by Ministerial visits when good opportunities arise.

*John Row*

27 April 1999



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FM PARIS TO FCOLN

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GRS 862

*Prime Minister*

*I'm sure this accurately reflects  
French views. But the argument is  
full of holes.*

*Top-JS  
cc J/0  
✓ PB  
AC  
Press*

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FM PARIS

TO DESKBY 271900Z FCO

TELNO 458

OF 271816Z APRIL 99

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK, BONN, UKDEL NATO, CABINET OFFICE

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS

FCO: FOR PS, PS/PUS, JONES PARRY, RICKETTS, PHILLIPS (EAD)

MOD: FOR PS/SOFS, CDS, AUS(HOO), MARSH (BALKANS SEC)

CABINET OFFICE: FOR SAWERS, POWELL AND CAMPBELL

MIPT

SUBJECT: PERSONAL: KOSOVO: FRENCH THINKING ON NEXT STEPS: COMMENT  
SUMMARY

1. WHERE THE FRENCH ARE COMING FROM, AND HEADING TO. A MIXTURE OF STRATEGIC, MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. A REAL DESIRE TO CHART THE WAY AHEAD WITH CLOSE ALLIES, FIRST AND FOREMOST THE UK.

DETAIL

2. THERE IS BOTH CONSISTENCY AND EVOLUTION IN FRENCH KOSOVO POLICY.

AIR CAMPAIGN

3. THE FRENCH REMAIN DETERMINED TO PURSUE THIS. THEY HAVE AGREED TO DIVERSIFY AND INTENSIFY THE AIR STRIKES. THEY ARE APPROVING PHASE III-TYPE TARGETS EVEN IF, FOR THE MOMENT, THEY CONTINUE TO RESIST A FORMAL TRANSITION TO PHASE III. THEY WANT IN PARTICULAR TO HIT HARD THE SERB MILITARY MACHINE IN AND AROUND KOSOVO, EVEN IF THAT MEANS INCREASED RISKS FOR THEIR PILOTS.

4. THE FRENCH ALSO REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO DIRECT THE AIR CAMPAIGN. FOR SEVERAL REASONS:

- CLARITY ABOUT OBJECTIVES: THE FRENCH BELIEVE WE NEED TO REMAIN FOCUSED ON NATO'S DEMANDS. THAT MEANS ATTACKING THE SERB MILITARY WITH THE AIM OF FORCING BELGRADE TO CONCEDE. IT DOES NOT (NOT) MEAN HITTING ECONOMIC/INDUSTRIAL TARGETS ACROSS THE FRY, IF THAT RISKS STRENGTHENING RATHER THAN WEAKENING MILOSEVIC'S POSITION AND SERB POPULAR SUPPORT FOR HIM:

- THE POLICY DIMENSION: THE CHOICE OF TARGETS HAS POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN FRENCH EYES, IN PARTICULAR THE EFFECT ON MONTENEGRO (A PERSONAL CHIRAC CONCERN) AND ON RUSSIA (DITTO):

- THE MILITARY DIMENSION: IT IS IMPORTANT FOR CHIRAC AND THE GOVERNMENT, NOT LEAST BECAUSE FRANCE IS OUTSIDE THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE, TO SHOW THAT NATO'S CAMPAIGN IS SET IN THE CONTEXT OF DECISIONS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTS, RATHER THAN AN EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY GAMEPLAN DRIVEN (AS THEY WOULD SEE IT) BY



SACEUR Worrying his US rather than NATO hat. The French continue to worry that SACEUR has no clear strategy. They would value CDS and his Quad counterparts having an early meeting with General Clark:

- PUBLIC OPINION: I WAS STRUCK BY LEVITTE'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO THE NEED TO KEEP THE PUBLIC ON SIDE. THE POLLS SUGGEST OPINION HERE IS ROBUST. BUT THAT COULD CHANGE. 'PUBLIC OPINION' IS ALSO, I SUSPECT, CODE FOR POLITICAL OPINION: A REAL CONCERN FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT AND A PRESIDENT LEADING A FRAGMENTED OPPOSITION.

#### GROUND INTERVENTION

5. ALL THESE FACTORS PLAY INTO CONSIDERATION OF GROUND TROOPS. THERE HAS BEEN A DISTINCT SHIFT IN THE FRENCH POSITION OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS. THEY SAY THAT WE NEED TO MAKE CLEAR TO MILOSEVIC AND TO OUR OWN PUBLIC OPINION THAT WE BELIEVE THE AIR CAMPAIGN WILL SUCCEED. TO DISCUSS, LET ALONE PREPARE FOR, GROUND INTERVENTION, WOULD SIGNAL LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN OUR OWN STRATEGY. IT WOULD ALSO UNDERMINE ALLIANCE COHESION. 1?

6. ALL OUR CONTACTS NOW TAKE THE LINE THAT, ASSUMING WE CANNOT DISMANTLE THE SERB FORCES FROM THE AIR, AN DEPLOYMENT IN KOSOVO WITHOUT SERB CONSENT WOULD MEAN TAKING THE FIGHT INTO MONTENEGRO AND ALL THE WAY TO BELGRADE. I CAN SEE CIRCUMSTANCES - SERB RESISTANCE SERIOUSLY REDUCED, BUT NOT ELIMINATED: FURTHER ATROCITIES - IN WHICH THE FRENCH MIGHT CONSIDER THIS. THEIR MILITARY PLANNERS ARE WORKING ON VARIOUS INTERVENTION SCENARIOS. BUT THEY ARE NOT PREPARED PUBLICLY TO CONTEMPLATE IT NOW. THEY ARGUE THAT, JUST AS WE NEEDED TO GO THE EXTRA MILE AFTER RAMBOUILLET BEFORE LAUNCHING AIR STRIKES, SO WE NEED TO GIVE THE AIR CAMPAIGN TIME BEFORE CONTEMPLATING WHAT TO DO IF IT FAILS. 1?

7. IF WE REACH SUMMER WITHOUT A BREAKTHROUGH, THE FRENCH WILL APPROACH THE CRUNCH DECISIONS ON GROUND INTERVENTION WITH SEVERAL FACTORS IN MIND:

- THE MILITARY RISKS: WOULD IT MEAN ALL-OUT WAR WITH THE FRY?
- THE STRATEGIC RISKS: HOW WOULD THE RUSSIANS REACT? WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPACT ON THE NEIGHBOURING STATES? WOULD NATO HOLD TOGETHER?:
- THE HUMANITARIAN RISKS, OF ACTION AND INACTION - FOR THE REFUGEES, BUT PARTICULARLY THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED, WITH WINTER TO COME:
- THE POLITICAL RISKS: WOULD JOSPIN'S GOVERNMENT HOLD TOGETHER? WOULD THE GAULLISTS SUPPORT CHIRAC? WOULD PUBLIC OPINION FOLLOW?

#### NEXT STEPS - CONSULTATION

8. I HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE IDENTITY OF VIEW EVIDENT FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH CHIRAC'S ADVISERS AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IT IS CLEAR THAT A LOT OF SERIOUS TOP-LEVEL THINKING IS TAKING PLACE HERE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PLUG INTO IT.

9. BUT THERE IS ALSO A REAL DESIRE FOR DIALOGUE WITH LONDON AND WITH CLOSE ALLIES MORE GENERALLY, NOT JUST ON THE IMMEDIATE AGENDA, BUT ALSO ABOUT HOW THE CONFLICT MAY EVOLVE. THE FRENCH VALUE AND WANT TO KEEP UP THE CONTACTS DEVELOPED AT ST MALO AND REINFORCED BY RAMBOUILLET. LEVITTE CAME BACK TO THIS TODAY, SUGGESTING A QUAD FOREIGN/DEFENCE MINISTERIAL AND/OR, AS HE SUGGESTED TO ME BEFORE WASHINGTON (JOHNSTON'S LETTER TO SAWERS OF 13 APRIL), A CANDID, FORWARD-LOOKING DISCUSSION WITH SAWERS, STEINER AND BERGER. I HOPE WE CAN RESPOND POSITIVELY. FOR KOSOVO REASONS AND MORE WIDELY, WE HAVE A LOT TO GAIN FROM CONTINUING TO WORK CLOSELY WITH FRANCE.



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INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VIENNA, ACTOR, WHIRL, CABINET OFFICE, MODUK  
INFO IMMEDIATE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POSTS, PJHQUK, UKNMR SHAPE  
INFO IMMEDIATE HQ MND SW BANJA LUKA, 30 SIGREGTDET UKNIC  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKSC(G) RHEINDALEN, UKNIC SARAJEVO

NOT FOR EU PARTNERS

SIC A2P/I9F

PJHQUK FOR J5 POL/OPS, HQMND SW FOR POLAD  
UKNMR PERSONAL FOR DSACEUR, UKNMR AND D/POLAD TO SACEUR  
30 SIGREGTDET FOR POLAD AND COL EVERSON  
MODUK FOR BALKANS SECRETARIAT  
UKNIC SARAJEVO FOR DCOMOPS

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: FRENCH THINKING ON NEXT STEPS

#### SUMMARY

1. FRENCH COMMITTED TO INTENSIFIED AIR CAMPAIGN. INSIST ALLIES RETAIN CONTROL OF OVERALL STRATEGY. FIRMER PUBLIC LINE EXCLUDING DISCUSSION OF GROUND TROOPS. SCEPTICISM ABOUT DRASKOVIC. HINT OF MOVEMENT ON NAVAL BLOCKADE. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL) FOR COMMENT.

#### DETAIL

2. I DISCUSSED FRENCH THINKING ON KOSOVO ON 27 APRIL WITH LEVITTE AND DANA (ELYSEE). WE HAVE ALSO TALKED TO DEFROMONT (MATIGNON) AND LEFEBVRE (VEDRINE CABINET).

#### AIR CAMPAIGN

3. LEVITTE SAID CHIRAC WAS CLEAR THAT THE AIR CAMPAIGN WAS OUR BEST, INDEED OUR ONLY STRATEGY. WE HAD TO PERSIST EVEN IF IT TOOK A LONG TIME. WE NEEDED TO DO MORE AGAINST THE SERB FORCES ATTACKING KOSOVO. INTELLIGENCE SUGGESTED THESE WERE BEING REINFORCED. THE FRENCH WERE READY TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE, EVEN IF IT MEANT MORE RISKS FOR THEIR AIRMEN. THE PHASED CAMPAIGN - AND THE BAD WEATHER - HAD MEANT THAT WE HAD NOT SO FAR MADE AS MUCH PROGRESS IN DESTROYING THE SERB MEANS OF REPRESSION AS WE MIGHT HAVE HOPED. BUT IT HAD BEEN IMPORTANT TO TAKE PUBLIC OPINION WITH US. PEOPLE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FAILURE OF THE RAMBOUILLET PROCESS WOULD LEAD ON TO AIRSTRIKES. HAD THERE BEEN MASSIVE STRIKES FROM DAY 1, WE MIGHT NOT HAVE KEPT PUBLIC SUPPORT. ALSO, THE BRUTALITY OF MILOSEVIC'S ACTIONS HAD BEEN IMPORTANT IN REINFORCING PUBLIC SUPPORT.

4. LEVITTE SAID CHIRAC AGREED TO WIDENING THE RANGE OF TARGETS,



BUT FOR FRANCE IT WAS CRUCIAL THAT THIS REMAINED UNDER POLITICAL CONTROL. AGAIN HE REFERRED TO PUBLIC OPINION. IF WE WERE SEEN TO BE HITTING OUT APPARENTLY RANDOMLY AT TARGETS NOT CONNECTED WITH THE SERB FORCES OF REPRESSION, PUBLIC OPINION WOULD DESERT US. THE SERB TV STATION COULD BE DESCRIBED AS PART OF THE PROPAGANDA MACHINE, BUT THAT WAS GETTING CLOSE TO THE LIMIT OF WHAT WAS ACCEPTABLE. IN CONSIDERING ATTACKS ON ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE, WE HAD TO RECALL THAT 80% OF MACEDONIA'S ELECTRICITY CAME VIA THE FRY.

5. LEVITTE SAID WE HAD TO BE CLEAR ABOUT OUR OVERALL STRATEGY, OF WHICH TARGETING WAS AN IMPORTANT PART. THE AMERICANS HAD SAID THE AIM OF THE STRIKES WAS TO DEMORALISE THE SERB POPULATION. WASN'T THERE A RISK, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT BY CUTTING OFF THEIR ELECTRICITY, WE WOULD HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT AND SIMPLY REINFORCE THE NATIONALIST SENTIMENT SUPPORTING MILOSEVIC?

#### GROUND INTERVENTION

6. LEVITTE SAID CHIRAC HAD NOT WANTED THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT TO DISCUSS OPTIONS FOR A GROUND INTERVENTION: IT WOULD HAVE DIVIDED THE ALLIANCE AND WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ADMISSION OF FAILURE OF OUR STRATEGY. MOREOVER, THE FRENCH MILITARY WERE CLEAR THAT, UNLESS THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY COULD BE LARGELY DESTROYED, AN INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO RISKED HAVING TO BE EXTENDED INTO THE REST OF THE FRY. BUT LEVITTE RECOGNISED THAT, WITH THE LEAD-TIME NECESSARY FOR GROUND DEPLOYMENTS, THE ONSET OF WINTER WOULD HAVE TO BECOME A FACTOR IN OUR CALCULATIONS IF THE AIR CAMPAIGN HAD NOT YIELDED THE DESIRED RESULTS WITHIN A COUPLE OF MONTHS.

7. JOSPIN EFFECTIVELY EXCLUDED A GROUND INTERVENTION, OTHER THAN IN THE CASE OF IMPLEMENTATION, IN A STATEMENT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 27 APRIL. DEFROMONT (MATIGNON) TOLD US THIS WAS LARGELY A REACTION TO PRESS COMMENT THAT COULD WE ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES ONLY BY DEPLOYING GROUND TROOPS. IN PRACTICE, THE SITUATION WOULD EVOLVE AND, IF AIR STRIKES PROVED INEFFECTIVE, WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER GROUND OPTIONS. BUT NOW WAS NOT THE MOMENT.

8. LEFEBVRE SAID (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT PART OF THE FRENCH CALCULATION WAS THAT THE GOVERNMENT (A DISPARATE COALITION INCLUDING GREENS, COMMUNISTS AND EUROSCEPTICS) MIGHT NOT HOLD TOGETHER IF A GROUND INTERVENTION WERE LAUNCHED. ALSO, THERE WAS A RISK THAT PREPARING FOR A GROUND INTERVENTION WOULD SIMPLY ENCOURAGE MILOSEVIC TO SPEED UP HIS ETHNIC CLEANSING. AND IT WOULD SET BACK ANY HOPES OF WORKING WITH THE RUSSIANS AND SECURING UNSCR APPROVAL FOR OUR APPROACH (COMMENT: AN APPARENT SHIFT AWAY FROM THE PREVIOUS FRENCH PUBLIC LINE, WHICH SUGGESTED A SETTLEMENT COULD BE IMPOSED VIA THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHOUT FRY APPROVAL).

#### BELGRADE

9. VEDRINE IN PUBLIC AND OFFICIALS IN PRIVATE HAVE BEEN FAIRLY SCEPTICAL ABOUT DRASKOVIC'S REMARKS. DEFROMONT SAID IT MIGHT BE THE FIRST SIGN OF BELGRADE WEAKENING. BUT THAT WAS ALL THE MORE REASON FOR US TO STAND FIRM. IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT HE HAD APPEARED TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN KOSOVO.

#### NAVAL BLOCKADE

10. LEFEBVRE REHEARSED FRENCH OBJECTIONS. WE NEEDED A UN LEGAL BASE. SCR 1160 WAS INSUFFICIENT. WE SAID IT WAS PARADOXICAL TO CLAIM THAT THE EXISTING UNSCRS JUSTIFIED AN AIR WAR, BUT NOT A NAVAL BLOCKADE. LEFEBVRE RECOGNISED THE FORCE OF THE ARGUMENT AND HINTED THAT FRENCH OBJECTIONS MIGHT NOT BE SUSTAINED FOR MUCH LONGER.



11. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL) FOR COMMENT.

JAY

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PCLNAN 3196






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Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

Top-JS  
cc JPB  
PB



*(Signature)*

MO 6/18/5/5/1T

27 April 1999

*Dear John,*

**KOSOVO – TARGETING**

This letter is to record our conversation of earlier today in which you gave clearance for an attack, using precision guided munitions, on Podgorica airfield in Montenegro (BE 0322-08085). I indicated that there were four specific DMPIs on the airfield which had been cleared with the Defence Secretary: bulk fuel storage, a maintenance hangar, an aircraft parking area, and an aircraft hangar. In all cases the assessment of the risk of casualties was low, for both civilian and military, and of collateral damage, medium. In approving these attacks, which he did on the basis that the airfield was being used as a base for operations in and over Kosovo, by, amongst other things super Galeb aircraft and helicopters, the Defence Secretary took into account the Foreign Secretary's wish to minimise attacks in Montenegro; a desire he shares.

*Yours ever  
Chris*

(C M DEVERELL)  
Private Secretary

John Sawers Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

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From the Private Secretary

**MICHAEL PAKENHAM**  
**CABINET OFFICE**

**KOSOVO: COMMUNICATIONS**

**Broadcasting to the Serb People**

The Prime Minister is keen that we get our message across to the Serb people on why we are taking this action and the burden Milosevic represents around their necks. This idea has been mentioned before, but I should be grateful for some advice for the Prime Minister on what extra measures can be taken in terms of the beaming of independent radio and television stations into Serbia, and other methods of communication.

**News Stories**

Richard Gozney is heading up a Cabinet Office Group looking at information available which we can use with the media. There is a great deal of demand for this, though obviously there has to be a screening process to protect sensitive material. Again, a note for the Prime Minister on progress made, and the work plan of the Group, would be helpful.

**Kosovar Albanian Spokesmen**

In the first week of the campaign, much effort was put into getting Kosovar Albanian spokesmen on to our screens. There was a high point at the Foreign Secretary's press conference with three Kosovar Albanians but not much has been seen or heard of them since. The Prime Minister is keen for the FCO to revive this effort. Again, some feedback on progress would be helpful.

I am copying this minute to Sebastian Wood, Sherard Cowper-Coles (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Tom McKane (Ministry of Defence).

**JOHN SAWERS**  
27 April 1999

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**From:** John Sawers  
**Date:** 27 April 1999

**PRIME MINISTER**

**cc:** Jonathan Powell  
Philip Barton

**VISIT TO MACEDONIA AND ROMANIA**


Who should accompany you on your visit?

*JS*  
*I don't like to refuse Charles if he wants to*

David Manning spent a week in Macedonia at the beginning of the crisis and knows the leadership well. He is available and could come.

Charles Guthrie has also said he would like to accompany you. It is always fun to have Charles along. I doubt it would be the best use of his time in terms of the overall war effort. The emphasis of your visit is political rather than military. It might be more helpful for Charles to follow up with a separate visit of his own to address purely military issues. Finally, Paddy Ashdown has suggested you have a one on one meeting with General Mike Jackson, and that won't be possible with Charles in tow.

Unless you see a valuable specific role for him, I suggest we plan on Charles following up your visit later rather than go with you.



**JOHN SAWERS**



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