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545/4

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History of S O E in Yugoslavia by
Dr Mark Wheeler

FILE BEGINS 3 March 1988 ENDS 27.4.91

FILE No. 545/4

PART NUMBER

INDEX HEADINGS

OFFICIAL HISTORIES

1991

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
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REVIEW OF REGISTERED FILES DISPOSAL RECOMMENDATIONS

File number 545/4

File title History of S.O.E. in Yugoslavia by Dr Mark Wheeler

Desk officer Miss P.M. Andrews

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Signature of desk officer P.M. Andrews

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Continued on HR 7/2/2

Continued on HR 1271

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CABINET OFFICE
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1 MAY 1991
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31

c- Miss Andrews (Page 1 only)

I have now read the attachment. I am inclined to think that I should offer an expert assessment from the FCO. What do you think?

27th April, 1991.

RRB 4.5.

Sir Robin Butler, K.C.B. C.V.O.
The Cabinet Office,
10 Downing Street,
Whitehall,
LONDON.

c- Miss Andrews

Advice & draft reply please

I have read the letter. I should like to read the attachment at the weekend.
RRB 1.5.

My friend Major Archie Jack has been in touch with you on the subject of the official history for SOE in Yugoslavia. We both of us share great concern about the attitude of Dr. Wheeler and I myself wrote to your predecessor Sir Robert Armstrong - as he then was - objecting to the appointment, as did Nora Beloff also.

I have just returned from Belgrade where I was launching the Serbo/Croat edition of my book "The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power". My visit coincided with the students' demonstration; and meetings in Valjevo, Kragujevac and Belgrade, organised by my publishers as meetings to promote the book, turned into political meetings protesting against communism. This was inevitable since the theme of the book struck a chord with the Serbian people and coincided precisely with the purpose of the students' demonstration. The students were, of course, protesting against the government domination of the media, and particularly of the Belgrade television, and demanding a totally free press and an end to communist propaganda.

It was most encouraging that the Yugoslav Ambassador was sent for by the Foreign Office to get a dressing down about the shootings. Immense harm has been done by London, and the British Yugoslav society in particular, continuing to give the impression that the British still think Titoism was "a good thing" and that we would welcome a return to Titoist values and the rule of force in order to "prevent chaos" and hold Yugoslavia together with the barrel of a gun. Tito and Titoist values are out of fashion for good and all in Yugoslavia except for those few die-hard ex Partisan Generals and their cronies who draw down good pensions and enjoy special privileges. I was asked time and again in Belgrade if the British Prime Minister would apologise for the harm done by Britain to Yugoslavia, and specifically to the Serbian people, as Mrs. Thatcher apologised to Havel in respect of the harm done to Czechoslovakia.

Getting the history ^{right} is now really important. It is vital that official circles in London are seen to accept: that Tito was a murderous monster and a disaster for the country and for the Balkans; that he only managed to survive economically by a combination of grant aid at first and then massive loans; that these gave an appearance of prosperity whilst camouflaging the gross inefficiencies, corruption and wasteful despotism of the Tito regime; that without an unobtrusive but ruthless and efficient secret police the regime

an unparalleled and extensive and efficient secret police the active
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could not have survived; and that the Yugoslav human rights record is one of the worst in Eastern Europe even after the West in general, and London in particular, was lionising Tito as a "good communist". The West, and London in particular, could also regret Tito's massive quarter million massacres in 1944 - 1946 instead of trying to fudge the figures as did Wheeler in his recent letter to the Telegraph (March 19th 1991). This gives forty thousand massacred in Spring 1945 but ignores the killings which started already in Autumn 1944 and continued into the Spring of 1946. At the end of 1945 Tito called a halt because "no one fears death any more". His henchlings continued for a few months longer.

If the Serbs see that London still hankers after Titoism - and the recent Sunday Telegraph interview with Fitzroy Maclean and the appointment of Wheeler as official historian and his Titoist effusions in "Borba" give them good reason so to believe - then they have to ask themselves what hope have they, alone and unsupported, of getting rid of the evil Titoist despotism embodied today by Milošević and his mafia gang.

Peace is very fragile in Yugoslavia due to the religious and ethnic problems. They will always be there but the immediate cause of tension is the continuing communist influence in Serbia. Milošević has been using the ethnic problems in order to stir up nationalism and thus to obtain a measure of Serbian support. However most of the Serbs have seen through this now and they are very keen to replace him. He won the elections thanks to his manipulation of the ethnic problems but even more thanks to his domination of the media. The students recognised this and they are determined to bring an end to it; and it is significant that they have the support of nearly all the intellectuals in Belgrade and of most of the country. Milošević had to climb down because he could not count on the support of the army. One faction in the army wanted to impose martial law but another prevented this and Milošević was forced to give way. The struggle will continue and it must be in the interests of peace in Yugoslavia that the democrats win; and that Milošević and his gang become displaced. Only then will it be possible to find a solution which at least contains the ethnic problems. With this background the recent invitation of Admiral Mamula to address the R.U.S.I. and the nature of that address in which he referred to a possible reimposition of censorship and use of the army to maintain order was extremely unfortunate, and indeed provocative to democratic opinion in Belgrade.

One of the main problems arises from the fact that the opposition is divided and there is no outstanding alternative leader as a substitute for Milošević who has considerable charisma. As is evident in all East European economies there arises a great problem if all the communists disappear since no one else knows what buttons to press. However, finding a solution to these sort of problems is impossible if lies about what really happened in the past continue to be told. The truth about the past and about the mistakes have to be recognised if anything sensible is to emerge and, precisely because it is based on lies and because no one believes them anymore, communism has to be totally discarded. Furthermore communism as an ideology has to be shown up. There is no such thing. There never really was. There is just despotism and all the big communists were self seeking despots. And that appealed to their self seeking lackeys who did not go for the ideological fudge but who loved the trappings.

could not have survived; and that the Yugoslav human rights record was one of the worst in Eastern Europe. Even after the West in general, and London in particular, was likening Tito as a "good Communist". The West, and London in particular, could also regard Tito's massive October 1956 massacre in 1944-1945 instead of trying to judge the figures as did Wheeler in his recent letter to the Telegraph (March 1997). This gives forty thousand massacred in 1945 but ignores the killings which started already in Autumn 1944 and continued into the Spring of 1945. At the end of 1945 Tito called a halt because "no one fears death any more". His banishments continued for a few months longer.

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
In this context it is not surprising that my book and my visit were seized on as a ray of hope and light. The atmosphere in the meetings was inspiring. No one questioned my main theme. The questions turned on detail; on who was responsible for misleading Churchill; on whether or not Churchill had a natural antipathy to Serbia; on how the communists penetrated the British agencies and secret services; and in particular on why London continues to preach the Titoist disinformation when Tito and Titoism are totally discredited in Belgrade. It would be going too far to say that Wheeler is already a hate figure in Belgrade but it would not be going too far to point out that there is immense antipathy to him there. He is seen as the major exponent of Titoism in the younger generation of British historians.

If the British Government could be seen to break with its Titoist past and to give the democratic Serbs a fair hearing I sincerely believe that this would do a lot towards creating the atmosphere in which the diverse components of Yugoslavia could find the way to live together in peace.

I permit myself to attach a memorandum I wrote about four months ago which summarises what happened in the war and what has happened since in respect of British relations with Yugoslavia. I think it shows just how false is the information which has been put out by those who have a vested interest in justifying what was done when Churchill was persuaded to abandon our traditional allies the Serbs.

Thank you for your patience if you have read so far.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Michael Lees', with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the left and then curves back under the name.

MICHAEL LEES

(1) 1.

BACKGROUND

Yugoslavia

There were two resistance movements in Yugoslavia. That of Mihailović which started in the mountains in April 1941 immediately following the German conquest and that of Tito which started resistance in June 1941 when the Germans attacked Russia. Mihailović who was nominated Minister of Defence by the Royal Yugoslav Government in exile in London, had his main base in Serbia where his movement was predominant until the Summer of 1944. His army was primarily Serbian, loyal to the King and the exiled government, and based on the centuries old Četnik Homeguard tradition. Tito was a Croat, a lifelong international comintern apparatchik and the Soviet nominated leader of the communist party in Yugoslavia. His Partisan forces had their main base in Croatia but his recruits were drawn from all sources including quite a large proportion of Serbs. These came from the minorities in Croatia who were fleeing from the genocide programme carried out by the Ustaša. This was the pre-war Fascist terrorist organisation of Ante Pavelić who had become dictator of the Independent State of Croatia created by the Axis. The Tito Partisans claimed to be a national army of liberation but were organised and totally controlled by the communists throughout the war. When, in 1943, the Italians capitulated and the ultimate defeat of the Germans became evident, substantial numbers of the Ustaša changed sides and joined the Partisans in Croatia. Despite their criminal record they were grabbed by the communists and in some cases given senior positions. The Partisans also recruited surrendered Italians in Croatia and Dalmatia.

Thus at the end of 1943, whilst the Germans held the towns and the main lines of communication throughout Yugoslavia, the mountains and most of the countryside of Serbia were Mihailović territory but in Croatia and Slovenia the Partisans were stronger. At the end of 1943 Mihailović had about 60,000 men under arms and on active service, with peasant reserves, with some military training, of some 300,000, of whom perhaps the half had arms. Those forces were situated in Serbia commanding the main routes of communication from Slavonika to Belgrade and also the key mineral resources which were important for the German war economy. Tito's forces numbered perhaps 80,000 in total including 20,000 Italians, all of them mobile troops. He had no Četnik-style reserves.

Tito's main forces were in the wastelands of Bosnia (in the new Croatian state) in a less strategically important area and his forces in Serbia were negligible, less than a thousand men.

Prior to 1943 the British recognised only the Loyalist movement of Mihailović. However support given to him was negligible. The total supplies dropped to Mihailović from 1941 until the end of 1943 were about 200 tons. Then he was abandoned. In April 1943 the first contact was made with Tito following authorisation by Churchill personally in January. By the end of 1943 the Tito Partisans received about 1000 tons by air and nearly 20,000 tons

by sea. The total deliveries to the Partisans in the war were around 20,000 tons by air and 30,000 tons by sea. These massive supplies were used primarily in the prosecution of the civil war against the Loyalists.

Churchill decided to abandon Mihailović and give exclusive support to Tito on 10th December, 1943. The decision was taken at a meeting between W.S.C., Brigadier Maclean, Col. Deakin and Ralph Skrine Stevenson. The latter was formally Ambassador to the Royal Yugoslav government but he was, in fact, a fanatical supporter of the Partisans and already active as Maclean's link in Cairo. Not surprisingly he later became the first Ambassador to Tito. Brigadier Armstrong had been dropped to Mihailović's Headquarters in September at the same time as Maclean dropped to Tito. The Foreign Office had intended that the two Brigadiers should study the two movements and then be brought out to report together. In fact, there was no representation from the mission to Mihailović and the long signal reports from both his British and American missions were deliberately held up in SOE Cairo so that they failed to reach either Churchill or Eden before the critical meeting. Indeed I believe that neither ever saw those signals. A determined effort by the American Liaison officers to evacuate and report was sabotaged by SOE Cairo. Thus Churchill took his decisions purely on the basis of information prepared by SOE Cairo and on the eye witness reports of Maclean and Deakin. Deakin had been all the time at Tito's Headquarters from end May when he dropped until early December, other than one visit to the coast in Croatia at the time of the Italian surrender. Maclean had spent less than a month in the country, also all the time at Tito's Headquarters, other than one visit to the coast to make arrangements for the reception of supplies by sea. Neither Deakin nor Maclean had set foot in Serbia, the largest and most important part of Yugoslavia and the key area of strategic interest.

It is now accepted fact that SOE Cairo was penetrated by communists and working throughout 1943 to persuade the British Government to abandon Mihailović and support the Partisans. The policy of the chiefs of staff decreed the provision of equal support to both movements after contact had been made with the Partisans. Yet Mihailović received only 150 tons in the whole of 1943 whilst the Partisans starting in June received 1,000 tons by air before the end of 1943 (apart from the supplies by sea). SOE controlled air supplies and deliberately switched supplies from Mihailović to the Partisans. When he dropped in Brigadier Armstrong carried a message from General Wilson the commander-in-chief Middle East to Mihailović which promised "more supplies". In fact SOE stopped all supplies to Mihailović two or three days before Brigadier Armstrong delivered the letter.

Apart from the malign SOE influence both Deakin and Maclean were totally captivated by Tito and his communist colleagues who were old hands at the art of bamboozlement. Their reports based on Partisan source information only, alleged that Mihailović was ineffective and a collaborator. They claimed that Tito was killing more Germans and that he would take over Yugoslavia in any case. Maclean's report even went so far as to state that Tito had 220,000 active soldiers in all and 30,000 in Serbia and that Mihailović had only one twentieth of the Partisan forces i.e. 11,000 men.

Churchill accepted these totally false figures and the arguments put up by Mackean, Deakin and SOE Cairo. He established a policy of total support to Tito in the hope and confidence of winning his friendship. He hoped that Maclean and Randolph, his own son, could together persuade Tito to have the King back, become a democrat and arrange free elections after the war. The communists bamboozled SOE Cairo, Maclean and Deakin and through them they bamboozled W.S.C. On 10th December, 1943 Yugoslavia's fate was sealed.

Throughout 1944 arms poured in to Tito's forces by sea and air and the BBC joined with the communist operated Radio Free Yugoslavia, which was broadcasting from southern Russia, in attacking the Loyalist Mihailović movement and urging all good citizens to join the Partisans. The full logistical, political and psychological force of the Western Allies was harnessed behind Tito.

Nevertheless Serbia remained practically inviolate Mihailović territory until the late Summer of 1944. The only change was that sabotage of the German main communications which had been building up under British Mission influence and leadership ceased when British support and the dribble of supplies stopped. In May 1944 British missions with Mihailović forces coming from all over Serbia concentrated for evacuation from an improvised airfield at Mihailović Pranjani Headquarters near Čačak in the Sumadija. Covering perhaps forty per cent of total Yugoslav territory these missions and some hundred crashed air-crew encountered no Partisans although, when they arrived in Bari, the fraudulent SOE maps claimed that the entire area was already in Partisan hands.

At the end of May 1944 Tito's Headquarters was attacked and over-run by German paratroops. Tito fled to Italy and was from then on installed on Vis, a Yugoslav island, but under British military and naval protection with a British airfield. He did not return to the Yugoslav mainland until the Autumn when he accompanied the Red Army. He sneaked out of Vis surreptitiously in September 1944 by air, without even telling his British hosts, in order to solicit Stalins help by diverting the Red Army into Yugoslavia to takeover the Partisans' job of driving out the Germans. This enabled the Partisans to concentrate their efforts on overcoming the Loyalists and establishing a communist dictatorship.

Before leaving Vis Tito had made plans with his British protectors for massive British help to be given for his invasion of Serbia. The Allied operation was named "Ratweek" and was mounted officially to catch the Germans retreating from Greece. In fact the German army made an orderly withdrawal and a major proportion of the allied efforts, including both strategic and tactical air support, was directed against the Loyalist forces. It was also used to terrorise the anticommunist population of the Serbian heartland. The Partisans avoided contact with the retreating Germans and concentrated their forces on the conquest of the Loyalist held areas in Serbia. Yugoslav fought Yugoslavs whilst the Germans retreated north westwards.

Ironically the major action fought by Yugoslavs against the retreating Germans was carried out by the Loyalists in the

Sumadija area near Mihailović's Headquarters near Čačak. Mihailović's whole strategy from 1941 on had been based on conserving his forces for a major uprising at the right time. Although abandoned by the Western Allies and desperately short of ammunition to defend himself against the Partisan invasion he nevertheless staged an "Ustanak" or uprising as he had always planned. His units met up with the Red Army who accepted their help and then turned them over to their Partisan enemies for disposal. The annihilation of the Loyalist forces and the elimination of all bourgeois and democratic elements of Serbian society was inevitable once the Red Army had cleared out the Germans and the Partisans were able to turn their full attention to the civil war with the major logistical and moral support of the Western Allies. Massacres were the order of the day.

The British policy fostered a civil war that could have been stopped. Indeed without the Western Allied support Tito could never have started any serious invasion of Serbia. The huge resistance potential of the martially inclined and fiercely patriotic heartland Serbs was utterly wasted. The Serbian people of the Serbian heartland, the major component of the Yugoslav population and our traditional allies, were decimated in a civil war in which they were attacked by a polyglot army of Croats, their Serbian cousins, ex-Ustaše, Italians and Bulgars who had been occupying Serbia on behalf of the Germans and who were turned around by Stalin for Tito's benefit. But the key to it all was the massive Western Allied support.

Worse still the British policy sacrificed the political future of Yugoslavia.

The claim that the British wartime policy of making friends with Tito influenced events in 1948 is utterly bogus. Tito's regime between 1945 and 1948 was about the most oppressive in Eastern Europe. When in 1948 Tito quarreled - temporarily - with Stalin the West sought to exploit this and pour in aid. Tito took the aid and used it to pretend that his regime was something better than other communist regimes. He gave absolutely nothing in return. Indeed his Third World initiatives were consistently harmful to the West. His human rights record remained appalling and Yugoslavia now has the burden of his massive debts to service. The West gave Tito virtually everything he asked for, in the war and afterwards. Neither in the war nor since did Tito give anything in return - other than the contempt which communists show to those they can deceive and whom they consequently despise.

The scene in Yugoslavia today is a direct consequence of the civil war. The Serbs are a proud people with an economy traditionally based on individualistic peasant holdings and they are the last people in Europe one would expect to embrace communism. Above all the Serbs are intensely nationalistic and proud of their history. It is a sad irony that the communist Nomenklatura - now calling themselves socialists - have managed to hold onto power in Serbia by harnessing the nationalism of the Serbs against the Albanian minority in Kosovo and against the Croats. Tito feared the Serbs and discriminated against them but the army is now trying to resuscitate communism; they claim in order to preserve the good aspects of Titoism; in fact to save their own position and privileges.

This is where history comes in. Both Churchill and Eden

acknowledged publicly and unequivocally that their Yugoslav policy was a disaster. Regrettably they lost the 1945 election and the government lost any interest in the fate of the Yugoslav people. Those who manoeuvred British policy into selling out Yugoslavia to communism hijacked history. Romantic fairy tales were published by participants in the war in Yugoslavia on the Partisan side and Tito's public relations men destroyed and created records to support anything they wanted to prove. In turn these romantic eye witness fairy tales and the Belgrade records became "sources" for historians. There was massive fellow-traveller and communist influence in the academic profession in the post-war years and symposia packed with Partisan protagonists were organised to create the false Red history. The events of 1948 gave this movement enormous momentum and it has never looked back. Having failed to get the Socialist government's support to give evidence in favour of Mihailović at his trial in 1946 the surviving members of the British Mission to Mihailović found themselves shouted down by the fanatical Titoites. The few Loyalists who escaped to the West were forced to keep their heads down for fear of being accused as "quislings". In Yugoslavia very very few Loyalist intellectuals survived the massacres of all those elements who might resist Tito. The Mihailović case went by default.

When the British records were released under the thirty year rule another spate of works appeared using these records further to ensure the perpetuation of the heroic Tito myth and another packed symposium was organised to reinforce them. Interestingly until David Martin - a lone American voice speaking out for Mihailović since the 1940's - and I, myself, discovered their significance, no one seems to have looked at the SOE files which were released, seemingly in error, and which blew the whole Tito myth apart. Maybe they were deliberately ignored.

Then the Cabinet office took the decision to appoint an official historian. This was followed by frantic manoeuvring. As was to be expected the selected candidate was a marked supporter of the Partisans, a young man, Dr. Wheeler of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, who had been a pupil of Deakin and whose whole training reflected the Titoite school of thought. His previously published work (Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940/43) demonstrates his total committment to the "Received Wisdom". Nora Beloff - author of Tito's Flawed Legacy - and I wrote to Sir Robert Armstrong of the Cabinet office expressing our concern at this appointment. We urged that an unprejudiced neutral historian be appointed or, better still, that no appointment be made and history left to those who wished to publish their views. However Sir Robert was adamant. We felt so aggrieved at the evident lack of consideration given to our arguements that we published the correspondence in the Salisbury Review with Sir Robert's agreement.

Since Dr. Wheelers appointment, I and others have endeavoured to provide him with material and give him every cooperation in order to help him learn the truth. But it is evident that his mind is grooved with Titoite prejudices.

As it was then obvious that the official history would just reflect the grotesque "received wisdom" I decided to write a book myself which was published by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich in America as British publishers felt it was too controversial or, perhaps, were warned off.

It is a fascinating fact that this book (The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power) was sought out and accepted for publication in Yugoslavia by BIGZ the largest semi-state publishing organisation in Belgrade, where the government in power is still communist, when all the British publishers we approached have shied away from it.

I visited Belgrade and found that there was immense interest in my book. Although it was then still in process of translation many intellectuals had obtained photocopies of proofs through contacts in the United States even before the book was published there and I was mobbed by the media seeking interviews and asking highly informed questions. There was immense interest in what they called "The new history replacing the only lying mythology". It was evident to me that there is a general desire to learn what really happened in the war and the largest opposition party in Serbia has made the rehabilitation of General Mihailovic one of its key election programmes.

I believe that it is our duty to tell the truth of what happened. Although Churchill and Eden both acknowledged their error in betraying Mihailovic the British Establishment has denigrated his patriotic Serbian Loyalists and accused them of being "quislings". Widows and children of good Serbian patriots have had to live with that slur for forty five years. Tito is dead and totally discredited in Yugoslavia even by those who still vote for the communists "in order to protect Serbian rights from the Albanians and the Croats and to avoid chaos". Great Britain has no longer anything to gain by perpetuating the forty five year old communist inspired lie. Never in the history of the world has it been more necessary to recognise the truth and denounce communist disinformation. I wrote my book in 1987 and 1988 before the events in Eastern Europe took place. I have not had to alter one word. The breakup of communism in Eastern Europe and the manoeuverings which are still going on by the old communist Nomenklatura and the members of the KGB, the Securitate and the Stasi and other evil oppressive organisations are now evident for all to see. The power of these evil organisations is horrifying. At least now we can recognise it and that is our major defence.

I am enormously concerned about the official history. An interview given by Dr. Wheeler to the newspaper Borba in Belgrade shows that he has changed his views hardly at all and that he is still caught up with the old Titoist Received wisdom. Dr. Wheeler is a young man and it will be a year or two before he finishes his work but when it is finished - if it is published - it will bear the imprint of the official history and for that reason it will be regarded by scholars and the public as more authoritative than books such as mine written by private individuals. The book has to be approved by the Government after it is finished but the arbitrary and cavalier treatment of the protests by Nora Beloff and myself at the time of Wheelers appointment are no great encouragement to believe that Government will be any more likely to listen then to protests or even that people like myself and Nora Beloff will have the opportunity to see the work before publication and comment.

There is still a very strong Titoite influence in the Special Force Club who may be consulted by the Cabinet Office or the Foreign Office as the case may be. If we make no arrangements now to ensure that the history gets a proper objective review then it will assuredly be rushed through on the nod.

I believe that we should endeavour to obtain from the Cabinet Office or from the Foreign Office an unequivocal undertaking that the Official Historian's book will be submitted for vetting before publication to a committee composed of an equal number of representatives from the two sides with an independent historian as chairman. The obvious choice for chairman is Stevan Pavlowitch of Southampton University. Pavlowitch is recognised throughout the world as the leading expert and as a man of total objectivity. He should have been appointed official historian. He was rejected out of hand on the specious grounds that he had a Yugoslav name. He is in fact a British citizen educated in France and Italy whereas the man who was appointed, Wheeler, is an American.

I believe that were such a binding decision taken and minuted, it would in itself perhaps have a salutary influence on the history. The alternative which many of us would prefer is that there should be no official history of SOE in Yugoslavia. By any standard the performance of SOE Cairo was at best very dubious, at worst criminal and treacherous. The history therefore has to be either mendacious or condemnatory. To publish an official history deliberately putting the governments seal of approval on a perpetuation of the lies and myths which constitute the "received wisdom" would be shameful and will do nothing for Britain's reputation in Yugoslavia. The majority of Yugoslavs today reject what Tito stood for and what they call the "old lying mythology".

My other earnest recommendation is that consideration be given to honouring General Mihailović with some decoration recognising his loyalty to the allied cause and his remarkable action in saving the lives of crashed bomber crews after we had abandoned him and were supplying his mortal enemies with arms to attack him. The Americans under Truman recognised the great injustice meted out to Mihailović and did just that in 1948. An honour for Mihailović precisely at this belated stage would clear his name and would have incalculably great psychological effect with the Serb people. The largest Serbian opposition party competing with the so-called socialists (who are openly communist. Nomenklatura under another name) has as a major point in its programme the rehabilitation of Mihailović.

My own book, which has only just been translated and is not yet in print in Serbo-Croat, has nevertheless made an extraordinary impact already because the rehabilitation of Mihailović is what the Serbian people want and what they believe in. We did terrible harm to Serbia in the war. To give them back the truth is surely not asking too much.

NOTE FOR RECORD

Dr Mark Wheeler came to see me on Tuesday 23 April 1991 to discuss the correspondence which Sir Robin Butler has been receiving from Mr Archie Jack about his appointment and competence as the Official Historian preparing "SOE in Yugoslavia".

I asked Dr Wheeler whether he thought that ceasing to take part in the sort of detailed correspondence favoured by Mr Jack, Mr Lees et al, whilst nevertheless arranging to see them and take account of their views, in so far as he was able, would help to stem the flow. He was doubtful and expressed the view that if he declined to correspond in detail with them they would complain the louder for being given the "brush off". He wondered why Mr Jack did not publish his own account. He had arranged to visit Mr Jack, in the company of Sir Alexander Glen, later this year. Mr Jack had known of his visit before he wrote his latest letter to Sir Robin Butler so the fact that he was to be given the opportunity to have his say obviously had not deterred him from continuing the correspondence. Dr Wheeler said that he was more agnostic on the subject than the Jack/Lees clan gave him credit for but the only way he could demonstrate impartiality to their satisfaction would be to agree one hundred per cent with their views. He added that his work was not made easier by the knowledge that whenever he spoke in public someone attended with the sole purpose of reporting what he had said to Mr Jack and/or his allies. Dr Wheeler was surprised and impressed by the amount of attention being paid to Mr Jack's views and wondered if he had high level Governmental connections. To this I said only that Sir Robin Butler and before him, Lord Armstrong, were concerned to ensure that the views of anyone who wrote to them received attention and a courteous reply. I did not mention Dame Anne Mueller's connection with Mr Jack.

Dr Wheeler then spoke more generally about the difficulties he is facing whilst preparing 'SOE in Yugoslavia'. The archive is more extensive than he had been led to believe and its chaotic state made research difficult. The length of time which he had agreed with Macmillan for completion of the work was now unrealistic as was the size of the book proposed (approx 220 pages). Adam Sisman of Macmillan, with whom he had agreed his contract, had left Macmillan some time ago and no-one else had expressed any interest but he is to meet a representative of the firm next week when he will explore the possibility of transferring his contract to HMSO. I said that we would have no difficulty in agreeing such a transfer if HMSO was willing and I hoped that the better deal with HMSO could offer (taking C Woods as an example) might make his life easier. Dr Wheeler said that the main problem was time. Given his full-time lecturing duties he could spare only two days a week to the history which is not enough but he cannot afford to take more time off. He had applied for a Leverhulme Grant but had not even been

shortlisted. He thought that the fact that he was the Official Historian worked to his disadvantage. It was assumed that he was Government-funded and given research assistance whereas neither is true and even the expenses of, for example, the visit to Mr Jack in France has to be paid out of his own pocket. He was very pessimistic about the amount of time it would take him to complete the work on the present basis.

I said that I would be interested to hear the outcome of the meeting with Macmillan and that I would give the matter some thought to see whether any ideas for funding occurred to me.

POIA

MISS P M ANDREWS

Historical Section
24 April 1991



29

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 071-270 0101

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service
Sir Robin Butler KCB CVO

Ref. A091/968 ✓



22 April 1991

Miss Andrews

Dear Mr. Jack,

Thank you for your letter of 11 April 1991. I note what you say and, as I said in my earlier letter, I appreciate your concern but I do not think it would be appropriate for me to reprimand Dr Wheeler in the way you suggest; he should be free to express his views on matters such as those raised by the correspondence to which you have drawn my attention.

On the question of the method by which the Official History should be approved for publication I can add little to my letter of 25 March. I, and others concerned with the Official Histories, wish to see that a fair and balanced picture is presented and, when the time comes, we will do our best to ensure that the procedures adopted for approval prior to publication are satisfactory for this purpose. I hope you will accept my assurance on this point.

Yours sincerely,

Robin Butler

A F M Jack Esq MC
La Collanche
74570 Thorens Glieres
France

28

CABINET OFFICE
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18 APR 1991
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PMB

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SIR ROBIN BUTLER ✓

SOE IN YUGOSLAVIA

I have been asked to advise on and provide a draft reply to Mr Archie Jack's latest letter dated 11 April 1991.

Apart from disputing one of a number of figures used by Dr Wheeler in an article in the Daily Telegraph of 19 March 1991 in which he appears to have been trying to demonstrate how such figures are inflated, Mr Jack asks again about the use of a Scrutiny Committee to approve Dr Wheeler's Official History of SOE in Yugoslavia. This is a suggestion he put forward in his letter of 12 March and which in your reply dated 25 March 1991 you said that you had noted. You added that whatever means may be chosen for approving the History before publication, all concerned would do their best to ensure that the History which emerges presents a fair and balanced picture.

I do not think we can go any further at this stage. As Mr Jack himself pointed out it will be some time yet before Dr Wheeler completes his research and begins to write. We have very much in mind the need to ensure that the clearance procedures cover the balance of argument as well as historical accuracy and, when the time comes, we shall ensure that the procedures we adopt are adequate for that purpose; it is just possible that the sensitivities surrounding this topic might have diminished by that time!

I attach a suggested reply to Mr Jack for your consideration but to discourage him from writing to you every time Dr Wheeler does or says something to annoy him would you perhaps prefer that I should write on your behalf - it is clear from his latest letter that he did not expect you to reply personally.

*I had better write this time
PMB*

Pat Andrews

MISS P M ANDREWS

Historical Section
17 April 1991

~~DRAFT~~ LETTER FOR SIR ROBIN BUTLER TO SEND TO:-

A F M Jack Esq MC
La Collanche
74570 Thorens Glieres
FRANCE

968

Thank you for your letter of 11 April 1991. I note what you say and, as I said in my earlier letter, I appreciate your concern but I do not think it would be appropriate for me to reprimand Dr Wheeler in the way you suggest; he ~~must~~^{should} be free to express his views on matters such as those raised by the correspondence to which you have drawn my attention.

On the question of the method by which the Official History should be approved for publication I can add little to my letter of 25 March. ~~Your suggestion has been noted.~~ I, and others concerned with the Official Histories, wish to see that a fair and balanced picture is presented and, when the time comes, we will do our best to ensure that the procedures adopted for approval prior to publication are satisfactory for this purpose. I hope you will accept my assurance on this point.

8r

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16 APR 1991
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Confidential

~~c- Miss Andrews - 24.6.91~~

Advice & draft
reply please

pps with
Pat Andrews

(cd) 16/4

La Collanche,
74570 Thorens-Glières,
France

11th April 1991

Dear ~~Sir Robin~~, ^{Mr B}

Thank you for your letter (AO 91/721) of 25th March and for having replied to it personally, for your work load, I would imagine, is Herculean.

Since I last wrote to you, there has been a further incursion into the game by the umpire in partisan (both senses of the term) fashion. I enclose a cutting from The Daily Telegraph of 19th March. The Wheeler letter claims as "perhaps 40,000" the figures for the Tito massacres at the end of the war, whereas it has hitherto been estimated as a quarter of a million. Does this not pose the question once again as to whether this person is sufficiently impartial to fulfil his duties as the Official Historian? If you are dis-inclined at this juncture to replace him, surely you can rap him over the knuckles and ensure that he behaves.

May I return to the suggestion that I made in my letter to you of 12th March. If, in fact, Wheeler cannot now be replaced, I really do feel that the idea of a Scrutiny Committee, on the lines that I suggested, is deserving of serious consideration. I would be most grateful, therefore, if you would confirm that you are prepared to proceed in this direction.

The British have a plain duty to all those Serbs, our Allies in two world wars, whom we so shamefully abandoned to their fate in 1944: it is to ensure that at long last the whole truth be told. As one, who was privileged to serve with them, I am sure that you will understand my feelings. Needless to say, your personal help in this matter would be very much appreciated.

Please treat this letter as Confidential and would you be good enough to ensure that it is not passed on to the Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely

Archie Jack

Sir Robin Butler, KCB, CVO,
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall,
London, SW1A 2AS

D.T.
19 Mar 91

Yugoslavia matters to the West

SIR—Yugoslavia's agony may yet prove neither final nor fatal, but Charles Laurence's effort to comprehend it (article, March 18) offers as much misinformation as insight.

In the first place, he bandies figures for the individual Yugoslav peoples' human losses during the Second World War without making it clear that these are wild and self-aggrandising allegations. According to recent, and reliable calculations the death toll of Serbs and Montenegrins amounted not to one million, but to 537,000.

The Croatian Ustasa state can probably be held accountable for about half of these. Although Yugoslav Jews were, proportionately, the greatest victims the total was 60,000, not 700,000. Croat losses were 207,000. The figure of 400,000 Croats killed by the supposedly Serb-dominated communists at war's end is ridiculous.

The communists did indeed massacre thousands of their enemies in the spring of 1945 (perhaps 40,000), but they did not discriminate as between Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Albanians.

That each of the Yugoslav peoples believes its wartime death toll to have been far worse than it was — and that it holds other Yugoslavs guilty for the carnage — is certainly salient politically, and helps to explain both the existential fear of Croatia's Serb minority and the cautious response — so far — of the Zagreb government to Krajina's "secession".

Your correspondent appears to subscribe to the tired view of the Croat-Serb divide as being between Catholic-Habsburg culture and Orthodox-Ottoman barbarism. However ubiquitous extreme nationalism may now be among Yugoslavs, last week's massive anti-communist Belgrade demonstrations show an equal fervour on behalf of democracy. This

makes all the more surprising Mr Laurence's seeming endorsement of his Bosnian Muslim interlocutors' regret at the passing of Tito's "wise prescription" for containing Serb hegemony.

It would appear that the old Western tendency to applaud the imposition of order upon turbulent peoples is as impervious to logic and experience as is the Eastern habit of blaming malevolent foreign powers for all their misfortunes.

In fact, Yugoslavia is not a far away country whose fate matters little. Its geopolitical importance may be much reduced by the end of the Cold War, but its break-up (whether peaceable or violent) will reverberate widely. Several of its neighbours still hanker after bits and pieces of its territory. Others will quake at the prospect of a flood of refugees.

The European Community cannot but be vitally interested, since it would be the favoured destination of both refugees and successor states. This gives the EC an opportunity to engage in the sort of creative involvement and substantive cohesion it was so widely accused of failing to manifest in the case of the Gulf war.

Whether in offering to provide "good offices" for negotiation, economic assistance in the form of association agreements or even peace-keeping forces, EC statesmen must bear in mind that their preconceptions may be as flawed as those of their Yugoslav opposite numbers.

Dr MARK WHEELER
London WC1

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Letters to the Editor may be sent by facsimile to 071-538 6455.



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POL 26

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 071-270 0101

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service
Sir Robin Butler KCB CVO

Miss Andrews

~~Ref. A091/721~~ ✓

25 March 1991

Dear Mr. Jack,



Thank you for your letter of 12 March 1991. I am sorry to read of your continuing concern about Dr Wheeler's appointment as the Official Historian to write the history of SOE in Yugoslavia.

As you know from earlier correspondence Dr Wheeler was one of several candidates considered for this task along with Professor Pavlowitch whom you mention. My predecessor took steps to satisfy himself that Dr Wheeler was a suitable person and his appointment was sanctioned by the then Prime Minister. I could not therefore, nor would I wish to, replace Dr Wheeler, nor do I think it appropriate to abandon the project. Moreover, I believe that it is right for the story to be written whilst people such as yourself are able to contribute to it and I understand that Dr Wheeler is making arrangements to see you for this purpose.

I have taken note of your suggestion about procedures by which the history might be submitted for approval before publication. Whatever means may be chosen of achieving this I assure you that I, and I believe all concerned, will do their best to ensure that the Official History which emerges presents a fair and balanced picture.

I do understand your concern - thank you for writing so frankly.

Yours sincerely,

A F M Jack Esq MC
La Collanche
74570 Thorens Glieres
FRANCE

Robin Butler

⊕

25

CABINET OFFICE
A 3339 ✓
22 MAR 1991
MAILING INSTRUCTION

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Pl. type for my sig.
I should be grateful if you
would proceed as at X1.

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

SOE IN YUGOSLAVIA: DR MARK WHEELER

FERB
25.3.

I have been asked to advise on and provide a draft reply to Mr Archie Jack's letter of 12 March 1991 about Dr Wheeler's appointment as the Official Historian to write the history of SOE in Yugoslavia.

An indefatigable writer of letters on this topic Mr Jack is, in company with Miss Nora Beloff and Mr Michael Lees, a passionate opponent of Dr Wheeler's appointment. In 1987 and 1988 he wrote letters to the Prime Minister and subsequently to you which were answered at official level by the Foreign Office. Mr Jack subsequently and still corresponds at length with the SOE Adviser in the FCO on this and related matters. He has also been in touch with Dame Anne Mueller whose father he knew when serving with Mihailovic. She has in turn spoken to me informally on the matter. She does not want to become involved but she is interested as she has met Mr Jack and is concerned that his views should be taken into account.

Mr Jack was a Royal Engineer officer during the war. He was parachuted into Yugoslavia in 1943 by SOE and was on the staff of Brigadier Armstrong's Mission to Mihailovic. He is, as the correspondence shows, a man with very strong views. I understand from Dr Wheeler, who telephoned me recently on a different topic, that he is due to visit Mr Jack later this year in company with Sir Alexander Glen so that his views can be taken into account during the preparation of the history. I mentioned to Dr Wheeler that we had heard again from Mr Jack (he is aware of and has seen the earlier correspondence) but, in deference to Mr Jack's expressed wishes, I did not disclose the contents of the letter or agree to let Dr Wheeler have a copy, but the anti-Wheeler 'lobby' copies its correspondence around in such quantities that it would be surprising if he did not receive a copy from another source.

The issues raised by Mr Jack are very similar to those raised in earlier correspondence from him, Miss Beloff and Mr Lees, the latest of which was Mr Lees' letter to Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker to which you responded in a letter dated 6 February 1991 (AO91/293). The 'lobby' did not want Dr Wheeler to be appointed, they preferred Professor Pavlovitch of Southampton University who was considered as a possible author but was ruled out when the view was expressed that being of Yugoslav extraction (his father was believed to have been connected with the wartime Yugoslav Government-in-exile) he would be bound to be regarded as biased! There seems now to be a campaign to get Dr Wheeler removed from his position as Official Historian (Mr Jack goes as far as to say that the History would be better not written at all than written by him). Mr Jack also raises the question of approval of the history, assuming it is to be written. This is something to which we have been given consideration as I mentioned in my earlier submission on Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker's letter. We shall need to ensure that the clearance procedures cover not only historical accuracy but also the balance of argument.

The only new aspect of Mr Jack's letter is the extent to which he considers that his doubts about Dr Wheeler have been re-inforced by Dr Wheeler's own statements, in print, and during lectures and interviews since he was appointed. I have discussed this with the SOE Adviser who points out that Dr Wheeler's specialist subject is Yugoslavia. We cannot ask him not to speak

on matters relating to Yugoslavia for the duration of his appointment as the Official Historian and he is well aware of the need to avoid making use of the material in the SOE Archive for any purpose other than the paration of the history. I think however that he would be well advised to avoid being drawn into exchanges of correspondence such as that which Mr Jack has enclosed with his letter. It is clear that Mr Jack, Mr Lees et al are not going to be satisfied with anything he says. As long as he sees them, listens to their points of view and take account of them in the History I think he can do no more. I could put these points to Dr Wheeler or ask the SOE Adviser to do so if you agree.

In the meantime I attach a suggested draft reply to Mr Jack for consideration. I do not think it would be appropriate to take up every point he raises and so I have drafted in fairly general terms.

Pat Andrews

MISS P M ANDREWS

Historical Section
22 March 1991

~~DRAFT~~ LETTER FOR SIR ROBIN BUTLER TO SEND TO:-

A F M Jack Esq MC
La Collanche
74570 Thorens Glieres
FRANCE

721

Thank you for your letter of 12 March 1991. I am sorry to read of your continuing concern about Dr Wheeler's appointment as the Official Historian to write the history of SOE in Yugoslavia.

As you know from earlier correspondence Dr Wheeler was one of several candidates considered for this task along with Professor Pavlowitch whom you mention. My predecessor took steps to satisfy himself that Dr Wheeler was a suitable person and his appointment was sanctioned by the then Prime Minister. I could not therefore, nor would I wish to, replace Dr Wheeler, nor do I think it appropriate to abandon the project. ^{Moreover, I believe that it is right} ~~It is right I believe~~ for the story to be written whilst people such as yourself are able to contribute to it and I understand that Dr Wheeler is making arrangements to see you for this purpose.

I have taken note of your suggestion about procedures by which the history might be submitted for approval before publication. ^{Whatever means may be chosen of achieving this} ~~and~~ I can assure you that ^{and} all concerned, will do their best to ensure that the Official History which emerges presents a fair and balanced picture.

I, and I believe

Miss Andrews - Advice to draft
reply please

c- FERB (letter only)
D 27.3.91

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14/3

Confidential



La Collanche
74570 Thorens Glières,
France

12th March 1991

Dear Sir Rosik,

The purpose of this letter is to register my concern at the appointment, over three years ago, of a certain Dr. Mark Wheeler, as the Official Historian of S.O.E./Yugoslavia in the last war.

When I first heard of this appointment, I wrote a letter to the Prime Minister dated 15th December 1987 requesting that serious consideration should be given to Professor Stevan Pavlowitch being appointed to this task instead of Dr. Wheeler, whom I considered less suitable. It took two further letters from me, sent by registered post, before I received a reply on 21st June, after six months delay. The reply was sent by the Foreign Office and it was a rejection of my proposal.

My doubts about Dr. Wheeler's suitability for this task have since been re-inforced. Some of his letters, which I have been shown, indicate that in his attitudes he appears to be inclined to the Left. The Official History of S.O.E./Yugoslavia is concerned essentially with the Tito/Mihailovic saga and Britain's responsibility for what happened. Having witnessed some of the events myself on the ground, you will understand my personal concern. For an official history that tells "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth" it is absolutely essential that the Official Historian should be someone with an open, evenly balanced mind; I do not consider that Dr. Wheeler matches up to this requirement.

Dr. Wheeler has recently got himself involved in a political argument in the pages of BORBA, perhaps the most important newspaper published in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. This situation arose

from an interview, which Dr. Wheeler gave in Belgrade and which was published in BORBA on 15th December 1990. This was brought to the attention of Michael Lees, who then wrote a letter to Dr. Wheeler expressing disagreement with the view he had expressed and this letter was published in full in BORBA. (I should perhaps tell you that Michael Lees served in Serbia as a British Liaison Officer with Mihailovic's Loyalists and has recently written a well-researched book on the subject entitled "The Rape of Serbia"). There followed a reply from Dr. Wheeler, which was also published in BORBA and that was followed by a second letter from Michael Lees, which BORBA has almost certainly published by now. I enclose herewith copies of:-

- A. The BORBA report of the Dr. Wheeler's interview
- B. Michael Lees' first letter
- C. Dr. Wheeler's reply.
- D. Michael Lees' second letter.

Having read these papers you will realise that there is a fierce argument taking place in the Yugoslav press between on the one hand, Michael Lees arguing a strong case for the Mihailovic cause and on the other hand, Dr. Wheeler arguing for the Tito cause. Michael Lees, particularly with his personal knowledge in this field has every right to put over his case, but Dr. Wheeler certainly has not; as the Official Historian he should be occupying the position of the Judge on the Bench and not of the Counsel for the Prosecution. I do hope that you will agree with this concept.

I have just learnt that, on 11th April at the Institute of Contemporary History and Wiener Library, Dr. Wheeler will be giving a lecture entitled "Resistance and Collaboration in Yugoslavia"; judging by his past performances this allocution will probably prove to be an unbalanced performance. Do you not think that the referee should play his proper part and not participate in the game?

Something that must also be borne in mind is the fragile political situation existing in Yugoslavia to-day. Several of the republics are seeking virtual autonomy from the Communist Federal Government in Belgrade. In Serbia and Montenegro the situation is particularly fragile with a number of opposition parties of the Right and the Centre fighting the Communists (now re-christened the 'Socialists'); in the Serbian republican elections last December the Communists won. The leading party of the opposition, the Serb National Renewal Party, made an election promise to rehabilitate

Draza Mihailovic, who was shot on Tito's orders, and make of him their national hero. Thousands of Serbs gathered in the streets of Belgrade to honour Mihailovic on the anniversary of his execution, thousands of magazines were sold in the bookstalls with a picture of Mihailovic on the front page and appeals were made on the radio for anyone to come forward, who might know where Mihailovic was buried. These matters were reported in 'Le Figaro' and in 'The Economist'. In this very delicate situation it is more essential than ever that the Official History of S.O.E./Jugoslavia should be fairly balanced and truthful beyond reproach. By no means should the referee get tangled up with the players.

Another matter of concern is the time factor. It is over three years ago that Dr. Wheeler was appointed; I understand that the necessary research will continue for perhaps another two years; thus the whole work may take some eight years before it appears. By that time the few of us, who actually participated in these events, may no longer be compos mentis! or we may indeed have departed. This would make the publication of the Official History less open to criticism, though I am not inferring that this might be Dr. Wheeler's object.

I wonder whether the members of the Committee, which selected Dr. Wheeler, had read the book that he had already written on the subject, "Britain and the War for Jugoslavia 1940 - 1943" (1943 seems a curious date to close the narrative). I suspect not for, had they done so, they might well have arrived at a different decision.

May I suggest some possible solutions to this problem: -

1. Dr. Wheeler should be replaced by someone else, who is, not only competent in this field, but also completely neutral in his political attitudes. (This would be the best solution).
2. If no one can be found to match up with these requirements, then it would certainly be preferable that no Official History be written whatsoever.
3. Any Official History written should be submitted in draft to a Scrutiny Committee for their approval -- not 'in toto', but perhaps every six months or so.

4. The Scrutiny Committee appointed should consist of the 'great and the good', supplemented by, say, two British officers, who served with Mihailovich's Loyalists and two who served with Tito's Partisans.

5. Preferably the Committee should have access to the same research material as the Official Historian. How can it possibly be argued that the S.O.E. Files of 1942-1945 constitute an unacceptable security risk for Britain in 1991? It really is quite ludicrous.

On the previous occasion, in December 1987, when I brought up this matter in a letter to the Prime Minister, the letter was forwarded to the Foreign Office and it took six months before I received a reply. Furthermore the Foreign Office, very undiplomatically, showed the letter to Dr. Wheeler, which put me in a somewhat difficult position. This time I do request you to answer this letter directly; please do not forward it to the Foreign Office, nor show it to Dr. Wheeler. I am classifying the letter as Confidential and I do ask you to give to it the attention, which I believe it deserves.

To give you an idea of what those of us feel, who served with Mihailovic's Loyalists, I am enclosing a typed copy of a tape-recorded interview, which I gave to a representative from the Imperial War Museum about two years ago.

Yours sincerely,

Archie Jackson

Sir Robin Butler,
The Cabinet Office,
10 Downing Street
Whitehall,
London, SW1

P.S. The violent confrontations, which took place in Belgrade last week-end, enforce my contention that the Official Historian, Mark Wheeler — very curiously an American — must now either 'shut up' or 'get out' — preferably the latter.

A PAPER BASED ON AN
INTERVIEW GIVEN BY MAJOR ARCHIBALD JACK
TO MR CONRAD WOOD
OF THE IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM, LONDON,
ON-18th MARCH 1989
(Original text somewhat revised)

(I do hope that there may be no inaccuracies in this document
but, should there be any doubts in this respect,
I would welcome comments - A.J.)

Question: Could you tell me first of all how you came to be involved with S.O.E. in Yugoslavia?

Major Jack: Well, it so happened that in the beginning of 1943 I arrived in the Middle East and became an instructor at the Mountain Warfare School at Tripoli in Syria and this was not too far off from Haifa, where there was the S.O.E. School: I got to know the people there and so I thought it would be interesting to see whether there was a vacancy in some S.O.E. operation. I was then offered the job of Sabotage Officer with the Mihailović Mission, which was going to be parachuted into Yugoslavia in September and thus it did. We dropped in the normal way, but unfortunately we lost the moon and we had to drop in absolute darkness: the planes didn't like flying too low in those mountains so I went out at 2,000 feet, something like that, was swept far away from the dropping zone and landed, fortunately without injury, in a very rocky valley.

Question: When did you drop in?

Major Jack: It was in late September 1943?

Question: Whereabouts was it?

Major Jack: Well, it was near Čačak in Serbia.

Question: How do you spell Čačak?

Major Jack: Čačak.

Question: Now I think you were going to give a kind of chronological background to the situation there.

Major Jack: I think it is wise to do this, because the time factor is an important issue historically in this particular story. Let us start in December 1941. Already at that time Mihailović was regarded by the Germans as an important enemy and there were posters offering rewards for his capture being displayed throughout Serbia: I have got the full text here, if you would like to see it. At that very time Mihailović was being accused of being a traitor alongside General Nedić, who was commanding the Home Guard, but its worth recording, I think, that in 1942 Mihailović actually signalled to the Yugoslav Government in London, requesting that Nedić be included on the official list of traitors and this was later broadcast by the BBC, so there is absolutely no doubt that these accusations against Mihailović were completely false. As to the opinions the Germans had of Mihailović at that time, in July 1942 Himmler sent a signal to Heinrich Müller, who was his representative in the field, saying - "The basis of every success in Serbia and in the entire South-East of Europe lies in the annihilation of Mihailović": I think that's important. In the report, which Meyszner, the SS Chief of Police, sent in August 1942 to Hitler, and he had been sent by Hitler to repress the Serb resistance, he mentions Mihailović and Nedić, but there is no mention of the Partisans whatsoever, so as far as the Germans were concerned the Partisans did not exist in Serbia in August 1942. Now this is an important point: in November 1942 the BBC broadcast a message from the Yugoslav Prime Minister telling Mihailović to reserve his forces and energy for the future. He has been criticized so often

for not being active enough and here he is getting direct orders from the Yugoslav Prime Minister to lay low, because he had been already too active. I mention this because these were the instructions which were issued by and large to all the resistance movements in Europe - that they were to await a date, which would relate to an important Allied offensive and then they were to come out, but by no means were they to come out in advance. Yet Mihailović was being pushed all the time to do more and more and more, whereas his attitude, formed on this message from the Yugoslav Government, was to reserve his forces for the day of the Allied landing, or offensive and then there would be the 'Ustanak', which in Yugoslav means the 'uprising'. This was all planned and at that time the Nedicefsi, the Home Guard, which was fully armed, would have come over to him. In fact Mihailović did, in the end, declare the 'Ustanak' when the Russian invasion occurred, because he then realized that the Allied invasion, which he had always been led to believe would take place - he was completely deceived on that score - would in fact never take place.

Now in January 1943, Brigadier Keble, who was running the S.O.E. office in Cairo, had access to enemy intercepted signals: whether they were ENIGMA I doubt, but I don't know what they were. Davidson and Deakin in the office assembled the information and produced a secret operational wall map: it appears that Keble was convinced by this map that the Partisans should be backed. That was the beginning of the switch in the S.O.E. hierarchy from Mihailović to the Left, to the Communists and, in justifying the switch to Tito, S.O.E. claimed that he was holding down twenty-four German Divisions, whereas in 1943 the German troop strength in Yugoslavia was some eight understrength Divisions: this gives an idea of the fact that all the claims made by Tito were accepted by S.O.E. as the truth.

Question: Why should Deakin have been involved in such a thing do you think?

Major Jack: I have no answer to that question. He just happened to be working in the S.O.E. office at that time and was entrusted by Keble, with the aid of Davidson, to produce this map.

Question: Because one would have thought that somebody like Deakin could have no sympathy with Communism.

Major Jack: I assume that Deakin was just assembling on the wall map the information which was coming in from intelligence sources. Then on the 30th January 1943, and this is very important, with Deakin's personal help, Keble hands Churchill, who happened to be in Cairo, a memorandum on the Partisans: it was because of Deakin having worked with Churchill on his "Life of Marlborough" before the war, that there was this personal contact. In fact S.O.E. in London was furious about Churchill being wedded into the Tito concept and the Foreign Office also was disturbed, but Churchill personally gave Keble orders in January 1943 to go ahead with full Partisan support. Now what was happening on the German side? What was the German opinion of Mihailović at that time? On the 9th of February 1943, General Gehlen, who was the Head of the German Military Intelligence, Eastern Europe, reports "Amongst various resistance movements the movement of General Mihailović remains in the first place with regard to leadership, armament, organization and activity". At the end of February, Hitler writes to Mussolini "Your second army should regard Mihailović and his movement as uncompromising enemies of the Axis powers" and at that time Ribbentrop calls for Mihailović to be captured and hanged. This is the man, who

being accused very shortly afterwards of being a traitor and a collaborator. But funny things were happening in the S.O.E. office: at about that time Davidson, in his book, records the fact that Keble pushed Klugmann, whom I haven't mentioned yet, who was working in S.O.E., into a lavatory saying that Security was after him, but he promised, nevertheless, to protect him - which was curious. Klugmann, as you know, was a Communist from Cambridge days, he was part of the 'Cambridge Communist Clique', and he was already a Russian Secret Agent and a recruiter. We know all that now, but we, of course, had no idea at that time. Now, this is an interesting fact which came out after the War and no-one had the slightest knowledge of it at the time. On the 13th of March 1943, a meeting took place at Tito's request, between three Partisan leaders, Djilas, Velebit and Popović, who were very important figures, and the German General Dippold. The Partisan delegation stressed that they saw no reason for fighting the German Army, but wished solely to fight the Četniks - that means Mihailović's troops, the Loyalists - and that they would fight the British should the latter land in Yugoslavia. That was a pledge to the Germans on behalf of Tito by these very important people: Djilas was later Vice-President, as you know - this only came out from the German papers later. Furthermore, they proposed a cessation of hostilities between Germans and Partisans: Velebit and Djilas were flown in German planes from Sarajevo to Zagreb for further discussions - it wasn't just a discussion in a cornfield outside Sarajevo, or anything like that. But Ribbentrop, for some reason, forbade all further contact with the Partisans. Now, by that time we had Colonel Bailey in; he parachuted in on Xmas Day 1942, as far as I remember, to Mihailović. Marko Hudson had been in there since 1941, but Bailey was senior to him and went in to head the Mission to Mihailović. He received a message on the 28th of May 1943, from S.O.E. (Cairo) for Mihailović and it was claimed to be a direct message from the Commander-in-Chief: it said that Mihailović's forces were quite useless and that - "The Partisans represent a good and effective fighting force in all parts and only the Quislings represent General Mihailović": it also ordered Mihailović to withdraw his forces into a very small box inside Serbia. Now who drafted this signal? - it has never ever been traced and no-one has ever looked into the question.

Question: What are your own beliefs?

Major Jack: I have absolutely no idea, but Bailey claimed that it was Davidson who did it. There was a catastrophic reaction from Mihailović, as you can imagine. The Foreign Office was absolutely furious and they called for the signal to be rescinded. I have no idea whether it was or not, but I should think probably not. Now in June - Is this interesting do you think?

Question: Very.

Major Jack: In June 1943, Maclean arrived in Cairo seeking an appointment of interest through his friend, Sir Reginald Leeper (Ambassador to the Greek Government in exile), and thus Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office. His name came to Churchill, who requests his return to UK for personal briefing. Not having yet heard of the Partisans, Maclean believes he is being sent into the Četniks, but it wasn't quite like that, because we now know that he was going to be sent in as a Political Officer to the Tito Mission, headed by another Brigadier. But then there was this bizarre history of the 'fake signal', which landed on Churchill's desk, purporting to come from the Commander-in-Chief,

Middle East, claiming that Maclean had a record of being a pronounced coward, had shown signs of cowardice in battle, was also a well known homosexual and was therefore unfitted for the post that Churchill had in mind for him. Churchill showed this signal to Maclean, who, of course, couldn't account for it and Churchill said "Well don't worry about that, we shall ignore it completely". So Maclean returned to Cairo and there he met the Commander-in-Chief, who had with him a Colonel Vellacott from Intelligence, who said that he had been ordered by S.O.E. (Cairo) to spread these rumours about Maclean in order to prevent his getting this appointment. Maclean then went to the SOE office where he saw Keble, who was furious to see Maclean wearing Brigadier's badges of rank: he told him that on no account would he be leading a mission into Tito and that all the S.O.E. files and signals were closed to him.

Question: Do we know who was responsible for spreading these rumours?

Major Jack: I have never heard any explanation. This report, of course, is confirmed by Maclean himself. As a result of this, when Maclean went into Yugoslavia, he insisted on having a direct line of communication with the Commander-in-Chief and also with Churchill. He wasn't trusting S.O.E. any further. Now, Mihailović was already complaining to the Yugoslav Government about grossly untrue BBC reports - all sorts of operations carried out by his forces were being attributed to the Partisans and he was being accused also of collaboration. At this particular time, it is interesting that Ambassador Sir George Rendel, who was our Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in exile, is quoted as saying "Many of the BBC speakers such as Zlatoper and Petrović, are violently Leftist" - so its not altogether surprising. The BBC then reported in July that Novo Vreme, an important newspaper in Yugoslavia, carried a large advertisement, in which the Germans offered 100,000 gold marks for Tito's head, omitting completely to say that this advertisement offered the same sum for Mihailović's head: I have photocopies of this advertisement and there is absolutely no doubt that the BBC just cut out the reference to Mihailović. In August 1943 ENIGMA, the German Top Secret signal system, "left no doubt that, at least at the highest level, the Germans remained set on Mihailović's destruction", and that is Hinsley speaking, who is the expert on ENIGMA. The 8th of September, of course, Italy surrendered and Mihailović felt certain that there would be an invasion, which would follow, but which never took place. On the 9th of September, Douglas Howard at the Foreign Office wrote a minute, "I am sure that S.O.E. Cairo plus the Minister of State do not want us to come to a satisfactory agreement with Mihailović". That was the Foreign Office view in London of what was going on in Cairo. On the 12th of September, this is following the Italian surrender, 1,500 Loyalist troops assault Prijepolje killing 200 Germans, Bailey being present. On the same day the Royalists took the surrender of a large Italian garrison at Priboj, after an all night fight: Hudson and Mansfield were both present and witnessed that. On the 14th of September the BBC reported that the Partisans had fought these battles not the Četniks, although a signal had gone back from Bailey to S.O.E. (Cairo) reporting these actions. Then - this was very important - on the 14th of September, on S.O.E. instructions, Bailey negotiated with the Venezia Division, the Italian Division that surrendered at Berane to the Loyalists, that they should agree to pass under Allied command, thus retaining their arms. The Loyalists were so short of arms and the whole point of the Italian surrender, as far as Mihailović was concerned, was that this was the first opportunity he was ever going to get, and maybe the last, to obtain the arms he so much required. S.O.E. sent a signal to Bailey saying that the arms were not to be handed over and that the

Italians were to surrender, retaining their arms. But what followed was interesting: on the 13th of October, the BBC then announced that the Partisans had taken Berane, which in fact they had, but they had taken it from the Loyalists, and directly they had driven the Loyalists off, the Partisans then disarmed the Venezia Division: thus the Partisans gained from the Loyalists this huge stock of arms, which was much more than Mihailović received during the whole of the war. This shameful action was carried out on S.O.E. instructions: of course Mihailović exploded with indignation and it was not surprising. Brigadier Maclean dropped to the Partisans on the 17th of September to head the Tito Mission, and Brigadier Armstrong dropped to head the Mihailović Mission on the 24th of September and I dropped about the same date. With Armstrong came Colonel Seltz, who was the head of the American Sub-Mission. Armstrong carried a personal letter for Mihailović from the Commander-in-Chief dated the 8th of September, which was full of extravagant praise, saying what a marvellous person Mihailović was and how much he was doing: it continued - "I hope that the effective assistance we are now in a position to offer you will contribute to the liberation of your country from the yoke of Germany tyranny". I only mention this because by the next month it was the last supply sortie that we had. On the 29th of September the Royalists blew up four railway bridges at Mokra Gora, having killed 100 Bulgars, all in the presence of Armstrong, Hudson, and myself. In fact I blew the bridges; I was responsible for blowing them. On the 5th of October, and this was very important, a huge body of 2,500 Loyalists captured Višegrad, which was a German garrison town, killing 200 Germans, and we then went off to the south to where the railway bridge crosses in a gorge the River Drina and there was a large railway bridge, which was some 150 metres long. A German garrison in pillboxes was holding the bridge: we drove them off and they escaped in an armoured train. We then blew up the bridge and I've got some photographs of it here: 150 metres single span bridge. It was, perhaps the longest single span bridge blown up by resistance forces in Eastern Europe. In spite of the signals sent to S.O.E. (Cairo) after both these operations, the BBC attributed both of them to the Partisans. So Mihailović naturally realized that he was being betrayed: the situation got very difficult between him and Armstrong after that, because obviously Mihailović didn't trust us any more - and rightly so.

Question: Could I ask you at this point to what extent you felt in danger because of what the British Government's policy was towards Mihailović? Did you feel in personal danger?

Major Jack: No: we retained a very friendly relationship with the Yugoslavs we were working with, not only with the officers who were commanding the corps and brigades, but also with Mihailović's staff - Lalatović, who was the head of operations, and Novaković, the intelligence officer: they were very friendly, couldn't have been nicer, very quiet, controlled people. But also with the soldier orderlies we had, who were very loyal and would do everything they could for us. Sadly, my faithful orderly, Ljubo was wounded in an affray we had with the Germans and, to avoid being captured, he committed suicide. No, we never felt in danger: we didn't feel worried at all.

Question: Does it surprise you that no action was taken by Mihailović against British agents?

Major Jack: Well, I think, as Mihailović's situation got worse and worse, and it became increasingly obvious that, as the Allied armies moved up Italy, an

invasion of the Balkans became less and less likely. Mihailović felt increasingly that he was going to be abandoned. However, Mihailović was certainly not the sort of person who would have revenged himself on members of the British Mission.

Question: Did the Royalists ever come to you with complaints about the British Government's policy?

Major Jack: Oh, consistently: they would say "We can't understand it". Of course they used to listen to the Yugoslav BBC news and quite often, when we were on the march we wouldn't hear it and so we would be asked "What on earth did that mean?" and we would just have to say, "I am very sorry we don't understand it ourselves". "But haven't you reported back that we did it?" "Yes we did, we did report back that you did it, that we all did it together: and we can't account for it". We used to send signals back to S.O.E. (Cairo) saying, "What on earth's happening?" and, "Will you please report on the BBC attributions and apologies?" But this was never, never, never done.

Question: But you didn't suffer from any personal antagonism?

Major Jack: No, certainly not, and I think that is an enormous compliment to pay to the Serbs. To continue - a Foreign Office memorandum 'Most Secret Sources' of November 1943, reported that "Mihailović has given orders to all Četnik units to co-operate loyally with the Germans". Now, can you imagine anything more ridiculous? Here were all our Sub-Missions scattered over Serbia, they knew what their Serbian Loyalist troops were doing and there was never any conception of this happening: and in view of the operations we had just carried out and the many Germans we had just killed the same month at Višegrad - can you possibly account for that signal from 'Most Secret Sources'? It must be a fake. So what was the organization inside 'Most Secret Sources', which was producing fake information?

Question: What is your own speculation?

Major Jack: I've absolutely not the slightest idea. On the 26th of October Erik Greenwood and Jasper Rootham carried out an operation on the Iron Gates of the Danube. They actually opened fire on a tug and they blocked the Iron Gates temporarily: that resulted in 150 hostages being shot and there is no doubt about that, both Jasper Rootham and Erik Greenwood saw reprisal announcements displayed. I've got some similar announcements here, which I used to tear down when I saw them, because they were so bad for the morale of the population. Then, on the 18th of November, Brigadier Armstrong sends S.O.E. a most important signal of 92 parts, which I remember helping to encipher, with a proposed solution for the whole of the Yugoslav problem, delineating areas for Royalists ~~and~~ and for Partisans: it was addressed to London for reference "to the highest level", which meant the Foreign Secretary and the War Cabinet. I've got the whole text of the message here and it was a very, very sensible concept and it was one which, if it had been applied, could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. It is one which could perhaps be applied today and which would divide roughly the previous Austro-Hungarian Empire on one side from the previous Turkish Empire on the other. These are completely separate entities and have nothing in relationship with each other at all, neither historically, nor ethnically, nor religiously, nor from the point of view of their alphabet and they waged war against each other furiously over the years: the Croats loathe

The Serbs and the Serbs loathe the Croats. Anyway, eventually Bailey got back to England and he saw Churchill and Anthony Eden; when he saw Anthony Eden, he asked him what he thought of this signal and Eden replied that he had never seen it, so it never got to him for some reason. Churchill, he saw him twice and I saw Bailey shortly after he had seen Churchill, so he told me this himself personally. He said to me, "I saw Churchill twice, the first time I went down to Chequers and I was ushered in to him about an hour and a half later than the appointment and it was very late in the evening. He was sitting in an armchair, he had obviously had too much whisky and I talked to him and told him all". Bill Bailey had lived all his working life in Serbia and he really felt what was happening to Serbia and its people: he'd appealed to S.O.E. to get him out before and S.O.E. would never get him out, so eventually he walked out to the coast, and got out and came back to England with the information direct. He was horrified with his first meeting with Churchill: he went back very dispirited to his flat but was surprised some three days later to get a message from S.O.E. Headquarters in London saying that "The Prime Minister wants to see you again", so he went back. This time he saw Churchill earlier in the evening; there was quite a different character in the chair and it went more or less like this - "Oh well, good evening Bailey I've been giving serious thought to the interesting discourse you gave me the other night: I'm horrified by what's happening in Serbia. Now there are one or two things I'm not too clear about: you were talking about the situation on the 8th of September, was that the same as it was on the 4th of August, or were there slight differences?" - and so on. It appeared that Churchill, this comatose figure in the chair with the whisky by his side, had in fact registered all that Bailey had said to him on the previous occasion: Bailey was one of several who had gone in one after the other that night and had an interview with Churchill and there was no-one there taking notes at all: it was clear that everything from the first interview had been well registered in Churchill's brain and he ended up the discussion with Bailey by saying "I regret to say that over Yugoslavia I have been seriously misinformed", which is interesting. This was confirmed by Marko Hudson who also had a meeting at Chequers with Churchill: apparently Churchill said to Hudson that he knew Cairo had cooked the books, destroyed records and that the S.O.E. office in Cairo was a nest of intrigue. Well that's going a bit far forward chronologically, but I just thought I'd mention that as we were passing. What happened, I wonder, to that 92 part signal? To continue - I quote from a Foreign Office minute of 21st November - "The question of throwing over Mihailović is now under consideration". One must assume that the Foreign Office was completely ignorant of Loyalist operations of which some 70 were reported to Cairo by BLOs between August and December 1943, at the very time that the Foreign Office were considering overthrowing him. And the majority of these incidents were witnessed by British Officers, particularly those of major importance, and there would also have been operations of which the BLOs would have no personal knowledge, which were not reported. In fact a Foreign Office memorandum of 19th November 1943 states that "During the last eighteen months there is no evidence of any effective anti-Axis action initiated by Mihailović". The only explanation is that S.O.E. (Cairo) was deliberately depriving the Foreign Office of information of all these operations carried out by Mihailović's Loyalists. At that time Sir Douglas Howard was head of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office. David Martin interviewed Sir Douglas Howard in December 1977 and asked him, if he had received the reports of Loyalist operations, which S.O.E. (Cairo) had not passed on, would the Foreign Office decision on Mihailović have been affected. Sir Douglas Howard replied in the affirmative. So S.O.E. (Cairo)'s strategy to topple Mihailović was really

working. It should be noted that, as far as the Partisans were concerned, they carried out operations generally without British Officers there and then told the British Officers present what they had done. So all this was reported back to S.O.E. (Cairo) second-hand. As far as we were concerned, we were there with the Loyalists most of the time, so we could vouch for what happened. The 28th of November at the Teheran Conference, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed to give maximum help to the Partisans. I remember so well the Intelligence Officer at Mihailović's headquarters saying to me a day or two later, "Have you heard about the Teheran Conference?" and I hadn't. He said "Well, you appear to have given us away", and he wasn't angry, "I simply can't understand that, but do you think you could tell us what you managed to get in exchange, because it must have been very important". I thought that was a very sensitive comment on his part: - he could have been a very angry man, but that's the way he put it and I was very touched. Now, Churchill was going to come to Cairo and S.O.E. (Cairo) managed to get Maclean and Deakin out to meet him. No attempt whatsoever was made by S.O.E. to extract representatives from the Mihailović Mission for this meeting with Churchill. Absolutely not, although Sir Orme Sargent in a signal to S.O.E. (Cairo), which is on the records, said they must get someone out from the Mihailović Mission to give the whole story: S.O.E. (Cairo) made certain that didn't happen. So when Churchill came and met Deakin and Maclean in Cairo on the 9th and 10th of December they just told him exactly what Tito had told them: they handed it over to him as the gospel and he swallowed it hook, line and sinker. Then, in early December, without consulting or even informing in advance our Mission, S.O.E. (Cairo) signals all the BLOs with the Loyalists to sound out their local Loyalist commanders to see whether Mihailović could be replaced as their leader. Well, I think the majority of the BLOs refused to do that, but you can imagine the effect that would have had on the Mihailović Mission Headquarters, knowing that all these British Officers were saying "Look here, lets get rid of the leader, can't you think of someone else?" and so on. On the 9th of December S.O.E. sends Armstrong an ultimatum for Mihailović, that he's to blow up certain railway bridges in the Morava and Ibar valleys by the 29th of December, failing which he would be completely abandoned. Mihailović was unable or unwilling to see Armstrong at the time, I think he was away, going round his 'corpuses'. So the ultimatum was not delivered until the 23rd of December: Mihailović replied that he couldn't undertake the operation until the first half of January and that he required for the purpose certain arms and ammunition. To this request S.O.E. (Cairo) said that he had what was required already: I've already told you that, as far as the drops to Mission headquarters were concerned, we'd had practically nothing. Erik Greenwood then set off for the Morava valley and I to the Ibar valley, accompanied by Brigadier Armstrong. The trek through deep snow took several days. After a long reconnaissance of the Ibar valley, I selected the bridge and made detailed plans, which I have here, for a 'coup-de-main' demolition assault: we just had enough explosive. However, S.O.E. (Cairo), having been told we could do the job, then forbade us to carry out any more sabotage whatsoever, because they wanted to make absolutely certain that this ultimatum would sink Mihailović. There's no doubt about that, because its in the files. I had also prepared detailed plans for the sabotage of two of the three antimony mines in Serbia, but for similar reasons these operations had to be abandoned. Then, 16 days before the original ultimate had run out, S.O.E. (Cairo) signals all BLOs with the Loyalist forces, again without informing or consulting Brigadier Armstrong, that Mihailović was possibly being dropped and that all British personnel were to escape to the Partisans at once, which would have meant a long, difficult haul across territory, which was being fought over. Anyway the only people to do so were

de and Hudson: the others decided to stay with the Loyalists. Bailey and Hudson got back to Bari in April, after a very long and difficult trek, and then to London. Hudson was so furious at the distortion shown in the editing of all his signals from the field, that he tore some of them up. Seitz and Mansfield, the two Americans, regained Bari and then set straight off to the United States: they both wrote excellent reports, because they had been all over the country in a way that few British had been, they were determined to see what was happening. They walked hundreds and hundreds of miles and the Mansfield report is really worth reading and it should be respected, for in later life Mansfield became a High Court Judge. Seitz and Mansfield convinced Donovan, you know who Donovan was in America?

Question: Can you explain that on the tape?

Major Jack: He was the head of the equivalent of S.O.E. in the U.S.A. Donovan was convinced of the truth about Mihailović and Donovan, with Roosevelt's approval, organized a USA Mission, consisting of two groups of forty men divided into six teams. These teams were all briefed: they were sent off to Italy and they stood by in a Villa near Brindisi. But on the 6th of April, Churchill persuades Roosevelt in the name of Allied unity, not to send in this Mission and the idea is abandoned. On the 16th of April, Orthodox Easter Sunday, Allied bombers most stupidly bombed Belgrade causing many casualties amongst the churchgoers. I saw photographs of the wreckage caused and the Loyalists said "Really, did you have to bomb the city as people were coming out of Mass on Easter Sunday? What a date to choose."

Question: This was Easter 1944?

Major Jack: Yes. In May. Bailey and Hudson met Churchill, but we have covered that already. Now our evacuation: the British Liaison Officers with the Loyalists had been told to concentrate at a place called Pranjani, which was near Čačak, and there Erik Greenwood and I made a sort of landing ground on top of a flat mountain and we started the evacuation. The length required for a landing ground for a Dakota is 1,400 yards at sea level and you add 10% for every 1,000 feet above sea level, I suppose we were there at about 2,000 feet, so we ought to have added 20% on to 1,400 which makes it about 1,700 yards and this landing ground was only about 600 yards. Anyway we paced it out and we sent a signal back to S.O.E. (Bari) saying it was 700 yards, because we thought it would encourage them to land! The first night, the first plane came in and Erik and I were in charge: it landed beautifully - they had dropped previously some gooseneck flares, which we had put at 100 yard intervals down the runway. The plane landed absolutely on the first flare, put the brakes right on and then just came to a halt before it got to the end, otherwise it would have gone over the edge, it wasn't a vertical edge, but the mountain went down steeply. The plane turned round, went back and then took off with the normal load. I was, of course, at the far end to see what happened and I was horrified to find, as the plane came to the end, that the tail wheels were still on the ground. So the plane ran right off the edge of the mountain and fell about 100 feet in the air and I was looking down on top of it. Of course, it was in the middle of the night: we had another mountain in front of us, which had one or two little farms on top and some plum orchards. I thought that the plane was going to hit it. It put its headlights on, because we'd warned them this feature was in front: the plane almost stalled, just cleared the top of the mountain and then turned off left for Bari.

Question: What was the date of this approximately?

Major Jack: 30th of May 1944. The next plane landed and the pilot said "Look, there's been a slight problem with the first plane: he only just cleared the trees on that far mountainside, so I'm not taking the same load, I'm taking a lighter load", which was quite sensible. So he took a lighter load and he managed to get off. Well, when that first plane got back to Italy, they found that the undercarriage had gone through a plum tree on the far mountain and, as a result, they couldn't draw the undercarriage up; so they flew across the Adriatic with the undercarriage down all the way to Bari. As a result the Commander Balkan Air Force said he wasn't risking any more British planes, so we were abandoned. Then the American Air Force stepped in, because we had some American airmen with us and the Americans said "Well if you're going to abandon the British, that's up to you, but we're certainly going to rescue the Americans and we'll take out the British too". So after a few days the Americans came in, two planes a night as far as I remember, in Dakotas and did the same thing. But it was strange that the R.A.F. abandoned us; I never had a proper explanation about that. When we got back to Bari, I think I told you, that Jasper Rootham and I, who were sharing a room in the Hôtel Impériale, went into the S.O.E. Yugoslav office, and there was this huge wall map. Shall I tell you about it?

Question: Indeed so, please.

Major Jack: The areas said to be held by Tito were all covered in red flags and the areas held by Mihailović, which were comparatively small on the map, were marked with flags of a different colour, which I can't remember. Anyway we said - "This is absolute nonsense: some of these red-flagged areas we know well, we have walked over them in past months and slept in many of the villages: there isn't a sign of the Partisans having ever been near there, it's a complete Loyalist Serbian territory". The chap in charge of the map said - "Well I'm sorry, but these are the facts" and this was the stuff coming out from Tito's headquarters, in which Tito was saying "We've got this, we've got that, we've got that, we've got that", but little of it verified by British officers. Anyway having argued about it, Jasper Rootham, who was a man who usually retained his "sang froid", - I think I told you he'd been Private Secretary to Neville Chamberlain in No. 10, and a very intelligent person indeed, - lost his temper: he went up to the wall map and swept all the pins on to the ground, - not all of them but a good many of them - to express his indignation at the whole setup. We were then seen by General Stawell, who was commanding the S.O.E. (Bari): he is quoted in David Martin's book as saying "You chaps have become mentally contaminated" speaking to us as members of the Mihailović Missions and Sub-Missions. "The chaps you have been with aren't really on our side at all. The only people who are are the Partisans".

Question: This is Martin's book "Patriot or Traitor"?

Major Jack: That's right, yes. Well none of us were allowed into the S.O.E. Offices again, that was the end of that. I decided then to invite Klugmann, whom I think I told you I'd known at my prep. school and who was G2 Intelligence in the Yugoslav office, to come the next evening to the hotel bedroom that Jasper and I were sharing. We gathered round us about half-a-dozen of our friends and we asked him to explain this extraordinary situation, in which we'd been put in Yugoslavia, the lamentable lack of supply support, the appalling delays in the signals' system, the gross inefficiency in general: Klugmann

ologized with lame excuses that policy changes were decided at a much higher level, inefficiency was due to overworked personnel, etc., etc., but it was all terribly unconvincing, terribly unconvincing. Nevertheless what else could we believe? We couldn't possibly believe that there were Soviet 'moles' working in the office, or even some who were very strongly Communist orientated, although they weren't Soviet moles. But still, there we were. S.O.E. then asked me to head a Mission, which was to be parachuted into Czechoslovakia: I turned down the offer, saying that S.O.E. was the most lousy organisation I had ever encountered and that I would have nothing more to do with it. John Sehmer, who had led a Mihailović Sub-Mission, accepted the job: sadly he was captured and ended his days at Mathausen. So I was fortunate.

Question: Had Klugmann at any time made his Communist views clear to you?

Major Jack: No, I only knew him when we were aged 12 so, of course, that's not the kind of time that you have Communist views. When I met him in Cairo before going in to Yugoslavia, it was only just to say "How are you and tell me what you've been doing" and that sort of thing, but I had absolutely no idea of his Communist leanings at all.

Question: Because it appears he made no secret of the fact that he was a Communist.

Major Jack: To those who were working with him in the S.O.E. office there was absolutely not the slightest doubt. In the same way there was absolutely no doubt at all about Basil Davidson's concept of things; he was extremely Left-Wing, in fact he used to refer to himself and Klugmann and others in the office as "We Partisans". In Bari, in some other offices there were Left Wingers too, as Julian Amery confirms in his book, "Sons of the Eagle". The MI6 office was considered so insecure by Lyall of the PWE that he refused to circulate classified documents to it - refused to circulate classified documents to MI6! Arnoldi, the head of the American O.S.S. secret intelligence Yugoslav Section, actually employed Partisan women in Partisan uniform in key positions in his office. To return to our chronology, in June 1944, we returned to England. There were numerous reports, mainly from Mihailović, that more USA aircrew were ready for evacuation. The 15th US Air Force was in favour of rescuing them, but S.O.E. was against, as they didn't want any more Allied contact with Mihailović. The 15th American Air Force proposed sending their own Mission and S.O.E. wouldn't even allow that. So eventually President Roosevelt insisted on Churchill allowing this to happen and finally a Mission was sent in, Musulin, who had been with us as one of the American Liaison Officers, was chosen to start this; but in taking off from the airfield at Bari, he experienced seven aborted take-offs - seven, for various reasons. There must be a story behind that.

Question: You don't think it was just coincidence, in other words?

Major Jack: Seven? No. S.O.E. claimed that Pranjani, which was the area, where we had made this sort of little airfield for our evacuation, was now in Partisan hands: not surprisingly, when our friend got there, the American, he found that it was still in Mihailović's hands. Then, in August, Colonel McDowell joined Mihailović as head of the American Mission: he saw the same map that we saw in the S.O.E. office, but when he got into Yugoslavia he found that it was completely false, as it had been when we saw it. McDowell was a Balkan

expert, he had spent the whole of the period between the First and Second World Wars in the Balkans, so he knew more about the area than any other American could possibly have done. The McDowell report is worth reading. McDowell had with him Musulin, Lalich and one or two other Americans; their task was to get out all these American airmen, of whom there were then an enormous number. They got out, I think, 430 airmen, who had been collected by Mihailović's forces from all over Serbia: they had dropped like confetti coming back from raids mostly on the Ploesti oilfields in Rumania. There is no record that I know of their ever having been handed over to the Germans though there were, of course, large awards being offered. But from over this huge area of Serbia the Loyalists succeeded in collecting all these airmen, looking after them for weeks, feeding them, lodging them, getting boots and clothing for them, although they hadn't got enough for themselves, and passing them on eventually to the Pranjani area, where they were all evacuated. 435 American aircrew were evacuated from Pranjani in that period, and we took out about 30, so we are getting up to a total of 500 American airmen rescued by Mihailović. On the 22nd of August, Hitler still displays hostility to Mihailović and says to Field Marshal von Weichs, who was the Commander-in-Chief South Eastern Europe, "Naturally the armament of Četniks is out of the question", because there had been a suspicion, due to the BBC claiming that the Četniks were collaborators, ready to help, that they might, perhaps, help the Germans fight the Partisans and the Russians, who were coming in. General Jodl summing up Hitler's attitude, says "the Serbian Army must not be allowed to exist, it is better to have some danger from the Communists". Then on the 1st to 7th September 1944, Mihailović calls for the 'Ustanak', the uprising, which S.O.E. had never credited him with the will to do: McDowell and other USA personnel witnessed the whole thing, thousands presented themselves at recruiting centres, but there were insufficient weapons, virtually none having been supplied by the Allies. Just previously the German estimation of Mihailović's strength was sixty to seventy thousand and then many from the Home Guard, the Nedićefsi, joined Mihailović as well. The Partisans attacked fiercely and consequently, because of the Partisans attacking the Serbs and the Loyalists, the Germans evacuated their troops from Greece with surprising ease: thus a major opportunity was lost. This area was the area in which I was interested, the Morava and particularly the Ibar Valley, through which passed the main railway lines from Greece. That was the very time that these railways lines and bridges should have been blown up, when the German evacuation from Greece was taking place. Soviet troops reached the Yugoslav frontier on the 6th of September. Mihailović proposed to the Russians a plan for the Royalists and Partisans to be confined to their respective territories until Yugoslavia was completely liberated: the Russians rejected the proposal. Tito then 'levants' to Moscow, without telling Maclean he is going, and he says to Stalin that, in the event of a British invasion of Yugoslavia, "We should offer strenuous resistance": that's on record. Musulin returned to Italy on the 9th September and Mihailović withdrew under Partisan attacks into Bosnia. On the 9th of October Churchill met Stalin in Moscow and they split up Eastern European nations into spheres of influence East and West. As far as I remember, Greece was 10% Russian and 90% British, or Western, and Yugoslavia was 50%-50%. I've often wondered what that meant, because although Stalin agreed to 50%-50%, of course, it became completely 100% Communist. Lalich returned to Italy with more American aircrew and offered to evacuate Mihailović with him, because he is the last chap to come out, but Mihailović refused. Now the Right Wing leader of the Albanian resistance, Abas Kupi, came out to Italy - he wasn't going to stay behind, understandably, and have his throat cut, or be shot. But Mihailović had courage and conviction: he knew then what his end was going to

, but he was not going to abandon his people, nor the loyal troops, who had been with him all through this appallingly difficult time. So he refused to be evacuated. March 1945, 30,000 Loyalists remained, and at the end of May only 2,000 Loyalists were left: from then they melted away. Some of them joined the Partisans: when the Partisans captured Loyalists they said "Will you join us? If you don't we shoot you", so a lot of Loyalists did join the Partisans in order to fight against the Germans - I think I would probably have done the same thing myself. On the 24th of March 1946, the Yugoslav Government announced that Mihailović had been captured ten days before. On the 10th of June the trial of Mihailović and others started: we can talk about that later because I've got all the details of it. On the 15th of July, Mihailović and ten others were condemned to death and then on the 17th of July Mihailović was shot. I think that gives you a synopsis of the whole thing.

Question: Now, this material which you've used to give your account, can you say something about the documentary sources, from which you've obtained the material for this?

Major Jack: Yes, shall I read them out to you?

Question: Yes

Major Jack: David Martin's "Patriot or Traitor", Basil Davidson's "Special Operations Europe", Stefan Pavlowitch's "Yugoslavia", which is a first-class book of the history of Yugoslavia in the World Series, Fitzroy Maclean's "Eastern Approaches", Chapman Pincher's "Their Trade is Treachery", Bill Deakin's "The Embattled Mountain", Jasper Rootham's "Misfire" and, finally, Nora Beloff's "Tito's Flawed Legacy".

Question: Now, you were talking about reprisals, the German reprisals which were taken.

Major Jack: Yes.

Question: What was the effect of these reprisals on the activity of various Yugoslav guerilla forces?

Major Jack: As far as the Partisans were concerned, they actually encouraged reprisals, because their force consisted of people who had run away into the mountains and the more reprisals there were, the more fugitives there were. And so that is the answer to that one.

Question: And on the ^uCetniks?

Major Jack: And on the ^uCetnik, the Royalist, side it was quite different. The Royalist forces were based on areas and they came from the various villages and from the towns round about: they knew what was going ^{on} in their own areas and so the reprisals meant a lot to them, because it was their own, not necessarily relations or even friends, but people from their own locality, who were being taken out and shot. What one's got to remember is that the Germans arrested a huge number of Serbs and stored them away in prisons, so that they could just be taken out and shot when required. They didn't have to go out into the countryside and arrest them, they were already in the prisons: thus they would take out people, who came from that area, and then they would publish huge posters which would be displayed, saying that these people have been taken out

and shot. I've got one poster here, which I'll show you later, if you like, and which has all the details on it. Hitler had on the 16th of September 1941, issued an order that for every German killed 100 hostages would be shot and for every German wounded 50. One of the most tragic examples of that was in the early period, before I was there of course, in mid-October 1941, when in a sortie near Kragujevac, which is a town south of Belgrade, 10 Germans were killed and 26 wounded: as a result, on the 21st of October, 7,000 hostages were taken out from the town and shot, including hundreds of schoolboys. The incident in Kragujevac may be rather an exceptional one, but nevertheless I think it gives you some indication of the scale of losses suffered by the Serbs.

There were some two million Serb immigrants living in Croatia and the Croatsians, particularly the Ustase, wreaked their vengeance on them and massacred an enormous number in the early part of the war; the Yugoslavs say it was half a million, some people say it was 300,000, but it was something of that order. And Mihailović used to actually mention this and say "Look you've got to remember what we've already lost. The Serbs have lost so much in the way of assassinations, that we can't afford to do sabotage operations, which are of no particular strategic value, if we're going to have this enormous reprisal calculation worked against us each time". But I was saying that the Partisan attitude was different and here is Kardelj, who was Tito's closest supporter, speaking "We must at all costs push the Croatian as well as the Serb villages into the struggle; some comrades are afraid of reprisals and that fear prevents the mobilization of Croat villages. I consider the reprisals will have the useful result of throwing Croatian villages on the side of Serb villages. In war we must not be frightened of the destruction of whole villages, terror will bring about armed action". Now that is absolutely symptomatic of what the difference of attitude was between Mihailović, who was trying to save the Serbian nation, and the Partisans, who were there for its destruction. And we've got to remember that the Yugoslavs in the last war lost 1,400,000 from a population of 17,000,000 and in the First World War the Serbs, I'm talking just about the Serbs this time, they lost, and this includes the figures of losses through illness, because there were illnesses which ravaged Serbia at that time, they lost one and a quarter million out of a population of six. Now that was the sort of background on which Mihailović figured and thought and pondered: and he had this heavy responsibility in his mind to ensure that nothing of this sort happened on that scale to his people again and in this respect I support him one hundred per cent.

Question: Now, there were different geographical areas which were held by the Partisans and by the Četniks (Loyalists). Is there anything that you can say from your own knowledge of the situation why it was that Tito forces held certain geographical areas and why it was, on the contrary, that Mihailović forces held other geographical areas?

Major Jack: Well, I think it goes back to the ridiculous concept of the State called Yugoslavia, which is the combination of two peoples, who are completely separated for all the reasons I have already given. And, you must also remember that the Royal dynasty of Yugoslavia was a Serbian one and the Croats and the Bosnians and the Slovenians had always been anti-Serb and therefore anti-Royalist, whereas the Serbs, having produced the dynasty, had always been Royalists. And so you can see the difference on that basis.

Question: So that would have meant that Mihailović held Serbian territory and Tito held non-Serbian territory.

Major Jack: Generally, yes, and Mihailović was a Serb and Tito was a Croat. But of course there were exceptions, I mean there were some bands of Mihailović's troops in Tito's territory, operating under some difficulty and who gradually, of course, melted away and there were, I believe, one or two Partisan bands in Serbia right down in the South, where Mike Lees and other BLOs were. There were small bodies of Partisans down there, but the whole bulk of the central area of Serbia pretty well up to the Sava was, in fact, in Mihailović's hands. As one went from village to village, the peasants spoke of nothing else except Mihailović - Draza Mihailović this, and Draza Mihailović that - they absolutely worshipped him. He was the commanding figure of the Serbian resistance and of their future. He was the Serbian national hero.

Question: And yet the Slovenian Home Guard, we know from an interview which our Museum has conducted with a pacifist, who was with the Friends' Ambulance Unit in 1945, we know that the Slovenian Home Guard was anti-Tito and were massacred by Tito's forces in 1945 when they were sent back by the British Army.

Major Jack: Well, if they were Slovenian Home Guard, they were probably pro-German: that's why, of course, they were massacred by the Partisans. In Serbia, the Home Guard was the Nedićefsi under General Nedić, who Mihailović treated as a traitor, but the Nedićefsi themselves were an enormous help to the resistance. I remember being taken on to one bridge over the Sava by the Sergeant of the Nedićefsi guard who, with the Germans, were responsible for guarding that bridge. He drove me there in a horse and trap, right through the town, and then took me to a house, which overlooked the bridge and where I could see it all from a bedroom. Then he took me on to the bridge: we went up to the German guards and he said "Hello chums its fine today isn't it?": we walked past, on to the bridge and back again. Now, if he'd handed me over you can imagine the reward he'd have got. He was a Sergeant. Then the important railway bridge at Sabac, a five-span bridge of about 500 yards: he arranged for me to be taken there in a horse and cart and I was able to jump off before it got to the bridge, hide behind bushes for some time, make sketches and evaluate the distances, dimensions and so on. He arranged all that.

Question: How often did you meet Mihailović?

Major Jack: Very seldom for he was a very shy sort of person. We used to meet his Staff Officers quite often, but I wasn't at Headquarters very much, I was off doing sabotage operations, or I was actually mapping out plans for this, that and the other. But before the Višegrad bridge operation he called me in and he had a Serb there who was going to give me the information about the bridge. So he said to the Serb, "Now tell me, tell Major Jack, what the bridge is like", and the Serb said, "Oh well, it's a bridge of some length" and I said, "How many spans has it got?" and he said, "Oh, its got three large spans", and so on. Of course he'd got it all wrong, it only had one span, and I don't think he'd ever seen the bridge! That was typically Serb. You could never really believe what they said to you: they were nice people, but you couldn't believe them. Whereas, of course, the Maclean mission to Tito believed every single word that the Yugoslavs told them, but we didn't. We liked to go and see for ourselves.

Question: Some people have drawn a contrast between the characters of Mihailović and Tito. Can you say anything about that?

Major Jack: I never met Tito, but I would think, having read what I have, that you've only got to look at him to see the sort of chap he was - exuberant, enthusiastic, ferociously Communist, with one sole object and that was to promote himself to the highest level, I would think - enormously personally ambitious. Mihailović wasn't: he was certainly in no way a politician: he was just a regular soldier, who found himself in this position, which he'd never wished for. He was a modest sort of chap, but it's very difficult to judge him under the circumstances of that period, for his situation was getting worse and worse and worse: his opinion of the British was falling rapidly and he knew he was being betrayed. It is quite awful to feel that one was a betrayer, or representing the betrayers.

Question: Some people suggested that Tito had much more charm than Mihailović. Is that so?

Major Jack: I should think that's probably true. I don't think Mihailović had much charm. He certainly didn't want to charm us towards the end: we were just a load and a very embarrassing load for him, but a load which he bore and defended faithfully until the very end. If I'd been in his position, I would have bargained, I think, with the British Government and said, "Look, I've got your Mission here: you either do this, or that, or I hand them over", or something like that. I think I probably would; but he didn't: there was never the slightest suspicion of that happening. I must say that I feel one owes a debt to the Serbian people, I don't say to the Yugoslavs, because I don't know them as a nation, but the Serbs I did know and I think we owe an enormous debt to them for the huge losses they suffered in the last war, to quite a large extent due to the policies we pursued, and I think personally of my very faithful Royalist orderly, Ljubo, who accompanied me on so many of the quite dangerous operations we did in native dress. I remember towards the end of the time in the Ibar Valley we were walking along the main road and making notes of the signs on the various German trucks and lorries passing us, so that we could signal back to S.O.E. (Cairo) this information, because you could then establish which divisions they belonged to. I and another chap were going down the road dressed as peasants and Ljubo and another orderly were following on a footpath, which was parallel to and above the main road, with a horse loaded with our belongings. We joined up when night fell on this path and we had another six miles to go to a safe house for the night. We came down to a village where there was a small bar with people drinking inside. I skirted round it and continued up the path, but Ljubo felt he wanted a drink apparently, so he entered the bar, not having noticed some German soldiers seated at a table to the side. They, of course, spotted the tommy-gun on his shoulder and pounced on him. Ljubo ran out of the door, pursued by the Germans, who sprayed him with light automatic fire: he was badly wounded and, rather than be captured, committed suicide by pulling a grenade on himself. The other orderly, also wounded, managed to join us and we ran off into the night pursued by gun fire. Under the circumstances we decided to set off at once for our safe refuge up in the mountains at Rudno. We mounted the orderly on the horse: he was suffering terribly from a bullet having penetrated his ankle. After a very sad and wearisome trek of about ten hours over snow and ice, we regained Rudno at dawn. My faithful Ljubo had fallen in a just cause, in a war of Loyalist resistance against the Nazi invaders of his country and what a very faithful ally he had always been of the British. He will never be forgotten by me.

Question: Those who have got to judge this situation like historians now and in the future, may say that on the one hand you've got British agents, who were working in the Tito area, on the other hand you had British agents, like yourself, who were working in the Loyalist area, and they might say - "How are we to judge between the evidence that both of them give, because both of these groups will have naturally been brainwashed by the side which they were dropped amongst and that they will only have been shown what the Partisans on the one hand, or what the Loyalists on the other hand, wanted to show them?"

Major Jack: I think the two situations were fundamentally different. With the Partisans BLOs generally were not allowed free travel. If they wanted to go to a certain place, they had to ask permission and it was very often turned down: in some cases the British officers were under house arrest, pretty well; they couldn't get out of the house without permission. You must remember that the Partisans had Political Commissars, who were in charge of all that, not just the Colonel commanding the brigade, or whatever. With the Loyalists we had absolutely nothing of the sort at all: if I wanted to get out of this house and walk over there, I just went out and did it. What I preferred to do was to talk to the local Loyalist commander and say "Is it all right walking out in that direction?" And he would say "Well you can if you like, but if I were you I should avoid that area and go that way, or this way". We used to take guides from the local villages at night to help us, but they used to carry a bottle of rakia with them in the winter and after about an hour you would find they were so drunk that they didn't know which way they were going. So, when we took a guide, we used to search him: if he had a bottle of rakia with him, we would say "Terribly sorry, old chap, but you can drink that when you go back". If we wanted to go in any direction at all, we went and quite often just with our orderlies. We said "We are going there and there and there for the next 3 or 4 days - all right?" "Yes, quite all right, on you go", and "Who shall we meet there?" "Well, I should advise you to see Captain Lalatovič; he will help you." But it wasn't like that with the Partisans at all. With the Loyalists we could question anyone we wanted and we talked to the villagers: I had a chap with me, who translated for me; we had absolutely free access to all the information we wanted. The two situations were quite fundamentally different.

Question: Each of us knows Mrs Jean Howard, who worked during the War for Bletchley Park, and she has said to me in an interview, which I conducted with her about 18 months ago, that in the Serbo-Croatian language there is some confusion about the words Četnik and Partisan. What the word Četnik means. Can you throw any light on them?

Major Jack: Yes, I can and it's one of the things that I want to talk to you about. During the War years the situation in Yugoslavia was very confused, because there were so many armed bodies, that if a shot was fired you had generally no idea who was firing, or why. To begin with the occupying troops were Germans, mostly in the Western part of the country, then there were Bulgarians, mostly in the Eastern part of the country, and Italians (until they surrendered) in the Southern part of the country, that means the Dalmatian Coast and Montenegro, and there were also some White Russians, who were Cossacks. You had all those on the Axis side. Now, on our side, we had the Loyalists, and I prefer to call them the Loyalists, because the term Četniks covered such a wide variety of groups. First of all, there were the Loyalist Četniks, who were Mihailovič's Četniks: I must just tell you that the word Četnik comes from the word Četa, which means a band, and that goes back to the time of the Turkish

Occupation, when the resistance groups fighting the Turks were Četas, the Četniks, so it's a Serbian term. Then the Germans actually enrolled Yugoslavs into so-called Četnik groups and so did the Italians, because by that means they could try to prove to the local people that the Četniks were on the side of the Axis. I remember once, I think it was the Intelligence Officer of Mihailović's Headquarters, showing me a photograph in a local paper, in which there was a group of Četniks with their traditional caps bearing the Royal coat-of-arms, I think it was in Montenegro, with a German officer smiling in the middle of them: and that had been published in the local papers to show the Četnik support for the Axis occupiers. But they weren't real Četniks at all - they were traitors. Then there were gangs of outlaws, there may not have been very many of them, but they called themselves Četniks too and they were just profiting from the situation in order to steal and rob wherever they could. We had a few Royal Marines with us, who had been captured in Crete and who had escaped from German troop trains in a rather amusing sort of way, which I can tell you about later; they had dropped off troop trains and found themselves in a country, which they had never seen before and would never see again, without knowing anything at all about it; they would be picked up by a band of outlaws, who lived just by raiding odd farms, or going to a town and stealing: they were called Četniks too. So when you find in S.O.E. files signals from the Partisans saying what the Četniks had been doing, so often it was lies, but even if it was the truth, it was almost certainly not Royalist Četniks. It was the other ones.

Question: So, are you suggesting that the words used to describe them should be Loyalists or Royalists?

Major Jack: You can say Royalists if you like. I think if you say Royalists it means that they were faithful to the Royal Family, which they were; it meant a lot to them. But if you say Loyalists, it has a somewhat wider meaning. It really does not much matter either way. Reverting for a moment to the situation that existed in Montenegro in 1943: Mihailović has frequently been accused of collaborating with the Italians in that area. However, Peter Boughey, then head of the Yugoslav section of S.O.E. London, in an interview in 1976 with Nora Beloff stated - "We certainly told Mihailović to be in touch with the Italians. We knew the situation in Montenegro and wanted him to be able to get Italian weapons, when the Italians withdrew, collapsed, or surrendered". Thus the charges of Mihailović's collaboration with the Italians in Montenegro are refuted.

Question: So to what extent in Yugoslavia did you see any support amongst the ordinary Yugoslavs for Communism?

Major Jack: Not only did we not see it, but the Serbian peasants expressed an absolute hatred for Communism; they were absolute Royalists.

Question: Can you tell me about this question of atrocities that were supposedly committed by the Četniks on the one hand, and the Partisans on the other hand, against each other when they captured each other?

Major Jack: I never took part in any operation against the Partisans. I think you've got to understand that, as far as Mihailović was concerned, his position was a defensive one and he was there to defend Serbia from Communist invasions, which were coming in all the time; therefore it was on the outskirts of the Serbian area where the Loyalists were fighting the Partisans, and I never went

to that region at all, though one or two British officers did so. I can't tell you, therefore, what the Loyalists would have done with the Partisans. I would think that their attitude might have been the same as the Partisans with the Četniks, which was to offer them to be assimilated into their new group, or to be shot - which is hardly an invitation, is it? It's a threat, rather than a promise. One's got to realize that in a resistance movement there's no question of taking prisoners, where do you put them? You've got no facilities for prisoners, quite apart from food and lodging; you haven't got the men to guard them. So you either say "Buzz off", or "Come in and join us", or you say "We shoot you".

Question: What can you say about the attitude of the Yugoslav Moslems towards the political situation at that time?

Major Jack: Well, the Ustaše, which I spoke about - and you must remember that it goes back historically quite a long time - the Ustaše was a Croat organization, which was to some extent Moslem and why was it Moslem? Because it was anti-Serb, it was a Croatian body and the Moslems had been anti-Serb ever since the Turkish Wars. These Moslems were not Turks, they were actually Serbs, who had over the centuries been converted into the Moslem religion. But the Ustaše were led by a man called Anton Pavelić, who was a Croat, and in fact they were the people who were responsible for the assassination of the Yugoslav King Alexander on the quayside of Marseilles, on 9th October, 1934: the Ustaše were the people who did that. I must say that the feeling of the Serbs, of the Loyalists against the Ustaše was ferocious, because following the German invasion the Ustaše had been responsible for this enormous massacre in Croatia, of between three hundred thousand and five hundred thousand Serbs; that's about the same as all British casualties in the whole war, and this was just a Massacre of the Innocents: they are figures which one can't understand at all. So, if there was a chance of killing Moslems in revenge, then our people I am afraid, took it: I did stop a massacre, which was just starting, in Višegrad after we had taken the town from the Germans.

Question: Of how many?

Major Jack: I don't know, but it was starting in the early morning. An American officer and myself were walking across this bridge, a huge 16th century stone bridge of eleven arches over the river Drina, and we saw the Moslems being brought out and shot, falling down about 40 feet into the river. So I went off straight away to Ostojić, who was the Loyalist Commander - he was one of the officers who came in with Marko Hudson in the submarine with Julian Amery in 1941; I liked him and he spoke very good French. I said "Look this has got to stop at once and I'm telling you this, we've got a wireless set here and I'm sending your name back to Cairo and after the war you will be held responsible for what happens today, so stop it at once".

Question: Were they civilians?

Major Jack: Probably, mostly. So Ostojić barked out an order to some of his men and they ran off and came back with a man of about fifty, I suppose, and a young chap of about twenty. Ostojić shouted at these two chaps and they sort of shilly-shallied and then he turned round to a man next to him and shouted out to him to shoot them, which with a tommy-gun he did, and these two men were only three yards away from me. That was the end of the massacre, which would have been horrific I think, if it had been allowed to go on. It is the only massacre, of which I have personal knowledge.

Question: They were Moslems were they?

Major Jack: Yes. Višegrad, you know, is a Moslem town with its mosque. But it's just to show that the Loyalists were prepared to stop it, if we made them: in fact, Ostoyić may not have known it was going on. To continue - I think, perhaps, now we might consider the question of the huge amount of arms, which went into Tito, and the derisory amount which went to Mihailović. The figures are cited by Professor Pavlovitch in his excellent history of Yugoslavia, and they are as follows:-

"With the supply of aircraft to SOE the volume of airborne supplies rose in the third quarter of 1943 (and of course there had been very very little before that) to 144 tons to both movements. At the end of September 1943, naval coastal forces were diverted to help the bombers and more than 2,000 tons of supplies were landed in the last quarter of the year on Partisan held islands, in addition to 125 tons of airborne supplies. During the first quarter of 1944, over 6,500 tons were either landed, or dropped, increasing in the second quarter to some 8,500 tons" (and we're talking about stuff which is going in to the Partisans, nothing in that time was going in to Mihailović at all). "The following figures for supplies during 1944 give some idea of the scale on which the Western Allies were now helping the Partisans; over a 100,000 rifles, over 50,000 light machine guns and sub-machine guns, 1,380 mortars, (and then of course all the ammunition that went with it including practically 100,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition), 700 wireless sets, 175,000 suits of battledress" etc. And one must remember that these supplies were used by the Partisans mainly for combatting and driving out the Royalist forces, who had received, in comparison, practically nothing in the way of arms. Now, perhaps we can consider what the attitudes of the Partisans were to the slaughter of their opponents: I am quoting from an issue in Encounter dated 1979 which was an interview with Milovan Djilas, who became subsequently one of the Vice-Presidents of Yugoslavia. He refers to the surrender of Italian troops and what the Partisans did to them. It reads as follows - "All the Italian troops, the entire 3rd Battalion of the 259th Regiment of the Murgi Division, were put to death. Many corpses were tossed into the Rama River; several got caught among the logs and I shared with our officers a malicious joy at the thought of Italian officers on the bridges and embankments of Mostar, stricken with horror at the sight of the Neretva choked with the corpses of their soldiers". Further quotes from one of his books - "To settle accounts, this is the most precious passion in life" - "The human heart can find peace and pleasure only in returning evil for evil" - "Vengeance, this is the breath of life, mother's milk and sister's vow, it was all, all". And then there's the question of the forced repatriation of Russian and Yugoslav refugees by the British Authorities in the spring and summer of 1945. Amongst these there were a large number of Loyalists, who had retreated across Yugoslavia and fled across the border in the face of attacks from the Partisans. It was with the Yugoslav Government, the Communist Government, that the British negotiated to hand back these men and women, who had been our allies. Djilas says here in his interview that the British certainly had some 20 to 30 thousand of these people in their hands: he then goes on to say - "That to be quite frank with you - we didn't at all understand why the British insisted on returning these people. We believed, in the ideological context prevailing at the time, that the British would have a good deal of sympathy with these refugees, seeing that they had fled Communism. We thought the British would show 'class solidarity' with them and it was even feared they would enlist them for future use against Communist Governments especially our own. Yet, to our very great surprise, they did none of these

things, but delivered them into our hands". And then he goes on - "Imbecility above all, they ought to have looked at the character of our Government, such as it was at that time, and drawn their own conclusions". And here he's criticizing the British - "Yes, the British did completely the wrong thing in putting those people back across the border" - and then he goes on to confess - "And we did completely the wrong thing in shooting them all". Thus, these thousands of our allies, were shot as a result of forced re-patriation. It may not generally be known, but the Americans, who had been rescued by Mihailović, and they numbered as you know very nearly 500 airmen, requested that at his trial witnesses should be allowed to go and testify in his defence: this request was turned down by the Yugoslav Government. As a result, the Americans decided to hold a trial in America of Mihailović 'in absentia' with these witnesses giving their evidence. I won't go through it all, because its a few hundred pages, but there wasn't a single case of any of the Americans, who gave evidence, saying that they had seen any active collaboration on the part of Mihailović, or any of his forces; I think this is quite interesting, because they'd all of them covered a huge distance to get to the evacuation area and thus were well aware of what went on. Now, one of the important witnesses was Colonel McDowell, who had led the American Mission which was finally sent in, in spite of Churchill's objections, by the American President to try and rescue the American airmen; we'd brought out about 40 with us, but there were another 450 or so, in the country, and so McDowell went in to rescue them, taking some other American officers with him. He was a Colonel, who was an expert in Balkan affairs; he'd passed many, many years in between the two wars working in the Balkans, and so he was not just an officer dropped in for no particular reason: in answering interrogations here are some of the things he said at the American trial - "From my personal observations, and those of reliable American and British officers, it is clear that the peasants and intellectuals in Serbia in large majority not only respected but loved General Mihailović. While we were retreating, closely attacked by the Communists, it was normal for the roads to be lined, even at night, by peasants with tears running down their cheeks, who passed out water and food to the men and called down God's blessing on the General. These peasants knew that in few hours they would be in the power of the Communists. As for intellectuals, I was able to establish that about two-thirds of the Faculty of the University of Belgrade was active in the organization of General Mihailović. In each district I visited I found brigades, or battalions, of students who were the most ardent supporters of the General". Here is another quote - "On the basis of all the evidence available it is my judgement that the Germans held greater hatred and fear of Mihailović than of Tito and concentrated proportionately more Axis troops on Četnik (Loyalist) than in Partisan territory. There is clear evidence that claims made by and for Tito, as to his contribution, have been very greatly exaggerated. The most important acts of sabotage against Axis communications were, in fact, performed by Četniks. Both Mihailović and Tito contributed to the Allied cause, but the ability of the Yugoslavs to contribute was substantially lessened by the Civil War. The evidence is clear that Mihailović was ready to place his forces under Anglo-American command and to cooperate with Tito, while the latter was unwilling to so subordinate his cause to the winning of the war against the Germans. In the light of all the evidence it is my judgement that Mihailović attempted a greater contribution than did Tito and accomplished more in proportion to his means." Finally, one more quote. It says "I have absolutely no evidence of any collaboration on the part of General Mihailović and Axis forces of occupation. The resistance of General Mihailović to Axis forces was limited only by his means, by the almost constant attacks on his forces on the part of the Communists and by the weight of German reprisals against his people."

Question: These passages are all contained in Martin's book?

Major Jack: Yes, they are all contained in Martin's book, which is called "Patriot or Traitor". Talking of Mihailović as an individual, there is a quotation which I'd like to take here from Nora Beloff's book "Tito's Flawed Legacy", which relates to the pre-invasion period in Belgrade, 'At a time when Tito and his men were blasting the British as warmongers, British officers in Belgrade representing all three forces were getting to know members of the Serb General Staff and examining with them the increasing likelihood that Yugoslavia would be dragged into war. In the summer of 1940, Colonel Clark, the head of the British Military Mission, and the Junior Naval Attaché, Alexander Glen, were told that, in the event of an occupation of Yugoslavia, the planning of internal resistance was being entrusted to a certain Staff Officer, Colonel Draza Mihailović. Glen invited Mihailović to several private dinners and now writes of him with respect "A man whom I am proud to have known, a man of honour, serious, well-informed, a good listener, articulate when he spoke and I found him broad in his understanding, with loyalty to the whole of Yugoslavia and not to a narrow Serb hegemony.' It was after the war that Churchill was more open, perhaps, about the result of the policy, which he had pursued in Yugoslavia. In December 1945, at a dinner party in Brussels, he was reported by the journal "Europe and America" and also by "Time and Tide" as saying - "During the war I thought I could trust Tito. He promised me to observe the agreement he had concluded with Šubašić (who was the Yugoslav Prime Minister), but now I am aware that I committed one of my biggest mistakes in the war". Sir John Colville later stated "This certainly represents Mr Churchill's views, but I doubt if he will say so publicly except under provocation. He certainly won't accept any arguments to the contrary". Then at the time of Mihailović's trial by the Communists in Belgrade on 9th of April 1946, Churchill requests Bevin, who was then the Foreign Secretary, to secure with the Yugoslav Government a fair trial for Mihailović. Attlee refused to intervene, as he thought such action would offend the Labour Party! Hence the British Government refused even to request that the British officers should attend to testify in Mihailović's defence. The Americans made such a request, but the Yugoslav Government rejected it. Hence no defence witnesses attended the trial, neither from America, nor from Britain. Finally, an interesting quote: on the 27th of August 1947, Tito in a speech on the occasion of his election as an honorary member of the Zagreb Yugoslav Academy said "I have outsmarted and deceived that old fox Churchill", and I think that really sums it up. My own hope is that whoever the people were, who were responsible for persuading Churchill to pursue this policy, should express their regrets at what followed.

Question: Could I ask you about Mihailović's trial, about your reactions at that time when you heard that he was going on trial?

Major Jack: Well, I was then in Trieste on Lord Harding's staff and, when I heard that the trial was taking place, I was in touch with my friends in London, Bill Bailey, Kenneth Greenlees and Erik Greenwood, who were all important people in the Resistance, and who were writing letters to the Government and to The Times, putting the Mihailović case, urging the Government to ensure that the trial was a fair one and that defence witnesses should be heard. I left it to them, because they were in the UK and were doing all they could. I had, however, the interesting job of talking to the Press representatives, who were passing through Trieste on their way to attend the trial at Belgrade; Lord Harding asked me to brief them and to tell them what I knew about Mihailović, which I did.

Question: Whereabouts were you in 1945 when the Yugoslav refugees were being sent back?

Major Jack: I think I was in Norway.

Question: Did you hear about it?

Major Jack: No, I didn't.

Question: Now earlier on you were telling me about your schooldays at prep school, that you actually knew Klugmann and Maclean, when you were very young. Can you tell me what you knew about them then?

Major Jack: About Klugmann I can tell you absolutely nothing. I've got no memory of him at all. I just recognized the connection between his name and his face when I went into the S.O.E. office in Rustom Buildings in Cairo. As far as Maclean is concerned, he was a close friend of mine at the age of 12 and we were together a lot: he was a marvellous companion, he was very funny and we enjoyed enormously larking about with him. That's really all I've got to say. To terminate there are just one or two short quotations, which I think fit in rather well with the Mihailović saga. One is the reference many years ago to the very complicated Schleswig-Holstein problem. It was said that only three people really understood the problem, you probably remember it - "but one is dead, one is mad and the other's forgotten all about it". We are now getting to the stage in relation to this problem, which I think is somewhat similar: so it is important to get the evidence, while the people concerned are still alive and 'compos mentis'.

Question: Who knows about it apart from you at first hand?

Major Jack: Well, people like Marko Hudson, Erik Greenwood, Mike Lees, and Jasper Rootham too. Another quotation, which I think is relevant, is Lenin's - "morality is subordinate to politics" and my word that certainly was Tito's motto as well. Finally, my last quote, which I think may reflect on some characters perhaps still alive, Lenin's comment on Left-Wing intellectuals in the Western World - "useful idiots".

Question: Do you have ~~any~~ in your possession any documentary evidence to indicate that Mihailović was not in the eyes of the Germans a collaborator?

Major Jack: Well, I have actually just a few. There were, of course, many anti-Mihailović posters put up by the Germans and wherever I went in the villages and saw these posters, they were so bad for the local morale, indicating the names and the villages of the people who had been shot as hostages, that I always used to tear them down. I kept three: this one is an important one, dated the 12th of November 1942; one part of it is in German, and the other part of it is in Serbo-Croat and it is a big poster, 4 feet wide and 2 feet high. The text reads: - "The following were condemned to death by the Special Court of the Commander of the Security Police Services Belgrade on the 12th of November 1942, and shot on account of espionage and sabotage in favour of Draža Mihailović" and there follow twenty names, stating in each case the village from which each person came. This is not an indication, in my view, that Mihailović could be termed in any way a 'collaborator'. I also have a photocopy of an order of May 1942, which was sent by the Germans to a certain number of people, including Draža Mihailović and fourteen of his staff officers,

saying that, if they didn't surrender on a certain date, all the families would be taken hostage. This was sent to me the other day by someone, who reckons that of the whole team of fifteen, he was the only survivor.

Can there really be people to-day who, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, still charge Mihailović and his Loyalist followers with collaboration? Surely Great Britain after all these years should take some positive action - we cannot restore to Mihailović his life, but at least it is our duty to restore to him his honour and reputation.

Mihailović, at his trial, summed up his situation in words, which are modest, restrained, dignified and without any hint whatsoever of bitterness. It is by these words that Mihailović and his men deserve to be remembered - "I attempted much, I started much, but the gale of the world swept me and my work away."

(A)

(The official Historian of Yugoslavia / SOE appointed by HMG)

Extracts from the interview with Mark Wheeler by Vesna Roganović in BORBA
15-16 December 1990.

(Dec
90)

◦ To the question: what lies behind "...Churchill's mysterious change of mind, abandonment of Chetniks and, according to many, the unexpected sympathies towards Tito and Partisans ...", M.W. replied:

No [a] "Churchill's change of mind in the direction of support of Tito and Partisans, is not at all so surprising, although there remain a few questions not yet explained about the manner (if not also about the causes [it is not quite clear whether M.W. wishes to say that there may be also some questions about the causes, which would be the strict interpretation of the Serbo-Croat, A.G.]) in which this happened. Of course, Churchill and his Government would have preferred to have been able to restore Yugoslavia under the Karadjordjević dynasty. However, in a country which - unlike Greece - was not of such a vital importance to British interests, nor was able to show sufficient power needed by Britain, there was only one, relatively simple, question: "who is killing the greatest number of Germans?" As the answer was obviously: "Tito", and because towards the end of 1943 it had become quite clear that Communists would be the future rulers of Yugoslavia, it was only left to them to do what was possible and to gain from Tito something for King Peter, while renouncing Mihailović as a compensation. Churchill's personal and somewhat romantic enthusiasm for Tito and Partisans was short lived, [it did not survive their 1944 meeting in Naples and Tito's subsequent departure by air from Vis for Moscow], but British policy did not change. What did change was that Churchill apparently gained from Stalin [in the "proportionality agreement" of October 1944] the influence over Yugoslavia which he had previously expected to extract from his friendship with Tito. At the time of the crisis of Koruška and Trieste in May 1945 and later, certain accusations appeared in the Whitehall about the failure of British Yugoslav policy. However, it seems that 1948 succeeded in cementing decisions made during the war and Anglo-Yugoslav relations were to warm up in that re-discovered glow for the next three decades."

◦ To the question: "Historians are intrigued by the role played by SOE in Cairo during World War II, that is by the possible Soviet influence on Deakin and Maclean, and indirectly, on Churchill?", M.W. replied:

No [b] "Bill Deakin and Fitzroy Maclean obviously played a particularly important role in the British decision to offer exclusive support to the partisans as well as to force King Peter to renounce Mihajlović. Not only was their first hand testimony on the events in Yugoslavia the most decisive, but, unlike British officers with Mihajlović's forces, they had personal contact with the Prime Minister and ready political references. The idea that they were under Soviet influence is ridiculous. They were influenced by what they saw and experienced in Yugoslavia. By their fighting readiness and their heroic spirit, as much as by the manner in presenting proof of the Četnik collaboration with the forces of the Axis, partisan leaders showed sufficient skill in bringing to their side such important witnesses as Deakin and Maclean!

Yes
honsense
No It is true that in the Cairo SOE HQ there was a pro-partisan conspiracy whose part was ideologically left-wing. But there existed an even stronger pro-Mihajlović conspiracy in the main London SOE centre in London! The SOE member James Klugmann who perhaps was a Soviet agent (he was indeed a communist) - was in no position to influence that policy in any way what so ever: SOE was not creating the policy of the British Government, it was only implementing it!"

° To the question "You are at present making new investigations into the British-Yugoslav relations having, it is claimed, obtained access to "top secret" documents. Can you tell us something about these investigations?", M.W. replied:

oh?
[c] "I have been working on the 'official history' of SOE since the Spring of 1988. I have the permission of the British Government to examine the restricted SOE archives. The proposed book is subject to the Government approval, but the interpretations that will be expressed in the book will be my own.

9
The quantity of available SOE documents is much greater than what one could have imagined. Moreover these documents are in a state of disorder. After two and a half years of research I have found nothing which would support the theory of conspiracies, which are currently in fashion. My most important discovery concerns the dates and the nature of the involvement of the SOE in favour of Draža Mihailović. Contrary to established opinion, SOE did not feel obliged to offer support to Mihailović until the middle of 1942. Before that, SOE tried hard to consolidate [sic! - establish? A.G.] contacts with the Partisans. When in summer of 1942 the SOE decided to offer assistance and give support to Mihailović, that was conditioned just as much by logistics (i.e. by the impossibility of long-term air deliveries), as by, let us say, strategy or politics! This means that for the SOE and the British, Mihailović was a likely leader of the Yugoslav resistance during a much shorter period of time than what was believed: only from summer to autumn of 1942. Already at the beginning of 1943 the British were certainly again attempting to establish contacts with Tito. Another area of my research which will also alter the established view concerns the controversial question of the collaboration of Četniks with the Axis Forces.

Controversial
—certainly

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(This letter was published
by "Borba" newspaper in
Belgrade).

(B)

5th January, 1991.

Professor Mark Wheeler,
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Dear Mark,

I saw your interview with Mrs. Vesna Roganovic in Borba 15-16 December, 1990 and was sad to read you trotting out yet once again the same old cliches and fairy tales which have been spread around by those who want to justify Winston Churchill's imposition of a despotic communist regime on Yugoslavia through massive Western allied support for the Partisans' civil war against the Loyalist resistance movement of General Draža Mihailović. Both Churchill and Eden bravely and unequivocally acknowledged their errors already in 1945. It is ironic that elements in London are still trying in 1990 to justify the perfidious decisions taken so long ago. I am shocked to read that you as official historian seem to be supporting their now totally discredited arguments.

Tito achieved his ends by bamboozling SOE Cairo as well as Deakin and Maclean. As you know Churchill took the key decisions in Cairo on December 10th 1943. You state that one factor was that the Partisans were "killing the greatest number of Germans". That may be statistically correct for the period April to June 1943 when the Germans surrounded and very nearly destroyed the main Partisan forces at Mount Durmitor and when the Partisans were unable to avoid all-out battle. But that claim is certainly not proven for the full period of resistance from April 1941 till end 1943. Indeed I and other researchers seeking the REAL TRUTH believe that this much trumpeted justification may well constitute just one more example of the totally false Titoist mythology put out by the communists to gain their ends. Thank God the whole world now at last recognises the use of the BIG LIE by communists as a tactical tool. We fervent anti-communists are not going to be dogmatic until we can produce undeniably true figures and facts, not preconceived generalisations and tendentious slogans.

You state that "towards the end of 1943 it had become quite clear that the communists would be the future rulers of Yugoslavia". Now that is really going too far. It is totally false. In correspondence with me this year you yourself agreed with my comments in my book "The Rape of Serbia" which tore the Maclean report of November 6th 1943 to shreds. It was that report - nicknamed "The Blockbuster" by the Foreign Office - which led Churchill to accept Maclean's claim that the communists were going to win the civil war

In any case. Totally contrary to what Maclean wrote, the Mihailovic forces were in fact still substantially more numerous than the Partisans and, had the Western Allies not deluged them with support, the Partisans could never have taken the heartland of Serbia.

You yourself admit of the existence of an ideologically left wing pro-Partisan "conspiracy" in Cairo SOE HQ but you then go on to claim that there existed an even stronger pro-Mihailovic "conspiracy" in the main London SOE centre. It is crass effrontery to employ the word "conspiracy" to describe SOE London's proper execution of its formal military duty. SOE London was carrying out the orders of the chiefs of staff in supporting the Loyalist Resistance of General Mihailovic, the Minister of Defence of an Allied power then recognised formally and exclusively by the British government. Soldiers and civil servants properly obey orders given them by their superiors.

Whilst admitting that James Klugmann was a communist and "perhaps" (!) a Soviet agent you state that he was in no position to influence British Government policy in any way whatsoever. You say that SOE was not creating the policy of the British Government but that it was implementing it. This too is grotesquely false. SOE Cairo influenced British Government policy in January 1943 when Davidson encouraged Deakin and Keble to persuade Deakin's friend, Churchill, then visiting Cairo, to authorise that contact be made with the Tito Partisans. Throughout 1943 SOE Cairo was the channel between the British Government and the two Yugoslav Resistance movements. SOE Cairo officers oversaw the signals office and decided which signals should be deciphered and which should be delayed or "lost". SOE Cairo officers wrote reports and decided what London should - or should not - be told. SOE Cairo officers briefed and debriefed the British Liaison Officers who parachuted into Yugoslavia. SOE Cairo officers gave the orders for the allocation of supplies and of signal equipment dropped in to them. IN TRUTH SOE Cairo had total effective control throughout 1943 of the contact with, and support of both Resistance movements. They also had enormous influence over the bulk of the information reaching Churchill other than the input late in 1943 by Deakin and Maclean. As is well known these two officers had been totally bamboozled by Tito and his communist Headquarters staff and they had seen nothing of the Loyalist resistance or even set foot in Serbia. Thus Churchill received a great deal of communist inspired information directly or indirectly from SOE. To say that SOE Cairo were only implementing British Government policy is utterly specious.

The claim, repeated by you, that Klugmann was without influence - a mere second Lieutenant - was first postulated by Basil Davidson in his New Stateman review of Nora Beloffs' book (Tito's Flawed Legacy). Yet in his own book (Special Operations Europe) he had filled whole pages glorifying Klugmann and the latter's influence in SOE Cairo in the Winter of 1942/43. This claim is typical Marxist Leninist double speak. Klugmann more than anyone else in Cairo handled the day to day work of SOE, controlling signals, liaison officers and supplies. Not only was he Brigadier Keble's most trusted adviser but also, by December 1943, chief coordinator in the Yugoslav section and shortly to be promoted to Major. His promotion from private to major was not quite as meteoric as that of Maclean from Captain to Brigadier, but it was amazingly fast. To suggest that Klugmann was without influence on policy is grossly dishonest.

You admit that Churchill's personal and somewhat romantic enthusiasm for Tito and the Partisans was short-lived but you claim that in the "proportionality agreement" Churchill gained from Stalin the influence over Yugoslavia which he had previously expected to extract from his friendship with Tito. This too is a very odd statement because I understand that Churchill had no influence whatsoever over Stalin's Yugoslav policy, or over Tito, after Autumn 1944. I sincerely hope that he did not and that you are once again historically wrong. Because, if Churchill had influence, then he too had blood on his hands from the massacres which took place. Please let us spare his reputation that additional slur.


You also bring up again that ridiculous implication that decisions made during the war helped Anglo Yugoslav relations from 1948 onwards, as if what happened in 1948 was helpful to the West. What happened in 1948 was that Tito, having had a temporary quarrel with Stalin, once again bamboozled the West into pouring in help. On this occasion it was money: billions of dollars. Tito used them to pretend that his was a benevolent and competent regime. Inter alia the money was useful to maintain Tito's magnificent personal life style. The West received nothing from Tito in return other than the contempt communists deal out to those they deceive. And Yugoslavia is now crippled with the burden of servicing those massive debts - yet another sorry legacy of "The British Role in Titos' grab for Power".

You gave your Yugoslav readers of Borba sketchy details of your role as Official Historian for SOE in Yugoslavia and your access to "Top Secret" documents. In the interest of historical objectivity it is correct, and necessary, that they should also be told that by background training, and, I would submit personal conviction, you have for long been a strong supporter of the Partisan case and prejudiced against both Mihailovic and the pre-war regime. This surely is evidenced by your own book (Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940-43). It follows - inevitably - that you will (if only subconsciously) see your role as defender of the Titoist Faith. That is why Nora Beloff and I opposed your appointment by the Cabinet Office and published our correspondence with Sir Robert Armstrong in the Salisbury Review. Your readers both in Yugoslavia and in UK ought to know this. It is really important that Britain does not mislead the Serbs again as she did in 1944 when we condemned Serbia to 45 years of communist misgovernment. The Serbian nation - our valiant ally in the first world war - is entitled to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The Serbs need the consolation and the true national pride that the truth will bring them. As many people said to me in Belgrade recently a totally new unbiased history must replace "the old lying mythology".

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mrs. Vesna Roganovic with the urgent request that "Borba" publish it in full.

With kind personal regards.

Yours ever,





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©

From Dr. M. C. Wheeler

31 January 1991

Mr. Michael Lees
Lislee House
Courtmacsherry
Co. Cork
Ireland

sent by Fat
to Borba

Dear Michael,

Your rejoinder to my *Nedeljna Borba* interview of 15-16 December, published on 12-13 January, made depressing reading. It seems that while you and I can enjoy fruitful exchanges on the details of Anglo-Yugoslav relations during the Second World War, we are separated by an unbridgeable gulf when it comes to basic aims and fundamental interpretations. This being the case, I initially thought it pointless to pursue the argument. On reflection, however, it strikes me that the connection we both perceive between Yugoslavia's wartime agony and its contemporary crisis warrants a reply, especially as you appear oblivious to the irony that your brand of Serbian nationalist revisionism serves, in fact, as grist to the mill of Serbia's neo-communist rulers.

You see yourself as a crusader for the historical and contemporary rehabilitation of Draža Mihailović and his movement. You therefore castigate British wartime policy-makers for their wrongheaded and culpable abandonment of Mihailović, a decision which, in your view, amounted to the 'imposition of a despotic communist regime on Yugoslavia'. Since this fateful decision was made by Churchill himself (otherwise an icon of British patriotism), you find it necessary to posit the existence of Soviet 'moles' and left-wing conspirators inside SOE who, together with Churchill's trusted but naive emissaries to Tito, Deakin and Maclean, misinformed, duped or bamboozled the Prime Minister. To his credit, you aver, Churchill later acknowledged his error in sacrificing the noble Mihailović - and Serbia - to Tito on the basis of tendentious 'facts' and unrealistic expectations. You regard me, on the other hand, as an unregenerate apologist both for British wartime perfidy and for Yugoslav communism.

It will come as no surprise to you to learn that I can neither accept your version of the REAL TRUTH as such nor recognise your description of me as a defender ('if only *subconsciously*!') of the 'Titoist Faith'. I do not regard my task in writing the official history of SOE in Yugoslavia as offering support to any particular version of 'the truth' - whether yours or that to which I have signed my own name in the past. Like you and any would-be historian, I have my own political preferences, working hypotheses and more or less unexamined preconceptions. It is also the case that no history can be written which does not benefit (and suffer) from retro-spection. I am therefore likely, for example, to pay more attention to various British ideas in 1943 and 1944 about sponsoring the re-emergence of an independent, Karadjordjević-ruled Serbia from the communist-dominated remainder of the country than I would have been a few years back. This is

what gives history contemporary relevance. But it also means that there can be no REAL TRUTH; only partial truth, approximate truth and relative truth.

Naturally, given my privileged access to documents which British governments are likely to keep under wraps for decades to come, I bear a special responsibility: to eschew polemics, to strive towards objectivity and to provide a factual basis for my interpretations such as will permit others, if they wish, to dissent. On the other hand, you and any readers I may eventually have should bear in mind certain inherent limitations on my work. I cannot hope to read, assimilate or reflect upon everything that relates to the subject. The primary documentary base (i.e. the surviving SOE archive) is itself so voluminous as to make its encompassment by one mind a near impossibility, at least within a reasonable number of years. Even so, there are gaps in the record which will mean that some parts of the story are destined to remain obscure. Secondly, my book cannot hope to deal with all aspects of Britain's wartime involvement in Yugoslavia, let alone with those of its allies or enemies. Even less can I presume to provide a full account of what REALLY happened in that war-torn country. All I can do is to try to illuminate what SOE (and various contending elements within SOE), as well as other relevant British bodies, THOUGHT was going on, what their reactions were and what consequences these responses had.

X

It is in terms of consequences, of course, that you and I have our most profound difference of opinion. Leaving aside the emotive and somewhat unhistorical question of whether or not the Yugoslav communist revolution (or seizure of power) was really the worst possible result either for the Serbs or for the other Yugoslav peoples (and I personally do still incline to the view that it was probably the least bad result in the circumstances), there are three substantive problems with your approach. In the first place, you exaggerate wildly both Britain's power to affect and interest in affecting Yugoslavia's destiny. This leads you, in turn, to inflate the importance of SOE's role and, then, to invent a pro-communist conspiracy in order to explain it all.

7

Like many of the Balkan peoples themselves, you are attached to an 'imperialist' view of their history which, seeing them as mere playthings of the great powers, absolves them of responsibility for their own fates. Although true enough, often enough in the past to merit consideration as a major factor, I do not believe that the Second World War was such a period for the South Slavs. Moreover, if any foreign power can be said to bear a large measure of the responsibility for the KPJ's revolution, then that power was not Britain or the Soviet Union, but Nazi Germany.

Far from being or imagining themselves the arbiters of Yugoslavia's destiny, it seems to me that senior British decision-makers were painfully aware of their own ever-lessening ability to influence - let alone to impose - solutions congenial to themselves in a country they regarded as remote from Britain's vital interests. Even in Greece, where a vital post-war political interest was perceived, where the military usefulness of the

communist-led resistance was much less than in Yugoslavia, and where the country's relatively small size and ethnic homogeneity seemed to permit the successful projection of such power as Britain retained, the defeat of a confused communist rising in Athens in December 1944 proved a near-run thing. Nor, of course, was Britain, acting alone, able to secure victory for government forces over the communists during the subsequent civil war.

You will note that all this took place in a country which had for Stalin only a certain embarrassment value: i.e. what the British and their American successors did in Greece could be portrayed by Stalin as the moral equivalent of his own imposition of 'friendly' regimes in those countries of East Central Europe which were truly important to him. It was the ambitious revolutionary Tito who, failing to appreciate both Greece's and Yugoslavia's relative insignificance for the USSR, later turned both countries into dangerous embarrassments for Stalin! This was the principal reason why he had to be expelled from the fold in 1948.

Yan edwin?
Stalin
to stop L m
down

You have, in this connection, misread my comment about the October 1944 fifty-fifty 'percentages' agreement on Yugoslavia between Churchill and Stalin. I did not say that Churchill 'gained' from Stalin the influence in Yugoslavia he had earlier hoped to win through friendship with Tito; rather that he 'sought' it. As I put it elsewhere, he had decided to deal with the organ grinder rather than with his monkey. In fact, neither warlord was happy with the extent of his 'influence' - though Churchill assumed that Stalin must be exercising his own missing share. Again, it was this assumption on the part of the western powers after the war that ultimately made Tito such a thorn in Stalin's flesh.

However, even if one were to grant that Britain did contribute significantly to Tito's victory and Mihailović's defeat, that would not mean that responsibility should be laid at SOE's door. Of course SOE was important. From mid-1941 to the end of 1942, when few British ministers or generals had any attention to spare for Yugoslavia, SOE, alternately guided and harrassed by the Foreign Office, was the principal maker and executor of British policy towards the Yugoslav resistance. But matters changed in 1943, and SOE was sidelined as a policy-making body just as (and because) the war in the Balkans again assumed real military and political importance for the British.

Appellate

As far as Yugoslavia was concerned, there were two linked turning points: Maclean's appointment by Churchill as his 'daring Ambassador-leader' to Tito in August and SOE Cairo's subordination to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, General H. M. Wilson, in September. Thus both the policy decision to break with Mihailović (and its concomitant: inducing Tito to work with King Peter) and the institutionalization of massive material support for the Partisans took place after SOE's effective relegation to the roles of forwarding agent and communications agency. To those of you on the ground, suffering from SOE's inadequacies on both counts, these residual roles no doubt loomed large; but in reality they connoted SOE's marginalization.

Mc
date name
r/c

All that did was
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reference to
the SOE
reference to
the SOE

Yes but in context
implications of
indivision

It is for this reason, among others, that I have great difficulty in taking seriously your obsession with the putative Soviet 'mole', James Klugmann. His apotheosis into an important personage in SOE's Cairo and Bari bases *followed* rather than preceded both the policy switch and SOE's relegation. Insofar as he or other 'conspirators' may have withheld or doctored reports from the field (and I have yet to see evidence of this), it would have mattered less and less. Not only were SOE missions now generating more data than SOE or other government departments could digest (and more than a score of busy Klugmanns could have held back or tampered with), but SOE was far from being the only provider of intelligence on Yugoslav developments. If Secret Intelligence Service sources (including Ultra intercepts) and the analyses of the military and naval intelligence directorates had not been in substantial accord with SOE's situation reports and such 'one-offs' as Maclean's 'Blockbuster' of November 1943, then alarm bells would have rung at the highest level.

To presume the existence of either a uniquely skillful or a massively wide-spread pro-communist conspiracy is to affront credulity and to misunderstand how bureaucracies function. On the other hand, it was because government and military machines work the way they do that Tito was able to benefit so much more from British and Allied support than had Mihailović. There had been no such machine in place in the days when he was Britain's and SOE's chosen instrument.

I know that there is little chance that my arguments will tempt you to think again about any of the issues I have discussed above. Although you have asked some awkward and pertinent questions in both your letter and your book - questions which I will have to address in my own work - it is no advance to substitute one simplistic mythology for another. I hope our readers in *Borba* will resist that temptation.

With best wishes,

Yours ever,

Mark

My book
I can't
remember

3 The Maltings
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88
D

Dr. M.C. Wheeler
School of Slavonic and East European Studies
University of London
Senate House
Malet Street
London
WC1E 7HU

sent to *Archie* by *X from* me! on 11.2.91

11th February 1991

Dear Mark

Many thanks for yours of 31st January, which only just reached me. I have returned from Lislee to UK and will be here till early April. I hope to visit Belgrade for a couple of days, end March, for the publication of the Serbo-Croat edition of the Rape of Serbia.

I am sorry that you feel that we are separated by an unbridgeable gulf when it comes to basic aims and fundamental interpretations. Quite rightly you state that I am endeavouring to achieve the rehabilitation of Draža Mihailović and his movement because I have concluded that the British Role in Tito's Grab for Power was wrong-headed, culpable and decisive. I lived through a full year with the Mihailović movement in Serbia. I've done some quite extensive research of very relevant files. That is my considered view and I spelled it all out clearly in the Rape of Serbia. Moreover further research now under way, and new evidence flowing in, serves to reinforce my fundamental interpretations.

I am not a lone Maverick. Far from it. Though earlier many feared to speak out, a lot of experts on the subject world wide are now opening their minds or openly proclaiming what intellectuals in Belgrade now categorise as the new history replacing "the old false mythology". And what about SOE itself? If you interviewed the remaining articulate participants on a non-discriminatory basis I think you'd find that there is an astonishingly wide acceptance of my theme, not only by those who knew the Loyalists of Mihailović, but also by the less-committed partisan HLO's. I don't expect Maclean or Davidson to change their tune. That's not Maclean's style. And I'm sure Davidson is still sincerely convinced of the wonders of Tito'ism and of all "revolutionary liberational movements". He wears his politics on his sleeve and he'll go down fighting to the last. He's a gutsy one.

But I have not abandoned hope of an eleventh hour recantation by Deakin, the intellectual, recognising that historical objectivity - and the great importance of recovering Serbian respect for the British - require him to take account of the brave denunciation of Tito'ism by his own Yugoslav friends and minders and notably the late Vladimir Dedijer. Dedijer, like Djilas was another gutsy one, however misguided he was during the early years of the communist triumphalism which gave them all their personal niches in history. While there's life there's hope. Maybe Deakin will come round too.

Whatever about the three high priests of the received wisdom, to my knowledge you have not questioned, even by mail, key senior witnesses such as Archie Jack, Peter Solly Flood, Robert Purvis, Erik Greenwood. You did,

cont....

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.....cont

I believe, question Sir Alexander Glen a partisan ELO of course. You may need to do that again, because I was very gratified to receive a most complimentary letter from him about the Rape of Serbia. The same applies to Sir Richard Keane, another Partisan ELO, very close to Fitz Maclean. And what does Julian Amery think? And the many others on the Partisan side? What do those, who have read the Rape of Serbia, now think?

Unless and until you hear the views of these people who lived it, how can you make up your mind?

It seems to me that you are merely confirming, in everything you write, that your fundamental Tito'ist interpretation is immutable.

I do, of course, read your claim that this need not affect your analysis of what SOE, SOE people and other agencies thought; or of their reactions and the consequences.

But you then state that we have most profound differences of opinion in regard to the consequences. This forces the conclusion that you have already formed an immutable opinion about the consequences too - which evidently rejects in toto the case for Mihailović and the facts of what happened to him and why - before even half concluding your study.

Your crass allegation that my "brand of Serbian Nationalist revisionism" serves as "grist to the mill of Serbia's neo-communist rulers" is grossly false. You know very well that the rehabilitation of Mihailović - in the desire to give the Serbs an honourable outlet for their inbuilt nationalistic ethos - is not only my own aim. The rehabilitation of Mihailović was in the programme of ~~the~~ ~~then~~ one of the opposition parties in the election, not that of the ruling neo-socialist party.

Let me also remind you that the dangerous neo-communists in Yugoslavia are the members of a senior clique in the armed forces who have openly declared their willingness to resort to repressive measures, including military force and censorship, so as to maintain the Federal form of government and Tito'ist values.

We all want Yugoslavia to hold together, but not by a dictatorship.

Finally, let me ask you if you approve of the provision by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, of a platform in London for Admiral Mamula to expound those neo-communist views? Did you go to the discussion? I am shocked by this British interference in Yugoslavia's affairs. Does justification of building up Tito in 1943 and 1948 really require us to meddle with bolstering communism in 1991?

The rest of your letter seems to me yet a further re-hash of the "worn out fairy tales" (Borba's description, not mine). But I do need to take you up on certain points:-

Firstly: Tito's communism: Good or bad for Yugoslavia? You don't go into reasons - or weigh the pros and cons - but you put once again on record your personal view that the Communist seizure of power was probably the least bad result in the circumstances. To me, that just re-confirms that you are determined to ignore the mass of new evidence coming to light - and the views of more and more people both in Yugoslavia and overseas - and that I was not unfair in suggesting that (consciously or sub-consciously) you see your role as Defender of the Tito'ist faith.

Cont.....

.....cont

What about the massacre and the mass graves, with more being discovered all the time because people did not dare speak of them? What about Gornj Otok? What about Tito's personal despotism and lavish expenditure? What about the human rights record? What about the fact that the 1948 break was not a conversion of Tito to democracy as his lackies in the West tried to pretend, but rather that Stalin slapped him down for being too big for his boots; following which Tito smartly exploited those in the West who had vested interests in justifying their wartime support for him. You brought up Greece, where communism failed to gain power. Economically, the Greeks are far better off than the Yugoslavs, although the latter have far more resources and potential. I'd love to know just what benefits the ordinary people of Yugoslavia - not the Nomenklatura - had from Tito'ism.

You suggest that I exaggerate the British role. This is the old contention that the Partisans were going to win anyway. This, supported by ludicrously false figures, was the theme of Maclean's blockbuster in November 1943. But it is totally false. In April '43, before the British got into his act, Tito's forces were 15,000 men cornered near Durmitor and only 10,000 survived that rout. You write of "The communist dominated remainder of the country" (apart from Serbia) in 1943. That was the communist disinformation then and its still rubbish now. There were communist cells all around and even in Serbia, but actual forces only in groups of a few hundred, apart from the main army. It was the totally uninhibited British support for Tito and the British hamstringing of Mihailović from May '43 when Deakin dropped which enabled Tito to build up his forces. It was the British manipulation of the Italian surrender, and clear evidence supporting communist claims that the British were selling out Mihailović, that enabled the communists to get all the Italian arms and the Italian recruits. And this also started the mass Ustaše defections to the Partisans, something the Tito'ites have covered up for long. All that was in addition to the massive British arms support: at least 50,000 tons of supplies for Tito against, maybe, 200 for Mihailović (up to the Italian surrender only 118 tons according to Hinsley). And the close air support; and the strategic bombing; and the BBC lying propaganda; and every other dirty trick of the trade. No, my friend, I don't exaggerate.

As for British decision makers being painfully aware of their own lessening ability to influence - let alone to impose - solutions congenial to themselves in a country they regarded as remote from Britain's vital interests, I beg you to study the F.O. series in the P.R.O. leading up to and following the December 1943 decisions to abandon Mihailović. Not to speak of Churchill, Eden, Orme Sergeant and even Ralph Skrine Stevenson were all arrogant in playing God with Yugoslavia's fate; and they evinced no doubts at all about their right and power to do so. You make a bureaucratic point about the role of SOE in all this. Yes, you are right that SOE Cairo became formally subordinated to General Wilson in the Autumn of 1943 (actually it was November, not September wasn't it when Force 133 came into being?) But that is a thoroughly misleading red-herring. The break with SOE London control strengthened the effective power and influence of the SOE Cairo personalities. SOE Cairo then dealt directly with the Army, who were dependent on them for advice on secret matters. The Army were much less questioning than SOE London - particularly as the Minister of State's office and The Ambassador, Stevenson, were rabidly pro Partisan.

Your glib and generalised comments about bureaucratic functioning and the counter-checks provided by secret intelligence sources, Ultra intercepts and military intelligence Directorates, ignore what actually happened on December 10th 1943.

cont....

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4.

.....cont

Vain A tired and sickening Churchill took an arbitrary and whimsical decision on the basis of Maclean's and Deakin's reports, supported by the Cairo view, presented by Stevenson - which was fanatically partisan and excluded the reports of the British and American Missions to Mihailovic. The Military and Naval Directorates had no input into the decision. Neither did the Foreign Office who had requested [^] that Bailey and Armstrong from the Mission to Mihailovic, should join the meeting.

The files even show that Eden didn't know, a fortnight later, that Churchill had actually ordered the definite abandonment of Mihailovic. But every peasant in Yugoslavia knew. Bureaucracies don't always function as you suppose. And that one didn't on 10.12.43 in Churchill's bedroom in Cairo.

Let me slap down, immediately, your attempt to suggest that I am claiming that there was an uniquely skilfull and massively widespread conspiracy. Don't put words into my mouth. I don't allege any "conspiracy" at all. There were, indeed, moles and/or agents who, in various places, contributed greatly to the con-trick. And there was a general pro-partisan culture. But I understand that you yourself once told a mutual friend of ours, that any intelligent person in 1939 had to be a communist. If you were right, it is hardly surprising that the intelligence services had their share of fellow travellers and that there existed an ideal infra-structure for communist manipulation. But I don't think there was any co-ordinated conspiracy. They just all favoured the Partisan^S.

Vemic Finally, as regards SIS and Ultra, I want to say that I discount the nods and winks that are dished out about Ultra decrypts. I sincerely believe that the evidence of the decrypts is largely gobbledigook. So let's see some factual basis here, or stop hinting about what was disclosed by Ultra. As regards the Special Intelligence Service information, I now learn that SIS had no-one in Yugoslavia before ¹⁹⁴² when Vemic was dropped, followed by the notorious Robertson. Hinsley refers to Robertson's reports but I think I've shown in the Rape of Serbia that Robertson was at best a charlatan, a planted communist spy, and at worst Selby's betrayer. In 1943, SIS had Stuart who was killed. He was replaced by Syers, a very dedicated communist who was probably the author of some of the phoney facts and figures that appeared in the Blockbuster (so to that extent SIS reports were certainly in accord, but that's not to say they were truthful). In my area there was an SIS man (Greenwich I think). He hung around Djuric's Headquarters and I still have a snap-shot of him, with Djuric. He sent through the Djuric tittle-tattle which, as I wrote in the Rape of Serbia, was very questionable indeed. As I say in the book, the SIS reports which leaked into th PRO are most unimpressive. So before we accept any claim about Ultra or SIS reports supporting other claims, we need some factual basis.


SIS was deeply penetrated by communists. As you must surely know, Millar in Cairo and Ennals in London were both highly compromised. Indeed, Ennals seems to have been mixed up with the Cambridge set.

Whilst Klugmann was important, I do not agree with David Martin that he was the key to it all. Indeed, in a recent book review I wrote that the general left-wing culture was so strong that it would have all happened even without Klugmann - but he sure oiled the wheels.

I gather from Borba that they are interested to encourage what they call the duel between Tito'ists and Drazinoists. I am very happy to oblige.

Regards,

Yours sincerely


Michael Lees

NOTE FOR RECORD

SOE IN YUGOSLAVIA

Dame Anne Mueller telephoned me on 20 February 1991. She said that Mr Archie Jack had been in touch with her about Mark Wheeler's appointment to write SOE in Yugoslavia. Dame Anne's father was with Mihailovic in Yugoslavia and she is therefore contacted by the anti-Wheeler lobby for support. Mr Jack wants to write to the Prime Minister and/or Sir Robin Butler to suggest that some sort of panel should be set up to consider the Wheeler book before publication. She was ringing me, she said, informally, to chat about the Wheeler appointment and what advice she might give to Mr Jack.

Mr Jack seemed to have got hold of a remarkable amount of information already. For example he already knew that Mark Wheeler did not expect to start writing for another 18 months. Mr Jack regards that as a disadvantage as it might mean that some of those wishing to criticise his book will no longer be around when it is published. I told Dame Anne that we were not anxious to have a discredited History on our hands; that Lord Armstrong had gone to some lengths to satisfy himself that Dr Wheeler understood the complexities of the area he would be working in and that he could be relied upon to bring balanced judgement to the task. We had already been considering, in the light of the representations made by Miss Beloff, Mr Lees et al how we would 'clear' the book; it would obviously be necessary to consider the political implications at the time of publication - we did not want another 'Cruickshank'. I also said that it was difficult to select a completely unbiased author in this instance. As I recalled there had not been many candidates, Dr Pavlovic from Southampton University had been suggested, but was thought to be too closely connected to the Mihailovic faction to be unbiased; no such allegation had, so far as I was aware, been made about Dr Wheeler until Miss Beloff and Mr Lees started their campaign. Dame Anne said that she would advise Mr Jack to make his representations to Sir Robin Butler rather than to the Prime Minister but she had no faith that he would accept her advice.

Mr Cowell, SOE Adviser, telephoned on 25 February 1991 to say that he had spoken to Dr Wheeler about the possible interview by the Yugoslav journalist. He had told Dr Wheeler that there was no statutory reason why he should not speak to the journalist but our advice to him, if we were asked, would be the less said the better; he should not regard any interview as a platform. Dr Wheeler agreed and said that he fully realised that anything he said was likely to be misrepresented. Mr Cowell thought that if Dr Wheeler did speak to the journalist he would be non-committal.

POIA

MISS P M ANDREWS

Historical Section
25 February 1991

To file

22



THE SOE ADVISER

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Old Admiralty Building, Room 3/97
The Mall
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Telephone 071 210 6735
Facsimile 071 210 6340

Miss Pat M Andrews
Historical Section
Cabinet Office
Hepburn House
Marsham Street
London SW1P 4HW

Your reference

Our reference

Date

19 February 1991

CABINET OFFICE
H 9/1/90 ✓
20 FEB 1991
FILM INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.

Dear Pat

Yugoslavia again. You should know that I was telephoned from Belgrade, in the days when one could still get to work - about a week ago, by one Tamara OGONJEVIC. She works for a free lance TV company and interviewed Michael LEES and Nora BELOFF when they were there recently. She is coming to London on 15 March to put together a feature on the British role in the Yugoslav revolution. It will I fear be sympathetic to the "Rape of Serbia" theme, and she will be seeking interviews with officials, including me.

I said I would be pleased to see her but that there were conventions about which officials could make statements to the media so I could not promise her an interview. I said I would alert others and if she got in touch when she arrived I would probably be able to advise her as to what was possible.

I will obviously have to receive her and can talk about the SOE records, whether to camera or not, but

/clearly ...

Spoke to G Cowell on 21.2.91.

Said only thing in Wheeler's contract with us is the restriction on his use for any purpose other than the OH of the material in the Archive. GC is going to talk to M.W.

about the need for discretion if he talks to Tamara Ogonjevic. difficult prior to any interview. He will let me know outcome. I floated the idea of asking FERB to talk to him but that is / Post 21/2



- 2 -

clearly I would not speak on historical policy. I will in the meantime see what the attitude of the FCO political desk is.

One particular reason I am bringing you in is because of the probability that she will home in on Mark WHEELER, both his selection, and himself. Is there anything in his contract which would affect this?

I think that our guiding principle should be to avoid at all costs giving the impression that there is, on my side, anything being hidden, and on the political side, anything to be ashamed of, whatever the actual consequence might have been of decisions taken at the time.

Perhaps we could discuss.

Yours ever

Gervase

Gervase Cowell

SOE Adviser
Room 3/97, OAB



CABINET OFFICE

Historical Section

Hepburn House, Marsham Street, London SW1P 4HW
Telephone 071-217 6050

21

Ref: HO91/95 ✓

7 February 1991

G Cowell Esq
SOE Adviser
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Whitehall
LONDON
SW1A 2AZ

Dear Gervase

You might like to have a copy of the letter which Sir Robin Butler has sent to Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker in reply to the one he sent in about SOE in Yugoslavia and about which I consulted you recently.

I told Sir Robin that Sir Christopher Curwen had offered his help in persuading the Security Service to grant the access you mentioned to Dr Wheeler - no doubt you will be in touch with him on that.

Yours

Pat

MISS P M ANDREWS



F
POLIC
20

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 071-270 0101

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service
Sir Robin Butler KCB CVO

Ref. AO91/293 ✓



6 February 1991

Miss Andrews

Dear Douglas,

As promised in my letter of 17 January I have taken advice on the points you made in yours of 14 January.

I should perhaps say first that I have found that most of the issues which Mr Lees raised with you in his letter of 4 January came up in correspondence which my predecessor had with him and with Nora Beloff.

I see the point of your suggestion that in present circumstances we should delay the publication of a book which could cause controversy. You might however take comfort from the fact that, perhaps fortuitously, its appearance is far from imminent. I have discovered that Dr Wheeler expects now to take some eighteen months more to complete his research. He then has to write the history to which official approval has to be given before the publication process can begin. No firm timetable can be put on all these states but we are certainly looking at a period of natural delay of at least three years and possibly longer. In that time we shall do our best to ensure that the Official History which emerges presents a fair and balanced picture.

In the meantime I am assured that the "Taylor papers", to which you refer in your paragraph 5, will be available to Dr Wheeler.

As you say, Dr Wheeler has come in for considerable criticism. However, Robert Armstrong saw him before he was appointed and felt

/that he had the

Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker
9 North Court
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that he had the ability to weigh up fairly and dispassionately the evidence available to him. Dr Wheeler is of course responsible for the use he makes of the material to which he has access and, as Robert pointed out to Mr Lees, anyone who disagrees with his account will be able to put on public record their views and supporting arguments.

With all best wishes,

Yours ever,

Robin

CONFIDENTIAL

19

Pl. type for my sig

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

CABINET OFFICE
 A 1367 ✓
 5 FEB 1991
 FILING INSTRUCTIONS
 FILE NO.

HO91/75

cc Mr Davie

'SOE IN YUGOSLAVIA'

I have been asked for advice on and a draft reply to Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker's letter of 14 January 1991 with which he enclosed one to him dated 4 January 1991 from Mr Michael Lees. This minute and the attached draft reply to Sir Douglas have been prepared following consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's SOE Adviser, Mr Cowell, and, as you suggested, with Sir Percy Cradock (who in turn consulted Sir Christopher Curwen).

Sir Douglas suggests that if 'SOE in Yugoslavia' being written by Dr Mark Wheeler is likely to be controversial, consideration should perhaps be given to delaying its publication in order to limit the damage to our relations with Yugoslavia.

'SOE in Yugoslavia' seems likely to be controversial whoever writes it, so intense are the feelings of the opposing factions. Even before Dr Wheeler was appointed representations were made to the then Secretary of the Cabinet by Mr Lees and Miss Nora Beloff that he was too much identified with the "Titoist" faction. Lord Armstrong saw Dr Wheeler and was sufficiently satisfied that he had the ability to weigh all the evidence available to him fairly and dispassionately, to recommend him to the Prime Minister as a suitable candidate for appointment as the Official Historian.

There are two aspects of Sir Douglas's letter on which it might be useful to comment in reply. The first is timing. We had expected that the text of Dr Wheeler's history would be with us for clearance during 1992, indeed this was the basis upon which the reply to Mr William Powell's Parliamentary Question to the Prime Minister, which was answered on 18 January 1991 (WA Cols 611-614), was prepared. In the event Dr Wheeler has now informed the SOE Adviser that it will be 18 months before he has completed his research and can begin to write. If he takes one year to write up the history, which we then have to 'clear' officially, we are looking at a period of 3 years at least before the text can be sent for publication. In the circumstances, given present sensitivities, Sir Christopher Curwen considers this to be a satisfactory situation and the Foreign Office would not recommend any further delay being built into the programme. It is to be hoped that the sensitivities will diminish before publication is due. Account will need to be taken of the changed political climate; views acceptable to the previous Administration would almost certainly not be acceptable to those currently in power.

Secondly, Mr Cowell assures me that the Taylor papers, referred to in paragraph 5 of Sir Douglas's letter, will be available to Dr Wheeler.

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 ACT 2000

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Although 'SOE IN Yugoslavia' will contain the usual disclaimer that the author is responsible for the statements made and the views expressed in the Official History it will be necessary to ensure that the clearance procedure in this case, which will have to be demonstrably fair to all sides, covers not only historical accuracy but also the balance of argument. Under the terms of our contract with Dr Wheeler (which is separate from the one he has with his publisher, Macmillan) the Government retains the right to decide whether publication should go ahead.

A draft reply to Sir Douglas is attached for consideration.

Pat Andrews

MISS P M ANDREWS

Historical Section
4 February 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CAB 1031799
18

HO91/74

1. SIR CHRISTOPHER CURWEN
2. SIR PERCY CRADOCK

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 'SOE IN YUGOSLAVIA'

Thank you for your comments on my minute of 29 January 1991 and the papers attached to it.

In response to the query at the end of your minute of 30 January 1991, the author, in addition to his contract with Macmillan, has a contract with us which sets out the conditions governing access to and use of official records not open to the public. Dr Wheeler has signed a copy of these conditions signifying his consent to be bound by them. Item (5) says:-

"The right to decide whether or not the history should be published will rest exclusively with the Government who may, as an alternative to withholding permission to publish, grant such permission conditionally upon the omission or alteration of any parts of the text which are not acceptable in the national interest, or because they might give occasion for an action for defamation."

I have not taken legal advice on this; it has not so far been necessary to do so, but I assume that the terms of our contract with Dr Wheeler would give us the right to seek such amendments to the text as are regarded as being in the national interest, and we would not authorise its submission for publication until any such amendments/deletions had been made.

I shall add a piece to the submission to Sir Robin Butler to cover this point; thank you for raising it.

CLOSED UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000

Pat Andrews

MISS P M ANDREWS

Historical Section
1 February 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

Jf01829 ✓

1. SIR PERCY CRADOCK ✓
2. MISS P. M. ANDREWS

*I agree with Sir C. Curwen's
comments*

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 'SOE IN YUGOSLAVIA'

*C. Curwen
- 3/1*



- 1. You asked me if I had a view on the attached papers, which are strangely relevant to the present day, as Michael Lees' letter indicates.
2. The key to understanding the controversy is that the SOE section running Yugoslav operations was heavily infiltrated by British Communists (who may or may not have been Russian agents) of which Klugman was the most notable. It is, therefore, essential in my view that Wheeler should have a full briefing on the basis of Security Service papers and I note that this is envisaged in the draft submission. I have asked the SOE Adviser to let me know who in the Security Service would deal with this and propose to have a word with them. I understand that Wheeler is Pvd so there should be no problem over this.
3. It is clearly satisfactory, given present sensitivities, that the book is not likely to be ready for publication for another three years, and I agree with the suggestion at the end of the draft submission that we will need to vet the manuscript for balance as well as accuracy and security. What is not clear to me, however, given that this will be a commercial publication, and that the author has signed a contract with a publisher, is whether we would be in a position to hold up publication further should this seem desirable, or should we be unable to persuade the author to take a balanced view.

C. Curwen

CHRISTOPHER CURWEN

30 JANUARY 1991

SIR PERCY CRADOCK

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF 'SOE IN YUGOSLAVIA'

Sir Robin Butler has suggested that I should consult you about representations which have been made to us in respect of the preparation for publication of the Official History of 'SOE in Yugoslavia'.

Dr Mark Wheeler, an American currently working at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at London University, was, in March 1988, appointed by the Prime Minister as the Official Historian to write the Official History of 'SOE in Yugoslavia'. Dr Wheeler had been recommended by Sir Harry Hinsley, the General Editor and author of the Intelligence History series, Sir Peter Wilkinson, a former Coordinator and Director GCHQ as well as by Sir William Deakin and Sir Fitzroy Maclean. The SOE histories are handled differently from the main programme of Official Histories in that the Historian/Author has a contract with a commercial publisher, in this case Macmillan, who pays the author on the usual terms. The Government is responsible for appointing the chosen author as an Official Historian and according him access to the official archive. .

It was recognised at an early stage that this History was likely to be controversial. Before Dr Wheeler's appointment was made both Mr Michael Lees and Miss Nora Beloff wrote to the then Secretary of the Cabinet complaining that he was the wrong person, being too closely identified with the "Titoist" faction. Lord Armstrong after consulting Sir Patrick Wright saw Dr Wheeler and recorded:-

"The enquiries I have made....lead me to the view that he can be relied upon to weigh all the evidence in an objective and balanced way, and I have satisfied myself that he is well aware of the need to give due weight to the views of those who take a "revisionist" as well as those who.....take a "Titoist" view."

Lord Armstrong cleared with Sir Patrick Wright a very full submission to the Prime Minister on the basis of which Dr Wheeler was appointed.

Whilst he has been working on the History Dr Wheeler visited Belgrade to give a series of lectures following which a letter signed by six academics complaining about his attitude and method of work was brought to this country by Princess Elizabeth of Yugoslavia. A copy of the letter and the reply which was sent is attached.

Sir Robin Butler has now received a letter from Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker of the Special Forces Club who has in turn received one from Mr Michael Lees, referred to above, a former member of SOE and a vociferous critic of Dr Wheeler. Sir Douglas suggests that the publication of 'SOE in Yugoslavia' should be delayed so as to limit damage to our relations with Yugoslavia.

I have discussed the correspondence with Mr Gervase Cowell, the FCO's SOE Adviser, and the attached draft submission to Sir Robin and reply to Sir Douglas reflect our discussion. It seems premature to consult other parts

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the Foreign Office until we have the text of the history and can see what line Dr Wheeler is taking. As you will see we are unlikely to reach this stage for some time yet.

I should be most grateful for your views on this matter and if there is any further information I can supply or if you would like to discuss I shall, of course, be glad to call upon you.

Pat Andrews

MISS P M ANDREWS

Cabinet Office
Historical Section
29 January 1991

Copied also to G Couell, SoE Adviser.

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

'SOE IN YUGOSLAVIA'

I have been asked for advice on and a draft reply to Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker's letter of 14 January 1991 with which he enclosed one to him dated 4 January 1991 from Mr Michael Lees. [This minute and the attached draft reply to Sir Douglas have been prepared following consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth's SOE Adviser, Mr Cowell, and, as you suggested, with Sir Percy Cradock.]

Sir Douglas suggests that if 'SOE in Yugoslavia' being written by Dr Mark Wheeler is likely to be controversial, consideration should perhaps be given to delaying its publication in order to limit the damage to our relations with Yugoslavia.

'SOE in Yugoslavia' seems likely to be controversial whoever writes it, so intense are the feelings of the opposing factions. Even before Dr Wheeler was appointed representations were made to the then Secretary of the Cabinet by Mr Lees and Miss Nora Beloff that he was too much identified with the "Titoist" faction. Lord Armstrong saw Dr Wheeler and was sufficiently satisfied that he had the ability to weigh all the evidence available to him fairly and dispassionately to recommend him to the Prime Minister as a suitable candidate for appointment as the Official Historian.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Secondly, Mr Cowell assures me that the Taylor papers, referred to in paragraph 5 of Sir Douglas's letter, will be available to Dr Wheeler.

Also, although this cannot be revealed in the reply to Sir Douglas, Mr Cowell is seeking the permission of the Security Service to show to Dr Wheeler papers which indicate the extent of James Klugman's role on behalf of the Communist Party - to date they have only consented to his access to secondary and much less persuasive material, thus Dr Wheeler has not so far appreciated its significance.

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Although 'SOE IN Yugoslavia' will contain the usual disclaimer that the author is responsible for the statements made and the views expressed in the Official History it will, we believe, be necessary to ensure that the clearance procedure in this case, which will have to be demonstrably fair to all sides, covers not only historical accuracy but also the balance of argument.

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DRAFT LETTER FOR SIR ROBIN BUTLER TO SEND TO:-

Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker
9 North Court
Great Peter Street
LONDON SW1P 3LL

As promised in my letter of 17 January I have taken advice on the points you made in yours of 14 January.

I should perhaps say first that all the issues which Mr Lees raised with you in his letter of 4 January are well known to us having already been made in forthright correspondence which my predecessor had with him and with Miss Nora Beloff.

I quite understand your wish to delay the publication of a book which could cause controversy but you might perhaps take comfort from the fact that, perhaps fortuitously, its appearance is far from imminent. Dr Wheeler expects now to take some eighteen months more to complete his research. He then has to write the history to which official approval has to be given before the publication process can begin. No firm timetable can be put on all these stages but we are certainly looking at a period of what we might perhaps call natural delay of at least three years and possibly longer. In that time we shall do our best to ensure that the Official History which emerges presents a fair and balanced picture.

In the meantime I am assured that the "Taylor papers", to which you refer in your paragraph 5, will be available to Dr Wheeler.

As you say, Dr Wheeler has come in for considerable criticism. However, Robert Armstrong saw him before he was appointed and felt that he had the ability to weigh up fairly and dispassionately the evidence available to him. Dr Wheeler is of course solely responsible for the use he makes of the material to which he has access and, as Robert pointed out to Mr Lees, anyone who disagrees with his account will be able to put his or her own views and the reasons for holding them on public record.

THE SOE ADVISER

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Old Admiralty Building, Room 3/97
Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2AZ


Tel 071 210 6735

Your reference

Our reference

Date

13 July 1990



DR MARK WHEELER

I have received the letter of 14 June 1990 from you and your co-signatories, to each of whom I am sending this reply and I have discussed it with the office which is concerned with the appointment of official historians. It has been agreed that I should send this reply.

We are naturally concerned by any expressions of misgiving on the part of an eminent group of academicians and realise the particular value which attaches to your views as Yugoslav historians.

The choice of any author for the history of SOE in Yugoslavia would inevitably be controversial - such is the strength of feeling which it arouses on both sides. We have every confidence in the integrity of Dr WHEELER (who is incidentally American). He is well aware of the controversy surrounding the affairs and events with which the history will be concerned and we believe he has the ability to weigh all the evidence available to him fairly and dispassionately. We certainly acknowledge the possibility that there could be evidence and arguments available to you in your special position, of which he might not be aware. Would not the best way forward be for you to present Dr WHEELER directly with

/such ...



- 2 -

such evidence? We do understand that, in the final analysis, interpretation may play a bigger role than evidence, but as your letter dealt solely with that, without the benefit of any concrete examples, it might be advantageous to illustrate your fears as well as to describe them.

In the meantime we will make Dr WHEELER aware that you have such reservations and we are sure he will give due weight to your observations. Thank you for writing to us and please feel free to do so at any time.

You can write to Dr WHEELER either through this office or at his university address

School of Slavonic & East European Studies
University of London
Malet Street
London WC1

Yours sincerely,

Gervase Cowell

SOE Adviser
Room 3/97, OAB

Belgrade, June 14, 1990.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

We would like to attract your attention to the fact that Mr. Mark Wheeler from the School For Slavonic and East European Studies of the London University, recently visited Belgrade and gave several lectures about his work on the history of the SOE and its activities in Yugoslavia prior and during World War Two.

As a group of Yugoslav historians we could not but to notice that Mr. Wheeler's professional and scolar horizon is far from what we had expected from a British professor coming from such a prestigeous institution. Our dissappointment became even greater when we heard that he was chosen to write an official history of SOE. For those reasons we felt obliged to react and express our general dissatisfaction.

It is quite logical that Yugoslav intellectuals show greater interest and sensitivity for questions of their national history than historians from other countries.

The problems of Mr. Wheeler's historical method in analyzing events and phenomena of the probably most complex period in the history of Yogoslavia (1939-1945) could be summarized and systematized in two segments:

1. Professor Wheeler seems incapable of understanding the multifold complexities of the Yugoslav history of the period in question. Most of his findings and conclusions, therefore, appear simplified and for the most part inccorect. His methodological point of view (i.e historical analysis of Yugoslav events from the British perspective) makes him even more confused. As a rule, Mr. Wheeler constantly falls into the error of mistaking causes and consequences.

2. What appears as an even more serious problem of Mr. Wheeler's method is the fact that, for some reason unknown to us, he often expresses biased opinions, sometimes openly taking sides in Yugoslav political matters of the period in question. Surprisingly enough, his pro-Communist views of the Yugoslav history were overcome in Yugoslav official historiography of Tito's era. Thus, Mr. Wheeler as a historian belongs to the group of ancient, ideologically colored, historiography and represents an anachronism in circles of modern historians not only in Yugoslavia but in the world as well.

We feel absolutely certain that among British experts in the field of East European modern history there must be individuals of much more knowledge and intellectual integrity than professor Mark Wheeler, who could write the history of SOE and its policies

towards Yugoslavia. We always looked towards British historians as examples of serious and well balanced scholars. Unfortunately, Mr. Wheeler proves the opposite.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Veselin Djuretic
Senior Fellow
Institute For Balkan Studies
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

Veselin Djuretic

Dr Dragoljub Dragojlovic
Senior Fellow
Institute For Balkan Studies
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

Dragoljub Dragojlovic

Dr Milan St. Protic
Research Fellow
Institute For Balkan Studies
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

Milan St. Protic

Dr Savo Skoko
Military historian

Savo Skoko

Dr Petar Opacic
Military historian

Petar Opacic

Dr Bosko Bojovic
Research Fellow
Institute For Balkan Studies
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

Bosko Bojovic



F
15

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 071-270 0101

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service
Sir Robin Butler KCB CVO

Ref. A091/143 ✓

17 January 1991

c- Miss Andrews
✓ 38291

Dear Douglas,

Many thanks for your letter of 14 January enclosing one from Michael Lees. I agree that the point which you raise in your covering letter is important. I will take advice on it and come back to you.

All best wishes,

Yours ever,

Robin

Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker KCMG CBE
9 North Court
Great Peter Street
SW1P 3LL

430/17

Personal

9 North Court,

Great Peter St, SWIP 3LL

14

14 January, 1991

My Dear Robin

Yugoslavia.

I attach a letter from Michael LEES, MC, a British Liaison officer in Yugoslavia and Italy. He has recently received a great welcome in Belgrade for his "The Rape of Serbia", pro Mihailovic and anti-Tito. Perhaps you would pass this to Patrick Wright, for consideration by his experts.

The points which seem to arise...

1. Is the present situation in Yugoslavia the same as it appears in Rumania? A takeover, preplanned, by former Marxists now self-styled Social Democrats. Thus not allowing the real Serb patriots to emerge and (we pray) hold Yugoslavia together.

2. If this is so, should not the publication of any 'official' record of British/Yugoslav cooperation in WWII, allegedly showing that Tito was the best bet for Yugoslavia as well as Britain, be held up? 3. Mr Wheeler seems to be coming in for criticism from several directions; not only for some alleged personal views, but as he has only access to the surviving documents alleged to have been 'cooked' and so misleading the decision-takers; who thus backed Tito and withdrew support from Mihailovic?

4. In other countries for which I had responsibility, Italy and France, we backed all regardless of any ideology; not unsuccessfully; helped, perhaps, by some action which I took directly with Italian and French decision-takers.

5. There seems to be no available record of action taken by George Taylor in 1940, which I knew of, while he was in D Section of SIS. On this was based the later support for Mihailovic. Perhaps such records, being SIS, cannot be used.

I believe that this subject is of sufficient importance in the present conditions of turmoil, to bother you and Patrick Wright. If the proposed book is to be controversial, should it at least not be delayed, to limit damage to British relations with those splendid Yugoslav people?

Sir Robin Yutler,
KCB, CVO

Yours ever
Douglas
Douglas Dodds-Parker.

c- Miss Andrews

8291



I have dictated a brief acknowledgement. I suggest that Miss Andrews consult Sir P. Craddock as well as the PCO

c- Miss Andrews
Advice & draft reply please

PERB 16.1.

16/1

CABINET OFFICE
A 497 ✓
16 JAN 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.

Michael Lee

Lislee House,
Courtmacsherry,
Co. Cork, Ireland.

Tel: Bandon (023) 40126

4.1.91

(1)

Dear Douglas,

Re your letter to Patrick Ellis of 23/12/90.
I'm afraid you've got one or two things wrong.
I was not in the North Catholic part. I was
all the time in the far South East in the Serbian
orthodox part and actually on the borders of
Bulgaria & Albania, not Austria Hungary.

Secondly I could give no useful advice
now. I haven't been in Yugoslavia for 47 years
other than my recent fortnight. I've even
forgotten the language in that time although I'm
starting to relearn it - not easy at 70!

Thirdly I don't know about the Ambassador
but the Jug Admiral (Mamula) is part of a
group forming a new openly communist party with
senior officers who are dedicated to "maintaining
the values of Titoism & preventing chaos". That
doesn't sound a very nice party to me. It sounds
like the Rumanian ^{salvation} National Front put into power
by a KGB outsch and the likely grouping in
USSR of the right wingers (so called) the Army
officers & the KGB. i.e. communist reaction
against democracy. What I want to know

is who invited Mamula & arranged his
lecture to the RUSI? Is history repeating itself? Are
the British Titomeniacs once again trying to help the
communists reimpose dictatorship on Yugoslavia, just
as the poor wretched Yugoslavs are trying to break
free? Do please let me know who invited Mamula?
Is Fitz behind this? or Deekin?

I'm afraid I can't be much use to you

14/1

or Patrick Ellis but you could. (2)
certainly help me by letting me know
just what happened with Mennuk.

"Borba" in Belgrade printed an interview
with Mark Wheeler in which he trotted out
some appallingly tendentious old "received
wisdom" including the claim that there
was a pro Mikeilovic "CONSPIRACY" in SOE London
and that Klugmann had no influence, nor did
Cairo SOE, on British policy. They only
implemented it. Wow! I know that the
BIG LIE is communist technique but Mark
Wheeler is official historian and this is just
too much. I've written a sizzler to
Belgrade to "Borba" which I hope they'll
publish and I'll try to get Mercetic to
publish it, with "Borba's" permission, in the
next number of the Smith Star journal. But
somebody has to do something about Mark. I've
tried earnestly and in good faith to temper
his mad prejudice but he is quite evidently
convinced in his pro communist faith. One
thing I can assure you is that the row over
the Danish history is going to look like a
love scene compared to what happens if
Mark is allowed to publish that sort of crap.
I've expressed my fears to Brooks and Chris
Wood repeatedly. Brooks at least registers my
objection. Chris hasn't had the manners to reply
or even acknowledge the gift of my book. I know
he's just got married but he is chairman of
the historical sub-committee and responsible.

(3.)

Lislee House,
Courtmacsherry,
Co. Cork, Ireland.
Tel: Bandon (023) 40126

Anyrate I'm ploughing on with my lone furrow.

The Minister, The No 2 at The Irish Embassy who Nora Seloff knows fairly well and who has seen them 20 years, asked for my book & I sent him a copy. I don't know if he's shown it to The Ambassador. I sincerely hope he has.

The main opposition party in Serbia, The party of Vuk Draskovic, has the rehabilitation of Miskovic as a part of its programme. Surely we in London should be supporting The democrats i.e. The opposition — not The socialists who are just The communist Nomenklatura under another name.

The communist Nomenklatura calling themselves socialists are clinging to power in Serbia (just in Serbia) by exploiting Serbian nationalism against The Albanian minority in Kosovo and The alleged repression of Serbian minorities in Croatia. The Serbs are, always have been, and always will be, fierce Nationalists. How much better to direct this emotion in a clean healthy direction — The rediscovery of The Patriotic Loyalties of Miskovic and his programme which envisaged a Federal form of Yugoslavia. Let The Serbs rediscover The good aspects of their history and build on them. For

The Nomenklatura to claim on the one hand (4).
That Tito held Yugoslavia together and on
the other to whip up Serbian nationalism against
others in order to keep the reins of power
is hypocritical to say the least

For London to get in on the act
by continuing to support old communist
Lies is I would submit, obscene; now that
even the blind have to see the evil that
the communist despots did to all of
Eastern Europe.

Sorry this is such a long letter but
I also have to correct your statement that
I was awarded the Military Cross. False.
I indeed very Tacitean! What happened was
that I was accused quite falsely of
disobeying orders and in fact demoted. I
recorded the truth in my deposition to
the Bologna conference. I was used as
a scapegoat by Charles Mackintosh. But I'm
not fighting a war with SOE about blunders
in Italy. On the whole Italian affairs were
handled well, although as everywhere bullshit
was at a premium. My crusade is to get
the truth told about what happened in
Yugoslavia. Here not only bullshit but
Lies have reigned supreme for 45 years.
That must be stopped before we die.
Happy New Year Yours ever

Sir Douglas Dodds Parker CBE. KCMB

PERSONAL. ~~Staff-in-confidence~~
PA to Miss Pat M Andrews

201A
13/8



With the compliments of

THE SOE ADVISER

"replacement"

with apologies - ie correct ref given

PA to Gervase Cowell
10 August 1990

Valerie Collins

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
OLD ADMIRALTY BUILDING
WHITEHALL SW1A 2AZ

TEL: 01 210 6735



13

THE SOE ADVISER

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Old Admiralty Building, Room 3/97
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LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Tel 071 210 6735

Miss Pat M Andrews
Historical Section
Cabinet Office
Hepburn House
Marsham Street
London SW1P 4HW

Your reference
Your letter of 9 July 1990 ref HO 90/252
Our reference
My letter of 5 July 1990
Date

9 August 1990

Post
PERSONAL. Staff in confidence 13/8

Dear Pat

Mark WHEELER



I have shown (8 Aug 90) to Mark WHEELER both the letter from Belgrade and my reply. (As you will note I included your suggested addition but left in my own phrase about interpretation largely in the hope of preempting an argument on that issue - but you may well be right in fearing it will only provoke one.)

He was naturally a little taken aback. He said his fault was obviously not being a right-wing Serbian. He said he had only admonished the Serbs for trying to blame everyone for their troubles except themselves! He believed that most of the signatories had not been present at his lecture. He was very keen to know how the letter had arrived. I assured him that that was irrelevant, and that the bearer had not wished to be associated with it. The second part of that is wholly true but the first almost. He wondered if it had been orchestrated in London by Nora BELOFF or Michael LEES, which I said I was sure was not the case.

I said I was sure he had been sufficiently battle hardened to take this sort of thing in his stride. I had felt it right however that he should see the letters

/because ...



- 2 -

because I did not like the idea of such criticism being made behind his back. What he had to realise however was that there was now a new factor in the equation, a Belgrade which did not want to hear about TITO. We agreed there was nothing he could do except carry on reporting things as he saw them. I did add however that I personally was not sure that he had given sufficient weight to the influence of KLUGMANN. He began to defend his view that KLUGMANN would not have had a decisive role but when I reminded him of some particularly revealing papers on this subject he changed to saying that it was too early at this stage to come to any conclusion. Outlook squally.

Yours ever

Gervase

Gervase Cowell

SOE Adviser
Room 3/97, OAB



POA
13/8

12

THE SOE ADVISER

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Old Admiralty Building, Room 3/97
Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Tel 071 210 6735

Miss Pat M Andrews
Historical Section
Cabinet Office
Hepburn House
Marsham Street
London SW1P 4HW

Your reference

Your letter ref HO 90/289 of 20 Jul 90
Our reference

Date

9 August 1990

*Wrong reference -
replacement letter being set.*

PERSONAL. ~~Staff in confidence~~

*POA
13/8*

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Mark WHEELER

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- 2 -

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Yours ever

Gervase
Gervase Cowell

SOE Adviser
Room 3/97, OAB



FOLIO
11

THE SOE ADVISER

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Old Admiralty Building, Room 3/97
Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Tel 071 210 6735

Your reference

Our reference

Date

13 July 1990



DR MARK WHEELER

I have received the letter of 14 June 1990 from you and your co-signatories, to each of whom I am sending this reply and I have discussed it with the office which is concerned with the appointment of official historians. It has been agreed that I should send this reply.

We are naturally concerned by any expressions of misgiving on the part of an eminent group of academicians and realise the particular value which attaches to your views as Yugoslav historians.

The choice of any author for the history of SOE in Yugoslavia would inevitably be controversial - such is the strength of feeling which it arouses on both sides. We have every confidence in the integrity of Dr WHEELER (who is incidentally American). He is well aware of the controversy surrounding the affairs and events with which the history will be concerned and we believe he has the ability to weigh all the evidence available to him fairly and dispassionately. We certainly acknowledge the possibility that there could be evidence and arguments available to you in your special position, of which he might not be aware. Would not the best way forward be for you to present Dr WHEELER directly with

/such ...



- 2 -

such evidence? We do understand that, in the final analysis, interpretation may play a bigger role than evidence, but as your letter dealt solely with that, without the benefit of any concrete examples, it might be advantageous to illustrate your fears as well as to describe them.

In the meantime we will make Dr WHEELER aware that you have such reservations and we are sure he will give due weight to your observations. Thank you for writing to us and please feel free to do so at any time.

You can write to Dr WHEELER either through this office or at his university address

School of Slavonic & East European Studies
University of London
Malet Street
London WC1

Yours sincerely,

Gervase Cowell

SOE Adviser
Room 3/97, OAB

Belgrade, June 14, 1990.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

We would like to attract your attention to the fact that Mr. Mark Wheeler from the School For Slavonic and East European Studies of the London University, recently visited Belgrade and gave several lectures about his work on the history of the SOE and its activities in Yugoslavia prior and during World War Two.

As a group of Yugoslav historians we could not but to notice that Mr. Wheeler's professional and scolar horizon is far from what we had expected from a British professor coming from such a prestigeous institution. Our dissappointment became even greater when we heard that he was chosen to write an official history of SOE. For those reasons we felt obliged to react and express our general dissatisfaction.

It is quite logical that Yugoslav intellectuals show greater interest and sensitivity for questions of their national history than historians from other countries.

The problems of Mr. Wheeler's historical method in analyzing events and phenomena of the probably most complex period in the history of Yugoslavia (1939-1945) could be summarized and systematized in two segments:

1. Professor Wheeler seems incapable of understanding the multifold complexities of the Yugoslav history of the period in question. Most of his findings and conclusions, therefore, appear simplified and for the most part inccorect. His methodological point of view (i.e historical analysis of Yugoslav events from the British perspective) makes him even more confused. As a rule, Mr. Wheeler constantly falls into the error of mistaking causes and consequences.

2. What appears as an even more serious problem of Mr. Wheeler's method is the fact that, for some reason unknown to us, he often expresses biased opinions, sometimes openly taking sides in Yugoslav political matters of the period in question. Surprisingly enough, his pro-Communist views of the Yugoslav history were overcome in Yugoslav official historiography of Tito's era. Thus, Mr. Wheeler as a historian belongs to the group of ancient, ideologically colored, historiography and represents an anachronism in circles of modern historians not only in Yugoslavia but in the world as well.

We feel absolutely certain that among British experts in the field of East European modern history there must be individuals of much more knowledge and intellectual integrity than professor Mark Wheeler, who could write the history of SOE and its policies

towards Yugoslavia. We always looked towards British historians as examples of serious and well balanced scholars. Unfortunately, Mr. Wheeler proves the opposite.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Veselin Djuretic
Senior Fellow
Institute For Balkan Studies
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

Veselin Djuretic

Dr Dragoljub Dragojlovic
Senior Fellow
Institute For Balkan Studies
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

Dragoljub Dragojlovic

Dr Milan St. Protic
Research Fellow
Institute For Balkan Studies
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

Milan St. Protic

Dr Savo Skoko
Military historian

Savo Skoko

Dr Petar Opacic
Military historian

Petar Opacic

Dr Bosko Bojovic
Research Fellow
Institute For Balkan Studies
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

Bosko Bojovic



CABINET OFFICE

Historical Section

Hepburn House, Marsham Street, London SW1P 4HW
Telephone 071-217 6050

Ref: HO 90/252 ✓

9 July 1990

G Cowell Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Room 3/97
Old Admiralty Building
Whitehall
LONDON
SW1A 2AZ

Dear Gervase

Thank you for your letter of 5 July enclosing a draft reply to Belgrade.

I have just two comments. First I think we might be a little more supportive (despite the concern you expressed when we met) of Dr Wheeler. Could I suggest an addition to the second sentence of the third paragraph viz:

"We have every confidence.....(who is.....).
He is well aware of the controversy surrounding the
affairs and events with which the history will
be concerned and we believe he has the ability to weigh
all the evidence available to him fairly and dispassionately.
We certainly acknowledge.....".

These are words taken out of the correspondence the former Secretary of the Cabinet had with Miss Beloff and Mr Lees.

My second comment is about the last half of the third paragraph. Isn't the sentiment about interpretation perhaps playing a bigger role than evidence something of a hostage to fortune? I leave it to your judgment but I would not presume...! I certainly think however that the complainants should be encouraged to submit examples of their concern.

We talked about the problem of getting the text satisfactorily cleared. I wondered if we might call upon Sir Harry Hinsley for this purpose. He recommended Dr Wheeler as I understand it, and his own standing as an historian is high in the aftermath of the publication of the History of British Intelligence series.

We spoke also about outstanding SOE histories. I think the programme at present and for the foreseeable future is the one agreed at the meeting which Sir Robin Butler chaired on 23 November 1988 (I sent you a copy of the minutes with my letter of 25 January 1989). The correspondence with Sir Brooks Richards in early 1989 amended this slightly but there have been no major developments since. You will see that in his summing up Sir Robin referred to "rounding off" the series with Mackenzie. This is why I thought that all possibilities had been covered but if you think there are fresh topics to consider do let us discuss again.

Yours ever Pat

MISS P M ANDREWS



9

THE SOE ADVISER

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Old Admiralty Building, Room 3/97
Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Tel 071 210 6735

Miss Pat M Andrews
Historical Section
Cabinet Office
Hepburn House
Marsham Street
London SW1P 4HW

Your reference

Our reference

Further to my letter of 21 June 1990
Date and subsequent discussion in OAB
on 27 June 1990

5 July 1990

PERSONAL. ~~Staff-in-confidence~~ PO1A 13/8

Dear Pat

Dr Mark WHEELER

Further to my letter of 21 June 1990 and our subsequent discussion I attach a draft reply to Belgrade for your comments.

Yours

Gervase

Gervase Cowell

SOE Adviser
Room 3/97, OAB



/Enc.

CLASSIC



Dr Mark WHEELER

I have received your letter of 14 June 1990 and I have discussed it with the office which is concerned with the appointment of official historians. It has been agreed that I should send this reply.

We are naturally concerned by any expressions of misgiving on the part of an eminent group of academicians and realise the particular value which attaches to your views as Yugoslav historians.

The choice of any author for the history of SOE in Yugoslavia would inevitably be controversial - such is the strength of feeling which it arouses on both sides. We have every confidence in the integrity of Dr WHEELER (who is incidentally American) but we certainly acknowledge the possibility that there could be evidence and arguments available to you in your special position, of which he might not be aware. Would not the best way forward be for you to present Dr WHEELER directly with such evidence? We do understand that, in the final analysis, interpretation may play a bigger role than evidence, but as your letter dealt solely with that, without the benefit of any concrete examples, it might be

/advantageous ...



- 2 -

advantageous to illustrate your fears as well as to describe them.

In the meantime we will make Dr WHEELER aware that you have such reservations and we are sure he will give due weight to your observations. Thank you for writing to us and please feel free to do so at any time.

You can write to Dr WHEELER either through this office or at his university address

School of Slavonic & East European Studies
University of London
Malet Street
London WC1



NOTE FOR RECORD

I went to see Gervase Cowell on Wednesday 27 June at his request to discuss the letter he sent to me on 21 June enclosing one from some Yugoslav academics who are unhappy about the appointment of Dr Mark Wheeler as Official Historian to write SOE in Yugoslavia.

Mr Cowell re-iterated what he said in his letter that the representations needed to be taken seriously partly because they had been made in the light of evidence deduced from Dr Wheeler's own lectures when he was in Yugoslavia recently;

and partly because of the impressions Mr Cowell had himself formed of Dr Wheeler and his attitudes and opinions which lead him to think that the fears about Dr Wheeler are not entirely without foundation.

Mr Cowell said that Dr Wheeler is a "republican (with a small r) American," which means that he has no time for monarchies and the trappings thereof; in conversation he told Mr Cowell that he believed that anyone with any intelligence would have been a communist or a communist sympathiser in the 1930s; and he has consistently belittled the damage believed to have been done to SOE by Klugmann despite written evidence which he (and now I) has seen. Such factors, small though they are individually, have given Mr Cowell some cause for concern that Dr Wheeler will be able to write as unbiased a history of SOE in Yugoslavia as we had hoped and believed.

In discussion we agreed that a reply should go from Mr Cowell saying that he had been in touch with the "competent authorities" and re-iterating our belief in Dr Wheeler's integrity but saying that those who felt he was unlikely to write an acceptable account of SOE in Yugoslavia should get in touch with him and make available to him any material which they thought he might not have seen. Mr Cowell would clear a draft letter with me.

In the longer term we agreed that clearing Dr Wheeler's text would be a delicate matter. The Government retained the right to decide whether to publish or not but we would need to find some-one who would be able to advise on whether Dr Wheeler had indeed produced a balanced account of SOE's activities. It would probably never be possible to please both sides of the argument but with the recent changes in public opinion on Eastern Europe we would need to ensure if at all possible that we did not cause offence by publishing an unacceptable account. Mr Cowell would consider whether the relevant Foreign Office desk officer would be able to help or advise.

With regard to other histories Mr Cowell said that Richard Clogg was attending the office again after a long break. He also wondered whether we should put something in hand on the areas not so far covered before all those who had been involved died. We agreed to look at this over the summer.

Pat Andrews

MISS P M ANDREWS

Historical Section
28 June 1990

CLOSED UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000

ACT 2000
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
CLOSED UNDER THE

Miss Pat Andrews,



With the compliments of

THE SOE ADVISER

PA to SOE Adviser, Gervase Cowell
10 August 1990

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
OLD ADMIRALTY BUILDING
WHITEHALL SW1A 2AZ

TEL: 01 210 6735



3pm 27/6
OAB 7
CAB 103/790

THE SOE ADVISER

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Old Admiralty Building, Room 3/97
Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2AZ**

Tel 071 210 6735

Miss P M Andrews
Historical Section
Cabinet Office
Hepburn House
Marsham Street
London SW1P 4HW

Your reference
Our reference
Date
21 June 1990

*Spoke to Dr. Powell on
27/6. He is going to
draft a reply & clear
it with me.*

PERSONAL. Staff-in-confidence ^{PGA 13/8}

CABINET OFFICE
H 9.01.90...
22 JUN 1990
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No

Dear Pat

Dr Mark WHEELER

The attached letter has been sent to me as the place of first asylum but I am happy to consider you as the "whom it may concern".

I think unfortunately that this is something more than just a late salvo in the crossfire that accompanied the original choice of Mark WHEELER, for the following reasons

- It was prompted not by a hypothesis about how he would deal with the subject but by an actual foretaste, made after he had already worked extensively at the files;
- The new political mood in Yugoslavia has released voices there disinclined to favour TITO and which look more sympathetically on the former monarchy and MIHAILOVIC.

CLOSED UNDER THE

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

Perhaps we could meet to discuss this further.

ACT 2000

Gervase
Gervase Cowell

SOE Adviser
Room 3/97, OAB


ACT 5000

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

CLOSED UNDER THE

FOLIO
43

Your reference HO 89/6
Our reference PUC 117/75/13
Date 14 March 1989



Her Majesty's Stationery Office

St Crispins
Duke Street
Norwich NR3 1PD

Telephone
Direct dialling
0603-69 5643
GTN 3014 "
Switchboard
0603-622211
Fax-Gp3 0603 695317
Telex 97301

Miss P M Andrews
The Cabinet Office
Historical Section
Hepburn House
Marsham Street
LONDON SW1P 4HW

CABINET OFFICE
89/100...
17 MAR 1989
INSTRUCTIONS

Dear Miss Andrews

SOE HISTORIES: LOW COUNTRIES AND YUGOSLAVIA

I refer to my letter of 30 December and your letter of reply dated 10 January covering the above proposed publications.

Following receipt of your letter, I wrote to the Editorial Director at Macmillans on the assumption that the two volumes would be published in the fairly near future. In my letter I made the following points:

- (a) that as the works were carried out under the direction and control of the Crown, HMSO would regard the works as Crown copyright;
- (b) that the books should carry a disclaimer stating that the author of these histories had been given free access to official documents but he alone (ie the author) is responsible for the statements made and the views expressed.

I received a reply from Macmillans stating, to my surprise, that neither of the books are likely to be published until 1990. Indeed, in the case of SOE in the Low Countries, the author has not yet delivered the manuscript to Macmillans. Of course, by the time these books are published the Copyright Designs & Patents Act 1988 will, in all probability, be operative. Under the new Copyright Act the Crown cannot claim Crown copyright by virtue of a work being produced under the direction or control of the Crown. In these particular cases, the argument that the works were carried out under the direction or control of the Crown would be a difficult one to sustain even under the current legislation. Under the new Act, therefore, I think we have no option but to accept that the two volumes will not be Crown copyright. We will, however, insist that the Crown copyright extracts used are acknowledged. Macmillans have agreed to point (b).

2 copies of
45/3 +
414/1

I enclose for your reference a standard letter which has just been issued by HMSO dealing with the subject of copyright and commissioned work under the new legislation which I trust you will find useful.

Please advise if you disagree with my assessment of the situation.

Yours sincerely

J F WRETHAM
Assistant Director
Publications Division (Copyright)

Enc



file 6

CABINET OFFICE

HISTORICAL SECTION

Hepburn House, Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4HW

Telephone: 01-211 6566

G Cowell Esq
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Room 3/97
Old Admiralty Building
London SW1

H0348 ✓

15 August 1988

Dear Gervase

SOE IN YUGOSLAVIA

I mentioned to you that Eastern European Department of the Foreign Office have been in correspondence over the last few months with Mr Archie Jack (Major AFM Jack MCRE as he was at the end of his wartime SOE career). Mr Jack is a prolific correspondent having written to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of the Cabinet as well as directly to the Foreign Office.

Mr Jack's main preoccupation is the appointment of Dr Wheeler to write SOE in Yugoslavia and in the most recent correspondence he asks for details of how that appointment came to be made and who was consulted in the process. The Foreign Office, with my agreement, has declined to give this information, other than that provided in the second paragraph of Mr Kershaw's letter of 21 June 1988, and, unfortunately, Mr Jack has now interpreted something said by Ann Lewis in a letter dated 18 July as implying that the information is classified SECRET. It is, of course, nothing of the sort, but it is PERSONALLY CONFIDENTIAL.

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, it would probably be very helpful to us if Dr Wheeler could add Mr Jack to his list of people to be seen, since a discussion with him is likely to satisfy Mr Jack far more than the rather arid correspondence now being conducted. You kindly agreed to pass on the correspondence to Dr Wheeler for his consideration.

Yours ever

Pat

MISS P M ANDREWS



file
5

CABINET OFFICE

HISTORICAL SECTION

Hepburn House, Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4HW

Telephone: 01-211 6566

Dr M C Wheeler
School of Slavonic and East European Studies
University of London
Senate House
Malet Street
LONDON WC1E 7HU

27 June 1988

HO293

Dear Dr Wheeler



Thank you for your letter of 23 June 1988. I apologise for my too sweeping statement that the correspondence with Miss Beloff was published "in full". I did indeed draw to Lord Armstrong's attention the fact that a sentence had been deleted from her letter of 14 April 1987. He commented as you have that the sentence was potentially libellous and that no doubt she had left it out on legal advice, but he raised no objection. I did not however draw his attention to the absence of the letter to Lord Annan. I am by no means a legal expert but I think the agreement between Lord Armstrong and Miss Beloff would be regarded as covering only her letters to him and vice versa, ie **not** her letters to a third party. If you are unhappy about this perhaps we could have a word when you come here to look at our Yugoslav papers?

On the question of a convenient time for you to visit us here, I am hoping to be on holiday from 18 July - 1 August inclusive. If you wanted to come before that any time in the week beginning 11 July would, at the moment, be fine (except perhaps Friday afternoon 15 July when I shall hope to get away early!) After that, any day except Thursday 4 August up to Friday 19 August after which I hope to take another few days holiday.

Perhaps you could ring and let us know when you would like to visit - we can then get the papers out ready.

Yours sincerely
Pat Andrews
MISS P M ANDREWS



School of Slavonic and East European Studies
 University of London
 Senate House
 Malet Street London WC1E 7HU
 Telephone 01-637 4934/38
 Extension 4079



23 June 1988

*Could I have
 the file to
 check on X
 Plz? Pw*

Miss P. M. Andrews
 Cabinet Office
 Historical Section
 Hepburn House
 Marsham Street
 London SW1P 4HW

Dear Miss Andrews,

Thank you for your letter of 16 June and its various enclosures.

*previous
 PPS on
 373/6
 X*

I had indeed already seen and sent in a short rejoinder to the correspondence printed in the March number of The Salisbury Review. It is not, however, true to say that the correspondence has been published in full: the potentially libelous final sentence from the second paragraph of Miss Beloff's 14 April 1987 letter (the first one printed) has been excised and her 9 September 1987 letter to Lord Annan, copied to Sir Robert on 10 September, has been omitted entirely. I hope that Lord Armstrong is aware of these deviations from his agreement with Miss Beloff.

The news that Sir Alexander Glen was moved by the letters' publication to volunteer his help to me is naturally most welcome. I will write to him to propose a meeting once I have seen enough of the archive to make one worthwhile.

As regards the various papers on Yugoslavia which you have accumulated, I should be happy to come have a look at them. I imagine that I have copies of the more recent ones, but I am sure there are a good many which are unknown to me. Please suggest a time when it would be convenient for me to descend upon you - preferably before the house-cleaning urge becomes overpowering.

With best wishes,

*Yours sincerely,
 Mark Wheeler*

M. C. Wheeler





file
3
POLIO

CABINET OFFICE

HISTORICAL SECTION

Hepburn House, Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4HW

Telephone: 01-211 6566

PERSONAL

Dr M C Wheeler
School of Slavonic and East European Studies
University of London
Senate House
Malet Street
LONDON WC1E 7HU

16 June 1988

H0272 ✓

Dear Dr Wheeler

You may recall that, during the second half of last year the Secretary of the Cabinet, the then Sir Robert Armstrong, had correspondence with Miss Nora Beloff about the commissioning of 'SOE in Yugoslavia' which he copied to you under cover of a letter dated 23 November 1987. I believe I subsequently gave you copies of exchanges with Mr Michael Lees in similar vein. I thought you might like to know (if you do not already) that the correspondence has been published in "The Salisbury Review", in full, as Miss Beloff was asked to do. I attach a copy in case you have not seen it. We had thought that Miss Beloff was to write an article to accompany the correspondence but she has not done.

The first result of this activity on Miss Beloff's part, quite contrary I suspect to what she anticipated, is that Sir Alexander Glen has been in touch to say how glad he is to hear that you are starting work on the project and that if he and his wife, who is a Yugoslav, can be of help they would be delighted if you would get in touch. You may know Sir Alexander. I do not, but I understand that he spent a good deal of time in Yugoslavia during the war.

His address is:-

Sir Alexander Glen KBE DSC
The Dower House
Stanton
Broadway
Worcestershire WR12 7NE

Perhaps I could leave it to you now to make contact if you wish.

Miss Andrews.

Dr Wheeler duly came to look at the British National Committee papers. he was, surprisingly, most interested by them and took away the vast majority. I've kept the rest to throw away at my leisure!

In view of this success, do you think you might now like to try Mr Clogg with the attached. I'd like to think his writing is too far advanced for them to be useful, but you never know.

373/16

Shelley
23.8.88

Shelley

I too hope that his writing is too far advanced! Is this all there is on Greece?
If so I am inclined just to send them to Lin & say "destroy if they are of no use".
Any objection? Pat 31/8

Finally I thought it might possibly be useful to let you know that we have here quite a pile of papers on Yugoslavia, rather old now, which have over the years been presented to the British National Committee for the Second World War which is chaired by Sir William Deakin. These papers have come to light during a clearing up process and could be destroyed unless they would be of use to you. I attach two examples so that you can see the sort of papers they are, and you would be most welcome to come and look at the rest if you would like to do so, then you could let us know whether they are of interest or whether we can dispose of them.

Yours sincerely
Pat Andrews

MISS P M ANDREWS

PERSONAL



23

S.03063 ✓

CABINET OFFICE

Government Offices Great George Street London SW1P 3AL Telephone 01-233 270 6030

Principal Establishment Officer

Dr M C Wheeler
School of Slavonic and
East European Studies
University of London
Senate House
Malet Street
LONDON WC1E 7HU

25 March 1988



Dear Dr Wheeler

I am very pleased to be able to tell you that the formalities which we needed to undertake before appointing you as an Official Historian for the purpose of writing 'SOE in Yugoslavia' have now been satisfactorily completed. Therefore subject to your formal acceptance of the Conditions of Access I am pleased so to appoint you.

Two copies of the Conditions of Access, which you have already seen, are enclosed, together with two copies of the Official Secrets Act declaration. Would you be so kind to sign one copy of each and return the signed copies to me.

During the preparation of the Official History, to be completed in accordance with your own contract with Macmillans, your main contact will be with Christopher Woods, FCO, but if at any time there is anything that we can do to help please do not hesitate to get in touch with Pat Andrews at the Cabinet Office Historical Section, in Hepburn House, Marsham Street, London SW1 (Tel No 211 6566), or with me.

May I wish you every success with your work.

Yours sincerely
J Stevens

J W STEVENS

Mr Stevens has written, so Dr Wheeler
can have his own file: PNR
H0109 ✓ 20/3

MR STEVENS

SOE IN YUGOSLAVIA

Now that the "formalities" have been concluded we can appoint Dr Wheeler formally to write 'SOE in Yugoslavia'.

Two matters have given me some concern whilst preparing the letter of appointment but I think I have resolved them. The first is that I discovered a discrepancy in the access conditions sent to the SOE authors. In the version sent to M R D Foot and the one provided for Sir Robert to show to Dr Wheeler there is a sentence in the first paragraph which says, "Typing services can also be provided if necessary". I noticed, however, that this sentence was not in the statement of access conditions sent to Charles Cruickshank or Richard Clogg. I could find no explanation for this difference so I mentioned it to Mrs Forbes who says it was simply that Cruickshank and Clogg were known to do their own typing and so it was not necessary. I think it should be in, whether or not the authors do their own typing, to guard against the danger of them sending unsanitised texts to commercial typing firms. Anyway, Foot and Wheeler will be working to a similar timetable. It is therefore important that they should have similar conditions and as Foot already has the offer of typing services it should in my view also go to Wheeler. We shall probably have to sort out with Mr Woods in due course who provides the typing services if either author wants them!

Secondly, the question of copyright, which I hope shortly to be ready to discuss with you in general terms. I did just wonder if we should add a clause to the access conditions, or in Wheeler's letter of appointment about copyright, bearing in mind that there will probably be new legislation in force when it comes to publication of his book. However Macmillan, have accepted that acknowledgement of Crown Copyright should be made and expressed themselves willing to be directed by HMSO on the form of words. I alerted HMSO to Wheeler's contract with Macmillans so I think we should now leave it to HMSO to ensure that Copyright is protected, if necessary before the legislation is enacted.

Unless you wish to consider these matters further you might wish to write to Dr Wheeler on the lines of the attached draft. I attach two copies of the access conditions. Could you please attach two copies of the OSA declaration forms?

Pat Andrews

MISS P M ANDREWS

Historical Section
3 March 1988

DRAFT LETTER TO:

Dr M C Wheeler
School of Slavonic and East European Studies
University of London
Senate House
Malet Street
LONDON WC1E 7HU

I am very pleased to be able to tell you that the formalities which we needed to undertake before appointing you as an Official Historian for the purpose of writing 'SOE in Yugoslavia' have now been satisfactorily completed. Therefore subject to your formal acceptance of the Conditions of Access I am pleased so to appoint you.

Two copies of the Conditions of Access, which you have already seen, are enclosed, together with two copies of the Official Secrets Act declaration. Would you be so kind as to sign one copy of each and return the signed copies to me.

During the preparation of the Official History, to be completed in accordance with your own contract with Macmillans, your main contact will be with Christopher Woods, FCO. I understand he is away on leave this week and next, but will be getting in touch with you on his return to arrange a meeting. If in the meantime or, indeed, at any time in the future, there is anything that we can do to help please do not hesitate to get in touch with Pat Andrews at the Cabinet Office Historical Section, in Hepburn House, Marsham Street London SW1 (Tel. No. 211 6566), or with me.

CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE ACCESS TO AND USE OF OFFICIAL RECORDS
NOT OPEN TO THE PUBLIC

- (1) You will be provided with accommodation for use during normal office hours and with suitable security furniture in protected official buildings, where you will be required to keep such records while working on them, and any copies or extracts which you may make in the course of such work. Typing services can also be provided if necessary. The Government will not accept responsibility for any other costs incurred in the writing of the history.
- (2) You will be bound by the provisions of the Official Secrets Act, and will be asked to sign a copy of the Official Secrets Declaration.
- (3) No information derived from your researches of closed records, including the manuscript of the history, may be disclosed without proper authority to any unauthorised person; and this prohibition extends to disclosures to Macmillans and to typing and other staff not provided by the Government Service.
- (4) You may make use of the closed material to which you are given access solely for the purpose of writing the said history, and for no other purpose. You will be required to submit for official clearance the manuscript of the history.
- (5) The right to decide whether or not the history should be published will rest exclusively with the Government who may, as an alternative to withholding permission to publish, grant such permission conditionally upon the omission or alteration of any parts of the text which are not acceptable in the national interest, or because they might give occasion for an action for defamation.
- (6) The usual disclaimer will need to be included in the history on behalf of Her Majesty's Government in the following terms:

"The author of this history, as of the other official histories of the Second World War, has been given free access to official documents. He alone is responsible for the statements made and the views expressed."
- (7) All copies of the manuscript not approved for publication shall be surrendered to the Cabinet Office if you are so requested, and copies or extracts of any records made for working purposes shall be surrendered to the Department concerned, on completion of the manuscript or beforehand, if requested.

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE PUBLISHERS

(1) They must indemnify Her Majesty's Government, its servants or agents against liability in respect of any claims that may be brought for defamation arising out of the publication of the history.

(2) They shall include the disclaimer common to all official histories, namely:

"The author of this history, as of the other official histories of the Second World War, has been given free access to official documents. He alone is responsible for the statements made and the views expressed."

(3) They shall acknowledge Crown copyright as to direct quotation in terms agreed with Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

(4) They shall provide copies for departmental use in agreement with Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Europe's hope

Playing into Milosevic's hand

ence of seismic con-
quite unprecedented
hope that Britain can
heart of Europe" is a
not just a matter of

SIR—A basic misapprehension of the aims and identities of the nations, governments, parties and armies contending over Yugoslavia's carcass pervades your leader (The Futility of Force) and the letters of Mark Almond and Anamarija Modric-Barbour (June 29).

fire there. In this they may have succeeded for the moment, but at the cost of carrying out what amounts to a *coup d'état* against their legitimate masters. The centre has not held. Yet it would be perverse to chastise Western governments for having tried to make reason prevail.

geographically any-
heart of Europe; and
has to a large extent
tory. Both have played
in forming our culture
test sense — our psy-
es and affectations.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the strictures directed at Western policy-makers by your correspondents should have been misplaced, even before the EC troika's flying visit to Belgrade and Zagreb demonstrated that Western support for a Yugoslav state was conditional upon its renunciation of the use of force.

As it has happened, the army has completed the Slovenes' alienation from Yugoslavia and provided them with the heroic, state-founding mythology they failed to create in the Middle Ages or the 19th century. Milan Kucan's inability to secure his parliament's assent to the EC foreign ministers' peace plan means that Slovenia must now be counted out of the Yugoslav imbroglio and means found to recognise its independence. This, however, will make resolution of the Yugoslav crisis even more difficult, since Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Macedonians will now have greater cause to fear Serbian hegemonism — and the Serbian minority in Croatia real justification for its existential terror.

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stick together.

Your leader also mistakenly equates the federal government, the Yugoslav People's Army, the Serbian republican government and Serbs generally under the common rubric of "Belgrade".

Probably unwittingly, the generals have strengthened the hand of Yugoslavia's principal gravedigger, Slobodan Milosevic. Civil war between the proponents of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia now looms. Both Serbian democrats (who tried but failed to topple Milosevic in March) and moderate Croats (who have tolerated the chauvinism of their leaders) will rue the day they made ethnic solidarity their transcendent value. The EC troika must pack its bags immediately.

It is the reformist federal government of Ante Markovic (a Croat and no Communist hardliner) that the West has sought vainly to uphold, whether against the democratic nationalists of Slovenia, the authoritarian nationalists of Croatia, the Communist nationalists of Serbia or the integral Yugoslavists of the army.

MARK WHEELER
School of Slavonic and East European
Studies, London WC1

The latter — if they thought at all — probably interpreted Western support for Markovic as giving them *carte blanche* to liquidate the Slovenes' bid to seize their frontiers. If so, they erred. Certainly, the generals, operating according to prevailing crude national stereotypes, expected no resistance; again, they miscalculated. It is likely, however, that their main aim was to intimidate Croatia, since even they must realise that the army will fall apart if ordered to open

to some of our Community partners. Maybe we should consider honouring the memory of those "grandfathers" of European unionism, Hitler and Napoleon, or simply let each member country select just one of their most famous subjects? This would provide endless hours of unifying discussion — and amusement as Europeans everywhere tried to identify the Belgian.

JON CLEMENTS
Stalybridge, Cheshire

For the record

SIR—The criticism of Pilkington's performance since the unsuccessful BTR bid for the company expressed in the City Column (June 26) is not borne out by our profit and dividend record since 1987.

From £123 million pre-tax just before the BTR bid in 1986, Pilkington earned £256 million followed by three consecutive years of over

£300 million profit. During this period our dividend to our shareholders increased at a compound rate of 18 per cent.

This year's profit of £152 million has been earned in a period of deep recession, which has been particularly damaging to the construction and automotive industries — our major customers.

Sir ANTONY PILKINGTON
St Helens, Lancs

Truth about pay

SIR—William Weekes's parliamentary report on management salaries (June 28) demonstrates that John Major and Norman Lamont are in danger of becoming worthy successors in that long line of ministers who have farked the issue of top pay.

In the 25 years that I worked in the nationalised coal, electricity and water industries, governments of all parties failed to pay adequate salaries to chairmen and board members, and had severe difficulties in finding suitable people to fill the top jobs.

The fact is that the pay for these jobs has been far too low for years and must be increased substantially. Some of the recent changes have been too modest. The issue of timing is irrelevant. The longer you wait, the bigger the correction has to be.

John Major and Norman Lamont should stick by the privatisation model they helped to create. Realistic top salaries, like realistic prices, profits and investment, are an essential part of the greater reality that privatisation has introduced. If politicians, public and the media cannot stand this reality, then we are back to the madness of the last 50 years with increasingly shabby utilities.

MICHAEL CARNEY
London SW1

Good image

SIR—With reference to your article on the Prime Minister's appearance (June 27), the strong appeal of John Major exists because of his complete sincerity and subdued spontaneity. It is not necessary to improve him sardonically — any attempt to project a "popular" or "sharper" image would destroy the impact of decency and sincerity. Life is not all image and presentation and people are not as gullible as the "improvers" and "manipulators" imagine.

K. HARVEY PACKER
Christchurch, Dorset

Always blame the police

S. Tel.
17.3.91.

As much of the world's storytelling bears witness, almost no image has more power to move us than that of an innocent hero or heroine who has been suffering some awful imprisonment finally being liberated. From the *Odyssey* to Beethoven's *Fidelio*, from *Jane Eyre* to *The Winter's Tale*, from *Cinderella* to *Star Wars*, such a moment of release is almost inseparable from our idea of a happy ending.

It was therefore perhaps not surprising that the overriding impression given by our news programmes on Thursday should have been of the joy surrounding the release of the Birmingham Six.

But several aspects of this affair made it hard for one's sense of joy to be unconfined. For a start, of course, it should scarcely be a cause for rejoicing that both the law and the police had come so appallingly badly out of the affair — despite the fact that it was the hard work of other lawyers and policemen which had ultimately made it possible for the Six to be released.

Then there was the realisation that, if these men were innocent, then those really responsible for this ghastly crime are still at large. Indeed the names of the suspects have even been published. If, having secured the release of the innocent, Mr Chris Mullin and others are really devoted to the cause of justice, then they should not finally rest happy until the guilty are caught as well.

Finally, however innocent the Six may have been of the dreadful offence for which they were imprisoned, it is hard to share the view of the *Independent* that they were just a "group of likely lads who set off for a weekend in Ireland in November 1974". The fact that they were travelling to Northern Ireland for the funeral of an IRA bomber, James McDade, suggests they may at least have had rather more sympathy with that organisation than one would expect of most wholly innocent people hauled at random off the street.

For some reason one could not help being reminded by Thursday's rejoicing at the discomfiture of the police of the response the previous day to the tragic pile-up in the fog on the M4. Here the police pointed out that no warning lights had been showing, because they assume that when there is blanket fog, motorists will have the sense to see this for themselves.

But this was not enough for the BBC and ITN who, when they reported the tragedy, went out of their way to headline the "police admission" that the notices had not been switched on — as if somehow the police had been responsible.

It may give some people excitement to throw blame at the police, just as it does others to howl for the resignation of the Lord Chief Justice. But, for many, recent events have made this a time for somewhat melancholy reflection.

Both Churchill and Eden later indicated that their worst single error in the Second World War was to have thrown such wholehearted support behind Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia — and away from the Royalist resistance led by General Mihailovich.

It was perhaps understandable that, in the interview in our *Review* last week to mark his 80th birthday, that romantic old warrior Sir Fitzroy Maclean was again allowed to defend his part in that unhappy decision — which began with the famous interview in 1943, just before he parachuted into Yugoslavia, when Churchill asked him to discover which side was killing more Germans.

In his book *The Rape of Serbia*, published last year, Michael Lees — who also worked with SOE in Yugoslavia — revealed just how wickedly some of his communist-sympathising SOE colleagues fiddled the evidence on which Churchill took the fateful decision. Any evidence showing Mihailovich's Chetniks in a good light was sup-



CHRISTOPHER BOOKER

pressed, while Tito's Partisans were puffed up into a far more impressive force than their record justified.

The result was that Tito's murderous crew were given such vast quantities of military aid that, at the end of the war, Tito was strong enough to massacre 250,000 of his opponents and to extinguish every vestige of freedom in the country. Many of us have in time past been

beguiled by Sir Fitzroy's colourful version of these events in his book *Eastern Approaches*. But it really is time we took a more grown-up view of this sad story. [Letters, P 26.]

In my item last week about Colonel Wood, the American officer who in the nick of time ordered his gunners not to demolish the zigurat at Ur, I regretted I had never discovered the name of the South African artillery officer who in 1944 was similarly responsible for saving Piero della Francesca's fresco *The Resurrection* in the town hall of Borgo San Sepolcro.

Three readers kindly identified this splendid man as Anthony Clarke, later a respected antiquarian bookseller in Cape Town, who died some 10 years ago. But my Somerset neighbour Dr James Maycock went even better, by sending Clarke's own account of this remarkable episode, included in H. V. Morton's *A Traveller in Italy*.

Clarke was in fact serving with the 1st Regiment, the Royal Horse Artillery, spotting for his guns in a bush overlooking San Sepolcro. He had already called in several artillery rounds on the town, but was nagged by the thought that he had heard its name before. Then a passing Italian boy told him that the Germans had evacuated the town — just as he remembered where he had read its name, in Aldous Huxley's essay "The Greatest Painting In The World".

In horror Clarke called off the bombardment. The next day he headed straight for the town hall. There was the stunning picture, unscathed. His final comment was that "the incident might, I suppose, be a fine illustration of the power of literature" — for if Huxley had never written his essay, "the greatest painting in the world" might be no more.

The most impressive member of the Front for National Salvation which took over in Romania after the fall of Ceausescu was Dmi-tru Masilu, a handsome, intelligent former ambassador to the UN who had spent the previous four years under house-arrest.

Much in evidence on our television screens at the time, Masilu resigned last February and retired to Geneva to write "the inside story" of how the Front had hoodwinked the world by pulling off a communist coup.

Two weeks ago, on March 5, Masilu opened his door to two "well-dressed Romanians" in masks, who proceeded to slash his face with knives and caused such severe damage to his liver that he is still critically ill in hospital. They left him with the friendly advice that if he told the world what had happened, the next time he might not survive.

Mr Masilu would nevertheless like the world to know that the Securitate is doing as good a job for President Iiescu as it did for Ceausescu.

The *Times* was on good form last week. On Thursday a headline told its readers that "After probing Hally's comet, Giotto scientists plan second mission". At least they didn't refer to the Italian painter G. Otto. Next day demonstrators in Bratislava were reported as carrying "pictures of Jozef Tito, the wartime Slovak leader". Some readers may have thought this referred to Josip Tito, the wartime Yugoslav leader. For others it might have brought to mind the wartime Slovak leader Father Josef Tiso. But of course the *Times* may just have intended to refer to "pictures of Joseph Tissot", the French painter.

Lady Powell's husband

years longer than the Prime Minister, and on the Tory front bench since 1975) and by intellect there was no one eligible who was better qualified. Not only there anyone better qualified, the gap, is no longer important, given the Government's flight from what its most influential members dismiss as "ideology", by which they mean right-wing ideology — liberal and social democratic ideology being less objectionable to them.

There have, though, been clouds on Mr Lamont's horizon, and none more brooding than the allegations that he was a leading "conspirator" in the "plot" to remove Mrs Thatcher. As more is learned about those events, it becomes clear that in many cases (but not all) blind panic and spinelessness are being dignified with the label of "conspiracy". Mr Lamont neither panicked nor conspired; he simply gave up. It is one of his most human characteristics that he is an abiding pessimist; many of his friends cite examples of this neo-Calvinist melancholy from various stages in the Lamont development. It was clear to Mr Lamont the moment Mrs Thatcher failed to win the first ballot outright that she was finished. Moreover, like a good ex-CUCA chairman, he would not have neglected in advance to consider what might be the best course in these unthinkable circumstances.

"It is complete nonsense to suggest I did Arthur Scargill and General Galtieri failed to do," Mr Lamont last week told the *Independent on Sunday*. He even telephoned Mrs Thatcher after her assassination to clear himself of any blame for it, but she is not known to have been especially impressed by this courageous act. Mr Lamont would, indeed, have been too shrewd to be involved in machinations. After all, his profile as Minister for Defence Procurement was ultra-low during the Westland affair. Within four months he was Financial Secretary to the Treasury, within five a Privy Counsellor, and within three years a Cabinet minister.

For Mr Lamont was one of the appointed. In her last conference speech Mrs Thatcher singled him out for praise for the important "short speeches" he had made as Chief Secretary; speeches of "no" to the spending demands of colleagues. It is interesting to note how in a few months the aim of balancing the books has been replaced by the certainty that he must be careful what he says in private, since there are always people such as myself (and he must be careful in public) who are excluded from self-defence, certainly in public counter-attack. As a civil servant, need not fear his Prime Ministerial setbacks, need not fear his that most famous of Sir Charles Powell, rassic Sir Charles Powell, who attacked or embarrassed Sir Charles Powell.

Who attacked or embarrassed Sir Charles Powell?

Several newspapers last week accused Sir Charles of being two-faced. They reported that his was the hand behind Mr Major's "heart of Europe" speech in Bonn last Monday as well as Mrs Thatcher's Bruges speech abhorring European integration. In fact the Bonn speech was largely written by Mr Chris Patten and Mrs Sarah Hogg, head of the policy unit at No 10. Lady Powell has, I understand, been letting friends know what she thinks of those who ascribe Bonn to the author of Bruges. "I was sick in the gut when I read that stuff."

Her first reaction was, I am told, to believe that the attacks were inspired by Whitehall jealousy — a familiar bane of the Powells' life. She is reported to have said, "This is the knife of the Foreign Office", and to have continued her recital of wrongs in vivid terms: "The authors have not thought or checked before publishing. The authors have not sucked the blood out of him and he would have been an ambassador. Probably I have been a deterrent to his career."

The mistaken story that Sir Charles had written Mr Major's speech first appeared in the *Daily Mail* on Tuesday. The *Evening Standard* then further disseminated the error with a lengthy attack on Sir Charles on Wednesday written by a freelance political journalist, Mr Edward Pearce.

Mr Pearce now says: "I used his maiden speech to support the leadership's policy. I have to admit that for some years I have been strongly pro-European which meant something different then from what it does now; for the end of the development of new institutions to deal with problems [of currency upheaval] nationally the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament and therefore the independence of the British people must be maintained."

As early as 1972 a *Times* reporter listed him as one of the backbencher hostile to the lurch to the left. Nonetheless he did what most new backbenchers would have done — publicly support the leadership's policy. After the U-turn, he said in the Commons debate on inflation in January 1973 "we are told by the pseudo-ists that one cannot reduce inflation without creating unemployment, but that is not the case. . . . monetary policy by itself is too crude a weapon. . . — thoughts not without interest today. But the retreat from Mr Heath was beginning. In the same speech he said, with a view to the future: "While I am prepared to argue the case for a price and incomes policy in general terms, I must confess that whenever I come down to discuss the details of any controls I begin to feel considerable misgivings about prices and incomes policies."

He did not, as has been reported, move to Mrs Thatcher with a singed bound. Despite having been in the House just two and a half years, he tried some amateur kingmaking and sought to persuade Sir Keith (and Lord) Joseph to stand instead; and Sir Keith refused, his route to Mr Thatcher was open.

It was Mr Lamont's ultra-orthodox on the Conservative front bench under Mrs Thatcher that seems to make for such an intriguing situation now. His views have altered subtly the past, so they could again. Yet he has to advocate (if only in neutral fashion) a Eurocentric policy which is deepening the recession unnecessarily, and which will soon

On being told of Lady Powell's reaction

"We were in a terrible push," he continued. "I am not sure how the entire premise of an article can be described as a slip, but no matter."

On being told of Lady Powell's ire, Mr Pearce replied: "She is reacting quite uncharacteristically. They have chosen not to live with the discretion of civil servants, protected from the knocks of politics. They have both dabbled actively in politics without ever breaking the formal rules of making overt political statements to the press. In politics people pull your leg. That's all that happened."

Sir Charles is thinking of leaving the FO anyway after his current stint in Bermuda with the Prime Minister, who met George Bush there yesterday. He has a further two weeks in Downing Street before taking a long leave in which to contemplate his future.

Next July he will be 50, and can collect his pension and pursue a lucrative career in the City or commerce. Lord Rothschild and Mr Henry Keswick are among those who are interested in his services.

In this he will undoubtedly be encouraged by his wife, who works for a merchant bank and has been heard complaining at dinner parties: "My standard of living has never been lower. The roof of my house is leaking; I am spending my own money to keep my husband working for Queen and country!"

Mr Sylvester Stallone, an American film actor who can command £10 million for his tough-guy roles, fellow beneath that he is a sensitive One of the bulging lan Tho as a bad

bad poet

The Times

30.3.91

OR

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Lest we forget heroic Yugoslavs

From Sir Alexander Glen

Sir, Fifty years ago today, on March 27, 1941, a group of Yugoslav officers led a rising to prevent their country from combining with the Axis powers. War was the certain outcome, but support was whole-hearted, extensive and courageous.

The Axis attack that followed, on April 6, was ruthless and brutal. Defences were fragmented, fighter aircraft were too few and, despite gallant individual actions, mutiny compounded weakness. Massacres by the Ustachi added elements of religious and ethnic war to Hitler's partition, occupation and terror.

Nevertheless, resistance forces were in the field by June: the Loyalists (to distinguish them from other Cetniks) under Mihailovic, the Communists (later the National Army of Liberation) under Tito. Each of these factions was resolved to mould the nation's future according to its own very different lights — differences which proved irreconcilable in the merciless civil war that followed.

As the then assistant naval attaché in Belgrade, I am one of the few Britons alive today who witnessed these events at first hand. I knew and respected Draza Mihailovic, and I am proud to have played a part with Tito's Partisans in Peljesac in 1943 and on the Danube and in north-east Serbia in 1944. The indomitable courage of the Yugoslav peoples on both sides, victims of unimaginable circumstances, remains undimmed in my memory.

That courage should be recalled today, when once again Yugoslavia faces tragic problems.

Yours very truly,
ALEXANDER R. GLEN,
The Dower House,
Stanton, Broadway,
Worcestershire.

March 27.

see f.3

SOCIAL NEWS

Forthcoming
marriages

**Mr T.R.E. Adler
and Miss C.E. Cox**

The engagement is announced between Timothy, son of the late Mr Louis R. Adler and of Mrs Adler, of Bigbury, Devon, and Charlotte, younger daughter of Mr and Mrs Jack Cox, of Frome, Somerset.

**Mr N.J. Brocklebank
and Miss M.A. Hale**

The engagement is announced between Nicholas, only son of Mr and Mrs Peter Brocklebank, of Uckfield, East Sussex, and Meredith, youngest daughter of Mr and Mrs George Hale, of Auckland, New Zealand.

**Mr R.G.U. Corbett
and Miss P.A. Gwilliam**

The engagement is announced between Richard, son of Mr and Mrs David Corbett, of Shobdon, and Penny, elder daughter of Mr and Mrs Richard Gwilliam, of Broxwood, Herefordshire.

**Dr F.G. Dickson
and Dr A.G. Wardropper**

The engagement is announced between Fraser, elder son of Helen and Tom Dickson, of Winchester, and Alison, only daughter of Mr and Mrs Alan Wardropper, of Gosforth, Newcastle upon Tyne.

**Mr I.M. Johnson
and Miss T.G. Burke-Gaffney**

The engagement is announced between Ian, elder son of Mr and Mrs D. Johnson, of Dray House, Titchfield, Hampshire, and Theresa, daughter of Mr and Mrs J.E. Burke-Gaffney, of Troon Court, Sunninghill, Ascot, Berkshire.

**Mr P.J. Moss
and Miss F.C. Ridsdill Smith**

The engagement is announced between Peter Moss, 18 Cloudesley Street, N1, son of Mr and Mrs Basil Moss, and Fiona, daughter of Mr and Mrs Christopher Ridsdill Smith, of The Cottage, Marden.

**Dr J.A.L. Nicholson
and Miss K.J. Allen**

The engagement is announced between Andrew, son of Mr and Mrs John Nicholson, of Coleherne Court, Kensington, and Katy, daughter of Mrs M.L. Branson, of Sevenoaks, and of Mr A.K. Allen, of Tunbridge Wells, Kent.

**Mr J. ...
and M. ...**

The engagement is announced between ... of Mr ... Ridd ... York ... only ... and the ... Leon ...

**Mr F. ...
and M. ...**

The engagement is announced between Mr and Mrs ... Speer ... Louis ... and ... Holy ...

**Captain ...
and M. ...**

The engagement is announced between Robert ... eldest ... Robert ... Dorset ... daughter ... Neil ... Nottis ...

**Mr D. ...
and M. ...**

The engagement is announced between ... and ... Sold ... Kath ... Inma ... and ...

**The ...
and F. ...**

The engagement is announced between ... Dunc ... Craig ... Anna ... Heid ... Laura ... and ... Dalla ...

**Mr R. ...
and M. ...**

The engagement is announced between John ... of W ... Philip ... Mrs I ... Hunti ...

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An enigma persists around Sir Fitzroy's Yugoslavian claims

*From Jean Howard, formerly
Jean Allington, TSA Hut 3,
Bletchley Park, 1941—1945.*

LIKE Sir Fitzroy Maclean (Review, March 10), my brief from Mr Churchill was to find out which guerrilla band was killing most Germans, and to send him a weekly report.

Searching through German Enigma intercepts at Bletchley Park in 1943, I found that the Germans believed that there were 11 different guerrilla bands, which they attempted to suppress with the utmost brutality in order to keep their roads and railways operational. General Gehlen, in 1943, reported Hitler's orders that an equal price was to be put on the heads of the Partisan Tito and the Royalist Mihailovich.

Sir Fitzroy claims that "we were reading the German signals". Quite so, but apart from minor signals decrypted in Cairo, Enigma signals were restricted to Churchill and the Joint Intelligence Committee, and even the Foreign Office was not allowed to see Enigma decrypts until just before he parachuted into Yugoslavia. Security was so tight that no-one likely to go into the field was allowed to read Enigma signals.

Furthermore, we did not read any which would have

endorsed the numbers Tito claimed to have under his command and which Brigadier Maclean quoted so credulously in his November 6, 1943, report after being in Yugoslavia less than a month.

Brigadier Armstrong was dropped to Mihailovich in September, 1943. I find it curious that British liaison officers who served under Brigadier Maclean were believed, but that none of the successes scored by BLOs who served with Mihailovich were ever acknowledged. In fact, their demolition of bridges and railways were attributed to the Partisans by the BBC. When they were ordered out of Yugoslavia they were not debriefed, and they were not allowed to give evidence at Mihailovich's trial.

The massed graves of Yugoslavs massacred by Tito when our former Allies were force repatriated in 1945, are being currently displayed and the rump of Tito's evil regime is bringing tanks into the streets of Belgrade.

Would history have been altered if Sir Fitzroy Maclean had been dropped to Mihailovich instead of to Tito?

JEAN HOWARD,
11 Knightsbridge Court,
Sloane Street,
London SW1.

The making of a Mullingar heifer

"THE Irish refer to a plain girl as a Mullingar heifer", wrote Barbara Neil (March 10). Not quite. It was said that the Pope gave Irish women a special dispensation to grow the thick end of their legs downwards. This was taken up by Joyce. In *Ulysses* we meet from Mullingar "a skittish heifer, big of

her age and beef to the heel". And the Irish Chekhov, Frank O'Connor, writes of a girl "beef to the heels, like a Mullingar heifer". It seems that plainness is not enough; without outsize legs no girl can claim to be a true Mullingar heifer.

A. R. FREWEN,
11 Lexham Gardens, W8.

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is beside the point. Electoral politics are about what the majority thinks is the truth, not the truth itself. Sooner or later, the electorate somehow decides what are the faults in a head of government's character, and that decision eventually undoes him (or her). Sometimes, this is preceded by the newspapers and television coming to the same decision, although not always. ("The media" decided that Mr Reagan was unfit to be President, but later the voters decided otherwise.)

About two years after Macmillan's great victory of 1959, the electorate decided that the Prime Minister was out of date. About six months after Lord Wilson's great victory of 1966, it was decided that he was shifty. About three years after he became Prime Minister, it was decided that Mr Heath was a stuffed shirt. About three years after he became Prime Minister, it was decided that Lord Callaghan was a solid citizen but could not control the unions. (We should not forget that personally he inspired confidence. To the initiated, he was a party string-puller. But in the opinion polls he was invariably more popular than the Opposition leader, Mrs Thatcher. It was his party which was unpopular. Mr Major, as he contemplates his high personal standing in comparison with Mr Kinnock's, is undoubtedly aware of that precedent.) As for Mrs Thatcher, very shortly after her last victory in 1987, it was decided that she was an impossible woman. The most famous British case of "indecision" was when Anthony Eden was accused of lacking "the smack of firm government".

All of which suggests that, once it is decided that Mr

welcome as a refreshing change, both were at first praised for sharing the people's humble tastes. Mr Carter was always said to be helping himself to an horrendous southern dish called "hominy grits", which has no British equivalent except possibly semolina or tapioca pudding. By last week, Mr Major's visit to a roadside Happy Eater had even come to the notice of *Le Monde*. In an editorial headed *Le style Major*, it admirably recounted how he had surprised his fellow citizens, habituated as they were to what *Le Monde* called the *comportement altier de Mme Thatcher*, by visiting un *modeste restaurant d'autoroute*.

Le Monde's admiration for Mr Major's gesture of solidarity with the people might have been less had the paper known that a *modeste restaurant* in Britain is sadly not the same as in France. The paper seemed to believe that, by the side of British motorways, there are places full of jolly workmen in blue and white striped vests and berets — downing a *pastis* before opening with *foie gras*, and going on to *cassoulet* or *pie de porc*, accompanied by a rough but by no means insubordinate burgundy, between glasses of which some Badoit would be consumed to prevent inebriation. Into this proletarian idyll strolls the Prime Minister off the *autoroute*. The only demand he makes on the *patron* is for some Dijon mustard instead of, as was really the case with Mr Major in that Happy Eater, brown sauce. *Le Monde* was using French standards of gastronomic modesty to judge a British Happy Eater (*Le Mangeur Heureux*).

Most Britons impressed by Mr Major's patronage of a Happy Eater, and taste for

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Yugoslavia matters to the West

19/3/91

SIR—Yugoslavia's agony may yet prove neither final nor fatal, but Charles Laurence's effort to comprehend it (article, March 18) offers as much misinformation as insight.

In the first place, he bandies figures for the individual Yugoslav peoples' human losses during the Second World War without making it clear that these are wild and self-aggrandising allegations. According to recent, and reliable calculations the death toll of Serbs and Montenegrins amounted not to one million, but to 537,000.

The Croatian Ustasa state can probably be held accountable for about half of these. Although Yugoslav Jews were, proportionately, the greatest victims the total was 60,000, not 700,000. Croat losses were 207,000. The figure of 400,000 Croats killed by the supposedly Serb-dominated communists at war's end is ridiculous.

The communists did indeed massacre thousands of their enemies in the spring of 1945 (perhaps 40,000), but they did not discriminate as between Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Albanians.

That each of the Yugoslav peoples believes its wartime death toll to have been far worse than it was — and that it holds other Yugoslavs guilty for the carnage — is certainly salient politically, and helps to explain both the existential fear of Croatia's Serb minority and the cautious response — so far — of the Zagreb government to Krajina's "secession".

Your correspondent appears to subscribe to the tired view of the Croat-Serb divide as being between Catholic-Habsburg culture and Orthodox-Ottoman barbarism. However ubiquitous extreme nationalism may now be among Yugoslavs, last week's massive anti-communist Belgrade demonstrations show an equal fervour on behalf of democracy. This

makes all the more surprising Mr Laurence's seeming endorsement of his Bosnian Muslim interlocutors' regret at the passing of Tito's "wise prescription" for containing Serb hegemony.

It would appear that the old Western tendency to applaud the imposition of order upon turbulent peoples is as impervious to logic and experience as is the Eastern habit of blaming malevolent foreign powers for all their misfortunes.

In fact, Yugoslavia is not a far away country whose fate matters little. Its geopolitical importance may be much reduced by the end of the Cold War, but its break-up (whether peaceable or violent) will reverberate widely. Several of its neighbours still hanker after bits and pieces of its territory. Others will quake at the prospect of a flood of refugees.

The European Community cannot but be vitally interested, since it would be the favoured destination of both refugees and successor states. This gives the EC an opportunity to engage in the sort of creative involvement and substantive cohesion it was so widely accused of failing to manifest in the case of the Gulf war.

Whether in offering to provide "good offices" for negotiation, economic assistance in the form of association agreements or even peace-keeping forces, EC statesmen must bear in mind that their preconceptions may be as flawed as those of their Yugoslav opposite numbers.

Dr MARK WHEELER
 London WCI

Worn words

SIR—Further to Lt-Cdr Brooke's letter concerning overworked words (March 14), I would suggest that the record must surely be held by the three words "euphoria", "linkage" and "scenario" so beloved of our media correspondents during the Gulf war.

P. J. WILLIAMS
 Totton, Hants

LET
 TO THE

Letters to the Editor
 facsimile

Can cathedral so many pro

SIR—As a canon of the Salisbury Cathedral, I appreciate close I appreciate your concern about new access to the river, but I am about the finances.

Dean, Chapter already involved.

● The Cathedral which still has to its £6.5 million target.

● The Water Me which the Dean already spent £100,000 on the river, with the reimbursement.

● An appeal, £500,000, to provide girls to be recruited.

They have also house on the ass may need its orchestra.

Cathedral Choir Salisbury Dean and Chapter.

ing on a tight budget dipping into investment.

Dean said last week appeal was envisaged however, speaking of professional fund-raising unreasonable in any way they may not be recruited.

Canon

Wainwright's

SIR—The pro Innominate

Britain has become more Titoist than the Yugoslavs. We are refusing to publish a book accusing Tito of duping the British — including one of the most romantic figures of the Second World War, Sir Fitzroy Maclean, now aged 79 — into supporting him during the war.

The book, *The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power 1943-1944*, is to be published in the United States next month by Harcourt Brace. And a Serbo-Croat translation will shortly come out in Yugoslavia, a country in which Tito's party, the communists, have not yet lost all power and influence. But it has failed to find a publisher in Britain.

The book, by Mr Michael Lees, who served in Yugoslavia during the war, did the rounds of the leading British firms. But inquiries around the book trade last week revealed that it had been turned down by Century Hutchinson, Macmillan, Collins, Heinemann, Sidgwick & Jackson, and Hodder & Stoughton. Apparently, the retired Foreign Office man Sir Nicholas Cheetham read it on behalf of Century Hutchinson and reported that it was excellent, and staff at Collins thought so too. But in the end both firms, like the others, thought the subject too specialised.

It is possible, however, that the unwillingness to publish can also be put down to reluctance — after the great Tolstoy-Aldington row — to stir up more trouble about Britain's role at the end of the war. Sir Fitzroy — who was a British officer serving with Tito's forces in Yugoslavia during the war and gave his side of the story long ago in his book *Eastern Approaches* (1949) — is a widely revered figure.

He has long faced accusations that he made a mistake. Mr Lees's book is the latest instalment in a story which goes back as far as the demobbed Evelyn Waugh, who also served in Yugoslavia with

the underground forces, and was among those who wrote that we backed the wrong side. But Mr Lees's is the most detailed statement of the case so far. Britain had the choice of backing — against the occupying Germans — either Tito's communist partisans or the forces loyal to General Mihailovich. Until 1943 we supported Mihailovich. Then we switched to Tito — partly on Sir Fitzroy's recommendation to Churchill. (According to Mr Lees's book, Churchill later privately acknowledged that this was a blunder.)

Mr Lees argues in effect that Tito was a brilliant public relations man who convinced Sir Fitzroy, and the British in general, that he was doing a better job than Mihailovich against the Germans. More sinisterly, communist agents in SOE encouraged the process. We therefore diverted *materiel* to the communists, who used it to overcome Mihailovich. Mr Lees says that Tito's forces murdered about a quarter of a million people, mainly Serbs, on achieving power once the Germans had been beaten (mainly by the Russians). Mihailovich was tried and executed in 1946.

"I have enormous respect for Fitzroy Maclean," Mr Lees writes. "Physically, intellectually, and in determination he is outstanding; and he can be charming. But, with sadness, I have to express the opinion that he was an instrument of harm as things worked out in Yugoslavia." Unlike Lord Aldington, whom Tolstoy depicted as pitiless, Mr Lees depicts Sir Fitzroy as an enthusiastic young amateur tricked by a more wicked man — Tito. It

Pat.
Stel 29.7.40

Is the truth about Tito being suppressed?

MANDRAKE

remains to be seen whether Sir Fitzroy takes a more relaxed view than did Lord Aldington.