

PREM 49 / 930 / 2

Part 2 of 2

SECRET

Top Secret Policy  
cc PB  
MT



1670

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 0171-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 19/3M

29 June 1999

Dear Rick,

**NORTHERN IRELAND: CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE MARCHING SEASON**

The Defence Secretary has agreed your Secretary of State's request and authorised that the UK Standby Battalion and an additional Public Order Battalion be made available for deployment in Northern Ireland from the beginning of July should the GOC, in consultation with the Chief Constable, decide that they are needed. I understand that the GOC has now requested the deployment of the UK Standby Battalion; accordingly we plan to deploy it to the Province on 2 July. The Defence Secretary has also agreed that the final decision for the deployment of the Public Order Battalion can be taken by the Chief of the General Staff, on the basis of a request from the GOC.

I am copying this letter to the John Sawers (No.10) and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office).

yours,

(H D KERNOHAN)  
Private Secretary

Nick Perry Esq  
Northern Ireland Office

SECRET



Recycled Paper

## SINN FEIN STATEMENT

Sinn Fein have long argued that it is through the full implementation of the Agreement, in particular the operation of its institutions and the delivering of equality and justice, that the issue of arms will be finally and satisfactorily settled. Sinn Fein have also emphasised the key role to be played by General de Chastelain and his colleagues. We have specifically said in our reply to the Independent Commission on Decommissioning that "the full implementation of the Agreement would demonstrably facilitate the decommissioning process".

Sinn Fein are therefore now indicating in response to the Commission's report that we will proceed to be part of the inclusive Executive and we acknowledge the UUP and SDLP statements to the same effect. Against that background we believe that we will succeed in persuading those with arms to decommission them in accordance with the Agreement. We agree that this will be in the manner set down by the Independent Commission on Decommissioning.

This reflects our conviction that with the overall implementation of the Good Friday Agreement the causes of the conflict are removed and, as far as the Republican movement are concerned, the war is finished, over, done with and gone.

JWS  
28 July 1999

2000

File  
—

FAILSAFE

In the event that the commitments now entered into are not fulfilled by May 2000, the Governments will commence a formal review as provided for in the Agreement. Should the review not lead, within one week of its commencement, to a resolution of the problems, the Governments undertake to suspend the institutions of the Agreement.

They also undertake to act in this way if at an earlier point General de Chastelain should convey to them that it was his belief that the commitments now entered into, leading to the completion of decommissioning by May 2000, were not being honoured.

28 June 1999 at 2000

File  
—

IRA Statement

We have seen Sinn Féin's statement and are content with it.

27. JUN. 1999 19:07

DR M MOWLAM STORMONT

NO. 484

P. 1/9

CONFIDENTIAL

**FROM: BILL JEFFREY**  
**Political Director**  
**27 June 1999**

John Sawers

Top - JS (by fax home)  
 cc PB  
 LMT  
 AC  
 GS  
 B.P

See copy distribution below

## CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL DE CHASTELAIN AND TIM DALTON

### Summary

- De Chastelain ready to meet Prime Minister and Taoiseach at Hillsborough tomorrow (Monday) for an unpublicised discussion of progress, but strongly recommends he be accompanied by his colleagues.
- Clear that he can only report what the parties are saying to him and must avoid any "political innuendo", such as a call for the Executive to be set up ahead of decommissioning. But - depending on what he is told, and by whom - he is ready at least to point up the need for an early discussion of modalities, and perhaps more.

### Detail

As agreed by the two Prime Ministers on Friday, Tim Dalton and I had a conference call with General de Chastelain yesterday morning.

2. I explained the outcome of Friday's discussions, and read over to him the three agreed principles. Dalton remarked that they might not seem earth-shattering, but that we saw them as a fairly important step forward. We both emphasised that the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach were anxious to avoid any impression that the two Governments wanted to give directions to the Commission. Anything we did had to be consistent with the Commission's independence. De Chastelain noted that, from that point of view, it was probably good that he was away from Northern Ireland for the weekend. When he had seen Trimble on Friday, he had emphasised

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that the questions he had put to all the parties were the Commission's own, and not ones that the Governments had asked them to ask.

3. We explained that the two Prime Ministers would welcome the opportunity to meet de Chastelain on Monday, probably at Hillsborough to avoid any suggestion that the meeting was part of the talks proper. This would be an opportunity for them to brief him on how the talks were going, and to hear about the Commission's emerging thinking, since they should by then have heard from all the parties. We did not expect it to be publicised, although if it got out it could easily be explained in terms of keeping in touch. De Chastelain said that he thought this would be entirely appropriate, but he would be more comfortable if he could be accompanied by his two Commissioners. He would strongly recommend that approach. We said we would refer back to the Prime Ministers on this, but did not expect to encounter any difficulty.
  
4. The discussion then widened. Dalton said that, with the achievement of decommissioning by May 2000 agreed as a principle, we had been talking about ways of working towards it. We knew that the Unionists would be unimpressed if all that was on offer was decommissioning by May 2000 with nothing in between. It would be straying into the political if the Commission were put in the position of saying that particular political developments had to take place. But that would presumably not be so if the Commission was recording what the parties had said to it. I added that, although the details were not yet fully worked out, the Prime Minister's desire was to edge discussions towards the kind of scheme described in his article in the Times. But this would be a delicate operation, given the Commission's independent role, which was why close contact over the next few days seemed essential.
  
5. De Chastelain agreed. With the May 2000 date agreed, and with an indication from the relevant parties that they were ready to discuss modalities, the Commission would certainly want to say that such discussions should start pretty soon. But they could only report what the parties were telling them. In particular, if Sinn Fein

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continued to say that they did not speak for the IRA, the Commission would need to report that fact. Unionists were still deeply sceptical about the Commission being used by the Governments as a "backdoor" for their proposals, and would only be convinced if the Commission's report was seen as objective and free of political innuendo. They had not yet worked out in any detail how to handle the Report, but had assured the parties that they would present it factually and objectively, and would not be suggesting that any party take a particular course, such as forming the Executive. When he had last met him, he had put to McGuinness the point about whether he spoke for the IRA. McGuinness had insisted he did not, but had offered to explore whether someone could be identified who could do so. He would remind him about this when he got the Sinn Fein response to his questions. He had heard from most of the parties, including the UUP, the DUP and the Alliance, but had yet to hear from Sinn Fein, the UDP or the PUP.

6. Dalton took the discussion a little further. It was possible that, on the basis of what they were told the Commission might be able to set out necessary stages on the road to May 2000, such as agreement on modalities by September and a start to decommissioning by the end of the year. (He emphasised that these dates were speculative and had only been discussed "among ourselves" and not with the parties). Subsequent reports by the Commission would indicate whether the paramilitaries had "failed the exam". If they had, matters would then have to go back into the political domain. De Chastelain noted that this seemed realistic. A key issue would be whether the Commission received any indication of what the IRA was prepared to do. If they did receive such an indication, it might be possible for them to say more about timescales.

Comment

7. You and I have since agreed that de Chastelain should bring his two colleagues to the lunch tomorrow. I have checked this with Dalton and told de Chastelain, and have provisionally fixed 12.45 as the time.

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27 JUN.1999 19:07

DR M MOWLAM STORMONT

NO.484 P.4/9

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8. The discussion about what the Commission's Report could say was by no means clear, partly because of Dalton's usual opaque style, and partly because we were all being deeply conscious of the proprieties. But my impression was that de Chastelain would be ready to have a fairly open exchange tomorrow. He is, however, genuinely concerned about Unionist suspicions that the Commission will be used by the two Governments; will be reluctant to say anything that he cannot base factually on what the parties have told him; and will be unwilling to say anything that constitutes a political call. But he did not react badly to Dalton's hints about what is actually in our minds. Ambassador Johnston may be less amenable.

**BILL JEFFREY****11 Millbank ☎ 6447 (Castle Buildings ☎ Ext.28142)**

cc PS/Secretary of State (B & L)  
PS/Mr Murphy (B & L)  
PS/Mr Ingram (B & L)  
PS/Mr Pilling (B & L)  
Mr Watkins  
Mr Hawker  
Mr Leach  
Mr Stephens  
Mr Brooker  
Mr Crawford  
Mr Maccabe  
Ms Scholefield  
Mr Warner  
PS/Sir Richard Wilson  
Mr Roberts, Dublin

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27.JUN.1999 19:08

DR M MOWLAM STORMONT

NO.484 P.5/9

## CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

Top - JS (h/lee)

FROM: JONATHAN STEPHENS  
Assistant Political Director  
27 June 1999

✓ PB  
MT  
AC  
ES  
BSP

John Sawers

See copy distribution below

**THE GUARANTEE**

Bill Jeffrey's note suggests we concentrate on Monday on the 'guarantee', leaving timescale to last.

**Approach**

Attached is a very short text which might be the basis of discussions on the guarantee. The thinking behind it is:

- the guarantee is a crucial element of the plan, so we need to get it out in the open.
- the guarantee needs to be offered principally by the two Governments and the SDLP, but there's everything to be said for binding the minor parties into it as well, and establishing that the UUP could live with it.
- neither the UUP nor Sinn Fein need be parties to it because it's guaranteeing the commitments they enter into.
- it's intended to give confidence to the UUP so they need to be satisfied it will do that;
- Sinn Fein are likely to welcome any guarantee; they need to be consulted to ensure they don't reject it out of hand.

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## CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

- if the guarantee is made a guarantee of both devolution and decommissioning it can be presented as a balanced guarantee of both sides' commitments.
- this means we would be guaranteeing to suspend the shadow Assembly if, having agreed a date for devolution, the UUP then backed off it.
- if we aim for a text of this sort to be issued by the end of the day, that would show clear progress during the day.

Text

The text is deliberately general and the Prime Ministers could again try to avoid any negotiation over words.

## In particular:

- it does not prejudice timescale: it could be compatible with either decommissioning or devolution going first.
- everything hangs on an approach to timescale to be agreed by the UUP and Sinn Fein: this might be as specific timetable itself or agreement to whatever the Commission proposes
- the sanction is Review and suspension, although the Irish continue to see suspension being an option to be discussed in the Review.

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**Process**

If the Prime Minister agrees to pursue something like this then the order of events might be:

- Prime Minister agrees text with Taoiseach
- 5-sided meeting promotes general discussion and 'guarantee'.
- PM/Taoiseach agree text with SDLP.
- PM/Taoiseach show text to UUP to get a sense whether they could live with it.
- PM/Taoiseach show text to Sinn Fein, but without seeking their agreement.
- PM/Taoiseach get support of minor parties.
- Text issued.

If asked about exclusion, we can say that is an option to be explored in any Review.

*Jonathan Stephens*

JONATHAN STEPHENS

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cc PS/Secretary of State (B & L)  
PS/Mr Ingram (B & L)  
PS/Mr Murphy (B & L)  
PS/PUS (B & L)  
Mr Jeffrey  
Mr Watkins  
Mr Bell  
Mr Leach  
Mr Brooker  
Mr Crawford  
Mr Maccabe  
Ms Scholefield  
Mr Warner  
PS/Sir Richard Wilson  
HMA Dublin

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**POSSIBLE TEXT**

The crucial issues of timing and implementation of the three principles agreed on Friday can only be resolved with the agreement of the UUP and Sinn Fein.

But, as the other signatories to the Good Friday Agreement, we pledge:

- we will support any approach which has the agreement of the UUP and Sinn Fein;
- if devolution or decommissioning are not in practice being implemented on the basis agreed, we will support the two Governments in convening a Review under the Agreement during which the operation of the political institutions established under the Agreement will be suspended;
- we will accept, and act on, the judgement of the Decommissioning Commission on whether decommissioning is being implemented on the basis agreed.

27.JUN.1999 18:20

DR M MOWLAM STORMONT

NO.482

P.1/4

**CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL**

Top-JS (see lane)

cc PB  
✓ MT  
AC  
GS  
BUP

**FROM: JONATHAN STEPHENS**  
Assistant Political Director  
27 June 1999

John Sawers

See copy distribution below

**LUNCH WITH DECOMMISSIONING COMMISSION**

The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach are to have lunch at 12.45 on Monday with the three members of the Decommissioning Commission. I attach points to make.

**Ambassador Johnson**

He has told both Governments he will resign from 2 July. The US Government has agreed to his replacement by his assistant, Andrew Sens. So the Prime Minister should thank Johnson for his service.

**Objectives**

The point of the meeting is to:

- hear how the Commission are getting on with their report.
- outline the two Governments' approach.
- discuss how to tackle timescale.

There are two sensitive points:

- the Commission are rightly protective of their independence. While ready to help, the Commission will need some basis in what the

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DR M MOWLAM STORMONT

NO.482

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parties have said to them for anything they say (a point the Irish tend to overlook).

- the Irish (Paddy Teahon in particular) want the Commission simply to deliver a timescale without any negotiation with the parties. But this is incompatible with the Prime Minister's assurance to Trimble on Friday that the Commission would not cover timing without the parties' agreement.

**JONATHAN STEPHENS**

cc PS/Secretary of State (B & L)  
PS/Mr Ingram (B & L)  
PS/Mr Murphy (B & L)  
PS/PUS (B & L)  
Mr Jeffrey  
Mr Watkins  
Mr Bell  
Mr Leach  
Mr Brooker  
Mr Crawford  
Mr Maccabe  
Ms Scholefield  
Mr Warner  
PS/Sir Richard Wilson  
HMA Dublin

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## DECOMMISSIONING COMMISSION: POINTS TO MAKE

- Respect your independence and integrity, but hope you can tell us how you're getting on.
- Our plan is as in 'Times':
  - securing Sinn Fein commitment to decommissioning by May 2000.
  - a timescale for implementation, starting with devolution.
  - a 'failsafe' guarantee that if it's not adhered to, the Executive will be suspended.
- So far:
  - we have agreed three broad principles.
  - we are working with the parties today on a 'guarantee'.
  - we are leaving timescale to last.
- Helpful if your report records:
  - whether the parties are committed to decommissioning by May 2000.
  - what they think is necessary to achieve that.
  - the next steps in decommissioning, eg agreement on modalities etc.
- On timescale, best not to make specific proposals for now. But we believe a reasonable timescale is:

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- now: devolution.
- September: agreement on modalities.
- December: start to decommissioning.
- Timescale likely to be resolved by:
  - direct agreement between Sinn Fein and UUP; or
  - indirect agreement behind the scenes with the Commission putting it forward as its own proposals; or
  - agreement to ask the Commission to make proposals.
- Keep you in touch: hope to meet tomorrow to discuss handling of your report.

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FROM: **BILL JEFFREY**  
Political Director  
27 June 1999

Top-JS (by h.w.c.)  
PB  
VMT  
AC  
GS  
Bup

John Sawers

## HOW TO GET THE BEST OUT OF TOMORROW

### Summary

- We should put the question of timescale to one side, to be resolved at the end.
- The aims tomorrow should be to agree the failsafe mechanism with the SDLP and the Irish (and if possible the UUP), and to push Sinn Fein on the best possible statement they (and preferably the IRA) could offer if the other conditions were right.
- We could then aim to put a fleshed-out version of the PM's "Times" scheme to the three main parties on Tuesday morning.

### Detail

The Prime Minister's "Times" article, and the plan we have been discussing with the Irish, both have three elements:

- a Sinn Fein commitment to decommission within the timeframe of the Agreement;
- a timetable laid down by the Decommissioning Commission; and
- a "failsafe" guarantee that, if the timetable is not met, the Executive will be suspended.

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2. Of these, the second is the most difficult, both in substance and handling. On substance, we will not get Trimble to move on the Executive unless the start date for decommissioning is close enough for him to feel he can sell it to his party. The Irish say that any earlier date than the end of the year will be impossible for Sinn Fein. On handling, there are two complicating factors. First, de Chastelain needs to be able to base any timetable he offers factually on what he has actually been told by the parties. Second, the Irish are determined to avoid any negotiation of the timescale, believing that this would be dangerous and that it should be left to drop out of the de Chastelain report, putting both sides on the spot. I doubt if this is realistic. Friday's exchanges revealed the depths of Trimble's suspicion that we are planning to bounce him on timescales. In my view, we will need either to get agreement from the parties to leave the call to de Chastelain (with positions reserved until people see what he says) or to address the matter substantively in the negotiations.

3. For these reasons, my advice would be to put timing to one side when discussions resume tomorrow, emphasising - as the Prime Minister did on Friday - that positions on it are completely reserved, and to concentrate on getting the other pieces in place.

4. This suggests an approach on the following lines:

- use the 10.30 am preparatory meeting with the Taoiseach to clear lines for the day, including on the guarantee (see paragraph 7 below);
- use an initial round table (with the UUP, SDLP, Sinn Fein) at 11 am to lay down the ground the two PMs hope to cover during the day and take views on how best to implement the three principles agreed on Friday - speaking note coming separately;
- use the meeting with de Chastelain and his colleagues at lunch-time to take delivery of their emerging findings, and explore how willing / able

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they are likely to be to say something about timescales - a separate brief for this meeting is coming;

- start the afternoon with the SDLP and explore what part they are prepared to play in the failsafe guarantee. At what point, and in what circumstances, would they vote to exclude Sinn Fein? If there was a generally understood timetable, and it was not met, would they support the immediate suspension of the institutions and a review?
  - cover the same ground from a different angle with the UUP. Without prejudice to timescales, and in particular whether decommissioning should start before or after devolution, would they be satisfied by a guarantee from the two Governments (supported by the SDLP) that if Sinn Fein did not meet their commitments in time, the Executive and other institutions would be suspended and a review called?
  - tackle Sinn Fein about whether, if everything else was in place, their words about those with guns successfully being persuaded to give them up within the timeframe of the Agreement are still on offer; whether they could be strengthened; and whether an IRA statement could be added. (Sinn Fein will also be interested in any guarantees the two Governments and the SDLP give, especially if they could lead to the ending of the Executive before May 2000 - which they would probably regard as outside the Agreement. But this part of the package does not really need to be cleared with them. They might even prefer not to be asked).
5. The aim, by the end of the day, would be:
- (i) to have a common understanding with the SDLP and the Irish, and if possible the UUP, about the nature of the failsafe;

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(ii) to have teed up - and if possible strengthened - the Sinn Fein statement.

6. On Tuesday the Prime Ministers could then turn to the vexed question of timescale, keeping de Chastelain closely in touch with developments as he finalises his report. Depending on how tomorrow goes, it might be a good idea to put a fleshed out version of the Prime Minister's "Times" proposal, on paper, to the three larger parties, on Tuesday morning.

7. The Prime Minister should be aware that there are two unresolved differences with the Irish over the "failsafe" mechanism. Both are to do with how automatically it would come into play:

- We think the guarantee should be that, if there was a commonly understood timetable (say modalities agreed by September, actual decommissioning to start by the end of the year) failure to meet any element of the timetable should trigger a review and the suspension of the Executive and other institutions. The Irish think that consistency with the Agreement requires a vaguer formulation linked to May 2000, with the failsafe operating earlier only if it became clear that the commitment was not going to be met by May 2000. That strikes us as too vague for Trimble.
- If the failsafe is activated, we think we should be committed to suspend the Executive and other institutions more or less automatically. The current Irish text has the Governments taking "whatever remedial action is deemed necessary, including, if required, the suspension of the institutions". Again, this seems to weak for Trimble.

8. We have not been able to resolve these differences with Irish officials. We will try again when we see them this evening. Failing that, the Prime Minister could raise them with the Taoiseach when they meet at 10.30 am tomorrow. It would be as well to have a common position before meeting the others, although

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any discussion with Trimble on the failsafe mechanism can be expected to bring home to the Irish what is likely to be required.

9. One last point. It is tempting to refer to the completion of decommissioning by May 2000, or to the decommissioning of all weapons by then. But it would be prudent not to link the failsafe mechanism to completion. Decommissioning of all weapons is so unlikely to happen that we would simply be guaranteeing another crisis in 10 months time.

10. I am copying this to Nick Perry for the Secretary of State and to Sir Richard Wilson and Ivor Roberts in Dublin.

*Bill Jeffrey*

**BILL JEFFREY**

11 Millbank ☎ 6447 (Castle Buildings ☎ Ext.28142)

**CONFIDENTIAL****NON PAPER**

The following to be agreed by the Portadown District LOL No 1 and the Garvaghy-Road Residents' Coalition in a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister on Monday 28 June 1999.

1. All parties affirm their commitments to upholding and securing the following rights as laid down in the April 10th 1998 Agreement, the Northern Ireland Act and the European Convention on Human Rights particularly:
  - i. The Right to free political thought.
  - ii. The Right to freedom and expression of religion.
  - iii. The Right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations.
  - iv. The Right to secure constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means.
  - v. The Right to freely choose one's place of residence.
  - vi. The Right to equal opportunities in all social and economic activity regardless of class, creed, disability, gender and ethnicity.
  - vii. The Right to freedom from sectarian harassment.
  - viii. The Right of women to full and equal political participation.
  - ix. The Right to freedom of assembly.
  
2. All sides recognise the damage which this conflict has caused. In a spirit of reconciliation Portadown District LOL No 1 will call for an immediate, guaranteed and permanent ending to all protests, demonstrations and rallies related to this dispute.
  
3. An open-air Act of Reconciliation in the presence of the four Church leaders, Prime Minister and political leaders, attended by both communities will be held at [ ] on [ ]. A joint statement of reconciliation by both sides will be read out by one young person from each community at the Act of Reconciliation. Members of both communities will then hold a walk from [ ] to [ ]. An endowment fund for young people from both communities to promote reconciliation will be set up by the Government.

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4. Following this direct dialogue, the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition agree that the Drumcree Somme Anniversary Service will be permitted to walk back to Portadown via the Garvaghy Road on 4 July 1999 on the basis of the following arrangements
- silent march
  - no music
  - no drum beat
  - no visitors
  - members to walk 7 abreast.
5. In addition to working together in the (yet to be agreed) structures of the Forum, all parties commit themselves to working genuinely and constructively in an agreed format to improve community relations in Portadown, to understand each other's positions, and to reach accommodation and agreement on any future marches to or from Drumcree.
6. An agreed Portadown Community Forum will be established and will meet as soon as possible. All sides agree to attend the Forum and be represented at senior level.
7. A proper and meaningful socio-economic initiative for Portadown will be announced and will be implemented, through targeting those areas of greatest need in compliance with TSN and other requirements, including the provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Structures that operate elsewhere will be examined to establish their appropriateness to the Portadown situation, taking into account best practice, etc.

Both sides will put this agreement to their own constituencies in accordance with their established arrangements.

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*file*

**From: John Sawers**  
**Date: 27 June 1999**

**PRIME MINISTER**

**cc Jonathan Powell**  
**Alastair Campbell**

**DECOMMISSIONING**

De Chastelain Remit

de Chastelain's remit is briefly set out in the Good Friday Agreement (relevant passage faxed to you by the Duty Clerk). A fuller description of its responsibilities is in the 1997 Agreement between the British and Irish Governments which established the Commission as an international body. Stephen Leech will be faxing this through in the next hour or two. I have not seen the document myself but I understand it talks of "facilitating" the process of decommissioning ie a step beyond the Good Friday Agreement's description of "reviewing and monitoring" the process.

Process of decommissioning

The process is as follows:

Step 1: Notification is given by a paramilitary organisation of its intention to decommission.

Step 2: The Commission have to satisfy itself that:

- the notice has been given authoritatively on behalf of the proscribed organisation;

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- 2 -

- it is persuaded that the organisation has a clear intention to decommission.

Once it is satisfied on these two counts, it issues a Declaration of Satisfaction, and sets out certain conditions/requirements for the actual act. Once the Declaration of Satisfaction issues, and provided the Commission's conditions are met, those concerned enjoy amnesty from prosecution for weapons-related offences.

**Step 3:** The paramilitary organisation provides information and answers questions from the Commission on what they precisely intend to do. The most likely course is that they identify which of two agreed schemes on decommissioning they wish to pursue. These two agreed schemes are:

- (i) that the Commission be told the whereabouts of illegal weapons, and would then collect them and destroy them;
- (ii) the weapons would be destroyed by those who have them in a way which can be verified by the Commission;

(two other possible schemes set out in the 1997 Decommissioning Act have not been agreed between the Commission and the two Governments: those involve the weapons being delivered to the Commission or transferred to a third location where they can be picked up.)

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- 3 -

The scheme considered most likely is that the weapons will be destroyed by those who possess them. The Commission have indicated they would prefer to be present for any such destruction and collect the residue eg cut up weapons. For the decommissioning of explosives, it would prefer to see the explosives beforehand and witness the destruction (it is very hard to determine how much explosive has been destroyed if there is just a bang in the forest).

Step 4: The Decommissioning Commission issue a formal report to the two Governments on the act of decommissioning that has taken place.

Whether or not there is publicity for an act of decommissioning is a matter for the paramilitary organisations concerned. The LVF wanted to have publicity and it was arranged accordingly.

*Marie Thibault*  
PP John Savers

- make provision for liaising with the Irish language community, representing their views to public authorities and investigating complaints;
  - place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision for integrated education;
  - explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in co-operation with the Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for achieving more widespread availability of Teilifis na Gaeilge in Northern Ireland;
  - seek more effective ways to encourage and provide financial support for Irish language film and television production in Northern Ireland; and
  - encourage the parties to secure agreement that this commitment will be sustained by a new Assembly in a way which takes account of the desires and sensitivities of the community.
5. All participants acknowledge the sensitivity of the use of symbols and emblems for public purposes, and the need in particular in creating the new institutions to ensure that such symbols and emblems are used in a manner which promotes mutual respect rather than division. Arrangements will be made to monitor this issue and consider what action might be required.



## DECOMMISSIONING



(A)

1. Participants recall their agreement in the Procedural Motion adopted on 24 September 1997 "that the resolution of the decommissioning issue is an indispensable part of the process of negotiation", and also recall the provisions of paragraph 25 of Strand 1 above.
2. They note the progress made by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and the Governments in developing schemes which can represent a workable basis for achieving the decommissioning of illegally-held arms in the possession of paramilitary groups.
3. All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. They also confirm their intention to continue to work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to use any influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement.
4. The Independent Commission will monitor, review and verify progress on decommissioning of illegal arms, and will report to both Governments at regular intervals.
6. Both Governments will take all necessary steps to facilitate the decommissioning process to include bringing the relevant schemes into force by the end of June.

# STRAND ONE

## DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. This agreement provides for a democratically elected Assembly in Northern Ireland which is inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community.

### **The Assembly**

2. A 108-member Assembly will be elected by PR(STV) from existing Westminster constituencies.
3. The Assembly will exercise full legislative and executive authority in respect of those matters currently within the responsibility of the six Northern Ireland Government Departments, with the possibility of taking on responsibility for other matters as detailed elsewhere in this agreement.
4. The Assembly - operating where appropriate on a cross-community basis - will be the prime source of authority in respect of all devolved responsibilities.

### **Safeguards**

5. There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including:
  - (a) allocations of Committee Chairs, Ministers and Committee membership in proportion to party strengths;
  - (b) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission;
  - (c) arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland;
  - (d) arrangements to ensure key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis;
    - (i) **either** parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting;
    - (ii) **or** a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting.

Key decisions requiring cross-community support will be designated in advance, including election of the Chair of the Assembly, the First Minister and Deputy First

Minister, standing orders and budget allocations. In other cases such decisions could be triggered by a petition of concern brought by a significant minority of Assembly members (30/108).

- (e) an Equality Commission to monitor a statutory obligation to promote equality of opportunity in specified areas and parity of esteem between the two main communities, and to investigate individual complaints against public bodies.

### **Operation of the Assembly**

6. At their first meeting, members of the Assembly will register a designation of identity - nationalist, unionist or other - for the purposes of measuring cross-community support in Assembly votes under the relevant provisions above.
7. The Chair and Deputy Chair of the Assembly will be elected on a cross-community basis, as set out in paragraph 5(d) above.
8. There will be a Committee for each of the main executive functions of the Northern Ireland Administration. The Chairs and Deputy Chairs of the Assembly Committees will be allocated proportionally, using the d'Hondt system. Membership of the Committees will be in broad proportion to party strengths in the Assembly to ensure that the opportunity of Committee places is available to all members.
9. The Committees will have a scrutiny, policy development and consultation role with respect to the Department with which each is associated, and will have a role in initiation of legislation. They will have the power to:
  - consider and advise on Departmental budgets and Annual Plans in the context of the overall budget allocation;
  - approve relevant secondary legislation and take the Committee stage of relevant primary legislation;
  - call for persons and papers;
  - initiate enquiries and make reports;
  - consider and advise on matters brought to the Committee by its Minister.
10. Standing Committees other than Departmental Committees may be established as may be required from time to time.
11. The Assembly may appoint a special Committee to examine and report on whether a measure or proposal for legislation is in conformity with equality requirements, including the ECHR/Bill of Rights. The Committee shall have the power to call people and papers to assist in its consideration of the matter. The Assembly shall then consider the report of the Committee and can determine the matter in accordance with the cross-community consent procedure.
12. The above special procedure shall be followed when requested by the Executive Committee, or by the relevant Departmental Committee, voting on a cross-community basis.

13. When there is a petition of concern as in 5(d) above, the Assembly shall vote to determine whether the measure may proceed without reference to this special procedure. If this fails to achieve support on a cross-community basis, as in 5(d)(i) above, the special procedure shall be followed.

### **Executive Authority**

14. Executive authority to be discharged on behalf of the Assembly by a First Minister and Deputy First Minister and up to ten Ministers with Departmental responsibilities.
15. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister shall be jointly elected into office by the Assembly voting on a cross-community basis, according to 5(d)(i) above.
16. Following the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the posts of Ministers will be allocated to parties on the basis of the d'Hondt system by reference to the number of seats each party has in the Assembly.
17. The Ministers will constitute an Executive Committee, which will be convened, and presided over, by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister.
18. The duties of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister will include, inter alia, dealing with and co-ordinating the work of the Executive Committee and the response of the Northern Ireland administration to external relationships.
19. The Executive Committee will provide a forum for the discussion of, and agreement on, issues which cut across the responsibilities of two or more Ministers, for prioritising executive and legislative proposals and for recommending a common position where necessary (e.g. in dealing with external relationships).
20. The Executive Committee will seek to agree each year, and review as necessary, a programme incorporating an agreed budget linked to policies and programmes, subject to approval by the Assembly, after scrutiny in Assembly Committees, on a cross-community basis.
21. A party may decline the opportunity to nominate a person to serve as a Minister or may subsequently change its nominee.
22. All the Northern Ireland Departments will be headed by a Minister. All Ministers will liaise regularly with their respective Committee.
23. As a condition of appointment, Ministers, including the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, will affirm the terms of a Pledge of Office (Annex A) undertaking to discharge effectively and in good faith all the responsibilities attaching to their office.
24. Ministers will have full executive authority in their respective areas of responsibility, within any broad programme agreed by the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly as a whole.
25. An individual may be removed from office following a decision of the Assembly taken on a cross-community basis, if (s)he loses the confidence of the Assembly, voting on a cross-community basis, for failure to meet his or her responsibilities including, inter alia, those set



at in the Pledge of Office. Those who hold office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded or removed from office under these provisions.

### **Legislation**

26. The Assembly will have authority to pass primary legislation for Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to:
  - (a) the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it which, if the courts found to be breached, would render the relevant legislation null and void;
  - (b) decisions by simple majority of members voting, except when decision on a cross-community basis is required;
  - (c) detailed scrutiny and approval in the relevant Departmental Committee;
  - (d) mechanisms, based on arrangements proposed for the Scottish Parliament, to ensure suitable co-ordination, and avoid disputes, between the Assembly and the Westminster Parliament;
  - (e) option of the Assembly seeking to include Northern Ireland provisions in United Kingdom-wide legislation in the Westminster Parliament, especially on devolved issues where parity is normally maintained (e.g. social security, company law).
27. The Assembly will have authority to legislate in reserved areas with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to Parliamentary control.
28. Disputes over legislative competence will be decided by the Courts.
29. Legislation could be initiated by an individual, a Committee or a Minister.

### **Relations with other institutions**

30. Arrangements to represent the Assembly as a whole, at Summit level and in dealings with other institutions, will be in accordance with paragraph 18, and will be such as to ensure cross-community involvement.
31. Terms will be agreed between appropriate Assembly representatives and the Government of the United Kingdom to ensure effective co-ordination and input by Ministers to national policy-making, including on EU issues.
32. Role of Secretary of State:
  - (a) to remain responsible for NIO matters not devolved to the Assembly, subject to regular consultation with the Assembly and Ministers;
  - (b) to approve and lay before the Westminster Parliament any Assembly legislation on reserved matters;

- (c) to represent Northern Ireland interests in the United Kingdom Cabinet;
  - (d) to have the right to attend the Assembly at their invitation.
33. The Westminster Parliament (whose power to make legislation for Northern Ireland would remain unaffected) will:
- (a) legislate for non-devolved issues, other than where the Assembly legislates with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to the control of Parliament;
  - (b) to legislate as necessary to ensure the United Kingdom's international obligations are met in respect of Northern Ireland;
  - (c) scrutinise, including through the Northern Ireland Grand and Select Committees, the responsibilities of the Secretary of State.
34. A consultative Civic Forum will be established. It will comprise representatives of the business, trade union and voluntary sectors, and such other sectors as agreed by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. It will act as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister will by agreement provide administrative support for the Civic Forum and establish guidelines for the selection of representatives to the Civic Forum.

#### **Transitional Arrangements**

35. The Assembly will meet first for the purpose of organisation, without legislative or executive powers, to resolve its standing orders and working practices and make preparations for the effective functioning of the Assembly, the British-Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council and associated implementation bodies. In this transitional period, those members of the Assembly serving as shadow Ministers shall affirm their commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means and their opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose; to work in good faith to bring the new arrangements into being; and to observe the spirit of the Pledge of Office applying to appointed Ministers.

#### **Review**

36. After a specified period there will be a review of these arrangements, including the details of electoral arrangements and of the Assembly's procedures, with a view to agreeing any adjustments necessary in the interests of efficiency and fairness.

(B)

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND  
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM  
ESTABLISHING THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION  
ON DECOMMISSIONING

The Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom:

Recalling their decision on the 28th day of November 1995 to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue;

Noting that the Report of the International Body presented to the two Governments on the 22nd day of January 1996 recommended that the decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission;

Noting that the Decommissioning Act, 1997 in Ireland and the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997 in the United Kingdom make reference to a Commission to be established by agreement between the two Governments;

Recalling the Joint Communiqué issued on the 29th day of July, 1997, following the meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, in which they announced their decision to complete preparations for the establishment of an Independent Commission in order that the mechanisms on decommissioning would be capable of being launched simultaneously with substantive political negotiations;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") is hereby established by the two Governments in accordance with this Agreement.

Article 2

- (1) The Commission shall be independent in the performance of its functions.
- (2) The Commission shall have the legal capacity of a body corporate in accordance with the Decommissioning Act, 1997 and any Order made by the Secretary of State under the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997.

Article 3

The objective of the Commission is to facilitate the decommissioning of firearms, ammunition, explosives and explosive substances (hereinafter referred to as "arms") in accordance with the Report of the International Body, any regulations or arrangements made under the Decommissioning Act, 1997 and any decommissioning schemes within the meaning of section 1 of the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997.

Article 4

In fulfilment of the objective set out in Article 3, the Commission shall have the following functions:

- (a) to consult with the participants in political negotiations in Northern Ireland, including both Governments, and others whom it deems relevant on the type of scheme or schemes for decommissioning including the role it might play in respect of each scheme;

- (b) to present to the two Governments proposals for schemes for decommissioning having due regard to the views expressed by those it has consulted;
- (c) to undertake, in accordance with any regulations or arrangements made under the Decommissioning Act, 1997 and any decommissioning schemes within the meaning of section 1, and in accordance with section 3, of the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997, such tasks that may be required of it to facilitate the decommissioning of arms, including observing, monitoring and verifying decommissioning and receiving and auditing arms; and
- (d) to report periodically to both Governments and, through whatever mechanism they may establish for that purpose, the other participants in political negotiations in Northern Ireland.

#### Article 5

The Commission shall consist of not less than two members. The members shall be appointed jointly by the two Governments who may also appoint additional members from time to time. The two Governments may jointly appoint one of the members as Chairperson. The members of the Commission shall serve on terms and conditions decided by the two Governments.

#### Article 6

The Commission, its property and premises, and the persons referred to in section 3(4)(b) of the Decommissioning Act, 1997 and in section 7(2)(c) of the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997 shall have such privileges, immunities and inviolabilities as may be conferred or provided for in accordance with orders made by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Secretary of State under those Acts.

## Article 7

Such moneys, premises, facilities and services as may be necessary for the proper functioning of the Commission shall be provided by the two Governments on a basis to be determined by them.

## Article 8

Members of the Commission, members of the staff of the Commission, persons carrying out work for or giving advice to the Commission and agents of the Commission shall be bound not to disclose any information obtained in the course of the performance of their functions as such members or persons unless such disclosure is authorised by or on behalf of the Commission.

## Article 9

The Commission shall keep proper accounts and proper records of all moneys received or expended by it and shall, at the joint request of the two Governments, appoint auditors who shall audit the accounts of the Commission. The reports of the auditors shall be submitted to both Governments.

## Article 10

The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Secretary of State may make further provision in relation to the Commission and the decommissioning of arms in accordance with the Decommissioning Act, 1997 and any decommissioning schemes within the meaning of section 1 of the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997.

## Article 11

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the two Governments exchange notifications of their acceptance of it.

Article 12

The Agreement shall continue in force until terminated by mutual agreement and thereafter shall cease to have effect save in so far as and to the extent necessary for meeting any liabilities or disposing in an orderly manner of any remaining assets of the Commission in accordance with the spirit of the Agreement.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

Done at Belfast in two originals on the 26th day of August, 1997.

For the Government of Ireland:

For the Government of the United Kingdom:

file  
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27.6.99

## 1. SINN FEIN POSITION

In the light of the agreement by the UUP and other parties to establish a fully inclusive Executive, we can say, now definitively, that on that basis and in the context of the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, for us, the war is finished and over. We also say now that as a result of these undertakings, we will successfully persuade the IRA to decommission all paramilitary arms by May 2000 as set out in the Good Friday Agreement.

We agree that this should be done in the manner set out by the Independent Commission on Decommissioning (ICD).



## 2. ICD

We have had talks with all the parties. As a result of these, we believe decommissioning can happen. We believe that all parties attached to paramilitary groups could deliver decommissioning should they really wish to do so. Parties attached to paramilitary groups are, at present, working with us in good faith but have not yet seriously attempted to achieve decommissioning because of a lack of political progress. We believe, on the basis of discussions with them, that, on an inclusive Executive being established, decommissioning will indeed then be delivered.

We can state now what the modalities of decommissioning will be, how it should be done. As to timing, we have no doubt that if parties work with us now in good faith to achieve actual decommissioning, then it could be completed by the May 2000 deadline.

As to the manner of doing this, we envisage it being done in a series of steps which we intend, shortly, to set out. The first step in the process of decommissioning would be an agreement by all relevant paramilitary organisations of an intention to decommission, together with a Declaration of Satisfaction from the ICD, setting out the conditions for actual decommissioning to happen.

3. UUP

We are committed to a fully inclusive Executive.

We recognise the significance of the Sinn Fein statement and welcome it. We take it as a firm commitment that decommissioning will indeed be done in the way and on the timescale set out in the Good Friday Agreement. We accept that the Independent Commission on Decommissioning (ICD) will decide how decommissioning is done; and how it is completed by May 2000.

Should decommissioning not happen in the way set out by the ICD then we will hold the parties and the two Governments to their firm undertaking that a breach of the ICD terms will mean the Executive is abandoned.

[We also believe that the full devolution of powers should only take place once there is a credible start to the process of decommissioning. We understand that the ICD will shortly set out the first step in that process.

We therefore agree, as a sign of our good faith and intention, to run the d'Hondt procedure, to nominate Shadow Ministers and to set up the Shadow Executive now; on the understanding that the moment the ICD signals the first step in the process of decommissioning has been done, the full Executive will be established and full devolution take place. We accept the sooner this happens, the better.]

#### 4. OTHER PARTIES AND THE TWO GOVERNMENTS


We undertake that should the process of decommissioning set out by the ICD not be carried out in the way and on the timescale specified, then the party attached to the paramilitary group refusing to act as the Independent Commission on Decommissioning has specified, will be expelled from the Executive.

[Foreign: PM Northern Ireland]

File

Immedank

# FACSIMILE COVER SHEET



Hebner pre sent to P...  
AC + JS tonight ✓  
**FAKED PAVED**

**FROM: STEPHEN J LEACH  
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR  
POLICING AND SECURITY  
STORMONT HOUSE**

**TEL: 01232-527012**

**ADDRESSEE:** PRIME MINISTER

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**FAX NO:** 0171 839 9044

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**PROTECTIVE MARKING:** \_\_\_\_\_

**DATE:** \_\_\_\_\_

**NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THIS PAGE):** \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS:** The attached is our best guess of what an agreement would look like. It has not been tabled yet.

V. J.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**NON PAPER**

The following to be agreed by the Portadown District LOL No 1 and the Garvaghy-Road Residents' Coalition in a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister on Monday 28 June 1999.

1. All parties affirm their commitments to upholding and securing the following rights as laid down in the April 10th 1998 Agreement, the Northern Ireland Act and the European Convention on Human Rights particularly:
  - i. The Right to free political thought.
  - ii. The Right to freedom and expression of religion.
  - iii. The Right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations.
  - iv. The Right to secure constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means.
  - v. The Right to freely choose one's place of residence.
  - vi. The Right to equal opportunities in all social and economic activity regardless of class, creed, disability, gender and ethnicity.
  - vii. The Right to freedom from sectarian harassment.
  - viii. The Right of women to full and equal political participation.
  - ix. The Right to freedom of assembly.
  
2. All sides recognise the damage which this conflict has caused. In a spirit of reconciliation Portadown District LOL No 1 will call for an immediate, guaranteed and permanent ending to all protests, demonstrations and rallies related to this dispute.
  
3. An open-air Act of Reconciliation in the presence of the four Church leaders, Prime Minister and political leaders, attended by both communities will be held at [ ] on [ ]. A joint statement of reconciliation by both sides will be read out by one young person from each community at the Act of Reconciliation. Members of both communities will then hold a walk from [ ] to [ ]. An endowment fund for young people from both communities to promote reconciliation will be set up by the Government.

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4. Following this direct dialogue, the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition agree that the Drumcree Somme Anniversary Service will be permitted to walk back to Portadown via the Garvaghy Road on 4 July 1999 on the basis of the following arrangements
  - silent march
  - no music
  - no drum beat
  - no visitors
  - members to walk 7 abreast.
  
5. In addition to working together in the (yet to be agreed) structures of the Forum, all parties commit themselves to working genuinely and constructively in an agreed format to improve community relations in Portadown, to understand each other's positions, and to reach accommodation and agreement on any future marches to or from Drumcree.
  
6. An agreed Portadown Community Forum will be established and will meet as soon as possible. All sides agree to attend the Forum and be represented at senior level.
  
7. A proper and meaningful socio-economic initiative for Portadown will be announced and will be implemented, through targeting those areas of greatest need in compliance with TSN and other requirements, including the provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Structures that operate elsewhere will be examined to establish their appropriateness to the Portadown situation, taking into account best practice, etc.

Both sides will put this agreement to their own constituencies in accordance with their established arrangements.

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25 June 1999

For Immediate Delivery

The Rt Hon Tony Blair MP  
Fax No (01232) 528201

Dear *Prime Minister,*

In my capacity as Chairman of the Group of 7 (organisations and names attached) I enclose a copy of a Statement on the current political impasse which we are releasing today.

Since our formation 3 years ago, we have consistently sought to assist the peace process and all involved in progressing it. If it is felt that we have any useful contribution to make towards a resolution in these crucial final stages, we hold ourselves ready to respond positively.

A list of those to whom this letter is being sent is beneath.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely

*George Quigley*

Sir George Quigley  
Chairman

Recipients: The Rt Hon Tony Blair MP  
The Rt Hon Dr Marjorie Mowlam MP  
Mr Bertie Ahern TD  
The Rt Hon David Trimble MP  
Mr Seamus Mallon MP  
Mr Gerry Adams MP



## STATEMENT BY THE GROUP OF 7

It is vital that current efforts to break the political impasse should succeed. Failure would dash the hopes of the great majority who looked forward to a new era of responsible self-government capable of delivering stability, economic growth and an inclusive society in which all might feel themselves to be valued stakeholders.

On 10 February last, we issued a Statement reflecting our view that a solution to the impasse required simultaneous action on twin, but separate, tracks. Along one track was the establishment of an Executive involving all those participants who affirmed the Pledge of Office. Along the other was the voluntary commencement of decommissioning by paramilitary organisations, republican and loyalist. We also invited the parties not simply to conduct a dialogue with each other but to look outward towards the community and to respond to the clearly expressed wishes for the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement.

Such a solution anticipated the later suggestion that both sides should 'jump together'. Our own proposal suggested what the jump in each case should be but there are no doubt other alternatives.

It is always wise to look before you leap but the looking has lasted long enough. We would earnestly urge the parties to make the simultaneous leap forward now in whatever way they can mutually agree and thereby enable us, as a community, to prove ourselves equal to the opportunity created by the Agreement.

If the politicians reach agreement over the next few days, we can all be certain of one thing. The outcome is unlikely to be the best possible solution in the best of all possible worlds. But, given the dedicated effort which has been put into the process over many months, it will be the best solution possible in difficult circumstances. The new world will be built through the patient accumulation of partial successes. All who welcomed the success of the political parties in concluding the Good Friday Agreement 15 months ago against all the odds should also welcome an outcome which enables its implementation.

We believe that the present uncertainty is conducive to instability and is highly detrimental to Northern Ireland's economic prospects. Others are moving ahead strongly, while we are stuck in a political rut. Unless we get out of it and unless we can get to grips urgently with highly damaging issues like Drumcree, we shall undoubtedly pay the price in terms of jobs, public services, standard of living and quality of life.



Heavily involved as we are in its economic life, we are acutely aware that, without stability, Northern Ireland will not be taken seriously as an economic player. We shall lose out badly on inward investment and the local economy will lack the dynamic thrust displayed by other locations which are not distracted by community unrest and by all the effort which has to be put into getting to the political starting gate here. Until we rectify our situation, we shall never realise our economic potential and everyone will suffer as a consequence. In the rest of the United Kingdom, the territories and regions are becoming increasingly assertive. Failure now will mean that we will be at a disadvantage, with no distinctive voice. We will have lost the ability to shape our own future.

If, sadly, no agreement is reached by 30 June, it will be important that the alternative way forward is swiftly clarified by the Governments so that we do not linger indefinitely in a state of suspended animation.

It would be a tragedy if a society with such potential were to fritter away its chances and sell itself short. The world would find it incredible that a community which had proved so resilient in face of adversity had balked at the challenge of inventing a new future.

**GROUP OF SEVEN***George Quigley***George Quigley (Chairman)***Chris Gibson***Chris Gibson, Chairman,  
Confederation of British Industry***Nigel Smyth***Nigel Smyth, Director  
Confederation of British Industry***Gwyn Jones***Gwyn Jones  
Chairman, Federation of Small Businesses***Ann F. Shaw***Ann Shaw, Chairman  
Institute of Directors***Linda Brown***Linda Brown, Director,  
Institute of Directors***Eamonn Oakes***Eamonn Oakes, Chairman  
NI Committee/Irish Congress of Trade  
Unions***Tom Gillen***Tom Gillen, Deputy NI Officer  
NI Committee/ Irish Congress of Trade  
Unions***Janet Trewsdale***Janet Trewsdale  
Chairman, NI Economic Council***Paul K. Gorecki***Dr Paul Gorecki  
Director, NI Economic Council***Pat Haren***Dr Pat Haren  
Chairman, NI Growth Challenge***Frank Hewitt***Frank Hewitt  
Director, NI Growth Challenge***Neville Morrison***Neville Morrison  
NI Hospitality Federation***Felix Mooney***Felix Mooney  
NI Hospitality Federation***Owen Lamont***Owen Lamont, President  
NI Chamber of Commerce & Industry***John A. Stringer***John Stringer, Chief Executive  
NI Chamber of Commerce & Industry**

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FROM: JONATHAN STEPHENS  
Associate Political Director (L)  
[date]

PS/Secretary of State (L&B)

CC See Copy Distribution Below

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE DUP: FRIDAY 25 JUNE**

SUBJECT  
MASTER  
Filed on:

As part of Friday's round of meetings the Prime Minister met Dr Paisley, Peter Robinson, Nigel Dodds and William McCrea at 17.15.

Dr Paisley handed over the attached statement and asked the Prime Minister to respond: the Prime Minister promised to read it. He explained his aim was to find a basis on which devolution would happen.

Dr Paisley commented on the 'Times' article proposals. A guarantee from Sinn Fein would be valueless because they continued to insist they could not speak for the IRA, even though everyone knew they were linked. It was unclear what the Prime Minister had in mind when talking about a 'failsafe' device - would that be the suspension of devolution or the exclusion of Sinn Fein? If there was no decommissioning then Sinn Fein was to blame and it was unfair to penalise all the other parties by suspending devolution as a whole.

The Prime Minister said the guarantee from Sinn Fein would be worth it precisely because of the relationship they had with the IRA. It would be backed up by the 'failsafe' device: the details of that were up for negotiation. But it was clear that the whole process should not come to an end if Sinn Fein chose not to be part of it. He was currently working on principles the parties might agree to, but was not putting specific proposals to them yet.

Dr Paisley commented that the 30 June deadline was a bad thing. He was not in favour of the Good Friday Agreement but it was in the better interest of the people in Northern Ireland that the deadline be set aside for the Summer. The coincidence of timing with Drumcree was very dangerous.

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Peter Robinson said that if there was any thought of scrapping the Assembly it could only be as part of scrapping the Agreement as a whole, all the institutions had to rise and fall together. The DUP were not worried about their salaries - they could eat fish and chips everyday. But unless prisoner releases, the Patten Commission etc were stopped at the same time as the Assembly, there would be trouble on the streets. There was, in any case, grave disquiet about the Patten Commission.

The Prime Minister said Drumcree was a separate issue, but the fact was it had a huge effect on the political climate. He was on the record defending the RUC: they would not be destroyed, everyone should wait to see what Patton actually said.

Nigel Dodds told the Prime Minister that his Stranmillis speech, coming immediately after the European Elections had caused a great deal of resentment. Those opposed to the Agreement did have integrity.

The meeting was entirely good natured, even jovial in tone.

*Jonathan Stephens*

**JONATHAN STEPHENS**  
11 Millbank  
Ext 6469 (Fax: 6479)

cc PS/Mr Ingram (B & L)  
PS/Mr Murphy (B & L)  
PS/PUS (B & L)  
Mr Jeffrey  
Mr Watkins  
Mr Bell  
Mr Leach  
Mr Brooker  
Mr Crawford  
Mr Maccabe  
Mr Warner  
Mr Sawers  
HMA Dublin

**STATEMENT BY DR IAN R. K. PAISLEY MP,  
MP Leader, Ulster Democratic Unionist Party**

The darkest hours in the history of Northern Ireland have come about, not because of the cowardice or folly of the Ulster people, but because of the treachery of their so-called friends.

The biggest step forward, which is the way you define the Hume/Adams Agreement, is absolutely true in one sense only, the biggest step forward to the destruction in this part of the United Kingdom. What with serial murderers released onto our streets with ready access to the greatest terrorist arsenal in Western Europe; the security forces subjected to investigation, enquiries and commissions; the denials of the right to march to and return from Protestant places of worship; the ethnic cleansing of the Protestant population in the border counties; the continuing terrorist beatings and killings; and now your proposal to no decommissioning of terrorist weaponry until after the terrorists are made members of the Northern Ireland Government, could bring our Province nowhere else than to the abyss. You by your broken pledges to the people of Northern Ireland and your following of the Republican agenda, are responsible for the present situation.

Please do not insult us, Prime Minister, by telling us this is the only way. Stop pretending the way to hell is the way to heaven.

Your position, Prime Minister, has changed. Read your letter of referendum days. Read the Hansard Record.

In your newspaper column today you stated that the terrorist representatives should be brought into government when:-

- a) There was a clear guarantee of decommissioning by Sinn Fein.  
*Sinn Fein have acknowledged they cannot speak for the IRA. How can they give such a clear guarantee?*

- b) It is in accordance with the time table ending in May 2000.  
*This is meaningless, for Sinn Fein could well call for time as the months speed away to May.*
- c) That there was a cast iron, fail safe device that if it didn't happen according to the time table, that Executive could not continue.  
*Thus Sinn Fein has the power to destroy the whole Executive when the time comes that it must suit them.*

The IRA has breached the ceasefire over and over again, but what have you done?  
Given them a polite slap on the wrist.

As the mandated leader of the majority unionist population, I am not talking of token decommissioning, I am talking about **total** decommissioning.

You are the person who has no alternative and you admit it.

The alternative to terrorist blackmail is the rule of law - all men equal under the law, all men equally subject to the law. Your Agreement has abolished that bedrock principle.

You have expressed faith in Sinn Fein and their pledges, and you despise and insult the law-abiding people who have endured and suffered so much.

It is not too late for you to draw back and stop driving our Province into the abyss.



# Looking into the face of disaster

Peace in Northern Ireland is in our grasp, says Tony Blair

Once again, we stare into the abyss. Somehow, we must pull back. If the Good Friday agreement collapses, the result is not a better peace, it is no peace at all. People who attack the agreement have not the faintest clue as to an alternative. That is why we strain every sinew to prevent ourselves going over the edge. This is not about "agreement at any price". It is that we are mindful of the actual consequences of failure. Real consequences to real people.

The agreement represented the biggest step forward for decades. Don't let anyone kid anyone else about it. It was inclusive of all the main communities of Northern Ireland. It was backed by people, North and South, in referendums. And it resolved the key constitutional questions. It agreed the principle of consent, fought for by Unionists ever since partition — no change to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the people. It agreed a directly elected assembly, the main demand of the Unionist community. It agreed all communities should be represented in government, a vital demand of the nationalists, it agreed North-South co-operation, wanted by nationalists; a new framework for British-Irish relations, wanted by everyone. It established, by agreement, mechanisms for resolving problems of fairness and equality.

All of it is now ready to go into action. It all waits on the resolution of the last remaining issues.

So a massive amount has been achieved. And the peace, though imperfect, is different from what went before. Yes, there is violence. And as the process stalls, it gets worse. It always does. But even now, it is a better place than in 1992. Go to Belfast and you will feel the difference. The only effective way of stopping the violence, whatever security measures we use, is to have the political process succeed, and the men of violence isolated.

It goes without saying that anyone in government has to be committed to democratic principles. The most important is a commitment to exclusively peaceful means. There are both loyalist parties, and Sinn Fein, who have a clear link to paramilitary groups. For example, Sinn Fein and the IRA are part of the same movement. You can't have the political side in the tent, if the paramilitary side is outside and active.

So, how do we make all parties follow exclusively the path of peace? First, they should give the commitment to do it, which they have done. Secondly, they should demonstrate it by stopping violence. The "ceasefires" in question are a way of doing this, but imperfectly, as we know. The third means is actually to disarm, to put

the guns beyond use; to decommission. This, too, is imperfect, since weapons can always be acquired again. But it is a tangible demonstration of good faith.

If a process begins in which these things are happening, the democrats can believe that the parties linked to paramilitaries really mean it when they say they are committed exclusively to democracy.

The Good Friday agreement laid down specific provisions on decommissioning. It was to be completed by May 2000. An Independent Commission on Decommissioning was to oversee it. All parties promised to work in good faith to achieve it.

Now: it was not a prior condition of entry into the executive that decommissioning be done first. But it was unquestionably a requirement that it be done, and all of it, by May 2000. What's more, no one would believe that Sinn Fein or the loyalist parties could not get decommissioning if they really tried. So if it doesn't happen, the Good Friday agreement is being breached, because the good faith provision would be broken.

This is very crude, but in essence, the current impasse is this: the Unionists won't believe Sinn Fein is committed to peace and fit for government unless it starts to decommission first. Sinn Fein won't try to get decommissioning until it knows that the Unionists are serious about letting it in the Government.

A few weeks ago we tried a formula to get round this impasse. Both would "jump together". On a specified day, Sinn Fein would do a symbolic act of decommissioning and the Unionists would put them in the executive. In the accompanying declaration we said "decommissioning is not a precondition but is an obligation". Everyone agreed, except Sinn Fein, which, after some consultation with its activists, refused, wrongly, in my view.

It is said that since then I have changed my position, that I am now not asking Sinn Fein actually to decommission: only asking for some vague promise. This is nonsense. It arises in part out of my speech last week, which

was covered perfectly fairly in Northern Ireland but twisted here. It became accepted wisdom that I was effectively saying that "words" would do; there was no longer a require-

ment for action. In fact, I stated unequivocally: "Republicans must accept that decommissioning can be got through, but it cannot be got round. Decommissioning is not a prior precondition of the Executive. But it is plainly part of the process. All parties are obliged to help to bring it about. No one will believe that a party with a

close connection with a paramilitary group could not bring about decommissioning.

My position always has been: decommissioning has to happen. It is a requirement not an option. But the sequencing of whether it begins prior, at or after, the setting up of the executive is a matter of negotiation. Of course it is best it happens now. I see a lot of sense in it happening contemporaneously with the executive. But I also see merit in it happening strictly in accordance with the Good Friday agreement — ie, not as a prior condition — provided that (a) there was a clear guarantee of decommissioning by Sinn Fein; (b) it was in accordance with a timetable laid down by the Commission on Decommissioning, ending with completion in May 2000; and (c) there was a cast-iron, fail-safe device that if it didn't happen according to the timetable, that executive couldn't continue. Nobody is remotely suggesting that the Unionists should be content with "words". Words must, of course, lead to deeds.

People say: how do you know a guarantee is serious? My answer is: the fail-safe device; if they break it, that executive is ended. And in any event, suppose a token act of decommissioning took place now. Everyone would then agree to Sinn Fein going into the executive. But that would not guarantee full decommissioning by May 2000. It would only guarantee one act; so there

are weaknesses in that process, too.

continued.

continued.

However, we cannot even begin to discuss these questions until we are all agreed on the foundation blocks of a settlement. One is the acceptance that there must be an inclusive executive: and the second is that decommissioning is an obligation and must be completed by May 2000. Because the argument is all about the timing, or sequencing, no one is being put to the test on the issues of principle. My whole strategy has been to get acceptance of the obligation, so that we can then debate timing. But at present, that is obscured. Incidentally, I have no doubt at all that both the leadership of the UUP and the leadership of Sinn Fein want the Good Friday agreement to work. None of them falls for the illusion that there is some easy alternative.

So we try again to find a way through. The deadline of June 30 is real. This argument won't change. It is time now to resolve it. Meanwhile, Drumcree hangs over us like a poison cloud.

ends.

ISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON

FRI 25 JUN 99 22:57

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*Top - JS  
cc JPO  
✓ PB  
MT  
AC*

British Embassy  
Washington

From the Ambassador  
Sir Christopher Meyer KCMG

3100 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008-3600

25 June 1999

By Fax

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*John Votaw*

**NORTHERN IRELAND**

1. When I was speaking to Steinberg on 25 June about the SRSG for Kosovo and the Stability Conference (both reported separately by telegram), he raised Northern Ireland. Steinberg said the news seemed reasonably positive. He had heard from Rita O'Hare that Adams had told the Prime Minister that his article in the Times today might offer a possible basis for compromise.

2. I reminded Steinberg of what he had said to Mo Mowlam some months back about a US role in the end-game: that the President might underwrite a verbal undertaking by Sinn Fein/IRA to decommission; and that if decommissioning had not happened after three or four months, Sinn Fein would be shut out of the White House. Congressman King (my note of 17 June, copied to you and others) had relayed to me last week a variant of this which he had heard from the President and which again would result in negative repercussions for Sinn Fein in Washington, if decommissioning did not take place in the 3-4 months following devolution. It seemed to me that Sinn Fein had to hear loud and clear from the White House that there was a high price to pay for blocking progress. They gave us the impression of feeling too comfortable with an immobile position.

3. Steinberg said that they should not be. He had recently spoken in plain terms to Rita O'Hare about the price to pay here for refusing to decommission.

*Chris Meyer*  
*1*  
*Christopher Meyer*

Christopher Meyer

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ISH EMBASSY WASHINGTONFBI 25 JUN 99 22:56

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

cc: Sherard Cowper-Coles Esq, Private Secretary, FCO  
Nick Perry Esq, PS/SOSNI  
Sebastian Wood Esq, Cabinet Office  
Ivor Roberts Esq, HMA Dublin

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FILE

AS



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff

25 June 1999

*Dear Mr. Perry*

**PARADES COMMISSION:  
PROCEDURAL RULES, CODE OF CONDUCT AND GUIDELINES**

Thank you for your letter of 24 June. This all seems very sensible but would it not be best to put off until we have got through July?

*Yours  
✓*

**JONATHAN POWELL**

N. Perry, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

AOB



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
11 MILLBANK  
LONDON  
SW1P 4QE

Mr Jonathan Powell  
Chief of Staff  
10 Downing Street  
London

*Jonathan Powell*

24 June 1999

*JP*  
*JS*  
*MT*  
*PB*  
*AC*

**PARADES COMMISSION: PROCEDURAL RULES, CODE OF CONDUCT AND GUIDELINES**

I am writing to let you know that we intend to lay before Parliament next week the Parades Commission's revised Procedural Rules, Code of Conduct and Guidelines.

Those documents are brought into force by Order under the Public Processions Act 1998. The current documents are those drafted by the Commission before the start of last year's marching season. With the experience of that marching season behind it, the Commission considered that revision of the documents was necessary.

The Commission consulted widely on the revised documents. Most of the changes were minor, although the Apprentice Boys objected to the Commission's proposal to amend the Guidelines with the effect that all town centres would no longer necessarily be regarded as neutral venues (the Apprentice Boys feared a knock-on effect on their parades in Londonderry).

In practice, the Commission has found its procedures increasingly difficult to follow this year, given the sharp increase in the number of parades applied for. The Procedural Rules set out rather bureaucratically the way in which evidence must be gathered (eg at least two commissioners must always be involved) which the Commission cannot in practice comply with. The Procedural Rules also include provision on Preliminary Views on particular areas or routes, setting out in non-




binding form the line the Commission is minded to take. While this provision reflects the recommendations of the North Report, last year's Preliminary View was held up at the request of the Prime Minister, and the Commission has decided in the light of experience that the requirement is cumbersome.

Following recent legal challenges, the Commission fears that a court could quash one of its decisions, leaving the Commission insufficient time to make the decision in a way compatible with their own rules. This would result in no legal determination being able to be made on an individual parade and the matter passing to the police to decide on the day. This is very much a worst case scenario: the Commission's more realistic concern is about the cumulative affect on its credibility of a series of criticisms by judges handling judicial review cases.

It is clearly undesirable to bring forward anything on the Parades legislation front at this time. We particularly want to avoid the impression that the Parades legislation is fundamentally flawed in some way. We are hopeful, however, that this change in the legislation can be presented as entirely technical and reflecting comments in court, thereby avoiding too much hostile comment.

We already have the Orders drafted. The Secretary of State is content to press on to laying the revised rules early next week, and look for a debate after 12 July, when hopefully things will be calming down. The Commission is content that the important thing is to demonstrate to the court that the defects identified are being remedied, and are relaxed about dealing with the major parades this year according to the old rules.

  
for N P PERRY

**CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL**

**FROM: S J LEACH  
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR POLICING AND SECURITY**

cc: JS  
PB  
GS

**25 June 1999**

**DESK IMMEDIATE**

**cc See Distribution List**

**MR WATKINS**

**DRUMCREE: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS**

It is worth recording the following developments since my minute of this morning.

2. I have spoken further to **Alistair Graham**. Mac Cionnaith visited the Commission this morning in less than emollient mood (he brought with him a lady whose nephew had recently committed suicide, arguing that the Commission were responsible for his death since he had been depressed by protest marches which they had failed to re-route). The Commission had asked twice whether there was a process currently in being aimed at achieving a local accommodation, and Mac Cionnaith had emphatically said that there was not. This did not make it any easier to persuade the Commission to defer. I said that Mac Cionnaith was probably defining process as talks within the same building - which he had separately said he wanted before he would be willing to consider the Orange proposal. We were working towards this. However, even before that stage was reached a process was in our view in being, involving intense activity by the facilitators and others.

3. Graham said that at his meeting with Trimble this morning, the UUP leader gave him a paper setting out a sequence of events which he said was being put to all sides. This involved a series of meetings in proximity format at Hillsborough, with the Prime Minister's involvement if a deal was to be struck. I said

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EPC/31557

P.02

TO

FROM R55 DIR POL & SEC

15:43

25-JUN-1999



## CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

that we were indeed moving towards such a process in the very near future, although Hillsborough would not be the venue and the extent of Ministerial involvement remained to be determined.

4. I separately spoke to **Peter Quinn and Jonathan Powell**. The residents have asked to meet Jonathan Powell in the Garvaghy Road at 6.30 pm tonight, and Powell has agreed to this. A pre-meeting has been arranged at a venue which I will separately notify at 6.00 pm, involving Jonathan Powell, Peter Quinn, you and Tony McCusker: with a press officer in attendance in case the media appear. We believe that the residents will not commit to participate in talks tomorrow until they have seen Powell. On the key question of whether the Orange Order will participate in unconditional talks, Milne has said they will and David Campbell has said they won't. This will need to be tied down tonight. Mac Cionnaith may be looking for one of the District Officers to say publicly that they will engage in unconditional talks - ie without the pre-condition of a 1999 march being agreed. (This ought not to pose much of a problem for the Order: all the proximity talks so far have been on this basis.)

5. Returning to the Parades Commission, Alistair Graham has (very constructively) agreed with his colleagues that they would not take a final decision on the timing of the determination until a meeting of the Commission due at **9 pm this Sunday**. Graham himself will remain in Northern Ireland on Saturday morning, returning to Leeds in the afternoon, and coming back to Northern Ireland for the Sunday evening meeting. It will be important to keep him in the picture over the weekend and to provide him (and his colleagues) with any letter from the Prime Minister, or statement by the two sides, in advance of the Sunday evening meeting. I am separately giving you a list of contact numbers.

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6. I am on active parenting duties from 6.30 pm today (although would not mind the odd call over the weekend to hear how things are going). Good luck!

*[sgd S J LEACH]*

**S J LEACH**  
**EXT: 27012**

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

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P.04

TO

25-JUN-1999 15:43 FROM ASS DIR POL & SEC

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Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

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## ARTICLE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

Once again, we stare into the abyss. Somehow, we must pull back. If the Good Friday Agreement collapses, the result is not a better peace, it is no peace at all. People who attack the Good Friday Agreement have not the faintest clue as to an alternative. That is why we strain every sinew to prevent ourselves going over the edge. This is not about "agreement at any price". It is that we are mindful of the actual consequences of failure. Real consequences to real people.

The Good Friday Agreement represented the biggest step forward for decades. Don't let anyone kid anyone else about it. It was inclusive of all the main communities of Northern Ireland. It was backed by people, North and South in referendums. And it resolved the key constitutional questions. It agreed the principle of consent, fought for by Unionists ever since partition - no change to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the people. It agreed a directly elected Assembly, the main demand of the Unionist community. It agreed all communities should be represented in government, a vital demand of the nationalists. It agreed North/South co-operation, wanted by Nationalists; a new framework for British/Irish relations, wanted by everyone. It established, by agreement, mechanisms for resolving problems of fairness and equality.

All of it is now ready to go into action. It all waits on the resolution of the last remaining issues.

So a massive amount has been achieved. And the peace, though imperfect, is different from what went before. Yes, there is violence. And as the process stalls, it gets worse. It always does. But even now, it is a better place than in

1992. Go to Belfast and you will feel the difference. The only effective way of stopping the violence, whatever security measures we use, is to have the political process succeed, and the men of violence isolated.

It goes without saying that anyone in Government has to be committed to democratic principles. The most important is a commitment to exclusively peaceful means. There are both Loyalists parties, and Sinn Fein, who have a clear link to paramilitary groups. For example, Sinn Fein and the IRA are part of the same movement. You can't have the political side in the tent, if the paramilitary side is outside and active.

So, how do we make all parties follow exclusively the path of peace? First, they should give the commitment to do it, which they have done. Second, they should demonstrate it by stopping violence. The "ceasefires" in question are a way of doing this, but imperfectly as we know. The third means is actually to disarm, to put the guns beyond use; to decommission. This too is imperfect, since weapons can always be acquired again. But it is a tangible demonstration of good faith.

If a process begins in which these things are happening, the democrats can believe the parties linked to paramilitaries, really mean it when they say they are committed exclusively to democracy.

The Good Friday Agreement laid down specific provisions on decommissioning. It was to be completed by May 2000. An Independent Commission on Decommissioning was to oversee it. All parties promised to work in good faith to achieve it.

Now: it was not a prior condition of entry into the Executive that decommissioning be done first. But it was unquestionably a requirement that it be done, and all of it, by May 2000. What's more, no one would believe that Sinn Fein or the Loyalist parties could not get decommissioning if they really tried. So if it doesn't happen, the Good Friday Agreement is being breached, because the good faith provision would be broken.

This is very crude, but in essence, the current impasse is this: the Unionists won't believe Sinn Fein is committed to peace and fit for Government unless they start to decommission first. Sinn Fein won't try to get decommissioning until they know the Unionists are serious about letting them in the Government.

A few weeks ago we tried a formula to get round this impasse. Both would "jump together". On a specified day, Sinn Fein would do a symbolic act of decommissioning and the Unionists would put them in the Executive. In the accompanying declaration we said "decommissioning is not a pre-condition but is an obligation." Everyone agreed, except Sinn Fein, who, after some consultation with their activists, refused, wrongly, in my view.

It is said that since then, I have changed my position, that I am now not asking Sinn Fein actually to decommission: only asking them for some vague promise. This is nonsense. It arises in part out of my speech last week, which was covered perfectly fairly in Northern Ireland but twisted here. It became accepted wisdom that I was effectively saying that "words" would do; there was no longer a requirement for action. In fact, I stated unequivocally: "Republicans must accept that decommissioning can be got through, but it cannot be got round. .... Decommissioning is not a prior pre-condition of the Executive. But it is plainly part of the process. All parties are obliged to help bring it about. No-one will

believe that a party with a close connection with a paramilitary group could not bring about decommissioning.”

My position is and always has been: decommissioning has to happen. It is a requirement not an option. But the sequencing of whether it begins prior, at or after the setting up of the Executive is a matter of negotiation. Of course it is best it happens now. I see a lot of sense it happening contemporaneously with the Executive. But I also see merit in it happening strictly in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement – ie not as a prior condition - provided that (a) there was a clear guarantee of decommissioning by Sinn Fein; (b) it was in accordance with a timetable laid down by the Commission on Decommissioning, ending with completion in May 2000; and (c) there was a cast-iron, fail-safe device that if it didn't happen according to the timetable, that Executive couldn't continue. Nobody is remotely suggesting that the Unionists should be content with “words”. Words must, of course, lead to deeds.

People say: how do you know a guarantee is serious? My answer is: the fail-safe device; if they break it, that Executive is ended. And in any event, suppose a token act of decommissioning took place now. Everyone would then agree to Sinn Fein going into the Executive. But that would not guarantee full decommissioning by May 2000. It would only guarantee one act; so there are weaknesses in that process too.

However, we cannot even begin to discuss these questions until we are all agreed on the foundation blocks of a settlement. One is the acceptance there must be an inclusive Executive: and the second is that decommissioning is an obligation and must be completed by May 2000. Because the argument is all about the timing, or sequencing, no one is being put to the test on the issues of principle. My



whole strategy has been to get acceptance of the obligation, so that we can then debate timing. But at present, that is obscured. Incidentally, I have no doubt at all that both the leadership of the UUP and the leadership of Sinn Fein want the Good Friday Agreement to work. None of them fall for the illusion there is some easy alternative.

So we try again to find a way through. The deadline of 30 June is real. This argument won't change. It is time now to resolve it. Meanwhile, Drumcree hangs over us like a poison cloud.



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**Senior Director, Belfast**  
**Director, Policing and Security**

**Jonathan Powell Esq**  
**Chief of Staff**  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1A 2AA

**Ref: 6254/**

**24 June 1999**

Dear Jonathan

**DRUMCREE: CURRENT POSITION**

You have asked about developments since Nick Perry's letter of yesterday to you. The main points are that -

- i. The facilitators are now at work with both sides. **Peter Quinn** has found **Mac Cionnaith** taking an unyielding line (although paradoxically, he also claims to be fearful that the **Parades Commission** will rule in favour of a parade this year). Quinn assesses that he is clearly not ready to cut a deal at the moment, but he will keep trying.
- ii. **Milne** is clear that the bottom line for the Orange is a parade this year. If that were agreed, the **Portadown District** would commit to:
  - the ending of the nightly protests around the **Garvaghy Road** (not all of these are within the **Orange Order's** control, but they would accept that the police should take robust action against any residual protest which continued);
  - an agreement to subsequent direct dialogue in the civic forum to discuss parades and other community relations issues; and
  - the economic initiative etc would proceed.
- iii. Quinn assesses that the residents will not concede the major card of a parade this year without some certainty about parades in the future - a commitment to negotiate in the civic forum is not enough, because neither side has much confidence in the other's willingness to engage in serious

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negotiation. An offer of marches in **alternative** years - ie 2000 would be missed out - might do the trick, but the Orange Order would not concede this **publicly** before the July 4 march took place, while Mac Cionnaith would need some public reassurance on this point before the march went ahead. There **might** be scope for the Parades Commission to act in some way as a public guarantor of future arrangements, although this would need very careful handling.

- iv. The Commission themselves are very reluctant to defer their determination until after 28 June, but would do so if both sides publicly called for this. This would be very difficult to arrange. In the end, a public appeal from the Prime Minister to the chairman of the Commission might be sufficient for them to agree to defer, but this again will need very careful wording and handling.

In the meantime I attach a form of words aimed at fitting into the text attached to your letter of last night to Nick Perry. Generally Trimble's proposals seem unlikely to be accepted by the GRRC without more, possibly related to certainty over next year and dialogue now (not in future as assessed by Milne). But we should also remain alert to the risk of Trimble and the facilitators cutting across each other.

We shall continue to keep you in touch. A copy goes to Nick Perry.

[Yours sincerely  
pp Glynis James (SPS)  
in David's absence]

D J WATKINS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

24. Jun. 1999 16:01

**CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL**

FROM: TOM KELLY  
DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATION  
24 June 1999

*Pat (Box)*

*to see*

*↙*

*✓ JP*  
*C: JS*  
*MT*  
*✓ PB*  
*AC*  
*CS*

cc PS/Mr Murphy  
PS/PUS  
Mr Powell (No 10) - by fax  
Mr Jeffrey  
Mr Stephens  
Mr Maccabe  
Mr Crawford  
Mr Warner

PS/SECRETARY OF STATE

*✓*

**FOCUS GROUPS - 21 JUNE**

Two more groups, this time in Dungannon and Newtownabbey.

The groups confirmed the general polarisation of opinion as the deadline and the marching begins.

The atmosphere was particularly tense in Dungannon, suggesting that the sense of confrontation is greatest in relatively mixed areas as both sides literally and metaphorically stake out their territory as Drumcree approaches.

People "from the other side" increasingly feel insecure walking through areas where they are made to feel they don't belong.

There is an increasing sense of dread.

24. Jun. 1999 16:01

No. 4322 P. 3/3

**CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL**

But three factors seem to make people pull back from the brink, and therefore should influence our themes in the coming days:

- the implications for our children. People are fatalistic about the implications of renewed conflict and political impasse for themselves, but they do not want their children to live through the same cycle, and are prepared to make compromises for them.
- equally, when pushed they do not want to put the Agreement at risk - if it comes down to a final choice, they will choose to preserve it rather than risk everything that has been achieved to date;
- and in working class Protestant areas, David Ervine remains a calming influence. He is seen as telling it as it is.

We are doing more groups tonight (Thursday) which should reflect on the events of this week.

(Signed)

TOM KELLY

**CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL**



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
11 MILLBANK  
LONDON  
SW1P 4QE

fox

John Sawers Esq  
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

24 June 1999

Dear John,

**NORTHERN IRELAND: TOMORROW'S DISCUSSIONS**

I attach some briefing for tomorrow's discussions with the Prime Minister:

- a gameplan for the day;
- our current draft of the "basic idea" (Annex A) for discussion with the Irish, but not in this detail with the parties at this stage;
- our draft of some more general propositions (Annex B), as the basis for discussion with the parties and any media opportunities.

**Meeting with the Taoiseach**

This needs to focus on the outcome we are aiming for. The key elements of the basic idea discussed with the Irish are set out at Annex A; Irish officials have been working on a longer outline text, on which we have commented. But the Taoiseach told the Prime Minister that it needs to be simpler.

The Prime Minister will want to emphasise that unionists are far from accepting any sort of outcome which does not deliver actual arms around the time of devolution.

To make the basic idea remotely sellable to unionists, we need to press for:



- an earlier timescale for decommissioning to start (the Irish are sticking on December, 6 months after devolution). We need to press hard for this to be moved forward or, conversely, for devolution to be delayed until September/October;
- agreement that sanctions should be triggered if the timescale is not adhered to at any time, including in particular a failure to start decommissioning on the indicated timescale. The Irish insist that May 2000 is the only timescale set out in the Agreement but recognise that it could become clear well before then that even this timescale was not being adhered to. We need to tie this down as clearly as possible;
- clear sanctions, including suspension of devolution and the other institutions. The Irish see suspension as only a possibility following from convening of a Review Conference. This simply will not give Trimble the certainty he requires;
- an upfront IRA statement that the war is over. Otherwise, from Trimble's point of view, the whole approach looks entirely backloaded.

It would also be helpful to agree with the Irish side the key elements of the process over the next few days:

- preliminary and fairly general soundings with all the parties in the meetings in the afternoon;
- possibly, more detailed soundings by each Government with the UUP and Sinn Féin in particular over the weekend;



- briefing of General de Chastelain on the approach;
- intensive start on Monday, with focus on the three main parties and regular five sided meetings.

The Taoiseach may also press the Prime Minister on the consequences if there is no devolution on 30 June. The Secretary of State is minuting the Prime Minister in parallel with a note on exit strategies. The Irish, in line with Sinn Féin's approach, will press for the Assembly and the First and Deputy First Minister to be suspended.

Long discussion at this stage will only be a distraction, but the Prime Minister will want to stress to the Taoiseach the political drawbacks of suspending the Assembly but not prisoner releases; the Irish can be expected to be hostile to any suggestion of suspension of prisoner releases. For now, it may be best to agree that in the event of failure, the Prime Minister and Taoiseach will need urgently to take stock with each other of where to go next - but possibly after Drumcree and 12 July.

#### Meetings with the parties

These are arranged with the three main parties first; followed by the smaller parties. It will be important to establish that these are preliminary soundings of the parties, so as not to create expectations that the Prime Ministers would continue with meetings over the weekend.

Discussion might best be focused around the general propositions (Annex B) which reflect the approach taken by the Prime Minister in recent speeches and bring out the key elements of any outcome without getting into specific details.





In addition to focusing on the outcome, the main parties in particular will want some idea of the process next week. Both the UUP and SDLP attach importance to having regular five-sided meetings (two Governments, UUP, SDLP and Sinn Féin) as well as a series of bilaterals.

A copy goes to Sir Richard Wilson's office.

*Yours ever,*  
*N P Perry*

**N P PERRY**

## **GAMEPLAN FOR FRIDAY**

### **Meeting with Taoiseach**

- Agree common approach to the basic idea (Annex A), pressing for:
  - timescale for start to decommissioning to be advanced to (?) October;
  - review and suspension triggered if decommissioning does not start on time, not just in May 2000;
  - positive IRA statement at outset.
  
- Agree approach to meetings with parties.

[Funeral; travel to NI]

### **Meetings with parties**

- Preliminary sounding on key issues.
  
- Float general propositions (Annex B), while avoiding specific timescales.
  
- Outline approach from Monday
  - five-sided meetings;
  
  - de Chastelain due on Tuesday.

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Annex A

Draft of 24 June 1999

The basic idea - speaking note for Prime Minister and Taoiseach for initial discussions with Sinn Féin, UUP and SDLP

- There would be three guiding principles: the importance of establishing the Executive quickly; acceptance of decommissioning as a commitment to be fulfilled within the timeframe of the Agreement; and acceptance that those in the Executive should demonstrate, by fulfilling their commitments, that they are using only democratic non-violent means, or face exclusion from office.
- There should be an understanding that, for the decommissioning commitment to be fulfilled in an orderly way, within the timeframe of the Agreement, the process would need to start now, with the modalities agreed by [date], and the verified decommissioning of arms beginning, at the latest, [date]. [This understanding might be endorsed by the Decommissioning Commission if they agreed.]
- Sinn Féin, and other parties with links to paramilitaries, would make statements to the effect that, with the establishment of the institutions, they were confident that those with arms would be persuaded to decommission them within the timescale of the Agreement.
- The IRA would make clear that they were not disassociating themselves from Sinn Féin on this issue.
- The two Governments would undertake that, if at any point the Decommissioning Commission reported that they believed that the decommissioning commitment was not being met, eg by a failure to adhere to their commitments on the timescale indicated, they would convene a formal review, during which the institutions would be suspended.
- The Decommissioning Commission would be asked to make progress reports on [date] and [date] and in May 2000.
- Other parties would support this approach.
- The running of d'Hondt and devolution would take place forthwith.

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**KEY PROPOSITIONS**

1. We must be clear on what the Agreement requires:
  - devolution and the other institutions should be up and running as soon as possible and on an inclusive basis;
  - decommissioning should be completed by May 2000 and in the context of implementation of the overall settlement.
  
2. There needs to be an understanding on how and when these requirements will be implemented:
  - the steps to be taken to achieve decommissioning in accordance with the Agreement by May 2000;
  - when these steps will be taken, on the basis of devolution from 30 June.
  
3. We must be clear on the consequences if these requirements are not being implemented:
  - how and when implementation will be monitored;
  - the action to be taken if implementation is not progressing.
  
4. We must look at any measures which give all sides confidence that all parts of the Agreement will be implemented:
  - including progress in implementing all other parts of the Agreement.

24.JUN.1999 17:01

N I O REGISTRY

NO.193

P.2/2

**SECURITY SITUATION STATISTICS**

	<b>20.07.95- 19.07.97</b>	<b>20.07.97- 23.06.99</b>
DEATHS	36	68
SHOOTINGS	312	341
BOMBINGS	71	199

**CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF PARAMILITARY STYLE ATTACKS**

	<b>20.07.95- 19.07.97</b>		<b>20.07.97- 23.06.99</b>	
	LOY	REP	LOY	REP
SHOOTINGS	57	19	70	68
ASSAULTS	207	293	176	108

24.JUN.1999 17:01

N I O REGISTRY



**SECURITY POLICY AND OPERATIONS DIVISION**

**NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
STORMONT HOUSE ANNEX  
STORMONT  
BELFAST  
BT4 3ST**

*Phone : (01232) 520700  
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*CE: JP  
PB  
MT  
AC*

**TO:**

*John Sowers*

**FAX:**

*0171 839 9044*

**FROM:**

*Stephen Webb, NIO*

**PHONE:**

*7440 27017*

**TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES:**

*(including this header page)*

**COMMENTS**

*Not a good story. Happy to discuss, and sorry for the delay*  
  
*SW*



*Prime Minister*

*Dear Tony,*

PRIME MINISTER

*JS  
EJB  
PB  
MT  
AC  
GS.*

THE 30 JUNE DEADLINE: EXIT STRATEGIES IF WE DON'T SUCCEED IN OUR MAIN OBJECTIVE

Summary

- We should push hard for success next week, but be prepared for failure.
- The most promising fall-backs if immediate devolution cannot be achieved would be (i) to run d'Hondt by agreement, setting the summer as a period of preparation for government, with an autumn target date for devolution and perhaps work by de Chastelain in parallel; and (ii) to obtain agreement to de Chastelain drawing up a plan for decommissioning (including dates) within a few weeks, with a view to devolution taking place before the summer recess.
- For the moment, we should hold the line that the deadline is absolute and decline to speculate about the consequences of failure to meet it. This is having the desired effect of putting pressure on both sides.
- If neither of the fall-backs works, we should avoid wholesale suspension or setting aside of the Agreement. Suspending the prisoners scheme without a widely recognised breach in the ceasefire would be outside the Agreement, very dangerous, and opposed by the Chief Constable and the GOC. Suspending other key elements of the Agreement, notably the Assembly, but not the prisoners scheme, is deeply unattractive politically.



- Cutting Assembly salaries and putting doubt on the two year cut-off point for the prisoners' scheme are possible more limited responses, best assessed at the time. Neither is free of difficulty.
- If the worst came to the worst, we would have to contemplate parking the process for the summer, or an implementation review. But we should avoid this if at all possible.

### Detail

We must push as hard as we can for a successful outcome next week. The ideas which Jonathan Powell and officials have been discussing with the Irish strike me as being on the right lines, although so far probably not early or certain enough in their impact to get Trimble off the hook on which he seems to feel bound to impale himself. You will be briefed on them separately.

2. But we also need to recognise that there is more than a chance that the gap will prove unbridgeable. The UUP seems to be in a particularly febrile state. The involvement of Donaldson will make a deal easier to sell if one can be agreed, but harder to agree. Although Sinn Féin are pressing for action next week, they will not be too put out if we fail, especially if it can plausibly be blamed on Trimble's intransigence. So they are unlikely to stretch very far.
3. We therefore need to be clear about what should happen if we do not succeed.
4. This will depend, in part, on whether there is an achievable half-way house - short of devolution - which would keep the process going. The obvious one would be to find an agreed basis for running d'Hondt and appointing the Ministers-designate. There could then be a period of preparation for government over the summer, including the drawing up by Trimble and Mallon, in consultation with the





Ministers-designate, of a programme of government. There could be an agreed programme of work on decommissioning by de Chastelain going on in parallel. We could set a firm target date for devolution in the autumn.

5. Something on these lines could provide us with a satisfactory bridge to get us over the summer. There are some signs that that is what Trimble is angling for. Whether it could be agreed is another matter. Trimble would probably insist on minimising the status of the Ministers-designate through changes in Standing Orders, which would be anathema to Sinn Féin. He may also expect a strong statement from Sinn Féin, but we are sure that such a statement would not be on offer for anything short of full devolution.

6. Another approach would be to pursue the Irish ideas, but in a slightly different way. It will be a tall order to negotiate the Irish scheme through the main parties and de Chastelain while still preserving some appearance of independence on de Chastelain's part. If it became clear that it was not feasible, we could pursue the more limited objective of agreeing a target date for devolution before the summer recess and putting de Chastelain to work on the decommissioning plan (including a timetable) in the next few weeks. This would at least get us past Drumcree. Neither Trimble nor Adams would commit themselves to accepting what de Chastelain came up with, but there would be some moral obligation on them to take it seriously.

7. If neither of these approaches works, where do we go? It would be tempting to administer a shock to the system by "suspending the Agreement" or, in the Taoiseach's words, setting it aside. But I think this would be counter-productive. In the first place, the Agreement is not ours to end or suspend. It belongs as much to the parties as to the Governments, and has been endorsed by the public in the



referendums. The decommissioning/Executive impasse apart, it is still the agreed way forward.

8. We also need to be clear what suspension would mean in practice. The main elements of the Agreement are:

- institutions which are already in place - the Assembly (without powers) and the Human Rights Commission;
- institutions which will come into being on devolution - the Assembly (with powers), the North South Ministerial Council, the British Irish Council and the British Irish Intergovernmental Conference;
- institutions which are planned but are yet to come into being - the Equality Commission and the Civic Forum;
- the constitutional changes, which will also not come into effect until devolution;
- three processes - prisoner releases, normalisation, decommissioning - the first well under way; the second happening but subject to a strategy which has yet to be published; and the third still to start;
- two reviews - on policing and criminal justice - well under way and due to report later in the year.

9. The Irish are arguing that, since the creation of the institutions is proving the stumbling block, it is the institutions that should be suspended, and not the other parts of the Agreement. Since most of the institutions do not yet exist, what this



boils down to is an argument for suspending the Assembly and the posts of First and Deputy First Minister. That would be quite feasible (provided we could find the time for the necessary primary legislation), but I share your view that politically it would be unsustainable if we did not at the same time suspend the prisoner release scheme. To do that would in my view be very dangerous. Sinn Féin (and indeed the Loyalists) would say, with some justice, that there was nothing in the Agreement to justify the ending of the scheme for any organisation in the absence of a breach in their ceasefire. The Taoiseach would not agree. The security implications, particularly at this time of year, would be serious. The Chief Constable and the GOC have told my officials that, whatever their personal views on the prisoners' scheme, they would have strong reservations about suspending the scheme as a response to failure next week.

10. For the rest, I think it would be hard to justify winding up the Patten Commission or the Criminal Justice review, although failure to make progress is bound to affect the climate in which we receive the reports of both of them. We are on record to the effect that these are important areas for reform for its own sake. Equally, given our support for the Human Rights Commission as a development which is desirable in its own right, it would be perverse to wind it up.

11. It is also worth noting that suspending the Agreement would lose us the May 2000 deadline for decommissioning.

12. My conclusion is therefore that, if the worst comes to the worst, it will not make sense to embark on any wholesale suspension or setting aside of the Agreement. We should, however, continue to present the deadline as absolute and refuse to speculate about the consequences of not meeting it.

12. Short of wholesale suspension, there are two more limited things we could do:



- I could make it known that we do not intend to call further meetings of the Assembly until the impasse has been broken, and reduce the salaries of Assembly members.
  
- We could indicate publicly that, if the Agreement is not implemented in full, we would not expect the circumstances to be right for all remaining prisoners to be released at the two year point in July 2000. (This cut-off point is described in the Agreement as "the intention..... should circumstances allow it".)

Whether to deploy either of these will depend on the circumstances of any breakdown. Reducing salaries would be seen as vindictive and could be counter-productive (though justifying the budget of £17 million and rising for an Assembly which has not met since March is difficult). Putting the two year cut-off point in doubt would be controversial with the Irish.

13. Otherwise, we would be driven either simply to park the process for the summer, with a late summer date for the resumption of talks, or to institute an implementation review forthwith, perhaps under independent chairmanship. If it comes to that, I will be ready to offer proposals on the details, but we should try to avoid it if at all possible.

14. I am copying this to Robin Cook, and to Sir Richard Wilson and Ivor Roberts in Dublin.

**MARJORIE MOWLAM**



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
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LONDON  
SW1P 4QE

fax  
JS  
CJB  
PB  
AG  
MT

John Sawers Esq  
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

24 June 1999

Dear John

**TIGHTENING THE EXCLUSION PROVISIONS**

I understand the Prime Minister was interested in whether it would be possible to introduce fresh legislation so that Sinn Féin could be excluded from Ministerial office even without SDLP support. I attach a background note on this. The Prime Minister's letter to David Trimble of 10 April 1998 raised expectations of something like this. But it would involve a breach of the Agreement, acting to exclude Sinn Féin when there was clearly not cross-community support for this, and run a high risk of leading to a resumption of IRA violence.

Better ways forward would be to look at ways of giving confidence that the two Governments would make clear their support for exclusion if necessary, which is what Seamus Mallon has asked for if he is to deliver on his promise. Or, as in the current Irish plan, to adopt the more neutral sanction of suspending the institutions as a whole. Because the consequences are a good deal less draconian (in particular, the risks of provoking a breakdown in the IRA ceasefire are less), it is more believable that the Governments will actually do this.

Yours ever,  
N.P.

**N P PERRY**

## **EXCLUDING SINN FÉIN IN THERE IS NO DECOMMISSIONING**

### **What the Agreement says**

- Ministers only removed from office:
  - by the Assembly;
  - voting on a cross-community basis;
  - for failing to fulfil Pledge of Office (which includes “commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means”, but no direct reference to decommissioning).
- “Those who hold office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded or removed from office under these provisions”.

### **PM's letter of comfort to Trimble, 10 April 1998**

- “... if during the course of the first six months of the shadow Assembly or the Assembly itself, these provisions [ie as set out above] have been shown to be ineffective, we will support changes to these provisions to enable them to be made properly effective in preventing such people from holding office”.

### What the NI Act 1998 says

- Adds provision for Secretary of State to require Assembly to debate motion of exclusion.
- Secretary of State to take into account range of factors (taken from PM's 1998 Balmoral speech) including whether the Minister/party is "co-operating fully" with the Decommissioning Commission.
- But decisions remains with Assembly on cross-community basis, as in Agreement.

### Possibilities for fresh legislation?

- Power for Secretary of State to override Assembly decision:
  - either by taking decision herself;
  - or requiring Assembly to take simple majority decision;
- criteria for override, possibilities include:
  - adverse report by Decommissioning Commission;
  - other breach of the Agreement.

### **Political assessment**

- Unionists would welcome (while harbouring doubts that the Government was no more trustworthy than the SDLP).
- But any change moves beyond the Agreement.
- Change might be acceptable if it was the product of a Review and was agreed by SDLP (but most unlikely if they had already refused to vote for Sinn Féin's exclusion).
- Any unilateral legislation would be condemned by nationalists and the Irish Government as a breach of the Agreement.
- It would be clear that we were trying to exclude Sinn Féin when we knew there was not cross-community support for it.
- Therefore a strong risk of SDLP withdrawing from Assembly, IRA ceasefire breaking down and Agreement collapsing.

### **A better way forward?**

- (i) Guarantee HMG will use existing powers in NI Act to require a debate on exclusion if decommissioning not delivered:
  - gives SDLP support of HMG (and Irish ideally) to vote to exclude Sinn Féin;



- gives UUP comfort that HMG will make clear its own view that Sinn Féin should be excluded;
  - but actual exclusion likely to threaten IRA ceasefire.
- (ii) Guarantee HMG (and Irish) will convene Review Conference, and suspend Agreement institutions, if decommissioning not delivered:
- gives confidence that Agreement will not just carry on if no decommissioning;
  - penalises all parties;
  - but runs less risk of provoking a breakdown in ceasefire;
  - may therefore be a more believable guarantee, even for unionists.

24.JUN.1999 17:43

N I O REGISTRY

NO.194

P.2/3

**From: Stephen Webb**  
**Security Policy and Operations Division**  
**24 June 1999**

*file*

**To: PPS / PM**

**STATISTICS ON THE SECURITY SITUATION**

*(N.I.)*

You asked for further figures, comparing the statistics for the past two years with those for the worst years of the Troubles. I have provided a sample of three pairs of years from the 70s, 80s and 90s

**1972-73**

Deaths	722
Shootings	15,650
Bombings	3,373

Paramilitary shootings	n/a
Paramilitary assaults	n/a

**1981-82**

Deaths	198
Shootings	1,689
Bombings	861

Paramilitary shootings	n/a
Paramilitary assaults	n/a

**1991-92**

Deaths	179
Shootings	1,005
Bombings	739

Paramilitary shootings	209
Paramilitary assaults	136

24.JUN.1999 17:43

N I O REGISTRY

The RUC statistics experts have left for the night, and as a result I am not sure if the bombing figures are on exactly the same basis as the more recent sets.

I hope this is helpful.

sgd

**Stephen Webb**  
#27017

RESTRICTED

**FROM:** HMA, Dublin  
**DATE:** 24 June 1999  
**TO:** PS/Secretary of State

cc: PS/Mr Murphy (L&B)  
PS/Mr Ingram (L&B)  
PS/Ms Quin  
PS/PUS (L&B)  
PS/Mr Semple (L&B)  
Mr Watkins  
Mr McCusker  
Mr Stephens  
Mr Leach  
Mr Bell  
Mr Jeffrey  
Mr Kelly  
Mr Crawford  
Mr Ferguson  
Mr Brooker  
Mr Beeton  
Mr Maccabe  
PUSD(DSW), FCO (via DAD)  
Ms Milligan, DAD, FCO  
Mr Cresswell, WED (via DAD)  
Mr Sawers, PS/No.10 (via CO)  
Mr Sanderson, Cabinet Office  
Mr Pakenham, Cabinet Office  
Mr Budd, FCO (via DAD)  
Mr Sheinwald, FCO (via DAD)

2  
CP! JP  
PS  
MT  
AC

**TRIMBLE'S COMMENTS ON SOSNI**

1. I saw Stephen King last night at a launch party for Ruth Dudley Edwards' book "The Faithful Tribe". (Her former teacher at UCD, now the President, Professor Art Cosgrove, slightly incongruously presided as he is no friend of the Orange Order.) Knowing King to be close to David Trimble (although, in Byzantine fashion, John Taylor is his paymaster), I asked him about the latter's call for the resignation of the Secretary of State. King said that it was no secret that the two got on extremely badly. I said that that was not the point. The remarks seemed crude and asinine in their timing.

2. King said in confidence that he had seen the draft of what Trimble proposed to say and had immediately called him to warn him off. Trimble would not be moved and refused to tone down his remarks. Later in the day he had again spoken to Trimble who, by this stage, was full of remorse - "why didn't I listen to you? This is disastrous" etc. I said that there seemed to be a terrible tendency among the politicians in the North at present to dig ever-deeper holes for themselves. This did not bode well for next week. King agreed. He was very pessimistic.

*(SIGNED)*

Ivor Roberts

RESTRICTED

24. Jun. 1999 15:20

No. 4316 P. 2/2

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: BILL JEFFREY  
Political Director  
24 June 1999  
BJ/MR/875



C:JS  
MT  
✓ PB  
AC

MR WATKINS

cc PS/Secretary of State(L&B)  
Mr Pilling  
Mr Leach  
Mr McCusker  
Mr Powell, No.10-Fax

**DRUMCREE: CURRENT POSITION**

I mentioned to you that I had had a conversation with Dermot Gallagher this morning in which he was more optimistic about the chances of the current initiative succeeding than I at least have been.

2. He had had a long conversation with Peter Quinn, whom he knows well. The prospects did not seem bad. It was coming down to two issues: the brokering of the deal in direct dialogue through a chairman, presumably the Prime Minister; and an end to intimidation and harassment for 10 days. Neither of these seemed insuperable. Gallagher did not seem to think that the vagueness about future years was necessarily the impediment for the residents which I had assumed. He did not really explain why, but I had the impression that the thinking was that, with the moral advantage of having allowed a march this year, the residents could be reasonably confident of getting their way in future.

3. Gallagher is talking to Archbishop Brady in London this evening or tomorrow morning. He thinks he could have a helpful influence on the residents. McCionnaith is unwilling to sell the proposed deal, but Gallagher thinks he will allow Hume, Adams, Brady and Quinn to do so.

*(Signed)*

BILL JEFFREY  
11 Millbank ☎ 6447

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 June 1999

*Chaitin*  
*file*  
*19/7*  
*Not much chance of this happening: sort of problem I would like.*

*Dear John,*

*TOP-JS*  
*C: JB*  
*PB*  
*MT*  
*AC*  
*KC.*

Inaugural Meetings of the British Irish Council (BIC) and British Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC): Prime Minister's Involvement

The Good Friday Agreement calls for meetings of the BIC at summit level twice a year and also of the BIIGC at summit level as necessary. In both cases this will require the participation of the Prime Minister and also the Taoiseach.

If Northern Ireland devolution goes ahead on 30 June, with the BIC and BIIGC coming into being at the same time, we will wish to hold inaugural summits of both quickly. The Irish Government agree and have already started identifying potential dates in July. On current plans these summits would follow the first meeting of the North South Ministerial Council, (NSMC) possibly in Armagh, and involving the Taoiseach and the Northern Ireland First and Deputy First Ministers.

All of the parties concerned, including the Irish Government have agreed that the first summit meeting of the BIC should be in London. The Taoiseach's office accept that the first BIIGC summit should also take place in London, immediately before the BIC. (Although the Prime Minister, in his speech to the Oireachtas last November, had spoken of plans for a summit in Dublin in the spring). This would be administratively simpler than separate summits in the two capitals.

The inaugural BIIGC and BIC summits should take no more than a couple of hours each, meaning that both events could be held back to back on the same day. The BIIGC summit might be held at Downing St. The BIC summit, which will include the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Ireland Administrations as well as the Channel Islands and Isle of Man, and the two Governments, will have a larger cast. Lancaster House will be undergoing refurbishing in July. The FCO Locarno Suite might be a suitable alternative venue.



Care will be needed in ensuring that the two events are seen as separate and distinct. The Scots and the Welsh will want to ensure that the BIC summit is given sufficient weight and publicity. This will also be a concern for Northern Ireland unionists, who will be particularly concerned to ensure the BIC summit is not overshadowed by either the inaugural meeting of the NSMC or the BIIGC.

The Taoiseach's office have identified two possible sets of dates in July: 6 July for the NSMC and 9 July for the BIC/BIIGC or 19 July for the NSMC and 23 July for the BIC/BIIGC. The first two weeks of July will see the height of the Northern Ireland Marching season, including Drumcree on 4 July. The latter dates might therefore be preferable. The Irish appreciate that any of these dates could be difficult for the Prime Minister and others and have also suggested Saturday meetings might instead be necessary.

I should be grateful to know if you can identify tentative dates in the Prime Minister's diary. The Cabinet Office, NIO and FCO will be jointly responsible for the administrative arrangements for the two meetings.

I am copying this letter to Nick Perry in the NIO and Sebastian Wood in the Cabinet Office and the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales.

*Yours ever,*

*Tim*

(Tim Barrow)  
Private Secretary

John Sawers  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
11 MILLBANK  
LONDON  
SW1P 4QE



Jonathan Powell Esq  
Chief of Staff  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

-taxed

23<sup>rd</sup> June 1999

*Dear Jonathan,*

**DRUMCREE**

Following my letter to you of 21 June, you have discussed with officials here the scope for a final effort on Drumcree which would meet the Secretary of State's concern about protecting the position of the Parades Commission.

It was agreed that we should follow an approach which would rely initially on the **facilitators** - Peter Quinn for the residents and Ian Milne for the Orange Order. They know their respective sides very well and in present circumstances are best placed to look for flexibility and foster it as far as possible. Liaising with each other, they would aim **not** to put a proposition on the table at the outset (which would be unlikely to succeed), but to tease out a facilitated solution over the next few days.

The objective would be for them to sustain this process up to and including the weekend and, **provided** there is justification, it might then continue into the following week, possibly involving more intense talks in a proximity format on Monday 28 and Tuesday 29 June. Provided this process was continuing, the Parades Commission might agree to defer the publication of its determination from 28 until 30 June, which would fit conveniently with the political deadline. (However, the Commission would not wish to go any later than 30 June, and neither would we, since further delay would pose serious logistical problems for the

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security forces.) If there is a proximity stage on 28/29 June, there could be a case for the Prime Minister or you to lend weight to the final stages of negotiation if it seemed that a deal could actually be achieved.

Both facilitators have agreed to undertake this role, but Ian Milne's task has been complicated because the Portadown District Officers have been told by David Trimble that they should deal with no-one except him in respect of Drumcree. To counter this unhelpful intervention, Milne needs a letter to the Portadown District underlining that No 10 are asking him to undertake this exercise. I accordingly attach a draft to Nigel Dawson (the Portadown District Secretary). If the Prime Minister is content, this draft should issue as soon as possible (to be faxed to Milne for him to transmit to Dawson, as has been done on previous occasions).

Peter Quinn is not sure that it would be helpful to have a parallel letter to Mac Cionnaith, but will advise us further on this. I accordingly attach a draft to Mac Cionnaith, which you might perhaps hold for the time being.

We shall of course keep you closely in touch with developments.

*Yours ever,*  
*N P*

N P PERRY

*PS Grateful if letter could come tonight to Milne (for Dawson)*

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**DRAFT LETTER FOR PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO:**

Nigel Dawson Esq

June 1999

As you know, the process which Frank Blair has been undertaking has now been suspended. I am therefore writing to notify you that I have asked Ian Milne, the facilitator for the Orange Order, to explore with the Portadown District over the next few days what scope may exist for progress towards a local accommodation. I have made a similar request to Ian Milne's counterpart who works with the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition, and the two facilitators will liaise.

The time to reach local accommodation is clearly now very short. I therefore hope that the Portadown District will co-operate fully in this exercise in the effort to find a fair and just resolution for the sake of the whole community.

**DRAFT LETTER FOR PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO:**

Councillor Breandan Mac Cionnaith

June 1999

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23. Jun. 1999 17:57

FROM: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

No. 4276 P. 2/5

**CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL****NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
11 MILLBANK  
LONDON  
SW1P 4QE**

Jonathan Powell Esq  
Chief of Staff  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

23 June 1999

**DRUMCREEE**

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23. Jun. 1999 17:58

No. 4276 P. 3/5

**CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL**

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We shall of course keep you closely in touch with developments.

*Yours ever,*

*Neil*

**N P PERRY**

*ps Grateful if letter could issue tonight to Milne (for Dawson)*

**CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL**

23. Jun. 1999 17:58

No. 4276 P. 4/5

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Nigel Dawson Esq

June 1999

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23. Jun. 1999 17:58

No. 4276 P. 5/5

**DRAFT LETTER FOR PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO:**


Councillor Breandan Mac Cionnaith

June 1999

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NATIONAL	
ARCHIVES	

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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
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This should be an indication of what the extract is,  
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If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3 (4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer  
or Number not used.

RESTRICTED

From: Ivor Roberts  
HM Ambassador  
British Embassy, Dublin

Date: 23 June 1999

cc: PS/SofS (L&B)  
PS/Mr Murphy (L&B)  
PS/Mr Ingram (L&B)  
PS/Ms Quin  
PS/PUS (L&B)  
PS/John Semple (L&B)  
Mr Jeffrey  
Mr Watkins  
Mr McCusker  
Mr Stephens  
Mr Leach  
Mr Kelly  
Mr Brooker  
Mr Maccabe  
Mr Beeton  
Mr Whysall  
PUSD(DSW), FCO  
Ms Milligan, DAD, FCO  
Mr Sowers, PS/No 10  
Mr Sanderson, Cabinet Office  
Mr Budd (via DAD)  
Mr Sheinwald (via DAD)  
Mr Cary, Washington

cc: JB  
PB  
MT  
AC  
GS

Mr Bell  
NIO

**MEETING WITH US AMBASSADOR: 23 JUNE**

SUMMARY

1. Seriousness of 30 June deadline stressed to US side. Reinforcement of message that the US can play important role by making the consequences of failure clear to Sinn Fein.

DETAIL

2. This morning I met US Ambassador Mike Sullivan to review current negotiations on Northern Ireland. He was accompanied by his DHM and 1st Secretary.

3. I took the opportunity to stress:

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(i) that the Prime Minister was deadly serious about the 30 June deadline. There was no secret Plan B, and the Secretary of State had resisted attempts by David Andrews on Monday to start discussing any such plan.

(ii) efforts were underway to achieve agreement on some form of sequencing involving formation of an Executive and a start to decommissioning. But there would need to be movement from both sides. What the US could most usefully do would be to make clear to those over whom they had influence, to coin a phrase, that in the absence of a commitment to decommission the Good Friday Agreement might collapse, and that this would lead to painful consequences for all parties. I suggested that those consequences might include an end to the sort of welcome that they have come to enjoy in Washington, and indeed to the granting of visas in the first place. Sullivan took careful note.

4. On Trimble's position, Sullivan said that by calling on the SofS to resign, and by (unfavourably) comparing the Prime Minister's position on Northern Ireland with his position on Kosovo, he was simply digging himself into a deeper hole. I agreed that such statements were unhelpful. Both sides were standing on points of principle. The only way forward was to stick to the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. But as Adams himself had said in Washington, there was a need for both sides to jump together. Adams now seemed to have stepped back from that position, and discussions with the Irish side suggested that the IRA were not necessarily prepared to offer a form of words. Sinn Fein couldn't have it both ways. Either they spoke for the IRA, or the IRA must speak for themselves. Sullivan agreed that there was a need to make the two sides turn over their cards at the same time. Were there any international figures who could have a positive influence over Trimble? I said that we ourselves had been looking at possible ways of building Unionist confidence. In particular more might be made of the dropping of Articles 2 and 3. But while such steps might make Unionists feel better, they would not themselves turn the trick.

5. Sullivan noted speculation that Sinn Fein wanted to delay progress until September and the Patten report, and that Sinn Fein appeared to feel that time was on its side. I said it was for that reason we needed to impress on Sinn Fein that if the 30 June deadline was not met there would be pain all round, and that a failure to meet commitments on decommissioning would lead to real consequences for them. Sullivan noted that in any event Patten would not give Sinn Fein all they wanted on RUC reform. He thought this was one reason why Sinn Fein was not building up expectations on this issue. He recognised that the current situation was critical, and that creating a vacuum over the summer would not be helpful.

6. Finally, Sullivan asked about the negotiating sequence over the next few days, and when the Prime Minister and Taoiseach would be going to Belfast. I discussed the timetable in general terms, but added that if the two Prime Ministers became too fully involved too early, there was a danger that their impact would be reduced. The Prime Minister had devoted a huge amount of time to Northern Ireland and (judging by last night's UTV programme) was increasingly frustrated by the entrenched positions. Sullivan agreed that the parties' lack of rationality would be difficult for any political leader to understand. Clinton was certainly

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baffled. These people had been given more time by world leaders, at a critical stage in other international events, than anyone else. Frustration with them was therefore fully understandable.

COMMENT

7. Sullivan, who is personally close to Clinton, has asked me a number of times whether there are any messages he can pass on. His aides made a careful note of my suggestion that increased pressure by the White House on Sinn Fein would be very helpful in this critical week.

*(SIGNED)*

*Ivor Roberts*

RESTRICTED



Northern Ireland Office  
Block B, Castle Buildings  
Belfast BT4 3SG

The Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP  
President of the Council and Leader  
of the House of Commons  
68 Whitehall  
LONDON SW1A 2AT

*JS*  
cc: *JB*  
*PB*  
*MT*  
*RR*  
*AC*  
*GS*  
*PU*

23 June 1999

*Dear Margaret,*

I am writing to you to advise that if the forthcoming political discussions in Belfast are successful and lead to the setting up of an Executive Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly, I would need, very rapidly thereafter, to lay the draft Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Appointed Day) Order 1999. I would need to have it approved urgently by both Houses and made at an emergency meeting of the Privy Council. This, together with a separate Commencement Order which requires no Parliamentary procedure, would commence the remaining parts of the Northern Ireland Act, thereby triggering devolution for Northern Ireland. The immense significance of finally achieving a political agreement in Northern Ireland, together with the obvious symmetry of the commencement of Devolution in Scotland and Wales on 1 July, make the case, I believe, for the urgency of this timetable. I should be grateful for confirmation that you are content with the course of action I am proposing.

Against the background of that deadline, and assuming that we can achieve a breakthrough, I would intend to lay the draft Order on 30 June with a view to it being debated in both Houses on 1 July and made at Privy Council as soon as possible thereafter. I understand that a business motion will need to be tabled in the Lords at the same time in order to set aside the requirement for the draft Order to be examined by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. My officials have already been in touch with yours to discuss the practical arrangements for my proposed timetable. If an agreement can be reached in Belfast it might also be worthwhile exploring the possibility of an announcement during business statements on Thursday of our intention to take the Order on 1 July.



I will of course. update colleagues further at this week's Cabinet meeting.

I am writing in similar terms to Denis Carter and Anne Taylor, and am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, members of IN, and Sir Richard Wilson.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Marjorie".

MARJORIE MOWLAM



Northern Ireland Office  
Block B, Castle Buildings  
Belfast BT4 3SG

The Rt Hon Anne Taylor MP  
Government Chief Whip's Office  
House of Commons  
LONDON  
SW1A 0AA

23 June 1999

*Dear Anne,*

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MARJORIE MOWLAM





Northern Ireland Office  
Block B, Castle Buildings  
Belfast BT4 3SG

The Lord Carter  
Captain of the Gentlemen at Arms  
Government Chief Whip's Office  
House of Lords  
LONDON SW1A 0PW

23 June 1999

Dear Dennis,

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*Marjorie*

MARJORIE MOWLAM

# Peace is not guaranteed, Mr Blair

## Events could soon spiral out of control, says Gerry Adams

Last week Tony Blair said that this was an anxious time in the North of Ireland and we are facing a crisis. He said it was right that the alarm bells are ringing. As to resolution, he said: "We must return to the Good Friday Agreement." I fully concur with that.

The alarm bells are ringing because the Agreement has not been anchored. The anxiety results from the fear that, in its unanchored state, it will drift on to the rocks. That is where the "no" camp want to take it. No change. No peace. No hope. No expectation. No justice. No equality. No reconciliation. No future but back to the past. That is their vision.

All the pro-Agreement parties, including the Ulster Unionists, must speak with a single voice. No U-turn into the past; the Agreement must be implemented.

The last British Prime Minister, John Major, squandered the opportunity for peace. He did so because he was a British Unionist. But Mr Blair's Government is unassailable from the negative forces of Unionism inside and outside his administration.

Therefore the onus on Mr Blair is greater because he has the power to bring about real and meaningful change. He should use the power he has to forge ahead. He should not allow himself to be knocked off course by pro-Unionist elements inside and outside the system who are still at war with republicans and who are

using every device to block progress.

With or without the Agreement, human rights, equality, justice, an acceptable policing service and many more key issues in the North of Ireland addressed by the Agreement are the direct responsibility of the British Government for as long as it has jurisdiction here. The Irish Government, too, has a political responsibility to uphold the rights of all Irish citizens. These are the norms of a society which purports to be driven and governed by a democratic ethos. They are some of the bricks in the wall of peace. But this wall needs a solid foundation. The Agreement holds out the hope and expectation that this will be built. Indeed it is that hope and expectation which has buoyed the Agreement through almost 15 months of debilitating inertia. Inertia is the enemy of the peace process, the chief ally of the "no" camp.

The "no" camp, whatever party badge they wear, could have their way if the Agreement is not anchored. The political institutions were designed to be the anchor. They have not been established.

There is therefore an onerous responsibility on the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister and all the parties to the Agreement to ensure that it is implemented as negotiated. The Agreement is viable. It can work. As with so much in the process to date, the political will to make this happen is the key requirement.

The negotiations that will take place over the next week are the most critical since the emergence of the peace proc-

ess six years ago. Indeed they could be the most critical in the modern history of this island. By June 30 we must collectively move forward. There is no alternative.

While the outcome of the discussions is not certain, there is no doubt that June 30 must see an end to the stalling, the delaying and the obstruction which have been the consistent characteristic of the Unionist approach to the peace process since its conception.

The present state of political limbo is untenable. Even in the most favourable circumstances the failure to implement the Good Friday Agreement would create a dangerous vacuum. Against a backdrop of escalating loyalist gun and bomb attacks and the relentless persecution of the nationalist community in Portadown, the failure of politics to deliver generates a volatile situation. It is being exploited by the "no" camp and loyalist death squads are filling the vacuum. There is a very real danger that events on the ground could spiral out of control. The next few weeks are, for many reasons, critical.

The results of the referendums North and South mean that there is a democratic imperative to implement the agreement and to implement it in the terms negotiated and agreed last Good Friday. It is not open for renegotiation or change. It cannot be cherry-picked or selectively applied. Its terms are binding on all of us who negotiated and signed up to it.

The UUP approach has been publicly to support the Agreement while trying to prevent its implementation. But there is no longer any room or time for this ambivalence. The UUP has to make a choice in the next two weeks - either to support the Agreement and to participate in its implementation

and consolidation or, at the insistence of a vocal but small minority in the party, to walk away from it.

Mr Trimble needs to seize the historic opportunity before it slips through his fingers. The rejectionists need to be faced down. The UUP needs to accept that they have to work with nationalists and republicans if we are collectively to build a better society. Sinn Fein wants the Agreement to work. We want to co-operate with the UUP, the SDLP and the other pro-Agreement parties to make the Agreement work. We are willing to help Mr Trimble out of the corner he has so tightly painted himself into. But we can only do so if he wants out of that corner, if he wants to take Unionism forward.

We have begun a process of change on an agenda which is wide and deep. The joint task for all involved is to implement what was agreed to ensure that the "no" camp is denied its objective of bringing about a U-turn into the past.

*The author is president of Sinn Fein and MP for West Belfast. A version of this article also appears in the Belfast Irish News*

*file*



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff

23 June 1999

*Dear Mr,*

**NORTHERN IRELAND**

**NO FURTHER COPIES SHOULD BE MADE of this letter and it should be made available ONLY to those WITH A STRICT NEED TO KNOW of its contents.**

The Prime Minister spoke to the Taoiseach this evening.

They agreed they would meet on Friday morning before Cardinal Hume's funeral. The Taoiseach thought it would be inappropriate to see de Chastelain face to face and the Prime Minister agreed we would not set up this meeting but would speak to him on the phone. They agreed they would meet the parties in the afternoon in Northern Ireland, but that they would not table any texts on Friday.


The Prime Minister said he thought Drumcree was enormously important. We had to get the Unionists out of their fug of depression. This was the only thing he could think of that would change the mood. He described the deal that Trimble had managed to sell to the Orangemen (text attached). The Taoiseach said the Residents would certainly have a problem with a march this year. If the agreement could make it clear that the march would not take place next year unless there was an agreement between the two sides, that might help sell it to the Residents. The Prime Minister said that Peter Quinn was meeting McKenna tonight to see if he could make progress. The Taoiseach said that he was very willing to pull all the levers possible with the Residents on this and to speak to Gerry Adams. The Prime Minister said we would contact the Taoiseach as soon as we knew when the right moment for pressure had arrived.

The Prime Minister said that the UUP were being extremely difficult and attacking him and the Secretary of State. We had not yet got them to the stage of agreeing to go ahead without an act of decommissioning. He thought the cornerstone to a way forward was the de Chastelain report.

The Taoiseach agreed. Decommissioning had to be complete by May 2000. But if we tried to move the initial date for actual decommissioning forward to September or October then we would be wasting our time. He was certain that the IRA would not undertake any decommissioning until Christmas.

The Prime Minister said this would certainly be a problem with Trimble who anticipated decommissioning taking place very shortly after the formation of the Executive. However, there were a number of elements here. If we could get a strong IRA statement, an acceptance by Sinn Fein of the commitment to decommissioning, a decent escape clause etc, it might be possible to sell December to him. The Taoiseach agreed that we could be flexible on these items. He added that we should keep any text of an agreement very simple. The more complicated we made it, the more parties would niggle. The Prime Minister agreed that our officials should make further progress on the text so that it was in a better state before the meetings at the end of the week. I would be grateful if Bill Jeffrey could take this on.

I am copying this letter to Bill Jeffrey.

Handwritten signature of Jonathan Powell, consisting of the name 'Jonathan Powell' in a cursive script.

JONATHAN POWELL

Nick Perry Esq  
Northern Ireland Office

**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

**Possible Agreement**

1. **Portadown District agree to meet with Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition. (as per the sequence above)**
2. **Portadown District call off all their protests.**
3. **A Portadown Community Forum is established [from Monday, 28 June, 1999 under the Chairmanship of ?] and will have its inaugural meeting on [Monday, 5 July, 1999].**
4. **The annual Drumcree Somme Anniversary Service is permitted to walk back to Portadown via the Garvaghy Road on 4 July, 1999.**
5. **Portadown District agree to attend the Portadown Community Forum and be represented at senior level.**
6. **A socio-economic initiative for Portadown is announced.**
7. **In addition to working together in the Community Forum, both Parties commit themselves to working constructively together in a structured format from September, 1999 to December, 1999 to improve community relations in Portadown, to understand each others' positions, and to reach accommodation on the future of parades on the Garvaghy Road. [The Prime Minister to ask the First and Deputy First Ministers to facilitate the format.]**
8. **Signed by the Prime Minister and both Parties.**



**RT HON PADDY ASHDOWN MP**

**FAX MESSAGE**

To: Jonathan Powell

Date: 23rd June

Of:

Pages: 2  
(inc. cover)

Fax No: 839 9044

From: Julian Arble

Subject: PMQ's

JJ  
BS  
RR  
DS  
AR

For your information. This may change a bit  
but the substance will remain as presented here.

Julian.

(1)

As Northern Ireland hangs precariously balanced between a route to peace and a return to conflict, is it not the case that, even if some of the compromises which had to be made in the Good Friday Agreement are difficult, tough and even distasteful, that agreement is integral, remains the only hope for peace we have, cannot be unpicked without destroying it and ought to be supported, as was the case with the previous Government, across the floor of this House by all those who put peace in Ireland before politics at home.

(2)

Will the Prime Minister also agree that neither history nor the people of Ireland, North and South, are likely easily to forgive Ireland's politicians who cannot find the courage to make the last compromises for peace. Is it not the case that though the letter of the Good Friday Agreement says that decommissioning is a commitment not a pre-condition, its spirit requires those who have been dedicated to the gun provide concrete evidence that they are committed to a future for Northern Ireland from which the gun has been removed.



**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

**From: David Campbell**

**Date: 22 June, 1999**

**For: First Minister (Designate)  
J Powell (for Prime Minister)**

JB  
~~e.~~ JS  
AC  
PB  
MT.

**DRUMCREE**

Summary of current positions as I understand them:

1. Residents require two preconditions to be met before they will reciprocate:
  - Direct meeting with Orange
  - End to protests
2. Residents want a package that settles matters for the next 5-6 years apparently on a basis of sequencing or alternate years' parades.
3. Orange are:
  - now willing to meet the preconditions but on condition of reciprocation
  - unwilling to consider alternate years' parades as a basis of future settlement.
4. I believe we should move forward on the basis of elements that can definitely be agreed and set in place, as part of an agreement, a firm structure and timetable for reaching agreement on the future.
5. To achieve this will require the Prime Minister to firmly indicate that it is an 'all or nothing' deal and that both sides will be left to themselves if they reject. The implications of rejection need to be explicitly detailed to both sides.
6. I detail below a possible sequence to be put to both sides.

R D S Campbell

**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL****Possible sequence for Drumcree Talks**

1. **Prime Minister arrives at Hillsborough. Initial discussions with First and Deputy First Ministers, Advisors, and Church Leaders.**
2. **Prime Minister has talks with Orange delegation. Indicates this is the final opportunity to reach agreement and outlines the broad parameters of an agreement. Asks if the Orange delegation will enter a meeting with the residents under his Chairmanship. Indicates that he will table a formal proposal for agreement.**
3. **Prime Minister has talks with the Residents delegation. Indicates this is the final opportunity to reach agreement and outlines the broad parameters of an agreement. Indicates that the Orange delegation will enter a meeting with the residents and that he will Chair this meeting in say half an hour. Indicates that he will table a formal proposal for agreement.**
4. **Prime Minister chairs talks. Outlines the proposal for agreement. Chairs a discussion and provides clarification. Calls a break for both sides to consider their response. Asks for a yes or no response.**
5. **Both Parties will have to take the agreement to their respective constituencies however if agreement is reached between the delegations the Prime Minister may wish to consider a press conference at which the agreement is outlined and both sides undertake to promote it. Alternatively, the Prime Minister could allow a break for the agreement to be ratified and indicate that a Press Conference would be held at an agreed time later in the evening.**

**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

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8. **Signed by the Prime Minister and both Parties.**

THE	
NATIONAL	
ARCHIVES	

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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
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Enter the piece and item references,  
eg. 28; 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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# Don't cave in to terror, Mr Blair

Britain's democracy is in  
danger, says David Trimble

Most British people still regard Tony Blair as having the potential to be one of the greatest British Prime Ministers. He is now fresh from his success in an honourable war. One fought for humanitarian reasons, not a war fought for oil or power or aggrandisement. He is riding high. But he is in danger of being brought low, of finding his integrity questioned and his honour besmirched.

People in Northern Ireland, who last year believed him, are now beginning to lose faith. In Kosovo he correctly identified the democratic interest. He saw clearly who were the terrorists and successfully insisted that there be no deviation, no weakening. He has succeeded in obtaining a Serb withdrawal and the beginning of disarmament by the KLA.

But in Northern Ireland he seems to have lost that clarity of vision. There the political process has been at a standstill since Easter. Last Tuesday the Prime Minister went to Belfast and made a speech intended to show how the impasse could be resolved. He said that one issue remained, an issue which he said revolved round the question of trust, and he urged each side to demonstrate to the other that its distrust was ill-founded.

There is indeed only one issue left. That issue is the need for all the parties to the

Agreement to be committed to peace and democracy. That need is spelt out again and again in the Agreement and is founded on the Downing Street declaration of December 1993. The key word here is "committed". Participating in democratic elections is not quite the same thing as being committed to democracy. A temporary peace or an armed peace is not the same as being committed to peace.

We do not even actually have peace now, just a lower level of violence than before the ceasefire. It must, however, be said that a significant amount of the current level of violence comes from anti-Agreement loyalists. They have been responsible for the recent murders of Elizabeth O'Neill and the solicitor Rosemary Nelson as well of a large number of petrol and pipe bomb attacks on nationalist property.

Republicans have also been responsible for violence, but with this difference: virtually all the republican violence is coming from the supposedly pro-Agreement republicans. And the tempo of IRA violence is increasing. Last week the RUC double agent Martin McGartland was seriously wounded in Tyneside. He was very lucky to survive. In previous weeks three people have been murdered in the Newry/South Armagh area. No one doubts that these were the work of the IRA. In total over the past year the IRA has been responsible for four murders, at least 47 shootings and 113 beatings. However, as they have not been claimed by the

IRA, the Secretary of State studiously avoids blaming them. By continuing prisoner releases while exhibiting this "Nelsonian" approach to terrorist violence, the Secretary of State has lost contact entirely with Unionist opinion in Northern Ireland and is increasingly losing contact with English opinion as well.

Many regard the decommissioning of weapons as largely symbolic. But it would go a long way to prove that republicanism had changed, and against the background of continuing violence, the republican refusal to decommission is insupportable. Mr Blair recognises this. In his speech he told republicans that this requirement cannot be got around, but must be got through. Unfortunately he went on to give the impression that it would be enough if Sinn Fein made some sort of declaration or even an explanation of why it has not yet achieved actual decommissioning. I must say that on this important matter a declaration of intent would not be sufficient. To see why one only need recall the original Mitchell report on decommissioning made in January 1996. In that report Senator Mitchell and his colleagues said they were satisfied that the paramilitaries were genuinely committed to decommissioning. Three weeks later the Docklands bomb went off, to be followed by others in a year-long campaign of IRA bombing.

Even without this demonstration of the unreliability of IRA statements, I would have to say that a mere declaration would be insufficient. It would not be believed by the Ulster British community. Their culture is one of few words, of believing that actions speak louder than words, and that "by their fruits shall you know them". It is suspicious of those who rely overmuch on their words.

Finally the Prime Minister says that all this must be sorted out by June 30 or else. In briefings it is said that the Assembly will be closed or the Agreement abandoned. Closing the Assembly even temporarily will destroy the Agreement. Abandoning the Agreement at the beginning of the summer would be simply irresponsible. Worse, it will be the Government resolving the decommissioning issue against the democrats and in favour of the terrorists.

It would be very sad for us all if a Prime Minister who had garnered so much credit for his country by opposing terrorism in the Balkans should find himself, through understandable impatience, giving too much comfort to those who have not yet crossed the bridge from terrorism to democracy. In Northern Ireland, as in the Balkans, there is no alternative to sticking to the right course, no matter how difficult things may seem.

*The author is First Minister of the Northern Ireland Assembly*

6

1

JS  
~~C. J. S.~~  
PB  
MT  
AC  
GS

**Speech by the Taoiseach Mr Bertie Ahern TD,  
on the Second Reading of the British-Irish Agreement  
(Amendment) Bill, 1999, Tuesday, 22 June, 1999 at 5.45 p.m.**

---

I would like to use the occasion of this Bill to say a few words as we enter the final days of negotiation up to 30 June. Time is running short. If the Agreement is going to work, we need to make it work now. There is nothing to be gained by further delay or procrastination. There are real risks coming at us from all sides, if we and all the parties do not soon move to fulfil the will of the people. Allowing a political vacuum to develop is not a responsible option for anyone. The large amount of progress represented by the Agreement has to be followed through and copper fastened.

I would appeal to all with influence in the situation to show the goodwill necessary to clear the impasse, to give not just the Agreement, but peace, reconciliation and democracy the chance they deserve. No one has the right, either through their actions or by their failure to act, to frustrate the prospect of a peaceful future for the people of Northern Ireland. The opportunity should be grasped, while it is still available.

People should not refuse to go beyond the minimum required of them. They need to accept that there may be more than one possible interpretation of the Agreement. There are many genuine and legitimate causes of grievance on all sides, even since the Good Friday Agreement. Anyone can put forward plausible reasons in abundance, why it is others who should move, why it is others who are responsible for creating the impasse or for letting it develop. These arguments have gone round and round in circles, and could go on doing so ad infinitum. We should each of us assume as an overriding goal our own responsibility for making the Agreement work.

If progress is to be made, it is first essential to establish the institutions. This would of course have to be on the clear understanding that all major commitments under the Agreement would be fulfilled in good faith within the timescales set out in the Agreement. In particular, all the indications are that the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, however desirable as a confidence-building measure on its own merits, will not take place in advance of the establishment of the institutions. But it is equally clear that the institutions will only be sustainable, if confidence and trust are built and developed through the fulfilment of commitments under the Agreement.



The delays in implementing different parts of the Agreement are unfortunately mutually reinforcing, and we are coming close to the point, where, without progress on institutions, the May 2000 target for achieving the decommissioning of paramilitary arms will soon cease to be credible.

Realistically, it is only in the context of a confidence in functioning democratic institutions that it will be possible to persuade the different groups involved permanently to dispose of their weapons.

Unionism owes it to itself to dispel the persistent doubts about its real willingness to enter into the inclusive partnership and other arrangements it signed up to under the Agreement, especially given the growing Loyalist dissident attacks on Catholics which are obviously designed to bring about the collapse of the Agreement.

But notwithstanding the severe pressure that some sections of the Nationalist community have been put under, Republicans can also do more to assist this situation. The Irish Government acknowledge the inestimable benefits that all the continuing cease-fires have brought. The pledge of office taken by Ministers precludes any use or threat of violence, and entry into government by Sinn Féin would itself send the most powerful signal that the war is over, as far as Republicans are concerned. All armed groups should acknowledge that they

have too an inescapable contribution to make to democracy and demilitarisation in Northern Ireland by the permanent removal of weapons from the political scene. The Good Friday Agreement cannot work on the basis that there will be no decommissioning. It will only work, if the institutions are established now, and if confidence is created that a process of decommissioning will be achieved under the aegis of General de Chastelain and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement.

Historic responsibilities have been placed on the political leaders of this generation. We have a duty to shoulder and not to shirk those responsibilities, and not place vetoes in the hands of opponents of the Agreement. There are ways forward available, that would be seen as reasonable by most people and that will protect the important principles involved for each party. But they would also allow the people of Northern Ireland - and of course of the island as a whole - to enjoy the peace and stability that they have been waiting so long for.

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John Sawers - Second version, as discussed. Grateful for comments before I send to Paddy Teahan. Bill Jeffrey. 22/6

(22 June 1999)

**POSSIBLE ELEMENTS: VERSION WITH BRITISH GOVERNMENT SUGGESTIONS**

cc: PB  
JPO  
MP  
AR

De Chastelain's report:

- notes that progress in the implementation of the Agreement has been uneven, with the key constitutional/institutional provisions not implemented so far;
- reports that, in the context of implementing the overall settlement and, in particular, devolution and the establishment of the other institutions, Sinn Féin have told the Commission that they are confident that those with arms will be persuaded to decommission them within the Agreement timescale;
- concludes that, with the establishment of the institutions, decommissioning should go ahead in accordance with the Agreement;
- proposes a number of steps to be taken, which are necessary if the Agreement timescale is to be fulfilled:
  - the modalities for decommissioning would be agreed with representatives of the paramilitaries by [1 September 1999];
  - he would expect actual decommissioning to start soon afterwards;
  - the commitment to decommissioning in the Agreement would be fulfilled by May 2000;
- indicates that he will report again in [September and December 1999] and May 2000.

**CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL**

Two Governments:

- endorse de Chastelain's report as the way to implement the commitments in the Agreement;
- undertake that if de Chastelain reports at any time that substantial progress is not being made in accordance with his proposals [(including a start to actual decommissioning soon after agreement on the modalities by 1 September 1999)] the two Governments will suspend the operation of the Agreement, including devolution and the other institutions, and convene a review conference to decide with the parties what further action to take;

British Government:

- trigger d'Hondt and devolution on 30 June.

IRA:

- is at least silent;
- does not condemn de Chastelain's approach;
- [makes a statement to the effect that, for their part, the war is over.]



Speaker's Office House of Commons London SW1A 0AA

RLS  
22 June 1999

Nicolas Bevan CB  
Speaker's Secretary

Dear Rob,

Following her letter to the Prime Minister of 10 June Madam Speaker has asked me to send you the enclosed copy of a letter which she has now received from Mr Gerry Adams MP concerning access to facilities in the House of Commons.

The Speaker hopes that before she responds to Mr Adams's letter she will have had the benefit of a substantive response from the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,

Nicolas

Rob Read Esq  
Cabinet Office  
10 Downing Street  
London  
SW1A 2AA



Gerry Adams MP  
Sinn Féin President

19 June 1999

Rt. Hon Betty Boothroyd MP  
Speaker's House  
Westminster  
London SW1A 0AA

A Chara

It is now just over two years since your decision to impose restrictions on House of Commons facilities to Martin McGuinness MP and myself.

Despite the difficulties, which the restrictions have created, we have represented our constituents to the best of our ability. Our success can be measured in the substantial increase in the votes given to our party during the Assembly elections in June 1998 and in the recent European election.

Martin McGuinness and I are determined to represent our constituents fully. We believe that the restrictions have inhibited our ability to do this.

In light of all of the constitutional and political changes that have occurred in recent years, including the Good Friday Agreement and devolution, I would respectfully ask that you remove the restrictions on myself and Martin McGuinness, and return to the practice as set out in Erskine May.

I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Is mise le meas

Gerry Adams MP





Speaker's Office House of Commons London SW1A 0AA

RR  
We ought to look  
at this issue again

RR  
cc: JS  
JPO  
PB  
MT  
AC  
GS

22 June 1999

Nicolas Bevan CB  
Speaker's Secretary

re: reply.  
JL

Dear Rob,

Following her letter to the Prime Minister of 10 June Madam Speaker has asked me to send you the enclosed copy of a letter which she has now received from Mr Gerry Adams MP concerning access to facilities in the House of Commons.

The Speaker hopes that before she responds to Mr Adams's letter she will have had the benefit of a substantive response from the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,  
Nicolas

Rob Read Esq  
Cabinet Office  
10 Downing Street  
London  
SW1A 2AA

**CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL**

(22 June 1999)

Top: JFO  
✓ CC: JS  
PB  
MP  
AE

**POSSIBLE ELEMENTS**

De Chastelain's report:

- notes that the intention to achieve decommissioning of all paramilitary arms by May 2000 is set in the context of implementation of the overall settlement;
- notes that progress in the implementation of the Agreement has been uneven, with the key constitutional/institutional provisions not implemented so far;
- reports that, in the context of implementing the overall settlement and, in particular, devolution and the establishment of the other institutions, Sinn Féin have told the Commission that they are confident that those with arms will be persuaded to decommission them within the Agreement timescale;
- concludes that, with the establishment of the institutions, decommissioning should go ahead in accordance with the Agreement;
- proposes a number of steps to be taken, which are necessary if the Agreement timescale is to be fulfilled:
  - the modalities for decommissioning would be agreed with representatives of the paramilitaries by [1 October 1999];
  - he would expect actual decommissioning to start soon afterwards;
  - the commitment to decommissioning in the Agreement would be fulfilled by May 2000;
- indicates that he will report again in [October and December 1999] and May 2000.

**CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL**

Two Governments:

- endorse de Chastelain's report as the way to implement the commitments in the Agreement;
- undertake that if de Chastelain reports at any time that substantial progress is not being made in accordance with his proposals to enable the commitments in the Agreement to the decommissioning of arms by May 2000 to be met, the two Governments will suspend the operation of the Agreement, including devolution and the other institutions, and convene a review conference to decide with the parties what further action to take;

British Government:

- trigger d'Hondt and devolution on 30 June.

IRA:

- is at least silent;
- does not condemn de Chastelain's approach.

**CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL**

CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL

**FROM: BILL JEFFREY**  
**Political Director**  
**21 June 1999**  
**JC:867**

cc see distribution

*R*  
*Top: SS*  
*cc: PB*  
*JB*  
*MT*  
*#E*

PS/Secretary of State (B&L)

**IRISH DISCUSSIONS WITH SINN FEIN**

Dermot Gallagher has given me a readout on the meeting which several of his colleagues had with Sinn Fein in Belfast this morning while we were meeting the Foreign Minister.

2. Sinn Fein had not been prepared to go beyond the kind of understanding and language which had been on offer at Downing Street. A statement on these lines would, they said, stretch them to the limit. They had been concerned about whether Trimble was actually interested in doing a deal, and had been inclined to interpret his invitation to Donaldson to be a member of the UUP negotiating team as an unhelpful move and another example of Trimble's unwillingness to stand up to his own dissidents. The only crumb of comfort that Gallagher had taken from the report of the meeting was that Sinn Fein had said that de Chastelain was the best way forward, and that when one of the Irish team had put the question whether de Chastelain could be stretched in some way, they had said that this would be worth thinking about.

3. In short, no surprises, and a report which tends to confirm our impression that, for the moment at least, Sinn Fein are sitting tight, and (with or without Irish encouragement) are much moved by doubts about whether, in the end, Trimble is capable of delivering.

4. Gallagher went on to say that both the Irish and Sinn Fein were concerned about the prospect of the Parades Commission determination on Drumcree being

## CONFIDENTIAL &amp; PERSONAL

published on Monday, just at the wrong moment as the substantive talks began. Sinn Fein's reaction to this had been to say that everything should be agreed before the weekend. Gallagher acknowledged that this was unrealistic, but there was a problem. Was the five day requirement a statutory one; or could the determination be delayed by a day or so? I said that the same thought had occurred to us. There was no statutory requirement on the Commission to report by a specific day, but a strong expectation in their code of practice that they would do so. It might, however, be possible that, if discussions were still continuing which held out some prospect of resolution before the parade, the determination could be delayed by a day or so. We were looking at this.

5. I took the opportunity to impress on Gallagher that, for the reasons outlined in John Sawers letter to Paddy Teahon, it was essential that Sinn Fein produce something more than language, with no necessary expectation of a start to decommissioning before May 2000. If that was the best Sinn Fein could offer, we were wasting our time. Gallagher agreed that it was extremely unlikely that this would be sufficient for Trimble. In his own view, there were two possible routes: an unambiguous statement (by implication from the IRA) that the war was over, which he thought would be extraordinarily powerful but looked as though it was not on offer; and some "warming up" of the idea of a de Chastelain timetable. I did not get him to enlarge on this, but he did not dissent when I remarked that this might mean de Chastelain specifying a date by which a credible start would have to be made on decommissioning for an orderly process up to May 2000, failure to meet which would trigger the operation of whatever safety net was agreed.

6. Mr Andrews is coming to Belfast tomorrow morning to have breakfast with Mallon and a subsequent meeting with McGuinness. Liz O'Donnell will arrive during the afternoon, and will probably have a range of bilaterals to match those being undertaken today by the Secretary of State and Mr Murphy. I suggested, and

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Dermot Gallagher agreed, that it would be important for her to have an early discussion with Mr Murphy.

(Signed)

**BILL JEFFREY**  
11 Millbank ☎ 6447 (Castle Buildings ☎ Ext.28142)

cc PS/Mr Murphy (B&L)  
PS/Mr Ingram (B&L)  
Mr Pilling  
Mr Watkins  
Mr Bell  
Mr Kelly  
Mr Leach  
Mr Stephens  
Mr Brooker  
Mr Crawford  
Mr Maccabe  
Mr Warner  
Mr Sawers, No 10  
Mr Roberts, Dublin

CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Northern Ireland Office  
 Block B, Castle Buildings  
 Belfast BT4 3SG

Top JS 2

cc: JP  
 PB  
 AC  
 GS

The Rt Hon George Robertson MP  
 Secretary of State for Defence  
 Ministry of Defence  
 Main Building  
 Whitehall  
 LONDON SW1 2HB

21 June 1999

Dear George,

**NORTHERN IRELAND: CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE MARCHING SEASON**

As you know, the GOC and Chief Constable have been working on plans to ensure that the security forces are able to cope with any public order challenges as the marching season reaches its peak in early July. To be prudent, we must ensure that we have the capability to deal with one or more stand-off situations and disorder elsewhere in Northern Ireland. I very much hope it will not come to this and initiatives to achieve an accommodation at Drumcree continue. But the two sides remain very far apart.

The GOC and Chief Constable have therefore advised me that we will need to deploy all the GOC's resources and in addition that I should write to you to request that the UK Standby Battalion and the Public Order Battalion No 1 be made available for deployment in Northern Ireland from the beginning of July should the GOC decide they are needed. I trust that you are able to agree.

I am most grateful for the support you have been able to offer in previous years, and hope these new battalions if required can be returned to the Mainland as quickly as possible once the worst of the marching season is over.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister

*Marjorie Mowlam*

MARJORIE MOWLAM

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

From: PS/Secretary of State  
21 June 1999

JS  
cc: JP  
PB  
MT  
AC

cc: See Copy Distribution List

Mr Jeffrey - O

***MEETING WITH DAVID ANDREWS, 21 JUNE***

The Secretary of State this morning met David Andrews and Liz O'Donnell in Iveagh House. She was supported by you, HMA and myself; the Irish Ministers were accompanied by Messrs Gallagher, O'Donoghue and Bassett. Tom Kelly and Declan Kelly joined the meeting towards the end to discuss media handling.

**Summary**

**The meeting was useful, with the Irish side agreeing that the good words were needed from both Sinn Fein and PIRA, and that some kind of guarantee was needed for Trimble was required in the event that no decommissioning occurred by May 2000. They were also content with the broad timetable which the Secretary of State suggested for the involvement of the Prime Minister and Taoiseach later this week. While there were signs that they are not fully signed up to the 30 June deadline - demonstrated mainly by Andrews' repeated, and unsuccessful, attempts to discuss contingency planning in the event of failure - both Andrews and Ms O'Donnell confirmed at the post meeting press conference that they regarded the deadline as a real one.**

**Detail**

2. After welcoming the Secretary of State, Mr Andrews noted that the key question was where the UUP, SDLP and Sinn Fein now stood. The Irish had

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NP/ANDREWS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

recently had a good meeting with Trimble, as well as with the SDLP and Sinn Fein, but Trimble's mood had reportedly since worsened. The Euro election results had not been disastrous for him, but nor had they been good. Sinn Fein on the other hand had done well on both sides of the border, which might increase their room for manoeuvre. Against that background he would be pressing McGuinness, whom he would be seeing tomorrow (and also Mallon) for a Sinn Fein statement that the war was over, and for a form of words for De Chastelain which indicated that decommissioning would take place by May 2000. He was not entirely optimistic however. A second issue to be considered was what would happen after 30 June if a breakthrough was not achieved.

3. The Secretary of State observed, on the latter point, that a discussion now at political level of post-30 June options would not be helpful. She was entirely happy for officials to work up proposals over the next few days and to have a Ministerial discussion at the weekend when matters were clearer: but were it to emerge that Ministers were apparently contemplating failure at this stage, that risked fatally undermining the process over the next 10 days. (Mr Andrews appeared to accept this, but returned to the charge on a number of occasions during the meeting, with equal lack of success.)

4. More generally, the Secretary of State noted the value of the two Governments having a shared position as we moved into this crucial period. If sufficiently forward statements could be extracted from Sinn Fein and PIRA (difficult for them, but not impossible) and if the Executive could be formed, then real progress would have been made. But in addition to words, Trimble would as a minimum need guarantees as to what would happen if there was no decommissioning by May 2000. Gallagher agreed that he would require support, though it would not necessarily be easy for the SDLP to back the kind of assurances which Seamus Mallon had previously suggested. A definitive report by de Chastelain, followed by a review if there had been no progress, was a possibility. Direct exclusion of Sinn Fein went beyond the

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GFA; but while their position might be legally correct it was morally untenable, and his hope was that, following their electoral successes, they would see it as in their own interest to adopt a more flexible stance. Ms O'Donnell thought that a guarantee for Trimble which was framed in a way that did not threaten Sinn Fein directly with exclusion but which confirmed the obligation to decommissioning under the GFA, and which was endorsed by all the parties, had possibilities. You noted the possibility of a statement which had a flavour of both approaches, and which pointed to a timescale for a start to decommissioning before next summer.

5. Andrews raised the timetable for the involvement of the Prime Minister and Taoiseach at the end of the week. He was concerned that their engagement over too protracted a period could undermine their impact. The Secretary of State acknowledged this risk, and also that Cardinal Hume's funeral raised logistical complications. Delaying their involvement until the beginning of next week was leaving too little time to achieve a breakthrough, and she could see benefit in the PM and Taoiseach having an initial discussion on either Thursday evening or Friday morning, to be followed by a round of preliminary meetings with the parties on Friday evening and/or Saturday morning. This would allow them to start the following week with a degree of momentum. Andrews agreed that, subject to the views of the Prime Minister and Taoiseach, this seemed a sensible approach. (The Secretary of State noted, parenthetically, that if the Prime Minister decided to make a final, personal effort on Drumcree, this could take place on Thursday evening. There were downsides to such an intervention, however, and a view on it would need to be taken in light of the likely prospects for success.)

6. On the handling of the discussions, the Secretary of State commented that text should not be deployed this week, to avoid parties rejecting proposals over the weekend. A proposition would need to be tabled in the course of Monday, although not perhaps immediately: it should be made clear to both sides that movement was needed and appropriate pressure



applied (in which President Clinton could have a part to play). We might aim to run d'Hondt on Wednesday, or even Thursday, as part of a package.

Gallagher observed that at some point the two Governments might reach the view that the gap between the two sides could not be closed further and that they should run with their own best judgement of an acceptable compromise.

7. The Secretary of State pointed out that she and Paul Murphy would be seeing the parties over the next few days in Castle Buildings: Andrews, somewhat unenthusiastically, indicated that Irish Ministers would also play their part.

8. Ms O'Donnell noted that the demilitarisation agenda would play a part in any deal. Gallagher agreed that a radical package could be a key element for Sinn Fein, though it should be offered only in the context of an overall deal. The Secretary of State recalled the existence of the strategy paper and of the Sinn Fein wish list, and confirmed that work on these would continue this week. However, recent murders and other events had made it even harder for her to move. She was still considering the position of the LVF, but the message needed to go out to Sinn Fein very clearly that recent incidents were making the situation very difficult. She would be grateful if the Irish could convey that message to McGuinness: Andrews said that he would. You pointed out that the rationale for several of the measures contemplated at Hillsborough had been that decommissioning would have started; Gallagher argued that an IRA statement that the war was over would be even more significant.

8. At this point the two Kellys joined the meeting to discuss media handling. Tom Kelly drew attention to the need to get the pacing of our information effort right, by giving the media enough this week to show that the deadline was serious without exposing too much of the detail. Declan Kelly added that press scepticism about the genuineness of the deadline was reinforced by briefing from both Sinn Fein and the UUP: this needed to be

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countered. (A number of key messages were then agreed, and deployed by the Secretary of State and Andrews at the ensuing press conference.)

Comment

9. The Secretary of State found this a more useful meeting with Andrews than some others. The two Governments' positions were not far apart - quite near on the need for a guarantee for Trimble, and on how the PM/Taoiseach could best be played in at the end of the week, but less than wholeheartedly committed to the end June deadline. She noted the need to progress work this week on guarantees for Trimble, the timescale for decommissioning, normalisation and Unionist confidence building measures, as well as exploring post 30 June options at official level with the Irish.

*SIGNED*

N P PERRY  
Private Secretary

cc: PS/Secretary of State (B&L) - O  
PS/Mr Murphy (B&L) - O  
PS/Mr Ingram (B&L) - O  
PS/Mr Pilling (B&L) - O  
PS/Mr Semple - O  
Mr Watkins - O  
Mr Stephens - O  
Mr Leach - O  
Mr Bell - O  
Mr Kelly - O  
Mr Crawford - O  
Mr Maccabe - O  
Mr Brooker - O  
Ms Scholefield - O  
Mr Warner - O  
HMA Dublin - O  
Mr Sawers, No 10

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FROM: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
BLOCK B, CASTLE BUILDINGS  
BELFAST BT4 3SG

Tel Belfast (01232) 520700

Jonathan Powell Esq  
Chief of Staff  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1A 2AA

TOP/JP  
cc: JS  
PB  
AC  
GS

21 June 1999

*Dear Jonathan,*

## DRUMCREE TALKS

Issue: possible next steps

Timing: urgent

Recommendation: Prime Minister should probe Frank Blair on Monday, but little realistic chance of positive outcome even if Prime Minister engaged directly in negotiations.

### Detail

The Frank Blair talks were resumed on Thursday. After several hours he judged that a positive outcome would not be achieved and that suspension, with an early report to the Prime Minister, would be the least damaging outcome. He is to call at No 10 on Monday. We now face the prospect of a vacuum between now and Monday 28 June when the Parades Commission will issue its determination.

### Frank Blair now plans

- to report orally to No 10 on Monday 21 June (directly to the Prime Minister or to you)
- to invite the Prime Minister to write to both sides bringing the talks to an end.

That would leave open the possibility of the Prime Minister, in writing to both sides, calling them to meet with him later this week. At that (in either separate or, conceivably, joint meetings) the Prime Minister could advocate a proposition of his own

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as a fair compromise which both sides would accept. A possible compromise package is being worked up, though you will doubtless wish to probe Frank Blair's views on Monday, both as to the prospects of any compromise succeeding and what such a compromise might look like.

Whether the Prime Minister should be involved personally is a difficult call. The strongest argument for his involvement is that it might conceivably make the difference between success and failure. This would not only be beneficial in itself, but would greatly improve the atmosphere for the pre-30 June political talks which will be starting at the end of the week. It would also avoid the need for a Parades Commission determination on 28 June, just the wrong moment from the point of view of the political talks.

On the other hand, we have to recognise that the prospects of the Prime Minister's involvement leading to a successful outcome must be remote. For him to be rebuffed within days (or possibly even hours) of the resumption of the political talks would expend some of the valuable credit on which he will have to draw when the talks get going. It would be a powerful reminder that even he cannot break down intransigent positions. At best, he would have been seen to make the effort, and avoided a vacuum developing in the early part of next week.

There is also a consideration which would arise if the Prime Minister became at all involved in detailed negotiations, to the point of putting a proposal on the table. If a proposal which included a parade this year was rejected by the residents, the matter would still fall to be determined by the Parades Commission. This would put the Parades Commission in a very difficult position. However much we argued that the proposal was entirely contingent on agreement on all sides, the public impression would be that the Prime Minister had backed a parade. The Orange Order would certainly

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claim that they had the moral authority to go down the Garvaghy Road, because the Prime Minister had agreed with them, rather than the Commission.

On balance, our advice would be that it would be better for the Prime Minister not to become involved, unless there was an appreciable chance of success. You should probe Frank Blair on this.

There is also the question, which would arise if the Prime Minister became involved, of whether to involve the Irish. The Prime Minister has raised this with the Taoiseach. The Secretary of State is anxious, based on previous experience, that developing a realistic joint position in time could well be impossible; and in any case any joint proposal could scare off the Orange side.

The Secretary of State has considered whether there are alternatives which would allow us still to pursue an accommodation without running the risks of the Prime Minister's direct involvement. One possibility would be for him to invite both sides to talks led by NIO officials. The risk of compromising the Parades Commission would be reduced, and it could represent some constructive activity. But the chances of success are faint, not least as the residents would almost certainly prefer to take their chances with the Parades Commission.

Another option would be for the Prime Minister to authorise you to pursue exploratory talks, on the clear understanding that any proposition you put forward did not have Ministerial authority unless it was agreed. The residents would be more likely to participate in such an exercise (if only to avoid being seen as obstructionist), while the Parades Commission could be reassured that this final effort to achieve an accommodation would in no way interfere with their independent statutory role. If the Prime Minister does wish a further effort to be made, Dr Mowlam believes this may be the best option.

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Should the Prime Minister decide against direct involvement, or a role for you or NIO officials, we do not believe Ministers will come under any great criticism. Our track-record in seeking agreement is good. We would want to emphasise this and to develop the message that unlawful action at Drumcree should not be supported.

I am copying this to Sebastian Wood.

*Yours ever*  
*J. McNeill*  
P. N P PERRY

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FROM: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



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*W/B*  
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LONDON  
SW1A 2AA

21 June 1999

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I am copying this to Sebastian Wood.

*Yours ever*  
*John McNameill*  
Mr. N P PERRY

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

21 June 1999

Dear Nick,

### NORTHERN IRELAND: TALK WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON

At the end of the G8 Summit, the Prime Minister spent 10-15 minutes talking to Clinton about Northern Ireland. I missed the first half of the discussion, but the Prime Minister briefed Clinton on how he intended to approach the last ten days before the deadline.

Clinton was emphatic that the Unionists and Republicans must now seize this opportunity to move forward. He would do whatever he could, day or night, to help. Having signed up to the Good Friday Agreement, the Republicans had to fulfil the decommissioning aspects. That meant starting to hand in their weapons in the next three to four months. He would make that abundantly clear to the Sinn Fein leadership, and wanted to stack up as high a price as possible should Sinn Fein/IRA fail to deliver.

Clinton also said that we should make more of the changes to the Irish constitution. In one respect, the IRA campaign was to achieve Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution. With those now amended, the Irish as a whole had accepted a different way forward.

In sum, Clinton said that if the Prime Minister was able to persuade the Unionists to move into the full Executive without prior decommissioning then he would lean on Sinn Fein/IRA to get them to live up to their part of the agreement. Having tried so hard for so long, his and the Prime Minister's credibility were now involved too.

The Prime Minister was encouraged by this exchange (at which Steinberg was present, nodding in agreement at what Clinton had to say). We need to give some thought as to how best to use Clinton's contribution. One possibility would

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be to try to engineer it so that Gerry Adams's words "successfully persuade" are made, among other things, in the form of a commitment to Clinton.

I am sending copies of this letter to Sherard Cowper-Coles (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sebastian Wood (Cabinet Office), and to Christopher Meyer (Washington) and to Ivor Roberts (Dublin).

*Yours ever,*

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'JS' with a flourish extending to the right.

JOHN SAWERS

Nick Perry, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

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