

PF 603,656

/ V1

PF 603,656

/ V1

V O L K O V, CONSTANTIN

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TRAY No.

10407

S Form 924A rev 10.74

W
408

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date
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S. 960 Edn2

LIMITED CIRCULATION

Please refer to S. Form 239 before sending this file to another Section.

S Form 238B

S Form 238

Y FILE

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HELD by R.5

The file should be passed for P.A. to R.5.

PF 603,656

/ V1

MINUTE SHEET

Reference PF.603656

1.

March 45

Ext

1z

t.45

Letters from the Foreign Office forwarded by [redacted] re VOLKOV.

1a

2.

0.45

A.D.F. minute re 1a.

2a

10.45.

Telegram from R.C.M.P. re VOLKOV

2b.

10.45.

Telegram to R.C.M.P. in reply to Serial 2b.

2c.

3.

8.3.46

To [redacted] re VOLKOV.

3a

4.

August 48.

Extract from B.2.b paper No.8 re Soviet Defectors, regarding VOLKOV.

4b

5.

7.9.48

Extract from report from American Embassy "Check List of Soviet Officials and semi-officials " mentioning VOLKOV

5a

8.

8.51

Note by B.2.b re re-examination of VOLKOV Case.

8a

8.51

Original document handed by VOLKOV to British Embassy Istanbul.

8b

8.51

Translation of serial 8b

8c

54) Wc21293/997
50 600,000 JC&S
ed. Gp736/209
REGIMINT)
CODE 5-34-0

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958
July 2023

[OVER

10.

20.8.51 Letter to Foreign Office enclosing copy of translation of document.

10a

1..9.51 Copy of letter mentioning John BENNETT.

10b

11.

12.9.51 Fresh translation of serial 8b.

11

12.

13.9.51 Letter to Foreign Office enclosing copy of 11a.

12a

13.

13.9.51 Letter to [redacted] enclosing copy of 11a.

1

14.

B.2

Please see paragraph 1 of the note at 13b. Perhaps we could discuss the possibility of writing to Mr. BROMLEY.

B.2.b
21.9.51

A.S. Martin
A.S. Martin

15.

~~AM~~
~~B.2.b~~

Agreed that Carey-Foster should write to Bromley, provided
(a) Bromley is L.S first (b) Carey Foster can write in such
a way that his letter is made effectively personal for Bromley only.

B2
24.9.51

J. M. [unclear]

MINUTE SHEET

Reference PF.603656

- 16.
- 8.9.51 Letter to Foreign Office ref. minute 15 re BROMLEY. 16a
- 17.
- 10.51 Copy of letter from F.O. to Mr. BROMLEY. 17a
- 18.
- 3.10.51 Letter from Foreign Office re VOLKOV, 18a
- 19.
- 11.51 Note by B.2.b re enquiries being made at F.O. re VOLKOV affair. 19a
- 20.
- 5.11.51 Secret Cross Reference re VOLKOV. 20a

23.

17.12.51 List of persons who knew about VOLKOV.

24.

19.12.51 List of Foreign Office staff at Ankara, Istanbul and Moscow 1945

*Page referring to Istanbul now transferred to SF 441/Turkey/1 - RR/Ri. 28-3-52
copy made for PF 603,656 24.11.65*

25.

19.12.51 Note by B.2.b re serial 24a.

26.

~~22.2.52 Letter to Foreign Office re list of employees at British Embassy Istanbul~~

22.2.52. Letter to Foreign Office re list of employees at British Embassy Istanbul and Ankara

27.

13.3.52 From Foreign Office re traces of staff in Istanbul.

28.

~~18.3.52 To Foreign Office in reply to 27a.~~

18.3.52. Extract from letter to the Foreign Office re staff at Ankara and Istanbul Embassies.

FILE CLOSED

FILE CLOSED

Extract for PF 603,656 VOLKOV.
Original in SF.441/Turkey/1. Serial 11a.

28B

Extract from letter dated 18.3.52. to the Foreign Office
re Staff at the Embassy at Ankara and Istanbul.

Thank you for your A.20/52 of 11th March 1952.

We are now able to say that we have no trace in our records of the following persons mentioned by you:

RAM.

Miss J.P.G. McLEOD.

Miss M.E. STEWART.

Miss A.M.L. BROWN.

Mr. J.H. MOORE.

Before we can finally clear this person, could you please say whether he was ever employed by the Admiralty. His long term of service with you seems to make this unlikely, in which case we have no adverse record.

.....

copied to L 595-46

27a 4/13

A. 20/52.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S. W. 1.

Secret & Personal

11th March, 1952.

13 MAR 1952

PF 877699

Dear Martin

26a

Your letter PF.603656 of 22nd February about the former staff of the Embassy in Ankara and Istanbul.

Ram was never a student at Cambridge. He was born on 23rd November 1891 at Panevezys, Lithuania, his nationality at birth being Russian, like that of his parents and his wife. From 1920-40 he worked as a clerical officer at our Consulate in Kovno. Since 1940 he has been similarly employed at the Embassy in Ankara. He studied at Glasgow and New York. He has just been established in Branch B of the Foreign Service, in order that, after over thirty years' continuous service, he may be entitled to a pension when he retires.

Miss J.P.G. McLeod left Istanbul in July 1945, being transferred to Belgrade, thence to Lisbon, and thence to The Hague where she is now stationed. In 1933 she was working in Berlin, at our Embassy. She came home for two short periods of leave, from 2nd - 21st March and from 5th - 19th September, 1933. We have no record of her address during these brief visits. Since 1945 her home address has been: 682 Glasgow Road, Wishaw, Scotland.

Miss M.E. Stewart, who does not appear to be the same person as you allude to, was in Ankara from September 1942 to July 1945. From 1945-47 she was employed in Lisbon. She resigned in 1947. Her last address in England was: 39 Alexander Road, East Sheen, S.W. We have no record of her having been to Oxford, or at the address in Whetstone.

Miss Brown is Miss A.M.L. Brown, M.B.E., who has served under the Foreign Office since 1934. Her family was in Russia before the Revolution, but for some years her widowed mother has lived in Istanbul. She was, and presumably still is, the Ambassador's P.A. She speaks fluent Russian and Turkish and has many local contacts. Her home address, when on leave in 1949, was: c/o Mrs. G.T. Charles, 39, The Bridle Road, Purley, Surrey.

I confirm that Mr. J. Moore is the J.H. Moore, born in February, 1883, whose lengthy service as chancery servant came to an end in 1948. We have found no record of the address you mention; his last address according to our files was 13, King Henry's Road, Chalk Farm, N.W.3.

^{PF 7170}
W. Smith-Lyte was born on 4th February, 1872 at Istanbul, where he seems to have spent almost all his career. His post on the M.E.W. staff at Istanbul was terminated in December 1944, after which he seems to have come to this country. Besides the post you mention, he was an American Vice-Consul for ten years (in Istanbul, presumably - though the record is not clear). Since his arrival in this country he has had to appeal to the Public Assistance Board.

Canon C.W. Hutchinson was born in 1887. For many years he was vicar of St. John's, Waterloo Road, S.E. He was appointed Chaplain in Ankara and Istanbul in October 1943. He is now believed to be back in this country and to have a parish at Hove.

/ J.L. Reed

A. S. Martin Esq.,

PF 440



REED
7F604,964

J.L. Reed resigned from the Foreign Service in February, 1948. His address is: Sidbury Hall, Bridgworth, Salop. (telephone: Stottesdon 221). He has, however, been working until recently for U.N.E.S.C.O. in Paris.

I am writing separately about J.S. Bennett.

Yours sincerely

J.A. Lacey

91110

Copy in SF441/Turkey/i-RR/R5 31/3.
copied to 4595-06

File

26a

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

22nd February, 1952.

PF.603656/B.2.b/ASM

Dear

We have now almost completed the check again our records of the staff of the British Embassy and Consulate in Istanbul which you listed for us.

There are three rather unlikely traces which I think you will be able to dispose of right away:

- (a) Was L. RAM, shown as a clerk at the Embassy in Ankara, at Pembroke College, Cambridge, in 1941? This seems most unlikely.
- (b) Did Miss J. McLEOD, shown as a shorthand-typist at the Embassy in Ankara, live in 1933 at 523 Warwick Rd., Greet, Birmingham?
- (c) Was Miss M.E. STEWART, shown as a shorthand-typist at the Embassy in Ankara, named Mary, was she at St. Hilda's Oxford in 1944 and did she ever live at 97 Ridge View Rd., Whetstone, N.20?

We also find it impossible to check Miss A. BROWN, shown as a shorthand-typist. Could you supply further identifying particulars?

There are two further traces which we think are identical, but we will postpone action on them until you confirm our belief:

- (a) The list shows a Mr. J. MOORE but gives no description of his appointment. We think he may be identical with a John Henry MOORE of whom we have it on record that in 1948 he

/was

B-6/10/7
26/52

2/10/29 - 5-11-1948 - 14472 - 2139
was head Chancery servant at the British Embassy, Istanbul. He was born 26th February 1883 at Wem, Shropshire, and his private address in 1948 was c/o Mrs. C. WARD, 91 Regents Park Rd., N.W.1. We believe he was previously employed at the Admiralty.

- (b) The list shows a Mr. William ^{PF 7170} [SMITH-LYTE] who was employed as a clerical assistant in Istanbul. We think he may be identical with a William SMITH-LYTE, a British subject who was born in Turkey and lived there most of his life, being employed before the first World War as secretary to the British Chamber of Commerce in Constantinople. His wife was Dutch and is related to a Mr. Edgar RIZZO, presumably identical with another of the clerical officers shown on your list.

There is one more trace which is certainly identical. It relates to Canon C.W. HUTCHINSON, shown on your list as a Chaplain. I would be interested to know what records you have of this man.

The remaining traces are for ^{PF 43,107} [W.E.D. ALLEN] and ^{PF 146,940} [J.S. BENNETT] about both of whom we have corresponded recently. In the case of BENNETT we are anxious now to check the allegation made by ALLEN that he was concerned in an incident relating to security in Cairo during the War. Could you let us have any details which your file may contain of his Army service.

Finally, we would like to know the present whereabouts of Mr. J.L. REED, Acting First Secretary at the Embassy.

When you have had time to look at the papers I have indicated, perhaps we could discuss the next steps to be taken.

Yours sincerely,

^{AM}
A.S. Martin.

G.A. Carey-Foster Esq., D.F.C., A.F.C.,
Foreign Office.

/NLM

ExHds L.564/2.
+suppA

PF.603656

25a

Covering letter copied to L.595/410.

copied to

L595/134

NOTE

At a meeting at the Foreign Office on 19th December 1951 with Mr. Carey-Foster, Mr. Watson and Sir Robert Mackenzie, I was given the attached lists of Foreign Office staff at Ankara, Istanbul and Moscow in 1945. I explained to the Foreign Office that I would arrange to have these lists checked against our records.

24a

~~trans to L564/2 + Supp A~~

B.2.b
20.12.51

A.S. Martin

Copy in PF 441 / Turkey / 1.
JBR/RS. 28/3/52.

LOCAL STAFF AT MOSCOW 1945.

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LS95/134

V. Vyalukhin	Clerk
Miss N. Annett	"
Mrs. Wagner	Telephone Operator
E. Bofit	" " (Left 15 June)
V. A. Golchekova	" "
Mrs. I. Price	" "
J. K. Belov	Head Hallman
P. Vasiliev	Hallman
I. Materikin	"
N. A. Voitvillo	"
Shaposhnikov	" (Left 31 July)
M. F. Komartskaya	"
P. P. Viasov	"
A. M. Krupenikova	"
Nechaev	Messenger
N. Y. Shehetinin	Head Chauffeur
G. Blablin	Chauffeur
Gushanov	"
Kuzeutsov	" (Left 18 May)
Maslov	" (Left 18 May)
Zagrebelni	"
Somin	"
Balashhev	"
G. K. Timonin	"
N. Timonin	"
Scherbakov	"
Sorokin	"
Zhdanov	"
Lisogorsky	"
S. Roumkin	"
Mischehenko	"
Golokhov	"
Koryazin	Truck Driver
I. Umyazov	" "
U. Zhemaletdinov	Mechanic
Nasibulin	Work Apprentice
R. Zhemaletdinov	Head Dvornik
Shchetinin	Dvornik
Frellov	"
K. E. Begichev	Hallman
I. E. Vedenichev	Asst. Stoker
Abduln	Dvornik
I. Zakarov	"
Drozdon	Chief Stoker-Plumber
Latze	Assistant Stoker
Zaharov II	Stok_er-Plumber
Bulobin	Stoker-Plumber
	" " (employed for July only)
A. A. Antipov	Garage-Watchman.

The Moscow 1945 accounts are not available and the foregoing information has been extracted from an old accounts abstract book. There is no guarantee that the list is fully comprehensive, but is the best obtainable under the circumstances.

Copied to LS95/46

Copied to B2B LS95-134

PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY STAFFS AT HIS MAJESTY'S

EMBASSY AT MOSCOW March 1945.

PF607260

- Sir A. Clark Kerr, G.C.M.G. 17.1.45 - 18.1.48 Ambassador
- Mr. F. K. Roberts 17.1.45 - 18.1.48 Acting Counsellor
- Mr. P. M. Crosthwaite 4.4.43 - 26.4.46 Acting First Secretary
- Mr. J. H. Watson 7.5.44 - 2.6.47 Second Secretary
- Mr. E. E. Tomkins 12.6.44 - 2.11.46 Ditto
- Mr. S. L. Burdett, M.C. 18.2.43 - 5.8.45 First Secretary
- Mr. G. W. Berry 11.6.42 - 4.6.45 Second Secretary (local rank)
- Mr. T. Brimelow Second Secretary
- Mr. G. H. P. Gifford Commercial Secretary (local rank with local rank of First Secy.)
- Mr. J. W. Lawrence Press Attaché
- Mr. T. G. Barman First Secretary (local rank)
- Mr. A. H. Birse, C.B.E. Translator (Second Secretary, local rank)
- Captain P. J. Bolton Private Secretary to His Majesty's Ambassador
- Miss R. Ayley 4.11.44 - Nov. 1945 Higher Clerical Officer
- Miss H. M. Bird, M.B.E. 18.6.43 - Apr 1946 Archivist
- Mr. G. R. Gunthorpe Clerical Officer
- Mr. C. G. F. James, M.B.E. Jan. 1930 Ditto
- Miss L. Campbell Ditto
- Miss M. B. Lewis Ditto
- Miss H. M. Richmond 2.8.44 - 21.2.47 Ditto
- Mr. C. M. Bullard Temporary Secretary
- Mr. L. G. Cole Shorthand Typist
- Mr. T. J. S. Gibb Temporary Secretary
- Mr. W. Hair Accountant
- Mr. W. L. McLorg Shorthand Typist
- Mr. P. N. Perks Ditto
- Miss S. N. P. Block Assistant Archivist
- Miss V. Rayfield Shorthand Typist
- Miss P. Webb Ditto
- Miss F. Whitman
- Col. Eric Robert Greer Military Attaché
- Group Captain David Neal Roberts, O.B.E., A.F.C. Air Attaché

Ex. 19

PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY STAFFS AT HIS MAJESTY'S

EMBASSY AT MOSCOW NOVEMBER 1945.

copied to
LS95-134

Mr. R. E. Gane	Administrative Officer (local rank First Secretary)
Mr. F. A. Jones	Translator (local rank First Secy.)
Mr. J. Fox-Strangways	Honorary Attaché
Mr. G. Bolsover	Attaché
Captain D. C. Hill, D.S.O., <small>S. No. 1943</small> R.N.	Naval Attaché
Wing Commander E. H. Dally	Assistant Air Attaché
Miss E. V. Large	Clerical Officer
Miss P. E. Thurgood	Ditto
Miss E. M. Caton	Ditto
Miss M. W. Ford	Shorthand Typist
Mr. A. C. Hall	Temporary Secretary
Miss M. Tuplin	Shorthand Typist.

PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY STAFFS AT ISTANBULMAY 1945

see LU	Commander G.R. Scott, R.N. (retd)	Assistant Naval Attaché
PF. 700,846	Canon C.W. Hutchinson	Chaplain
MT	Major J.H. Bradney	Temporary Secretary
see LU	Mr. A.W. Churchill	Clerical Assistant
MT	Mr. H.V. Harty	Clerk
MT	Lt Commander Eric C.B. Mares R.N.V.R.	Naval Attaché

MLT	Mr. L.H. Hurst	Consul-General
MLT	Mr. C.H. Page	Vice-Consul

see LU	Mr. C.T. Bennett	Accountant & Clerical Assistant
"	Mr. William Smith-Lyte	Clerical Assistant
MT	Mr. Edgar V. Rizzo	Clerical Officer
see LU	Mr. John A. Rizzo	Clerical Assistant
"	Miss Mary Hall	Secretary-typist
"	Miss Winnifred G. Lyne	Secretary, typist, M.E.W.
MT	Mr. Halil Katovitch	Turkish Scribe
MLT	Miss Winifred A. Baxter	Archivist, typist
LU	Mr. Richard Marinitsch	General Office Clerk
"	Mr. Michael D.T. Evans	Consular Assistant, Temporary
"	Mr. John S. Bennett P.F. 145,940	

copied to L 595-46
Received 19.12.51

PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY STAFFS AT HIS MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY AT ANKARA - MAY 1945.

Mr. M. D. Peterson, K.C. M.G.	Ambassador
Mr. A. K. Helm, C.B.E.	Counsellor
Mr. D. L. Busk	First Secretary
Mr. J. L. Reed <i>PF. 604, 964</i>	Acting First Secretary
Mr. A. C. Maby	Second Secretary
Mr. M. J. R. Talbot	Second Secretary
Mr. H. Somerville Smith, D.S.O., C.B.E., M.C.	Chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee (with local rank of Counsellor)
Mr. F. J. C. Webb	Assistant to Co-ordinating Committee
Mr. R. A. Dickinson	Technical Adviser
Mr. W. S. Rawlin	Ditto
Mr. J. G. Lomax, C.M.G., M.B.E., M.C.	Counsellor (Commercial)
Mr. K. E. Mackenzie	First Secretary (Commercial)
Mr. J. A. Currie	Second Secretary (local rank)
Mr. K. J. Ritchie	Third Secretary (local rank)
Mr. N. S. Roberts, M.B.E.	First Secretary (Commercial)
Rear-Admiral W. L. Jackson, D.S.O.	Naval Attaché
Lt. Commander Mares	Assistant Naval Attaché
Commander (Acting) F. L. Tewkesbury	Assistant Naval Attaché
Major-General A. C. Arnold, O.B.E., M.C.	Military Attaché
Colonel N. J. P. Wadley	Assistant Military Attaché
Major F. H. V. Wellesley	Ditto
Major H. J. J. Wynne	Ditto
Air Commodore C. G. Wigglesworth	Air Attaché
Squadron Leader E. H. Irving, A.F.C.	Assistant Air Attaché
Squadron Leader P. A. L. Cooper	Ditto
Squadron Leader A. M. N. de Lavison	Ditto
C. M. Colbeck	Civil Air Attaché
Mr. A. Leigh-Ashton	Director Information Bureau
Mr. W. E. D. Allen <i>PF 43, 107</i>	Press Attaché (with local rank of First Secretary)
Mr. R. Tristram	Press Attaché (with local rank of Second Secretary)
Mr. W. C. Scott, M.B.E.	Senior Accountant
Mr. A. T. Cox, M.B.E.	Archivist
Mr. G. W. Vincent, M.B.E.	Accountant
Miss M. H. Allbright	Clerical Assistant
Mr. W. C. Brayne	Archivist
Miss E. S. Whitrow	Shorthand-typist
Mr. M. Allen	Translator
Mr. A. G. Close-Brooks	Temporary Secretary
Mr. E. C. C. Crapp	Clerk
Mr. T. J. S. Gibb <i>PF</i>	Temporary Secretary
Mr. C. La Fontaine	Temporary Secretary
Hon. J. Willoughby	Temporary Secretary
Mr. D. Naunton-Evans	Temporary Secretary
Mr. L. Ram	Clerk
Mr. W. P. Malone	Clerk
Mr. J. A. D. Stewart-Robinson	Clerk
Mr. W. H. Taylor	Clerk
Mr. A. G. Westcott	Clerk
Miss A. Brown	Shorthand-typist
Miss N. Carter	Shorthand-typist
Miss G. F. Hurley	Shorthand-typist
Miss B. Lewis	Clerical Assistant
Miss J. Macleod	Shorthand-typist
Miss C. Mullarkey	Shorthand-typist
Mrs. M. S. Richardson	Shorthand-typist
Miss M. E. Stewart	Shorthand-typist
Mrs. B. Broadley	Shorthand-typist
Miss R. Clark	Shorthand-typist
Mr. T. H. Propellus, M.B.E.	Accountant
	Second Archivist

M. D. T. Evans - see previous list
 Miss F. Foley
 Miss M. K. Allan
 Miss E. Peacock
 Miss J. W. Wilson
 Mr. A. C. Visser - (see previous list?)
 Mr. A. Richards
 Mr. J. Moore

LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF - ANKARA 1945

Secy R. Mill	Chancery Servant
NT V. Richichi	Kavass
Secy I. Hakki	"
NLT J. Serra	"
NT R. Ahgull	"
Denniki	Chauffeur
Riza	"
Mehmet	"
B. Sök	"
M. Acele	"
NT Ellul	Telephone Operator
NT Sedotti	Telephonist
NT Giamalva	"
NT Miss Giamalva	"
Worsley	Nightwatchman
Salvo	"
Saban	"
E. Ahgul	"
Secy S. Mamo	Chancery Servant
A. Castle	Assistant Gate Porter
NT A. Ellul	Kavass
NT J. Casser	"
NT N. Regis	"
N. Margionovich	Hall Porter
A. Micaloff	" "
C. Papadopulos	Cleaner
S. Uçar	"
J. Gulia	Night Gate Porter
V. Zammit	Nightwatchman
M. Aydogan	"
M. Dervis	"
N. Karabalert	"
NLT S. Amodeo	Chancery Servant
M. Yass	Cleaner
A. Hökinck	"
H. Yalcinkaya	"
K. Meral	"
E. Yalcin	"
E. Kaynah	Nightwatchman
NT S. Kuriothe	Stocker
NT V. Angeli	
NT R. Lya	
NT N. Infanta	
Ali	
NLT M. Sevine	
NT Kiriako	
NLT Francois	
NT I. Yastankaç	
NT G. Gurdan	

Received 17/2/51

in re VOLKOV

23a

List of people who knew
about Volkov

Foreign Office

Sir A. Cadogan
Mr. T. Bromley
Sir R. Howe
Mr. Codrington
Mrs. Watts
Mr. Garvey
Mr. Maude
Miss Mary Howard
Miss Jane Wilkins
Miss Betty Sykes
Miss M. L. Powell

? Sir O. Sargent
? Mr. Howard
? Miss Janet Pennycuik
? Miss Bruce-Lowe

Turkey

Mr. Reed
Mr. Helm
Mr. Busk
Mr. Allen PF 45107
Mr. Bennett PF 145, 940
Mr. Hurst
Mr. Page

Ex 12 to 1595/46

Ex 12 to 1595/46

Note: This list was ~~compiled~~ compiled by the F.O. (Cary Foster).
It is not known at what date each was informed. The only persons who can be said positively to have known before the disappearance are: Cadogan, Bromley, Howe, Codrington, Reed, Helm & Busk. According to Reed it would seem that Bennett knew also 'off the record'. A.S.R./B26

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ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 JANUARY 2023

copied to
LS 95/134

22a
File

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

PF. 603656/B. 2. b/ASW

6th December, 1951.

Thank you very much for offering to go through the S.O.E. files, but I do not think the enormous labour involved would be justified *at this stage.*

Yours sincerely,

ASW
A.S. Martin

/NLM

THIS IS A COPY
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IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 *July 2022*

21a

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

20a

Secret Cross Reference

for file number : PF.603656

Title : VOLKOV

VOLKOV

INFORMATION re :

dated : 15.11.51

is filed in

*(a) FILE number : SF.53-33-1

at serial : 233a

*(b) FOLDER held by : B2b

under ref. :

O Cross reference made by : NLM

Section : B2b

Date : 4.12.51

*Use (a) or (b) as appropriate.

19a

NOTE

1 At a meeting with Mr. Carey-Foster (Foreign Office) yesterday action to be taken on the VOLKOV statement was discussed.

2 It was agreed that the Foreign Office should continue their researches into the staff employed in the British Embassy Moscow during the latter part of the war, and into the staff employed at the British Embassy and Consulate in Istanbul. We agreed that no other action seemed necessary.

11 February 51
S. K. K. / Turkey / 11

Extracted
PF 604807
Brady

3 Carey-Foster told me that he had received a reply to his letter to Mr. Bromley but that it had proved unprofitable. Bromley was able only to add the names of two further persons who might possibly have known of the VOLKOV affair. They were Sir Orme Sargent and the Head of the Southern Department. He was not able to help in supplying names of secretaries. Carey-Foster will let me have this list in due course but it seems that no further enquiries can be made along these lines.

E. 2. b
1. 11. 51

A. S. Martin
A. S. Martin

B2A/M/17
31157

8810

18a



Held B2B

Foreign Office, S.W.1.

ENCL 3 Notes

18th October, 1951.

Top Secret.

23 OCT 1951

TO B2B

REF REF 603656.

Dear Martin

Ext d/b
LS95/134

Reference your letters P.F.603656/B.2.b/
ASM of 20th August and 13th September and their
enclosures about Volkov. 12a

I have at last been able to consider them
at some length. For reference purposes in this
letter I am using the translation contained in your
letter of 20th August, i.e. your first translation
in which I do not see any significant differences
from your second translation contained in your letter
of 13th September. I agree with you, however, that
the difference in para.2 from the original
translation made in Istenbul in 1945 is very
significant when we come to consider the possible
identity of the Russian agents.

2. The important paras. from the British point
of view are paras. 2 to 6 on page 1, para.7 on page 2
and condition 1 on page 2. Of the remainder I find
para.1 on page 1 of more than passing interest in
regard to information on R.I.S.

3. The description of the material in the
possession of the N.K.G.B. mentioned in paras.2 to 5
on page 1 suggests that it might all have been

/obtained

A.S. Martin, Esq.,
M.I. 5.

12b/134
23/10/51

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obtained in London



operations are meant,
but it suggests two.

4. I am not quite sure how to interpret para.6 on page 1 except that it seems to be unconnected with the sources of information on both the British and Russian sides which would appear to be involved in the other paragraphs.

5. From the foregoing therefore there would appear to be Russian agents in British employ in 1945 in the following places

- (a) 9 in London
- (b) 1 or 2 in Moscow
- (c) 1 in Istanbul
- (d) possibly 1 in Tehran.

By taking into consideration Reed's account of his conversation with Volkov, (a) above can be subdivided into 2 agents in the Foreign Office and 7 in British Intelligence.

6. The remaining significant factor is the insistence by Volkov, both in his discussion with Reed and in his first condition in the memorandum, that no account of the latter or the interview should be telegraphed. This suggests that one of

/the

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Extd 6
LS95/134

the Russian agents either in Istanbul, London or Moscow had access to cyphers and/or telegrams. Alternatively, because of the information he had provided ~~about a flat in Moscow etc.~~ Volkov might have calculated that there was a risk of a telegram being sent to Moscow in the cypher which he said the Russians were reading at that time. Or was Volkov simply afraid that one of the Russian agents in the Foreign Office would see the telegram?

7. As regards the identification of the Russian agents, I am unable to suggest any to fit the seven in the British Intelligence Service. As regards the two in the Foreign Office, we can be sure, in the light of our present knowledge, that one was Maclean, but I am still not certain that we can identify the other one. Burgess had only been in the Foreign Office about a year at the time Volkov gave his information and, assuming that Volkov's information on agents in the Foreign Office was not up to date, since presumably he would not be told about this sort of thing while in Istanbul, the inference is that there was another Russian agent in the Foreign Office before Burgess arrived. With regard to Moscow, it is not clear, as I have already explained, whether there are one or two penetration operations. Floyd was, of course, in Moscow from January, 1944 but he did not join the Embassy until November, 1945. Nevertheless, I would not put it beyond the bounds of possibility that a British officer in a Military Mission in Moscow at that time could not have had access to a good deal of information in the Embassy, particularly if he went out of his way to try to do so. (I assume that Floyd has been questioned very closely on this point).

/Nevertheless

Nevertheless, if Volkov's statement is true that the Russians were reading Foreign Office telegrams to Moscow from the beginning of 1943 it would hardly seem possible that Floyd could have obtained access to the cyphers at such an early date. The conclusion therefore appears to be that there was a Russian agent inside the Embassy in 1943 and who was perhaps still there in 1945. There may also have been another Russian agent in the Military Mission in 1945 or earlier.

8. With regard to the agent in Istanbul, I can make no really very positive suggestion, but I should have thought we ought to follow up more closely the information that has been given about [J.S. Bennett], who was the Information Officer at that time in Istanbul. He is alleged to have Communist sympathies by [W.E.D. Allen], the Information Officer in Ankara. We have done some work on this but it has proved inconclusive. Our papers show, however, that Bennett was told of the Volkov incident, although exactly when it is not possible to say from the information in our possession. It should also be remembered that the British Assistant Military Attaché in Istanbul, who was living with the Bennetts in (?) 1944, committed suicide, but this was, of course, before Volkov volunteered his information, therefore it does not seem that he could be identical with the Russian agent in Istanbul who presumably was still there in 1945. It is curious in this connection to note that Reed's account of his conversation with Volkov makes no mention of a Russian agent in the British Consulate in Istanbul until Reed asked Volkov what the name of this agent might be. Presumably Reed omitted to record this point earlier in his record of the conversation,

/because

PF 44-940
REED PF 604, 964
EXD to L 595/46
of Hill Turkey



8/4/46 / 2/1/46

because he certainly had not seen at that time the document provided by Volkov some days later. (Ought we not also, incidentally, to look more closely at Mr. Allen?).

New list

File to 1.595/46.

9. As regards the identity of the Russian agent in Tehran, I can offer no suggestions. We should first try to consider how much of the information supplied by Volkov is true and whether any of it is exaggeration or speculation on his part. This applies particularly to paras.3 and 5 on page 1 and para.7 on page 2. If we take into consideration what is set out above, para.3 on page 1 seems to ring true and if the first part of the last sentence of this para. is true, the agent here could have been the source of the material referred to in paras.4 and 5 on page 1. ^{Article 154} Clearly also there is something in Volkov's insistence about not using the telegraph or radio, which suggests that his statement that Foreign Office/Moscow cypher traffic could be read and the information in para.7 on page 2 are both true. On the other hand, I am not sure that Volkov is not simply afraid that a telegram if sent on this subject would not reach one of the agents referred to in para.3 on page 1. Equally, however, anything in a despatch might reach them, therefore on the whole Volkov's information seems to suggest that the information that Foreign Office cyphers were compromised is true, or that there was a Russian agent somewhere who had direct access to telegrams. ~~X~~ As regards the Russian agent on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul obviously Volkov should know, but this person might quite easily have been on a very low level employed by Volkov.

New list file

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Handwritten notes: "New List" and "15/10/46 to 15/12/46".

10. As to the lines of enquiry suggested by you, I agree that the first thing to do is to draw up a list of all the staff, British and foreign, in Moscow from January, 1943 until December, 1945. I have this in hand. I think, however, it should include a list of staff of the British Military Mission, particularly if we find that the Embassy transmitted some or all of the telegrams for the British Military Mission. [I also agree with your other line of enquiry, which is that we should get out a list of all staff in Istanbul in 1945. I have an idea, however, that this will also mean getting a list of staff at Ankara, owing to the fact that the Embassy moved to Istanbul in the summer months. This I also have in hand.]

11. The third line of enquiry, on which I am also working, is to find out who had knowledge inside the Foreign Office of the Volkov incident. This I am afraid is not easy, but quite clearly very few people did know. ~~X~~ One thing we should do is to find out more about the various cyphers in Moscow, who had access to them, and how they were kept: i.e. Ext'd (a) was there a common cypher room for the Embassy and Military Mission, (b) did the Embassy transmit and receive telegrams in Foreign Office cypher for the Military Mission, (c) at what intervals, if any, were the cyphers changed in the Embassy, (d) was a new series brought into use during or after 1943? If so, when? ~~X~~ 6595/131

12. There is one further point which I think might usefully be looked into and that is to find out who [redacted] drafted the memorandum enclosed with [redacted] letter to Bromley [redacted] of 19th October, 1945. While this document sets out the /facts

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facts of the case it ends up in an extremely unhelpful manner which is calculated to prevent the case being pursued. I must confess that it is surprising that the Foreign Office accepted it without any further attempts to assess the value of the information supplied by Volkov. The last two sentences may have been purposely put in by [redacted] because the policy at that time was that [redacted] was precluded from trying to set up an organisation inside the U.S.S.R. He may, therefore have been only trying to draw attention to this point in the light of the conclusions set out in the previous sentences of the paper.

13. I do not suppose much of this is new to you but I have set it out largely for my own benefit for the purpose of knowing where to be on the lookout for unreliable characters. You will remember that I tried in 1949 to get someone with more knowledge than I to do this but I failed. I should welcome your views on this analysis.

14.. I should be very grateful if you would kindly return Volkov's original Russian text.

*Returned by
hand by
Mr Martin
31-10-57*

*Yours sincerely
G. Lacey Jones.*

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8752

17a

23 OCT 1951

per PF Volkov

With Mr. Carey Foster's
compliments.

Foreign Office, S.W.1.

2nd October, 1951.

B26/104
AM/1951
11/10/51

17a

TOP SECRET AND

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

STRICTLY PERSONAL

2nd October, 1951.

A.1/50.

I wonder if you can throw your mind back to the time when you were Private Secretary to Alec Cadogan. You may remember that in September 1945 information was received from Knox Helm in Ankara that a certain Constantin Volkov had volunteered information to J. L. Reed of the Consulate-General Istanbul. You will, no doubt, also remember that Volkov was removed by the Russians just when arrangements were made to contact him.

The information about this incident in Foreign Office files is extremely slender. All I have been able to discover is the original letter from Knox Helm to Will Codrington, a minute by Robert Howe to Sir A. Cadogan and a note from yourself to [redacted] What I am trying to discover is, who else in the Foreign Office, if anybody, was informed of this incident? Was it, for example, discussed with the Departments concerned, presumably Southern and Northern? Who would Alec Cadogan have consulted?

I should be most grateful for any information you can give me including the names of secretaries.

Please burn a/p.

T. E. Bromley, Esq.,
Bagdad.

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JANUARY 2025

V_o

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TOP SECRET Document/Package No. PF.603656/B.2.b/ASM *Noted in R*

Dated 28.9.51 Sect: B2b *RS 2/10*

Despatched to:— G.A. Carey-Foster Esq., D.F.C., A.F.C.,

Room 119 Foreign Office.

Date.....

led B2b

RECEIVED the above:

Date 1/10.

Signature *J.F.W.*

16a

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

28th September, 1951.

FF.603656/B.2.b/ASM

Dear

You will remember that we discussed the possibility of your writing to Mr. BROMLEY in Teheran to discover from him the manner in which the original information concerning VOLKOV was handled within the Foreign Office, and in particular the names of the persons who were aware of the case.

I have discussed this suggestion with Mr. White and we agreed that it would be most valuable if you could write such a letter to BROMLEY, providing you are able to ensure that it can be conveyed to him without any risk of any other person seeing it.

I would be most grateful if you could let me know whether you feel able to go ahead.

Yours sincerely,

ASM

A.S. Martin.

G.A. Carey-Foster Esq.,
Foreign Office.

/NLM

212/125
5-10-51
BDB/AV7
28507

copied to L595/134. 13b

PF. 603656

NOTE

Excd to L595/46

At a meeting with Mr. Carey-Foster (Foreign Office) on 18.9.51 I discussed with him our requirements arising from our investigations into the VOLKOV statement:] Excd to L595/134

- (1) List of Foreign Office Personnel who knew of the VOLKOV Case before 22.9.45.

Carey-Foster said that he was finding it extremely difficult to draw up a list of secretaries of persons who had known, nor was he able to approach anyone regarding the degree of secrecy this information was given in the Foreign Office. He suggested that the only person likely to be able to give a precise answer would be Mr. BROMLEY who is now serving in Baghdad. Carey-Foster said that he could write to ~~Bromley~~ Bromley if we agreed with this step. I said that I would consider it and let him have an answer later.

Excd to L595-46

- (2) List of Personnel in the British Consulate Istanbul in 1945.

Carey-Foster said that this list was being compiled and would be ready shortly.

New list file

SF 441/134

- (3) List of Cipher Personnel employed in the British Embassy, Moscow throughout the war.

[Carey-Foster said that the compilation of this list was in hand.]

Excd to L595/134

B.2.b
19.9.51

A.S. Martin
A.S. Martin

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TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

13th September, 1951.

PP. 603656/B. 2. b/ASM

Dear

Please refer to my PP. 603656/B. 2. b of 20.8.51 with which I enclosed a translation of the document handed to the British Embassy, Istanbul, by Constantin VOIKOV in September 1945.

We have now had made a fresh and independent translation of this document, a copy of which I enclose. It provides no material differences to its predecessor in so far as the general sense goes, but it has been translated rather more literally and, where there is any doubt about the meaning of the original, it gives alternative renderings.

There seem to me to be three lines of investigation arising from this document. The first two occur in paragraph 3 of page 1. As you know we are already making enquiries which may concern the identity of the NKGB agent said to be head of a department of the British Counter-Espionage Directorate in London; we now propose through the Foreign Office Security Department to make enquiries concerning the identity of the agent working in the office of the British Consulate Istanbul.

The third line of enquiry arises from paragraph 5 on page 1 and paragraph 7 on page 3. Paragraph 5 on page 1 implies, and paragraph 7 on page 3 states, that British ciphers were compromised to the Russian. I do not know whether the Cipher Policy Board has ever been so informed, but if they have not I feel that even at this late date they should be. Perhaps you would let me know whether you agree that we should do this.

.../Certainly

5f. 441/12647/16

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15/1/2024 + 15/1/2024

Certainly I think we should attempt to trace the alleged source of leakage of cipher documents and I think the first step should be to draw up a list of all cipher personnel in Moscow during the war. Would it be possible for you to do so [redacted] I will ask the Foreign Office Security Department to do the same for their cipher staff.

I shall, of course, be very interested to hear your views on the whole of the new version of this document and hear whether you think there are any other lines of enquiry which either of us should follow.

Yours sincerely,

AS
A.S. Martin

15/1/2024

[redacted]

/NLM

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TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

13th September, 1951.

PF.603656/B.2.b/ASM

Dear

Please refer to my PF.603656/B.2.b/ASM of 20.8.51 with which I enclosed a translation of the document handed to the British Embassy Istanbul by Constantin VOLKOV in September 1945.

We have now had made a ^{11a} fresh and independent translation of this document, a copy of which I enclose. It provides no material differences to its predecessor in so far as the general sense goes, but it has been translated rather more literally and, where there is any doubt about the meaning of the original, it gives alternative renderings.

Arising from this document I think there are two lines of enquiry which we should follow. The first arises from para. 3 on P.1 in which it is said that an NKGB agent was employed in the office of the British Consulate in Istanbul. I suggest that as a first step the names of each member of that staff should be passed through our records. I wonder, therefore, if you could draw up a list of the entire staff as at August 1945 (I imagine it will not be a large one).

11/1/1977

The second line of enquiry arises from para. 7 on P.3 which suggests that the Russians had sources in Moscow for receiving samples of English diplomatic and military ciphers. Here again I think we should start by drawing up a list of all cipher personnel employed in Moscow during the war years.

I would be grateful if you could draw up a similar list of Foreign Office cipher staff in Moscow.

.../I shall be

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I shall be very interested to hear your views on the document as a whole and of course to know whether you feel there are any other lines of enquiry which we could usefully follow.

Yours sincerely,

A.S. Martin.

G.A. Carey-Foster Esq., D.F.C., A.F.C.,
Foreign Office.

20/4/51 (copy)

Enc.

NLM

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*noted in R1
8/19
Cork*

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Dated... 13.9.51.....

Sect: ... B2b.....

led B2B

Despatched to:— G. A. Carey Foster Esq., D.F.C., A.F.C......

Foreign Office......

Date... 13.9.51.....

RECEIVED the above:

Date... 15/9.....

Signature... *[Signature]*.....

TRANSLATION.

11a

L595/466

Further to our conversation, I have the honour to inform you that I can, on conditions set out below, hand over to the Special English service all the listed records (documents) of the Intelligence Administration of the N.K.G.B. National Commissariat of State Security of the U.S.S.R., and employee of which I have been since the autumn of 1936.]

1. A list of the agency of the Intelligence Administration of the N.K.G.B. in Turkey - 314 persons. (The list takes into account both the active and reserve agencies). There are official descriptions of individual agents.
2. A list of permanent employees of the military and civil Intelligence Services of Great Britain, known to the N.K.G.B., as well as their agencies. The list contains approximately 250 public and secret members of the above-mentioned service together with descriptions.
3. A list of documents (in some cases their duplicates and photo-stats) which were handed to us by agents of the N.K.G.B. who were employees of the English Intelligence Service and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain. (Judging by their nicknames there must be 9 such agents in London).
This list is of singular interest as it affords the possibility of establishing (the existence of) an agency of the N.K.G.B. in exceedingly important British establishments. I for instance know that one of the agents of the N.K.G.B. fulfils the duties of the head of a department of the English Counter-Espionage Administration in London, while another works in the office of the British Consulate in Stambul. ↓
4. Copies of documents of cases-forms and special dossier of the English Intelligence Service.
5. Photo-cliché and translations of guiding documents of the English Intelligence Service, in particular correspondence between London and General HILL.
6. A copy of the conclusions of Heads of the Near Eastern Department of the Intelligence Administration of the N.K.G.B. on documents of the English intelligence organisations in Iran.
7. Detailed information regarding certain N.K.G.B. agents in Palestine, the Balkan states and Iran (their nicknames and conditions of contact).

L595/466
L595-46
14.6.72

See
L595/134

8. A complete list of employees of the Intelligence Administration of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow, their private (home) addresses and numbers of both home and office telephones. Likewise the addresses of garages and number of the cars of the Intelligence Administration of the N.K.G.B.
9. The addresses of certain secret apartments of the Intelligence Administration of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow.
10. Possible recruits - the captain (now probably major) of the counter-espionage service of the N.K.G.B., the secretary of the Headquarters of the National Commissariat of the Petroleum Industry, and an employee (female) working in one of the divisions for special assignments in Moscow. These three persons can be used in the interest of ^{the} English service.
11. Two original identity cards of officers of the Intelligence Administration of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow, for the year 1945, which admit bearer to all operative, record (archives) and other official premises of the N.K.G.B., N.K.V.D. and counter-espionage administrations of the National Commissariat of Defence and the National Commissariat of the Navy of the U.S.S.R.
- These identity cards can be used as samples.
12. Sample stamps and commandants' seals of two departments of the N.K.G.B. which would make possible the issue of reference (?) cards and passes, giving the right to take parcels of official documents out of the building of the N.K.G.B. of the U.S.S.R.
13. Samples of official forms and of every kind of registration card used by the Intelligence Administration of the N.K.G.B. The latter could be in order to obtain, in the order established by the N.K.G.B., information from the operative-registration department of the Intelligence Administration and of other special Administrations in Moscow.
- The above mentioned forms will enable you to establish the existence of agencies of the N.K.G.B. all over the world.
14. The keys to two offices of ~~the~~ operative departments of the Intelligence Administration of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow, in which secret documents on the near East are kept.
15. There are a number of documents showing the financial state and operative potentialities of individual branches of the N.K.G.B. of the U.S.S.R.

This list of the documents that are at my disposal can be supplemented by documents which I am in a position to hand over to you here on the spot. They are as follows:-

1. Copies of ciphered telegrams despatched to Moscow and to the Ambassador. The value of these (apart from their contents) is the fact that they will help decipher all ciphered telegrams despatched by the Consulate General (and possibly in-coming ones too).
2. A list of regular (permanent) officers of the Intelligence Administration of the N.K.G.B., the National Commissariat of Defence and the National Commissariat of the Navy of the U.S.S.R. who work under cover of the official Soviet missions in Turkey (their nicknames and functions (duties)).

Likewise an incomplete list on Iran and Egypt.

3. Several keys to offices, safes and entrance doors to the Consulate General.
4. Notebooks containing records of conversation between leading members of the Consulate General and visitors, as well as other official documents.
5. I can prepare a structural scheme of the political and military intelligence services of the U.S.S.R. in Turkey, as well as of the Intelligence Administration of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow.

6. I can, at the same time, prepare a detailed report on the structure of departments of military counter-espionage in units of the Red Army, their spheres of activity and methods of work.

7. Added to this I can give explanations regarding measures taken by the N.K.G.B. in regard to the English secret service in Moscow (phon.), as well as the sources of receipt of samples of English diplomatic and military ciphers (in Moscow).

(--- I can give explanations regarding the sources (in Moscow) which supplied samples of English diplomatic and military ciphers).

Conditions on which the above listed information can be handed over to you, are as follows:-

1. The suggestions made by me to be kept absolutely secret. No dispatches on this matter to be transmitted either by wireless or by telegraph.

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2. All arrangements with your department to be made direct, without the participation of any intermediaries.
3. I must be suitably compensated for loss of employment and position. At least £50,000 must be handed to me at the time of the transaction.

I mention this sum as a minimum, in view of the importance of the information I am handing over to you and of the consequences which will unavoidably befall all my relatives living in the territory of the U.S.S.R.

4. I am to be afforded asylum and given a guarantee of complete security.

Please inform me of your decision (be it affirmative or negative) by 25th September, or at latest by 1st October, 1945.

I can be called on any of the Consulate telephones, but naturally great discretion should be used. (It would be advisable for such a call to take the form of an official and personal invitation and should definitely be in the name of the Consulate, this would not arouse suspicion).

In conclusion I should like to assure you, and through you the Government of Great Britain, that my present contribution and modest participation will hasten the date of a just revenge in the interest of the mighty Commonwealth of British people, and in the interest of peace-loving and suffering humanity.

Your sincere friend,

COPY

*now B2B / v PA -
P.F. 603656 .Joklov*

106

SECRET AND PERSONAL

ISTANBUL

September 5th, 1951.

Dear Carey Foster,

I have now received a report from my informant about John BENNETT which I am passing to you. The writer - it would not be difficult for you to guess who it is - W. E. D. ALLEN, who was press attaché here when I arrived, has, I think, made a very fair report. The lady, Mrs. B. R-M, referred to in the penultimate paragraph is Mrs. RUTHVEN-MURRAY, another suspect about whom I have already written some time ago.

I know I can trust you to keep all this entirely secret as I would not like ALLEN's name to be let out of the bag.

Yours sincerely,

Noel Charles.

*B2B/PAW
2690*

To B.2B & P.A. ORIGINAL IN P.F. 145940 - John BENNETT

Attachment to Foreign Office letter A. 40/51 dated 11/9/51.
M BENNETT

Whitechurch House, Cappagh, Co. Waterford.

30 August 1951.

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Noel,

Thanks for your letter of 23rd August. You may remember the circumstances of my mentioning 'B' to you. It was during the flap over Maclean and Burgess. In view of my suspicions of 'B' some years ago and in view of the fact that I believed him still to be en poste in Stockholm, I suggested that it might be just worth while watching that particular bolt hole. I did not make any specific charge against 'B' - nor am I in a position to do so. Having said so much I will try to summarize my impressions - if only for purposes of record.

When I was appointed to the post of Press Attaché in Ankara in September 1944, I arrived to find 'B' as my No 2 in the post of Information Officer in Istanbul. My first impression of 'B' and his wife was favourable. He showed himself very willing to work on friendly terms with me. He is a man of considerable culture and charm. His wife (a sister or half-sister of Ribnikar - a former partner in the Belgrad newspaper Politika and at that time Minister of Information in Tito's government) is a lady of great vitality with all the social graces. I heard much from 'B' of his influential connections in London: his brother-in-law is a Law Lord and 'B' himself seemed to enjoy the friendly patronage of Sir Stafford Cripps in whose chambers he told me he had worked as a younger man.

As time went on I found I was put to a certain amount of trouble in checking the leftish tendencies of 'B' in the matter of putting out propaganda in Istanbul. I did not attach much importance to this. Leftishness was fashionable at the time. Later, during the spring and summer of 1945, the Counsellor, Mr A.K. Helm, several times expressed uneasiness and lack of confidence in regard to 'B' and while there seemed no definite grounds on which positive action might be justified, we agreed that when an opportunity occurred it would be in the interest of the post for 'B' to be transferred.

In Istanbul I learned that 'B' and his wife had the reputation of taking part in some rather wild orgies from time to time. Some of these had taken place in the flat which I later occupied in Istiklal caddesi; others, at a house on the Bosphorus which he and his wife had rented during the summer of 1944. Persons living near this house (including the wife of the Egyptian Ambassador and Mme Sokolnicki, wife of the ex-Polish Ambassador) commented somewhat sourly on these goings on. There was never an occasion, however, on which an incident was brought directly to my attention.

These orgies were apparently related to the Cribb tragedy which occurred before my arrival, in the summer of 1944. Capt. Cribb was an Assistant Military Attaché (or member of General Arnold's staff) who shared the Istiklal caddesi flat with the 'B's. According to the later stories he was very much under the influence of Mrs 'B'. He got into money difficulties and eventually committed suicide. It seemed always odd to me that a young man should take this step - even if threatened with Court Martial in connection with discrepancies in the Impressed Account. One night while rowing about in a boat on the Bosphorus in the summer of 1945, 'B' was at great pains to explain all the details of this tragedy to me and he attributed it to the general neurotic condition of Cribb.

In the summer of 1945 there was a very disturbing incident. I recognize that the implications are serious but I feel that the circumstances as I know them should be on record. It appears that an official of the Soviet diplomatic staff had conveyed to the British Embassy a desire to seek protection with us. There was a delay of some days while his offer was under consideration and

Copied 17.9.51.

P.F. 603656.

during this period he was removed from circulation by his colleagues in the Soviet Embassy and disappeared from human ken. I never saw the papers on the subject nor did it lie within the competence of the Press Attaché. It was probably ~~XXXXXX~~ some weeks afterwards that the First Secretary (John Reed) told me about the incident one evening when I was dining with him in Istanbul. He said that only three persons were aware of the Soviet official's offer - the Ambassador, the Counsellor and himself; and he could not understand how there could have been a leakage. I knew John Reed to be a friend of 'B' and I asked him if he was sure that he had not mentioned the matter to anyone else. He replied: "Well, only 'B'." When I said that I had no confidence in 'B's discretion, Reed, who is an open-hearted ingenuous fellow, took offence at my implying that the leakage might have been through 'B'.

In the autumn of 1945 'B' spent a night with me in my house in Ankara. There was a late session and conversation took a philosophic and then a reminiscent turn. 'B' confessed to me that he had been a Communist during the war and that he had been sent home from Cairo after trouble with MI 4 because of his Communist attachments. (This can presumably be checked.) While 'B' gave the impression that he was not still a Communist, the conversation increased my general uneasiness with regard to 'B'. At the same time I did not know to what extent he might be romanticising himself (a common enough phenomenon in unbalanced types).

In the late autumn or winter of 1945 a demand from London for staff reductions in the Information Office in Turkey made it possible for the Counsellor and myself to get 'B' off the ground. 'B' showed great resistance to going. He had some difficulty in securing another posting. I recollect that he was refused for Madrid and Salonika. Eventually, after returning to London, he was posted to Bucharest and, a year or two later, to Stockholm.

In the above connection a rather curious remark was made to me by Mrs B R-M (about whom I think you know) when I was on leave in London (probably in the summer of 1948). Mrs R-M (who in those days made no bones about her liaison with Alec Brown, a well-known Communist and Slavonic scholar) is inclined to be very indiscreet and boastful late in the evening. Speaking of 'B' she said: 'We got him into Bucharest'. This remark, again, may or may not have had significance.

As you will note, all the above is circumstantial. John Reed's indiscretion to 'B' may not have had any relation to the disappearance of the Soviet official. 'B' may have been a "parlour Communist" at one time during the war and he may genuinely have seen the light and have become a perfectly respectable official. I am not prepared to say that I believe 'B' to be an active Communist. But I do believe that he is a man who should be treated with caution until and unless there is absolutely clear evidence as to his good faith. And he was, when I knew him, an unstable character, clearly unhappy and at odds with himself, deeply hysterical and seeking relief in bouts of dissipation. He had a chronic tendency to live beyond his means (a common enough failing). He was, I think, also rather ambitious and (although relatively successful in life) consumed by the idea that he had not had his due. Withal a very nice fellow, charming and often spontaneously kind, with an attractive intellect and rather 'a way with him'.

I think I have said all that I can usefully say on this matter. But for the astonishing evidence of the confusion of the spirit and the mind and the disintegration of the will in members of our class - as revealed in the Maclean-Burgess case - I should not have felt justified even in drawing your attention in confidence to this matter. As it is it would seem to me that there is a case for caution and, perhaps, an attempt to check up on my facts from other sources.

I enclose an extra copy of this letter.

Yours ever, Bill.

Introduced to AFB
by P. H. B. in 1956

WED. ALLEN

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 L 595/46
 Check
 Extra to
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10ab.

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
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Receipt for TOP SECRET Document.

To be signed by the recipient and returned immediately to:—

Box 500, PARLIAMENT STREET B.O., LONDON, S.W.1.

TOP SECRET Document/~~Parabody~~ No PF.603656/B.2.b/ASM *Noted in R*

Dated 20.8.51

Sect: B2b

B1 23/8

Despatched to:— G.A. Carey-Foster Esq., D.F.C., A.F.C.,

Foreign Office.

Date 20.8.51

held R5

RECEIVED the above:

Date Aug 22nd 1951

Signature Talbot de Malines

Handwritten text, possibly a name or address, in the top left corner.

Handwritten text, possibly a name or address, in the top right corner.

Handwritten initials or a small mark on the left side.

Large handwritten signature or name, possibly "Rafiq", written across the middle of the page.

File

10a

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

20th August, 1951.

PF.603656/B.2.b/ASM

Dear

I enclose a copy of a translation of the document handed to the British Embassy Istanbul by Constantin VOLKOV in September 1945.

You will note one striking difference between this and the original translation - paragraph 2 clearly refers to 250 British agents whose identity was known to the NKGB, whereas the original translation made it appear that there were 250 NKGB agents in Great Britain.

There are in addition several minor amendments which no doubt you will wish to study. I would like to come and talk to you about this case as soon as you are ready to do so.

Yours sincerely,

^{ASW}
A.S. Martin.

G.A. Carey-Foster Esq., D.F.C., A.F.C.,
Foreign Office.

Enc.
/NIM

9/15/51
4 9-51
Bob Martin
8-187

File

9a

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

20th August, 1951.

PF.603656/B.2.b/ASM

Dear

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There are in addition several minor amendments which no doubt you will wish to study.

Yours sincerely,

ASM
A.S. Martin.

Enc.
/NLM

31/12/51
4-9-57
BOLTON
BLEN

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ACT 1958 July 2022

CONSTANTIN VOLKOV.

80
~~24.8.45~~
13.9.45

Russian.

Further to our talk, I have the honour to inform you that, on conditions stated below, I can deliver to the British Special Services the following documentary material from the Intelligence Directorate of the People's Commissariat of National Security (N.K.G.B.) whose agent I have been since 1936:-

1. A list of 314 Intelligence Directorate of NKGB's agents in Turkey. (The list includes both active and "sleeping" agents' networks. Official personality notes on certain agents are also available.)
2. A list of known to NKGB established agents of the British Military and Civilian Intelligence Services and their networks. The list enumerates some 250 official and unofficial members of the above services together with their personality sheets.
3. A list of material (in some cases their duplicates and photostatic copies) received by us from the agents of NKGB in the British Intelligence Services and the Foreign Office. (Judging by their code names there are 9 such agents in London.) This list is of extraordinary interest as it should make it possible to uncover NKGB networks in some extraordinarily important British Departments. I know for instance that one of the agents is a departmental Head of the British Counter-espionage Directorate in London and that another one is on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul.
S. Hill / Turkey
4. Copies of materials, files and special dossiers of the British Intelligence service.
5. Photostatic copies and translations of operational material of the British Intelligence Service, in particular the correspondence between London and General HILL.
6. A copy of the report by the Directorate of the Near-East Department of NKGB on the materials from the British Intelligence Services in Iran.
7. Detailed information about certain NKGB agents in Palestine, the Balkans and Iran (their code names and methods of contact).
8. A full list of the members of the Intelligence Directorate of NKGB in Moscow, their home addresses and their home and office telephone numbers. Also addresses of their garages and numbers of their cars.
9. Addresses of certain undercover flats used by the Intelligence Directorate of NKGB in Moscow.
10. Recruitment material on Captain (now probably Major) of the counter-espionage services of NKGB, the secretary of the "GLAVKA" (?) of the Ministry of Oil Production, and a woman official dealing with orders in one of the special divisions in Moscow. All three could be made use of in the interests of the British Services.
11. Two passes of officers of the Intelligence Department in Moscow for 1945 allowing access to all operational, registry and other departments of NKGB, NKVD, and counter-espionage directorates of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Navy. These passes could be used as models.
12. Samples of stamps and commandant's stamps of two directorates of NKGB which will make possible the issue of references and passes for taking out from the NKGB premises of official documents and files.

13. Samples of official forms and various entry cards of the NKGB Intelligence Directorate. The latter could be used to obtain, through the established procedure, any information from the operational-registry department of the Intelligence Directorate and other special departments in Moscow. The forms, above-mentioned, will make it possible for you to establish all NKGB networks in the world.
14. Keys to two offices of the NKGB Intelligence Directorate operational departments in Moscow containing secret files on the Near East.
15. There are other various documents bearing on the financial and operational position of various NKGB establishments.

This list of material available to me could be enlarged with documents which I could let you have here on the spot. The latter contain:-

1. Copies of coded telegrams to Moscow and to the Ambassador whose value (apart from their contents) is that they may enable you to break the code for outgoing telegrams from the Consulate General (and also maybe for the incoming ones).
2. A list of establishment officers of the NKGB Intelligence Directorate, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Navy, operating in Turkey under cover of legal establishments (their code names and functions within the network). Also a partial list for Iran and Egypt.
3. Several keys of offices, safes and outside doors of the Consulate General.
4. Books of notes on the conversations between the Consulate officials and visitors, also other official documents.
5. I could, if necessary, provide a schematic plan of the political and military networks of U.S.S.R. in Turkey and also of the NKGB Intelligence Directorate in Moscow.
6. I could also prepare a detailed report on the organisation of counter-espionage in Red Army units, their competence and methods of work.
7. Apart from that I could explain the measures taken by NKGB against the British Secret Service in Moscow also the source of the British diplomatic and military codes received (in Moscow).

Conditions on which the above material can be handed over to you are as follows:-

1. Complete secrecy about this offer. No mention of it to be made by radio or telegraph.
2. All negotiations with your principals to be made direct and without middlemen.
3. Loss of my appointment and status is to be adequately compensated by simultaneously handing to me at least £50,000. This is the minimum considering the value of the material you will receive and the inevitable consequences to all my relatives in U.S.S.R.
4. Assurance of my refuge and guarantee of full safety.

Your decision (positive or negative) is to reach me before September 25th or at the latest October 1st 1945. I could be summoned for talk on any of the Consulate telephones provided necessary precautions are taken. (It will be better if in such a case I were to be summoned officially and personally in the name of the Consulate as this will not raise suspicions.)

In conclusion, I assure you and the Government of Great Britain that my present modest contribution will hasten the just vengeance in the interests of the powerful union of British peoples and of the freedom loving and long suffering mankind.

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86

OPEN by slitting right hand edge.
RE-USE with Economy Label.

Photostat Copy within.

(made 22.10.55)

ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT HANDLED BY VOJKOV
TO BRITISH EMBASSY ISTANBUL.

15th
(Received from Foreign Office August 1951)

Returned by hand to Mr. Carey-Foster
(Foreign office by Mr. Martin)

31.10.57

248/185
15-5-57
✓
BANKING
1957

86
дящих из генконсульства шифртелеграмм/ а может быть и входящих/.

- 2- Список кадровых офицеров Разведуправления НКГБ, Наркомата Обороны и Наркомата Военно-Морского Флота СССР, работающих под прикрытием легальных Советских представительств в Турции / их клички и функции каждого в резидентуре/.

Также- не полный список по Ирану и Египту.

- 3- Несколько ключей от кабинетов, сейфов и входных дверей генконсульства.
- 4- Тетради записей бесед руководства генконсульства с посетителями, также как и другая служебная документация.
- 5- Специально могу составить структурную схему политической и военных разведок СССР в Турции, а также Разведуправления НКГБ в Москве.
6. Одновременно могу написать подробный доклад о построении органов военной контр-разведки в частях Красной Армии, их компетенции и методах работы.
- 7- Кроме того, могу дать объяснения о проведенных НКГБ мероприятиях в отношении английской секретной службы в Москве, / ХИЛЛ, БАРКЛЕЙ/, также, как и источниках получения образцов английского дипломатического и военного шифров/в Москве/

Условия, при которых может состояться передача в Ваше распоряжение всех перечисленных выше материалов,- следующие:-

- 1- Сохранение в абсолютной тайне сделанных мной предложений. Воздержание от передачи каких-либо депеш по настоящему вопросу, с использованием радио или телеграфа.
- 2- Все согласования с Вашим руководством должны проходить

непосредственно и без участия каких-либо посредников.

- 3- Потеря мной должности и положения должна быть достойным образом компенсирована, единовременным вручением мне, по крайней мере- 50.000 фунтов стерлингов.

Я называю эту цифру как минимальную, учитывая значимость передаваемых Вам материалов и последствия, с которыми неизбежно столкнутся все мои родственники, проживающие на территории СССР.

- 4- Предоставление мне убежища, также, как и гарантий полной безопасности.

О любом Вашем решении / положительном или отрицательном/ прошу поставить меня в известность до 25-го сентября, или в крайнем случае- до 1-го октября 1945 года.

Вызов меня для переговоров возможен по любому из консульских телефонов, безусловно, с соблюдением требуемой осторожности. / Лучше, если бы при таковой необходимости, вызов был бы обличен в форму официального и персонального приглашения и обязательно от имени консульства, что не вызовет подозрений/.

В заключение, заверяю Вас и в Вашем лице- Правительство Великобритании, что мой настоящий вклад и скромное участие приблизят дату справедливого отмщения ради интересов мргучего содружества Британских народов, ради свободолюбивого и истрадавшегося человечества.

Ваш искренний друг

В дополнение к нашему разговору, имею честь сообщить Вам, что на указанных ниже условиях я могу передать в распоряжение специальной английской службы всю перечисленную документацию Разведывательного Управления Наркомата Государственной Безопасности СССР, сотрудником которого я являюсь с осени 1936 года.

1- Список агентуры Разведуправления НКГБ в Турции на 314 человек./ В списке учтена, как действующая, так и законсервированная агентура. На отдельных агентов имеются официальные характеристики/

2- Список известных НКГБ кадровых сотрудников военной и гражданской разведок Великобритании, ~~также~~ как и их агентуры. В списке значатся около 250 гласных и негласных сотрудников поименованной службы, на которых указаны характеризующие их данные.

3- Список материалов./ а в отдельных случаях, - их дубликаты и фото-копии/, переданных нам агентами НКГБ, являющимися сотрудниками английских развед. органов и Министерства Иностранных Дел Великобритании.

/ Судя по кличкам, таковых агентов в Лондоне насчитывается -9 /

4- Этот список представляет исключительный интерес, т.к. дает возможность установить агентуру НКГБ в чрезвычайно важных Британских учреждениях. Мне, например, известно, что один из агентов НКГБ исполняет обязан-

ности начальника отдела английского контр-разведывательного Управления в Лондоне, а другой работает в аппарате Британского консульства в Стамбуле.

- 4- Копии материалов дел-формуляров и специальных досье английской разведки.
- 5- Фото-клише и переводы руководящих материалов английской разведки, в частности переписка Лондона с генералом ХИЛЛ.
- 6- Копия заключения руководства Ближне-Восточного Отдела Разведуправления НКГБ по материалам английских разведорганов в Иране.
- 7- Подробные данные в отношении некоторых агентов НКГБ, находящихся в Палестине, Балканских странах и Иране./ их клички и условия связи/.
- 8- Полный список сотрудников Разведуправления НКГБ в Москве, их домашние адреса и №№ служебных и домашних телефонов. Также адреса автогаражей и №№ автомашин Разведуправления НКГБ.
- 9- Адреса некоторых конспиративных квартир Разведуправления НКГБ в Москве.
- 10- Вербовочный материал на капитана/ теперь, очевидно-майора/ контр-разведывательной службы НКГБ, секретаря Главка Наркомата Нефтяной Промышленности и сотрудницы для поручений в одной из дивизий специального назначения в Москве. Все эти три лица могут быть использованы в интересах английской службы.
- II- Два подлинных удостоверения личности офицеров Разведуправления НКГБ в Москве на 1945 год, дающих право прохода во все оперативные, архивные и другие служебные

помещения НКГБ, НКВД и контр-разведывательных управлений Наркомата Обороны и Наркомата Военно-Морского Флота СССР.

Эти удостоверения могут быть использованы в качестве образцов.

12- Образцы штампов и комендантских печатей двух управлений НКГБ, дающих возможность выписки справок и пропусков на право выноса из здания НКГБ СССР пакетов служебной документации.

13- Образцы служебных бланков и всевозможных учетных карточек, Разведуправления НКГБ. Последние могут быть использованы для получения установленным в НКГБ порядком любых справок из оперативно-учетного отделения Разведуправления и других специальных управлений в Москве.

Наличие указанных выше бланков даст вам возможность установить агентуру НКГБ по всем странам мира.

14- Ключи от двух кабинетов оперативных отделений Разведуправления НКГБ в Москве, где хранится секретная документация по Ближнему Востоку.

15- Имеются еще всевозможные документы, характеризующие финансовое состояние и оперативные возможности отдельных резидентур НКГБ СССР.

Этот список располагаемых мной материалов может быть дополнен за счет документов, которые я имею возможность передать вам здесь на месте. К числу последних относятся:

I- Копии отправленных в Москву и послу шифротелеграм, ценность которых, /помимо содержания/, заключается в возможности дальнейшего расшифрования всех исхо-

TOP SECRET

PF. 603656

8a

NOTE

I called on Mr. Carey-Foster (F.O.) today and discussed with him further steps which we wish to take in the case of Constantin VOLKOV. I explained that our enquiries would be along two fronts:

- 1) to assume that VOLKOV's sudden flight from Turkey was the result of a leakage from British sources and to attempt to trace the source of that leakage;
- 2) to re-examine the information supplied by VOLKOV and attempt to identify the spy whose presence either in Istanbul or the Foreign Office, London, had caused VOLKOV to insist that his information was not telegraphed.

[I asked Carey-Foster for the following information:]

- a) a list of Foreign Office personnel who were aware of the proposed defection of VOLKOV on or before 22.9.45;
- b) the original Russian document in which VOLKOV described the information he had to offer;
- c) a list of cipher clerks employed in the British Consulate and Embassy in Istanbul in September 1945 and a similar list of those employed in the Foreign Office, London, at that time.

Mr. Carey-Foster said that he would provide this information.

B.2.b
8.8.51

A.S. Martin
A.S. Martin

New but
Exa to K595/46

27/10/51
4-9-51

The information proffered by Constantin VOLKOV was in two parts, the first part being that which he offered at a meeting with Mr. J.L. REED at the British Consulate on 4.9.1945., and the second part being what has come to be known as his "Sales Catalogue" which was contained in a letter handed by VOLKOV to Mr. G.H. Page, Vice-Consul, Istanbul. on 13.9.45. 80

Meeting Between Constantin VOLKOV and Mr. J.L. REED on 4.9.1945.

Information given by VOLKOV (as interpreted by REED).

For 2½ years the Soviet authorities had been able to read all cipher messages between Foreign Office and British Embassy in Moscow.

The Russians were able to read [redacted] S.O.E. messages in Moscow.

The Russians had two agents in the Foreign Office in London and seven agents in the British Intelligence Services.

VOLKOV knew the names of British agents in Turkey, [redacted] REED, etc.

VOLKOV said he had a suitcase in an empty flat in Moscow which contained the names of 314 Soviet agents in the United Kingdom.

ko (by implication) that there was a spy in the Building where the interview took place

Comments.

This could mean that the Russians had broken our cipher by technical means, or that they had obtained cipher books from a spy.

cf 7 under Sales Catalogue part 1

It is noted that no location was given for the "seven agents in the British Intelligence Services," but from Item 3 of the "Sales Catalogue" it would seem that these particular spies (Foreign Office and British Intelligence Service) were situated in London.

VOLKOV was accurate in respect of [redacted] but not in the case of REED. It would seem that VOLKOV knew REED's name, but did not in fact know him personally and was mistaken as to his functions.

There seems no doubt that Mr. REED made an error here, because in his own translation of the "sales catalogue" he says, "a list of agents of the N.K.G.B. in Turkey numbering 314 men". Both new translations confirm this interpretation.

VOLKOV'S "Sales Catalogue".

Verbatim Reproduction of 1951 Revised Translation.

1. A list of 314 Intelligence Directorate of N.K.G.B.'s agents in Turkey. (The list includes both active and "sleeping" agents' networks. Official personality notes on certain agents are also available.)

2. A list of some 250 official and unofficial members of the British Military and Civilian Intelligence Services and their networks who are known to the N.K.G.B.

Comments.

VOLKOV stated that he was Deputy Chief of the N.K.G.B. in Turkey. If true, he must have had this information.

At first sight, 250 seems a large number of British Intelligence personnel to be "blown" to the Russians, but when it is considered that this figure may have included serving members of the Intelligence Corps as well as members of [redacted] and M.I.5, and agents of the services anywhere in the world, it is not so considerable.

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3. A list of material (in some cases their duplicates and photostatic copies) received by us from the agents of N.K.G.B. in the British Intelligence Services and the Foreign Office. (Judging by their code names there are nine such agents in London). This list is of extraordinary interest as it should make it possible to uncover N.K.G.B. networks in some extraordinarily important British Departments. I know for instance that one of the agents is a departmental Head of the British Counter-espionage Directorate in London and that another one is on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul.
4. Copies of materials, files and special dossiers of the British Intelligence Service.
5. Photostatic copies and translations of operations material of the British Intelligence Service, in particular the correspondence between London [redacted]
6. A copy of the report by the Directorate of the Near-East Department of the N.K.G.B. on the materials from the British Intelligence Services in Iran.
7. Detailed information about certain N.K.G.B. agents in Palestine, the Balkans and Iran (their code names and methods of contact).
8. A full list of the members of the Intelligence Directorate of N.K.G.B. in Moscow, their home addresses and their home and Office telephone numbers. Also addresses of their garages and numbers of their cars.
9. Addresses of certain undercover flats used by the Intelligence Directorate of N.K.G.B. in Moscow.
10. Recruitment material on Captain (now probably Major) of the counter-espionage services of N.K.G.B., the secretary of the "GLAVKA" (?) of the Ministry of Oil Production, and a woman official dealing with orders in one of the special divisions in Moscow. All three could be made use of in the interests of the British Services.
1. Two passes of officers of the Intelligence Department in Moscow for 1945 allowing access to all operation, registry and other departments of N.K.G.B., N.K.B.D., and counter-espionage directorates of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Navy. These passes could be used as edels.

It would seem that VOLKOV knew of these agents (VOLKOV regarded them as "agents". They may have been informants to whom code names were given) by their code names and by the material they produced and, in some cases, by their official position, but not by their real names. It seems probable that the 9 agents mentioned referred specifically to London and that the agent on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul must be reckoned as yet another.

If VOLKOV had this material with him or available in his flat in Moscow he must have been contemplating defection for some time.

This material could presumably have been obtained from a British Intelligence Service spy in London [redacted]

This appears to suggest a British Intelligence Service spy in Iran, or alternatively that the report in question derived from Anglo/Soviet intelligence liaison in Teheran. The report itself might presumably have been sent to VOLKOV in Turkey.

Possibly within the scope of the N.K.G.B. officer in Istanbul to have this information.

This material would seem to be of a kind available in the "Admin. Division" of any intelligence service.

Comment as in (8).

Information presumably obtained in Moscow. This suggests that VOLKOV may have been discontented before his arrival in Istanbul and knew of others in the same position.

Comment as in (8).

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12. Samples of stamps and commandant's stamps of two directorates of N.K.G.B. which will make possible the issue of references and passes for taking out from the N.K.G.B. premises of official documents and files.

Comments as in (8).

13. Samples of official forms and various entry cards of the N.K.G.B. Intelligence Directorate. The latter could be used to obtain, through the established procedure, any information from the operational-registry department of the Intelligence Directorate and other special departments in Moscow. The forms, above-mentioned, will make it possible for you to establish all N.K.G.B. networks in the world.

Comment as in (8).

14. Keys to two offices of the N.K.G.B. Intelligence Directorate operational departments in Moscow containing secret files on the Near East.

Comment as in (8).

There are other various documents bearing on the financial and operational position of various N.K.G.B. establishments.

Comment as in (8).

About half the items of information are such as might have been within the reach of an officer in charge of the administration of an intelligence office rather than within that of an executive intelligence officer. The variety of items offered suggests that VOLKOV may have been collecting information with the idea of defection for some time prior to his posting to Istanbul, and this is certainly borne out by the statement that documentary material offered in the first part of his "Sales Catalogue" was, apparently, to be collected from a suitcase in a flat in Moscow.

"Sales Catalogue" PART II.

1. Copies of coded telegrams to Moscow and to the Ambassador whose value (apart from their contents) is that they may enable you to break the code for outgoing telegrams from the Consulate General (and also maybe for the incoming ones).

Presumably available to VOLKOV in Istanbul.

2. A list of establishment officers of the N.K.G.B. Intelligence Directorate, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Navy, operating in Turkey under cover of legal establishments (their code names and functions within the network). Also a partial list for Iran and Egypt.

This is similar material to that offered in (1) of Part 1.

3. Several keys of offices, safes and outside doors of the Consulate General.

Comments as in (1).

4. Books of notes on the conversations between the Consulate officials and visitors, also other official documents.

Comments as in (1).

5. I could, if necessary, provide a schematic plan of the political and military networks of U.S.S.R. in Turkey and also of the N.K.G.B. Intelligence Directorate in Moscow.
6. I could also prepare a detailed report on the organisation of counter-espionage in Red Army units, their competence and methods of work.
7. Apart from that I could explain the measures taken by N.K.G.B. against the British Secret Service in Moscow (HILL, BARCLAY) also the source of the British diplomatic and military codes received (in Moscow).

Comments as in (1).

This offer seems to be exaggerated but the information might be within the knowledge of an N.K.G.B. officer.

This offer at least shows that VOLKOV knew who HILL and BARCLAY were, but this may have been common knowledge in Moscow at the time.

Conditions made by VOLKOV.

1. Complete secrecy about this offer. No mention of it to be made by radio or telegraph.
2. All negotiations with your principals to be made direct and without middlemen.
3. Loss of my appointment and status is to be adequately compensated by simultaneously handing to me at least £50,000. This is the minimum considering the value of the material you will receive and the inevitable consequences to all my relatives in the U.S.S.R.
4. Assurance of my refuge and guarantee of full safety.
5. Your decision (positive or negative) is to reach me before September 25th or at the latest October 1st, 1945.

This suggests that he genuinely believed that our ciphers could be read in Moscow, or that the N.K.G.B. had a spy in the Foreign Office cipher department, or that the Istanbul spy was a cipher clerk. It also suggests that he knew he was safe from the N.K.G.B. spy working in the Consulate. Perhaps he knew that this individual was in Ankara at the time of his offer or on leave.

He wished to deal only with the Foreign Office and did not wish the Intelligence Service to be called in.

VOLKOV valued himself high but I think his information would have been cheap at the price.

No comment.

VOLKOV's insistence on dates suggests that he may have had reason to believe that he would not be in a position to defect after 1st October, 1945., or possibly that he knew that the Istanbul spy would have returned to the British Consulate by October 1st.

General Comments.

It can be said that the information offered by VOLKOV would appear to be such as would be available to a well-placed officer of an intelligence service. As none of the material offered was in fact received it is quite impossible to assess its reliability. It is, however, clear that VOLKOV was aware of certain British Intelligence Service activities, i.e. the functions of HILL and BARCLAY (S.O.E.

and S.I.S. representatives respectively) in Moscow and the functions of [redacted] and [redacted] in Turkey. It is, of course, possible, and in the cases of HILL and BARCLAY, probable that this was a rather open secret.

Two items of information proffered by VOLKOV which may be thought to have been confirmed by later events are the following:-

- 1) Two N.K.G.B. spies in the Foreign Office in London; since it is now known that D.D. MACLEAN was an active Soviet spy in 1945 it has been thought most probable that he was one of the two Foreign Office spies mentioned by VOLKOV. As against this it must be remembered that VOLKOV specifically stated that the spy was operating in London whereas D.D. MACLEAN was en poste in Washington at the time.

Guy BURGESS, who has been considered as a possible candidate for one of the two Foreign Office spies, was a member of the News Department of the Foreign Office in 1945, having joined the Foreign Service in June, 1944. BURGESS was at this time also employed as an outside agent of the Security Service. VOLKOV held, officially, the appointment of a Vice-Consul of the British Consulate General in Istanbul. He arrived in Istanbul from Moscow to take up the appointment in June, 1945, and left Istanbul accompanied by his wife, Loya VOLKOVA, in a Russian military plane on 26th September, 1945. It is possible, therefore, that VOLKOV may have been referring to BURGESS. Although BURGESS could be one of these two Foreign Office spies, it is quite impossible to say that he was. Apart from the fact that VOLKOV gave us nothing that would serve to identify the spy, we have no evidence that BURGESS was actively engaged in espionage in 1945 although it is in a high degree probable that he was.

- 2) VOLKOV said that one of the N.K.G.B. spies in the British Intelligence Services held the post of a Departmental Head of the British Counter-Espionage Directorate in London; a case has been made against H.A.R. PHILBY as a Soviet spy. A number of occurrences in his history can be interpreted as the acts of a spy, but while the cumulative weight of the circumstantial evidence is considerable, the case against him has not been proved and in all probability never will be. As regards VOLKOV's statement, PHILBY was in 1945 Head of Section IX of S.I.S. This section was responsible for studying Russian espionage and could be accurately described as a counter-espionage department. PHILBY's handling of the VOLKOV case constitutes, in my view, one of the strong points in the case against him.

CONCLUSIONS.

In my opinion, the VOLKOV information suggests the following:-

- 1) VOLKOV was an officer of the N.K.G.B. as claimed.
- 2) The information offered by VOLKOV was such as could have been known to an officer of the N.K.G.B. at Headquarters in Moscow.
- 3) VOLKOV had been contemplating defection prior to leaving Moscow.
- 4) He knew of the existence of at least three spies in the Foreign Service, i.e. two in London and one in Istanbul.
- 5) He knew of the existence of seven spies in the British Intelligence Service in London and knew the official position of one.
- 6) He knew of the existence of spy networks in various British Government Departments but did not know details of their composition or personalities.
- 7) He knew British cyphers to be compromised to the Russians and probably thought he knew how this had happened.

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8) The nine spies mentioned by VOLKOV as being situated in London cannot be regarded as the sum total of Russian spies in British Government employment.

My conclusion is that VOLKOV's "Sales Catalogue" material should be regarded as authentic. It remains, therefore, that even allowing a margin for exaggeration and for some degree of error by VOLKOV's sources it is possible that there are still undetected Russian spies in British Government employment.

6a
7a.

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5a

Extract for file :- P.F. 603,656 Name :- VOLKOV.
 Original in file :- L. 76E/21. Serial:- la Receipt Date :- -
 Original from :- American Embassy. Ref:- No.600. Dated:- 14.9.48.
 Extracted on :- 13.12.48. By :- BHE Section:- R.4.

Extract from report from American Embassy, forwarding Copy No., 100 dated 1.8.48. of 'Check list of Soviet Officials and semi-Officials abroad, based on information covering 1940-48, and received prior to 15.6.48. mentioning :- VOLKOV.

<u>Name.</u>	<u>Last reported Information.</u>	<u>Date of Information.</u>
VOLKOV, Konstantin.	Vice Consul, Istanbul, Left for Moscow 10.11.45.	11/45

A report has been received re., the above named individual implicating him/her with Espionage activities. It should be noted, that although much of this information comes from reliable sources, a large proportion is based upon undocumented reports of variable reliability, in many cases unsupported by adequate evidence.

VDF:R
7/1/49

4B

Constantin VOLKOV

On 24.8.45, Mr. Page, British Vice Consul of Istanbul, received the following letter:-

"Dear Sir, I should be very much obliged if you would receive me at the British Consulate to-day or to-morrow evening at 10 o'clock. I want to speak to you on important and urgent business.

Would you kindly let me know whether you can receive me. As a confirmation of your agreement, please send me your visiting card by courier or ring the Consulate up (the telephone number is 42610), addressing the man on duty in such a way:

"The British Consulate requests your Consul to call upon us for negotiations regarding the Soviet citizen by the name of Beergence".

Please note that if the presence of an interpreter is necessary, it is desirable that he should be an Englishman.

Hoping to hear from you soon, I am very truly yours," (The visiting card of Consul VOLKOV a member of the Soviet Embassy was attached.)

After consultation with Mr. Hurst, Mr. Page decided to ignore this letter.

On 4.9.45 VOLKOV arrived at the British Consulate in Istanbul and saw Mr. Page. He was brought by an official of P.C.O. to Mr. Reed of the the British Embassy. VOLKOV said that what he had to tell Mr. Reed was of a strictly private nature and the official was sent away.

VOLKOV introduced himself as the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Security Service in Turkey and without further preliminaries said he had some information of great importance to give to Mr. Reed. He alleged that he would be able to provide information on Soviet Intelligence activities directed against Britain. Mr. Reed asked him why he was telling him this, to which he replied that he had quarrelled with his Ambassador and other members of his Embassy and could not stand it any more. He became quite excited at this juncture - although both before and afterwards he remained sitting very quietly - talking very fast and never looking at Mr. Reed. This made him at times difficult to understand but Mr. Reed says that he seemed normal, sober and composed.

VOLKOV then told Mr. Reed that he had an empty flat in Moscow in which he had left a suitcase containing the names of Soviet agents in the U.K. and a great deal of other information connected with Soviet activities. It could be arranged for somebody to go and collect this suitcase which was supposed to contain only private papers. This all seemed so extraordinary to Mr. Reed that he told VOLKOV that he was not particularly interested in what happened in Moscow, but would like to know more details of the work against Britain. VOLKOV refused to give these details until Mr. Reed could confirm that the British were "interested" in the information he had to give. He was not asked for

Handwritten note:
The presence of an interpreter is necessary?
differs from
version 1a

a definition of the word "interested" but was told the conversation would be reported to Mr. Reed's superiors.

VOLKOV begged that if any account of the conversation were sent to London it should go in writing and not by telegraph and that the information he had given should be restricted to the minimum number of people. What he had to say he wished to say only to Mr. Reed. Mr. Reed was not to telephone to VOLKOV who would come and see him again in a few days' time.

He was asked if he were not running a considerable risk in making these visits but he said that he was not - that he was not being followed or watched and that only his wife knew what he was up to. He then went away.

On the 13th September 1945 - nine days after his interview with Mr. Reed - VOLKOV handed to Mr. Page a long letter addressed to Mr. Reed. In this he asked for the following guarantees:

- "1. The maintenance of absolute secrecy with regard to my proposal. The non-despatch of any record about the matter either by radio or telegraph.
2. All agreements with your Management must be conducted directly and without the participation of any third parties.
3. The loss of my post and situation must be worthily compensated by an immediate payment to me of at least £50,000 sterling. I consider this sum as a minimum, considering the importance of the material and evidence given to you, as the result of which all my relatives living in the territory of the U. S. S. R. are doomed.
4. The offer to me of a refuge and also a guarantee of full safe conduct. I beg you to communicate to me your decision either provisionally or definitely by the 25th September or at the latest by 1st October 1945".

In return for these concessions, VOLKOV offered a long catalogue of information which he represented himself as able to provide. He said that he himself had been an official of the N. K. G. B. Intelligence Service since the Autumn of 1936. There is no doubt that had he really been able to provide all that he offered, the information would have been of inestimable value.

Late in September and early October three telephone calls were made to the Soviet Consulate in an attempt to get into touch with VOLKOV. The first was answered by the Russian Consul General, the second by a man speaking English who claimed to be VOLKOV, but clearly was not, and the last by the Russian telephone operator who said that VOLKOV had left for Moscow.

Enquiries showed that VOLKOV and Mrs. VOLKOV had in fact left by air for Russia on 26th September 1945 in a plane which was carrying a Doctor and two persons who were described as Diplomatic Couriers, but who had not formerly appeared on any Soviet courier lists.

24 JUL 1951

M.I.5. already have a copy of the papers attached to R.G.HOWE's letter of 19.9.45. to Sir A. CADOGAN. In connection with these papers the following points are noted.

On August 24th 1945 VOLKOV wrote a personal letter to the Vice-Consul, PAGE, asking to be received either that day or the next evening on urgent and important business. An interpreter would be needed and he should be an Englishman. HURST, the Consul-General and PAGE decided to ignore this letter and suspected that VOLKOV's name was being used without his knowledge.

On Sept. 4th 1945. VOLKOV called at the Consulate General. to interpret. VOLKOV then told Mr. PAGE that he wished to see Mr. REED the 1st Secretary of the Embassy.

PAGE then telephoned REED and sent VOLKOV over accompanied by [redacted] VOLKOV insisted that his interview with REED should be private, so [redacted] was sent out.

According to an account written by REED on the same day VOLKOV told him (among other things) that

1. (a) The Soviet authorities had been able to read all cypher messages between the F.O. and the Embassy in Moscow for the last 2½ years.
- (b) They could also read messages from BARCLAY.
- (c) Also from Col. HILL - these were particularly easy to decypher.
2. The Russians had:
 - (a) 2 agents inside the F.O.
 - (b) 7 inside the British I.S.

3. He was not apprehensive about making this visit, as he was not being followed or watched and only his wife knew what he was up to.

This minute was forwarded by BUSK in Istanbul to HELM in Ankara, who received it on September 5th 1945 and forwarded it to CODRINGTON at the F.O. on the same day.

On September 13th VOLKOV handed PAGE an envelope addressed to REED which REED translated as best he could. This described the information which VOLKOV was prepared to supply. Among other items it offered the following:

1. (a) a list of N.K.G.B. agents in the English Intelligence Service and the F.O. in Great Britain. (apparently nine)
- (b) One of the above agents acts as head of a Section of the British C.E. Service in London.
- (c) Another works in the British Consulate in Istanbul.
2. (a) Explanations of the measures taken by the N.K.G.B. in connection with the English Secret Service in Moscow (HILL and BARCLAY).

(b) Explanation of the sources from which the N.K.G.B. have received copies of British diplomatic and military cyphers in Moscow.

22.9.45. C.S.S. signalled our Mid East representative personally that PHILBY would leave U.K. for Istanbul via Cairo on Sept 26th before going on to Istanbul.

22.9.45.

PHILBY took with him a letter of instruction from CADOGAN to HELM in which it was said that it had been agreed with C.S.S. that the case should continue to be handled by REED, who would be briefed by PHILBY

If possible the handling of the case should be restricted to these persons, but HELM could decide whether PHILBY should also inform the Ambassador and BUSK of the F.O.'s views on the case.

29.9.45. PHILBY signalled that PAGE telephoned at noon of 29th Sept. to the Soviet Consulate to arrange an appointment with VOLKOV, but the Soviet Consul General himself replied that VOLKOV was "not in".

PAGE telephoned again later and was answered by a person who claimed to be that of VOLKOV (but was not) who agreed, nevertheless, to meet PAGE this afternoon, however, nobody arrived to keep the appointment. This looks ominous but we will try again on Monday.

1.10.45. Telegram from PHILBY

Today the telephone operator at the Soviet Consulate informed PAGE and VOLKOV is in Moscow.

PHILBY adds that he has not thoroughly investigated the possibility of a local leakage and asks if he is to do so, though his own view is that such investigation should be undertaken by the F.O., in which case he proposes to leave on October 3rd.

2.10.45.

it was clear there had been a leakage of VOLKOV was watched when he visited HELM. Possible indiscretion on the part of should be followed up.

PHILBY was asked whether he could ascertain the names of all Russians who left Turkey over the relevant period, how long VOLKOV had been stationed in Istanbul and whether his wife was still there. In reply he said that our local representative had this in hand.

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As regards cryptographic work itself, the following sets out what was said:

REED's account of 4.9.45.

The Soviet had been able to read all FO/Embassy, Moscow cypher messages for the last 2 1/2 years. Also messages from Col. HILL - the latter were particularly easy to decipher.

VOLKOV's written offer.

VOLKOV offered an explanation of the sources from which the N.K.G.B. have received copies of British diplomatic and military cyphers in Moscow.

Reference

PHIBBY's report

The "sales-catalogue" makes no mention of Soviet cryptographic work. If copies of telegrams are in the office of the N.K.G.B. their most likely source would be the N.K.G.B. agents in the P.O. and British I.S.

76

Meanwhile our representative in Istanbul reported that it was not established that a Russian military plane had arrived (without notification to or authorisation from the Turkish authorities) at Yesilkoy airfield on 25.9.45. from Sofia.

It had been occupied by:

Lt. Ivan LUKIYEVIC	1st pilot.
Lt. Grigori PAVLOV	2nd pilot.
2/Lt. Igor DIMITRIEV	mechanic.
2/Lt. Alexandre ULIANOVIC	"
Sgt/Maj. Mikhail SHANOV	Radio operator.
Col. PETERCIN.	Doctor.

The plane took off again at 16:00 on 26.9.45 with the following passengers in addition to the above:

Constantin VOLKOV	Soviet Consul, Istanbul.
Loya VOLKHOVA	Wife of above.
Andre SILOVA or SILOVA	Consular Secretary.
Andre BAIKO	
Alexandre DANILOV	

"Diplomatic couriers" who had arrived by train from Bulgaria on Sept. 24th with Turkish visas issued Moscow on Sept. 21 and 22nd respectively, proceeding to Ankara and reaching the YESILKOH airfield from there one hour before the plane took off. (Their names did not appear in a subsequent list of diplomatic couriers).

Our representative in Istanbul interviewed [redacted] who was at first reluctant to talk as he had been sworn to secrecy by REED. He stated that when he was left alone with VOLKOV, the latter said he knew about him and knew his christian name. [redacted] remembered, almost certainly, that VOLKOV arrived on this occasion in a chauffeur driven Soviet Embassy car.

Our representative does not believe there was any leakage on our side, but that VOLKOV was either suspected, caught out or recalled as the result of his quarrel with his Ambassador and colleagues.

18.10.45. Andrei SILOVA (now shown as SILOVA), whose role had presumably been that of an escort, returned to Istanbul on 4.10.45. from Sofia.

18.10.45. On C.S.S. instructions, PHIBBY prepared a rather shorter account of this affair for the P.O., which concluded as follows:

It is extremely unlikely that we shall ever hear of VOLKOV

See 1300/Di/17th Oct. (Slona)

See for Sentinels

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again. From the evidence already at hand, we can draw the following conclusions:

- 1) VOLKOFF's statement that he was an officer of the R.K.G.B. was true; he genuinely intended to put his information at our disposal, on conditions.
- 2) Although he probably exaggerated considerably the quantity of intelligence which he was in a position to give us, there is little doubt that his information would have been of great value.
- 3) It is exceedingly difficult to guess which parts of his statement were true and which parts exaggerated or false. We regard the figures of 250 and 314 for R.K.G.B. agents in the U.K. and Turkey respectively as wildly exaggerated. We tend strongly to the opinion that VOLKOFF was mistaken (possibly honestly) in asserting that R.K.G.B. cryptographers were reading Foreign Office and S.I.S. telegrams. On the other hand, information from other sources leads us to take seriously his statement that there are two R.K.G.B. agents in the Foreign Office and seven in the British "Intelligence Service".
- 4) It is extremely unlikely (though of course it is impossible to speak with certainty) that indiscretion in the British Embassy in Istanbul was the cause of VOLKOFF's exposure to the Russians. The more probable explanation is that VOLKOFF betrayed himself. He was resident in the Embassy; he had confided in his wife; he had quarrelled with his Ambassador; and, ever since August 24th, he must have been living in a state of great nervous anxiety. It is quite probable that his quarrels led to his being watched, and that either he or his wife, or both, made some fatal mistake.

Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that VOLKOFF's information as to the existence of R.K.G.B. agents in official positions is so vague that it is improbable that we shall succeed in identifying them. To scrutinise the past records, and maintain observation, of all those who might possibly fill the bill would be an impracticable as it would be invidious. While we, and no doubt M.I.5. as well, will do all that is possible in this respect, my own firm belief is that we shall achieve success only by offensive methods. It is in the U.S.S.R. itself, and in its diplomatic and commercial missions outside its boundaries, that the roots of this activity are to be found. If we want the information, we shall have to go and get it.

6.

8.3.46. M.I.5. SPY.422/Turkey/P.2.c/JHM of 8.3.46. asked whether certain Constantine VOLKOV may be identical with the VOLKOFF known to us.

3.4.46.

Our CX. 95504/A/R.5.2. of 3.4.46 gave an unsatisfactory answer owing to VOLKOV's name not having been carded.

8.4.46.

PHILBY minuted Head of Registry asking that this should be repaired without delay.

9.4.46.

Our CX. 50396/R.5. of 9.4.46 to M.I.5. (Mars) PHILBY apologises for the lapse of our first letter and says the identification is very unlikely.

13.1.48. to 3.6.48. Over this period there was a renewed attempt (by OLDFIELD) to establish whether the two VOLKOV's were identical, which ended in proving with certainty that they were not.

7.

MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS.

- (a) In connection with VOLKOV's agent was working in the

3b-4a.

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SECRET.

Tb 17a

3A
Ba

SFY.422/Turkey/P.2.c./JHM

8th March, 1946.

Dear [redacted]

I have been informed by Special Branch that on 20.2.46. there embarked at Woolwich Buoy on the Soviet vessel Yakutsk one Constantine VOLKOV, a Soviet citizen born 14.10.14. at Volonna and holder of passport No. 23930 issued in Moscow on 9.11.45. He was accompanied by his wife and child and I am wondering whether he is by any chance identical with the individual known to you who was Vice Consul in Istanbul. I imagine that this is exceedingly unlikely.

for the USA

Yours sincerely,

J. H. Marriott.

[redacted]
JHM/MVR.

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SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER

R34 PA 422 / Near ME / Cont Vol

20
2

Office File No. Section of Origin

Date Signed GW

66960
6457
A

To:
Ottawa

Reference your letter No. MP 52 of 30.10.45
our telegram

F2B 3/10 x
O

Following for HOLLIS:

Yes but on strictly confidential basis owing to remote possibility agent's return.

R34
Re attached file:
No extracts etc
of 422 / 5er
Time
to be
being.
bonae des in mind
A.S. 26/11

O.T.P.

No. DS/2636/45
Date. 31.10.45
Ciphered by W.K.

contact
before despatch

EPBUB
11.653.

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.


2B
~~9/5/45~~

SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER

From : RCMP Ottawa Office File No. Originator's No. MP 52
 Passed for Action to D.B. Date of Origin 30.10.45
 Date of Receipt 30.10.45
 Copies to Deciphered by W.K.

NIGHTCAP. MOST IMMEDIATE.

May I tell first STEPHENSON, second Canadian Authorities, third our Washington Embassy story KIM's recent trip. Reply most urgent yes or no only if possible.



The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments, or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

CFBUB
11.6.53

CFB/R34
2.13.4

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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 JANUARY 2023

CONSTANTIN VOLKOV NT

Vice-Consul

Soviet Embassy

Consulate General ISTANBUL

Mr. Mamott

Did you see this?

Guy told me he had not yet read it. I should like to have it back in due course.

Make the
+ fiction to Feb 1944

Russ. make
S.F 422/Turkey
Jst.

See. About you.

pl. card
VOLKOV

of 1945

? Near Middle East

L.H.

16441

FKA.

F2B Col. Sam...

with you NY Box...

Summit.

Russ. 20/10

10/10

Register No.

Minute Sheet No. ~~1111~~ ~~2A~~

[redacted] after Shilby's arrival, three telephone calls were made to the Soviet consulate in an attempt to contact Volkov. The first was answered by the Russian Consul General, the second by a man speaking English who claimed to be Volkov, but that he was not, and the last by the Russian telephone operator, who said that Volkov had left for Moscow.

Independent inquiries showed that Volkov, Mr. Volkov, did leave by plane for Russia on, I think, Sept. 26th.

S. R. W.

Rose Holtz.

Secret cross reference
in cc. 93.224 Savidakis
@ Volkoff.

~~TOP SECRET.~~

~~TOP SECRET.~~
IA
~~2/1~~

URGENT.
PERSONAL.
TOP SECRET.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

19th September, 1945.

[redacted]

I enclose herein our papers about an extraordinary approach which has been made to our people in Turkey by a Vice-Consul of the Russian Consulate-General in Istanbul.

It is rather difficult to know what to make of it, but I send it over to you urgently for any observations you may have, as it may conceivably tie up with the Canadian business. I do not know whether you have anyone suitable who could check the Russian document.

You may perhaps wish to mention the matter to Captain Guy Liddell.

Yours sincerely,

Signed. TOM BROMLEY.

[redacted]

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TOP SECRET.

Sir A. Cadogan

I attach hereto 'i) (Flag A) a minute of an interview between Mr. Reed, First Secretary at the Embassy in Istanbul and a M. Volkov, a Vice-Consul of the Russian Consulate-General in the same place; (ii) (Flag B) a letter in Russian with translation from the same M. Volkov.

The substance of these documents is as follows:

On September 4th M. Volkov asked to see Mr. Reed in private and told him that he was the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Security Service in Turkey, that for two and a half years past the Soviet authorities had been able to read all our telegrams; that the Russians had two agents inside the Foreign Office in London and seven inside the British Intelligence Service; that he, Volkov, had a great deal of information of the organisation of our Secret Service and that he could give us the names of hundreds of Soviet agents in the United Kingdom.

The letter at Flag B from M. Volkov gives a list of all the information he is prepared to furnish including lists of agents and documents relating to the Russian Secret Service and our own. He also offers the private stamps and seals of the Russian Secret Service and a host of other secret material.

He offers to supply all this in return for the payment of £50 thousand sterling and asylum, presumably in British territory, and a guarantee of safe conduct.

TOP SECRET
AND PERSONAL.

British Embassy,
Istanbul.

14th September, 1945.

Dear Codrington,

With reference to my letter of September 5th, I enclose the original of a letter which the person in question handed yesterday to Page of the Consulate General in an envelope addressed to Reed.

Reed has done his best at a translation of the document and I enclose a copy of this. I am also keeping one myself. You will realise of course that Reed does not guarantee his translation because he does not profess to be an expert in Russian. It seems to me however that he must be rather good!

Our position remains the same, namely that we will take no action without instructions from you though I presume that if the gentleman cares to leave anything more we naturally take delivery of it.

I have thought it well to send you a short telegram warning you that this letter is coming.

Yours ever,

Signed. A. K. HELM.

W. M. Codrington, Esq., M.C.,
Foreign Office,
S.W. 1.

TOP SECRET.

Mr. Page and I discussed the attached mysterious unsigned letter and I agreed to ignore it. It rather looks as though the name of Volkov is being taken without his knowledge.

(?) S.F.H.

24.8.45.

la

He asks for a reply not later than the first October.

[Redacted]

Signed, R. G. HOWE.

19th September, 1945.

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Copy of whole Report in REED, PF 604, 904

Ex'd to L 595-134 (pp 1-3)

TOP SECRET.

Mr. Page of the Consulate General rang me up this morning to say that a M. Volkov of the Soviet Embassy was in his office and wished to see me.

M. Volkov arrived in my room with [redacted]

[redacted] who had apparently gone over to the Consulate to interpret - M. Volkov speaking no word of any language other than Russian. Once they were inside my room Volkov said that what he wanted to tell me was of a strictly private nature and that he did not wish to speak in the presence of a third person. My Russian is not very good and I tried to keep [redacted] as an interpreter, but Volkov insisted that the interview should be private and [redacted] accordingly went out. *ed*

Volkov then introduced himself as the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Security Service in Turkey and without further preliminaries said that he had some information of great importance to give me. For the last two and a half years the Soviet authorities had been able to read all cypher messages passing between the Foreign Office and our Embassy in Moscow.

Moreover the Russians had two agents inside the Foreign Office in London and seven inside the British "Intelligence Service" who were passing them information of great importance. He (Volkov)

Ex V. to PF-604, 432

Ex - to PF 48175

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ACT 1958
January 2023.

had a great deal of information about the organisation of our secret service in this ^{Turkey} country and knew the names of most of our agents - including [redacted] Reed etc. X I here interrupted him to say that if the Soviet Security Service believed me to be an Intelligence Agent they must be singularly badly informed as my functions were entirely innocent. Volkov appeared quite unconvinced and said "Oh yes I know - we are all innocent". I then asked him why he was telling me all this - to which he replied that he had quarrelled with his Ambassador and other members of his Embassy and couldn't stand it any more. He became quite excited at this juncture - although both before and afterwards he remained sitting very quietly - talking very fast and never looking at me. This made him at times difficult to understand - but he was normal, sober and composed.

He then told me - which seems quite fantastic - that he had an empty flat in Moscow in which he had left a suitcase containing the names of three hundred and fourteen Soviet agents in the United Kingdom and a great deal of other information connected with Soviet activities. It could be arranged for somebody to go and collect this suitcase which was supposed to contain only private papers. This all seemed so extraordinary that I told him I was not particularly interested in what happened in Moscow but would be grateful if he would tell me the names of his agents in the Foreign Office and also the name of the person, who he said, was working for him in this building. That, however, he refused to do until I could confirm that we were "interested" in the information he had to give. I

|| which
Buckden

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did not ask for a definition of the word "interested" but told him that I should report the conversation to my superiors.

X He begged that if any account of the conversation were sent to London it should go by writing and not by telegraph and that the information he had given should be restricted to the minimum number of people. What he had to say he wished to say only to me. I was not to telephone to him but he would come and see me again in a few days' time. X

I asked him if he were not running a considerable risk in making these visits - but he said he was not - that he was not being followed or watched and that only his wife knew what he was up to. He then went away.

Signed. J. L. REED.

4th September.

British Embassy,
Istanbul.

~~It is on~~
A copy of the original
of this letter is now
filed at serial 161a.

TOP SECRET.

N.B. The original is in English.

6/3/69

Envelope addressed: C. H. PAGE.

Vice-Konsul de Consulat General de Grande Bretagne.

Personnelement

En Ville.

August 24, 1945.

Dear Sir,

I should be very much obliged if you would receive me at the British Consulate to-day or to-morrow evening at 10 o'clock. I want to speak to you on important and urgent business.

Would you kindly let me know whether you can receive me. As a confirmation of your agreement, please send me your visiting card by courier or ring the Consulate up (the telephone number is 42610) addressing the man on duty in such a way: "The British Consulate requests your Consule to call upon us for negotiation regarding the Soviet citizen, byt he name of Beergence."

Please note that the presence of the interpreter is necessary. It is desirable that he should be an Englishman.

Hoping to hear from you soon, I am

Very truly Yours.

ISTANBUL.

(Visiting card of Constantin Volkov attached)

TOP SECRET.

(CYpher)

FILES

FROM ISTANBUL (CONSTANTINOPLE) TO FOREIGN
OFFICE

Mr. Helm.
No. 330.
14th September, 1945.

D: 3.06 p.m. 14th September, 1945.
R: 4.35 p.m. 14th September, 1945.

DEDIP

TOP SECRET

Following for Mr. Codrington.

My Angora telegram No. 773.

Istanbul bag numbered A.65 due in London on September 17th or September 18th contains further letter on paragraph

(a) subject with "sales catalogue".

O.T.P.

TOP SECRET
AND PERSONAL.

British Embassy,
Ankara.

5th September, 1945.

Dear Codrington,

I am quite prepared for the following to be a complete mare's nest but I think you must have it all the same.

Today I have received from Busk in Istanbul the enclosed self explanatory minute prepared by Reed regarding an interview yesterday. Although the minute is in manuscript a copy has been retained in Istanbul.

Behind the minute you will find an unsigned letter which, with the attached card, was enclosed in the envelope also enclosed and also a minute by Hurst, the Consul General at Istanbul. I am keeping copies of the unsigned letter and of Hurst's minute here. V's file
672 52

I must stress that the existence of the documents behind is not known to Reed when he wrote his minute - it was only thereafter that the Consul General gave them direct to Busk yesterday.

Busk tells me that he has closely questioned Reed as regards the facts stated in his minute and is satisfied that the account given is completely accurate. Nobody has seen the minute or knows anything about what passed between the man and Reed except Reed, Busk and myself. There is however no doubt that the man whom Reed saw is the owner of the enclosed card

since Page (Vice-Consul at Istanbul) already knew him in connection with routine business. We in the Embassy know nothing about him. Finally, we do not know what previous contact, if any, there has been between _____

_____ and the man whom

Reed saw.

I do not feel that I myself can make any useful comment. It seems to me to be for you to judge whether the matter is worth pursuing and if so how. In any case you can take it that Reed, Busk and I will take no action or speak to anyone about the business in the absence of instructions.

Yours ever,

Signed. A. K. HELM.

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With reference to our conversation, I have the honour to inform you that on the conditions stated below I can place at the disposal of the British Special Service numbered documents of the Intelligence Service of the People's Commissariat of State Security (N.K.G.B.) of the U.S.S.R., an official of which I have been since the autumn of 1936:

1. A list of the agents of the N.K.G.B. Intelligence in Turkey numbering 314 men. The list shows both active and reserve agents; including the official, descriptions (characteristics) of special agents.

2. A list of the known regular N.K.G.B. agents of the military and civil Intelligence ^{in Great Britain} and their agents. In the list are noted about 250 known and less well known agents of the abovenamed service with their characteristic details.

3. A list and, in certain cases, duplicates and photostats of the material handed over to us by the agents of the N.K.G.B. who are our collaborators (in the English Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Great Britain.) Judging by the clichés, the number of such agents ^{in London} would be nine. This list is of exceptional interest because it provides a possibility of identifying the agents of the N.K.G.B. in exceptionally important ^{British institutions.} I know, for instance, that one of the agents of the N.K.G.B. is fulfilling the functions of the head of a Section of the British Counter-Espionage Service in London and that another

ent
L-545-46
L-4-72

is working within (the British Consulate at Istanbul.) ^{5 words} ✓

4. Copies of the material of the papers ^{2 words} and special dossiers of the (British Intelligence.)

5. Photo olichés and translations of important material (of the British service) ^{4 words} and in particular of the correspondence between (London ^{4 words} and General Hill.)

6. Copy of the (?) conclusion of the Direction of the Near Eastern Section of the N.K.G.B. dealing with the material of the British Service in Iran.

7. Detailed information in connection with certain agents of the N.K.G.B. who are in Palestine, the Balkans and Iran, their photographs and connections.

8. A full list of the agents of the Intelligence Service of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow, their home addresses and the numbers of their official and private telephones. Also the addresses of the garages and motorcars of the N.K.G.B. service.

9. The addresses of certain konspirativnich (sic) flats of the service of the N.K.G.B.

10. Recruiting material (sic) about the captain, now probably major, of the Counter-espionage service of the N.K.G.B., of the secretary of the head of the People's Commissariat of the petrol industry and a member of the management of one of the divisions of special significance in Moscow. All these three people could be used in the interests of the British Service.

11. Two original identity documents of officers of the Intelligence Service of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow in 1945 giving the

right of access to all operational, archive and other services of the N.K.G.B. organisation, N.K.V.D. and counter-espionage organisation of the People's Commissariats of Defence and of the War Fleet of the U.S.S.R. These identity papers can be used as examples.

12. Examples of the stamps and executive seals of two services of the N.K.G.B. authorising the giving of certificates and passes and right of taking out of the N.K.G.B. building in Moscow packets and parcels of service documents.

13. Copies of blank Service forms and of all sorts of accounting forms of the Intelligence Section of the N.K.G.B., the latter can be used for obtaining by the method used in the N.K.G.B. any documents in the operational accounting section of the Intelligence Section and other special organisations in Moscow. Copies of the above mentioned blank forms will give you the possibility of finding out the agents of the N.K.G.B. in all the countries the world.

14. Keys of two cabinets of the operation section of the Intelligence Section of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow where the secret documents for the Near East are kept.

15. There are also all kinds of documents about the financial organisation and the operational possibilities of the separate bureaux of the N.K.G.B. of the U.S.S.R.

This list of material in my possession can be supplemented by a number of documents which I have the possibility of giving you here on the spot. The latter include copies of the cypher

telegrams sent and despatched from Moscow, the value of which, that is to say of their contents, consists in the possibility of decyphering all further telegrams sent out from the Consulate General and perhaps of the incoming ones. (2) A list of the regular officers of the Intelligence of the N.K.G.B., of the People's Commissariats of Defence and of the Fleet of the U.S.S.R. Working under the cover of legal Soviet representatives in Turkey, their clichés and the functions of each of those in residence, also a full list for Iran and Egypt. (3) Certain clichés of cabinets, safes and doors of entry into the Consulate. (4) Written records of conversations of the head personnel of the Consulate General with visitors and other Service documents. (5) In particular I can furnish the structural plan of the political and military intelligence units of the U.S.S.R. in Turkey and also of the organization of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow. (6) At the same time I will copy a detailed document about the distribution of the organs of military counter-espionage in the units of the Red Army, their methods of work. (7) In addition to which I can give explanations about the measures taken by the N.K.G.B. in connection with the English Secret Service in Moscow (Hilla nd Barclay) and also about the sources from which we have received copies of British diplomatic and military cyphers in Moscow.

The conditions under which all the above mentioned material can be handed over to you are as follows:

One. The maintenance of absolute secrecy about my proposal.

the non-despatch of any report about the present question either by your radio or by telegraph.

Two. All agreements with your management must be conducted directly and without the participation of any third parties.

Three. The loss of my post and situation must be worthily compensated by an immediate payment to me of at least £50,000 sterling. I consider this sum as a minimum considering the importance of the material and evidence given to you as a result of which all my relatives living in the territory of the U.S.S.R. are doomed.

Four. The offer to me of a refuge and also a guarantee of full safe-conduct. I beg you to communicate to me your decision either provisionally or definitely by the 25th September or at latest by the 1st October, 1945.

You could call me up for conversations on one of the Consulate telephones, naturally only if all necessary precautions are observed. If the call is absolutely essential, it would be best if it were touched in the form of an official and personal invitation which should originate from the Consulate, thus not causing any suspicion.

In conclusion I assure you, and in your person the Government of Great Britain, that my present approach represents the proof of sincere affection for the interests of the mighty fraternity of the British peoples and for freedom loving and suffering humanity.

Your sincere friend,

(Unsigned)

TOP SECRET

4 Sept. 48
Mr. Reed's note

Mr. Page of the Consulate General rang me up this morning to say that a M. Volkov of the Soviet Embassy was in his office and wished to see me.

M. Volkov arrived in my room with [redacted] who had apparently gone over to the Consulate to interpret - M. Volkov speaking no word of any language other than Russian. Once they were inside my room Volkov said that what he wanted to tell me was of a strictly private nature and that he did not wish to speak in the presence of a third person. My Russian is not very good and I tried to keep [redacted] as an interpreter, but Volkov insisted that the interview should be private and [redacted] accordingly went out.

Volkov then introduced himself as the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Security Service in Turkey and without further preliminaries said that he had some information of great importance to give me. For the last two and a half years the Soviet authorities had been able to read all cypher messages passing between the Foreign Office and our Embassy in Moscow. [redacted]

Moreover the Russians had two agents inside the Foreign Office in London and seven inside the British "Intelligence Service" who were passing them information of great importance. He (Volkov) had a great deal of information about the organisation of our secret service in this country and knew the names of most of our agents - including [redacted] Reed etc. I here interrupted him to say that if the Soviet Security Service believed me to be an Intelligence Agent they must be singularly badly informed as my functions were entirely innocent. Volkov appeared quite unconvinced and said "Oh yes I know - we are all innocent". I then asked him why he was telling me all this - to which he replied that he had quarrelled with his Ambassador and other members of his Embassy and couldn't stand it any more. He became quite excited at this juncture - although both

TOP SECRET

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before and afterwards he remained sitting very quietly - talking very fast and never looking at me. This made him at times difficult to understand - but he was normal, sober and composed.

251 1595-46
14-4-72.

He then told me - which seems quite fantastic - that he had an empty flat in Moscow in which he had left a suitcase containing the names of three hundred and fourteen Soviet agents in the United Kingdom and a great deal of other information connected with Soviet activities. It could be arranged for somebody to go and collect this suitcase which was supposed to contain only private papers. This all seemed so extraordinary that I told him I was not particularly interested in what happened in Moscow but would be grateful if he would tell me the names of his agents in the Foreign Office and also the name of the person, who he said, was working for him in this building. That, however, he refused to do until I could confirm that we were "interested" in the information he had to give. I did not ask for a definition of the word "interested" but told him that I should report the conversation to my superiors.

He begged that if any account of the conversation were sent to London it should go by writing and not by telegraph and that the information he had given should be restricted to the minimum number of people. What he had to say he wished to say only to me. I was not to telephone to him but he would come and see me again in a few days' time.

I asked him if he were not running a considerable risk in making these visits - but he said he was not - that he was not being followed or watched and that only his wife knew what he was up to. He then went away.

Signed. J.L. REED.

4th September.

British Embassy,
Istanbul.

CONSTANTIN VOLKOV.

Russian.

Further to our talk, I have the honour to inform you that, on conditions stated below, I can deliver to the British Special Services the following documentary material from the Intelligence Directorate of the People's Commissariat of National Security (N.K.G.B.) whose agent I have been since 1936:-

1. A list of 314 Intelligence Directorate of NKGB's agents in Turkey. (The list includes both active and "sleeping" agents' networks. Official personality notes on certain agents are also available.)
2. A list of known to NKGB established agents of the British Military and Civilian Intelligence Services and their networks. The list enumerates some 250 official and unofficial members of the above services together with their personality sheets.
3. A list of material (in some cases their duplicates and photostatic copies) received by us from the agents of NKGB in the British Intelligence Services and the Foreign Office. (Judging by their code names there are 9 such agents in London.) This list is of extraordinary interest as it should make it possible to uncover NKGB networks in some extraordinarily important British Departments. I know for instance that one of the agents is a departmental Head of the British Counter-espionage Directorate in London and that another one is on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul.
4. Copies of materials, files and special dossiers of the British Intelligence service.
5. Photostatic copies and translations of operational material of the British Intelligence Service, in particular the correspondence between London and General HILL.
6. A copy of the report by the Directorate of the Near-East Department of NKGB on the materials from the British Intelligence Services in Iran.
7. Detailed information about certain NKGB agents in Palestine, the Balkans and Iran (their code names and methods of contact).
8. A full list of the members of the Intelligence Directorate of NKGB in Moscow, their home addresses and their home and office telephone numbers. Also addresses of their garages and numbers of their cars.
9. Addresses of certain undercover flats used by the Intelligence Directorate of NKGB in Moscow.
10. Recruitment material on Captain (now probably Major) of the counter-espionage services of NKGB, the secretary of the "GLAVKA" (?) of the Ministry of Oil Production, and a woman official dealing with orders in one of the special divisions in Moscow. All three could be made use of in the interests of the British Services.
11. Two passes of officers of the Intelligence Department in Moscow for 1945 allowing access to all operational, registry and other departments of NKGB, NKVD, and counter-espionage directorates of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Navy. These passes could be used as models.
12. Samples of stamps and commandant's stamps of two directorates of NKGB which will make possible the issue of references and passes for taking out from the NKGB premises of official documents and files.

- 13. Samples of official forms and various entry cards of the NKGB Intelligence Directorate. The latter could be used to obtain, through the established procedure, any information from the operational-registry department of the Intelligence Directorate and other special departments in Moscow. The forms, above-mentioned, will make it possible for you to establish all NKGB networks in the world.
- 14. Keys to two offices of the NKGB Intelligence Directorate operational departments in Moscow containing secret files on the Near East.
- 15. There are other various documents bearing on the financial and operational position of various NKGB establishments.

This list of material available to me could be enlarged with documents which I could let you have here on the spot. The latter contain:-

- 1. Copies of coded telegrams to Moscow and to the Ambassador whose value (apart from their contents) is that they may enable you to break the code for outgoing telegrams from the Consulate General (and also maybe for the incoming ones).
- 2. A list of establishment officers of the NKGB Intelligence Directorate, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Navy, operating in Turkey under cover of legal establishments (their code names and functions within the network). Also a partial list for Iran and Egypt.
- 3. Several keys of offices, safes and outside doors of the Consulate General.
- 4. Books of notes on the conversations between the Consulate officials and visitors, also other official documents.
- 5. I could, if necessary, provide a schematic plan of the political and military networks of U.S.S.R. in Turkey and also of the NKGB Intelligence Directorate in Moscow.
- 6. I could also prepare a detailed report on the organisation of counter-espionage in Red Army units, their competence and methods of work.
- 7. Apart from that I could explain the measures taken by NKGB against the British Secret Service in Moscow (HILL, BARKLEY) also the source of the British diplomatic and military codes received (in Moscow).

Conditions on which the above material can be handed over to you are as follows:-

- 1. Complete secrecy about this offer. No mention of it to be made by radio or telegraph.
- 2. All negotiations with your principals to be made direct and without middlemen.
- 3. Loss of my appointment and status is to be adequately compensated by simultaneously handing to me at least £50,000. This is the minimum considering the value of the material you will receive and the inevitable consequences to all my relatives in U.S.S.R.
- 4. Assurance of my refuge and guarantee of full safety.

Your decision (positive or negative) into reach me before September 25th or at the latest October 1st 1945. I could be summoned for talk on any of the Consulate telephones provided necessary precautions are taken. (It will be better if in such a case I were to be summoned officially and personally in the name of the Consulate as this will not raise suspicions.)

In conclusion, I assure you and the Government of Great Britain that my present modest contribution will hasten the just vengeance in the interests of the powerful union of British peoples and of the freedom loving and long suffering mankind.

Yours sincere friend.

TOP SECRET

13 Sekh 45.
Mr. Reed's translation
of Vorikov's letter.

With reference to our conversation, I have the honour to inform you that on the conditions stated below I can place at the disposal of the British Special Service numbered documents of the Intelligence Service of the People's Commissariat of State Security (N.K.G.B.) of the U.S.S.R., an official of which I have been since the autumn of 1936:

1. A list of the agents of the N.K.G.B. Intelligence in Turkey numbering 314 men. The list shows both active and reserve agents; including the official, descriptions (characteristics) of special agents.
2. A list of the known regular N.K.G.B. agents of the military and civil Intelligence in Great Britain and their agents. In the list are noted about 250 known and less well known agents of the above named service with their characteristic details.
3. A list and, in certain cases, duplicates and photostats of the material handed over to us by the agents of the N.K.G.B. who are our collaborators in the English Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Great Britain. Judging by the cliches, the number of such agents in London would be nine. This list is of exceptional interest because it provides a possibility of identifying the agents of the N.K.G.B. in exceptionally important British institutions. [I know, for instance, that one of the agents of the N.K.G.B. is fulfilling the functions of the head of a Section of the British Counter-Espionage Service in London and that another is working within the British Consulate at Istanbul.]
4. Copies of the material of the papers and special dossiers of the British Intelligence.
5. Photocliches and translations of important material of the British service and in particular of the correspondence between London and General Hill.
6. Copy of the (?) conclusion of the Direction of the Near

ed L. 555-46
14.4.72.

TOP SECRET

Eastern Section of the N.K.G.B. dealing with the material of the British Service in Iran.

7. Detailed information in connection with certain agents of the N.K.G.B. who are in Palestine, the Balkans and Iran, their photographs and connections.
8. A full list of the agents of the Intelligence Service of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow, their home addresses and the numbers of their official and private telephones. Also the addresses of the garages and motorcars of the N.K.G.B. service.
9. The addresses of certain konspirativnich (sic) flats of the service of the N.K.G.B.
10. Recruiting material (sic) about the captain, now probably major, of the Counter-espionage service of the N.K.G.B., of the secretary of the head of the People's Commissariat of the petrol industry and a member of the management of one of the divisions of special significance in Moscow. All these three people could be used in the interests of the British Service.
11. Two original identity documents of officers of the Intelligence Service of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow in 1945 giving the right of access to all operational, archive and other services of the N.K.G.B. organisation, N.K.V.D. and counter-espionage organisation of the People's Commissariats of Defence and of the War Fleet of the U.S.S.R. These identity papers can be used as examples.
12. Examples of the stamps and executive seals of two services of the N.K.G.B. authorising the giving of certificates and passes and right of taking out of the N.K.G.B. building in Moscow packets and parcels of service documents.
13. Copies of blank Service forms and of all sorts of accounting forms of the Intelligence Section of the N.K.G.B., the latter can be used for obtaining by the method used in the N.K.G.B. any documents in the operational accounting section of the Intelligence Section and other special organisations in

Moscow. Copies of the above mentioned blank forms will give you the possibility of finding out the agents of the N.K.G.B. in all the countries of the world.

14. Keys of two cabinets of the operation section of the Intelligence Section of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow where the secret documents for the Near East are kept.
15. There are also all kinds of documents about the financial organisation and the operational possibilities of the separate bureaux of the N.K.G.B. of the U.S.S.R.

This list of material in my possession can be supplemented by a number of documents which I have the possibility of giving you here on the spot. The latter include copies of the cypher telegrams sent and despatched from Moscow, the value of which, that is to say of their contents, consists in the possibility of decyphering all further telegrams sent out from the Consulate General and perhaps of the incoming ones. (2) A list of the regular officers of the Intelligence of the N.K.G.B., of the People's Commissariats of Defence and of the Fleet of the U.S.S.R. working under the cover of legal Soviet representatives in Turkey, their cliches and the functions of each of those in residence, also a full list for Iran and Egypt. (3) Certain cliches of cabinets, safes and doors of entry into the Consulate. (4) Written records of conversations of the head personnel of the Consulate General with visitors and other Service documents. (5) In particular I can furnish the structural plan of the political and military intelligence units of the U.S.S.R. in Turkey and also of the direction of the N.K.G.B. in Moscow. (6) At the same time I can copy a detailed document about the distribution of the organs of the military counter-espionage in the units of the Red Army, their methods of work. (7) In addition to which I can give explanations about the measures taken by the N.K.G.B. in connection with the English Secret Service in Moscow (Hill and Barclay) and also about the sources from which we have received copies of British diplomatic and military cyphers in Moscow.

The conditions under which all the above mentioned material can be handed over to you are as follows:

- One. The maintenance of absolute secrecy about my proposal. The non-despatch of any report about the present question either by your radio or by telegraph.
- Two. All agreements with your management must be conducted directly and without the participation of any third parties.
- Three. The loss of my post and situation must be worthily compensated by an immediate payment to me of at least £50,000 sterling. I consider this sum as a minimum considering the importance of the material and evidence given to you as a result of which all my relatives living in the territory of the U.S.S.R. are doomed.
- Four. The offer to me of a refuge and also a guarantee of full safe-conduct. I beg you to communicate to me your decision on either provisionally or definitely by the 25th September or at latest by the 1st October, 1945.

You could call me up for conversations on one of the Consulate telephones, naturally only if all necessary precautions are observed. If the call is absolutely essential, it would be best if it were couched in the form of an official and personal invitation which should originate from the Consulate, thus not causing any suspicion.

In conclusion I assure you, and in your person the Government of Great Britain, that my present approach represents the proof of my sincere affection for the interests of the mighty fraternity of the British peoples and for freedom loving and suffering humanity.

Your sincere friend,

(Unsigned).

H.J.D R5

EXTRACT

12

Extract for File No. : P.F.603,656 Name :

Original in File No. : SF 422 - 0114 Supp A. Vol. : Serial : 1a Receipt Date :

Original from : S.O.E. Forwarding Under Ref. : 6 Dated : March 1945
Document on N.K.V.D. & Translation

Extracted on : 1.8.72 by : P.Z. Section : R6

Extract from S.O.E. Document re Organisation of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the Soviet Union. Taken from captured documents issued by The German Security Service. General 1930 - 1945.

.....
ORGANISATION OF THE NKVD.
.....

III. The "Special Department" (Osobyi Otdyel - OO). The "Special Department" mentioned above in connection with the Directorate of Internal Security Troops exists in general only in the Red Army and Fleet. Its task is the political surveillance of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the same way that the GUGB watches over the civil population. The "Special Department" operates on the same lines as the GUGB, and the same network of agents as described in Appendix 2a exists.

Until February 1941 the "Special Department" came directly under the NKVD, i.e. it was not attached to the Directorate for State Security. Since this date the special department has been completely separated from the NKVD and now comes under the People's Commissariat for Defence (Narodny Kommissariat Oborony - NKO) and has been renamed Department III. Its duties however remain the same. It was intended later to give members of the 'Special Department military rank, but how far this has been achieved is not known. Up till then members of the department attached to regiments and independent battalions were called "plenipotentiaries".

