PF 603,656 / V2

VOLKOV, CONSTANTIN

FILE CLOSED

TRAY No.

S Form 924A rev 10.74

PF 603,656 / V2

W 408

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date

KV2/4675

S. 960 Edn2

LIMITED CIRCULATION

Please refer to S. Form 239 before sending this file to another officer

S Form 238

Y FILE

THIS FILE WHEN IN TRANSIT MUST BE IN A CLOSED ENVELOPE, ADDRESSED PERSONALLY TO THE OFFICER.

HELD by R.5

The file should be passed for P.A. to R.5.

PF 603,656 FILE CLOSED / V2

Vol. 1. closed at 28b dated 18 3. 52.

MINUTE SHEET

Reference PF 603,656 vol. 2.

30.

2.7.52. Copy of minute from D.B. to B.2/B.2.B re 29a. 30a.

33.

1.7.52. To Washington forwarding copy of 31a. 33a.

N. 4/1012
35,000 JC&S
Gp736/209
(MINT)
E 5-34-0

[OV.

34.

7.8.52 Letter from Foreign Office in reply to 33a re VOLKOV document. 34a

35.

D.B. P.G.W. 21/8

Please see the letter from S.L.O. Washington at serial 34a.

B.2.B
8.8.52

R.T. Reed

13.1.53 Draft letter to Foreign Office re VOLKOV's information 35b

36.

B.2

You will remember that I told you recently of a telephone conversation I had with Carey-Foster. He said he had been re-considering the problems of security of the Foreign Office and its establishments and had related his fears to the VOLKOV incident. He wondered how we now felt about the possibility that the two spies in the Foreign Office mentioned by VOLKOV had now been found in the persons of MACLEAN and BURGESS.

If we felt that one spy in the Foreign Office remained he thought it would help him if we wrote to him a letter saying so.

Miss McBarnet and I have considered this possibility and Carey-Foster's own letter to us in October 1951 at 18A. At 35b we submit a draft letter which might be suitable and we would like to discuss it with you when convenient. I may say I am not certain that we ought to send such a letter at all.

B.2.B
13.1.53

R.T. Reed

MINUTE SHEET

Reference FF 603656
VOLKOV

B.2.B.

We spoke about 35b today and agreed that, in our own interest as well as that of Carey Foster, it was time we made a very exact assessment of the significance of the VOLKOV information, especially in this context of penetration of the Foreign Office.

For your guidance, I suggest that it should take approximately this form:-

1. Verbatim statement of the VOLKOV information.

2. Assessment of its reliability, including a recapitulation of such items in the VOLKOV report as are considered to have been corroborated from other sources (i.e. the identification of MACLEAN, and the possible identification of PHILBY, as equating with spies whose existence was indicated by VOLKOV.)

3. Statement of the circumstances and dates of the employment of
   (a) VOLKOV
   (b) BURGESS

   with the object of establishing whether or not VOLKOV would have been in a position to know of the existence of BURGESS as a spy in the Foreign Office. I understand that your conclusion is likely to be that he could have known, and that BURGESS was therefore probably the second spy to whom his information referred. I do not however wish to anticipate your conclusions, which must be very carefully derived from the evidence.

4. Conclusion - i.e. was BURGESS the second spy, or was he not.

5. Whatever the conclusion, it cannot on present evidence indicate any proof that BURGESS was one of the two spies VOLKOV had in mind. No more can be done than to indicate the likelihood one way or the other. The assessment should end by pointing this out. It should, I think, include a warning that even if the two VOLKOV spies in the Foreign Office were BURGESS and MACLEAN, this does not mean that they were necessarily the only two. At this point, it would be useful if you could draw from the BURGESS, MACLEAN and PHILBY cases some conclusion as to the extent to which high level Marxist spies of this type may still remain undetected in the Government Service.

J. C. Robertson.

B.2.
16.1.53.

39.

8.6.53. Copy of B.2.B. Minute re. John REED. 39a.

40.

17.6.53 Note by D.B. re leakage of information re VOLKOV. 40a

42.

19.6.53 Letter from Foreign Office re VOLKOV. 42a

43.

22.6.53. To Foreign Office in reply to Serial 42a. 43a.

44.

23.6.53. B.2.B. Note re. VOLKOV. 44a.

MINUTE SHEET

Reference P.F.603,656.

46.

B.2. through B.2.B. Mr. Reed. m 25/6.

Please see at Serial 45a an assessment of the significance of the VOLKOV information as required by you in your Minute 37. The different parts of the assessment are numbered 1 - 5 in accordance with your suggestions.

I think you will agree that it is impossible to dismiss the VOLKOV information and also quite impossible to say definitely who are the known or unknown spies in the United Kingdom to whom he may have been referring.

Evelyn McBarnet

E. McBarnet.

B.2.B.
25.6.53.

47.

30.6.53. Revised version of Serial 45a. 47a.

48.

30.6.53. Draft letter to Foreign Office enclosing copy of Serial 47a. 48a.

49.

B2.
I am very keen for Carey Foster [redacted] to have a copy of this. Mr Reed 1/7.

B.2. through B.2.B. Mr. Reed. m 1/7

Please see at Serial 47a a revised edition of my note about Constantin VOLKOV and at Serial 48a a draft letter to Mr. Carey-Foster for your signature if approved.

[redacted]

Evelyn McBarnet

E. McBarnet.

B.2.B.
30.6.53.

(883) Wt10505/4396
1/52 1,000,000 JC&S
Ltd. Gp736/209
(REGIMINT)
CODE 5-34-0

[OVER

replaced by 54a

1.7.53. (Alternative draft letter to F.O. re VOLKOV analysis.) 50a

D.B.

At the beginning of this year Carey Foster asked us if we would prepare an assessment of the VOLKOV information and in particular of that part of the information which indicated the presence in 1945 of two spies in the Foreign Office.

I asked B.2.B. to undertake this, their terms of reference being set out in Minute 37. This task has had to take second place to the recently completed review of the BURGESS/MACLEAN case; it has however now been done, Miss McBarnet's report being filed at 47a.

Miss McBarnet's conclusions - and especially those contained in Paras.1 and 2 on the first half of page 5 of her report - speak for themselves, and there is little which I can usefully add to them by way of comment. They are, as you will see, largely negative, especially where the spies in the Foreign Office are concerned. It is quite impossible to conclude with any certainty that the Foreign Office spies in London were BURGESS and MACLEAN; logically indeed, and assuming exact accuracy on VOLKOV's part, MACLEAN's absence from London at the relevant time points to his not having been one of the two.

VOLKOV's reference to a third Foreign Office spy - in the Consulate in Istanbul - is especially to be noted. It is doubtful whether much can be done to follow up this slender clue; enquiries will however be made as to the whereabouts of members of the Istanbul Consulate staff during the period of VOLKOV's attempt to defect. If any members of the staff were temporarily absent from Istanbul at that time, they may have to be investigated further.

Of the seven spies in the British Intelligence Services, none has been identified with certainty; it is however of course probable that one was PHILBY, and CAIRNCROSS is a second "probable". Although we have candidates for some of the remaining five, the fact must be faced that their identification is still a matter of guess work. On the other hand, I think it very likely that these spies were a group, and that all were friends of BURGESS. It is also very possible - but this is an opinion only - that some at least of these "spies" were no more than casual sources of information to whom cover names were allotted by the Russians in accordance with espionage routine, and whose importance was perhaps magnified by BURGESS.

Carey Foster's own most recent opinion of the VOLKOV information is contained in his letter at 42a. It is clearly not sound, and his letter can I suggest best be answered by now sending him a copy of Miss McBarnet's summary. I have also drafted a covering letter at 50a as an alternative to Miss McBarnet's first draft at 48a.

Extracted for SF. 50-38-2/1

I think you will agree that Miss McBarnet's report has served a very useful purpose; indeed it would have done so if it had done no more than serve as a reminder - although no such reminder should be necessary - of the likelihood that there are still undetected spies in important places. It also serves to reinforce my own conviction that these spies will remain undetected, until we are able successfully to go over to the offensive in our counter espionage work. I am sure that we must now try by every means available to penetrate the R.I.S. in the U.K. more deeply than has up till now been possible, and that our operations should be directed in the first place against the Soviet Embassy itself.

J. C. Robertson.

B.2.
1.7.53.

14.7.53. Secret Cross Reference to PF.603,656. 51b.

MINUTE SHEET

Reference PF.603656
VOLKOV

52.

B.2.B. m Done 21/7.

As agreed with D.B. today, will you please take a copy of 47a, together with the covering letter as drafted at 50a, by hand to Carey Foster.

It was also agreed that you would take with you a copy of the consolidated B.2.B. report on the BURGESS/MACLEAN case. This report is to be lent to Carey Foster personally, and he is to be invited to discuss it with D.B. and the other officers concerned here.

J. C. Robertson.

B.2.
20.7.53.

53.

B.2.A. Done. 21/7.

We agreed that a copy of Miss McBarnet's report at 47a should be circulated among B.2.A. officers.

J. C. Robertson.

B.2.
20.7.53.

54.

21.7.53. To F.O. enclosing copy of 47a. 54a

22.7.53 Extract from note by B.2.B on meeting mentioning VOLKOV. 54b

[C

57.

NOTE.

(D.B. to see on return from leave.)

I discussed 55a and Minute 56 with D.B. this morning

D.B. did not feel inclined to send the [redacted] when he himself was about to go on leave and will not be in a position to discuss it further.

[redacted]

J. C. Robertson.

B.2.
23.7.53.

58.

D.C.

Please refer to the last paragraph of Minute 57.

Carey Foster telephoned this morning and informed me that he had shown the report on VOLKOV to Sir William Strang last night. Strang had urged strongly that the report be shown to Sir Norman Brook, and that this be done before Brook's committee meets on Monday next. He would also like Sir Norman Brook told that the report is being brought to his notice at the instance of the Foreign Office.

You will note that D.B. was inclined to let this matter stand over until his return from leave. It does not now seem that we can wait until then, in view of Sir William Strang's insistence.

J. C. Robertson.

B.2.
24.7.53.

MINUTE SHEET

Reference PF.603656
VOLKOV

59.

D.C. Rec'd. 29/7.

After discussing Minute 58 with you, I telephoned Talbot at the Foreign Office as agreed and put these points to him:-

(a) We assumed that Strang did not expect us to present Sir Norman Brook with the VOLKOV report in toto, but simply with the basic facts of it in summary form. Talbot confirmed that this was so, and that all that Strang had in mind was that Brook should know enough of our conclusions in the VOLKOV affair, to appreciate its bearing on P.V. policy. "A word" to Brook was all that was necessary.

B.2.
24.7.53.

J. C. Robertson.

28.8.53 Letter from Foreign Office enc. letter from British Ambassador, Istanbul. 59b

61.

7.9.53 Letter to Foreign Office in reply to 59b. 61a

(1883) Wt10505/4396
4/52 1,000,000 JC&S
Ltd. Gp736/209
(REGIMINT)
CODE 9-34-0

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23.10.53.	D.I.B. note re. the VOLKOV Documents.	65a.

MINUTE SHEET

Reference PF 603656
VOLUME 2.

MINUTE 72 CONTINUED.

Conclusion (2) of 69a should also be amended. Is this really what was agreed? [redacted] No doubt the background enquiries could be made more intensive and thorough in both Services, and I suspect that this is what the meeting agreed to recommend.

G.R. Mitchell.

G.R. Mitchell.

D.
4.2.54.

73.

D.1.A. Miss McBarnet.

Please see Minutes 71 and 72, and my amended version of 69a, filed at 69b.

[redacted]

You have told me that arrangements are in hand for the interview with Sir Alexander Helm. We agreed that I should be present at the interview when it takes place, and I should be glad to have as much notice as possible of the date.

J. C. Robertson.

D.1.
5.2.54.

[redacted]

74.

D.1. 5.2.54

[redacted]

As spoken this morning, I have heard from the Security Department of the Foreign Office that Sir Alexander Knox Helm will be in the Foreign Office on Monday and it would be convenient for him to see us in Mr. De La Mare's room at 10.30. I have agreed therefore that we will go there at 10.30 on Monday 8 January.

E. McBarnet.

D.1.A.
5.2.54.

(1883) Wt10505/4396
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CODE 5-34-0

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75.

8.2.54. Report of interview with Sir Alexander Helm on 8.2.54. 75a

77.

8.2.54. To F.O. enclosing copy of 75a. 77a

78.

D.

To see Miss McBarnet's note at 75a of our interview with Sir Alexander Helm at the Foreign Office today.

Copies have been sent to de la Mare (see my covering letters at 76a and 77a).

J. C. Robertson.

D.1.
8.2.54.

To see and discuss with me on return please.

79

Although we can hardly hope that anything very useful will emerge, I agree that it would be worth trying one last interview with REED.

G. R. Mitchell

D
10.2.54

MINUTE SHEET

Reference P.F.603.656.

67.

4.12.53. D.1.A. note re. interview with John REED ment. VOLKOV. 67a.

12.1.54. Note on interview with John REED on 12.1.54. ment. VOLKOV 67b.

68.

D.1. We should certainly arrange for Sir Alexander to see this minute. 18/1

I telephoned this afternoon to Mr. De La Mare and asked him if he could tell me when Sir Alexander Helm was expected home on leave. He said that to the best of his recollection Sir Alexander was in fact due home to retire some time this year, and he would find out the date and let me know. He later telephoned to say that Sir Alexander was due in this country on 31 January 1954. He suggested that I should remind him nearer the date that we should like to see Sir Alexander and he would do his best to arrange this.

Evelyn McBarnet

D.1.A. E. McBarnet.
15.1.54.

69.

26.1.54. Note on meeting held on 26.1.54. to discuss VOLKOV case. 69a.

26.1.54. **Amended version of 69a.** 69b

70.

1.2.54. D.1.

To see note at 69a of meeting on 26.1.54.

Evelyn McBarnet

D.1.A. E. McBarnet.

(1883) Wt.10505/4396
4/52 1,000,000 JC&S
Ltd. G.736/209
(REGIMENT)
5-34-0

[OVER

D. 4.2

It was, as you will note, agreed that the "respective specialists" should get together for further discussion of the case, and that as a first step REED (to whom VOLKOV made his first approach in Istanbul) should be re-interviewed.

REED as you know has been seen by both Miss McBarnet and myself (67a and 67b). No useful information resulted.

I therefore arranged for a meeting of the D.1 and "specialists", in order to review the case and to consider what further action could be taken. You yourself attended part of this meeting, a note of which is now filed at 69a. This note summarises the discussions fairly enough; I would however qualify the last sentence on page 2b in which it is recorded as having been decided that it would be "very doubtful" whether further investigation of the cases of BLUNT, and others would confirm the suspicion that VOLKOV's spies in British intelligence were among their number. you know, is in fact under investigation; where BLUNT and and their friends are concerned, what we in fact decided was that direct interrogation of these people would be unlikely to serve any useful purpose unless based upon some new information. I do not consider that investigation of selected members of this circle should be ruled out; and as you know we have recently applied for a H.O.W. in the case of HARRIS,

Personal

J. C. Robertson.

D.1.
3.2.54.

72.

D.1.

Let us, as you suggest in effect, agree with a record of your meeting held on 26 January before we report to D.G. Let us also have our interview with Sir Alexander Helm, which follows logically from the abortive interviews with REED and may therefore be regarded as part of the preliminary action agreed between D.G. and take it that you will conduct this interview.

I will now make arrangements for my interview with

I agree with the amendment you propose to 69a. Would it not also be right to delete from it the name of Kemball JOHNSTON? I know that his name was mentioned at the meeting but there is not, to the best of my belief, a shred of evidence to connect him with espionage.

/Conclusion ...

Reference 24.003.070.

MINUTE SHEET

87.

5.4.54. Copy of letter to Foreign Office re VOLKOV case. 87a.

88.

4.4.54. From Foreign Office in reply to 87a. 88a.

89.

17.5.54. Note on obtaining lists of all members of Military Mission to Moscow in 1945. 89a.

90.

19.5.54. Note of work done on the VOLKOV case. 90a.

92.

28.5.54. (~~Secret X-reference re VOLKOV.~~ removed on D.1 authority 31.5.54) 92a

93.

28.5.54. Secret X-reference re VOLKOV. 93a

Transferred to L595/13a Andh CHIO/162

~~31.5.54. From N.I.D. enclosing nominal roll of Brit. Mil. Mission in Moscow in January 1945.~~ 93b.

~~2.6.54. To N.I.D. in reply to 93b.~~ 93c.

94.

D. cus

Will you please refer to 69b and Minutes 71, 72 and 91.

As you will see, Miss McBarnet has summed up at 90a such progress as has been made in the further examination of the VOLKOV material. I am afraid it has not been very considerable.

We are still left in uncertainty as to:-

1. The reason for VOLKOV's removal from Istanbul before his defection could be completed.

2. The identity of the Russian spy who, according to VOLKOV, was on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul at the time at which he made his offer of defection.

3. The means whereby the Russians were able for 2½ years (up to the time of VOLKOV's approach to the authorities in Istanbul) "to read all cipher messages between the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Moscow" and S.O.E. messages.

4. The identities of the "seven agents in the British Intelligence Services" referred to by VOLKOV.

5. The Russian source of "photostatic copies and translations of operational material of the British Intelligence Service, in particular the correspondence between London and General Hill" (Hill being S.O.E. representative in Moscow).

On the other hand:-

1. In the light of the PETROV information, I think that it is now a reasonably safe assumption that VOLKOV's "two agents in the Foreign Office in London" were BURGESS and MACLEAN, notwithstanding the fact that MACLEAN was in Washington in 1945.

2. Although we are still considerably short of proof that PHILBY was the "Departmental Head of the British Counter Espionage Directorate in London" named by VOLKOV,

/over...

Minute 94 contd.

nothing has happened to weaken the case against him, and as you know certain new facts have emerged which - although not probative - tend slightly to strengthen it. These are the possibly significant evidence of LONDON/MOSCOW diplomatic traffic on 20/21 September 1945.

If the PHILBY case is in fact well founded, this accounts also for one of VOLKOV's seven agents in the British Intelligence Services.

3. In the light of Sir Alexander Helm's information (75a) I find it difficult to believe that BENNETT had any part in the leakage - if there was a leakage - to the Russians about VOLKOV. This is I know a matter of opinion I have nevertheless now come to the conclusion that to interrogate BENNETT, who is in any event in Houston, U.S.A., would be a waste of time.

With the exception of the proposal that BENNETT should be interrogated, I consider that the outstanding work listed by Miss McBarnet at the conclusion of 90a ought to be completed. Of the items which she lists:-

(1) is, as you will see, not very likely to produce results.

(4) has already produced some interesting results, and may produce more when further material is obtained

(5) is progressing, lists of the Service Missions in question having now been obtained.

J. C. Robertson.

D.1.
11.6.54.

D.G. (through D.D.G.).

The note at 90a and minute 94 summarise the present position. It is impossible to forecast an early end for the completion of outstanding enquiries, nor is it possible to be at all optimistic of the contribution they are likely to make to the achievement of the main task - namely, the clearing up of the five items of uncertainty listed by D.1. Of these, item 4 in particular must continue to cause grave disquiet. I am indeed acutely conscious that nothing in the field of D branch is more unsatisfactory than that we should have been told, apparently on good authority, of the existence of seven spies in the British Intelligence Services and that we should not know who they are or were. But nearly nine years have now passed since we got the information and I see little or no chance now of our solving the problem without some brand new break. This being so, I am strongly of opinion that, against so many competing and more immediate claims, the investigation of these matters should no longer enjoy a high priority. However much we may want to, we cannot in any case do more in existing circumstances than touch the fringes of the problem, as is shown by the schedule of outstanding work at the end of 90a.

Perhaps the most interesting of the current enquiries is analysis of certain September 1945 traffic. This suggests but does not prove that the VOLKOV leakage took place in London, and, if this is right, it eliminates of course the possibility of VOLKOV having somehow betrayed himself in Istanbul. But there is more work to be done on this material.

/by ...

MINUTE SHEET

MINUTE 95 CONTINUED.

G.R. Mitchell

G.R. Mitchell.

D.
18.6.54.

RB/6

DIA/EtoB through Dr JK 25.6.
Please submit a draft
D. on the lines indicated
25.6

91a.
100a.
101a.
102a.
103a.

93a

Secret Cross Reference

for file number: PF.603656

Title: VOLKOV

INFORMATION *re*: above

received (date): 28.5.54

is filed in

*(*a*) FILE number: SF.441/UK/1 Vol.2.

at serial: Minute 67.

*(*b*) FOLDER held by:

under ref.:

Cross reference made by: FMM

Section: D.1.

Date: 28.5.54.

*Use (*a*) or (*b*) as appropriate.

S. Form 111c/5000/rev. 10.52.

28-5-54

9/a.

NOTE.

of the Security Service paper on the attempted defection of Constantin VOLKOV:-

1. Re-examination of the existing material and mutual consultation at the working level,

2. Interview of John REED

The interview with Mr. John REED took place at the War Office on 2.12.53. No useful information was obtained from Mr. REED who appeared to have an extremely bad memory. He did, however, mention an incident concerning Mr. John BENNETT, Information Officer at Istanbul in 1945, which appeared to cause him some embarrassment. Mr. REED said that some three weeks after the disappearance of VOLKOV Mr. BENNETT told him that he had seen VOLKOV and his wife carried on stretchers into a Soviet aeroplane on Yesilkoy Airfield. Mr. REED said that he had given this information to the Counsellor, Mr. Helm, who had instructed him to say something, he could not recall what, to Mr. BENNETT.

It was decided that an attempt to clarify Mr. REED's information should be made, particularly in connection with the incident to which he alluded, but either could not or would not explain, about Mr. BENNETT. A further interview was arranged on 12.1.54.

Again it proved impossible to overcome Mr. REED's faulty memory. As regards the story about BENNETT, he suggested that BENNETT himself or perhaps Sir Alexander Knox Helm, the Ambassador in Istanbul, might have a clearer memory of what had occurred. Arising out of these two interviews with Mr. REED, it is thought that there can be no doubt that his very bad memory is genuine. It is also apparent that he is an extremely indiscreet person.

The interviews with John REED were discussed and it was agreed that Sir Alexander Helm should be seen when he returned to this country and, depending on the result of that interview, that the question of seeing John BENNETT should be reconsidered. The suggestion was put forward that the staffs of the various Missions in Moscow in 1945 should be checked against our records with a view to finding someone who might have been responsible for information reaching the Russians which would have enabled them to read our cipher messages, as VOLKOV alleged they did.

Sir Alexander Knox Helm returned to this country in January 1954, and an interview was arranged at the Foreign Office on 8.2.54. Sir Alexander was not able to add anything to the VOLKOV story; but he did recall that there had been some difficulty about John BENNETT. Sir

Alexander's memory on this matter was not entirely clear, but it seemed that the most likely sequence of events was that John BENNETT happened by chance to see the removal of the VOLKOVs on stretchers and immediately told REED because he was surprised by so unusual an incident. REED reported this to Helm and was instructed to tell BENNETT not to enquire further into the matter. This interpretation does not entirely explain REED's uneasiness about the matter. If the interpretation is correct, it argues that BENNETT was not aware of the possibility of VOLKOV's defection at the time of VOLKOV's approach to the Consulate. It was thought that REED should be seen again in order to test the interpretation of the BENNETT incident based on Sir Alexander Helm's recollections.

It was agreed that BENNETT merits further enquiry and that he should be interviewed when available. He is in the United States at the present time. It was also agreed that we should attempt to establish whether BENNETT might have been away from Istanbul at the time of VOLKOV's approach and that we should try to obtain a full list of the Consulate staff. M.I.5. still thought that there might be some value in seeing REED again.

New Lit. file.

Extd 6/9/46

At the present time outstanding work on the VOLKOV case is as follows:

1. Checking of lists of personnel of the British Consulate in Istanbul in 1945. The Foreign Office is examining the possibility of obtaining the information required, but they are not hopeful of success.

Ext'd to L. 596/46

2. Checking of Mr. BENNETT's whereabouts at the time of VOLKOV's visit to the British Consulate in Istanbul. The Foreign Office are looking into this.

3. Interviewing Mr. BENNETT. Mr. BENNETT is at present Consul at Houston, U.S.A. The Foreign Office will inform us when he is returning to the U.K. on leave.

5. The obtaining and checking of lists of Military, Naval and Air Missions in Moscow in 1944/45. The possibility of obtaining these lists is being explored.

Ext'd to L595/134

D.I.A.
19.5.54.

copied to
L595/134

89a

Note for PF.603,656.

I have asked Mr. Mars, F.2., if he will explore the possibility of obtaining lists giving all the members of the Military Mission to Moscow (Navy, Army and Air Force) in 1945.

Evelyn McBarnet

D.I.A.
17.5.54.

E. McBarnet.

RBS
27/1/71

copied to 2595-46.

88a

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

May 3, 1954.

Top Secret and Personal

4 MAY 1954

Dear Miss McBarnet,

I am sorry that I have not yet replied to your letter PF.603,556/D.1.A/E.McB of April 5 about the Volkov case.

2. From what I can see it is going to be rather difficult to get the information for which you have asked. I am told that when the case was previously considered these various points came up but it was not found possible to answer them. We shall, however, make another attempt but this is just to warn you not to expect too much.

PF.45,940.

3. As regards your paragraph 3, Mr. J.S. Bennett is still in Houston, Texas, and there is at the moment no intention of moving him. I shall, however, let you know when he is next due to come home on leave.

Yours sincerely
A.J. de la Mare

(A.J. de la Mare)

Miss E. McBarnet.

JC/DAH
5/5/54

Receipt for TOP SECRET Document.

87a.

To be signed by the recipient and returned immediately to :—

BOX 500, PARLIAMENT STREET B.O., LONDON, S.W.1.

TOP SECRET Document/Package Reference No. PF.603,656/D.1.A/E.McB. Held DIA noted in 21/8

Dated 5 April 1954. Sect: D.1.A.

Despatched to :— A.J. de la Mare, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

Date 5.4.1954.

RECEIVED the above:

Date Ap 6 54 Signature A.J. de la Mare

S. Form 243/5000/rev. 5.50.

copied to L.373-44.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

87a

Copy on PF.145,940. (J.S. BENNETT)

PF.603,656/D.1.A/E.McB.

5 April 1954.

Dear Mr. de la Mare,

Please refer to our PF.603656/D.1. of 8 February 1954 and to previous correspondence relating to the VOLKOV case.

As you know we are still trying to tie up the loose ends of this case and, arising out of our interview with Mr. John REED and the meeting which you arranged for us with Sir Alexander Knox Helm, we have had further discussions to consider whether there are any other leads which we can usefully follow up. It has been agreed that we should take the following action and I should be grateful for your help in the matter.

1. We should establish if possible whether or not Mr. John Still BENNETT was in Istanbul at the time of VOLKOV's approach to the Consulate at the beginning of September 1945.

2. We should accept literally VOLKOV's words in connection with the alleged spy in Istanbul, i.e. "on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul". This would narrow the field somewhat and we should endeavour to check a full list of Consulate employees as opposed to employees of other departments and organisations who worked in the Consulate building in Istanbul.

3. We should interview Mr. John Still BENNETT on the subject of VOLKOV's disappearance at the first available opportunity.

As regards 1. above, it may be that J.S. BENNETT's personal Foreign Office papers contain some indication of whether BENNETT was in Istanbul at the time of VOLKOV's abortive attempt to defect. The relevant dates are:

24.8.45: first letter from VOLKOV to the Consulate
4.9.45: VOLKOV's visit to the Consulate.
13.9.45: VOLKOV's "Sales Catalogue" handed to Mr. C.H. Page, the Vice-Consul.

BENNETT might possibly have been away on leave or working at the Embassy in Ankara at these dates.

2. On 19.12.51. Mr. Carey Foster handed us a list of Foreign Office employees at Istanbul in 1945 for checking over our records. This list was headed "Permanent and Temporary Staffs at Istanbul, May 1945" and contained the names of 18 persons, only three of whom were specifically described as Consular, i.e.,

Mr. L.H. HURST - Consul General
Mr. C.H. PAGE - Vice Consul.
Mr. Michael D.T. EVANS - Consular Assistant, temporary.

Presumably some of the other persons named on this list (clerical assistants, secretaries etc.) were Consular employees. The list was checked over our records and we passed the result to Mr. Carey Foster in our PF.603,656/B2B/AFB of 18 March 1952 (this letter also contained the result of our check of lists of Foreign Office staff in

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

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the Embassy at Ankara). Would it be possible to produce a list of Consular employees only, covering the period August - September 1945 and including locally employed Consular staff such as servants, kavass, chauffeurs, telephone operators etc.? I make this request with some diffidence as I recall the remarks made by Sir Alexander Helm about what he described as the "jungle nature" of the Consulate in Istanbul in 1945, but it seems worth asking you whether by limiting ourselves to Consular employees it might be more feasible to obtain a full list.

3. I understand that Mr. J.S. BENNETT was appointed in 1952 to be Consul at Houston, U.S.A. Can you please confirm that he still occupies this position and if it is known when he is likely to be returning to this country on leave or change of appointment.

Yours sincerely,

E. McBarnet.

A.J. de la Mare, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

PF. 145, 940

8 Sa

TOP SECRET PERSONAL

PF.603656/D.1.

1 April 1954.

Dear

At the time of VOLKOV's removal, John S. BENNETT was Information Officer attached to the Embassy, but apparently normally based in Istanbul. The Press Attache, W.E.D. ALLEN, was in Ankara. It is I think quite likely that BENNETT had met Soviet officials socially in Istanbul and he may well have known the VOLKOVs by sight. It is also possible that, having been present at the airfield and having seen the removal of the VOLKOVs, BENNETT made enquiries of the Turkish airfield authorities who were, as we know, in a position to supply the names. I agree however that BENNETT merits further enquiry and that he should be questioned when this is possible.

I agree that we should examine the possibility that BENNETT himself was away from Istanbul at the time of VOLKOV's approach to the Consulate at the beginning of September 1945. It may be possible to check this through the Foreign Office and we will try to do this.

I still think that there might be some value in seeing REED again in order to put to him the suggestion that he was mistaken in the timing of BENNETT's report to him about the VOLKOVs' removal.

While I agree that if we take VOLKOV literally, the words "on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul" would appear to narrow the field of suspects, I understand that in the peculiar circumstances prevailing in Istanbul at the time it is likely to prove very difficult to distinguish positively between the various types of employees all working in the same building. We received from the Foreign Office in December 1951, and checked over our records, a list described as "Permanent and Temporary staffs at Istanbul - May 1945". This consists of a list of 18 names including that of the Naval Attache and Assistant Naval Attache amongst others. It must be presumed that there were in addition a certain number of locally employed staff, such as servants, kavass, chauffeurs, telephone operators, etc., and it is doubtful if it will be possible to obtain a full list of all employees. We will however go into this again with the Foreign Office.

Yours

J. C. Robertson.

80a - 84b.

Receipt for TOP SECRET Document.

To be signed by the recipient and returned immediately to:—

BOX 500, PARLIAMENT STREET B.O., LONDON, S.W.1.

VOCKOV.

TOP SECRET Document/Package Reference No. PF.603656/D.1.

Held DIA

Dated 8.2.54 Sect: D.1.

Despatched to:— A. de la Mare, Esq.,

Foreign Office.

Date 9.2.54.

Noted on P21
16/2/54

RECEIVED the above:

Date Feb 10 1954 Signature [illegible]

S. Form 243/5000/rev. 5.50.

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TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

77a

ce in 155546.

(Copy in PF.604964 - REED)

PF.603656/D.1.

8 February 1954.

Dear de la Mare,

As agreed, I enclose a brief note by Miss McBarnet of our conversation today with Sir Alexander Helm.

I am myself inclined to agree with Miss McBarnet's conclusion, as expressed in the last paragraph of her note. We are now considering having a further word with REED, in order to see whether Sir Alexander's recollections may perhaps help him to remember rather more of what happened at the time of the VOLKOV episode.

Thank you very much for the trouble which you took to arrange the interview with Sir Alexander Helm which, although it did not produce very much in the way of new information, will I think be not unhelpful in clearing up some of the loose ends in the VOLKOV affair.

Yours sincerely,

J. C. Robertson.

A. de la Mare, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

ENCLOSURE.

Send D1
9.2.54

copied to L.595-46.

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

76a

(Copy in PF.604964 - REED)

PF.603656/D.1.

8 February 1954.

Dear

Please refer to Miss McBarnet's letter under above reference of 5 February 1954, enclosing a note of our meeting on 26 January 1954 to discuss the VOLKOV case.

We have now seen Sir Alexander Helm, and I enclose a brief record of our conversation with him.

As you will see, it does not add very much to our information. I am inclined however to agree with Miss McBarnet's interpretation of REED's account of the BENNETT episode. It seems very likely that BENNETT told REED about having seen the VOLKOVs removed in the Russian aircraft shortly after this happened, and that he did so because he had been surprised by so unusual an incident. If this is correct, it argues that BENNETT was not privy to the possibility of VOLKOV's defection, and indeed knew nothing about the affair until the last moment.

I think it might now be worth while to interview REED once again, if only to see whether Helm's recollections do anything to improve his memory.

I am sending a copy of the attached note to de la Mare.

Yours

J. C. Robertson.

9.2.54

Copy in PF 60464 (REED)

ce N 2555/46

75a

Note on Meeting with Sir Alexander Helm
re VOLKOV case.

The interview arranged with Sir Alexander Helm took place in Mr. De La Mare's room at the Foreign Office this morning. Mr. Robertson and Miss McBarnet were present.

Mr. Robertson explained to Sir Alexander that the particular point on which we were seeking information was a story told us by John REED in a recent interview. REED had said that about a fortnight or three weeks after the disappearance of VOLKOV he had received a message in Ankara from John BENNETT describing the removal of VOLKOV in a Russian plane. REED remembered that he had been instructed by Helm, to whom he had reported the matter, to say something to BENNETT which he could not recall but which he knew had been unpalatable. REED had suggested to us that Sir Alexander Helm might be able to remember what had happened.

Sir Alexander said that his recollection of the circumstances was far from clear, but he thought he could recall a story of the VOLKOVs being taken onto a Russian plane on stretchers. He did not remember giving any particular instruction to REED for BENNETT, but he was quite sure that if such a story had been reported to him he would most certainly have said that BENNETT should be told to shut up and keep his nose out of matters which did not concern him. He explained that he did not regard BENNETT as particularly trustworthy.

Sir Alexander said that he thought he could remember seeing the Russian plane on the Yesilkoy Airfield. He did not remember the exact circumstances but thought it was by chance, either when he himself happened to arrive there or when he had gone to meet someone, possibly the individual who had been sent out from England (i.e. PHILBY).

Sir Alexander told us that he and Mr. Busk took it in turns a month at a time to stay in Ankara during the summer and as Mr. Busk was in Istanbul at the beginning of September he probably took over towards the end of the month.

Sir Alexander expressed the opinion that, although he knew that REED was apt to talk too much, he thought it unlikely that he would have done so on this occasion as he had been most emphatically warned not to. As already stated, he did not entirely trust BENNETT and thought that he "knew too much". He had recommended that BENNETT should not be further employed in Balkan countries. Mr. Robertson asked if he regarded BENNETT as pro-Russian or Communist and Sir Alexander said that he was certainly not anti-Russian.

It would appear that the probable explanation of REED's story about BENNETT lies in REED's faulty memory. The main peculiarity of the story was the timing. According to REED, BENNETT saw the removal of the VOLKOVs on 26 September but only told the story to REED some fortnight later. It seems likely that BENNETT saw the removal of the VOLKOVs, probably by chance, and immediately informed REED. REED reported this to Helm, who was by now in Istanbul, and was instructed to tell BENNETT to mind his own business. If this happened, it was approximately three weeks after REED's interview with VOLKOV.

Evelyn McBarnet

E. McBarnet.

8 February 1954.
D.I.A.

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73a

See 69b for amended version. 69a

Note for PF.603656.

A meeting took place this afternoon in Mr. Robertson's room to discuss further action to be taken in connection with the VOLKOV case. Present were:

Mr. Robertson M.I.5.
Mr. Reed M.I.5.
Miss McBarnet M.I.5.

Mr. Mitchell, M.I.5., was present for the last part of the meeting.

Mr. Robertson said that since the last meeting (on 22 October 1953) two interviews had taken place with John REED. It was agreed that the result of these meetings was entirely negative. reminded the meeting that one point arising out of the interview with REED was the possibility of leakage by REED to BENNETT. Mr. Robertson said that it had been agreed that an interview should be sought with Sir Alexander Helm in the hope that he might have a better recollection of the circumstances than REED apparently has. Depending on the result of this interview, the case of John BENNETT will be reconsidered. Sir Alexander Helm is due back in this country on 31 January 1954 and it was agreed that in addition to the question about BENNETT, he should be asked to recall everything he could about the circumstances of VOLKOV's attempted defection.

The meeting then went on to consider whether any further lines of investigation were open to us,

1. About the circumstances of VOLKOV's disappearance.

2. Arising out of his "sales catalogue".

As regards 1, it was agreed that although further examination had not added to the case against PHILBY, it had done nothing to weaken it. The meeting was reminded that it was possible that VOLKOV's removal was due to some indiscretion of his own rather than to any kind of British leakage, deliberate or otherwise. In this connection the question of the alleged agent in the British Consulate in Istanbul was considered and the very considerable risk VOLKOV ran in coming to the Consulate. It was thought that he must have had reason to know that the agent in question would not be in a position to report the visit to the R.I.S. It was thought on balance that it was improbable that the spy was a senior person in the Consulate and that it was probably impossible to identify such a person among the subordinate members of the staff. It was agreed that Sir Alexander Helm should be asked for his views on this question.

drew attention to the other risk taken by VOLKOV, knowing as he said he did that a "departmental head of the British counter espionage directorate in London" was a Russian agent, and knowing presumably that his offer was bound to be reported to the counter espionage authorities in London. It was agreed that this was an extraordinary risk to take and could not be explained unless VOLKOV thought that his offer would be considered and accepted with such speed as to make the risk negligible.

As regards 2, Mr. Robertson went through the "sales catalogue" item by item and it was agreed that for the most part further

..... /investig

investigation was impossible. We are left, however, with VOLKOV's statement that he knew that there were two spies in the Foreign Office and seven in the British Intelligence Services. It was agreed that there is a strong case for believing Guy BURGESS to have been one of the two Foreign Office spies in London, and a reasonable possibility that the second one was Donald MACLEAN, bearing in mind, however, that VOLKOV did specifically mention London and MACLEAN was in Washington at the time. Of the seven spies in the British Intelligence Services it was agreed that two probables had been identified in the persons of PHILBY and CAIRNCROSS and a number of possibles, i.e., BLUNT, KLUGMANN, REES and more tentatively Kemball JOHNSON and Tomas HARRIS. It was emphasised that it was impossible to say positively that any of these individuals (including BURGESS and MACLEAN) were the spies known to VOLKOV, and very doubtful that further investigation of their cases would confirm this.

The other item in the "sales catalogue" which was especially considered was that which referred to "the source of the British diplomatic and military codes received (in Moscow)". It was recalled that in connection with the "Elli" case an examination was made of the staffs of various British Missions in Moscow. This took place in about 1946. It was agreed that the papers should be re-examined and the names re-checked over the records. In conclusion it was agreed that we could not say positively that the nine spies mentioned by VOLKOV had been identified and, short of some kind of special "break", it was most improbable that we should ever find proof. In any case VOLKOV had not stated that nine was the sum total of Russian agents in the Foreign Office and the Intelligence Services and it is possible that others may exist or may have existed in the past. In the circumstances it was agreed that the following recommendations should be made:-

Evelyn McBarnet

E. McBarnet.

D.I.A.
26.1.54.

PF.604964 - REED.
Copy in: PF.603656 - VOLKOV. + PF.145.940 - BENNETT.

PA

67b

Interview with John REED on 12.1.54.

REED was interviewed by Miss McBarnet and myself at Room 055 this afternoon.

I explained to him that despite the lapse of time since the VOLKOV episode, we were still anxious to do everything possible to obtain information which might throw light upon what had happened. It was our practice to keep on worrying at this kind of investigation, in order to make sure that no possible line of enquiry had been neglected. Even therefore if it meant covering again some ground which had already been covered at the last interview with REED, I should be grateful if he would answer a few further questions, and do his best to refresh his admittedly rather vague memory.

I then reminded REED that, on re-examining the sequence of events in the VOLKOV story, it was clear that there seems to have been a leakage to the Russians, and that this leakage must have taken place at some time between 13 September and 26 September 1945, on which day VOLKOV was removed from Turkey in a Russian military aircraft. On 13 September VOLKOV's "sales catalogue" had been handed into the Consulate; after that time no British Embassy official in Istanbul had seen or heard anything of him - until his departure, which BENNETT later claimed to have witnessed.

REED at once said that he disagreed with my assumption that there must have been a leakage, and suggested that VOLKOV might have been indiscreet with his own colleagues, or have been followed by the Russians. I admitted that such a possibility could not be ruled out, but reminded REED of VOLKOV's own extreme consciousness of the need for security, as for example in his insistence that should not be present at his first interview with REED himself at the British Embassy, and his further insistence that nothing should be telegraphed about himself or his offer over British diplomatic channels. The balance of probability, I thought, lay heavily with the likelihood that there had in fact been a leakage from the British side. REED appeared to accept this estimate of the position.

I then asked REED to search his memory for anything in the period 13-26 September which might be relevant to the hypothesis that there had been a leakage. He at once referred again - apologetically - to the vagueness of his own memory, and said that he was unable to recall anything further which might help.

At an early stage in the interview, REED himself brought up again the name of BENNETT, and I took the opportunity of saying that his account of BENNETT's presence at the Istanbul airfield on the day of VOLKOV's departure, as well as of the circumstances in which he himself was asked to speak to BENNETT on behalf of Helm, had not made sense to me and seemed to require further explanation on his (REED's) part. I invited REED to search his memory again and see if he could not add something to his account of this episode which would clarify it.

REED then gave this account of what had happened. In mid-October the Embassy had moved to Ankara from its summer quarters in Istanbul. Shortly after arrival there, BENNETT told REED how he had been present on the Istanbul airfield on 26 September, and had witnessed the departure of VOLKOV and his wife, both on stretchers, in a Soviet military aircraft. REED thought, but could not be certain, that BENNETT (who was permanently in Istanbul) had told him this story over the telephone. REED at once reported to Helm what BENNETT had said. Helm then asked him to speak to BENNETT. At this point, in spite of repeated questioning and cajoling by me, REED expressed himself totally unable to remember what he had been asked to say to BENNETT except that it was something that would have been distasteful to BENNETT and also to some extent to himself, and that he had therefore suggested to Helm that it would come better from Helm himself as a more senior official. Helm had refused and had ordered REED to speak to BENNETT. Searching his memory (or apparently doing so) REED added that he may have been told to ask BENNETT why he (BENNETT) had thought that REED

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67b

Ex to 2.5.95/46

would be interested in his account of the VOLKOV's departure. Whatever the question was, REED was fairly sure that BENNETT had answered by letter, and that the answer had been "negative". By this REED seemed to mean that if his question to BENNETT had been as he suggested, BENNETT's answer had been something to the effect that there had been no particular reason for his reporting the episode to REED and that he had simply done so because it was a matter of interest, REED being as good a person to tell as anybody else.

REED then asked whether it would not be possible to probe the memories of BENNETT or Helm, the latter now being H.M. Ambassador in Ankara. I agreed that it might well prove necessary to do so, but pointed out that a lot of trouble would be saved if REED could out of his own memory produce an explanation which made sense. REED then volunteered to write a letter to Helm on the spot. I accepted this offer, and the letter at 32a was duly drafted and signed by REED in my presence. It was agreed that the decision, as to whether or not the letter should be sent, would be left to us. If for example it proved a simple matter to get hold of BENNETT and question him, we might find it unnecessary to use it. Alternatively REED himself suggested that there was a likelihood of Helm returning to the U.K. early in the New Year. He could then be questioned directly and there would be no need to write to him.

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Throughout this part of the interview REED was insistent that BENNETT was at no time told of VOLKOV's offer to defect. His interest in what he had seen at the airport had been because of its unusual character and because he knew VOLKOV by sight. REED was unable to advance any explanation as to why BENNETT had not reported what he had seen earlier. He agreed with me that it was extraordinary that BENNETT had taken it into his head to report only after the move of the main part of the Embassy to Ankara in the middle of October. When I suggested that the reason for Helm's request for himself to speak to BENNETT having been so "distasteful" might have been because Helm had in some way implied that REED had been indiscreet with BENNETT, REED firmly denied that this explanation was in any way possible.

Asked his personal impression of VOLKOV, REED said that the principal impression which VOLKOV had created was one of extreme nervousness. He thought he was by nature a nervous man, but was undoubtedly extremely ill at ease throughout his interview at the British Embassy on 24 August. He thought him perfectly sane, and his own impression of the information which VOLKOV volunteered was at the time that it was bona fide. Indeed, of the Embassy staff who knew of the affair only the Ambassador (Sir Maurice Peterson) had expressed any real scepticism about VOLKOV and the information which he offered.

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Ex to 2.5.95/46

I reminded REED of that part of the VOLKOV information which had related to the presence of a Russian agent in the British Consulate itself, and explained to him the theory that the agent - whoever he was - might well have been absent on leave at the time of VOLKOV's approach. One fact which supported this theory was VOLKOV's insistence that the decision should be made about himself before a certain definite date towards the end of September. I invited REED to exercise his memory, in order to see whether he could recall any particular member of the Consulate staff who might have been on leave at the time. The exercise proved fruitless, and he was unable to make any suggestion.

Finally, I reminded REED of his previous "confession" that he had told a number of people about the VOLKOV episode in recent years. I said that we would like to know who these people were, since for the purpose of getting our records in order we required to know who knew about the matter.

12

REED thought that he had spoken to HARE in 1952, but was not certain that he had mentioned it to him at all. He had also told his wife, and thought that he might have told his father-in-law. He seemed to realis that he should have told nobody, but explained that he thought the matter must have ceased to be confidential after this lapse of time. I do not think that he was left in any doubt as to its being highly confidential now I asked him if - apart from his wife and father-in-law - he had told anyone outside the Government Service.

13

Throughout the interview REED seemed to be pretty well at ease, although I felt that he knew that he was being examined somewhat critically Possibly for this reason he twice described himself as "the only anti-Russi member of the Embassy" at the time. Asked whether he meant by this to impl that his colleagues in the Embassy were pro-Russian, he said that he of course meant to imply nothing of the kind. He himself had just come back from Russia, and had come back with a feeling of hostility to the Russians. His denial that BENNETT was at any time told anything that he should not have known about VOLKOV was categorical.

14

I am inclined to think that REED genuinely has a very bad memory and that he has not - at least consciously - been lying about the BENNETT episode, whatever it may have amounted to. It seems to me possible howeve that the weakness of his memory may have been increased by the fact that h has no wish to remember exactly what happened at the time: there is no doubt whatever - as his admission about having talked that he is far from discreet. On his own admission he was a close friend of BENNETT, and I think it quite possible that he told BENNETT more than he should have about VOLKOV, and that he ma have done so before VOLKOV's departure. (It does not of course follow tha there was any further leakage at the time through BENNETT.)

Extracts - 590-146

In these circumstances my recommendation is that BENNETT should be located and asked to give his own version of what happened, and that we should do this rather than use the letter to Sir Alexander Helm. We should however find out at the same time whether Helm is in fact likely to be coming back to this country in the near future; if he is and dependent upon the answers to the questions we put to BENNETT, we may wish to ask him to tell us what he can recollect.

16

J. C. Robertson.

12 January 1954.

Copies in P.F.604,964. REED.
P.F.603,656. VOLKOV.
P.F.145,940. BENNETT.

67A

Interview with John REED.

Ext'd to L595/134

1 The interview arranged with Mr. John REED took place at the War Office on Wednesday, 2 December, 1953 at 2.30 p.m.

[redacted] started by saying that REED would, of course, understand that everything we were about to discuss was to be regarded as very secret and in fact subject to the Official Secrets Act. REED interrupted to say that he had signed that and [redacted] explained that he was talking particularly of the subject of our conversation this afternoon which should not in fact be discussed even with colleagues. REED seemed surprised but agreed that he would not discuss it with anybody.

2

I then told REED that what we wanted was for him to cast his mind back to the summer of 1945 and the strange story of Constantine VOLKOV. I gathered that he had already been told that this was the subject of the interview. REED said that he first went to Ankara in November, 1944 having previously been in Moscow. He went up to Istanbul with the rest of the Embassy staff in the summer of 1945 as was the regular custom. In Istanbul the Embassy staff worked in the old Consulate buildings. He had met a few Russians in Ankara at social functions but he did not know any Russians in Istanbul. On a date that he thought was the 2nd September (it was in fact the 4th) he received a message to say that Mr. VOLKOV of the Soviet Consulate wanted to see him. He did not know VOLKOV and had no idea why he had selected him or how he knew his name. VOLKOV appeared with [redacted] He was very nervous and jumpy. He said that he would prefer the interview to take place between himself and REED alone and [redacted] was sent away. REED was reluctant to do this as he felt his Russian to be inadequate for the purpose, but VOLKOV insisted.

3

Ext'd to L595/134

4 REED then described in rather vague terms what took place at the interview. In his first recollection this was the first of two interviews and on this occasion he thought VOLKOV offered to give information without much detail. REED paused here and after a little thought said that he thought he was mistaken and only one interview took place. He recalled that VOLKOV was emphatic that no telegrams should be sent concerning his visit because the Russians were able to read our cypher messages. He recalled that VOLKOV said that he knew of some of our agents in Istanbul including [redacted] and himself and that he had denied that he was an agent. VOLKOV said that REED was known to be anti-Russian. VOLKOV said there were Russian agents in the Foreign Office, in the Intelligence Service, in the Admiralty and in the Air Ministry. [redacted] asked REED if he was sure that the Admiralty and Air Ministry had been mentioned and he immediately said that he was not sure and he thought he had merely supposed that to be the case because British Government departments had been mentioned, but he certainly had the impression that VOLKOV intended to imply that there were agents in the Service Ministries.

Ext'd to L595/134.

Ext'd to L595/146

5 REED said that he had the impression that VOLKOV did not mean that the Russians had succeeded in breaking our cyphers but that they were in a position to get hold of "telegrams". He did not seem able to remember any more. At this point I asked him what VOLKOV had said about the Russian agent in the Consulate in Istanbul. REED could only remember that VOLKOV had said that the Russians had such an agent, he was quite sure that VOLKOV did not describe him in such a way as to make him identifiable. He recalled that after the interview he had gone through the list of Consulate employees with the First Secretary Mr. Busk.

6 REED went on to describe [redacted] and the efforts made to re-contact VOLKOV. He said that he had himself telephoned to VOLKOV and somebody had replied in English saying that he was VOLKOV. This person agreed to call at the Embassy at 3 o'clock. However nobody appeared at 3 o'clock. (According to our information it was Mr. Page, the Vice Consul who telephoned, not REED).

67A

I asked REED when the arrangements for re-contacting VOLKOV were made and he said that he thought they were made at his interview. He then contradicted himself and said he was sure they were not made at the interview because VOLKOV had been emphatic that nobody should telephone to him.

REED then went on to say that at a date of which he was not positive but probably sometime in October after he returned to Ankara, Mr. John BENNETT, the Assistant Press Counsellor, told him of a very curious thing that he had seen. BENNETT had seen an unknown aeroplane arrive at Istanbul airfield without warning and it was touch and go whether it would be fired on by the Turks. When it came down it proved to be a Soviet military plane. BENNETT then saw VOLKOV and his wife carried on to the plane on stretchers. I asked how BENNETT knew the VOLKOVs but REED did not know. REED recalled that there was some trouble about BENNETT reporting this story. REED then said that something very awkward had arisen as a result of BENNETT's telling him this story. He had been instructed by Mr. Helm, the Counsellor, to "threaten" BENNETT. REED appeared to be unable to go on with this story so I asked him what he was to threaten BENNETT about. He said that he could not remember, he could not imagine what it could be about but that he had the impression that some information was to be forced out of BENNETT. He remembered that he had protested to Mr. Helm that he should deal with BENNETT himself as it was very awkward for REED who was of approximately the same age and seniority. However, Mr. Helm was adamant. REED appeared very worried and embarrassed over this matter and quite anxious to leave the subject.

REED then asked if I had a copy of his original note about his meeting. As I felt sure by this time that he was not going to be able to produce any more information about the meeting, I said I had and gave it him to read. He expressed himself surprised at his own statement "that VOLKOV had told his story without further preliminaries" because he said his impression was that VOLKOV had beaten about the bush for about half-an-hour before coming through with the story. REED said that he had completely forgotton about the empty flat in Moscow and the suitcase full of documents. He agreed that VOLKOV must have said something about an agent working in the Consulate building but he was quite sure that he gave no description of this person. He had the impression that VOLKOV had asked for a large sum of money, what he described as rather an odd sum, possibly £23,000 or £27,000. He seemed to be a little surprised that he had not mentioned this in his note of the meeting, but later said he might well be confusing in his memory what had occurred at the meeting and what he later read in the "Sales Catalogue".

I then asked him if it was correct to assume that the only people who knew about the visit of VOLKOV at the time when it occurred were Mr. Page, the Consul; Mr. Helm, the Counsellor; Mr. Busk, the First Secretary and Mr. BENNETT, the Press Counsellor, in addition to himself. He immediately said that BENNETT did not know the story of VOLKOV. He said that even when BENNETT told him that he had seen the VOLKOVs put on to the plane he, REED, was strictly forbidden to tell BENNETT of VOLKOV's visit to the Consulate.

From here we went back to the subject of his being told to "threaten" BENNETT. Unfortunately REED found himself quite unable to say why he was instructed to do this. He had recalled that Bill Allan, who was the Press Counsellor at the time and who is a very close friend of his own, was not on very good terms with BENNETT and had, in fact, told him that he did not trust BENNETT. Allan had apparently said that BENNETT was, or had been in the past, very left wing. As REED seemed to doubt this story told him that there was some truth in it. REED said he did not take very much notice of what Allan said because he is a man of great violence of opinion and had been a Fascist in pre-war days which would naturally tend to make him look askance at even the mildest of left wingers.

REED said that he had a confession to make. He had not realised that the story of VOLKOV was still regarded as confidential and he had, he was afraid, told it to several people. I assured him that we regarded the

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Extd
L. 59/5/46

REED said that his wife had recently been visiting Istanbul where her parents lived. While there she had met Sir Alexander Knox Helm, who is now the Ambassador, and he had sent a message to REED via his wife. He had said that she should tell her husband to remember what happened in the summer of 1945. "It has had more terrible consequences than we thought at the time." REED said that Sir Alexander Knox Helm apparently thought that Mrs. REED did not know of the VOLKOV story. When he received this message he assumed Helm to be thinking of Donald MACLEAN.

The whole interview was conducted in a friendly atmosphere but there is no doubt that REED was extremely nervous. I had the impression that his nervousness was due to three things: 1) his inability to remember clearly what had occurred, 2) his acute discomfort over something which had happened between himself and John BENNETT and 3) his realisation that he had been guilty of indiscretion in repeating the story of VOLKOV to other people. I am inclined to think that it is rather remarkable that the story has not hitherto reached the press as I have little doubt REED had been dining out on it.

As I believe that REED is genuinely unable to remember precisely what happened and is in fact completely confused between what he remembers of his interview with VOLKOV and what VOLKOV said in his "Sales Catalogue", I am of the opinion that there would be no value in questioning him further. An instance of his faulty memory is that he is unable to remember even the existence of Mr. C.H. Page, the Vice-Consul. This is particularly odd as Mr. Page played quite an important part in the story.

I did not ask Reed the names of the people to whom he has told the story of VOLKOV because I thought this would be extremely embarrassing for him and alter the character of the interview. I did, as already stated, tell him with considerable emphasis that the story was of a particularly secret and confidential nature.

In my view there is no reason to think that REED is a spy or that he was intentionally responsible for the information about VOLKOV's attempted defection leaking. I should certainly regard him as indiscreet.

E. McBarnet.

D.1.A.
4.12.53.

66a
67a

65A

copy in PF 604964 (Reed)

Note for P.F.603,656.

A meeting took place in B.2's room on 22nd October, 1953. Present were Mr. Reed, M.I.5. and Miss McBarnet, M.I.5. The meeting took place in order that the Security Service paper on the VOLKOV Documents might be discussed.

The general view was that VOLKOV was a genuine intelligence officer; that he was probably in a position to produce some at least of the information he offered, and that he probably exaggerated the value of his wares.

It was further agreed that the only positive step that can now be taken is to interview John REED. said that he would take steps to find out when REED is returning to this country and we can then arrange how his interrogation should take place. It was thought that it might be best undertaken by a representative of this office

Evelyn McBarnet

E. McBarnet.

D.1.B.
23.10.53.

23.10.53

62a
64a

Receipt for TOP SECRET Document.

To be signed by the recipient and returned immediately to :—

BOX 500, PARLIAMENT STREET B.O., LONDON, S.W.1.

TOP SECRET Document/~~Package~~ Reference No. PF.603656/B.2.B/EMcB

Dated 7.9.53 Sect: B.2.B

Held B2B

Despatched to :— Lord Talbot de Malahide, Foreign Office.

Date 7.9.53

noted in 9/9/53

RECEIVED the above:

Date 8/9/53 Signature Talbot de Malahide

S. Form 243/5000/rev. 5.50.



Copied to L595-46.

File

61A

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

PF.603656/B.2.B/EMcB.

7th September, 1953.

Copy in SF441/Turkey).

Dear Lord Talbot,

Thank you for your letter of August 27, 1953.

As you say, it is not altogether surprising that it should prove so difficult to test our hypothesis at this late date.

We shall, of course, be most interested to hear in due course the result of your investigation of the cypher personnel at Ankara and Istanbul.

Yours sincerely,

E. McBarnet

Lord Talbot de Malahide,
Foreign Office.

/NLM

60

PF.603656/D.G.

Copy to SF Quintin Hogg

1st September, 195

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

We have recently completed a review of the case of Constantin VOLKOV. Our objects were firstly to re-assess in the light of our most recent knowledge the reliability of the information VOLKOV supplied, and secondly to decide whether any further lines of investigation remain.

I enclose a copy of the report compiled by our research section to consider. A copy has also been sent to the Security Department of the Foreign Office who were anxious that the material in the case should be reviewed with particular regard to that part of VOLKOV's information which related to the Foreign Service.

At the time it was first received, when evidence of any kind was lacking, both VOLKOV's information and his financial demands had an air of extravagance. Having re-examined his information we are satisfied that it must in fact be regarded as authentic. Furthermore, comparison of the material with those cases of proven and suspected espionage which we have recently had to investigate points to the conclusion that a number of the spies to whom VOLKOV referred remain unidentified.

Thus VOLKOV claimed knowledge of seven spies in the "British Intelligence Services". PHILBY and CAIRNCROSS may account for two out of the seven. If, as seems probable BURGESS was active as a spy at the time to which VOLKOV's information relates, it is on the whole likely that the remaining five Russian sources are to be found among BURGESS' entourage, This however remains a theory, the accuracy of which is far from being proved.

The position, therefore, is that the Russians almost certainly had seven sources in this particular field in 1945, that none of these sources has been conclusively identified, and that although it is on the whole unlikely that all or even most of them are still operating, some may be

The term "British Intelligence Services" is of course capable of wide interpretation and should not necessarily be regarded as applying only to M.I.5. The fact remains that it is a vital necessity that the sources should be identified.

/After.....

After the report has been studied in [redacted] it might be a good thing if we discussed:

(a) whether the facts should now be made known to any other senior members [redacted]

(b) whether there are any further steps we can severally or jointly take further to pursue the investigation.

James Sinclair

D. G. WILLIS

copied to L595/46
Miss McBarnett

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

SGB

B.2B/RTR
Mr

August 27, 1953.

Top Secret & Personal

CC in L595/46

Received 28.8.53.

Copy in SF441/Turkey/1 + attachment

Dear Robertson,

In your letter No. PF. 603656/B.2 of July 21 you sent Carey Foster a copy of your recent report on the Volkov case. I believe that Carey Foster later discussed the case with you and Dick White and agreed that we would make further enquiries about the staff at Istanbul. I wrote to the Ambassador for this purpose on August 6 and sent you a copy of my letter.

I now enclose a copy of the Ambassador's reply which shows, I think conclusively, that enquiries in Turkey are no longer feasible, even of the limited character we suggested. We have likewise made hardly any headway with similar enquiries into records here. In these circumstances it seems that the most we can do is to try and trace the movements of the cypher personnel and I propose, therefore, to limit our investigation to the cypher staff of the Embassy at Ankara and the Consulate-General at Istanbul. This will, of course, take no account of the cypher staff of the Service organisations or of [redacted] and it is going to be very difficult at this late date even to find out the names of those people.

I am sorry that we can do so little to test this particular hypothesis now but I do not expect that you will be altogether surprised.

Yours ever
Talbot de Malahide

J.C. Robertson Esq.,

(Talbot de Malahide)

COPY

British Embassy,

Ankara.

(at Istanbul).

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

14th August, 1953.

( )

.....

I wish with all my heart that I could give you an encouraging reply. But I fear that it is just not possible. Fortunately you yourself were vaguely familiar with the jungle nature of this Istanbul house in 1945 so you will be all the better able to understand my difficulties.

There was as you know a complete lack of organisation in the Consulate General and even today I am fairly sure that if we had to set about an enquiry into the whereabouts of its own staff in September 1951 the result would be quite inconclusive. Related to 1945 it would be hopeless.

The Consulate General was however only one of many organisms all functioning independently in this house. Most of them - S.O.E., Military Intelligence among them - have disappeared, probably leaving no trace and certainly no usable one. Then there was the menial staff of all the organisms but each with its own - my efforts in 1943 to get some coordination in this field were vain.

Some of the menial staff of the 1945 period of course remain, as does Bennett of the Consulate General. But otherwise I don't think there are any survivors.

Against that background I am sure you will understand that the suggested researches are not today feasible. Frankly I doubt whether, with things as they certainly were, they would have been feasible even in 1946! Anyway I am convinced that such researches today would at the best be barren and at the worst might arouse curiosity and create embarrassment.

I think the Security people may well be right in their conclusion that Mr. X. knew there was at least one agent in this building - my guess is and was that there were probably several and I don't see how in the milling throng and the atmosphere here at the time it could well have been otherwise. But I do remember being struck at the time by X's insistence about wireless and telegraph. So much was this the case that entirely on my own, I kept a keen but unobtrusive eye on our own cypher people at Ankara - I felt X might think we should report from there. I found nothing on which to base the slightest suspicion.

There were of course cypher people here - each organism had its own - and it occurs to me that they might be worth following up if only because they involve a much smaller number of people. So far as the Consulate General is concerned the names will be on record in the Foreign Office - I don't remember now who they were. The names of those of the other organizations - the friends and Naval Intelligence in addition to S.O.E. and Military Intelligence - would be more difficult to trace.

I readily admit that my identification of the clue with cyphering is not exclusive. But X was presumably a man of intelligence and ought to have known that any report home "by wireless or telegraph" would not go in clear. Thus he should perhaps have realized that he had nothing to fear from the operators unless of course he knew that they could break our cyphers. Equally he apparently did not fear the typing staff. Logically therefore we should perhaps be left with the cypherers.

Serial 13b in EF.604558/SUPP.E PF.603656

Extract from note by B.2B dated 22.7.53.

54B

TOP SECRET

A meeting was held this morning in D.B.'s room; present were Mr. Carey-Foster, Foreign Office, Mr. White, Mr. Robertson, Mr. Simkins, Miss McBarnet and Mr. Reed. Carey-Foster had come prepared to discuss three things: (1) The report prepared by Miss McBarnet on the VOLKOV case; ....

(1) VOLKOV PF.603656

Mr. Carey-Foster said that there was very little upon which he could comment on the VOLKOV report except that he thought that it might paint a rather blacker picture than necessary. He did not feel that the spy in the British Consulate was perhaps of a very high grade but agreed that it was right to take the worst possible view when considering any recommendations that should be made. He proposed to show Sir William Strang the conclusions of the VOLKOV report and to impress upon people that there was no room for complacency. He also agreed that further work could be done by the Foreign Office Security Department in checking on the employments of U.K. based staff who may have been at the British Consulate at the relevant time or may have been on leave. This would require rather a lot of work which Lord Talbot would not be in a position to undertake and he thought it ought to be farmed out

Mr. White reported that Ian Colvin had got hold of part of the story and that there was therefore a danger that it might be revealed to the Press. Carey-Foster thought that that was an additional reason for making Sir William Strang aware of our conclusions.

Mr. Robertson made the point that while VOLKOV thought that there were a number of sources in British Government employ, some might be attributable to BURGESS claiming to have sources, some of whom may not have been conscious ones.

....

22.7.53 (signed) R.T. Reed.

TOP SECRET

B3P/NA 30/7/23

Cockcr.

Receipt for TOP SECRET Document.

To be signed by the recipient and returned immediately to:—

BOX 500, PARLIAMENT STREET B.O., LONDON, S.W.1.

TOP SECRET Document/Package Reference No. PF.603656/B.2.

B23 for PA
DC 28/7

Dated 21.7.53. Sect: B.2.

Despatched to:— G. A. Carey Foster, Esq., C.M.G., D.F.C., A.F.C.,

FOREIGN OFFICE. (BY HAND)

B2B
29/7

Date 21.7.53.

RECEIVED the above:

Date 21/7 Signature G.A.W.

S. Form 243/5000/rev. 5.50.

B.2.B.

54a

TOP SECRET PERSONAL

PF.603656/B.2.

A.60/51.

21st July, 1953.

Dear

42a 43a

Please refer to your letter of 18th June, 1953, and to our letter of 22nd June, 1953, reference PF.603656/B2B/RTR. We have now completed our examination of the VOLKOV material and I enclose a copy of our report. (47a)

As you will see, we feel that VOLKOV's information should be regarded as authentic and we cannot feel entirely satisfied that we now know the identity of all the spies mentioned by him.

In our view there is a strong case for believing BURGESS to be one of the two Foreign Office spies in London and we remain hopeful that MACLEAN can be regarded as the second. The argument against this is that VOLKOV did specifically mention London and MACLEAN was in Washington. In any case I think we must reckon with the possibility of at least one other Foreign Service spy, the "agent on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul".

There remain the seven alleged spies in the British Intelligence Services, concerning whom you state in your letter of June 18th that "most of these have now been identified". Our opinion, as you will see, is that this assumption is perhaps somewhat over-confident. I do not think that we can at this stage justifiably claim more than that we have candidates in mind for most of the seven.

Yours

JCR

J. C. Robertson.

G. A. Carey Foster, Esq., C.M.G., D.F.C., A.F.C.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

Enclosure: 1.

Secret Cross Reference

51B

for file number: PF.603656

Title: VOLKOV

INFORMATION *re*: VOLKOV

received (date): 14.7.53

is filed in

*(*a*) FILE number: SF 84/USSR/2/SUPP.A Vol.2

at serial: 41a

*(*b*) FOLDER held by: D.I.A

under ref.:

Cross reference made by: NLMcD

Section: DIA

Date: 7.5.54

*Use (*a*) or (*b*) as appropriate.

S. Form 111c/5000/rev. 10.52.

DIA/JC 25/5/54

Draft Letter/Minute to
G.A. Carey-Foster, Esq., C.M.G., D.F.C., A.F.C.,
Foreign Office.

Copies to

For Signature by

Grading

Date 30th June, 1953.

Our Ref. P.F.603,656/B2B/FCB.

Their Ref. A.60/51.

Approved by

NOT SENT

[Please refer to your letter of 18th June, 1953 and to our letter of 22nd June, 1953 reference P.F.603,656/B2B/RTR. We have now completed our examination of the VOLKOV material and I enclose a copy of our report.

As you will see, we feel that VOLKOV's information should be regarded as authentic and we cannot feel entirely satisfied that we now know the identity of all the spies mentioned by him.

In ~~my~~ our view there is a strong case for believing BURGESS to be one of the two Foreign Office spies in London and ~~I~~ we remain hopeful that MACLEAN can be regarded as the second. The argument against this is that VOLKOV did specifically mention London and MACLEAN was in Washington. In any case I think we must reckon with the possibility of at least one other Foreign Service spy, the "agent on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul".]

As regards the seven spies in the British Intelligence Services, we believe that we have identified two probables i.e. H.A.R. PHILBY and John CAIRNCROSS; and two, perhaps three, possibles i.e. [redacted] Anthony BLUNT and [redacted] These last named individuals were in the circle of BURGESS and there is considerable suspicion against them but no proven case. If guilty, they may have been members of a spy network or unconscious sources of information. In either capacity their names might have been recorded in Moscow and known to VOLKOV. Our identifications may, therefore, have given us four or five of the seven spies mentioned by

VOLKOV as in the British Intelligence Services in London.

There are two additional candidates who might conceivably fit in either category, one being David FLOYD, who in 1945 was a member of the British Military Mission in Moscow and, on his own admission, in touch with the Russians, and Goronwy REES who is known to have been the subject of an attempted recruitment to espionage by BURGESS in 1937. In 194 REES was an army intelligence officer who held a staff appointm in the Political Division of the Control Commission for Germany

NOT SENT

67B

Constantin VOLKOV.

ASSESSMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VOLKOV's INFORMATION.

The information proffered by Constantin VOLKOV was in two parts, the first part being that which he offered at a meeting with Mr. J.L. REED at the British Consulate on 4.9.1945., and the second part being what has come to be known as his "Sales Catalogue" which was contained in a letter handed by VOLKOV to Mr. C.H. Page, Vice-Consul, Istanbul. on 13.9.45.

Meeting Between Constantin VOLKOV and Mr. J.L. REED on 4.9.1945.

Information given by VOLKOV (as interpreted by REED).	Comments.
For 2½ years the Soviet authorities had been able to read all cipher messages between Foreign Office and British Embassy in Moscow.	This could mean that the Russians had broken our cipher by technical means, or that they had obtained cipher books from a spy.
The Russians had two agents in the Foreign Office in London and seven agents in the British Intelligence Services.	It is noted that no location was given for the "seven agents in the British Intelligence Services," but from Item 3 of the "Sales Catalogue" it would seem that these particular spies (Foreign Office and British Intelligence Service) were situated in London.
VOLKOV knew the names of British agents in Turkey, REED, etc.	VOLKOV was accurate in respect of but not in the case of REED. It would seem that VOLKOV knew REED's name, but did not in fact know him personally and was mistaken as to his functions.
VOLKOV said he had a suitcase in an empty flat in Moscow which contained the names of 314 Soviet agents in the United Kingdom.	There seems no doubt that Mr. REED made an error here, because in his own translation of the "sales catalogue" he says, "a list of agents of the N.K.G.B. in Turkey numbering 314 men". Both new translations confirm this interpretation.

VOLKOV's "Sales Catalogue".

Verbatim Reproduction of 1951 Revised Translation.	Comments.
1. A list of 314 Intelligence Directorate of N.K.G.B's agents in Turkey. (The list includes both active and "sleeping" agents' networks. Official personality notes on certain agents are also available.)	VOLKOV stated that he was Deputy Chief of the N.K.G.B. in Turkey. If true, he must have had this information.
2. A list of some 250 official and unofficial members of the British Military and Civilian Intelligence Services and their networks who are known to the N.K.G.B.	At first sight, 250 seems a large number of British Intelligence personnel to be "blown" to the Russians, but when it is considered that this figure may have included serving members of the Intelligence Corps as well as members of M.I.5. and agents of these services anywhere in the world, it is not so considerable.

47A

3.	A list of material (in some cases their duplicates and photostatic copies) received by us from the agents of N.K.G.B. in the British Intelligence Services and the Foreign Office. (Judging by their code names there are nine such agents in London). This list is of extraordinary interest as it should make it possible to uncover N.K.G.B. networks in some extraordinarily important British Departments. I know for instance that one of the agents is a departmental Head of the British Counter-espionage Directorate in London and that another one is on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul.	It would seem that VOLKOV knew of these agents (VOLKOV regarded them as "agents". They may have been informants to whom code names were given) by their code names and by the material they produced and, in some cases, by their official position, but not by their real names. It seems probable that the 9 agents mentioned referred specifically to London and that the agent on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul must be reckoned as yet another.
4.	Copies of materials, files and special dossiers of the British Intelligence Service.	If VOLKOV had this material with him or available in his flat in Moscow he must have been contemplating defection for some time.
5.	Photostatic copies and translations of operations material of the British Intelligence Service, in particular the correspondence between London and	This material could presumably have been obtained from a British Intelligence Service spy in London
6.	A copy of the report by the Directorate of the Near-East Department of the N.K.G.B. on the materials from the British Intelligence Services in Iran.	This appears to suggest a British Intelligence Service spy in Iran, or alternatively that the report in question derived from Anglo/Soviet intelligence liaison in Teheran. The report itself might presumably have been sent to VOLKOV in Turkey.
7.	Detailed information about certain N.K.G.B. agents in Palestine, the Balkans and Iran (their code names and methods of contact).	Possibly within the scope of the N.K.G.B. officer in Istanbul to have this information.
8.	A full list of the members of the Intelligence Directorate of N.K.G.B. in Moscow, their home addresses and their home and Office telephone numbers. Also addresses of their garages and numbers of their cars.	This material would seem to be of a kind available in the "Admin. Division" of any intelligence service.
9.	Addresses of certain undercover flats used by the Intelligence Directorate of N.K.G.B. in Moscow.	Comment as in (8).
10.	Recruitment material on Captain (now probably Major) of the counter-espionage services of N.K.G.B., the secretary of the "GLAVKA" (?) of the Ministry of Oil Production, and a woman official dealing with orders in one of the special divisions in Moscow. All three could be made use of in the interests of the British Services.	Information presumably obtained in Moscow. This suggests that VOLKOV may have been discontented before his arrival in Istanbul and knew of others in the same position.
11.	Two passes of officers of the Intelligence Department in Moscow for 1945 allowing access to all operation, registry and other departments of N.K.G.B., N.K.V.D., and counter-espionage directorates of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Navy. These passes could be used as models.	Comment as in (8).

47a

12. Samples of stamps and commandant's stamps of two directorates of N.K.G.B. which will make possible the issue of references and passes for taking out from the N.K.G.B. premises of official documents and files.	Comments as in (8).
13. Samples of official forms and various entry cards of the N.K.G.B. Intelligence Directorate. The latter could be used to obtain, through the extablished procedure, any information from the operational-registry department of the Intelligence Directorate and other special departments in Moscow. The forms, above-mentioned, will make it possible for you to establish all N.K.G.B. networks in the world.	Comment as in (8).
14. Keys to two offices of the N.K.G.B. Intelligence Directorate operational departments in Moscow containing secret files on the Near East.	Comment as in (8).
15. There are other various documents bearing on the financial and operational position of various N.K.G.B. establishments.	Comment as in (8).

About half the items of information are such as might have been within the reach of an officer in charge of the administration of an intelligence office rather than within that of an executive intelligence officer. The variety of items offered suggests that VOLKOV may have been collecting information with the idea of defection for some time prior to his posting to Istanbul, and this is certainly borne out by the statement that documentary material offered in the first part of his "Sales Catalogue" was, apparently, to be collected from a suitcase in a flat in Moscow.

"Sales Catalogue" PART II.

1. Copies of coded telegrams to Moscow and to the Ambassador whose value (apart from their contents) is that they may enable you to break the code for outgoing telegrams from the Consulate General (and also maybe for the incoming ones).	Presumably available to VOLKOV in Istanbul.
2. A list of establishment officers of the N.K.G.B. Intelligence Directorate, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Navy, operating in Turkey under cover of legal establishments (their code names and functions within the network). Also a partial list for Iran and Egypt.	This is similar material to that offered in (1) of Part 1.
3. Several keys of offices, safes and outside doors of the Consulate General.	Comments as in (1).
4. Books of notes on the conversations between the Consulate officials and visitors, also other official documents.	Comments as in (1).

4a

5.	I could, if necessary, provide a schematic plan of the political and military networks of U.S.S.R. in Turkey and also of the N.K.G.B. Intelligence Directorate in Moscow.	Comments as in (1).
6.	I could also prepare a detailed report on the organisation of counter-espionage in Red Army units, their competance and methods of work.	This offer seems to be exaggerated but the information might be within the knowledge of an N.K.G.B. officer.
7.	Apart from that I could explain the measures taken by N.K.G.B. against the British Secret Service in Moscow (HILL, BARCLAY) also the source of the British diplomatic and military codes received (in Moscow).	This offer at least shows that VOLKOV knew who HILL and BARCLAY were, but this may have been common knowledge in Moscow at the time.

Conditions made by VOLKOV.

1.	Complete secrecy about this offer. No mention of it to be made by radio or telegraph.	This suggests that he genuinely believed that our ciphers could be read in Moscow, or that the N.K.G.B. had a spy in the Foreign Office cipher department, or that the Istanbul spy was a cipher clerk. It also suggests that he knew he was safe from the N.K.G.B. spy working in the Consulate. Perhaps he knew that this individual was in Ankara at the time of his offer or on leave.
2.	All negotiations with your principals to be made direct and without middlemen.	He wished to deal only with the Foreign Office and did not wish the Intelligence Service to be called in.
3.	Loss of my appointment and status is to be adequately compensated by simultaneously handing to me at least £50,000. This is the minimum considering the value of the material you will receive and the inevitable consequences to all my relatives in the U.S.S.R.	VOLKOV valued himself high but I think his information would have been cheap at the price.
4.	Assurance of my refuge and guarantee of full safety.	No comment.
5.	Your decision (positive or negative) is to reach me before September 25th or at the latest October 1st, 1945.	VOLKOV's insistence on dates suggests that he may have had reason to believe tha that he would not be in a position to defect after 1st October, 1945., or possibly that he knew that the Istanbul spy would have returned to the British Consulate by October 1st.

General Comments.

It can be said that the information offered by VOLKOV would appear to be such as would be available to a well-placed officer of an intelligence service. As none of the material offered was in fact received it is quite impossible to assess its reliability.

Two items of information proffered by VOLKOV which may be thought to have been confirmed by later events are the following:-

1) Two N.K.G.B. spies in the Foreign Office in London: since it is now known that D.D. MACLEAN was an active Soviet spy in 1945 it has been thought most probable that he was one of the two Foreign Office spies mentioned by VOLKOV. As against this it must be remembered that VOLKOV specifically stated that the spy was operating in London whereas D.D. MACLEAN was en poste in Washington at the time.

Guy BURGESS, who has been considered as a possible candidate for one of the two Foreign Office spies, was a member of the News Department of the Foreign Office in 1945, having joined the Foreign Service in June, 1944. BURGESS was at this time also employed as an outside agent of the Security Service. VOLKOV held, officially, the appointment of a Vice-Consul of the ~~British~~ Russian Consulate General in Istanbul. He arrived in Istanbul from Moscow to take up the appointment in June, 1945, and left Istanbul accompanied by his wife, Loya VOLKOVA, in a Russian military plane on 26th September, 1945. It is possible, therefore, that VOLKOV may have been referring to BURGESS. Although BURGESS could be one of these two Foreign Office spies, it is quite impossible to say that he was. Apart from the fact that VOLKOV gave us nothing that would serve to identify the spy, we have no evidence that BURGESS was actively engaged in espionage in 1945 although it is in a high degree probable that he was.

2) VOLKOV said that one of the N.K.G.B. spies in the British Intelligence Services held the post of a Departmental Head of the British Counter-Espionage Directorate in London: a case has been made against H.A.R. PHILBY as a Soviet spy. A number of occurrences in his history can be interpreted as the acts of a spy, but while the cumulative weight of the circumstantial evidence is considerable, the case against him has not been proved and in all probability never will be. As regards VOLKOV's statement, PHILBY was in 1945 Head of Section IX of S.I.S. This section was responsible for studying Russian espionage and could be accurately described as a counter-espionage department. PHILBY's handling of the VOLKOV case constitutes, in my view, one of the strong points in the case against him.

CONCLUSIONS.

In my opinion, the VOLKOV information suggests the following:-

1) VOLKOV was an officer of the N.K.G.B. as claimed.

2) The information offered by VOLKOV was such as could have been known to an officer of the N.K.G.B. at Headquarters in Moscow.

3) VOLKOV had been contemplating defection prior to leaving Moscow.

4) He knew of the existence of at least three spies in the Foreign Service, i.e. two in London and one in Istanbul.

5) He knew of the existence of seven spies in the British Intelligence Service in London and knew the official position of one.

6) He knew of the existence of spy networks in various British Government Departments but did not know details of their composition or personalities.

7) He knew British cyphers to be compromised to the Russians and probably thought he knew how this had happened.

8) The nine spies mentioned by VOLKOV as being situated in London cannot be regarded as the sum total of Russian spies in British Government employment.

Ex'd P 2593/134

My conclusion is that VOLKOV's "Sales Catalogue" material should be regarded as authentic. It remains, therefore, that even allowing a margin for exaggeration and for some degree of error by VOLKOV's sources it is possible that there are still undetected Russian spies in British Government employment.

45a.
46ab.

44A

Constantin VOLKOV.

In October, 1945 Security Service (probably received by Mr. Hollis about 5.10.1945) a collection of documents which consisted of the following:-

1) Copy of a letter from Tom Bromley (Foreign Office) to dated 19.9.1945., enclosing papers re an attempted defection of a Russian Vice Consul in Istanbul. Bromley suggests that this should be mentioned to Captain Liddell.

2) Copy of minute from R.C. Howe (Foreign Office) to Sir Alexander Cadogan, dated 19.9.1945, enclosing papers re attempted defection of Constantin VOLKOV. Suggests that this should be handed to for his comments.

3) Copy of a letter from A.K. Helm (Charge d'Affaires, Ankara) to W.M. Codrington (Foreign Office) dated 14.9.1945, enclosing original letter from VOLKOV and a translation. Mentions that a telegram had been sent warning Codrington that this letter was coming.

4) Copy of a note signed "S.F.H?" (probably L.H. Hurst, Consul General, Istanbul) dated 24.8.1945, re a discussion with C.H. Page (Vice-Consul, Istanbul) about an unsigned letter from VOLKOV.

No! letter was in English!

5) Copy of translation of unsigned letter from Constantin VOLKOV to C.H. Page (British Vice-Consul, Istanbul) dated 24.8.1945 asking for interview and enclosing a visiting card.

6) Copy of a telegram from A.K. Helm to Foreign Office dated 14.9.1945. Mentions previous telegram and refers to "Sales Catalogue".

7) Copy of a letter to W.M. Codrington from A.K. Helm dated 5.9.1945, enclosing report prepared by J.L. Reed (Acting First Secretary, Istanbul) re interview with VOLKOV.

8) Copy of report by J.L. Reed, Istanbul, dated 4.9.1945 on visit of Constantin VOLKOV on that date.

9) Copy of a translation by J.L. Reed of VOLKOV's "Sales Catalogue". (original handed to C.H. Page by VOLKOV on 13.9.45)

5.10.45. Mr. Hollis wrote a minute He mentioned PHILBY's arrival (presumably in Istanbul) and failure to contact VOLKOV. He stated that VOLKOV had left with his wife for Moscow by plane on 26.9.45. Minute and papers passed to J.H. Marriott and to E.L. Spencer on 5.10.45.

30.10.45. Mr. Hollis, who was then in Ottawa, telegraphed for permission to tell the VOLKOV story to Stephenson (Head of British Security Co-ordination), the Canadian authorities and the Washington Embassy. Mr. Hollis was in Canada on business connected with the CORBY Case.

31.10.45. Reply sent to Mr. Hollis agreeing that the story might be told on a strictly confidential basis.

8.3.46. J.H. Marriott wrote to H.A.R. Philby asking whether a certain Constantin VOLKOV who embarked at Woolwich Buoys for the U.S.A. on 22.2.1946., could be identical with the VOLKOV of Istanbul.

3.4.46.

DS/303
25.6.53

9.4.46. H.A.R. Philby wrote to J.H. Marriott saying that he thinks it very unlikely that VOLKOV who travelled to the U.S.A. was identical with the Istanbul one. He does not propose to inform the F.B.I.

August, 1948. B.2.B. paper No. 8 contained a description of the VOLKOV case.

July, 1951. In connection with enquiries then being made about H.A.R. Philby who had come under suspicion in connection with the MACLEAN and BURGESS Cases, it was realized that H.A.R. Philby was himself sent to Istanbul to take charge of the VOLKOV case.

These contained fuller details about the attempted defection and listed the activities of PHILBY in connection with it. They included H.A.R. PHILBY's own account of what took place, written immediately after his return to the United Kingdom and the conclusions he reached. In addition there are some comments on PHILBY's conclusion made at the time and miscellaneous information from the file which showed that up to 8.4.1946, VOLKOV's name was not carded.

notes that no attempt was ever made to investigate VOLKOV's statement that an N.K.V.D. agent was working in the British Consulate in Istanbul, or to discover who was employed by the Consulate at the time.

8.8.51. Mr. Carey-Foster of the Foreign Office was asked to supply a list of Foreign Office personnel who were aware of the case on or before 22.9.1945., the original Russian document sent by VOLKOV and a list of cypher clerks employed in the British Consulate and Embassy in Istanbul and Ankara in September, 1945., and a similar list for the Foreign Office at the same date.

15.8.51. The Foreign Office forwarded the original Russian document. On 24.8.1945 the document was retranslated and showed one mistranslation in the original and several slight variations in the text.

20.8.51. Copies of new translation sent to S.I.S. and to the Foreign Office.

9.5.51. Sir Noel Charles wrote to Carey-Foster enclosing a letter from W.E.D. Allen giving his suspicions about a certain John Bennett who was Information Officer in Istanbul from August, 1943 to July, 1946. Allen's letter indicated that he thought that J.I. Reed had been indiscreet.

12.9.51. A further translation of the VOLKOV document was made but did not provide any new information.

13.9.51. A.S. Martin wrote to Carey-Foster enclosing copy of the new translation and asking for a list of the entire staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul in August, 1945., and a list of Foreign Office Cypher staff in Moscow during the war years.

13.9.51. A.S. Martin wrote to [redacted] cypher staff in Moscow during the war and asking whether the Cypher Policy Board had ever been informed of VOLKOV's statement that British cyphers were compromised to the Russians and asking for his agreement that they should be informed even at this late date.

18.9.51. Note of discussion between A.S. Martin and Carey-Foster on requirements for further investigation:

1) List of Foreign Office personnel who knew of the VOLKOV case before 22.9.45. Carey-Foster suggested that Bromley could help.

2) List of personnel in the British Consulate, Istanbul in 1945. This is being compiled to still not included S.I.S. personnel.

3) List of cypher personnel in Moscow. This is being compiled.

28.9.51. A.S. Martin wrote to Carey-Foster agreeing that he should write to Tom Bromley as suggested above.

[illegible].10.51. Copy of letter from Carey-Foster to Bromley.

18.10.51. Letter from Carey-Foster setting out his views on the investigations desirable on the VOLKOV case.

1.11.51. Carey-Foster informed A.S. Martin that Mr. Bromley was unable to help very much.

It was agreed that no further action other than the checking of the Foreign Office staff in Moscow and Istanbul was necessary.

4.12.51. [redacted] Barclay ~~was~~ ~~in~~ cypher telegrams himself and had no other staff for the purpose in Moscow. S.O.E. records not available, but it was thought that Colonel Hill followed the same practice as Barclay.

17.12.51. List of Foreign Office personnel who knew of the VOLKOV case received here.

19.12.51. List of staff at Ankara and Istanbul also Moscow in 1945 received here. Ankara and Istanbul lists checked through the Index.

22.2.52. A.S. Martin wrote to the Foreign Office asking for further information about certain persons on the above lists who were found to have identical or ? identical traces.

11.3.52. The Foreign Office replied to the letter of 22.2.52. above.

18.3.52. To the Foreign Office advising that we had traces of three individuals only in addition to our information about J.S. Bennett and W.E.D. Allen. Information on the other three persons not important.

E. McBarnet.

B.2.B.
23.6.53.

43A

SECRET

22nd June, 1953.

PF.603656/B.2.B/RTR

A.60/51

Dear Carey-Foster,

Thank you for your letter of June 18th, 1953.

When we spoke about this problem in January this year, I told you that I was reluctant to express any firm opinion as I thought that we ought to review all the information we possessed before trying to come to a conclusion. The analysis had to take a lower priority to other things, but during the last week or two we have been able to put some work into it and we have nearly completed a paper which covers the field.

As soon as it is ready we shall send you a copy which I think you will find helpful.

Yours sincerely,

R.T. Reed.

G.A. Carey-Foster Esq., C.M.G., D.F.C., A.F.C.,
Foreign Office.

24.6.53

57/5

FOREIGN OFFICE, S. W. 1.

42f

June 18, 1953.

Secret & Personal

19 JUN 1953

A. 60/51

Dear Rowlie

Will you please refer to my letter to Martin of October 18, 1951 concerning Volkov (your letters No. PF.603656/B.2B/ASM of August 20 and September 13, 1951 refer).

I had occasion to re-examine these letters the other day and in the light of more recent information I would like to change some of the views expressed in paragraph 7 of my letter referred to above. As regards the Russian agents in the British Intelligence Service, I of course know that most of these have now been identified. With regard to the two in the Foreign Office, we can remain sure that one is Maclean but I am now more certain that the other one was probably Burgess. When I wrote this letter I was unaware of much of the information we now have about Burgess which suggests that he was a Russian agent long before he joined the Foreign Office. As he joined the Foreign Office in June 1944 he would obviously have informed the Russians that he was going to ~~join the office~~ do so and therefore Volkov, who presumably was still in Moscow at that time if the information in the summary of the Volkov case is accurate, would have known about Burgess' movements.

/I do not

R.T. Reed Esq.,

I do not know whether you agree with the foregoing but it seems to me that it is less likely that there is still an undetected agent in the Foreign Service. I hope I am right about this but the possibility that I am not cannot, I suppose, be excluded.

Yours sincerely

J.A. Carey Foster

PF.603656
(VOLKOV)

41A

I did not have the VOLKOV files with me, but read to me the following extract from the sequence of events that appeared to have occurred:

On the 24th August 1945 VOLKOV wrote a letter to Page of the Embassy at Istanbul saying that he wanted to pay a visit to discuss an important matter. Hurst, the Consul-General, discussed this with Page and agreed to ignore it.

On 4th September VOLKOV presented himself at the Embassy and was seen by Page. was called for by Page to interpret and VOLKOV then said that he wanted to speak to REED. This interview resulted in REED's presenting his memorandum of the 4th September.

On 5th September Helm wrote to Codrington of the Foreign Office with a copy of REED's minute and a minute by Hurst sending some papers, the nature of which is not clear.

Surely, the unsigned letter, envelope & VOLKOV's card?

On the 14th September Helm sent a letter to Codrington enclosing the "Sales Catalogue". On the same day also Helm sent a telegram to Codrington to report despatch of this letter.

On the 19th September there is a covering minute to Sir Alexander Cadogan summarizing the correspondence.

B.2.B
18.6.53

R.T. Reed.

40a.

Reference PF.604964. (REED)
Copy PF.603656 (VOLKOV) ✓

39A

B.2

I understand that [redacted] has previously spoken to you about the story that [redacted] has come upon, that the Russian official VOLKOV tried to defect to us in 1945. Apparently [redacted] he got it from a journalist in Paris, and [redacted] suspect (on what grounds I do not know) that the journalist in Paris got it from John REED as the details are accurate. It seems that John REED has leaked on other occasions and this is a further example of his indiscretions. We have therefore decided to open a PF for John REED incorporating the relevant traces.

B.2.B
8.6.53

R.T. Reed.

(1793)WtY32685/4230
11/51 800,000 JC&S
Ltd. Gp736/210
(REGIMITE)
Code 5-35-0

11.6.53

38a.

35B

We have been reviewing our information on the cases of Donald Duart MACLEAN and Guy Francis de Moncy BURGESS from the point of view of the information provided by the would be defector Constantin VOLKOV.

Our investigations over the past two years tend to confirm our opinion that the information proffered by VOLKOV was authentic, and you will recall that he said "Moreover the Russians have two agents inside the Foreign Office in London". We feel satisfied that Donald Duart MACLEAN was one of these two "agents" and believe there are reasonable grounds for thinking that Guy BURGESS may have been the second one.

The information given by VOLKOV reached us in September, 1945 at which time BURGESS had been employed by the Foreign Office for just over a year. Our reasons for believing that BURGESS may be identified as the second spy in the Foreign Office are based on the following facts:-

1. We know BURGESS to have been a Communist at Cambridge at the same time as Donald MACLEAN.
2. An informant has told us that BURGESS attempted to recruit him for an espionage purpose in 1937.
3. BURGESS was employed in the Foreign Office when VOLKOV gave his information.
4. BURGESS' disappeared with MACLEAN.

I think you will agree that while the evidence that BURGESS was a Russian spy is reasonably strong, we cannot be certain that this fact could have been known to VOLKOV and that we must therefore bear in mind the possibility that another Russian spy was operating in the Foreign Office in 1945 and may still continue to be employed there.

B.2B

p/c & mark file for DB to see on return

341

TOP SECRET &
PERSONAL

7/T

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

Br. 7/8

PF.95(R)

July 30, 1952

Rec'd 7-8-52.

Dear Dick,

Thank you for your PF.603,656/Y/DB of July 21st with which you enclosed a copy of the amended version of the VOLKOV document 33a It is very interesting indeed, and it is certainly useful for me to have a record here.

I very much doubt if C.I.A. will discuss the matter with me and if they do they won't get very far. I also think it unlikely that they will continue to prod the F.B.I. because they know that they will be referred to London.

Yours ever,

Zaphen

D.G. White Esq., C.B.E.,
D.B.

87/14

TOP SECRET

(Copy on PF.603656 Supp. A)

PF.603656/Y/D.B.

21st July, 1952.

Please refer to my letter of 16th May 1952 (PF.604584/Y/Supp.A/DB) reporting an approach we had received from DeBardeleben for a copy of the VOLKOV document.

DeBardeleben subsequently requested a copy of this document [redacted] who, after discussions with us, eventually decided to supply C.I.A. with an amended version. I am sending you a copy of the covering letter which [redacted] wrote to DeBardeleben and also a comparison of our translation of the VOLKOV document and the [redacted] amended text as sent to DeBardeleben. I think it may be useful for you to have this on record because we shall, of course, have to bear carefully in mind, in any future conversations we have with C.I.A. on this matter, the fact that the version they have received varies considerably from the original text.

B.G. WHITE

G.T.D. Patterson, Esq.,
c/o British Embassy,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

TOP SECRET

29a
30a
31a.