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SF 603,656 ~~FILE CLOSED~~ V3

V O L K O V, CONSTANTIN.

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S Form 924E

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date

KV 2 / 4676

PF 603,656 ~~FILE CLOSED~~ V3

MINUTE SHEET

21.7.54

Army Papers for Major

~~B.R.C. SMITH~~ requested from F.2

104z

104a

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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 *FEBRUARY 2024*

113.

28.10.54 Copy of letter from SLO Australia re PETROV mentioning VOLKOV.

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SECTION
ACT 1982

115.

4.11.54

Destroyed - replaced by serial 118a)
 (Draft letter to SLO AUSTRALIA in reply to 113a - PETROV/VOLKOV.

115a

116.

D.1

Reference serial 113a.

I have prepared a draft letter at 115a to be sent to Derek Hamblen.

I do not think we can go further than put the questions I have outlined. If PETROV shows a knowledge of the events, we must obviously be guided by what he says. There is one additional point it might be worth bringing in, and that is to find out if Mr. or Mrs. PETROV can shed any light on VOLKOV's statement that for 2½ years (i.e. presumably from the beginning of 1942 onwards) the Soviet authorities had been able to read all cipher messages between the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Moscow. Actually I should have thought that if either of the PETROVs had some knowledge of this they would have told us before now.

D.1.A
4.11.54

R.T. Reed
R.T. Reed.

117.

D.1.A 24.4.11.

I agree your draft (subject to one minor amendment).

As regards your additional point, I think this is best left alone until we see if PETROV bites.

D.1
4.11.54

Hamblen

118.

11.54 Letter to SLO Australia in reply to 113a, re Mins 116, 117. PETROV/VOLKOV. 118a
 11.54 From NED re 111c. - TAYLOR & JAMESON *transf to 2595/134 in coll. 4/11/CHN* 118ab
 12.54 Loose minute from P.2 re 118ab *transferred to 2595/134 and CHN/k2* 118abb
 .12.54 Extract from letter from SLO Australia re PETROV. 118b

31.12.54 Letter to SLO Australia re VOLKOV

119a

120.

24.1.55 Extract from letter from SLO Australia correcting 118b

120a

121.

18.2.55. Ext. from PETROV report forwarded by SLO Australia ment. VOLKOV

121b

15.3.55. Copy of letter from F.O. re VOLKOV case

121c

122.

25.3.55. To F.O.

122a

123.


Copy of Minute 38 in PF.145940 - BENNETT.

D.1.A. Mr. Reed.

Will you please get in touch with Miss McBarnet and find out how this stands. I should be grateful also if you would let me have an assessment of the contents of 32a, and let me know whether it contains any new information, which would justify modification of the conclusion formerly reached about BENNETT, as recorded at 29a. You will note that there is a full summary and assessment of our record of BENNETT up to May 1952, at 24a.

D.1.
25.3.55.

(signed) J. C. Robertson.



Copy of Minute 40 in PP.145040 - BENNETT.

D.

Since receiving the letter from the Foreign Office at 36ab, I have with Mr. Reed reviewed the position as regards the enquiries about REED and BENNETT which, as you will remember arose from our renewed investigation of the VOLKOV episode.

Where REED is concerned, the position is as stated at 37a, which you have already seen.

The last assessment of BENNETT sent by the Security Service to the Foreign Office was in the letter at 22a in this file. At the same time a fuller summary of our records of BENNETT up to that time was sent to R.5 in the letter at 24a. Briefly, it was recognised that BENNETT had been returned from Cairo in 1943, because he was prematurely pro-Tito and because he had a Yugoslav mistress who herself had some Communist relatives. The allegations by ALLEN were largely discounted, in view of his Fascist record and of his reported inclination "to see Communist bogies". BENNETT was interviewed at the Foreign Office by Carey Foster and Whyte on 26 June 1952, when both decided that he could be cleared of suspicion subject to a satisfactory report from one referee (29a). This report was later received (30a).

I do not think that there is anything in the long analysis (received a year and a half after the decision reached at the Foreign Office interview with BENNETT) to justify any alteration of the decision previously reached. The letter underlines the fact that BENNETT had a Yugoslav mistress, and that she had Communist relatives. It contains a great deal of speculation as to the possibility that BENNETT knew about VOLKOV's prospective defection before his disappearance, and about BENNETT's relations with the Assistant Military Attache in Istanbul, Cribb, who committed suicide; it also covers once more the ground of BENNETT's pre-Partisan sympathies while working for S.O.E. in Cairo, which led to his recall. None of this is new material, and none of it in my opinion justifies any alteration of the earlier assessment of BENNETT.

that we should see Helm and ALLEN. The former course has been taken, and as regards ALLEN I consider that the principal reason for which he was not seen before - namely that he was unlikely to be an objective witness - still holds good.

If you agree, D.1.A. will be writing accordingly, and the position will remain that we shall plan an interview with BENNETT about the events surrounding VOLKOV's disappearance, when he returns to the U.K.

(signed) J. C. Robertson.

D.1.

4.4.55.

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ACT 1958
July 2023.

27.7.55 Copy of minute on file of Valentine VINCENT & VASSILIETZ re request by VOLKOV not to send telegram from Istanbul in 1945.

125a

27.9.55. D.1. note re date of first information coming to U.I.S.

126a

24.10.55. To F.O.

127a.

25.10.55. Note on HILBY and VOLKOV.

128a.

3.9.56. Copy of minute re WILLERT.

131a

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132.

D. 1./CTY

D. recently asked me to look at the VOLKOV file and in particular serials 100a and 101a to see if in the light of any recent investigations, e.g. the interrogation of REVAI, we had got any further towards identifying the agents listed in the catalogue, and if so whether it would serve any purpose to have a further meeting [redacted]

I do not consider that at the moment anything more can be done. I notice, however, that in December 1953 the assessment was circulated to D.1.A. (see serial 67z) and you may like to consider whether this should be done again.

D.H. Whyte
D.H. Whyte.

D. 1.
28.11.56.

133.

28.11.56.

Copy of D. minute ment. VOLKOV

133a

134.

8/11/56
3/11/56
D. 1/D.H.W.

I do not consider that there is much, if anything, we can do to proceed ^{at present} with these investigations. I agree that it is necessary that we should always keep the VOLKOV sales catalogue constantly at the back of our minds, and I think it is at the back of the minds of all D.1.

2. It occurs to me that the alleged leakages of Foreign Office telegrams from Moscow might be explained by the fact that the Russians might even at this period have been listening to the noises made by our cypher machines. You will remember that this point came up in the investigation into the R.I.S. attack on our Embassy personnel, with emphasis upon D.W.S. staff, which offensive coincided with the fitting of suppressors to our cypher machines in the Embassy.

3. As regards Hill, we do not know the grade of his cyphers, but he does not appear to be a particularly secure person and I should have thought that his flat and office were certainly miked up to the eyebrows.

D. 1.
30.11.56

[Signature]
Courtenay Young

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12.6.57. Note for file

135b

15.7.57. Note re BENNETT ment. VOLKOV


136a

6.9.57. Ext. from Interrogation Report

136b

20.4.59. Secret Cross reference.

137a.



his report, but he does not appear to be a particularly
sensitive person and I should have thought that his flat
and office were certainly tiled up to the eyebrows.

9.3.60. From
2.5.61. Copy of letter to SLO India

141a

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ACT 1952

6.2.64. To G.C.H.Q. 143 143a

23.4.64. To G.C.H.Q. 144 144a

21.10.64. Original draft translation of VOLKOV's document
by [redacted] GCHQ 145 145a

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147.

10.11.65 Ext. from D.3 Loose Minute re. ZAEHNER 147b

2.12.65. Copy of letter

148a

28.1.66 Ext. from D.3 Note

148d

151.

21.2.66 Note re. KLINGHARDT

151a

152.

4.4.66 Note re. HERMANN

152a

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31(1) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958

153.

15.10.67

Ext. from "Sunday Times"

153a

155.

27.10.67

Ext. from "New Statesman"

155a

156.

Conf
D.D.G.

Director D. has asked me to look into the question of the source, or sources, of the story about VOLKOV which appeared in the "Sunday Times" on 15th October, 1967, and about which a letter from the Chief Assistant to the Editor of the "Sunday Times" appeared in the "New Statesman" on 27th October, 1967.


2. It seems probable that the story came, in the first instance, from Ian COLVIN (PF.63401). We know that COLVIN knew the VOLKOV story in 1954 when he published a highly bowdlerised version in the "Sunday Express" of 2nd May, 1954 (serial 41a PF.63401). There is no doubt that COLVIN knew a good deal of the true story.

3. We do not know the identity of COLVIN's source, but it could have been one of quite a large number of people who knew the story and were in Turkey at the time. Of these John REED is the most likely (he is the subject of PF.604964 attached), but there are of course other possibilities amongst those who originally knew the story.

Extd. to
PF. 63401 (COLVIN)
&
PF. 604964 (REED)

RP
M.h.w
7.11.67

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ACT 1958 August 2022



E. McBarnet
E. McBarnet

D.1/Inv

1st November, 1967.

157

D.1./Inv. through Secretariat

Thank you very much. This will be very helpful if the question is raised. Will you have the minute copied to the other PFs?

Colin King

D.D.G.

2.11.67.



159

21.5.68

Ext. from note for file

159a

160

22.5.68

Copy of note for file

160a

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161.

7.3.69

Papers copied from the Foreign Office files for VOLKOV.

161a

162

17.3.69

Ext. from Note for file

162a

163.

K.2./SMCC

We ought to have a L.595 for papers relating to the investigation of the spy or spies alleged by VOLKOV to have been the source of British diplomatic and military codes received (in Moscow) (see in particular page 3 of serial 11a). Suitable extracts will have to be made from REED's account of his interview with VOLKOV and from the "sales catalogue". A number of papers relating to the investigation, such as it was, could be removed to the new file. When it is made, perhaps you will let me know what further action, if any, you consider we can take.

C.J.L. Elwell
C.J.L. Elwell

K.2.

30th September, 1970.

164.

15.10.70

Copy of Note re. L.595-46

164a

165.

15.10.70

Copy of Minute on L.595-46

165a

166

4.12.70.

Interview report (BUSK)

166a

167

7.12.70.

Interview report (PAGE)

167a

169

11.12.70.

Copy of minute on L. 595-46

169a

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Copy of minute on L. 595-46

169a

Copied to: PF. 603,656 ✓

K2

Reference minute 48.

2. You will wish to see the reports of my interviews with BUSK and PAGE at serials 49a and 50a respectively. Serial 51a is also relevant.

3. With regard to sub-paragraph (iii) of minute 48, I doubt if any more definitive lists of staff in Istanbul during September 1945 can be produced by the F.C.O., and I shall have to rely on the memory of selected persons who were themselves there and who can be regarded as reliable. In this connection I have it in mind to see John BRIGHTMAN (paragraph 4 at 49a).

4. Action on sub-paragraph 4 of minute 48 will be put in hand as time permits.

K2

S. McCallum ✓

168a

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Report of interview with Chantry Hamilton PAGE at Folkstone
on 1.12.70.

After clearing my approach with Terry Empson in F.C.O. Security Department, I arranged to see PAGE in his flat. I spent nearly two hours with him but I fear that we are at least five years too late in taking this initiative. He is an old man and far from well. Indeed when I first saw him, I thought, from the immobility of his face, that he must be a stroke victim. I was wrong, in fact, but the reality is probably worse as he has arterio-sclerosis and is semi-crippled in his legs, moving very slowly and carefully with the aid of a stick.

2. Whether it is due to this illness or simply to old age, I cannot say, but his mind has greatly deteriorated and although I took him slowly and patiently through all those parts of the VOLKOV story in which he had himself been intimately involved, he never sparked at all and as far as he is concerned, the whole episode might never have happened.

3. So vague has he become, that he found it difficult to separate in his mind any particular period of the 27 years he spent in Istanbul. It appears that when he joined the Foreign Service in 1920 after demobilization from the Indian Army, he was posted to our Embassy in Turkey which at that time, of course, was situated in Istanbul. He seemed to be unaware that at some stage the Embassy moved to Ankara and he was clearly puzzled by my references to the Embassy staff coming down to Istanbul during the summer months.

4. When I showed him our list of Permanent and Temporary Staffs in Istanbul May 1945, he was able in a number of cases to recall the names mentioned, even to the extent of adding Christian names to the initials supplied. From time to time he would try to refresh his memory from a copy of the F.O. Red Book for 1957 but he obviously found difficulty in picking out the details of any one particular person's career. The majority of the staff in Istanbul are not listed there anyway.

5. As PAGE seemed to be better on names, at least as far as his colleagues in Istanbul were concerned, I think it is worth recording what he had to say about his Istanbul colleagues and those few people on our list of staff at the Ankara Embassy whose names he remembered:-

Ankara staff

Knox Helm

PAGE had known him from 1920, Helm having been in the Embassy when PAGE joined.

J. G. LOMAX
N. S. ROBERTS

These names are listed as Counsellor (Commercial) and First Secretary (Commercial) respectively and are known to PAGE who was able to add ROBERT'S Christian names as Norman Stanley, but he could tell me nothing about them and was inclined to agree with my suggestion that they, being on the Commercial side of the Embassy, would have visited Istanbul at fairly regular intervals.

Istanbul staff

A. W. CHURCHILL

Formerly Army, became a clerk in the Istanbul Embassy about 1921
/and

and subsequently worked in the Registry. He was sacked at some date, probably before PAGE left in 1947, for "letting non-Embassy and other unauthorised people come to visit him in the Registry". He was unable to elaborate on this riveting piece of information but told me that he did not think any classified papers were held in the Consulate-General's Registry.

Henry HARTY

Also worked in the Registry. He had been locally-engaged, his parents being leading grocers in Istanbul and very long established there.

C. T. BENNETT

This was Charles Taylor BENNETT who had lived in Istanbul for many years before joining the Consulate-General after the war started. Quite a well-educated and capable chap.

William SMITH-LYTE

Joined the Consulate-General before the war. Was the son of the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce.

John RIZZO

Maltese. A son of Dr. Alfred RIZZO, a leading lawyer in Istanbul.

Edgar RIZZO

An uncle of John and brother of Dr. Alfred.

Mary HALL

Had been born in Istanbul - worked in the Consulate for years.

Winifred G. LYNE

Before joining the Consulate had been a teacher at the U.S. school at Bebek.

Halil KATOVICH

The Head Kavass and a very reliable man.

Richard MARINITSCH

His father had been a Counsellor at the Embassy many years earlier. When the son retired at the age of 70, he collapsed in the street outside the old Consulate at Galata, opposite the Austrian Hospital. He died the same day.

Michael D. T. EVANS


John S. BENNETT

PAGE could not remember these.

6. I asked him if he could think of any names of people he knew to have been in Istanbul but who were not shown on our list. He could only think of one but when we looked into it we discovered that this man had, in fact, left Istanbul in 1924. This difficulty over dates was typical of PAGE's present state of mind.

167a

7. I hope that my account of PAGE does not appear in any way derogatory. Nothing could be further from my intention as I was quite moved by the dignity and authority which can still be seen in this man who served the Foreign Office for some 40 years and is now brought to a very low state indeed. When we parted, he thanked me very graciously for coming down to see him and cheering him up. I think he meant it, so perhaps my journey was not so much of a failure after all.



K2

7.12.70.

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ACT 1958 August 2022

Report of interview with Sir Douglas BUSK at Chilbolton
on 30.11.70.

166a

After [redacted] had rung BUSK to prepare the ground for me, I arranged to see him at his home in the evening after work. I found him a charming and sensible man who clearly made every effort to co-operate in what was for him a prodigious feat of memory. He was kind enough to offer me a whiskey and soda on arrival which I was happy to accept, having had a somewhat trying time making my way through unfamiliar lanes to his house.

2. The main purpose of my interview was to determine whether BUSK could recall any details of the VOLKOV affair which had not so far been brought to our attention (he is on record as having questioned REID carefully about the latter's interview with VOLKOV on 4.9.45. and as having satisfied himself that REID's report was accurate). I had also hoped that he might be able to add to our lists of British staff stationed in Istanbul at the time of VOLKOV's attempted defection. Unfortunately he was unable to be of any great assistance on either point and indeed had only been marginally involved. He was able to dig out his diary for 1945 from which he confirmed that he had relieved Knox Helm in Istanbul on 9.7.45. and had remained there until only 7.9.45. (i.e. three days after VOLKOV's call on PAGE and interview by REID) when Helm relieved him and he moved back to Ankara. He therefore missed all the subsequent developments in this matter and was fairly confident that he had never been told about them later.

3. As the name VOLKOV seemed to mean nothing to BUSK, I outlined for him the sequence of events as we knew them and for good measure, showed him REID's manuscript minute written after he had talked to VOLKOV. When I had finished, he told me that he had the vaguest of memories that REID had discussed the matter and that they had sent off REID's report by the night bag to Knox Helm in Ankara. I asked him why Helm had been selected as the recipient of this highly important document rather than the Ambassador. He could not be certain of the answer, but thought that quite possibly Sir Morris Peterson had been away. Peterson was of an older school of diplomat and would from time to time absent himself for two or three days on his yacht. In any case in BUSK's view, the whole subject would have been distasteful to him. Except for his discussion with REID he had not been involved in this matter and, indeed, he could remember practically nothing about it.

4. With regard to the identification of Istanbul staff, he was able to be only slightly more helpful. I showed him our list of Permanent and Temporary Staffs Istanbul May 1945 and he recognised a number of names but knew nothing to their detriment. HURST and PAGE were, of course, familiar to him and he remembered Henry HARTY as having been the Archivist who dealt with the bags to and from Ankara. The only name he could think of who had been in Istanbul and was not included in our list was John BRIGHMAN who had been the Assistant Naval Attaché at the time and subsequently was called to the Bar, became a Q.C. and is now Sir John and a Judge. He, incidentally, lives in the next village to my own at Hurstbourne Tarrant and BUSK thought it might be worth seeing him with regard to the identification of Istanbul staff.

5. We discussed VOLKOV's allegation that there was a spy in our Consulate at Istanbul and the fact that REID seems to have understood VOLKOV to have said that he was "in this building". BUSK

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166a

confirmed that REID's office would have been in the old Embassy building and he thought it likely that both VOLKOV and REID would have had in mind the compound as a whole rather than any specific building. BUSK took the view that VOLKOV must have been referring to the staff permanently stationed in Istanbul rather than to those in Ankara who were spending the summer there. (see separate notes below).

6. Other points, of direct or indirect relevance to my objective, which emerged from our discussion were as follows:-

(a) Geography of British Mission in Istanbul

The old Embassy is an enormous building which was not used at all during the war. The Consulate General occupied a wing built out from the Embassy but quite separate from it and with no connecting door. To get from the Consulate to the Embassy it was, therefore, necessary to leave the former building by its door and walk round. These buildings were surrounded by a wall in which were gates and in this compound, which was of considerable size, there were a number of other buildings.

(b)

(c) Move of Embassy staff from Ankara to Istanbul

BUSK told me that I would be wrong to think of this in terms of a complete exodus which occurred every year during the summer. This had been the case during the pre-war years but after the war started the Embassy remained firmly in Ankara throughout the year, until 1945 when there were special reasons for making the move. It had been decided that the Embassy should move in to what had been the Ambassador's residence and that the Ambassador should make his home in the old Embassy building. This necessitated a great deal of structural alteration and it was desirable to move as many of the Ankara staff as possible out of their offices to allow the builders to get to work. Sometime in June 1945, therefore, the Ambassador was persuaded to move down to Istanbul and was taken there by Helm leaving BUSK in charge at Ankara. The latter made it his job to see that as many staff as possible moved to Istanbul but was quite unable to name those who went there or those who remained behind. As indicated above, Helm and BUSK took it in turns to hold the fort in Ankara.

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166a

(d) John REID

BUSK knew REID fairly well but has not seen him for some years. He was stationed in Hungary at the start of the war and, after the German invasion, was evacuated to Moscow and Kubichev where he spent about two years. BUSK described REID as something of a womaniser in his gay bachelor youth and had heard that the Russians kept him supplied with pretty girls. He could not elaborate on this allegation and, noticing my obvious interest, hastened to add that he was sure REID's behaviour in Russia had done no damage to the interests of diplomacy!

(e) "Cicero"

BUSK told me that he had himself employed "Cicero" in Ankara. His wife was pregnant at the time and was forbidden to drive a motor car, BUSK had been on the look out for someone who could double as chauffeur and butler. I did not press him for any further details.

7. It seemed curious to me that a matter of such obvious interest as the proffered defection of a man claiming to be a senior Russian Intelligence Officer should have made so little impression on BUSK that he can now recall nothing of it. Perhaps we are too subjective in our view of such matters. To an over-worked diplomat at that time, it may perhaps have seemed nothing more than another administrative matter to be dealt with.

8. However that may be, I doubt if BUSK is a man of any great security perception or awareness, although he went out of his way to assure me that when he achieved Ambassadorial status he would watch his staff like a hawk and was "suspicious of everybody". Rather curiously, I thought, as our discussion was on the friendliest of bases, he volunteered that he had always been very opposed to totalitarian regimes and had before, during and after the war regarded Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin as the leaders of equally reprehensible systems.

K2

4.12.70.

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165a

48.

K.2./SMcC

(Copied to PF.603,656)

✓ PA

I have placed, at serial 47a, a copy of a note on the VOLKOV affair insofar as it relates to the existence of a spy in the Consulate at Istanbul in 1945. I do not think there is very much more we can do now to identify this spy but there is some action we can take to ensure that we have tapped every possible source of information on the subject and that, having done this, our information can be readily related to any other reports that could have a bearing on the Istanbul spy. To this end we should:

- (i) interview PAGE. You have this in hand already;
- (ii) interview Sir Douglas BUSK;
- (iii) compile a composite list of officials working in the Consulate/Embassy at Istanbul in September 1945 and indicating which of them can safely be disregarded as candidates for VOLKOV's agent;
- (iv) index this file.

C.J.L. Elwell

K.2.

15th October, 1970.

✓
K2
15/10/70

164a

L.595-46

On 24th August, 1945, Constantin VOLKOV of the Russian Consulate General at Istanbul addressed a letter typed in almost impeccable English to C.H. PAGE, British Vice Consul at Istanbul, with whom VOLKOV had in the past done some official business. Enclosed with the letter, which seems to have been brought by hand to the British Consulate General and which was unsigned, was VOLKOV's visiting card. The letter requested an interview with PAGE the same or the following day at 10 o'clock in the evening, as the writer wished to speak to him "on important and urgent business". The writer requested also that PAGE would signify his agreement either by sending him his visiting card or by telephoning the Soviet Consulate and saying to the man on duty "The British Consulate requests your Consul to call upon us for negotiation regarding the Soviet citizen by the name of **EMERGENCE**". The letter said that an interpreter would be necessary and that it would be desirable that he should be an "Englishman".

2. PAGE discussed this "mysterious unsigned letter" with his Consul General, S.F. HURST, and they decided to ignore it.

3. Eleven days later on 4th September, VOLKOV himself called on PAGE at the Consulate General. PAGE appears to have sent for [redacted] of the Passport Control Office in order to interpret. VOLKOV had then apparently intimated that he wished to speak to the First Secretary, REED, whom it later emerged he believed to be [redacted]. PAGE accordingly telephoned, and then went to consult REED, who agreed to see VOLKOV. VOLKOV was brought over to REED by [redacted] who, on VOLKOV's request, left him alone with REED.

4. REED, in the minute he wrote the same day recording his interview with VOLKOV, described how VOLKOV introduced himself as the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Security Service in Turkey and how he offered information about N.K.G.B. activities in return for asylum and £50,000. He made his offer speaking rapidly in Russian which REED himself did not speak very well. Among the items of intelligence VOLKOV offered to supply was "the name of the person who, he said, was working for him in this building". VOLKOV begged that if any account of his

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conversation with REED were sent to London it should go in writing and not by telegram and that the information he had given should be restricted to the minimum number of people. What he had to say he wished to say only to REED. REED was not to telephone him but he would come and see REED again in a few days' time.

5. REED reported his exchange with VOLKOV to the Head of Chancery, Douglas BUSK (BUSK was a very senior First Secretary who was shortly afterwards promoted Counsellor and transferred to Baghdad). BUSK immediately forwarded REED's minute to HELM at the Embassy in Ankara. HELM in his letter forwarding it to London on 5th September said that BUSK had questioned REED closely about the facts recorded in his minute and regarded them as completely accurate. According to HELM, nobody had seen the minute or knew anything about what passed between VOLKOV and REED except REED, BUSK and himself. HELM also reported that "we in the Embassy know nothing" about VOLKOV.

6. On 13th September VOLKOV called again at the British Consulate General and handed to PAGE an envelope addressed to REED. This was found to contain a document typewritten in Russian which was translated by REED and forwarded to the Foreign Office. The document, which has come to be known as VOLKOV's "sales catalogue", enumerates the items of intelligence he would be prepared to give to the British if suitably recompensed. One of the items was as follows:

"A list of material (in some cases their duplicates and photostatic copies) received by us from the agents of N.K.G.B. in the British Intelligence Services and the Foreign Office. (Judging by their code names there are 9 such agents in London.) This list is of extraordinary interest as it should make it possible to uncover N.K.G.B. networks in some extraordinarily important British Departments. I know for instance that one of the agents is a departmental Head of the British Counter-espionage Directorate in London and that another one is on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul" (an alternative and perhaps definitive translation of the last sentence reads, "I know for instance that one of the agents of the N.K.G.B. fulfils the duties of the head of a department of the English Counter-Espionage Administration in London, while another works in the office of the British Consulate in Stambul").

7. REED was interviewed by an officer of the Security Service on 2nd December, 1953. The report on the interview contains the following passage:

"... I asked him (REED) what VOLKOV had said about the Russian agent in the Consulate in Istanbul. (It would appear that REED had not said anything about this to his interviewer). REED could only remember that VOLKOV had said that the Russians had such an agent; he was quite sure that VOLKOV did not describe him in such a way as

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to make him identifiable. He recalled that after the interview he had gone through the list of Consulate employees with the First Secretary, Mr. BUSK".

8. REED was again interviewed by the Security Service on 12th January, 1954 and the report of this interview contains the following passage:

"I reminded REED of that part of the VOLKOV information which had related to the presence of a Russian agent in the British Consulate itself, and explained the theory that the agent - whoever he was - might well have been absent on leave at the time of VOLKOV's approach. One fact which supported this theory was VOLKOV's insistence that the decision should be made about himself before a certain definite date towards the end of September. (In his memorandum VOLKOV had said, "I beg you to communicate your decision either provisionally or definitely by the 25th September or at latest by the 1st October, 1945".)

9. The account of the first Security Service interview with REED also contains the following passage:

"REED then went on to say that at a date of which he was not positive but probably sometime in October after he returned to Ankara, Mr. John BENNETT, the Assistant Press Counsellor, told him of a very curious thing that he had seen. BENNETT had seen an unknown aeroplane arrive at Istanbul airfield without warning and it was touch and go whether it would be fired on by the Turks. When it came down it proved to be a Soviet military plane. BENNETT then saw VOLKOV and his wife carried on to the plane on stretchers. I asked how BENNETT knew the VOLKOVs but REED did not know. REED recalled that there was some trouble about BENNETT reporting this story. REED then said that something very awkward had arisen as a result of BENNETT's telling him this story. He had been instructed by Mr. HELM, the Counsellor, to 'threaten' BENNETT. REED appeared to be unable to go on with this story so I asked him what he was to threaten BENNETT about. He said that he could not remember, he could not imagine what it could be about but that he had the impression that some information was to be forced out of BENNETT. He remembered that he had protested to Mr. HELM that he should deal with BENNETT himself as it was very awkward for REED, who was of approximately the same age and seniority. However, Mr. HELM was adamant. REED appeared very worried and embarrassed over this matter and quite anxious to leave the subject.

.....

I then asked him if it was correct to assume that the only people who knew about the visit of VOLKOV at the time when it occurred were Mr. PAGE, the Consul; Major the interpreter; Mr. HELM, the Counsellor; Mr. BUSK, the First Secretary and Mr. BENNETT, the Press Counsellor, in addition to himself. He immediately said that BENNETT did not know the story of VOLKOV. He said that even when BENNETT told him that he had seen the VOLKOVs

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put on to the plane he, REED was strictly forbidden to tell BENNETT of VOLKOV's visit to the Consulate.

From here we went back to the subject of his being told to "threaten" BENNETT. Unfortunately REED found himself quite unable to say why he was instructed to do this. He had recalled that Bill Allan, who was the Press Counsellor at the time and who is a very close friend of his own, was not on very good terms with BENNETT and had, in fact, told him that he did not trust BENNETT. Allan had apparently said that BENNETT was, or had been in the past, very left wing.

REED said he did not take very much notice of what Allan said because he is a man of great violence of opinion and had been a Fascist in pre-war days which would naturally tend to make him look askance at even the mildest of left wingers."

10. This was elaborated in the second interview as follows:

"... At an early stage in the interview, REED himself brought up again the name of BENNETT, and I took the opportunity of saying that his account of BENNETT's presence at the Istanbul airfield on the day of VOLKOV's departure, as well as of the circumstances in which he himself was asked to speak to BENNETT on behalf of HELM, had not made sense to me and seemed to require further explanation on his (REED's) part. I invited REED to search his memory again and see if he could not add something to his account of this episode which would clarify it.

REED then gave this account of what had happened. In mid-October the Embassy had moved to Ankara from its summer quarters in Istanbul. Shortly after arrival there, BENNETT told REED how he had been present on the Istanbul airfield on 26 September, and had witnessed the departure of VOLKOV and his wife, both on stretchers, in a Soviet military aircraft. REED thought, but could not be certain, that BENNETT (who was permanently in Istanbul) had told him this story over the telephone. REED at once reported to HELM what BENNETT had said. HELM then asked him to speak to BENNETT. At this point, in spite of repeated questioning and cajoling by me, REED expressed himself totally unable to remember what he had been asked to say to BENNETT except that it was something that would have been distasteful to BENNETT and also to some extent to himself, and that he had therefore suggested to HELM that it would come better from HELM himself as a more senior official. HELM had refused and had ordered REED to speak to BENNETT. Searching his memory (or apparently doing so) REED added that he may have been told to ask BENNETT why he (BENNETT) had thought that REED would be interested in his account of the VOLKOVs' departure. Whatever the question was, REED was fairly sure that BENNETT had answered by letter, and that the answer had been "negative". By this REED seemed to mean that if his question to BENNETT had been as he suggested, BENNETT's answer had been something to the effect that there had been no particular reason for his reporting the episode to REED and that he had simply done so because it was a matter of interest, REED being as good a person to tell as anybody else."

/..."Throughout ...

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"...Throughout this part of the interview REED was insistent that BENNETT was at no time told of VOLKOV's offer to defect. His interest in what he had seen at the airport had been because of its unusual character and because he knew VOLKOV by sight. REED was unable to advance any explanation as to why BENNETT had not reported what he had seen earlier. He agreed with me that it was extraordinary that BENNETT had taken it into his head to report only after the move of the main part of the Embassy to Ankara in the middle of October. When I suggested that the reason for HELM's request for himself to speak to BENNETT having been so "distasteful" might have been because HELM had in some way implied that REED had been indiscreet with BENNETT, REED firmly denied that this explanation was in any way possible."

11. On 8th February, 1954, Sir Alexander Knox HELM was interviewed by members of the Security Service and asked specifically about REED's story of BENNETT's connection with the VOLKOV affair. HELM could remember nothing about it.

12. On 15th July, 1957, John Still BENNETT was interviewed by a member of the Security Service. BENNETT could remember nothing about the VOLKOV case. However, "when prompted he recalled that he had seen VOLKOV being taken to an aeroplane on a stretcher, and he supposed that he recognised him because he had known of the case". BENNETT thought that REED must have told him of the case as at the time he was "very close to REED". Here it should be noted that in August 1951 ALLEN, BENNETT's superior, reported gratuitously that REED had told him that he had told BENNETT about the VOLKOV affair.

13. [redacted] was interviewed by a member of the Security Service on 20th July, 1962. [redacted] told his interviewer that the Russians knew all about him "as was shown by events in Istanbul in 1946 (sic) when he had been present at an interview with a Russian who wanted to defect". [redacted] was referring to VOLKOV, who on being left alone with him had indicated that the Russians knew all about him. Some time later REED warned [redacted] that he should not mention VOLKOV's visit or the subject of it to anyone. REED, according to [redacted] added that he had known VOLKOV in Moscow.

14. When [redacted] was questioned [redacted] early in October 1945 about the VOLKOV affair, he was at first reluctant to talk as REED had sworn him to secrecy. He said that when he and VOLKOV were left alone in PAGE's room while PAGE went to see REED, VOLKOV told him that the Russians knew all about him. [redacted] was almost sure that VOLKOV came to the Consulate in an official Russian car and that he told his chauffeur to wait.

15. On 8th December, 1967, when REED was discussing the VOLKOV affair [redacted] he said that he believed BENNETT had homosexual tendencies. He also told [redacted] that he had received a telephone call from BENNETT saying in effect,

Philpotts of

/"It may interest ...

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"It may interest you to know that a Soviet military aircraft landed this morning without clearance and the body of a Soviet citizen was carried on board. I presume it was VOLKOV". This struck REED as peculiar in the extreme as knowledge of the VOLKOV approach had been strictly limited to the Ambassador, REED himself and Knox HELM, the Minister. REED had no reason to believe that BENNETT knew anything about VOLKOV and could see no reason why BENNETT should telephone him with this information, including the assumption that the body was VOLKOV's. REED was forcibly reminded of VOLKOV's earlier statement to him that there was a spy in the British Embassy.

16. This revelation - apparently encouraged us to see REED again. He was interviewed on 17th May, 1968, but was dismissed as useless as a source of information on the VOLKOV affair.

17. Neither BUSK nor PAGE has been interviewed about their knowledge of the VOLKOV affair.

18. That VOLKOV was betrayed by PHILBY is of course no longer in doubt but there are other aspects of this disastrous incident in British Intelligence history which must give rise to continued speculation. Many who have examined the facts have drawn attention to VOLKOV's apparent rashness in sending "a mysterious unsigned letter" together with his card to a member of the British Consulate where, according to him, an N.K.G.B. agent was then working. There are several possible explanations:

- (i) There was no agent in the Consulate and VOLKOV knew there was not. If that was the case, why should he have bothered to mention it. There were plenty of other tempting offerings in his "sales catalogue" to whet our appetite.
- (ii) The agent was not in the Consulate but the Consulate (General) Building, which housed other organisations, and VOLKOV knew this but was not prepared to indicate his identity more closely until he knew we were "interested". If this agent was not in fact working in the Consulate, but was a member for example of the Embassy staff stationed at Istanbul, VOLKOV's letter to PAGE and subsequent approach to REED would still have been hazardous, but less hazardous.
- (iii) There was an agent in the Consulate building and perhaps in the Consulate itself whose access was so negligible - perhaps a native employed on clerical or even menial tasks - that the risk of him becoming aware of VOLKOV's negotiations with PAGE and REED was equally negligible. Moreover - and this would apply to any theory of a spy in the Consulate or Embassy - VOLKOV, being Deputy N.K.G.B. Resident, may well have been the spy's case officer (he told REED the spy was working for him (VOLKOV)) and


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/thus may have ...

thus may have felt reasonably confident that he could have foiled or at least noticed any attempt by the spy to betray him.

19. That there was a spy in the Consulate or Embassy is, I think, very likely for the reason suggested in paragraph 18 (i) above. A possible, and on occasions much favoured, candidate was John Still BENNETT, Information Officer at Istanbul. His candidature depends to a large extent on another circumstance of the VOLKOV case that has given rise to repeated speculation. This was BENNETT's report to REED on the abduction of the VOLKOVs. If REED did not tell BENNETT about VOLKOV - and he claims he did not - why should BENNETT have reported something to him which he had no reason to think would be of interest to him. It is just possible that he might have mentioned it when it happened, as one would any odd event of no particular significance, but it is hard to imagine why he should have taken the trouble to report it perhaps a fortnight after it occurred, as REED has suggested. Again it is curious that BENNETT should have known the VOLKOVs sufficiently well to be able to recognise them as they were being bundled in stretchers on to the Russian aeroplane. If BENNETT had been the spy he might well have known VOLKOV, who would very probably have been his controller, but in that case one can hardly imagine BENNETT would have said anything about him to REED. Why then did he tell the story to REED and how did he recognise the VOLKOVs? The answer is, I believe, to be found in a story ALLEN, BENNETT's superior, told in 1951 about a dinner he had with REED in Istanbul several weeks after VOLKOV's disappearance. It was during that dinner that REED told ALLEN that he had told BENNETT about the VOLKOVs. REED must have told BENNETT the story while they were both in Istanbul and before REED left for Ankara. If BENNETT had seen two people being carried into a Russian aircraft on stretchers about the time of their disappearance, as related by REED, he could very reasonably have concluded they must have been the VOLKOVs and would naturally have told REED what he had seen. Hence his remark to his interviewer in 1957 that "he supposed he must have recognised him (VOLKOV) because he had known of the case".

20. There is one other oddity about the VOLKOV affair which cannot easily be explained. This is the excellent and almost faultless English of VOLKOV's letter to PAGE. If VOLKOV could not speak English, who wrote the letter? His wife? And if it was not she, was there someone else who was in his confidence?


C.J.L. Elwell

K.2.

15th October, 1970.

162a

Extract from Note for File/Interview Report

Extract for File No. P.F. 603,656 Name.....

Original in File No. P.F. 145,940 Serial 115a Dated 17.3.69

Date and Place of Interview/Meeting.....

with (also give security context of person being interviewed).....

Subject ~~to hold Communist Views~~ mentioning the VOLKOV Case
 Summary of the Security Information about John Sell Bennett (1944:Reported)

Officer..... using @ of..... Section K2

Extracted by JP Section R5 Date 31.3.69

0 STILL

1. VOLKOV

Since we now know that PHILBY betrayed VOLKOV this is to some extent of academic interest but it does also raise the question as to whether BENNETT could have been "The Spy in the Consulate in Istanbul."

2. VOLKOV's arrival on 4th September, 1945, was known to at least PAGE, REED and (5a on P.F. 604,964), but his offer was made only to REED, who appears to have immediately informed BUSK who then wrote to HELM in Ankara. According to HELM's letter to the Foreign Office (Annex A) no one else knew of VOLKOV's offer but these three. At some unknown stage however, prior to PHILBY's arrival the Ambassador Sir Maurice Peterson was also informed.

3. According to ALLEN (3a) BENNETT was told of the affair by REED before VOLKOV's abduction, but REED firmly denied that he had done this (19a and 33a, PF. 604,964) and HELM also thought that REED was unlikely to have told BENNETT (40a, PF. 604,964). For what it is worth, PHILBY also thought that REED had not talked out of turn (5a, PF. 604,964) and this is stated more emphatically on the Foreign Office Security Department files for VOLKOV. BENNETT himself is inconclusive on this point (55a), but inclined to the view that REED probably did tell him.

4. The next problem is that BENNETT apparently witnessed the abduction of VOLKOV and his wife on 26th September, 1945. BENNETT himself admits that this was so (55a). According to REED, BENNETT told him of this event several weeks later (19a and 33a, PF. 604,964) and we have concluded that this was an unlikely explanation of the facts and that BENNETT probably told REED almost immediately after the event (40a, PF. 604,964). I do not find this very convincing:- If BENNETT reported on the incident on either 26th September or 27th it seems unlikely that REED would have failed to mention it while the various attempts to contact VOLKOV were taking place between the period September 28th, 1945, to October, 1st (5a, PF. 604,964); it also seems unlikely that both REED (even with his notorious memory) and HELM should have forgotten it.

*Strike out inapplicable.

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JP RF
1/4/69

Extract from Note for File/Interview Report

Extract for File No. Name

Original in File No. Serial Dated

Date and Place of *Interview/Meeting

with (also give security context of person being interviewed)

.....

Subject

Officer.....using @ of..... Section.....

Extracted by.....Section.....Date.....

5. Could BENNETT have been "The Spy in the Consulate in Istanbul"? On a strict interpretation of VOLKOV's words BENNETT is a candidate since he was always based at the Consulate in Istanbul and was not a member of the Embassy in Ankara, who was merely there for the summer. We have however assumed in the past that VOLKOV would not have made his approach if his "Spy" had been in Istanbul at the time. From an examination of BENNETT's old Ministry of Information file it certainly looks as if BENNETT was there throughout September, 1945. There are letters from BENNETT in Istanbul during August, 1945, saying that he would be fully occupied in Istanbul until the Industrial Exhibition opened on 5th September and as a result had been unable to have any local leave. During September various Ministry of Information internal minutes discussing the possibilities of BENNETT's future posting make it plain that since ALLEN will not be returning to England before October 6th at the earliest and therefore is unlikely to be back in Turkey before the end of the year, BENNETT will be unable to have any leave or be removed from Turkey for some months. We already know that he was certainly around on the 26th because he saw the abduction of the VOLKOVs. This has been regarded as a sinister coincidence (32a), but it seems to me that if BENNETT were in any way involved in VOLKOV's betrayal he would be unlikely to admit that he had seen his removal from Turkey even if he had done so. *By the same token, if B. were the "Consulate Spy" he would surely not have drawn attention to himself in this way? Dis-ops*

*Strike out inapplicable.

161A

PF.603,656 Vol.3

Original "Sales Catalogue"
and Volkov's first letter, and
PAPERS COPIED FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE FILES
FOR VOLKOV (A.1/1950 and A.60/1951)

Robert B. Bant

Contents from loose in file a returned
to envelope

1/704/1151
5/5/76.

1/108
7/3/79

CONSTANTIN VOLKOV

VICE-CONSUL, GERANT DU CONSULAT GÉNÉRAL DE L'URSS.

STAMBUL

Consulat Général
de l'U. R. S. S.
Istanbul

C. H. P A G E.

Vice-Konsul de Consulat Général de Grande Bretagne

Personnelement

En Ville.

August, 24, 1945.

Dear Sir,

I should be very much obliged if you would receive me at the British Consulate to-day or to-morrow evening at 10 o'clock. I want to speak to you on important and urgent business.

Would you kindly let me know whether you can receive me. As a confirmation of your agreement, please send me your visiting card by courier or ring the Consulate up (the telephone number is 42610) addressing the man on duty in such a way: "The British Consulate requests your Consule to call upon us for negotiation regarding the Soviet citizen, by the name of Beergence."

Please note that the presence of the interpreter is necessary. It is desirable that he should be an Englishman.

Hoping to hear from you soon, I am

Very truly Yours.

Istunbul.

В дополнение к нашему разговору, имею честь сообщить Вам, что на указанных ниже условиях я могу передать в распоряжение специальной английской службы всю перечисленную документацию Разведывательного Управления Наркомата Государственной Безопасности СССР, сотрудником которого я являюсь с осени 1936 года.

- 1- Список агентуры Разведуправления НКГБ в Турции на 314 человек./ В списке учтена, как действующая, так и законсервированная агентура. На отдельных агентов имеются официальные характеристики/
- 2- Список известных НКГБ кадровых сотрудников военной и гражданской разведок Великобритании, также как и их агентуры. В списке значаться около 250 гласных и негласных сотрудников поименованной службы, на которых указаны характеризующие их данные.
- 3- Список материалов./ а в отдельных случаях, - их дубликаты и фото-копии/, переданных нам агентами НКГБ, являющимися сотрудниками английских развед. органов и Министерства Иностранных Дел Великобритании.
/ Судя по кличкам, таковых агентов в Лондоне насчитывается -9 /
- 4- Этот список представляет исключительный интерес, т.к. дает возможность установить агентуру НКГБ в чрезвычайно важных Британских учреждениях. Мне, например, известно, что один из агентов НКГБ исполняет обязан-

ности начальника отдела английского контр-разведывательного Управления в Лондоне, а другой работает в аппарате Британского консульства в Стамбуле.

- 4- Копии материалов дел-формуляров и специальных досье английской разведки.
- 5- Фото-клише и переводы руководящих материалов английской разведки, в частности переписка Лондона с генералом ХИЛЛ.
- 6- Копия заключения руководства Ближне-Восточного Отдела Разведуправления НКГБ по материалам английских разведорганов в Иране.
- 7- Подробные данные в отношении некоторых агентов НКГБ, находящихся в Палестине, Балканских странах и Иране./ их клички и условия связи/.
- 8- Полный список сотрудников Разведуправления НКГБ в Москве, их домашние адреса и №№ служебных и домашних телефонов. Также адреса автогаражей и №№ автомашин Разведуправления НКГБ.
- 9- Адреса некоторых конспиративных квартир Разведуправления НКГБ в Москве.
- 10- Вербовочный материал на капитана/ теперь, очевидно-майора/ контр-разведывательной службы НКГБ, секретаря Главка Наркомата Нефтяной Промышленности и сотрудницы для поручений в одной из дивизий специального назначения в Москве. Все эти три лица могут быть использованы в интересах английской службы.
- 11- Два подлинных удостоверения личности офицеров Разведуправления НКГБ в Москве на 1945 год, дающих право прохода во все оперативные, архивные и другие служебные

дящих из генконсульства шифртелеграмм/ а может быть и входящих/.

- 2- Список кадровых офицеров Разведуправления НКГБ. Наркомата Обороны и Наркомата Военно-Морского Флота СССР, работающих под прикрытием легальных Советских представительств в Турции / их клички и функции каждого в резидентуре/.

Также- не полный список по Ирану и Египту.

- 3- Несколько ключей от кабинетов, сейфов и входных дверей генконсульства.
- 4- Тетради записей бесед руководства генконсульства с посетителями, также как и другая служебная документация.
- 5- Специально могу составить структурную схему политической и военных разведок СССР в Турции, а также Разведуправления НКГБ в Москве.
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- 1- Сохранение в абсолютной тайне сделанных мной предложений. Воздержание от передачи каких-либо депеш по настоящему вопросу, с использованием радио или телеграфа.
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помещения НКГБ, НКВД и контр-разведывательных управлений Наркомата Обороны и Наркомата Военно-Морского Флота СССР.

Эти удостоверения могут быть использованы в качестве образцов.

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15- Имеются еще всевозможные документы, характеризующие финансовое состояние и оперативные возможности отдельных резидентур НКГБ СССР.

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непосредственно и без участия каких-либо посредников.

- 3- Потеря мной должности и положения должна быть достойным образом компенсирована, единовременным вручением мне, по крайней мере- 50.000 фунтов стерлингов.

Я называю эту цифру как минимальную, учитывая значимость передаваемых Вам материалов и последствия, с которыми неизбежно столкнутся все мои родственники, проживающие на территории СССР.

- 4- Предоставление мне убежища, также, как и гарантий полной безопасности.

О любом Вашем решении / положительном или отрицательном/ прошу поставить меня в известность до 25-го сентября, или в крайнем случае- до 1-го октября 1945 года.

Вызов меня для переговоров возможен по любому из консульских телефонов, безусловно, с соблюдением требуемой осторожности. / Лучше, если бы при таковой необходимости, вызов был бы обличен в форму официального и персонального приглашения и обязательно от имени консульства, что не вызовет подозрений/.

В заключение, заверяю Вас и в Вашем лице- Правительство Великобритании, что мой настоящий вклад и скромное участие приблизят дату справедливого отмщения ради интересов мргучего содружества Британских народов, ради свободлюбивого и истрадавгося человечества.

Ваш искренний друг

Consulat Général
de l'U. R. S. S.
Istanbul

C. H. P A G E.

Vice-Konsul de Consulat Général de Grande Bretagne

Personnelement

En Ville.

August, 24, 1945.

Dear Sir,

I should be very much obliged if you would receive me at the British Consulate to-day or to-morrow evening at 10 o'clock. I want to speak to you on important and urgent business.

Would you kindly let me know whether you can receive me. As a confirmation of your agreement, please send me your visiting card by courier or ring the Consulate up (the telephone number is 42610) addressing the man on duty in such a way: "The British Consulate requests your Consule to call upon us for negotiation regarding the Soviet citizen, by the name of Beergence."

Please note that the presence of the interpreter is necessary. It is desirable that he should be an Englishman.

Hoping to hear from you soon, I am

Very truly Yours.

Istunbul.

CONSTANTIN VOLKOV

VICE-CONSUL, GERANT DU CONSULAT GÉNÉRAL DE L'URSS.

STAMBUL

В дополнение к нашему разговору, имею честь сообщить Вам, что на указанных ниже условиях я могу передать в распоряжение специальной английской службы всю перечисленную документацию Разведывательного Управления Наркома Государственной Безопасности СССР, сотрудником которого я являюсь с осени 1936 года.

- 1- Список агентуры Разведуправления НКГБ в Турции на 314 человек./ В списке учтена, как действующая, так и законсервированная агентура. На отдельных агентов имеются официальные характеристики/
- 2- Список известных НКГБ кадровых сотрудников военной и гражданской разведок Великобритании, также как и их агентуры. В списке значатся около 250 гласных и негласных сотрудников поименованной службы, на которых указаны характеризующие их данные.
- 3- Список материалов./ а в отдельных случаях, - их дубликаты и фото-копии/, переданных нам агентами НКГБ, являющимися сотрудниками английских развед. органов и Министерства Иностранных Дел Великобритании. / Судя по кличкам, таковых агентов в Лондоне насчитывается -9 /
- 4- Этот список представляет исключительный интерес, т.к. дает возможность установить агентуру НКГБ в чрезвычайно важных Британских учреждениях. Мне, например, известно, что один из агентов НКГБ исполняет обяза

ности начальника отдела английского контр-разведывате-
ного Управления в Лондоне, а другой работает в аппарате
Британского консульства в Стамбуле.

- 4- Копии материалов дел-формуляров и специальных досье
английской разведки.
- 5- Фото-клише и переводы руководящих материалов английской
разведки, в частности переписка Лондона с генералом ХИЛЛ.
- 6- Копия заключения руководства Ближне-Восточного Отдела
Разведуправления НКГБ по материалам английских разведорга-
нов в Иране.
- 7- Подробные данные в отношении некоторых агентов НКГБ, нахо-
дящихся в Палестине, Балканских странах и Иране./ их клички
и условия связи/.
- 8- Полный список сотрудников Разведуправления НКГБ в Москве.
их домашние адреса и №№ служебных и домашних телефонов.
Также адреса автогаражей и №№ автомашин Разведуправления
НКГБ.
- 9- Адреса некоторых конспиративных квартир Разведуправления
НКГБ в Москве.
- 10- Вербовочный материал на капитана/ теперь, очевидно-
майора/ контр-разведывательной службы НКГБ, секретаря
Главка Наркомата Нефтяной Промышленности и сотрудницы
для поручений в одной из дивизий специального назначения
в Москве. Все эти три лица могут быть использованы в
интересах английской службы.
- 11- Два подлинных удостоверения личности офицеров Развед-
управления НКГБ в Москве на 1945 год, дающих право про-
хода во все оперативные, архивные и другие служебные

помещения НКГБ, НКВД и контр-разведывательных управлений Наркомата Обороны и Наркомата Военно-Морского Флота СССР.

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дящих из генконсульства шифртелеграмм/ а может быть и входящих/.

2- Список кадровых офицеров Разведуправления НКГБ. Наркомата Обороны и Наркомата Военно-Морского Флота СССР. работающих под прикрытием легальных Советских представительств в Турции / их клички и функции каждого в резидентуре/.

Также- не полный список по Ирану и Египту.

3- Несколько ключей от кабинетов, сейфов и входных дверей генконсульства.

4- Тетради записей бесед руководства генконсульства с посетителями, также как и другая служебная документация.

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6. Одновременно могу написать подробный доклад о построении органов военной контр-разведки в частях Красной Армии, их компетенции и методах работы.

7- Кроме того, могу дать объяснения о проведенных НКГБ мероприятиях в отношении английской секретной службы в Москве. / ХИЛЛ. БАРКЛЕЙ/. также, как и источниках получения образцов английского дипломатического и военного шифров/в Москве/.

Условия, при которых может состояться передача в Ваше распоряжение всех перечисленных выше материалов,- следующие:-

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Воздержание от передачи каких-либо депеш по настоящему вопросу, с использованием радио или телеграфа.

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Ваш искренний друг

Top Secret Personal

VOLKOV

1. I spoke to-day with one [redacted] who was ^{stationed} in Istanbul at the time.

2. He confirmed that the Consulate and the Embassy there are in the same building - though at different ends of it and with separate ~~two~~ entrances. (At the same time it is stated that in 1945 the Consulate entrance was closed and that the only entrance was the one serving the Embassy end.) It seems, therefore, that we need have no doubts about the "agent in the Embassy" and the "agent in the Consulate" being identical.

3. I asked "our friend" about ^{of the staff} ~~any~~ ^{having} been noticed ^{about} ~~from~~ Istanbul at

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

the time. He replied
(with some natural embarrassment)
that he himself had been
away and ^{had} returned two days
after Volkov had called (!)

4. For the record: the "friend" is
[redacted] (he is mentioned
in your file), but I
doubt whether we need
seriously regard him as
suspect.

5. Mackoy On the subject
of locally-engaged staff
Mackoy said ^{he believed} that "many"
of them of various nationalities
(Turkish, Greek, Yugoslav) had
been employed for a number
of years but that as a rule
they were very low level
(sweepers, cleaners, etc.).

6. He mentioned that ~~was~~ a
British subject called

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Henry HARTY has been in charge of these staff in his day that Harty had himself been there many years and that, to the best of his knowledge, Harty was still in Istanbul — though now working, he believed, not for the British but for the Americans.

→ [redacted] also mentioned that [redacted] had been, and still is, [redacted] in Istanbul and would doubtless be able to get in touch with Harty ~~if~~ and put any questions to him if we so wished [redacted] is, I understand, also a "friend", so that any questions we wished to put should probably go through this

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channels. May I have
your views on this?

8. Both Hasky & I have apparently
been in Istanbul a
long time and, viewed in
the light of the theory
that the "Russian agent" may
have been employed
continuously from the Koevitzky
period to the Volkov
period, must to some
slight extent be considered
as suspect. At the same
time I think you might
~~assume that both are~~
~~obtainable~~ feel we shall
have to check this one if
we are to get any information
about the locally-employed staff.
There would, of course, be no
need to mention Volkov
when we frame our questions.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Col. Robert de Polakite. *En Ciel*
4/5.

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Top Secret.

Volkov

1. I had a talk this afternoon with one of who told me the following.

2. Many years ago a Russian defector named KREVITZKY (who had been in charge of Russian I.S. activities in ~~W. Europe~~ Europe) stated that the Russians had an agent in the "British Embassy" building in ISTANBUL. The period covered by this information was between 1933/34 ~~to~~^{to} 1936: after this the alleged agent may or may not have remained on the Embassy staff.

3. on the reliability of KREVITZKY's information (in general), further

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fairly highly: as the years go on they have received many proofs ~~that~~ of the accuracy of his forecasts about R.I.S. activities.

4. It is just possible that KREVITZKY's "agent" and VOLKOV's "agent" are identical: at least ~~it~~ you may think it worth asking Sir Knox Helm whether he has a record of a member of the staff (on the face of it, probably locally employed) who has served continuously in ISTANBUL from 1933/34 to 1936, and perhaps on to 1945. If there is such a person we shall at least have a suspect less shadowy than the average.

Top Secret

Minutes.

(2)

5. There is one point, which
has as the above, which
were uncertain of
and which I was not able
to clear up: is the
"British Embassy" building at
Istanbul identical with,
adjoining, or quite separate
from the "Consulate" building?

This seems to be quite a
crucial point, not only in
connection with the above, ~~but~~
because ~~it is~~ ^{whereas} VOLKOV's
"sales catalogue" he mentions
"an agent in the Consulate,"
John REED in his report
of 4.9.45 - quotes himself
as having ^{been asked}
as ~~asking~~ VOLKOV for the
names of the alleged Russian
Russian agents in the
Foreign Office and of the
agent in "this" (i.e. presumably
the "Embassy") building.

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6. Thus there is a slight discrepancy about where the agent was actually alleged to be. If the buildings are identical, all is well; if not, the plot thickens further. John Reed, I understand will shortly be questioned on ^{his exact wording} ~~the point~~ and we shall doubtless be informed of ~~the results~~ his replies.

Earl C. [unclear]
2/9.

Copied from F.O. file A.60/1951

British Embassy,

Ankara,

(at Istanbul),

14th August, 1953.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL.



My dear Nils.

[But for a talk some time ago with Carey Foster when he made my hair stand on end I might have had to scratch my head a bit about the subject matter of your letter of August 6 over which I have reflected at length.]

I wish with all my heart that I could give you an encouraging reply. But I fear that it is just not possible. Fortunately you yourself were vaguely familiar with the jungle nature of this Istanbul house in 1945 so you will be all the better able to understand my difficulties.

There was as you know a complete lack of organization. The Consulate General itself was never well run and even today I am fairly sure that if we had to set about an enquiry into the whereabouts of its own staff in September, 1951 the result would be quite inconclusive. Related to 1945 it would be hopeless.

The Consulate General was however only one of many organisms all functioning independently in this house. Most of them - S.O.E., Military Intelligence among them - have disappeared, probably leaving no trace and certainly no usable one. Then there was the menial staff of all the organisms but each with its own - my efforts in 1943 to get some coordination in this field were vain.

Some of the menial staff of the 1945 period of course remain, as does Bennett of the Consulate General. But otherwise I don't think there are any survivors and my own contacts with Istanbul in the 1942-6 period were so tenuous that my only really lasting impression is that of confusion, jealousy, individual self-importance and gross extravagance. The place was a complete shambles.]

Against that background I am sure you will understand that the suggested researches are not today feasible. Frankly I doubt whether, with things as they certainly were, they would have been feasible even in 1946! Anyway I am convinced that such researches today would at the best be barren and at the worst might arouse curiosity and create embarrassment.

I think the Security people may well be right in their conclusion that Mr.X knew there was at least one agent in this building - my guess is and was that there were...

The
Lord Talbot de Malahide,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.



were probably several and I don't see how in the milling throng and the atmosphere here at the time it could well have been otherwise. But I do remember being struck at the time by X's insistence about wireless and telegraph. So much was this the case that entirely on my own, I kept a keen but unobtrusive eye on our own cypher people at Ankara - I felt X might think we should report from there. I found nothing on which to base the slightest suspicion.

There were of course cypher people here - each organism had its own - and it occurs to me that they might be worth following up if only because they involve a much smaller number of people. So far as the Consulate General is concerned the names will be on record in the Foreign Office - I don't remember now who they were. The names of those of the other organizations - the friends and Naval Intelligence in addition to S.O.E. and Military Intelligence would be more difficult to trace.


I readily admit that my identification of the clue with cyphering is not exclusive. But X was presumably a man of intelligence and ought to have known that any report home "by wireless or telegraph" would not go in clear. Thus he should perhaps have realized that he had nothing to fear from the operators unless of course he knew that they could break the cyphers. Equally he apparently did not fear the typing staff. Logically therefore we should perhaps be left with the cypherers.

That is however just a theory of mine - and perhaps I ought not to have one. Yet I have another based on something Carey Foster also told me in secrecy. If the worst offender was in Broadway, and if there was an agent here, might the former not have had a hand in the placing of the latter? And if he had is it not most likely that he would have been placed in the friends' organization in this building? I admit that this is far from convincing argumentation but there could be something to it and it, like my first theory, could reduce the field. It would be still further reduced if the two theories were married - and in all probability suspicion cast on some entirely innocent individual!

I apologize for wandering entirely outside my province. Indeed what I have written may seem like teaching grandmother My only excuse is interest due to my having been on the sidelines in a very distressing affair and my regret at my inability to hold out any hope of useful action along the lines suggested in your letter. The latter I am now destroying and I am keeping no copy of this.

Yours ever,

Kenan Wilson



160a

NOTECopy
at 67a

In her minute of 1st November, 1967 to the D.D.G., D.1/Inv/E.McB. noted her suspicion that information on the VOLKOV affair printed in the "Sunday Times" on 15th October, 1967 had probably leaked from John REED. For what it is worth, the following facts strongly point to him as Insight's main source.

2. When he was interviewed on Friday 17th May, 1968 at Room 055, REED explained how Insight got in touch with him. After reading the first installment about PHILBY in the "Sunday Times" (which appeared on the 8th October, 1967), he claimed that he was so shocked by the pejorative remarks about Stewart Menzies and other former members of M.I.6, that he wrote to the Editor of the "Sunday Times" asking that his name should not appear in any future article or, if it did, that he should have the text submitted to him first. REED's letter instantly resulted in a telephone call from Philip KNIGHTLEY who proposed himself for a visit. REED's wife invited him to lunch and REED said he took the precaution of inviting an independent witness in the person of Parson Dory. REED assured both his interviewers at Room 055 and earlier [redacted] on 7th December, 1967, that he had not told KNIGHTLEY anything that he did not already know, and he ~~also~~ KNIGHTLEY was extremely well informed.

68a

is in
P.607,219
app.A

.....

J.P. What did Phil KNIGHTLEY come up with - was it interesting?

J.B. Yes, fabulous - very good stuff - chapter and verse on the defector incident - you know, dates, names, the lot!

J.P. Oh, somebody's been rather ignoring the Official Secrets Act then?

J.B. Er - yes - (laughter) - shall we say a patrician attitude towards the whole thing, you know, he couldn't quite decide what - ehm -

.....

4. The VOLKOV incident was described in the issue of the "Sunday Times" on 15th October, 1967.

5. During the recent interview, REED said that it was he who had told KNIGHTLEY that when PHILBY reached Istanbul and was asked why someone could not have come out sooner, he replied, "Sorry old man, it would have interfered with leave arrangements." (Note: REED also said that when the Insight team had shown this text to PHILBY in Moscow, he had commented that this sentence was inaccurate as it was not in his style.)

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16.
Miss
B. G. 68

6. There is also a textual indication in the Insight book which points to REED as a source. Insight gives the figure demanded by VOLKOV in return for his information as £27,500, "(an odd amount but possibly converted from another sum in roubles)...". When REED was interviewed in 1953 he said that he had the impression that VOLKOV had asked for a large sum of money, and described this as "rather an odd sum, possibly £23,000 or £27,000". REED's memory in this is inaccurate, VOLKOV in fact asked for £50,000, a nice round sum.

7. All this suggests that REED is not telling the truth when he makes assurances that he did not talk out of turn to KNIGHTLEY.

D.3

22nd May, 1968.

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ACT 1958
January 2023

159a

Extract from Note for File/Interview Report

Extract for File No. PF 603,656 Name VOLKOV

Original in File No. PF 604,964 Serial 84a Dated 21.5.68

Date and Place of Interview/Meeting 17.5.68. Room 055, Old War Office Building.

with (also give security context of person being interviewed) John Leigh REED (1952: Served at the British Embassy at Washington in 1941 and in Istanbul in 1945. Was a contact of Guy BURGESS.)

Subject Constantine VOLKOV.

Officer [redacted] using (a) of [redacted] Section K7

Extracted by FML Section R5 Date 26.7.72.

In answer to his request, a meeting was arranged with John REED at Room 055 on Friday morning, 17th May, 1968. [redacted]

4. REED took the opportunity of the meeting, (might this have been his reason for seeking it?) to disclose that he had informed Warwick Perkins, an American First Secretary, of VOLKOV's approach and its tragic dénouement shortly after the event. He had felt compelled to do this, convinced as he had been that he could achieve nothing further through official channels - Foreign Office or the Friends. He had passed the information in "broadest outline" and without request or recommendation for action to Perkins at a party. He had not known Perkins particularly well and never discussed the matter with him again. On looking back he considered he would have done better to have spoken to Theodore Babbitt, a Professor from Yale or Harvard temporarily attached (in uniform) to the American Embassy in Ankara who was a good friend of his. He also mentioned that he had recently written to the American Ambassador in London on this matter. (This we know from the Americans.)

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*Strike out inapplicable.

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Reference PF.603,656

159a

Extract from note for file on interview with John REED.

Original filed at 84a in PF.604,964 (REED), dated 21.5.68.

In answer to his request, a meeting was arranged with John REED at Room 055 on Friday morning, 17th May, 1968.

.....

10. Of minor points just worth recording is the fact that,
- 1) according to REED, VOLKOV had chosen to make his approach specifically to REED as he thought he was head of the anti-Soviet section in the Embassy.

.....

12. As already recorded in 1953/54 by Evelyn McBarnet, REED is useless as a source of information on the VOLKOV incident. During this recent interview he was indeed able, as he asked, to refresh his memory of the report he wrote on 4th September, 1945. The main purpose of the interview, however, seemed a general easing of his conscience about having informed Warwick Perkins about VOLKOV without authority and having concealed this when interviewed in 1953/54, about the disclosure of sexual deviation BENNETT had made to him, but which he had kept to himself, and possibly even his proposed trip to Leningrad and relations with NECHIPORNIKO.

D.3
21st May, 1968.

SECRET

Extd. D3/CB 22.5.68.

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157b.
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158a.
158ab.
158b.

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155A

Reference.....

PA in PF.603656

Ext. from "NEW STATESMAN" dated 27th October, 1967.

The Philby-Volkov Affair

Sir, One can sympathise with Magnus Turnstile's scepticism over newspaper stories that give no indication of sources. There are, as we all know, some notorious examples of journalists 'protecting their sources' for the simple reason that they do not have any. However, Mr Turnstile's incredulity over the *Sunday Times's* account of Philby and the Volkov Incident is misplaced. The Volkov Incident was important to the whole investigation both for the light it casts on Philby's way of working and for the light it casts on the subsequent actions of the secret services. Mr Turnstile is familiar enough with the rigorous approach of the *Sunday Times* Insight group to know that such a central theme would not be accepted second-hand. He will recall from the days when he worked on a newspaper that sometimes an event is known to so few people that virtually any indication of source is equivalent to revealing all. This problem was met several times in writing up the Philby investigation.

But to put Mr Turnstile's doubting mind at rest, I can do two things. Publicly, I can assure him that there was a totally reliable original source for the Volkov story, that this person is British and that the account is also well corroborated from a well-diversified range of first-hand interviews. Privately, the 'original source' has agreed to meet Mr Turnstile, who may write about it, providing he respects the normal journalistic conventions of confidentiality. I hope the shock of meeting an original source, after so many months of writing about the work of other journalists, will not prove too great for him.

RON HALL

Chief Assistant to the Editor

Sunday Times

RP
D.1/Inv
31.10.67

✓ 10/11/67
28/1/68

154a

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Extract from the
"SUNDAY TIMES" dated
15th October, 1967.

Volkov: agents for sale

THE LAST days of the second world war, and the first days of the peace, were marked by urgent discussions among young Englishmen who had been caught up in the military machine on how to re-assemble their broken careers. Most had one urgent impulse: to do something which had nothing to do with their war work. It was an impulse from which Kim Philby seemed to be immune.

He showed no desire to revive his excellent pre-war prospects in journalism. To friends who did not know what his wartime "civil service" job had been, he said: "I've decided to join the bureaucrats. The future belongs to them." To war-weary colleagues in the Secret Intelligence Service, like Malcolm Muggeridge, he evinced a willingness to work on against Russian instead of German antagonists which they found simply baffling.

Muggeridge recalls a drunken evening in Paris in 1945, when at Philby's insistence, the two of them lurched round to take a look at the Russian Embassy. Philby marched up and down, shaking his fist at the silent building, and demanding: "How are we going to penetrate them?"

Philby's zeal, of course, is highly explicable in retrospect: a long-term Soviet agent who had succeeded in early 1944 in becoming head of the British counter-Soviet espionage operation would hardly be ready to get out of the business. His war was just beginning, and the cavorting outside the Russian Embassy was no more of an indiscretion than the action of a racing-driver who cuts one corner extra-close to revel in his control.

Around this time, however, Philby was involved in a serious and peculiar incident. The way it was handled raises strange questions about the philosophy on which the Secret Intelligence Service was working in those days: if only because when the incident, years later, came to the

attention of Britain's other main secret department, MI5, it was taken as virtually conclusive evidence that Philby was working for the Russians.

Early in August 1945 an unexpected visitor with a heavy Russian accent called at the British Consulate in the Beyoglu district of Istanbul in Turkey. The man, obviously very nervous, demanded an interview with a certain high-ranking British diplomat. He wanted no one else present but himself and this diplomat—not even an interpreter.

The officer was found and the man was ushered into a quiet room. There, he spelt out the reason for his visit. He gave his name as Volkov. Ostensibly, he was a newly-appointed Russian consul in Istanbul. Actually, he said, he had been appointed head of Soviet Intelligence for Turkey.

He had arrived only two months earlier from the Moscow headquarters of the NKVD (then initials of the Russian secret service), and he had a proposition to make. In return for £27,500 (an odd amount, but probably converted from a round sum in roubles), plus a laissez-passer to Cyprus, Volkov was prepared to offer certain valuable counter-espionage information. Were the British interested?

The British diplomat was not one of the resident SIS men operating under diplomatic cover—although the Russian, it seems, assumed that he was. Nevertheless, the diplomat expressed cautious interest. What was the information for sale? Naturally, said Volkov, he was not prepared to give details until there was a deal. But—and here he handed over a batch of handwritten notes and sketches—this was an outline of what he had to sell.

The British official read rapidly, and with mounting excitement, through the headings: addresses and descriptions of NKVD buildings in Moscow with details of burglar-alarm systems, key impressions and guard schedules; numbers of all NKVD cars; a list of Soviet agents in Turkey, together with their means of communication; and finally—almost as a throwaway—"names of Russian agents operating in Government departments in London." It all looked as though Comrade Volkov, before taking up his post in Istanbul, had spent some time in Moscow acquiring material which could take him into the Western world with a golden one-way ticket.

The British official went straight to his Ambassador, Sir Maurice Peterson. But the reaction from the Ambassador was one of straight horror: he had for some time been trying to prevent what he regarded as an "invasion" of the Embassy by SIS men under cover, and he saw the Volkov business as a step in the same direction. "No one is going to turn my Embassy into a nest of spies," he said. "If you must go ahead with this business, do it through London."

The official returned to the waiting Russian. London would have to have time to make a decision on the proposition, he said.

Volkov agreed to wait, but he made two conditions. Firstly, any outline of his documents must be handwritten by the man he

153A
was speaking to, and not typed. There was a Russian agent operating in the British Embassy in Turkey, he said, so he could not risk anyone typing copies of his material. Secondly, there must be a decision within twenty-one days. If he had not heard by the evening of the twenty-first day, he would assume the deal was off. He departed after making complex arrangements for getting in touch.

The British diplomat spent a long night preparing a handwritten brief addressed to the SIS in London, and it went away with the courier next day. After a week, there had been no response, and a cable was sent from the Embassy in Turkey asking for a reply. After another week, there was still no reply; and on the twentieth day the diplomat who had interviewed Volkov had still heard nothing, and was almost frantic.

Then, at last, on the morning of the twenty-first day, an agent arrived from London and announced he had come to take personal charge of the Volkov affair. He was a calm, unhurried figure wearing a cutaway collar with a flowing Byronesque cravat. It was Kim Philby.

The diplomat who had interviewed Volkov, with nerves understandably taut, pointed out that the delay had probably ruined the whole deal—and asked why the hell couldn't someone have come out sooner. Philby produced, casually, an almost incredible excuse. "Sorry, old man," he said. "It would have interfered with leave arrangements."

They tried to contact Volkov, and waited for word to come back. Nothing happened. In the end they sent men out to look for "Consul Volkov"—but he could not be found. Throughout the afternoon, the interviewing officer could get no further explanation of the delay from Philby. "I finally made up my mind," he told friends later, "that either Philby was criminally incompetent, or he was a Soviet agent himself."

When it was clear that Volkov was not coming, Philby returned to London. And then a few days later, something occurred which revived the whole unhappy affair in the mind of the interviewing officer. A Russian military aircraft made an unscheduled, and quite irregular landing at Istanbul airport.

While the control tower was still trying to think of something to do, a car raced out across the tarmac to the aircraft. A heavily-bandaged figure on a stretcher was lifted from the car and put into the aircraft—which immediately took off.

It seemed to be an urgent Russian removal in the *bravura* style which was more common then, although still to be seen on occasion. And it seemed a fair assumption that the man being removed was the unfortunate Volkov: on which the interviewing officer decided to pass on his doubts about Kim Philby to someone else.

He contacted a British SIS officer, and reported his version of the Volkov incident. But nothing seems to have happened. If there was an inquiry, it was kept strictly inside the SIS family circle. And clearly the incident, although later thought

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
NOTE FOR FILE

see 148c

I have examined the file PF.605164 for Andrew KLINGHARDT as suggested by Mr. Thistlethwaite in the context of C.I.C.Persia.

2. It does not appear to me that KLINGHARDT is to be regarded as suspect as the person who supplied the R.I.S. with information about British Intelligence in Tehran, but the reports of his association with SOSNIN indicate once again that there was close association between the British and Russian Intelligence units in Tehran in 1944-45, and that it is absolutely clear that the R.I.S. gained a considerable amount of information about the British set-up and about the individuals employed in it. (See also Archives S.369).

3. In the light of what we now know about the R.I.S. there is no reasonable doubt that they learnt a great deal more about us than we learnt about them.



E. McBarnet

D.1/Inv

21st February, 1966.

RP
33/07/inv
22.2.66

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P.A. in P.F. 603,656.

Orig in P.F. 605p512, serial 39a, dated 10.11.65.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DI EAY 24/1

1480

Reference.....

Extract from D.3. Note for File.

.....

Secondly, recent research into the C.I.C.I. files has shown that the liaison with the Russians may well have acquired a complete knowledge about British Intelligence in Iran by proper and semi-overt means.

D.3.
28.1.66.

Sgd., P.M. Wright.

WA/R5.
9.2.66.

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148 A

Copy to PF.603,656

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PF.66,812/D.1/EMcB.

2nd December 1965.

Dear

Ivan KINGSLEY

Please refer to your letter of 3rd November 1965 about the above named. I have re-examined our record of KINGSLEY, in the first instance, in the context of VOLKOV's spy in the British Consulate in Istanbul.

2. While I agree that KINGSLEY is a possible candidate for VOLKOV's spy I do not think that he is a good one. This is principally due to the fact that he left Istanbul in at least January 1945 (he was in India in February 1945) and, as you will recall VOLKOV said (in writing) "While another is working on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul", and this was in September 1945.

3. As regards PETRENKO's information, I agree that this peculiar story should be clarified if possible and Patrick Stewart agrees that, subject to the pressure of other work, we should arrange to interview KINGSLEY next time he comes to the United Kingdom.

4. We have no trace in our records of Miss Dorrien May READ or of Claude BLOCH.

Yours sincerely,

E. McBurnet

[Redacted]

EMcB/CHK

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h/c
[Handwritten initials]

P A. in P.F. 603,656

Orig. in P.F. 605,512, serial 39a, dated 10 11.65.

TOP SECRET

147E

Reference... Loose Minute.....

Extract from D.3./P.A.M.H. Loose minute re [redacted] contact of
[redacted] (Guy BURGESS).

.....

Dick Thistlethwaite can comment better than I on the C.I.C.I. personalities in Teheran but it is surely a fallacy to suggest as [redacted] does that unless one is in cahouts with the Russians one is unlikely to be a Russian spy. I personally regard both [redacted] and CARSTAIRS as being above suspicion.

[redacted] I knew of him at the time but was not well enough acquainted with him to form a judgement of his character. The documents on British Intelligence Organisation in Iran referred to by VOLKOV (see 19a) could have been obtained in Cairo, Bagdad or Teheran from military headquarters as well as from establishments such as C.I.C.I., M.E.I.C., S.I.M.E., [redacted] and, probably, the embassies proper in Bagdad and Teheran. In all likelihood details of the organisation of our intelligence were also known to the S.C.O.E. stations in Bagdad and Teheran: the Bagdad one certainly contained some queer fish.

.....

D.3.
10th November, 1965.

sgd. P.A.M.Hughes.

WA/R5.
7.2.66.

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2/13/66

CODE 18-76

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145b - 147a

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ACT 1958.

Ex'd to L 595-134
q as marked on att'd

1150

This is a draft translation of
VOLKOV's document done by
He will be publishing
an authorised version in due course. (but not did)

Peter M. Wright

Peter M. Wright

D.3.

21st October, 1964.

CODE 18-76

24/2/65
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ACT 1958 August 2022

Draft Translation

Original

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VOLKOV'S DOCUMENT

Draft Translation

↑
Ex W to L595-134
Further to our conversation, I have the honour to inform you that, on the terms stated below, I can make available to the British Special Service all the undermentioned documentary matter of the Intelligence Directorate, People's Commissariat of State Security, U.S.S.R., in which I have been serving since the autumn of 1936.

↳ (1) A list of the agents of the Intelligence Directorate, N.K.G.B., in Turkey, comprising 314 persons. Both active agents and those in cold storage are included in the list. For some agents official personal reports are available.

(2) A list of persons known to the N.K.G.B. as permanent officials of British military and civilian intelligence, and also of their agents. In the list there should be about 250 overt and covert officers of this service, together with information about their personalities.

(3) A list of papers (and in some cases duplicates and photo-copies of them) passed to us by N.K.G.B. agents who are officers of British intelligence organs and of the British Foreign Office. (To judge by the covernames, the agents of this kind in London amount to nine.)

This list is of exceptional interest, in that it makes it possible to identify N.K.G.B. agents in extremely important British establishments. I know, for instance, that one of the N.K.G.B. agents is acting Head of a Department of the British Counter-Intelligence Directorate in London, while another is working on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul.

(4) Copies of papers from personal files and special dossiers belonging to British intelligence.

↑
Ex W to L595-134
(5) Photostats and translations of directives of the British intelligence service, in particular London's correspondence with General Hill.

(6) A copy of an evaluation by senior officers of the Near Eastern Department, Intelligence Directorate, N.K.G.B., of documents from the British intelligence organs in Iran.

(7) Detailed information relating to some N.K.G.B. agents located in Palestine, the Balkan countries and Iran. (Their covernames and arrangements for contact.)

(8) A complete list of the officers of the Intelligence Directorate, N.K.G.B., in Moscow, with their home addresses and their office and home telephone numbers. Also the addresses of

/garages

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TOP SECRET

and the [registration] numbers of cars belonging to the Intelligence Directorate, N.K.G.B.

- (9) The addresses of some of the safe flats of the Intelligence Directorate, N.K.G.B., in Moscow.
- (10) Matter which might be used for recruiting a captain (now, no doubt, a major) of the Counter-Intelligence Service, N.K.G.B: a secretary in the Chief Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the Petroleum Industry: a woman official serving as a personal assistant in one of the Special Purpose Divisions in Moscow. These three individuals could all be of use to the British [Intelligence] Service.
- (11) Two sets of genuine identification papers for officers of the Intelligence Directorate, N.K.G.B., in Moscow, valid for 1945 and giving right of access to all operational establishments, archives and other official premises of the N.K.V.D. and the Counter-Intelligence Directorates of the People's Commissariat for Defence and of the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the U.S.S.R.
These identification papers can be used as models.
- (12) Specimens of stamps and KOMENDANTS' seals of two N.K.G.B. directorates; these make it possible to issue vouchers and passes giving authority to take packages containing official documents out of the building of the N.K.G.B., U.S.S.R.
- (13) Specimens of official forms and all sorts of registration cards of the Intelligence Directorate, N.K.G.B. The latter may be used according to established N.K.G.B. procedure, to obtain any kind of information from the Operational Records Section of the Intelligence Directorate and from other special directorates in Moscow.
Possession of the forms mentioned above will enable you to identify the N.K.G.B. agents in every country in the world.
- (14) Keys from two inner offices of operational sections of the Intelligence Directorate, N.K.G.B., in Moscow, where secret documents relating to the Near East are kept.
- (15) In addition, there is a variety of documents describing the financial position and operational capabilities of some of the residencies of the N.K.G.B., U.S.S.R.

This list of material which I have in my possession can be supplemented by documents which I am in a position to pass to you here locally. [i.e. in Istanbul.]

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/ The following

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The following belong to the latter category:- 7

- (1) Copies of cypher telegrams sent to Moscow and to the Ambassador, [present in Ankara] the value of these being (apart from their content) that they may make it possible in the future to decypher all outgoing cypher telegrams from the Consulate-General (and perhaps the incoming ones as well).
- (2) A list of permanent officials of the Intelligence Directorate, N.K.G.B., the People's Commissariat for Defence and the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the U.S.S.R., who are working under the cover of legal Soviet representative bodies in Turkey (their covernames and the functions of each one in the residency.)
Also an incomplete list for Iran and Egypt.
- (3) Several keys to inner offices, safes and outside doors of the Consulate-General.
- (4) Notebooks recording conversations between senior members of the Consulate-General and visitors, as well as other official documents.
- (5) By special request I can draw up a table of organisation of the U.S.S.R.'s political, military [and naval] intelligence services in Turkey, and also of the Intelligence Directorate, N.K.G.B., in Moscow.
- (6) At the same time I can write a detailed report on the structure of the military counter-intelligence organs in units of the Red Army, their terms of reference and methods of work.
- (7) In addition, I can tell you about the measures taken by the N.K.G.B. in regard to the British Secret Service in Moscow (Hill, Barclay) and also about the sources "for setting" specimens of British diplomatic and service cyphers (in Moscow).

All the above-mentioned material can be put at your disposal on the

following terms:-

- (1) The proposals I have made must be kept absolutely secret. There must be no transmission by wireless or telegraph of any despatches relating to the matter in hand.
- (2) Everything agreed with your superiors must come through direct and without the participation of any intermediaries.
- (3) My loss of post and status must be compensated for in a fitting manner, by paying me a lump sum of at least £50,000 sterling.
I name this as the minimum figure, taking into account the importance of the material being passed to you, and the consequences which all my relatives living on U.S.S.R. territory will inevitably have to face.
- (4) I must be granted asylum and also given guarantees of complete safety.

TOP SECRET / Whatever

Ex 6d

W

595-134

TOP SECRET

- 4 -

Whatever your decision (affirmative or negative) please let me have it by 25th September, or at the very latest, by 1st October 1945.

It is possible to summon me for negotiations by using any of the Consulate telephones, naturally exercising the necessary caution. (It would be best, if the need arises, for the call to be disguised as an official and personal invitation and it is essential that it should come from the Consulate, as this will not arouse any suspicion.)

In conclusion, I assume you, and the Government of Great Britain as represented by you, that the contribution I am making and the modest part I am playing will bring the day of just retribution nearer and benefit the mighty British Commonwealth of Nations and freedom-loving and long-suffering mankind.

Your sincere friend

TOP SECRET

VOLKOV'S DOCUMENT

Draft Translation

Further to our conversation, I have the honour to inform you that, on the terms stated below, I can make available to the British Special Service all the undermentioned documentary matter of the Intelligence Directorate, People's Commissariat of State Security, USSR, in which I have been serving since the autumn of 1936.

- ① A list of the agents of the Intelligence Directorate, NKGB, in Turkey, comprising 314 persons. Both active agents and those in cold storage are included in the list. For some agents official personal reports are available.
- ② A list of persons known to the NKGB as permanent officials of British military and civilian intelligence, and also of their agents. In the list there should be about 250 overt and covert officers of this service, together with information about their personalities.
- ③ A list of papers (and in some cases duplicates and photo-copies of them) passed to us by NKGB agents who are officers of British intelligence organs and of the British Foreign Office.
(To judge by the covernames, the agents of this kind in

London amount to nine.)

It This list is of exceptional interest, in that it makes it possible to identify NKGB agents in extremely important British establishments. I know, for instance, that one of the NKGB agents is acting Head of a Department of the British Counter-Intelligence Directorate in London, while another is working on the staff of the British Consulate in Istanbul.

- ④ Copies of papers [from] personal files and special dossiers belonging to British intelligence.
Photostats.
- ⑤ Photostats and translations of directives of the British intelligence service, in particular London's correspondence with General Hill.
- ⑥ A copy of an evaluation by senior officers of the Near Eastern Department, Intelligence Directorate, NKGB, of documents from the British intelligence organs in Iran.
- ⑦ Detailed information relating to some NKGB agents located in Palestine, the Balkan countries and Iran. (Their covernames and arrangements for contact.)
- ⑧ A complete list of the officers of the Intelligence Directorate, NKGB, in Moscow, with their home addresses and their office and

home telephone numbers. Also the addresses of garages and the [registration] numbers of cars belonging to the Intelligence Directorate, NKGB.

- (9) The addresses of some of the safe flats of the Intelligence Directorate, NKGB, in Moscow.
- (10) Matter which might be used for recruiting a captain (now, no doubt, a major) of the Counter-Intelligence Service, NKGB; a secretary in the Chief Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the Petroleum Industry; ~~■~~ a woman official serving as a personal assistant in one of the Special Purpose Divisions in Moscow. These three individuals could all be of use to the British [Intelligence] Service.
- (11) Two sets of genuine identification papers for officers of the Intelligence Directorate, NKGB, in Moscow, valid for 1945 and giving right of access to all operational [establishments], archives and other official premises of the NKGB, the NKVD and ~~■~~ the Counter-Intelligence Directorates of the People's Commissariat for Defense and of the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR.

These identification papers can be used as models.

(12) Specimens of stamps and KOMENDANTS' seals of two NKGB

directorates; these make it possible to issue vouchers and passes giving authority to take packages containing official documents out of the building of the NKGB, USSR.

(13) Specimens of official forms and all sorts of registration cards of the

Intelligence Directorate, NKGB. The latter may be used, according to established NKGB procedure, to obtain any kind of information from the Operational Records Section of the Intelligence Directorate and from other special directorates in Moscow.

Possession of the forms mentioned above will enable you to identify the NKGB agents in every country in the world.

(14) Keys from two inner offices of operational sections of the Intelligence

Directorate, NKGB, in Moscow, where secret documents relating to the Near East are kept.

(15) In addition, there is a variety of documents describing the financial

position and operational capabilities of some of the residences of the NKGB, USSR.

This list of material which I have in my possession can be supplemented

ix in Istanbul
by documents which I am in a position to pass to you here locally. The following belong to the latter category:—

- (1) Copies of cypher telegrams sent to Moscow and to the Ambassador, (pres. in Ankara).
the value of these being (apart from their content) that they may make it possible in the future to decypher all outgoing cypher telegrams from the Consulate-General (and perhaps the incoming ones as well).
- (2) A list of permanent officials of the Intelligence Directorate, NKGB, the People's Commissariat for Defence and the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR, who are working under the cover of legal Soviet representative bodies in Turkey (their cover names and the functions of each one in the residency.)

Also an incomplete list for Iran and Egypt.

- (3) Several keys to inner offices, safes and outside doors of the Consulate-General.
- (4) Notebooks recording conversations between senior members of the Consulate-General and visitors, as well as other official documents.

- ⑤ By special request I can draw up a table of organisation of the USSR's political, military [and naval] intelligence services in Turkey, and also of the Intelligence Directorate, NKGB, in Moscow.
- ⑥ At the same time I can write a detailed report on the structure of the military counter-intelligence organs in units of the Red Army, their terms of reference and methods of work.
- ⑦ In addition, I can tell you about the measures taken by the NKGB in regard to the British Secret Service in Moscow (Hill, Barclay) and also about the sources ^{"for setting"} ~~which provided~~ specimens of British diplomatic ~~a service~~ ^{cyphers} (in Moscow).

All the above-mentioned material can be put at your disposal on the following terms:—

- ① The proposals I have made must be kept absolutely secret. There must be no transmission by wireless or telegraph of any despatches relating to the matter in hand.
- ② Everything agreed with your superiors must come through direct and without the participation of any intermediaries.
- ③ My loss of post and status must be compensated for in a fitting manner, by paying me a lump sum of at least £50,000

sterling.

I name this as the minimum figure, taking into account the importance of the material being passed to you, and the consequences which all my relatives living on USSR territory will inevitably have to face.


(4) I must be granted asylum and also given guarantees of complete safety.

Whatever your decision (affirmative or negative) please ~~let me~~ ^{have} it by 25th September or, at the very latest, by 1st October 1945.

It is possible to summon me for negotiations by using any of the Consulate telephones, naturally, exercising the necessary caution. (It would be best, if the need arises, for the call to be disguised as an official and personal invitation and it is essential that it should come from the Consulate, as this will not arouse any suspicion.)

In conclusion, I assume you, and the Government of Great Britain as represented by you, that the contribution I am making and the modest part I am playing will bring the day of just retribution nearer and benefit the mighty British Commonwealth of Nations and freedom-loving and long-suffering mankind.

Your sincere friend



On Her Majesty's Service

145a.

Attachment to 145a in PF 603,656 (VOLKOV)

contents found loose in file & returned
to envelope
K704/1127
2/15/56

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

144a

PF. 603,656/D3/PMW

23rd April, 1964.

Dear [redacted]

McKane reminded me the other day that I had not sent you the account of VOLKOV's interview with REED in Istanbul. I enclose it herewith. *serial 1a.*

Yours sincerely,

Peter M. Wright



PMW/GC.
Enc. (3 pages).

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

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ACT 1958 August 2022

Enclosure to letter under reference PF. 603656/D3/PMW of
23rd April, 1964.

Mr. Page of the Consulate General rang me up
this morning to say that a M. VOLKOV of the Soviet
Embassy was in his office and wished to see me.

M. VOLKOV arrived in my room with [redacted]
[redacted] who had apparently gone
over to the Consulate to interpret - M. VOLKOV speaking
no word of any language other than Russian. Once they
were inside my room VOLKOV said that what he wanted to
tell me was of a strictly private nature and that he
did not wish to speak in the presence of a third per-
son. My Russian is not very good and I tried to keep
SUDAKOV as an interpreter, but VOLKOV insisted that
the interview should be private and [redacted] accordingly
went out.

VOLKOV then introduced himself as the Deputy
Chief of the Soviet Security Service in Turkey and
without further preliminaries said that he had some
information of great importance to give me. For the
last two and a half years the Soviet authorities had
been able to read all cypher messages passing between
the Foreign Office and our Embassy in Moscow. [redacted]

[redacted] The latter's
telegrams were, he said, particularly easy to decypher.

Moreover the Russians had two agents inside the
Foreign Office in London and seven inside the British
"Intelligence Service" who were passing them informa-
tion of great importance. He (VOLKOV) had a great

/deal of information.....

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deal of information about the organisation of our secret service in this country (Turkey) and knew the names of most of our agents - including [redacted] [redacted] Reed etc. I here interrupted him to say that if the Soviet Security Service believed me to be an Intelligence Agent they must be singularly badly informed as my functions were entirely innocent. VOLKOV appeared quite unconvinced and said "Oh yes I know - we are all innocent". I then asked him why he was telling me all this - to which he replied that he had quarrelled with his Ambassador and other members of his Embassy and couldn't stand it any more. He became quite excited at this juncture - although both before and afterwards he remained sitting very quietly - talking very fast and never looking at me. This made him at times difficult to understand - but he was normal, sober and composed.

He then told me - which seems quite fantastic - that he had an empty flat in Moscow in which he had left a suitcase containing the names of three hundred and fourteen Soviet agents in the United Kingdom and a great deal of other information connected with Soviet activities. It could be arranged for somebody to go and collect this suitcase which was supposed to contain only private papers. This all seemed so extraordinary that I told him I was not particularly interested in what happened in Moscow but would be grateful if he would tell me the names of his agents

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/working in the.....

working in the Foreign Office and also the name of the person, who he said was working for him in this building. That, however, he refused to do until I could confirm that we were "interested" in the information he had to give. I did not ask for a definition of the word "interested" but told him that I should report the conversation to my superiors.

He begged that if any account of the conversation were sent to London it should go by writing and not by telegraph and that the information he had given should be restricted to the minimum number of people. What he had to say he wished to say only to me. I was not to telephone to him but he would come and see me again in a few days' time.

I asked him if he were not running a considerable risk in making these visits - but he said he was not - that he was not being followed or watched and that only his wife knew what he was up to. He then went away.

Signed. J. L. REED.

4th September.

British Embassy,
Istanbul.

143a

PF. 603,656/D3/PMW

26th February 1964

Dear [redacted]

86

I spoke with McKane yesterday about getting a new translation of Constantin VOLKOV's bill of sale, and we felt that it would be a very good idea if [redacted] could have a go. McKane said that he would speak to you about the matter. I therefore enclose a copy of VOLKOV's statement in Russian. I am not, at this time, sending you the English translation which we have as I think it would be interesting to compare what [redacted] makes of it with our translation. If [redacted] wishes to discuss the matter with me, I shall be only too pleased to see him either here [redacted]

2. When [redacted] has finished with the Russian copy, could you please return it to me.

Yours sincerely,

Peter M. Wright

Peter M. Wright

[redacted]

PMW/GC.

Enc.

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26-2-64

142a.

142b.

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ACT 1958.

SECRET

GEN.
float.
letter book.

Ext. from SLOMA's file
being made.

141a

GEN. 1300/D.1./E.McB.

TO: S.L.O. INDIA

With reference to the attached form we find that we and CX. H.O. have a trace of Andrei Ivanovich SLOMA.

2. Andrei Ivanovich SLOMA was on the staff of the Soviet Consulate General in Istanbul from 1945 - 1948. He was then described as a Consular Secretary but he was strongly suspected of K.G.B. activities, rather as a strong-arm security guard type than as a high-grade intelligence officer.

3. On 4th September 1945 Constantin VOLKOV, Soviet Vice-Consul in Istanbul, approached the British Consulate General and announced his intention of defecting. VOLKOV made an offer to produce information of great value and importance and asked in return for asylum and a large sum of money. On 13th September he made a further approach and asked for a decision agreeing to his terms by 25th September 1945. Before any decision could be taken VOLKOV and his wife disappeared from Istanbul. It has since been established that they were removed on stretchers on a Russian Military aeroplane from Yesilkoy Airport. The aeroplane had arrived from Sofia on 25th September with a crew of six; first and second pilots, two mechanics, a radio operator and a doctor, all Military personnel, and it took off at 16.40 on 26th September 1945, with the following passengers in addition to the crew mentioned above:

Constantin VOLKHOV, of the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul,

Loya VOLKHOVA, wife of the above,

Andre SILOVA or SLOMA, Consular Secretary,

Andre BAIKO, and Alexandre DANILOV, "Diplomatic couriers" who had arrived by train from Bulgaria on 24th September reaching the Yesilkoy Airport one hour before the plane took off, and whose names did not appear in any subsequent lists of diplomatic couriers.

4. Andrei SLOMA has been identified beyond doubt as identical with the subject of your enquiry. It is thought that he accompanied the VOLKOVs to Moscow, probably as a security guard. He is known to have returned to Istanbul by train on 3rd October 1945 and remained there until 31st August 1947 when he left for Odessa by sea and has never come to notice since.

5. It has always been assumed that VOLKOV was removed because his intention to defect had somehow become known to his masters. There are, of course, many ways in which they could have learned about this, including leakage of information. However, the story of VOLKOV's approach was kept within a very narrow circle and in spite of much investigation it has never been established that a leakage took place from a British source either by accident or by design. It is quite possible that the VOLKOVs brought notice on themselves by some indiscretion of their own.

SECRET


8

D.1.18
2.5.56

SECRET

- page 2 -

6. Since SLOMA was involved in the VOLKOVs removal he may know how, and when, information about their contemplated defection leaked. In any case D.I.B. should know that there can be little doubt that SLOMA is a member of the R.I.S. and, while I hesitate to suggest that they should take any action about him, they may like to bear in mind, in case some opportunity arises to get close to him, that he is a worth while subject for their attention.



E. McBarnet

4th May, 1961.

EMcB/JJB

SECRET

138a.

139a.

1412

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Secret Cross Reference

157A

For file number:..... P.F. 603,656

Title:..... VOLKOV.

* INFORMATION re:..... Subject.

is filed in

FILE number:..... S.F. 441/U.K./1

vol. 3.

at serial:..... 199a.

Dated:..... 20.4.59.

Cross reference made by:..... DEW

Section:..... R.5.

Date:..... 8.5.59.

*NOTE.—Give full name and personal particulars in the case of an individual.

SECRET

1366

EXTRACT

Extract for File No. : PF 603,656 Name : VOLKOV
 Original in File No. : PF 68,583 Vol. : 2 Serial : 84a Receipt Date : -
 Original from : Interrogation Report Under Ref. : - Dated : 6.9.57
 Extracted on : 23.3.72 by : AH Section : R5

The interrogation of PALOCZI-HORVATH. (1944:In touch with the Russian Intelligence Service) was carried out by C.O. Shipp. D.1.

.....

9. PALOCZI-HORVATH gave the following list of S.O.E. personnel with whom he was acquainted in Istanbul, Jerusalem, Cairo and elsewhere:

- Basil DAVIDSON
- Thomas MASTERSON
- William BURLAND
- William MORGAN
- Hugh SETON-WATSON
- Peter BOUGHIE
- William BAYLEY
- Julian AMERY
- Leslie HARMER
- John BENNETT
- Ivor PORTER
- Leslie HARROP
- Col. UNDERWOOD (Teheran)

- Adrian BISHOP (Baghdad)
- Ian BUTLER
- Lord HARCOURT
- Lord GLENCONNEL (?GLENCONNER)
- Capt. HOWARTH
- James KLUGMAN
- Col. TEMPLIN

RF 45,597.

Ext.
 PF 606 932
 CSNIE

SECRET

SECRET

136b.

EXTRACT

Extract for File No. : PF 603,656 Name : VOLKOV

Original in File No. : PF 68,583 Vol. : 2 Serial : 84a Receipt Date :

Original from : Interrogation Report Under Ref. :

Dated : 6.9.57.....

Extracted on : 23.3.72 by : AH Section : R5.....

When asked whether he had suspected that any British employees, particularly in Istanbul, might have been in clandestine contact with the Russians, PALOCZI-HORVATH replied that he could only suggest James KLUGMAN for this role, although KLUGMAN had, as far as he knew, never been stationed in Istanbul. He had met KLUGMAN in the winter of 1942/43 in Cairo and subsequently on numerous occasions after his return to London in 1945. He described KLUGMAN as a cynic with little interest in the workers and added that he had been somewhat surprised when KLUGMAN had continued to follow the Party line after the attacks on STALIN. As regards Basil DAVIDSON, PALOCZI-HORVATH had had no evidence of any contact between him and the Soviet authorities in Istanbul in the two periods when he had served there under DAVIDSON. He believed that DAVIDSON became more pro Communist in outlook during his later service in Yugoslavia. With regard to John BENNETT, PALOCZI-HORVATH knew that he was married to a Yugoslav woman but he thought both BENNETT and his wife, who was of middle class origin, were reliable from the British point of view. Asked about [redacted] in Istanbul, PALOCZI-HORVATH said that he was a fiery emigre of the old order and completely anti-Soviet in outlook. When the name Tamas REVAI was mentioned to him, PALOCZI-HORVATH recalled that REVAI, who had worked with S.O.E. in Yugoslavia together with DAVIDSON, had after his return to Hungary, been arrested and treated rather badly in prison. After his release he was partially rehabilitated and travelled on official business to Egypt and South America. PALOCZI-HORVATH knew that he had expressed anti-Communist opinions after his release and had heard that during the Revolution in Hungary, he had played an active part with the insurgents. Although he believed that REVAI had wished to leave Hungary after the Russian counter action, he had been astonished to learn that REVAI had come to terms with the KADAR Regime and had been appointed to Rome as Hungarian Commercial Attache. PALOCZI-HORVATH volunteered the information that he considered that REVAI would, if approached, be prepared to work for the British authorities whilst continuing his official Hungarian employment.

PF 603,656

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copied to L. 595-16.

Copy PF.603656 VOLKOV

PF.145940

136A

NOTE

On 15 July I interviewed in Room 055 at the War Office John Still BENNETT. I explained that some years ago we had reopened our enquiries into the case of VOLKOV, a Russian official who tried to defect in Istanbul in 1945. We had seen a number of people who might have known the case and we would have seen him earlier had he not been abroad and unavailable for interview. BENNETT told me he had a vague recollection of the VOLKOV case but it was all very hazy in his memory. He thought for a few minutes but could not remember anything further. When prompted he recalled that he had seen VOLKOV being taken to an aeroplane on a stretcher, and he supposed that he recognised him because he had known of the case.

I asked him if REED had told him at the time of the case. He could not remember but thought that he certainly had because at the time he was "very close to REED". It appears that they were personal friends. BENNETT asked me if I could tell him where REED was. I said that I was not certain but I thought he could probably get hold of him through an address in Shropshire.

Since BENNETT was unable to help over the VOLKOV case I saw no reason for prolonging the interview. He said that he would see if his diary supplied any clues and if it did would get in touch with me through Room 055.

J.N.U.

D.H. Whyte.

D.I.
15.7.57.

6-3-57

*2/10
4.1.57*

Copy: P. 603,657

135b

PF.145,940

NOTE FOR FILE

Downing of the Foreign Office telephoned on 11th June to enquire whether we wished to interview BENNETT (a) as a witness or (b) in connection with his own security. On consulting the file, I got the impression that (a) was correct, and this was confirmed by D.1/C.T.Y. Downing happened to be visiting the office on 12th June, and the opportunity was taken to inform him of the position. He explained that where a member of the Foreign Service was being interviewed purely to assist in an investigation ~~to~~ sanction of an Under Secretary was sufficient, but if the interview concerned the officer's own reliability, then sanction had to be obtained from the Secretary of State himself.

2. Downing went on to discuss briefly BENNETT's part in the VOLKOV incident and remarked that his only connection with it seems to have been that he saw by chance the departure of VOLKOV and his wife on stretchers in a Russian military aircraft from Istanbul. According to Downing, BENNETT had immediately telephoned the news to A.K. Helm, the then Counsellor, and had been told to mind his own business - in Downing's view a typical reaction by Helm in the case of someone he did not like. I said that I was not familiar with BENNETT's file, but from glancing through it quickly my impression was that BENNETT had told ~~no~~one of the VOLKOVs' departure at the time, but had spoken about it some weeks later to Reed, the First Secretary. I said that if Downing's version was right it showed BENNETT up in a much better light. Downing appeared confident that he had got his facts correct.

3.

I imagine that Downing has got the story muddled, but it might be worth sorting this out with him before BENNETT is interviewed.

4. BENNETT, incidentally, according to Downing, was hoping to travel back from Khorramshahr via Russia. Downing thinks it unlikely that BENNETT will obtain a Russian visa, however. Until BENNETT finalises his travel plans, no E.T.A. in this country can be given, but Downing will keep us informed.

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D.1.
12.6.57


P.A.M. Hughes

135a

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133a

Original in PF.55,570 (REVAI).



[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]

535.

Copies on: PF.604529 BURGESS
PF.604558 MACLEAN
PF.603656 VOLKOV

PA ↖

D.D.G.

Please see 531a, reporting Mr. Young's and Mr. Whyte's interviewing of REVAI at Room 055 on 20 November, and D.1's comments thereon in Minute 533. The most interesting thing which emerged from the interview was, I think, REVAI's account of his dinner with BURGESS on the evening of 24 May 1951, at which POLLOCK and MILLER were also present, and of which (according to REVAI) BLUNT later had knowledge. This is described in paragraph 4 of 531a.

I agree in general with Mr. Young's comments in Minute 533, but must qualify what he has said in his paragraph 4.

I agree that, unless we obtain new information about his association with BURGESS, there is unlikely to be any need for us to see REVAI again. With regard, however, to the general question of investigation of the cases of BURGESS and MACLEAN, I do not think we should be justified in stating flatly that investigations are closed pending the receipt of new information.

I have discussed this with Mr. Young, and he agrees:-

1. That there may be further communication between DRIBERG and BURGESS, and that in view of BURGESS's tendency to indiscretion it may be possible to turn this to advantage, and to obtain from BURGESS himself leads for further investigation.

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DIB
25/8/52

2. That we must keep continuously in mind the hypothesis (in my opinion more tenable than ever) that BURGESS and his circle of friends is to be equated with the network of spies described by Constantin VOLKOV in 1945 as having penetrated British Intelligence.

Otherwise, I agree with D.1 that there is little more we can do in the way of investigations, unless and until new information is received. I prefer however not to describe the investigations as "closed", since I doubt if they ever will be. D.1 must be continuously on the alert and on the look out for any possibility of obtaining new information.

J. C. ROBERTSON.

J. C. Robertson.

28:11.56
D.
28:11.56

I agree in general with Mr. Young's comments... I think, REVAI's account of his dinner with BURGESS on the evening of 24 May 1951, at which BURGESS and REVAI were also present, and of which I have a copy to REVAI. This is included in paragraph 4 of my report.

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D.1.

Reference Minute 188. WILLERT's wartime career is as follows.

At the outset of the war he joined Department EH under Sir Campbell Stewart. He is said to have been in the Paris office until June 1940 though it is not clear when he went to France. There was some question of a mission to Gibraltar in December 1940 which did not materialise. He returned to the U.K. in June 1940 and the department which he served subsequently became S.O.1. He left it in January 1941.

In April 1941 he enlisted as an airman and was subsequently commissioned. He served in the R.A.F. on normal duties until January 1944 when he was transferred to special duties. In December 1944 he became Staff Officer to the Air Attache in Paris. He later became Air Attache and remained in the Embassy until February 1946 at least, when he was demobilised.

D.1.
3.9.56.

J.H.J.
D. H. Whyte.

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129a

130a.

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H.A.R. PHILBY and Constantin VOLKOV

PA & Volkov
Copy in PF Philby
main vol
604584
128a

- 24 August 1945 Mr. Page, British Vice Consul in Istanbul, received a letter from VOLKOV asking for an interview. The letter was ignored.
- 4 September 1945 VOLKOV arrived at the British Consulate in Istanbul and saw Mr. Page, and was interviewed by REID
- 13 September 1945 VOLKOV came to the Consulate and handed to Mr. Page a long letter. With this he enclosed his "sales catalogue".
- 19 September 1945 Papers from the Foreign Office Mr. Tom Bromley were sent by letter (It is believed that these papers arrived at the Foreign Office on 19 September). The letter enclosed a copy of the "sales catalogue".
- 20 September 1945 PHILBY was informed of the contents of the "sales catalogue". He was detailed to fly to Istanbul to see VOLKOV.
- 22 September 1945 PHILBY would leave the U.K. for Istanbul via Cairo on 26 September.
- PHILBY would be coming but gave a fictitious reason for his visit.
- 26 September 1945 VOLKOV was flown away with his wife in a Russian plane from Istanbul to Moscow.
- 27 September 1945 PHILBY reached Cairo on his way to Istanbul.
- 28 September 1945 PHILBY arrived during the afternoon at Istanbul.
- 29 September 1945 PHILBY tried to contact VOLKOV through Page in Istanbul.
- 1 October 1945 PHILBY cabled that he proposed to leave Istanbul on 3 October.
- 3 October 1945 PHILBY flew to Cairo on his way to return to this country.

Receipt for TOP SECRET Document.

To be signed by the recipient and returned immediately to:—

Box 500, PARLIAMENT STREET B.O., LONDON, S.W.1.

TOP SECRET Document/Package Reference No... ~~PP 603656/DIA/CPDew~~

Noted in AIR-Mails.

Dated... 24.10.55

Sect:..... D.L.A.

27.10.55 SS

Despatched to:—..... J.E.D. Street, Esq.,

Held DIA

..... Foreign Office.

Date.....

RECEIVED the above:

Date... Oct 25th 1955

Signature J.E.D. Street

127a

✓ FF. 603656/DIA/CPCdeW

TOP SECRET PERSONAL

24 October, 1955.

Dear Street,

I return with thanks the enclosed document. We have taken a photostat copy for our records.

Yours sincerely,



C.P.C. de Wesselow.

J.E.D. Street, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

Enc. (VOLKOV "Sales Catalogue" in original Russian received under compliment slip 21.10.55. photostat copy filed at serial 86)

Reference... PF.603656 + VOLKO

32/29
D.1.A./RTR to see.

126a

NOTE.

1a. marked [redacted] shows that no written information reached this office about VOLKOV until that month - that is to say some time after his disappearance.

This is confirmed by the present D.D.G.'s manuscript note at 2a.

There is no evidence as to whether any information was passed orally to this office at an earlier date. If so, the fact was not recorded in the file. The first relevant entry in Captain Liddell's diary, kept at the time, is dated 5 October 1945. (*Information received from D.D.G.*)

J. C. Robertson
J. C. Robertson.

D.1.
27.9.55.

REGIMITE
(1945)
JCSLtd
Gp736/210
Code 5-35-0

BPDIA
28/9/55

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125a.

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
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THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

TOP SECRET

122A

Copy to

Copies in: PF.603656 - VOLKOV.
PF.145940 - BENNETT.

PF.604964/D.1.

25 March 1955.

Dear

Reed has passed me your letter of 14 March on the subject of John L. REED.

I attach copies of reports in our files of two interviews which we had with REED in London on 2 December 1953 and 12 January 1954.

You will see from these reports that the principal feature of these interviews was the remarkable vagueness of REED's memory. Because of this he was able to add little or nothing of value to the information we already had about the VOLKOV episode. Some of his recollections of the episode were, as you will see, definitely inaccurate.

The only part of his story which we at the time regarded as calling for further consideration was the part relating to John Still BENNETT who, according to REED, knew something about the fact of VOLKOV's sudden departure from Istanbul airfield, and who was interviewed on this subject by REED himself on the instructions of Sir Alexander Helm. Here again, REED's recollection of what happened was very unclear, and it was for this reason (and at REED's own suggestion) that we had a later talk with Sir Alexander Helm, a note of which was sent to de la Mare with my letter under reference PF.603656 of 8 February 1954.

We were left with no final proof of what had actually happened where REED and BENNETT were concerned, but with the strong impression that BENNETT, having witnessed the removal of the VOLKOVs from Istanbul airfield, told REED about this; and that the latter was then instructed by Helm to keep quiet about it and - in effect - to tell BENNETT to mind his own business.

Our interviews with REED left us in no doubt that his sense of discretion left much to be desired. On the other hand, Sir Alexander Helm considered it unlikely that REED was indiscreet about the VOLKOV affair before the disappearance from Istanbul of VOLKOV and his wife, and there is so far no evidence which contravenes this opinion. No further enquiry is therefore being made about REED.

As regards John Still BENNETT, the position still rests as reported in our letter PF.603656 of 5 April 1954, and de la Mare's reply of 3 May 1954. Should BENNETT return to this country and be available for interview, we should like to see him, if only for any help he may be able to give us towards the further clarification of REED's story.

Yours

Malcolm, Esq.,
Sign Office.

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J. G. Roberts

Handwritten initials and date: "Handwritten initials" and "20.3.55"

TOP SECRET
EXTRACT

Extract for File No.: *Held DIA* P.F. 603,656. Name: VOLKOV. *RTR*

Original in File No.: *PF. 604,964. REED. Vol.: Serial: 43a. Receipt Date: 15.3.55. *12/16/54*

Original from: Foreign Office. Under Ref.: -- Dated: 14.3.55.

Extracted on: 15.4.55. by: DCB. Section: R.5.

Copy of letter from Foreign Office re. VOLKOV case.

I think you told me recently that you have taken on the work done last year by Evelyn McBarnet. I therefore write to you on the Volkov case, which rests with Miss McBarnet's letter No. PF.603,656/D.1.A/EMcB of April 5. I have been looking through our records recently and I see that you interviewed John L. Reed but I do not think we had an account of the interview. A point which struck us was that we did not seem to have any record of an enquiry into Reed himself. He was evidently one of the people in the secret from the beginning and if John Still Bennett knew anything which he should not have known it must, I think, have been because John Reed told him.

2. I should be very glad, in order to tie up this loose end, if you would let me know to what extent there was enquiry into Reed's bona fides.

* If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner

*DIA 16A
15.6.54*

SECRET

1216

Extract for File No.: PF. 603,656. Name: VOLKOV.

Original in File No.: *PF. 157,694. Link A. PETROV. Vol.: Serial: 252a. Receipt Date: 10.2.55.

Original from: S.L.O. Gambera. Under Ref.: PF. 216 Link (3) Dated: 7.2.55.

Extracted on: 2.4.55. by: JGS. Section: 2.6.

RET

Extract from "Third Report Concerning Miscellaneous Soviet Intelligence Personalities" forwarded by S.L.O. Gambera ment. VOLKOV.

.....

* If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner

73. Konstantin VOLKOV. The above named was described to PETROV as a Soviet Vice Consul in Istanbul, born about 1909, who in September, 1945, was hurriedly recalled to Moscow, possibly because he had become suspect to the Soviet Security Service. PETROV did not react at all to these particulars; of course he was away in Sweden during 1943-47, so that he would not necessarily have known about the matter.

74. PETROV commented that if VOLKOV was an R.I.S. cadre worker, he may well have assumed the name VOLKOV for the purpose of his posting to Turkey. VOLKOV is of course a common name, and PETROV has known many VOLKOVs, but none that fits these particular circumstances.

.....

SECRET

+ dated 25.1.55.

DIA/BA
7435

121a.

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SECRET

Extract for File No.: PF 603656 Name: VOLKOV 120A

Original in File No.:* PF 137694 Link A Vol.: 7 Serial: 316a Receipt Date: 24.1.55.

Original from: Letter from Australia. Under Ref.: PF 516 Link A Dated: 12.1.55.

Extracted on: 1.2.55. by: BP Section: D1A

Copy of letter from SLO Australia. ^{re} 118 B

Your letter of 31.12.54.

Your presumption is correct - for "names" please read "points".
Many apologies for this error.

Yed
3/2/55

copy to PF.603656 - VOLKOV ✓

PF.137694 Link A/DIA/RFR

PF.516 Link A (2)

119A

PERSONAL

TOP SECRET

S.L.O. Australia

Please refer to your letter of 7 December 1954.
We presume this is a reply to our letter about VOLKOV and
that for "names" we should read "points" or "questions".
Would you please confirm?

yes see
120 a

31 December 1954.

C.P.G. de Wesselow.

CFCdeW/BA

118A

PF.137694/Link'A'/D.l.A/RTR

PF.516 Link A

(Copy on PF.603656)

To: SLO Australia.

From: Head Office.

Reference your letter of 14 October, 1954.

This is a good idea. We suggest that the questions and information about VOLKOV should be put in stages and the interrogator can depart from the schedule as soon as he gets a bite. Unfortunately we have no photograph of VOLKOV.

The questions might go in this order:

- (a) Have you ever heard of a man called Constantin VOLKOV, who would now be about 45 years old ?
- (b) He was Soviet Vice-Consul in Istanbul in 1945;
- (c) He was flown back to Moscow from Turkey in a great hurry in September 1945;
- (d) We think he might have wanted to defect.

If PETROV does not react to any of the above, there is no point in going further. If he does, the interrogator should obviously get everything possible. We will then examine what has been obtained and ask for an expansion where it looks possible or relevant.

4.11.54

R. T. Reed.

Extract for File No.: PF 603,656 - Held DIA Name: VOLKOV 118 B

Original in File No.: * PF 137694 Link A Vol.: 7 Serial: 285a Receipt Date: 16.12.54

Original from: SLO Australia Under Ref.: PF 516 Link A(2) Dated: 7.12.54

Extracted on: 5.1.55 by: JGC Section: A6/Sec

Copy of a letter from SLO Australia.

Please refer to your letter PF 137694/Link A/DIA/RTR of 4 November 1954.

I regret to say that this idea has been unproductive. PETROV does not react to any of the four names mentioned in your letter. There is therefore no point in going further at this stage.

points see 1209

114a.

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EXTRACT

113A

Extract for File No. : PF.603656 Name: VOLKOV
 Original in File No. :* PF.137694/Link'A' Vol.: 7 Serial: 234b Receipt Date: 28.10.54
 Original from : SLO Australia Under Ref.: PF.516 Link A Dated: 14.10.54
 Executed on : 4.11.54 by : IMcD Section: D1A

1. I wonder whether you would think it desirable for us to interrogate PETROV on his knowledge, if any, of VOLKOV.
2. We could introduce his name in discussion either singly or when raising matters affecting Nato countries. Alternatively, and perhaps most profitably, we could show PETROV a photograph if one is available.
3. If you agree with this general idea, would you give us a brief and your views on the method of approaching this matter with PETROV ?

(Copy of handwritten notes:

D.1 This is a most interesting suggestion. May we discuss the terms of a reply ?
 D1A/RTR 28/10

D1A/RTR We should have thought of this before. Pl. prepare a brief. D1/JCR 29/10

104a.

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Reference Loose Minute.
(PF. 603,656)


104²

F.2.

Could you please obtain for me the
War Office file for -

Major (in 1945) E.R.C. SMITH,
Royal Signals.

I am sorry I have no other information
about this man.



D.1.A.
24.7.54.

E. McBarnet.

DIA/SC
11/9/54

