

PF72,493/V3

CAIRNCROSS, JOHN

PF72,493/V3

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date
KV 2 / 4680								

S. 960 Edn2

PF72,493/V3

MINUTE SHEET

Reference PF 72+93

111.

26.2.52

ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS referred to in serial 112a.

111a

112.

26.2.52

B.2.b note re document found amongst BURGESS's papers.

112a

26.2.52.

Branch memorandum B.2./S.L.B. re legal position presented by CAIRNCROSS document found amongst effects of Guy BURGESS

112b

113

27.2.52.

Photostat copy of letter from the Treasury to CAIRNCROSS re sick leave.

113a

27.2.52.

Int. letter to CAIRNCROSS from John QUINN re anonymous letter

113b

114.

B.2.a. Mr. Burbidge

In reading through the Supp. vols of this file, I notice that CAIRNCROSS has been in touch recently with George WEILENFELDT and Andrew COWAN, both mentioned at 17a and 19a in this file. The spelling of WEILENFELDT's name in the Supp. vol. is different, but it is clearly the same man.

Evelyn Bant
E. McBurnet.

B.2.b.
28.2.52.

115.

^{MM 25.52}
B.2. through B.2.b. and B.2.a./Mr. Simkins ^{29/2}

To see serial 113b.

The writer is identical with John QUINN (PF.84,077 attached). This is apparent from the similarity between the handwriting in 113b and that at serials 1a, 2a, 4a and 5a in QUINN's file. QUINN is at present a Secondary School teacher employed by the Glasgow Corporation. He has a Communist record, having joined the Party in 1941. After an active career in the Party, both QUINN and his wife resigned owing to their inability to reconcile the views of the British C.P. and the Soviet Union on the Yugoslav question. In December 1950 they were described by the Chief Constable of Glasgow as Titoists and as such still Communists, though outside the C.P.

It is, I think, worth listing the following possible conclusions

/ which

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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 OCTOBER 2023

[OVER

which amongst others can be drawn from QUINN's letter:-

- a) Either CAIRNCROSS genuinely does not know, or he has forgotten, the identity of the writer of his anonymous letter.
- b) In sounding QUINN on the matter CAIRNCROSS has gone to a person he must have known was a Communist. It is, therefore, possible that he presumes the letter to have been written by a person of Communist sympathies.
- c) QUINN's final paragraph suggests that when he knew CAIRNCROSS he (QUINN) was a Communist. We do not know when QUINN and CAIRNCROSS first knew each other, but it is possibly significant that QUINN did not join the C.P. until 1941 though he could conceivably have held Communist views before this date. *both attended Glasgow University*
- d) Finally, it is conceivable that QUINN's letter is a plant intended to deceive the Security Service. QUINN certainly roundly excuses himself from authorship of the anonymous letter, while CAIRNCROSS is made to appear ignorant of the identity of its writer. On the whole, however, I feel that the theory that QUINN's letter is a plant is improbable.

*is - non taken
a letter which
was in Quinn
and Quinn's
file.*

*inquiry - through
in A.L.O.
CAFJ*

We might eventually consider approaching QUINN to ask him for an account of his association with CAIRNCROSS. It is much too early to do so at the present stage, however, though, subject to your approval, I should like as a preliminary step to ask the Chief Constable of Glasgow to obtain as discreetly as possible a full background history of him, with particular reference to any connections he may have with the CAIRNCROSS family in Glasgow.

A.F. Burbridge
A.F. Burbridge

B.2.a.
28.2.52.

- 28.2.52 B.1.k source report re CAIRNCROSS mentioning [redacted] 115b
- 116.
- 28.2.52. B.2. Note re CAIRNCROSS. 116
- 28.2.52 B.2.b note re extracts from G.C. & C.S. Personal file for CAIRNCROSS 116b
- 28.2.52 B.2.b note re extracts from Treasury personal file for CAIRNCROSS 116c
- 28.2.52 Request to C.4.a for passport papers for Joan and Alexander K. CAIRNCROSS 116d

117.

1.3.52. From H.O. Records re. OPPENHEIM. 117b

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MINUTE SHEET

Reference PF.72493

119.

B.2

CAJ
2/3

Reference minute 115.

Although I agree that (d) is a possible inference to be drawn from QUIN's letter, personally I subscribe to (a), and of course I agree with (b).

If the C.C. Glasgow is to be asked about QUIN and his connection with the CAIRNCROSS family, then I think we should also ask for any information he may have about the brothers John and Alexander CAIRNCROSS while they were at Glasgow University. We had decided earlier not to do this, but it seems to me that, since QUIN's letter gives us the opportunity, we should now do so.

I think we should have a settled policy concerning the restrictions to be placed on filing. I notice, for instance, that a secret cross-reference has been made on PF.84077 (John QUIN) to cover his letter to CAIRNCROSS. Personally, I can see no objection to a copy of the letter going on to this PF. I suggest that the CAIRNCROSS files (PF.72493) should be Y-Boxed but that no further restrictions are necessary.

B.2.b
3.3.52

A.S. Martin

A.S. Martin

120.

3.3.52

B.2.b minute to A.6 enclosing documents at 111a

120a

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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 September 2023.

[OVER

122.

4.3.52. Draft letter for D.B.'s signature re CAIRNCROSS and document filed at 112b (replaced by 124a).

122a

123.

ENCL. 4/3

D.B. through B.2.a./Mr. Simkins

To see the draft requested by D.B. at serial 122a

A.F. Burbidge
A.F. Burbidge

B.2.a.
4.3.52.

124.

4.3.52. To F.O. re action in CAIRNCROSS case.

124a.

4.3.52 Note by B.2.b attached to CAIRNCROSS passport papers.

124b

125.

5.3.52. Copy of Passport particulars for CAIRNCROSS.

125a.

5.3.52 Int. letter from Screenwriters Association

125b

126.

B.2.A

b7/3

You may like to see Serial 125a which is an analysis of the travels of John CAIRNCROSS between August 1932 and May 1942.

I do not think there is anything very valuable to be deduced from this. CAIRNCROSS was a fairly frequent visitor to the continent, but since his subject was Modern Languages and he was a student at the Sorbonne between 1932 and 1934, there is probably nothing remarkable in this.

B.2.b.
6.3.52.

E. McBarnet
E. McBarnet.

Loose Minute

B.2.A./D.S.

Mr Laker has no objection to our retaining
John CAIRNCROSS's passport no 42308, and
return it herewith for you to P.A. in the file.

C.4.A./P.S.J.

P.S. Joyce
17.6.52.

Return of Passport Papers.

The Passport Papers of John CAIRNCROSS and of Alexander Kirkland CAIRNCROSS in the envelope at serial 124b are attached for favour of return to the Passport Office. We would like to retain John CAIRNCROSS' old passport, which would, presumably, be destroyed anyhow on return to the Passport Office, and I would be grateful if you could arrange this with the Passport Office.

The reason for our not returning these papers is recorded in the Note at serial 124b. Laker's curiosity about John CAIRNCROSS no longer matters now that the latter has been fully investigated by us and sacked from the Treasury.

B.2.A.
16.6.52.

D. Stephens
16/6/52

D. Stephens.

ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE

PASSPORT PAPERS FOR JOHN CAIRNCROSS
AND ALEXANDER KIRKLAND CAIRNCROSS.

Returned 16.6.62

47308

BRITISH PASSPORT



UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

MR. J. CARROLL

We Sir John *W. SIMON* Simon
 a Member of His Majesty's Honourable
 Privy Council, Knight *PENCE* Commander of
 the Most Excellent Order of the Star of India
 Knight Commander of the Royal Victorian Order
 Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British
 Empire, a Member of Parliament etc. etc. His
 Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign
 Affairs.

Request and require in the
 Name of His Majesty all those whom
 it may concern to allow the bearer to
 pass freely without let or hindrance
 and to afford *him* every assistance
 and protection of which *he* may
 stand in need.



John Simon

This Passport contains
 32 pages.
 Ce passeport contient
 32 pages.

1
 UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND.
 ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET D'IRLANDE DU NORD.
 PASSPORT.
 PASSEPORT.

2 NOV 1932

No. of PASSPORT } 42308
 No. du PASSEPORT }
 NAME OF BEARER } MR JOHN CAIRNCROSS
 NOM DU TITULAIRE }
 ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE }
 (Maiden name) }
 ACCOMPAGNÉ DE SA FEMME }
 (Née) }
 { and by } children }
 { et de } enfants }

NATIONAL STATUS

NATIONALITÉ

British Subject by Birth

DESCRIPTION
SIGNALEMENT

H.M. Diplomatic Service.

Profession } *Student*
Profession } *Student*

Place and date of birth } *Leamington*

Lieu et date de naissance } *25 July 1913*

Domicile } *Scotland*
Domicile } *Scotland*

Height } *5 ft 9 1/4 in*
Taille } *5 ft 9 1/4 in*

Colour of eyes } *Blue*
Couleur des yeux } *bleu*

Colour of hair } *Auburn*
Couleur de cheveux } *Auburn*

Special peculiarities }
Signes particuliers } */*

CHILDREN - ENFANTS

Name Nom	Date of birth Date de naissance	Sex Sexe



PHOTOGRAPH OF BEARER



WIFE FEMME



John Cairns

SIGNATURE OF WIFE. ET DE SA FEMME.

COUNTRIES FOR WHICH THIS PASSPORT IS VALID.
PAYS POUR LESQUELS CE PASSEPORT EST VALABLE.

Dutch Empire (See Regulations (part 1))

All countries in Europe including

the United Kingdom and Ireland

France and Jersey

France



The validity of this passport expires:

Ce passeport expire le :

18 JULY 1937

unless renewed.

à moins de renouvellement.



Issued at }
delivré à }

date }

date }

RENEWALS
RENOUVELLEMENTS



18. Sep. 1932

This Passport is hereby renewed

Valid until *18 July 1937*

W. N. ...
Chief Passport Officer

OBSERVATIONS.

NOT VALID FOR SPAIN
OR THE SPANISH
ZONE OF MOROCCO.



UNITED KINGDOM
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

VISAS

7 OCT 1932
 UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
 DEPARTURE
 COMMISARIAT SPECIAL DE DIEPPE
 2 - SEP 1934
 COMMISARIAT SPECIAL DE DIEPPE
 4 - OCT 1934
 DEPARTURE
 COMMISARIAT SPECIAL DE DIEPPE
 9 JUN 1934
 DEPARTURE

COMMISSARIAT SPECIAL
 NANTES
 5 - JANV 1934
 13 KAS
 17 MARS
 COMMISSARIAT SPECIAL
 NANTES

COMMISSARIAT SPECIAL
 PORT-BOU
 23 AVR 1935
 ENTRADA
 18 MAI 1935
 IRELAND
 12 AOUT 1935
 ARRIVEE EN IRAN
 12 AOUT 1935
 ARRIVEE EN IRAN
 12 AOUT 1935

COMMISSARIAT SPÉCIAL de DIFPP VISAS
 2 - AOUT 1935
DÉBARQUEMENT

Rmk.: _____
 aus Registermark - Reiseschecke ausgezahlt
 Berlin 13. Aug. 1935
 Deutsche Verkehrs-Kredit-Bank
 Aktiengesellschaft
 Wechselstube Bht. Zoolog. Garten

Rmk.: _____
 aus Registermark-Reiseschecke ausgez.
 Berlin
 Deutsche Verkehrs-Kredit-Bank
 Aktiengesellschaft
 Wechselstube Bht. Zoolog. Garten

RM 100 für die Zeit vom 27 bis 28.9.35
 Berlin, W 56 | aus Registerguthaben gezahlt,
 den 28. Sep. 1935
 Dresdner Bank

Rmk.: _____
 aus Registermark - Reiseschecke ausgezahlt
 Berlin 29. Dez. 1935
 Deutsche Verkehrs-Kredit-Bank
 Aktiengesellschaft
 Wechselstube Bht. Zoolog. Garten

VISAS

RM 25 für die Zeit vom _____ bis Acute
 Berlin W 56 | aus Registerguthaben gezahlt,
 den 13. 1. 36
 Dresdner Bank

UNITED KINGDOM OF IRELAND
 COMMISSARIAT SPÉCIAL DE DIFPP
 28 FEV. 1937
 DÉBARQUEMENT
 No peut occuper aucun emploi.
 15 MAR 1937
 ÉMBAQUEMENT

G 8530
 18 JUN 1937
 Uppvisat vid
 Polisen i Göteborg den
 INRESAN 9 JUL 1937
 Polisen i Göteborg

VISAS

4 - DEC. 1937
COMMISSARIAT SPECIAL DE DIEPPE
EMBARQUEMENT

MARS 1938
DEPARTEMENT

COMMISSARIAT SPECIAL DE DIEPPE
16 JUN 1938
DEBARQUEMENT
COMMISSARIAT SPECIAL DE DIEPPE
29 DEC. 1938
EMBARQUEMENT

Gezien
HOEKVAAL
v.m. - 7 MEI 1938
Politie Departement te
Hoe...

M. van der ...

COMMISSARIAT SPECIAL DE DIEPPE
25 SEP 1937
EMBARQUEMENT

COMMISSARIAT SPECIAL DE DIEPPE
6 - DEC. 1937
EMBARQUEMENT

COMMISSARIAT SPECIAL DE DIEPPE
27 SEP 1937
EMBARQUEMENT

COMMISSARIAT SPECIAL DE DIEPPE
29 JUN 1938
EMBARQUEMENT
13 AVR 1938
EMBARQUEMENT

COMMISSARIAT SPECIAL DE DIEPPE
24 DEC. 1938
DEBARQUEMENT

VISAS

Herr *Herr*

Stichtag *8. Mai 1939*

Name des Reisenden
John Garmore
(Name des Reisenden)

Wohnort *Bentheim*

Der Stichtag kann zum Grenzübertritt bis zum *8. Mai 1939* einschließlich benutzt werden.

Reisepass: *13* Tage vom Grenzübertritt ab
(Einschließlich gerechnet).

8. Mai 1939
Deutsches Konsulat

(Unterschrift)

Deutsches Reich
Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten

Grenzübergang Bentheim
Eingetrost - 8. 5. 39

Grenzübertrittspolizeistempel
13. MAI 1939

VISAS

COMMISSIONAT SPECIAL
 ST-LOUIS (M-RRH)
 25 MAI 1939
 ENTREE

UNITED KINGDOM OF
 GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

VISAS

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

VISAS

AYBW 574 1

Valid for the Single Journey

PASSPORT AND PERMIT OFFICE

EXIT PERMIT No. 229289

Holder is travelling to

FRANCE.

This Permit is valid until

18 MAY 1940

DATE

FOREIGN OFFICE

18 APR 1940

THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID FOR ANY MILITARY ZONE OVERSEAS

CE PASSEPORT N'EST PAS VALABLE POUR AUCUNE ZONE MILITAIRE D'OUTRE-MER

EMBARQUÉ LE 18 AVRIL 1940

VISAS
2 AVR. 1940

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(15)
19 MAY 1940
SOUTHAMPTON

UNITED KINGDOM OF
IRELAND
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

VISAS
LE TITULAIRE NE POURRA
OCCUPER AUCUN EMPLOI EN FRANCE.

Consulat General de France à Londres

VISA d'ENTRÉE
utilisable pour le franchissement
de la frontière
jusqu'au 6 Mai 1940

Valable pour un seul voyage
ALLE: et RETOUR
et un séjour en France
de nuit et un jour

Motif du voyage: pour ses
affaires

Fait à Londres, le 26 Avril 1940
Consul General, p.a.

18 MAY 1940
SPECIAL
LONDON

AFFAIRES
ÉTRANGÈRES
GRATIS

AUTORISATION DU B.O.M.G. DU
18 SEPTEMBRE 1940

PA on Lt Cairncross

126A



John Cairncross Esq.,
16 Lansdowne Court,
Lansdowne Crescent,
London, W.11.

5 - MAR 1952

G 9070 H

By for
Hson
Screenwriter

Book

See
L.N.

1258

The SCREENWRITERS ASSOCIATION

Affiliated to the Society of Authors

7 DEANERY STREET, PARK LANE, LONDON, W.1 · GROSVENOR 1514

President:
FRANK LAUNDER

29th February, 1952.

Vice Presidents:
J. B. WILLIAMS

Hon. Secretary:
T. J. MORRISON

John Cairncross Esq.,
16 Lansdowne Court,
Lansdowne Crescent,
London, W.11.

Hon. Treasurer:
MARJORIE DEANS

Executive Committee:
BRIDGET BOLAND
ROGER BURFORD
JACK DAVIES
SIDNEY GILLIAT
DUDLEY LESLIE
AUDREY LINDOP
W. F. LIPSCOMB
ALEXANDER MACKENDRICK
MICHAEL PERTWEE
GORDON WELLESLEY
JACK WHITTINGHAM
WOLFGANG WILHELM

Dear Mr. Cairncross,

This is to inform you officially that at the last Meeting of the Associate Branch Executive Committee you were unanimously elected an Associate Member of the Screenwriters Association.

Associate Members:
IAN STUART BLACK
ELIZABETH DAVIES
BERNARD MCNABB

Secretary
ANN PAGET

You have already received our Receipt No. 1947 for your subscription of £1.1s.0d. for 1952, but I enclose herewith a Bankers' Order form in case you should wish to pay future subscriptions in this way. For your information, all subscriptions fall due on the 1st January of each year.

Council:
ERIC AMBLER
BEVERLY BAXTER, M.P.
MAY-GENE IAN MAY BEITH
SIDNEY BERNSTEIN
BRIDGET BOLAND
T. E. B. CLARKE, O.B.E.
JACK DAVIES
DORIS DAVISON
CAMPBELL DIXON
THE LORD CORSELL
ALAN GROGAN
MARGARET KENNEDY
ANTHONY KIMMINS
DUDLEY LESLIE
ROGER MACDOUGALL
ANGUS MACPHAIL
MILES MALLESON
GUY MORGAN
MICHAEL PERTWEE
EMERIC PRESSBURGER
D. KILHAM ROBERTS
PAUL ROTH
MONTAGU SLATER
E. P. SMITH, M.P.
G. B. STERN
WOLFGANG WILHELM

I also enclose copies of the Minutes of the last Annual General Meeting of the Screenwriters Association and the February 1952 Associate Branch Bulletin.

Yours sincerely,

Ann Paget
Secretary.

Legal Advisers:
RUBINSTEIN, MASH & CO.

Copy in of 779. Bal/10
3/4/52

6 9070 H

1257

Passport No. 42308. John CAIRNCROSS. Issued by Foreign Office on
18.7.32 valid until 18.7.37. Renewed 18.9.37 valid until 18.7.42.

28.8.32.	Einreise.	Passau Donaulände.
18.9.32.		Ehrwald (Austria).
3.10.32.	Sortie.	Pont du Rhin.
6.10.32.	Entrée.	Pont du Rhin.
1.12.32.	Embarquement.	Dieppe.
4.12.32.	Debarquement.	? (France).
6.1.33.	Debarquement.	Dieppe.
15.7.33.	Einreise.	Passau Donaulände.
5.1.34.	Debarquement.	Boulogne sur Mer.
29.6.34.	Embarquement.	Dieppe.
2.9.34.	Debarquement.	Dieppe.
2.10.34.	Embarquement.	Dieppe.
17.3.35.	Debarquement.	Dieppe.
26.3.35.	Entrada.	Port-Bon (Spain).
19.4. (?35).	Entrée en France.	Frontier . . . ?
23.4.35.	Embarquement.	Dieppe.
2.8.35.	Debarquement.	Dieppe.
13.8.35.	(Entry stamp to Germany).	Aachen.
13.8.35)	On all these	
15.8.35)	dates subject	
28.9.35)	changed Traveller's	
29.12.35)	cheques for	
13.1.36)	Reichsmach in Berlin.	
28.2.37.	Debarquement.	Dieppe.
15.3.37.	Embarquement.	Dieppe.
18.6.37.	Inresan.	Göteborg.
3.7.37.	?	Göteborg.
25.9.37.	Debarquement.	Dieppe.
27.9.37.	Embarquement.	Dieppe.
6.12.37.	Embarquement.	Dieppe.
29.3.38.	Debarquement.	? (France).
13.4.38.	Embarquement.	Dieppe.
16.6.38.	Debarquement.	Dieppe.
29.6.38.	Embarquement.	? (France).
15.8.38.	Embarquement.	Dieppe.
30.10. (?38)	Ausreise.	Passau (Austria).
24.12.38.	Debarquement.	Dieppe.
29.12.38.	Embarquement.	Dieppe.
7.5.39.	? (Dutch)	Hoek van Holland.
8.5.39.	Entry visa for Germany issued	
		at Rotterdam.
8.5.39.	?	Grenzübergang, Bentheim.
13.5.39.	? (German)	Brenner-Bahn.
13.5.39.	Entrata.	Brennero Ferrovia.
25.5.39.	Uscita.	Domodossola Ferrovia.
25.5.39.	Entrée.	St. Louis (Mt. Rhin).
26.5.39.		Brigue (Suisse).
18.4.40.	Exit permit for France valid	
	until 18.5.40 issued	Foreign Office, London.
26.4.40.	Entry visa for France valid	
	until 6.5.40 issued in	London.
27.4.40.	Embarked.	Newhaven.
28.4.40.	Debarquement.	Dieppe.
18.5.40.	Embarquement.	Le Havre.
19.5.40.	Immigration Office	Southampton.

B.2.b.
5.3.52.

24/5/39
6.3.

124c.

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

124b


NOTE

I spoke to D.B. this morning concerning the return of the old passport belonging to John CAIRNCROSS, pointing out that it would almost certainly be destroyed by the Passport Office as soon as they received it.

D.B. suggested that the Passport Office should be asked whether we could retain permanently this passport and accordingly I spoke to Mr. Joce/C.4.a. Joce told me that his contact at the Passport (Mr. Lahee) was obviously interested in our request for this particular passport since he had expressed interest when the passport was first requested. In Joce's view this probably means that he was aware of CAIRNCROSS's employment. I therefore agreed with Joce that it was probably better not to arouse his interest further by asking for permanent retention of the passport at this stage. It was agreed that in about a month's time, when the case becomes clearer, we should refer to Lahee again but that meanwhile the passport should remain in our possession. It has therefore been filed in the attached envelope.

B.2.b
4.3.52

A.S. Martin
A.S. Martin



TOP SECRET

PF.72493/D.B.

4th March 1952.

Dear *Carey*,

You will remember discussing the case of John CAIRNCROSS with Arthur Martin on the 26th February, with particular reference to a document found amongst the effects of Guy BURGESS. We are satisfied, as a result of our mutual enquiries, that the author of the document was CAIRNCROSS.

Although we do not propose at present to take any action which might prejudice our investigation of CAIRNCROSS, we have been looking into the legal position presented by the character of the document and its discovery amongst BURGESS' property, with a view to determining whether any offence has been committed under the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts. Legal opinion here is that it would be necessary in any prosecution to show that the information collected or communicated by CAIRNCROSS in the document "is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy". Evidence would have to be given on this point.

We should be grateful if you would give your attention to this latter problem and consider whether an official from the Foreign Office could so testify in open court.⁺ Perhaps we could discuss this matter when I visit the Foreign Office tomorrow afternoon.

Yours *Sincerely,*

D.G. WHITE

D.G.White.

G.A.Carey Foster Esq.,
D.F.C., A.F.C.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

⁺should it ever prove necessary.

TOP SECRET

124
TOP SECRET

PF.72493/D.B.

4th March 1952.

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Yours *Sincerely*,

D.G. WHITE

D.G.White.

G.A.Carey Foster Esq.,
D.F.C., A.F.C.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

⁺should it ever prove necessary.

TOP SECRET

✓

When replying—address **OUTSIDE** envelope to:—

Box 500, PARLIAMENT STREET B.O., LONDON, S.W.1.

and **NOT** to any individual.

Lord Galbo... etc.

Telephone Nos.
REGENT 6050.
WHITEHALL 6789.

Telegraphic Address
SNUFFBOX, LONDON.



BOX No. 500,
PARLIAMENT STREET B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

TOP SECRET

Our Ref.: PF.72493/D.B.

4th March 1952.

Your Ref.:

Dear Carey,

You will remember discussing the case of John CAIRNCROSS with Arthur Martin on the 26th February, with particular reference to a document found amongst the effects of Guy BURGESS. We are satisfied, as a result of our mutual enquiries, that the author of the document was CAIRNCROSS.

Although we do not propose at present to take any action which might prejudice our investigation of CAIRNCROSS, we have been looking into the legal position presented by the character of the document and its discovery amongst BURGESS' property, with a view to determining whether any offence has been committed under the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts. Legal opinion here is that it would be necessary in any prosecution to show that the information collected or communicated by CAIRNCROSS in the document "is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy". Evidence would have to be given on this point.

We should be grateful if you would give your attention to this latter problem and consider whether an official from the Foreign Office could so testify in open court⁺. Perhaps we could discuss this matter when I visit the Foreign Office tomorrow afternoon.

Yours ever,

G.A. Carey Foster Esq.,
D.F.C., A.F.C.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

Dick.

⁺should this ever become necessary.

TOP SECRET

121a .

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

120a

PF.72493

A.i / Mr. Hedger.

Can you say whether - leaving aside the possibility of deliberate forgery - there is any doubt that the two enclosed examples of handwriting came from the same hand. Personally, I have no doubts in the matter but I would like your expert
op.

B.2.b
3.3.52

Am
A.S. Martin

✓
1326/1124
3312

Acst/cld
119d

COPY

Mr. Cairncross has been my pupil in German for two years, during which time I have seen a good deal of him, and have had ample opportunity of judging of his character and ability, without being especially intimate with him. I consider him a very able man indeed - even better than his academic record would suggest - with wide and varied interests, well-read, and possessed of an excellent faculty of assimilating and valuing what he has read and done. He has strong opinions, which he is not afraid to express, and I daresay some people might find him a little too definite in his views; but I do not think any serious criticism can be put forward on this score. I think he would do very well in the service which he seeks to enter. I should perhaps mention that he has taken a very prominent part in encouraging serious modern humanities' studies among the men, having more or less founded and run the "Modern Languages Club"; and that I should say he does possess very fair powers of leading and influencing other people.

(Sgd.)

[Redacted signature]

[Redacted line]

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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 September 2023

118a.

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

Request for Information regarding Aliens from Home Office Records

117B

0137

Our Reference PF 72493 Section B2b/ASM H.O. Reference ~~445094~~
(if known)

1. Surname OPPENHEIM Christian Names Gabrielle Susanna

2. Address(es)

3. Born 23.4.1914 at Frankfurt Germany Sex Female

*4. Nationality German by birth British by naturalisation At Birth German

5. Occupation

6. Passport Number

N.R. No. AMA 9705052 E. McBarnet Date 26.2.52

Nat. Cert. No. AZ. 19028 issued London 12.8.46 Signature

N.B. Use a separate form for each name. *Only Aliens are recorded.

To R.1. for Representative at H.O.

Please supply (tick information required):

HOME OFFICE FILE. Household depository

PERSONAL PARTICULARS

Information lacking in 1—6 above, or if different from that in 1—6 above.

LOCATION AND REGISTRATION PARTICULARS

Latest Registered Address

Registration District..... Serial No.....

A.P.R.C. Number..... ENCL

MOVEMENTS

Date and particulars of latest arrival in U.K.

Arrived at on from

Landing Conditions.....

Forwarding Address.....

Date and particulars of latest departure from U.K.

Departed from on to

From Address.....

Particulars of arrivals and departures between and

Continue overleaf if necessary

To B2b/ASM

Filing Date

Returned by Representative at H.O.

Signature D. E. Brophy Date 25.2.52

29/2/52
6-3-52

117a.

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

116e

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

C.4.a / Mr. Joce.

I am very anxious to see any old passports and/or passport papers which may exist in respect of the following two men:

John CAIRNCROSS.

British. Born 25.7.1913 at
Lesmahagow, Lanarkshire.


Alexander Kirkland
CAIRNCROSS.

British. Born 11.2.1911 at
Lesmahagow, Lanarkshire.

I do not need to see the application forms dated 30.3.50 (John CAIRNCROSS) and 1.2.49 (Alexander CAIRNCROSS) for the passports which they currently hold as these have already been seen.

I would be grateful if you would treat this as a matter of urgency.

B.2.b
28.2.52


E. Mcbarnet.

✓
B 24/11/52
3302

NOTE

On 26th February 1952 I called on Mr. R.C. Griffiths, the Establishment Officer at the Treasury, and explained to him that we were re-examining the case of John CAIRNCROSS and that I would like to obtain from him the fullest possible particulars of his career in the Treasury. Mr. Griffiths then ran through CAIRNCROSS's personal file with me, from which I compiled the following notes:

Actually joined in Oct-1936

April 1936.

Joined public service (Foreign Office). His application form to the Civil Service Commissioners contained the following information:

Address - Helens Lea, Lesmahagow, Lanarkshire. His father, Alexander Kirkland CAIRNCROSS, was described as a merchant. In addition to the details of his education which are already on the file, it was recorded that his college tutor was Mr. A.H.J. KNIGHT, Lecturer in German at Cambridge University. I extracted from the file a report written by Mr. KNIGHT which is attached to this note. It was also recorded that CAIRNCROSS from 1934 - 1936 was the representative of his college at the French Society, Cambridge, and that he was the founder and chairman of the Modern Languages Club, Cambridge, in 1936. His referees were - Rev. R.R. LINDSAY, Ph.D.,
The Manse, Lesmahagow;
and Dr. Edward GLOVER,
18 Wimpole Street, W.1.

July 1938.

Negotiations began between the Foreign Office and the Treasury for the transfer of CAIRNCROSS to the Treasury.

1st October 1938.

Joined Treasury. His address at this time was - 76, Warwick Square, S.W.1 (telephone Victoria 2873).

23rd September 1940. Appointed Private Secretary to Lord Hankey.

5th March 1942.

Left the private office of Lord Hankey, with whom he had served while the latter held the posts of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Paymaster General. A note from Lord Hankey recording good services CAIRNCROSS had rendered to him was on the file.

March 1942.

While awaiting a permanent posting, CAIRNCROSS was lent to the Ministerial Committee on Reconstruction Problems.

11th May 1942.

Enlisted in H.M. Forces.

13th May 1942.

Address - 15, Oaklands Terrace, Bedford. At this time his bankers were Barclays Bank Ltd., Churton Street, S.W.1.

1st June 1942.

Address - 28 Alexandra Road, Bedford.

10th September 1942. Address - 409, Keyes House, Dolphin Square.

23rd October 1942. Address - 76 Stratford Road, Wolverton, Bucks.

B26/MAN
37 82

May 1943. Address - 16, Lansdowne Court, Lansdowne Crescent, W.

11th May 1942 -
31st May 1943. Throughout this period CAIRNCROSS was employed at G.C. & C.S., Bletchley Park. From May until September 1942 he was paid from Army Funds (M.I.8). From September 1942 until May 1943 he was paid from Foreign Office Funds.

31st May 1943. Released from G.C. & C.S.

1st June 1943. His pay was transferred from the Foreign Office vote to the Treasury vote.

14th June 1943. Joined Section V of S.I.S.

March 1945. His work in Section V of S.I.S. was described as, "Analysis, collation and circulation of Intelligence reports, particularly those dealing with Germany".

21st June 1945. Released from Section V of S.I.S. and returned to Treasury.

June 1943 -
June 1945. CAIRNCROSS worked in Section V throughout this period although he received his pay from the Treasury. It was only after strong representation from the Treasury that S.I.S. agreed to release CAIRNCROSS.

June 1945. Began work in Defence Material Division of the Treasury.

Summer 1947. Address - 16 Lansdowne Court, Lansdowne Crescent, W. Leave address given as - Hotel Scribe, Paris.

June 1947. Transferred within the Treasury to the branch dealing with questions of Service personnel.

16th June 1947. Wrote to the Establishment Branch of the Treasury asking them to accept his resignation with effect from 30th September 1947, in order to take up "several interesting offers from outside concerns which would take me abroad". As a result of this letter CAIRNCROSS was interviewed and persuaded to retract. It was clear from the interview that CAIRNCROSS was dissatisfied with the progress he had made in the Treasury (he was still a Principle), and the file makes it equally clear that the Treasury were dissatisfied with his work.

3rd March 1948. CAIRNCROSS again wrote to the Establishments Branch offering his resignation to take effect from 8th May 1948. He explained that he was resigning in order to take up an appointment with Courtaulds. It is recorded on the file that this time the Treasury were prepared to accept his resignation.

4th March 1948. CAIRNCROSS again wrote to the Establishments Branch asking that his resignation should be postponed for a further week.

- 12th(?) March 1948. CAIRNCROSS again wrote to the Establishments Branch to say that a hitch had occurred in his negotiations with Courtaulds and that he wished to postpone his resignation yet again until August 1948.
- 25th March 1948. In a letter signed by George Courtauld, Courtaulds Ltd. explained to the Establishments Branch of the Treasury that their decision not to employ CAIRNCROSS was due to a change in the nature of the job, and not to any deficiency in CAIRNCROSS himself. The writer explained that he was anxious that CAIRNCROSS should not suffer as a result of their change of plans.
- August 1948. Nothing further transpired in connection with CAIRNCROSS's request to resign in that month and the Treasury did not themselves raise the issue.
- January 1949. CAIRNCROSS was interviewed at his own request by the Establishments Branch of the Treasury when he asked for an internal posting, preferably to a job which would involve International affairs. He explained that he had no present intention of resigning.
- January 1950. Appointed U.K. representative on Western Union and N.A.T.O. Finance and Economic Committee. It was explained to CAIRNCROSS before he took up this appointment that it would give him the opportunity for promotion.
- August 1950. Transferred to Exchange Control Division of the Treasury. It is recorded on his file that this posting was the result of his having failed to make the grade in his previous appointment. His successor was promoted to Assistant Secretary on appointment.
- 1st May 1951. Transferred to Ministry of Supply.
- December 1951. Transferred back to the Treasury. Since his return to the Treasury CAIRNCROSS has been at work for one day only. The rest of the time he has been on sick leave and doctor's certificates are still being received weekly saying that he is suffering from jaundice.

B.2.b
28.2.52

A.S. Martin
A.S. Martin

116b

NOTE

On 27th February 1952 I examined the personal file for John CAIRNCROSS covering his service with G.C. & C.S. at Bletchley Park. His file records:

11th May 1942.

Joined G.C. & C.S. His application form described his civil employment as private secretary to Sir William Jowett and Lord Hankey.

It gave his next of kin as -

Dr. A.K. CAIRNCROSS (brother),
21 Warwick Square, S.W.1.

It gave his bankers as Barclays Bank Ltd.,
Churton Street, S.W.1.

15th July 1942.

Transferred to Foreign Service. This entry in fact means that his pay was taken over by the Foreign Office, but no other entries appear on his G.C. & C.S. file to cover his subsequent employment at Bletchley Park.

B.2.b
28.2.52

A.S. Martin
A.S. Martin

PF. 72,493. P18

Historical
file copy 9126
116

Copy to B.2.A.
" " B.2.B.

CAIRNCROSS CASE.

Objective:

The final objective in this case is to interrogate CAIRNCROSS and obtain a confession.

The question as to whether CAIRNCROSS, given the necessary evidence, is to be prosecuted, will be decided later.

B.2.A Responsibility:

The preparation of the interrogator's brief, and the final putting together of all information and evidence substantiating the case against CAIRNCROSS, will be the responsibility of the B.2.A case officer. This case officer will be Mr. Burbidge, who will keep B.2.A (Mr. Simkins) and B.2 closely informed at all stages.

B.2.B Contribution:

B.2.B will be responsible for research into CAIRNCROSS's past where they are specially qualified for this research by specialised knowledge of contemporary espionage. B.2.B. will pass the results of all such research to B.2.A as being the B.2.B contribution to the current investigation, and in particular to the interrogator's brief and to any eventual prosecution.

Use of Files:

It will be necessary for B.2.A and B.2.B to arrange the timing of their work in such a way that the files in the case can be made available to either Section when required.

B.2.
28.2.52.


J. G. Robertson.

✓ B2b/Beau
1/3/52

SECRET

1156

Part 1.

Section and Officer of origin B.1.K/CTY Report No. Gen.A/2558 Report Date 28.2.52.Action copy to B.2.B/ASM. Information copy to.....

REPORT

Please refer to report No. Gen.A/2001 of 2.1.52 regarding CAIRNCROSS.

As requested I have caused the source of the information in paragraph 1 of the report to be asked again if he could dredge his memory regarding CAIRNCROSS.

He said that he could go no further than to say that, while at Cambridge, CAIRNCROSS had pronounced left-wing views. He could not say that CAIRNCROSS was a member of the Communist Party, nor could he say whether he was a Communist. His impression was that these pronounced left-wing views were not particularly deep-seated and he thought that it was a passing phase out of which CAIRNCROSS would grow.

CTY/MRA.

Part II.

COMMENTS BY SECTION OF ORIGIN

[redacted] is perfectly willing to be seen but, in the opinion of the intermediary, it would be profitless as [redacted] has produced really all he knows about CAIRNCROSS. My source told me that [redacted] said that he was under the impression that CAIRNCROSS had been in Hut 3* during the war. He did not seem very certain of this so it would seem likely that they did not see much of each other in those days.

* i.e. G.C.C.S. Bletchley Park.

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ACT 1958 SEPTEMBER 2023

Part III.

COMMENTS BY CONSUMER SECTION

(Value, interest, probability, extent to which confirmed by other sources, etc.)

Thank you. I agree that an interview with [redacted] would be profitless.

A.S. Martin

B2b

3.3.52.

ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE

27 FEB 1952

R.



J. Cairncross, Esq.,
Ham Manor Golf Club,
Angering, Sussex.



6. LANDS COURT 10
LANDS CRESCENT

W. 11.

(Label)

Handwritten scribble
22/v

5 8568 A

P.A.

Tel. No.: WHItball 1234.



Your Reference

Treasury
Reference



TREASURY CHAMBERS,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON, S.W.1.

23rd February, 1952

Dear Cairncross,

I am going to be a nuisance to you. We have now received a medical certificate dated 8th February which you sent to Mrs. Johnstone. This does not, however, state that you have been ill for any particular period.

You have been away from the office since the 19th December, I gather, first on annual leave, then presumably on sick leave.

We should like to know when your sick leave began, and to have supporting medical evidence of this. The normal rules require a medical certificate each week, unless the illness is of a very long duration. While we do not adhere to this rule very strictly it is essential that we should have a certificate or certificates covering the period of sick absence. I should be glad if you could let us have one drawn in that form.

Although as a Civil Servant you do not actually draw sick benefit but draw full pay, full pay is notionally abated by the amount of sick benefit that is due to you and such benefit is exempt from Income Tax, in your case, at the standard rate. Tax relief amounts to a substantial sum, but unless we get precise dates properly certificated we cannot ask the Accountant to make the necessary adjustment in your pay. This is an added reason why you should be punctilious in these matters.

/I am

J. Cairncross, Esq.,
Ham Manor Golf Club,
Angmering, Sussex.

Signed by JUPE of

5 8568 A

Treasury

I am sorry you have been ill but glad to hear that you
are hoping to return to work soon. Jaundice is a nasty ailment.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

J. B. [unclear]

5 8568 A

113a

✓ B26/B
28/2/52.

F/S
to

writer

for [redacted] APPB

[Handwritten signature]



BRITISH INDUSTRIAL
16 MAY 1952
LONDON & BIRMINGHAM



John Cameron Esq.,
16, Lansdowne Court,
~~to~~
Lansdowne Crescent,
London. W. 11.

4 8030 W

25 FEB 1952 19 FEB 1952

5 Torbreck St.,
Glasgow. S.W.2.
18/2/52.

Dear John, I'm sorry to have delayed
a few days answering your letter.
My wife was suffering from a
bad attack of influenza which
kept me very busy when I
came in from work.

While I hope that you clear
up this matter of an anonymous
letter which seems to be causing
you some difficulty I'm surprised
that you ask me if I sent it.
Surely you know that I've never
had any reason to write to you
anonymously either in 1938 or at
any other time. Actually I was
in Germany in 1938, but I was
not in Holland. So it was

not I who wrote the letter.

I may add that my political opinions are now very different from what they once were. We live and learn.

Best wishes

yours sincerely,
John Quinn

[Faint handwritten notes, possibly "John Quinn" and "1892"]

TOP SECRET

1126

NO MINUTES TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS JACKET
BRANCH MEMORANDA (B.M.) COVER

UNREGISTERED

Reference Number of Originating Branch.	Subject.
FF. 72493/B.2.	John <u>CAIRNCROSS.</u>

If this number is quoted in correspondence sent outside the War Office, "M.I.5" must not be appended nor any reference made to M.I.5.

NOTES ON THE USE OF BRANCH MEMORANDA.
(See paragraphs 160—165 Office Instructions, 1943)

- The existence and movement of a B.M., unlike those of a registered file, are NOT recorded by Registry.
- B.Ms. may ONLY be used as :—
 - ENCLOSURE B.Ms.—For action on letters or other important papers when the appropriate registered file is not available. When it is essential for a branch to obtain quickly the views of a number of other branches, and these branches are not likely to need to refer to the file in order to formulate their views, it is often appropriate to send "Enclosure B.Ms." simultaneously to each such branch. Enclosure B.Ms., or the substance of them, must be enclosed in the registered file at the first opportunity.
 - INTERNAL DISCUSSION B.Ms.—For "domestic" records or discussions within a directorate, etc. ; or for other preliminary soundings on any questions which may or may not at a later stage require a registered file.
 - COVERS FOR UNIMPORTANT LETTERS, ETC.—B.M. covers may be used when a jacket is essential for unregistered correspondence unlikely to involve much inter-branch discussion.
- If a B.M. has, or acquires, any general importance, the branch concerned should link the B.M. to a registered file at the earliest possible moment in one of the following ways :—
 - By sending the complete B.M. to be registered and thus raised to the status of a registered file :
 - By transferring the B.M. as an enclosure to a registered file.
- The branch originating a B.M. must be informed, if the B.M. is registered, or inserted in a registered file, by another branch.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
S.L.B. B2	26.2.52. 27/2				

TOP SECRET

MINUTE SHEET

Reference PF.72493
(CAIRNCROSS)

H 87/11/11

S/L.F.

I should be grateful for your opinion as soon as possible on the legal position in the following case.

The enclosed photostat is of a document found among BURGESS's property. The original document is in the possession of B.2.b.

From internal evidence the document must have been written early in 1939.

As you will see, the document consists of notes of conversations on current international affairs and British foreign policy with a number of named Government officials.

In considering the document, it should be recalled that Goronwy REES (our sole source of positive evidence as to BURGESS's espionage before the war) has told us that BURGESS asked him to collect information from persons who, by reason of their position, possessed inside information about matters of state, and to pass this information to him (BURGESS) for onward transmission to "a secret branch of the Comintern". It will be seen that the author of the enclosed document was apparently doing precisely the same thing.

On 25.2.52, we established beyond doubt that the hand-writing of the document is identical with the hand-writing in 1939 of John CAIRNCROSS, now an official in the Treasury, who in 1939 was also employed in that department, having from 1936 to 1938 been a junior Foreign Office official in the same department as Donald MACLEAN. In addition, Colville of the Foreign Office (see Page 2 of document) has confirmed by reference to his diary that he met CAIRNCROSS on the relevant date in 1939, and may well have had a conversation with him in the sense reported by the author of the document.

Pitblado (Page 11 of document) has confirmed Colville's recollection.

There would appear therefore to be no doubt that CAIRNCROSS was operating as a spy, with BURGESS as intermediary, in 1939. It is not improbable that he continued to spy for considerably longer. He is known to have been in contact with MACLEAN a few weeks before the disappearance of the latter.

The fact of the contact between MACLEAN and CAIRNCROSS in 1951 was learned from examination of MACLEAN's diary. This led to an investigation of CAIRNCROSS which produced no evidence of current espionage, and in view of CAIRNCROSS's employment at that time in the Ministry of Supply, the case was transferred to B.1.e., who kept the Ministries concerned informed of our doubts as to CAIRNCROSS's reliability. The up-shot was that CAIRNCROSS was moved from the Ministry of Supply, ostensibly on the ground of his incompetence, back to the Treasury in December 1951. It is not considered that he has access to important secret information in his present position.

In the course of these recent B.2.^B and B.1.e. enquiries, CAIRNCROSS was twice interviewed by officers of this Service. ~~It is significant that he denied acquaintanceship with BURGESS.~~

more than casual

Investigation by B.2.a. of CAIRNCROSS's current activities and contacts will now be intensified. B.2.b. will be collecting all possible information about his past, with the particular objective of establishing (a) that he was a Communist in his University days (Glasgow and Cambridge) and (b) that he was acquainted with BURGESS, especially


/over...

[OVER

Amended
27.2.52

at the time when the enclosed document was written. The ultimate objective will be to interrogate CAIRNCROSS, in the hope of obtaining a confession which can be used as a basis for prosecution.

Meanwhile I should be grateful for your urgent observations on the prosecution aspects of the case, and in particular your view as to whether CAIRNCROSS's authorship of the enclosed document, together with the fact that the document was found among the property of BURGESS, constitutes evidence of an offence under the Official Secrets Acts. If your opinion is that no such evidence exists at this stage, I should then be glad of your advice as to the manner in which the B.2 investigation should be conducted, with a view to obtaining the necessary further evidence.


J. C. Robertson.

B.2.
26.2.52.

DB. To see. May we discuss, please?
B.2. JCR 27/2

1. I have considered your Minute and have had the advantage of a discussion with you this afternoon, amplifying in some respects certain aspects of the case.
2. John CAIRNCROSS at the time when the manuscript in question was written, was an official of the Treasury, having previously been employed at the Foreign Office. The fact that this manuscript was found in the possession of BURGESS does not amount to legal evidence that CAIRNCROSS communicated this information to BURGESS. He may in fact have communicated it to an intermediary who in turn passed it to BURGESS. The document does not therefore constitute evidence which would justify a prosecution under Section 2(1)(a), for communicating information acquired in the course of his employment to a person other than a person to whom he was authorised to communicate it.
3. I assume, however, that the evidence of a handwriting expert can, if necessary, show that the handwriting of the manuscript is identical with that of John CAIRNCROSS, and that therefore CAIRNCROSS was the author of the manuscript.
4. I think it can be said that the text of the manuscript represents information which he obtained in 1939 owing to his position as a person who held office under His Majesty, or in the alternative that such information had been entrusted to him in confidence by a person holding office under His Majesty. If this view is right, then the manuscript is a document within the meaning of Section 2 of the Official Secrets Acts, and the fact that it was found in the possession of BURGESS is conclusive evidence to support a charge under Section 2(1)(c), that CAIRNCROSS failed to take

Handwritten initials: HSD/ld

MINUTE SHEET

Reference.....

reasonable care of, or so conducted himself as to endanger the safety of the document. This offence is, however, only a misdemeanour, and the maximum penalty on conviction on indictment is imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or on conviction under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or to a fine not exceeding £50, or both such imprisonment and fine.

5. As the case stands today, in my opinion there is no evidence available to support a charge of espionage under Section 1 of the Official Secrets Acts. I explained to you in conference precisely what had to be proved to support a charge under that Section, and we agreed that you were not in a position to produce such evidence. In my view we should proceed with our enquiries with a view to proving whether or not CAIRNCROSS was a Communist during his University days, and whether or not he was then acquainted with BURGESS. It would greatly assist the case if we could establish that CAIRNCROSS knew BURGESS in 1939. Once this additional information has been collected I think we should then submit the case to the Director of Public Prosecutions, with a view to his advising -

See amendment to previous minute.

- (i) whether the manuscript itself is sufficient evidence to institute proceedings against CAIRNCROSS under the provisions of Section 2(1)(c). If the answer to this is "Yes", then -
- (ii) whether the Director will agree to the ports being circularised with a view to CAIRNCROSS being arrested without a warrant, should he attempt to leave the country.

6. The Director's views should also be sought as to the method of interrogating CAIRNCROSS. It would be undesirable, in my view, to undertake any interrogation without the Director's advice, as it would be unwise to prejudice this minor right of prosecution in case in the last resort we wish to avail ourselves of the very minor offence. In my view it is possible to carry out an interrogation of CAIRNCROSS and still preserve our right to prosecute him for failing to take reasonable care of the document. Any such interrogation would in any event be likely to produce evidence for other charges under Section 2. For example, he might admit giving the document to BURGESS, when he could be charged with communicating the information contrary to the provisions of Section 2(1)(a).

7. Although in my view sufficient evidence is available to constitute a technical offence as indicated above, these events happened in 1939 and unless there be present strong grounds of public policy the Attorney-General would not authorise any such prosecution. That is one of the reasons why I think it necessary to make enquiries with a view to establishing that CAIRNCROSS had a Communist background.

8. It might well be that if CAIRNCROSS was interrogated he may make a confession or a voluntary statement which would be sufficient to justify a prosecution against him for espionage under Section 1 of the Acts. It is a

condition precedent, however, for any prosecution under that Section that the information collected or communicated is information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy. Evidence has to be given on this point and in this case it would seem that the official witness would have to be some official from the Foreign Office. It might be advisable, therefore, at this stage to obtain advice from the Foreign Office as to whether their official witness could so testify in open Court.

S.L.B.
26.2.52.

B. A. Hill
B.A. Hill.

12th Conversation Junior.

Hyam

Ady Special

Secretary to Stanhope - mildly anti-Chamberlain. Just after invasion of C.S.

Italy was putting out feelers for a rapprochement with Britain. Various high-up Fascists had (obviously as part of a preconceived plan) told Embassy staff that Axis was an ephemeral creation and that they hoped Britain would not include Italy in her statistics on the invasion of C.S. For O. was apparently fairly hopeful that influence of Pope and King of Italy would keep Mussolini out of a war.

Chamberlain was very firm in Cabinet on pushing through a policy of checking Germany.

[My informant] thought that as a result of the publication of ultimatum to Roumania, small nations distrusted us. { I'm not clear on this point }

which was either not true or several weeks old.

2 - Conversation

Colville - Eastern Dept,
Junior FO man. Sincere
Chamberlainite.

A few days after invasion of C.S.

Halifax had impounded out of
all recognition and was thought
even by anti Chamberlain faction
in FO to be the only man with
brains in the Cabinet. He was
quite a probable successor to
C.

Chamberlain was really
very disappointed at the invasion of
C.S. but he said that he
was sure that when Hitler gave
him the assurance that he would
not demand further territory
he was sincere. My informant
sincerely thought Hitler would
stop after Munich and fully
approved C's public policy.

Britain's military
situation

2)

situation had improved very considerably since Munich according to a report by the Chief of Staff.

The Romanians had positively received an ultimatum three weeks before the publication of the news in English newspapers. and Tillea had informed the British Govt that this ultimatum had been delivered. He then received official instructions to deny the ultimatum but after doing so assured the FO personally that he was sure the ultimatum had been delivered.

3 - Conversation. Fairly serious FO anti-

8/18/48
Straight

Central

Dypt. Chamberlainite (on 5th)
Explet on Poland.

Said Hitler had been
intoxicated by W. and
might go off the deep end at
any moment. A further
incident (on the Polish border)
would be sufficient to provoke
war. Poles hated the Russians
but he thought they were now
beginning to see the necessity
of accepting Russian help
- even though the fence was now
coming off. As far as he had
read in the draft of the
Beck conversations there had
been no mention of a pledge
to assist Britain by Poland
[I don't think this is very
significant, but the lack
anticipation of no pledge is
certainly strange].

3)

On the evening of the 1st he said there was no change in the situation:

↳ Conversation to with 1st.

on 6th A.P. afternoon:

We were still putting our feelers to Hedy. In his opinion Hedy was simply trying to quell our suspicions [This is obviously the case]

He thought the press report of the Berle conversation (re mutual pledge) was quite correct and that the Poles and the UK got meant business. There were no snags behind the agreement. Poland was, he thought, prepared to accept arms etc from Russia but the other small nations such as Yugoslavia were rather stand

Russia was rather stand offish
and had been rude to FO three days ago.
The small nations, too, didn't
want to commit themselves
(except Turkey, which was
quite clear and definite about
the support it would give
Britain) but he thought they
would join in on Britain's
side if once their existence
was threatened.

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situation as definitely better.

Halifax was talking
a much more independent
line, not against Chamberlain
but elaborating the ^{news} ~~situation~~
put forward by C and
giving a practical shape to
them.

Stanhope was really
an efficient First Lord. He
was an abstemious
man

4)

but had probably had a glass of wine. He had seen a telegram from Berlin saying it had been rumored that Hitler might try and knock out the British fleet by a surprise blow, but in any case instructions to the Navy ~~had~~ to hold themselves in readiness had been issued some time back. The words that Stanhope or the Admiralty couldn't understand were "Before I left the lady".

He had merely wanted to say that the Navy was prepared for all eventualities but had chosen a bad way of saying it.

For.

5 Conversations
Roberts
Central.

Junior FO official
Chamberlainite. Sometime
after CS mission
argued that it was very
difficult to bring in Russia
as Rumanians and Poles
hated the Russians even
more than they hated Germans.
Public opinion in Britain
was now sided behind
Chamberlain.

If he had intervened
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Germany would have
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that country was completely
defeated would have turned
round and offered to make
peace — which we could
hardly have resisted
agreeing to.

Agreed that Chamberlain's
methods

5

and reasoning were unsatisfactory
but not his policy.

FO had known that
there would be trouble about
CJ beforehand but not that
there would be an invasion.

It was probably only a
last minute decision on
Hitler's part.

There had been good
reason for optimism.
Dunde talks with Germany
were proceeding nicely, and
no trouble was coming from
Italy (whence it had been
expected). This view was
shared by 2.

Burdley
Southern

6th Conversation

Junior FO official - anti
Hitler morning. Chamberlain
Thought Halifax was
imposing

Chamberlain's volte face was sheer opportunism. He realized the advantage to be gained from it, but had been carried rather further than he had wished by pressure of public opinion.

During the period immediately preceding the giving of the pledge to Poland, that country had been seriously threatened.

Jebb (Cadozan's private secretary) had put up recently a proposal that we should again make a definite approach to Italy, but Cadozan had buried the plan down.

Vansittart had learned from sources of his own that CS would be invaded, but Halifax had rejected this information. Vansittart had ~~just~~ had a brusque discussion with Halifax after the invasion.
The Poles

6
Poles were very difficult
people to deal with, but he
thought they would ultimately
take up a sensible attitude,
nevertheless he sympathized
with Dele's difficulties (but
not with Dele as a person). The
Poles were so anti Communist that
cooperation with Russia was almost
out of the question.

7th Conversation

Pitblado Junior D.O. Official,
Very shrewd, and cynical
Chamberlainite.

Italy was the cardinal
factor in situation, if she
could be bought off and kept
neutral, our situation would be
very much easier in a war.

Russia was playing
a waiting game, as usual
— but he didn't see what she
had to gain by supporting
Poland. Poles ~~would~~ would
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have no objection to pact
between Russia and England,
so that if war broke out
Russia would be technically
at war with Germany and
her active entry into the war
would be facilitated.

If Poles were actually
attacked, they might quickly
be brought to accept Russian
help even in the form of troops.

He thought both the
Poles and Chamberlain
were sincere in their desire to
oppose Germany and back
each other up.

The present agreement
with Poland represented an
additional reason for Hitler
declaring war, to prevent
the anti German forces growing
stronger. He might therefore
(a) attack Poland, and thus
try to

2) represent the French and British
action as ~~the~~ ^{an} invasion of Germany
or (b) stage a knockout blow
at the British fleet or on land
in which case his own public
opinion could not be worked up
so easily.

On the other hand, he
might be so impressed by
the opposition to his designs
that he would hold off.

Hankey Junior PO. Chamberlainite.
Central D.P.

Chamberlain's ~~reaction~~ change
of front due to slowness of
reaction in an old man
(i.e. change from Parliamentary
speech to Birmingham speech)
SIS had reported that
there were rumors of an
impending

impending coup in CS but
that FO had not believed
them [Said his father had
started by having implicit
faith in SIS but had gradually
become more sceptical and
now thought most of their
reports were thought up for
political reasons] In any
case no action could be
taken on these rumours
however probable. [This
amounts to saying that
FO knew but willfully
disbelieved reports]

This is untrue
Reverse the
case. Missions
subject to
political bias

Thought Russia ought
not to be brought in
now. ~~fact~~ as this would
scare off little nations
such as Yugoslavia.

Was convinced now
that Germany must be
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Berlin Embassy reports, i.e.
present reports represented
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other countries (This is a complete
change from previous (Henderson)
attitude; i.e. that once Hitler
got Sudetenland, he would
not undertake further aggression)

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Junior Special at WO

Thought Germany
would try to wear down
Poland. Stage a major
war before August, as he
was not quite ready at
present.

WO had knowledge
intention to invade, on
Saturday before...

112a

NOTE

I

The attached document recording various conversations with Government officials was found among the possessions of Guy BURGESS (PF.604529) after his disappearance. From the context the conversations would appear to have taken place immediately after the German invasion of Czechoslovakia (i.e. March/April 1939).

After consultation with Mr. Carey-Foster (Foreign Office) it was agreed that this document should be shown to Mr. John COLVILLE, the subject of the second conversation, who is now employed at No.10 Downing Street. By consulting his diary for 1939 Mr. COLVILLE discovered that he lunched with Mr. John CAIRNCROSS on 14th March 1939. After further consultation with this office Mr. COLVILLE was allowed to consult another officer in the Prime Minister's private office, Mr. PITBLADO, who is the subject of one of the later recorded conversations. Mr. PITBLADO confirmed that he too remembered conversations he had had with CAIRNCROSS at about this period.

By comparison of the handwritings, it has been established that the writer of this document was indeed John CAIRNCROSS. A letter written by CAIRNCROSS to the Foreign Office dated 5th December 1939 has been extracted from his Foreign Office personal file and a photostat copy is attached. II

A further photostat copy of the document is filed at Item 6 in PF.604529/SUPP.B.

Mr. Carey-Foster informed me that neither COLVILLE nor PITBLADO had any further useful information concerning CAIRNCROSS to impart. However, COLVILLE will be told that the document he has seen was written by CAIRNCROSS and he will be encouraged to give us any further information he may recollect.

B.2.b
26.2.52

A.S. Martin
A.S. Martin

112

112a

PF. 724.93

I. Attachment to B.2.b note of 26.2.52

(Item 6 in PF.604,529/SUPP.B.)

(Original at 111a)

ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE

12th Conversation ^{Junior.} Secretary to Stanhope - mildly

anti-Chamberlain.
In Hyam Special - Just after invasion of C.S.

Italy was putting out feelers for a rapprochement with Britain. Various high-up Fascists had (obviously as part of a preconceived plan) told Embassy staff that Axis was an ephemeral creation and that they hoped Britain would not include Italy in her statistics on the invasion of C.S. F.O. was apparently fairly hopeful that influence of Pope and King of Italy would keep Mussolini out of a war.

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which was either not true several weeks old.

2 - Conversation Colville Eastern Dept,
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Halifax had implored out of
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29
3 - Conversation. Fairly senior FO anti-
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[I don't think this is very
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3). On the evening of the 6th he said there was no change in the situation:

4th Conversation to with 1st.

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Russia was rather stand offish
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The small nations, too, didn't
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Central D.H.

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112a

PF. 72493

II. Attachment to B.2.b note of 26.2.52.

(Letter to Foreign Office dated 5th December 1939)

(Original at 111a)
Letter to FCO only

ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE

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In any reply
please quote Regd. No.



Cairncross

TREASURY CHAMBERS,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.
(Tel: WHITEHALL 1234.)

5/12/59

INDEXED

Dear Wallet,

✓ Very many thanks
for your letter, communicating
to me the FO's decision
about my suggested transfer.

I quite appreciate
their inability to ask the
Treasury to have me back,
and indeed the conversation
in which you explained the
position to me fully
prepared me for their
refusal.

As I mentioned to
you at the time, I am quite
happy in my present position
and

and, in approaching you as
I did, I was concerned solely
with the long term prospects
in my career, and ~~also~~ in
the desirability of my working,
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in that Dept where I could
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the C. & C. School.

May I add that I
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for the sympathetic and
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handled the whole matter
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application considered.
Yours ever, J. Cairness.



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111a

NOTE

Attached are originals of documents referred to in B.2.b's note of 26th February 1952. (Item 6 in PF.604529/SUPP.B - BURGESS and Letter extracted from CAIRNCROSS's Foreign Office file dated 5th December 1939).

x serial 112a

B.2.b
26.2.52

Copy at 112a
held in FO. only

Note
Original documents removed from their envelope and returned to BURGESS property. Item 6.

John R. Bunch

D-1
19/6/62



B26/1121
27252

11/a

Attachment to B2b Note of 26.2.52

ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS

(Item 6 in PF.604529/SUPP.B - BURGESS
and Letter extracted from CAIRNCROSS's
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26.2.52

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