

PF 72,493

V14

PF

72,493

V14

C A I R N C ~~R O S S~~, JOHN

FILE CLOSED

TRAY No.

S Form 924A rev 10.74

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date

S. 960 Edn2

PF 72,493

V14

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554.

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19.2.64. Extract from note of D.G.'s discussion with Home Secretary. 556a.

19.2.64. Brief for Prime Minister by Sir Burke Trend 556b

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20.2.64. Note prepared for D.G. 558a

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20.2.64. From Foreign Office with attachment 560a

561.

20.2.64. Note for file 561a

20.2.64. Note for file 561b

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 *September 2023*

562.

21.2.64. Telegram to Washington 562a

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25.2.64. D.G. letter to Cabinet Office 570a

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27.2.64. To D.G. from Foreign Office 575a

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579.

28.2.64. To S.L.O Washington with enclosure 579a

580

28.2.64. Note for file

580a

28.2.64. From Cabinet Office to No.10 with record of meeting.

580b

581

28.2.64. Tel. to Washington

581a

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581b

582

2.3.64. To Cabinet Office

582a

583.

3.3.64. Note re telephone call from G.C.H.Q.

583a

4.3.64. From SLO Washington ack. 566a.

583ab

5.3.64. D.G. note with attachments

583b

5.3.64. Note by D re CAIRNCROSS's cousin

583c

584

D.
D1/KCS 613

Please see attached to the inside of this file a summary which it is suggested is now sent to SLO Washington for the F.B.I.

All AS7's account of his second interview with CAIRNCROSS is also enclosed.

Joan Russell King.
J. Russell King.

D.1.
6.3.64.

585

7.3.64. Note for file

585a

- 5.3.64. Telegram from WASHINGTON. 586. 586a.
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- .3.64. From British Embassy, Washington 590. 590a
- .3.64. Copy letter from Cabinet Office w. submission to P.M. 590b
- 10.3.64. From Washington 591. 591a
- 10.3.64. Copy letter from H.O. to P.M's office. 592. 592a
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594.

10.3.64. Note of D.G.'s conversation with Sir B. Burrows.

594a

10.3.64. Copy of note re Alexander CAIRNCROSS

595.

11.3.64. To SLO Washington re 'C's visit.

595a

596.

11.3.64. From SLO Washington ref. 587a.

596a

11.3.64. Note by D.G. re Miss KIRK WILSON

596b

597.

11.3.64. Copy letter from F.O. to Cabinet ref. 590b.

597a

12.3.64. Note by D

597b

598

*D. 13/3
D/G Sec*

To see latest papers, just received from

D/G Sec

[Signature]

13/3/64

D

599.

19.3.64. From SLO Washington re Foreign Agents Registration.

599a

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ACT 1958

	600.	
23.3.64.	From H.C.M. Stone, Washington.	600a.
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1.4.64.	To H.C.M. Stone, Washington.	602a.
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24.4.64.	From H.C.M. Stone, Washington	610a
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27.4.64.	Extract from interview between A.S. Martin and BLUNT	610c
		610d

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 ACT 1958 *September 2023*

611.

29.4.64. From S.L.O. WASHINGTON.
1.5.64. Ext. from interview with Sir Anthony BLUNT
7.5.64. Extract from D1 interview report.

611ao 611a
611b

612.

Note,
Mr Hamblin was brought up to date
about this case before leaving for the
U.S. tomorrow

D

[Signature]
19/5/64

20.5.64. Ext. from transcript of interview between Mr. Martin & Sir A. BLUNT
ment. CAIRNCROSS.

612b.

613.

21.5.64. From S.L.O. WASHINGTON.

613a.

614.

29.5.64. Note for file

614a

615

4.6.64. From S.L.O. Washington

615a

616.

8.6.64. Minute from D.1. re 615a

616a

617

D.C. *Recd. 9/6*

D1's note at 616 A. answers your comment
on 615 A. I think we can only await

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LORDS
APR 1988

Further news from S.O. Washington

D

[Signature]
8/6/64

FILE CLOSED

616A

D. *Handwritten in* 5816

-615A

I really have no comment on this except to say that the F.B.I. always recognised that CAIRNCROSS would have to pass through an I.N.S. check. Although they cannot control the actions of I.N.S. they seemed confident when I was there that, providing CAIRNCROSS was frank, he would probably be accepted. I think we must now await events. I feel confident that the Bureau will warn the S.L.O. if any drastic action by I.N.S. is contemplated.

A.S. Martin

D.1.

A.S. Martin

8.6.64.

Re 65
25/1/64

AD
8/6

TOP SECRET



615

Our Ref: PF.735.
Your Ref: PF.72,493.

British Embassy,
Washington 8, D.C.

2nd June, 1964.

Rec. 4-6-64

Handwritten initials and scribbles

Dear *Director General* *Am commi on has 2?*

Derek Hamblen saw CAIRNCROSS as arranged and found him co-operative but very shifty. He will be reporting fully about this but, in the meantime, I thought you would like to know that CAIRNCROSS has planned to go to Italy this Summer, leaving Cleveland at the end of June and returning on the 5th September to fulfil his three-year contract with the University. He says that his wife has a good job in Italy and therefore may not wish to return to America with him.

2. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service also plan to interview CAIRNCROSS this week. I do not think this will revive the deportation question but there is now, I imagine, a possibility that they will wish to refuse him re-entry. I will continue to persuade the Bureau to influence Immigration to take no action against CAIRNCROSS, because a refusal of re-entry would also entail some risk of publicity.

Yours

Handwritten signature: H. C. M. Stone

H. C. M. Stone.

Sir Roger H. Hollis, C.B., O.B.E.,
HEAD OFFICE.

TOP SECRET

614a

NOTE

After discussion with ~~D.1.~~ and D.1/Inv, I saw Superintendent Bill Kelly, R.C.M.P. before he left London for Canada today, when I put him appropriately in the picture in regard to the case of John CAIRNCROSS, adding that we wished knowledge of this case to be confined for the present to the Commissioner, Bordeleau, himself and Higgitt, and assuring him that as soon as any aspect emerged directly touching Canadian interests we would inform the R.C.M.P.

I accented the importance of the R.C.M.P. maintaining absolute discretion as regards the F.B.I.'s co-operation.

We spoke in this context of accountancy for KAGO's 'Ring of Five'.

Kelly expressed his gratitude to us for bringing him up to date in this matter.

I subsequently informed D1

D.

M.E.D. Cumming

29th May 1964

*12/185
27/164
D1/165
4/16*

TOP SECRET



613a

Our Ref: PF.735.
Your Ref: PF.72,493/D.1/EMcB.

British Embassy,
Washington 8, D.C.

To: Head Office. (Attention: Miss E. McBarnet.)

John CAIRNCROSS.

PF 72493

Please refer to Mr. Stone's letter dated 28th April, 1964.

2. The photographs enclosed with your letter dated 28th February 1964 were shown to John CAIRNCROSS and he was unable to identify these with any of his former Soviet principals.

3. After examining photograph No. 24 (Ivan Ilyich BARABANOV), enclosed with your letter of 1st April, CAIRNCROSS stated that the photograph of this individual which appeared in the "Daily Herald" resembled, in stature and build, one of his principals who contacted him during the period 1945 to 1951. After viewing other photographs of BARABANOV, however, CAIRNCROSS stated definitely that he was not one of his Soviet principals.

ENCL

21 MAY 1964

TO: DI 2515.
REF: PF 72493.

Vols 13 onwards held R3
20th May, 1964. (S.L.O. Washington absent on tour.)
Mr. Noble →

TOP SECRET

PF 75
22/7/64
R/13

28/20/01

TOP SECRET

612b

Original at serial 364b in PF 604,582

Extract for PF 72,493 - CAIRNCROSS

Extract from Transcription of Interview between D.1/A.S. Martin and Sir Anthony BLUNT on Wednesday, 20th May, 1964.

M Yes. Anything more about Guy's (?) during that time? What about John CAIRNCROSS in all this?

B Well I never saw him at all.

M No. Did Guy never talk about him after the war?

B Remind me where he was and what he was doing after the war? Was he back in the Treasury?

M I think he was back in the Treasury. He was back in the Treasury immediately after the war, then he went to the Ministry of Supply. I don't think there was anything in between.

B Was he mainly in contact through Guy, or was he directly in contact?

M He was certainly directly in contact during the war and after the war. What he told me was that after the war his job was so dreary, I mean dreary from his point of view and also from their's, that he thought they began to get tired of him, that is to say his own heart was no longer in it although he was frightened to break off, but the sort of stuff he was producing, so he said, was so dull that the meetings began to spin themselves out.

B Yes. Yes. I remember that Guy did see him a certain amount and - I'm right in thinking am I not that among Guy's papers there was found a report?

M Yes.

B Well, was that done during the war?

M That was pre-war.

B Oh pre-war?

M Pre-war or early war, yes.

B And he kept it?

M Yes. It wasn't just one - there were seven or eight.

B From him?

M Yes.

B God!

M They weren't signed.

B No. Internal evidence?

M Handwriting.

TOP SECRET

2/16/64 ghy. 6116

Extract for PF 72,493 - CAIRNCROSS

Original at serial 360a in PF 604,582 - BLUNT

Extract from D.1./A.S. Martin's interview with Professor BLUNT at 18 Chandos Court, Caxton Street, S.W.1. on Friday, 1 May 1964, ment. John CAIRNCROSS

.....

11. I noted a few points in our conversation which I believe are reported but which, for safety's sake, I will mention here:

- (a) BLUNT said that he had talent-spotted John CAIRNCROSS but had not recruited him. He had given CAIRNCROSS' name to BURGESS who had told him that the recruitment would be made by someone else. BLUNT had always understood that it was BURGESS who had made the recruitment and therefore was surprised when I had told him that it had been made by KLUGMAN.

.....

D.1.
7.5.64.

(signed) A.S. Martin

TOP SECRET

6/1/65
16/11

Original at serial 360z in PF 604,582

Extract from Transcription of Interview between D.1/Mr A.S. Martin and Sir Anthony BLUNT on Friday, 1st May, 1964 at 18 Chandos Court, Caxton Street, S.W.1.

M Ah, now CAIRNCROSS then resulted from your talent spotting?
B Resulted from my talent spotting, but I didn't do the recruiting.
M No. I hadn't realised that.
B Oh I'm sorry.
M This is new to me.
B Oh is it?
M He didn't realise this.
B Oh he didn't?
M No. You see he said that it was KLUGMAN.
B Yes. Well, I think I can throw a little light on this. I -
M No - I hadn't realised this.
B (May I just tell you that?) was that - this I hadn't remember about and this was one of the documents I did tear up out of Guy's - er out of his flat, not out of the other thing. It's

TOP SECRET

1/8/65
12.3.65

TOP SECRET

- 19 -

B (cont) appalling what Guy kept. (Very quiet)

M I wonder why he did it.

B Yes. I don't know at all. The psychology of Guy is something we could talk about later. (Slow and pensive). No what happened in this particular case was John CAIRNCROSS wasn't a pupil of mine because he again I think was back at Cambridge for a year working for the Civil Service. But he lived on my staircase - he was reading Modern Languages which was, technically, my subject and I think I'd probably known him before. Anyhow I got to know him and liked him - I thought he was very intelligent, obviously very left-wing and, I imagine was a local(?) Party member - I don't remember.

M He said not.

B He said not - well, I don't know. Anyhow he was so obviously -

M Yes. No, I think he was telling the truth - he said he'd never actually joined the Party -

B Yes, well that may well be.

M - there it is.

B And Guy presumably had gone through the same process and got the same response - investigated him. And Guy came down - and of course it was the easiest thing in the world just to happen to meet John CAIRNCROSS on the stairs. And they met.

M Yes.

B But, by pure chance - and this I think is why John CAIRNCROSS didn't connect me with it at all - they met on a train going up to London on a Monday morning.

M You mean John ~~and~~ -?

B John and Guy.

M And Guy? Yes.

B And I remember Guy discussing these things, with the greatest reluctance of course - "he will think it is entirely due to this."

M (Laughs) Yes. But where does KLUGMAN come into it then?

B At this stage, not at all.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 20 -

M This was just Guy saying -

B -must have gone - as I say, I didn't know KLUGMAN did come into it. This was complete news to me. And whether - what is quite possible, of course, is that George may then have thought "Let's keep Guy out of this". After all, and particularly if John CAIRNCROSS was not a firm Party member.

M Yes.

B There might have been certain danger.

M Yes. Well now, I can see one reason for danger because he was going into the Foreign Service and Donald was already there.

B Oh, he was definitely going into the Foreign Service, was he?

M Well he did.

B Yes. But he was presumably just taking the Civil Service -?

M Yes - I suppose he was. But in fact, of course, the two of them served in Western Department together.

B They did?

M Yes.

B I've always - I get confused about this - I entirely associate John CAIRNCROSS with the Treasury.

M Yes, but he started with the Foreign Service.

B He started with the Foreign Service? I didn't know that.

M Yes.

B But as regards heading - you see, after all if you went in for the Civil Service exam, you put down your order of preference. And you might end up in the Scottish Office.

M Yes. Well he passed out top.

B Yes, yes. Well, of course -

M - and went into the Foreign Service.

B Now among the letters I destroyed was one - shows how naive I was ever to have written it - saying "Dear Guy, delighted you're coming down for the weekend. I will arrange for John CAIRNCROSS to come in for a drink and of course make it quite clear that this was not planned"

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 21 -

M Now did Guy himself know that CAIRNCROSS had been recruited?

B Yes.

M He did? He knew that without any doubt?

B Oh certainly. And was in contact with him. Wasn't he?

M Well - I don't remember John CAIRNCROSS telling me that -

B Well I may be wrong -

M KLUGMAN sticks in my mind from what he said and I thought he was put straight in touch with a Russian and thereafter worked direct - there was no intermediary.

B Well my reason for saying this is something Skardon told me I think (laughter). No, I do remember this, Skardon on one of the occasions suddenly said "do you know John CAIRNCROSS?" and then he told me roughly the following story - a long document -

M (interrupting) Ah yes, of course, this is perfectly true.

B That is right isn't it?

M Yes, yes.

B And that was found in Guy's place -

M This must be right he must have told you -

B And therefore at that stage they must have been in contact -

M Yes, you are quite right. But you and Guy didn't discuss CAIRNCROSS again except that, I suppose, that it was accepted that he was -?

B It was accepted that he was recruited and whether we discussed him again or not - I don't know. I should have thought we probably did but I don't know in what sense. I wasn't involved with CAIRNCROSS any further at all, but my guess would be that Guy occasionally said - CAIRNCROSS was an unhappy rather tortured character and I should have thought Guy occasionally said "John's in a terrible state".

M Well this was much too difficult for him.

B He is really all right now?

M Oh as far as I can tell he's all right now. If you say that you are

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 22 -

M (cont) thankful -

B Yes.

M Then he was overwhelmingly so.

SECRET



G/1a.

Our Ref: PF.735. British Embassy,
Your Ref: PF.72,493/D.1/EMcB. Washington 8, D.C.

28th April, 1964.

Dear *Hedlyn,*

Please refer to your letter dated
22nd April, 1964.

2. For some reason or other the photographs
enclosed with your first letter (of 28th February)
were not, in fact, shown to CAIRNCROSS. They will
be as soon as possible.

Yours *lun*

ENCL _____
SL 29 APR 1964 *DI 3/4*
TO: _____
REF: *PF. 72,493*

[Handwritten signature]

H. C. M. Stone.

Held RS

Miss E. McBarnet, M.B.E.,
HEAD OFFICE.

SECRET

[Handwritten notes: RS, DI, 115/64]

TOP SECRET

Hester 9/d

610c

Reference..PF..72493.....

Extract from PF. 604,582 Vol. 6. Ser. 355c dated 27.4.64

- Report on interview with Sir Anthony BLUNT ment. CAIRNCROSS

Date of interview 25.4.64

.....

7. We debated the merits of various candidates for the fifth place. I suggested KLUGMAN. BLUNT said that KLUGMAN certainly knew that BURGESS was a spy but he doubted if he knew the others. In any case KLUGMAN had remained an open Communist.

.....

9. I suggested CAIRNCROSS. BLUNT said that BURGESS had recruited CAIRNCROSS and had told him so but he doubted if he had told MACLEAN and PHILBY. In any case CAIRNCROSS had never been a member of their circle. I confirmed that CAIRNCROSS had not known about PHILBY and MACLEAN and had only guessed about BLUNT. I also corrected the statement that BURGESS had recruited CAIRNCROSS pointing out that it was KLUGMAN who had done so. This surprised BLUNT.

.....

Handwritten:
L.R.F.
22/7/64
D/K/S

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

610b

S. Form 81B 8m 3.64

PF. 604,558 (MACLEAN) EXTRACT

PF. 604,584 (PHILBY)

Extract for File No. PF. 72,493 (CAIRNCROSS) Name:

Original in File No.: * PF. 604,582 Vol.: 6 Serial: 355b Receipt Date: 27.4.64

Original from: D.I. Report Under Ref.: D.I./ASM Dated: 27.4.64

Extracted on: 2.7.64 by: JAR Section: D.I.

Extract from report on interview with Sir Anthony BLUNT which took place on 23rd April, 1964. ment. MACLEAN, PHILBY and CAIRNCROSS.

.....

8. BLUNT came to London in 1937 to become a member of the Warburg Institute. He was in regular touch with BURGESS and knew that the latter was working for the Russians. He knew too (because BURGESS had told him in Cambridge) that Donald MACLEAN and Kim PHILBY were in the conspiracy. He was aware (again because BURGESS had told him) that John CAIRNCROSS had been recruited but was not part of BURGESS' network. He himself contributed little because he was not able to do so. He was, as he told us originally, "BURGESS' respectable friend" who assisted at parties and generally gave support. All he could remember of BURGESS' activities at this time was that he moved around in respectable political circles (hence his effort to join the Conservative Central Office) and in not-so-respectable Fascist circles (e.g. the Dean of S.E. Europe and Jack Macnamara, M.P.).

.....

*If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner

TOP SECRET

Handwritten notes: 22/7/64, D.I. 217

TOP SECRET

HS 11 90

610a



Our Ref: PF.735.
Your Ref: PF.72,493/D.G.

British Embassy,
Washington 8, D.C.

22nd April, 1964.

Rec: 24-4-64

*27/4
Di... 30/4
let us have a word - then discuss with DG -
as soon as you are ready
* 6/29/4*

Dear Director General

Recd. 24/4

When I was with Al Belmont yesterday he told me how much Hoover would like to have CAIRNCROSS deported if only he could get him to the United Kingdom. Hoover is aware of the difficulties over this, but in any event Belmont is, of course, most anxious that nothing should be done to upset us and our present useful co-operation with CAIRNCROSS. He has advised Hoover accordingly and I do not think we need worry that the Boss will allow his possibly gnawing thoughts about CAIRNCROSS to goad him into action against this wretched confessed spy.

Yours

lun
H. C. M. Stone

H. C. M. Stone.

Sir Roger H. Hollis, C.B., O.B.E.,
HEAD OFFICE.

* I spoke to DG today, says I did not see that any action was required. He agreed. He was anxious that TOP SECRET Hamblin should know of the importance attached by the PH to the CAIRNCROSS visit never returning to the UK

Note
I informed Hamblin of this today, prior to his (post-prime) visit next week (see 603A)

13/5
27/64

24/51

13/5/64



TOP SECRET
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

609a

MA

American Embassy
Grosvenor Square
London, W. 1, England
April 21, 1964

Rec. D. 22/4/64

No. 11567-65-1161

RE: JOHN CAIRNCROSS
PF 72,493/D.1

Dear Evelyn:

There is enclosed a memorandum dated April 13, 1964, and a newspaper clipping dated April 12, which appeared in the Cleveland "Plain Dealer".

It is thought this might be of interest to you.

Sincerely,

Charles

Charles W. Bates
Legal Attache

Miss Evelyn McBarnet
Leconfield House

Enclosures: (2)

TOP SECRET

RLS
22/7/64
D/187
23/4



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

65-3308

Cleveland, Ohio
April 13, 1964

JOHN CAIRNCROSS

An article appeared in the April 12, 1964, issue of the "Cleveland Plain Dealer" a local daily newspaper, Cleveland, Ohio, entitled, "New WRU Professor Details Thais' Way of Life." This article states that Professor JOHN CAIRNCROSS, newly appointed chairman of the department of romance languages, Western Reserve University (WRU), Cleveland, Ohio, spent three years in Thailand with a United Nations team. He was chief editor for the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).

Since then he spent a year at Pakistan with the Harvard (University) Advisory Group, a private organization technical assistance.

CAIRNCROSS in this article discussed Asia and its problems pointing out that the Pakistanis are making a determined efforts to develop their country which when split from India had no industry or administration.

He described the Vietnamese as a key people, extremely able and hard working; but warned that if the Communists win in Viet Nam the Thais might have second thoughts about sticking closely to the West.

CAIRNCROSS went on to state that Thailand is a go-ahead country where industry is developing and a middle class is beginning to emerge but the Thais, with their undefined border in Laos, would be in an impossible position if the United States had to withdraw from Viet Nam. The Peace Corps, he felt, though "Not where the big effort goes," is a good thing because of the contact between the young people of the countries involved.

RE: JOHN CAIRNCROSS

This article concluded by stating that CAIRNCROSS plans to stay at WU for three years where he is working at his hobby, French literature. CAIRNCROSS plans to write concerning the French feminist movement and 17th century Thailand. CAIRNCROSS does not exclude the possibility of sometime going back to Thailand.

JOHN CAIRNCROSS appeared on Cleveland Television Station WJW's program, "Opinion" from 11:30 to 12:00 noon on April 12, 1964. CAIRNCROSS' topic of discussion was "Southeast Asia." This program was moderated by ROGER GOODRICH, a WJW commentator and announcer who asked CAIRNCROSS questions regarding his opinion as to Southeast Asia.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

New WRU Professor Details Thais' Way of Life

By JOHN LUDWIGSON

Outside the windows of Western Reserve University's Mather building it was a typical Cleveland spring day—cold and drippy.

Inside, palm trees swayed and soft breezes blew as WRU's newest department chairman described his previous job.

"Of course the climate is hot and humid," the professor was saying, "but the Thais have an extraordinarily satisfying way of life."

Prof. John Cairncross, newly appointed chairman of the department of romance languages, spent three years in Thailand.

"IT'S A LAND of smiles," he said. "They grow the best rice. They have a stable government and they've been a faithful ally of the United States."

The sandy-haired Scot was stationed in Bangkok, the capital, with a United Nations team. He was chief editor for the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).

Since then he spent a year in Pakistan with the Harvard (University) Advisory Group, a private organization for technical assistance.

MUCH OF HIS LIFE, in fact, has been lived far from his native town of



John Cairncross
Plain Dealer Photo (Marvin M. Greene)

Lesmahagow, in Lanarkshire, Scotland. Cairncross has worked as a correspondent for the "London Economist," with the British Civil Service and later with Italconsult, an Italian development firm.

"The Italians have the great art of living in the present," he observed warmly. "That's true even more of the Asians who value especially the human factor."

Asia, however, has its problems—mostly economic—the new professor explained.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

A18 The Plain Dealer

Date: 4-12-64
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:

Character: JOHN CAIRNCROSS
or
Classification: ESP-R
Submitting Office: C.V.

ENCLOSURE

THE PAKISTANIS, for example, "are making a determined effort to develop their country but they started from scratch."

When Pakistan split off from India it had no industry, no administration, not even a capital.

"It's been a great achievement just to get the country going," Cairncross said.

Not money, but administration, is the shortest resource in these countries, he added.

"Many deplorable features of the Ngo Dinh Diem administration in Viet Nam left the United States bearing the main burden," he noted.

The new Vietnamese rulers are a "national regime," he continued, more representative of the people and traditions of the country.

"THE VIETNAMESE are a key people, extremely hard working." They have never forgiven the Chinese for 1,000 years of domination in the past.

"If the Communists win in Viet Nam," he said, "the Thais might have second thoughts about sticking closely by the West.

"Thailand is really a go-ahead country. Industry is developing, a middle class is beginning to emerge."

But the Thais, with their undefined border on Laos, would be in an impossible position if the United States had to withdraw from Viet Nam, he pointed out.

A "HUMAN SOLUTION," not just a technical one is needed, Cairncross concluded. The Peace Corps,

he felt, though "not where the big effort goes," is a good thing because of the contact between the young people of the countries involved.

"An underdeveloped nation has an underdeveloped approach to things. All foreigners, not just Americans, have difficulty adjusting to that. Even the most intelligent Americans tend to think in terms of dollars, but they forget that the people don't earn dollars."

A foreigner living in an Asian community can cause a severe disruption of the local economy by simply

spending money at his "normal" level, Cairncross said.

HE, AT LEAST, won't have to worry about the problem for three years. During that time he plans to stay at WRU, where, he happily noted, he gets paid for working at his hobby—French literature.

As Prof. Cairncross he plans a series of essays on the French feminist movement, the legend of Don Juan and the connections between Europe and Thailand in the 17th century.

"But," he said—and you could see the lure of "the

land of smiles" working on him—"I might go back. I don't exclude the possibility at all."

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

608a

PF 72,493/D.1/EMcB

22nd April, 1964.


Dear

Thank you for your letter of 13 April. I quite agree that the expeditious way in which CAIRNCROSS's case is being handled is due to it being channelled through you and I think it is far better that we should continue in this way.

2. Would you please refer to your letter of 15 April (signed by Eileen Noble in your absence). I am not quite clear whether this constitutes a reply to my minute of 28 February enclosing photographs numbers 7 - 21 as well as to my minute of 1 April enclosing photographs 22 - 25. Could you let me know about this. We have had no indication that photographs 7 - 21 have been shown to CAIRNCROSS.

3. I wonder if the Bureau could be a little more explicit about the photographs numbered 24 as the copy of the press cutting with its caption did seem to tally with CAIRNCROSS's description of the photograph he saw in the press, see the note of Arthur Martin's second interview with CAIRNCROSS on Sunday, 1 March 1964, paragraph 9.

Yours



E. McBarnet

H.C.M. Stone, Esq.,
British Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

EM cB/JG

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

PK/LS
22/4/64

copied to PF 68,705 **TOP SECRET**
MILOVZOROV

607A

(omitting CAIRNCROSS'
name)



Our Ref: PF.735.
Your Ref: PF.72,493/D.1/EMcB.

British Embassy,
Washington 8, D.C.

ENCL

16 APR 1964

To: Head Office. (Attention: Miss E. McBarnet).

TO:

REF

DI
PF 72,493

John CAIRNCROSS.

held R5

DI 3/4

Please refer to your minute dated 1st April, 1964.

2. The photographs enclosed with your minute were shown to CAIRNCROSS. He said that the face of Yuri Dmitrievich MILOVZOROV (No. 25) is vaguely familiar and it is possible that this may have been his principal previously described as having a "military bearing". This individual, according to CAIRNCROSS, contacted him in the period around 1943.

3. CAIRNCROSS was unable to make any further identifications.

John H. Noble

15th April, 1964.

(S.L.O. Washington absent on tour.)

TOP SECRET

Handwritten notes at bottom right corner, including "KCS" and "4/17/64".

SECRET

606A



Our Ref: PF.735.
Your Ref: PF.72,493/D.1/EMcB.

British Embassy,
Washington 8, D.C.

13th April, 1964.

V 13. crutt

ENCL - noted R5

SK 14 APR 1964

TO: DI
PF. 72,493

DI 3/4

Dear *Overlym,*

Thank you for your letter dated 6th April.

I have discussed Charlie's suggestion with the Bureau, who say that if subject was an American in England they would normally channel correspondence through his office. In reverse then, they suggest that your briefs in this case (copies to Charlie) should be channelled through me. No-one has strong feelings about this, but the Bureau point out that if some of the matters Arthur and I had been able to discuss with them in an hour or so had been handled by correspondence through their LEGATT office in London, there would have been so much greater delay in getting results.

Yours

hmc
Stone

H. C. M. Stone.

Miss E. McBarnet, M.B.E.,
HEAD OFFICE.

SECRET

per R5
22/7/64
01/02
20/11

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

605a

PF. 72,493/D.1./EMcB.

6th April, 1964.


Dear

John CAIRNCROSS

I should be very glad to have your views on the following problem. Charlie Bates has suggested that the proper channel for future briefs to the Bureau for interrogating CAIRNCROSS is through him rather than through you. He declares that he has no strong feelings in the matter but is merely suggesting that things should now be put on the right lines.

2. Would you let me know how you feel about this. We have promised to let Charlie have copies of any future briefs and I think this would satisfy him, if you would prefer things to continue as before.

Yours


E. McBarnet.

H.C.M. Stone, Esq.,
British Embassy, WASHINGTON, TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

Handwritten notes:
RHS
22/7/64
21/64
6/2/64

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

604a


PF. 72,493/D.1./EMcB.

6th April, 1964.

Dear

With reference to our conversation last week in Arthur Martin's room, I am enclosing copies of four briefs which I have sent to America for CAIRNCROSS, and a copy of Arthur's note of his second interview with CAIRNCROSS.

Yours


E. McBarnet.

Mr. Charles W. Bates,
Legal Attache,
American Embassy,
Grosvenor Square,
LONDON, W.1.

EMcB./JG.

Enc.

Handwritten notes:
B. E.
2/17/64
D.1./D
6/4/64

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

SECRET

603a


PF. 702,335/F.1.

2 April, 1964.

We are at present investigating, from an F. Branch angle, the case of Alexander Kirkland CAIRNCROSS who is Economic Adviser in the Treasury and a brother of John CAIRNCROSS.

2. Alexander had a distinguished academic career before he entered Government service in 1961, but his activities and associations have given rise to security doubts about him. In particular we want to probe more deeply into his University activities. He was a contemporary of John CAIRNCROSS at Cambridge. He has in our opinion been less than frank about his knowledge of Communists and his own political life at the University and we would therefore like to question John CAIRNCROSS on these, and other points.

3. It has now been decided that an officer should visit the States and discuss with John CAIRNCROSS his knowledge of Communist activity in Cambridge, providing of course that CAIRNCROSS is willing and that our American friends have no objection. The officer most suited for the task is Derek Hamblen and it is suggested that he travels to Washington on Saturday, 18 April, returning on 28 April. He would of course see CAIRNCROSS in Cleveland. Would you please put this to the F.B.I.



5. I am informing the F.B.I. in London that I am making these requests to you.

Yours sincerely,

C. A. Herbert.

H.C.M. Stone, Esq.,
C/o British Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

GAH/LVB

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SEPTEMBER 2023

Handwritten notes: *copy 2/27/64 FIK/BS 3-4-64*

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

602a

PF. 72,493/D.1./EMcB.

To: S.L.O. WASHINGTON

Please refer to my letter of the 28th February 1964.

2. I enclose herewith some more photographs to be shown to CAIRNCROSS in the hope that one or other of them may be identical with some of CAIRNCROSS' R.I.S. controllers.



E. McBarnet.

1st April, 1964.

Enc.

EMcB/JG.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

Handwritten notes:
K15
2/1/64
D 11/02
114/68

TOP SECRET

- (22) Nikolai Mikhailovich (Y)ELAGIN, Naval Attache, Soviet Embassy, London 1942-1948. Candidate for the Military controller.
- (23) Willy BRANDES @ STEVENS, R.I.S. spy (illegal) U.K. 5th January 1937 - 6th November, 1937. Candidate for "Otto".
- (24) Ivan Ilyich BARABANOV, Diplomatic Courier 1950. Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, London 1952 - 1954. Candidate for '45 controller.

These photographs are included because of the press cutting "Daily Herald" dated 25th November, 1954, which with its caption seems to qualify by CAIRNCROSS' description. We have no record of BARABANOV visiting the U.K. before 1950 but he may have done so under another name.

- (25) Yuri Dmitrievich MILOVZOROV, Secretary, Soviet Embassy, London 1945 - 1948. Candidate for 1945 controller and candidate for Military controller.

Possible

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

601a

PF.72493/D.G.

PF.735

25th March 1964.

Thank you for your letter of 20th March with its terrifying contents. I am glad that you have managed to bring Mr. Hoover down to earth again.

2. I have had a brief talk with Dick White and I hear that his visit went very well. I am about to go down to Somerset for Easter and to take the following week there. I shall have more detailed talks with him on my return.

R. H. HOLLIS

H.C.M. Stone Esq.,
S.L.O. Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

R.H.H.
20/3/64

6012

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ACT 1958.

TOP SECRET



650a

Our Ref: FF.735.
Your Ref: FF.72,493/D.G.

British Embassy,
Washington 8, D.C.

20th March, 1964.

23 MAR 1964

Dear *Director General,*

At the end of a long interview with Hoover Sir Dick gave him your personal good wishes and also thanks for his co-operation in the CAIRNCROSS case. For some reason Hoover appears to have immediately taken this to mean that you wanted F.B.I. help to get CAIRNCROSS deported and instructed Dan Brennan, his liaison representative who was present at the meeting, to get things moving in this direction! It was hastily explained that a deportation order would present problems not the least of which would be that CAIRNCROSS would be unlikely to choose the United Kingdom as his next port of call.

2. Dan Brennan told me about this at the earliest opportunity and he, Bill Sullivan and I got together. I said that the last thing in the world we wanted for CAIRNCROSS was any overt action to be taken to remove him either from his job or the country. Bill Sullivan agreed and ordered a memorandum to be sent to Hoover explaining the deportation problem (already considered hypothetically with the Immigration Service) and how undesirable it was to risk publicity in the case. He was also to be reminded that CAIRNCROSS was proving very co-operative and that the Bureau themselves had not yet interrogated him. Bill Sullivan told me that it would turn out all right and that the Boss would be persuaded not to act.

Yours

hm
H. C. M. Stone

H. C. M. Stone.

Sir Roger H. Hollis, C.B., O.B.E.,
HEAD OFFICE.

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JANUARY 2024

TOP SECRET

h.c.m.
22/11/64
2/19/2

TOP SECRET

599a



Our Ref: FF.735.
Your Ref: FF.72493/D.G.

British Embassy,
Washington 8, D.C.

17th March, 1964.

19 MAR 1964

D/KMB
D/KMB
dis 20/3
20/3
Russ. 19/3

Dear *Director General*,

Thank you for your letter dated 11th March.

2. Since my last letter I have been having discussions with the Bureau about the possibility that CAIRNCROSS may be obliged to register under the Foreign Agents' Registration Act. This is a requirement of the Attorney General that all persons who have been used by a foreign power or received training abroad in the field of espionage or counter-espionage must register. At the discretion of the Attorney General any particular registration may be separated from the main Register and the public denied access to it. This will be a matter for the Bureau to take up with the A.G.'s Department after they have interviewed CAIRNCROSS on the grounds that he is an ex-agent who is now co-operating fully with them and is not in present circumstances a security risk to the United States.

3. The F.B.I. assure me that as this procedure is not new to him there will be no risk to our secret. Through their Field Office in Cleveland and their liaison with the A.G.'s Department here the mechanics of CAIRNCROSS' registration will be by safe hand only. All this supports my belief that Hoover has no intention at the present time to take any overt action against CAIRNCROSS.

Yours

hcm
H. C. M. Stone

H. C. M. Stone.

Sir Roger H. Hollis, C.B., O.B.E.,
HEAD OFFICE.

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
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5976

NOTE FOR FILE

On 17th February 1964 John Street of Foreign Office Security Department rang to say he had put up a note on the CAIRNCROSS affair, which had reached a Minister at the Foreign Office.

Street told me that the principal comment which had been made was it was essential that the Security Service should not withhold from the U.S. intelligence authorities any adverse information regarding John CAIRNCROSS, even if this might be calculated to lead to U.S. action which he would find unwelcome. I informed D.1./Inv. (Mr. Symonds) forthwith.




M.E.D. Cumming

D.

12th March 1964

N.B. This record of conversation, typed on 12.3.64., is taken from manuscript record made on the day in question (17.2.64.)



Repts
27/3/64
01/02
13/3

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

597A

March 11, 1964.

The Foreign Secretary has no comments on the submission to the Prime Minister enclosed in your letter - 590B to Bligh of March 6 about Cairncross. As I have already told you on the telephone, the Foreign Secretary wished that Lord Harlech should be informed of this matter in case he had to take action at short notice with the U.S. authorities with regard to publicity in case there was a leakage. With your agreement and that of Roger Hollis I have arranged for "C" to inform him on a strictly personal basis during "C"'s forthcoming visit to Washington next week.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bligh, Cunningham, Hollis and Philip Allen.

B.A.B. Burrows.

Sir Burke Trend, KCB, CVO,

Cabinet Office.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

[Handwritten signature]
22/7/64
INT 4

597a



WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF
SIR BERNARD BURROWS

Sir Roger Hollis

11 MAR 1964

Foreign Office, S.W.1.

, 1963.

D. → ~~D. J. J. J.~~
~~Ms. J. J. J.~~ { 12/3/64 } 5966

I have spoken to Sir Timothy Bligh and told him that Miss KIRK WILSON has not come to our notice in any way.

Rose J. J. J.

D.G.

11.3.64.

2/1/64

I do not think we need home to return
the card n.d.s. rec. 12/3

~~12/3/64~~
D. J. J. J.
13/3

TOP SECRET

ALST1170

596A



Our Ref: PF.735.
Your Ref: PF.72,493/D.G.

British Embassy,
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.

9th March, 1964.

11 MAR 1964

Dear

Director General,

Recd 12/3

Thank you for your letter dated 6th March. - 587A

2. I was told the reason Hoover wanted to see our report on CAIRNCROSS in such a hurry was to be able to digest it thoroughly before the arrival of Sir Dick White. He and Sir Dick are to meet in the great man's office
3. Hoover always wants to know beforehand what subjects are likely to be raised by his visitors and to be given written briefs. I think it is very likely he was advised that because of CAIRNCROSS' service in M.I.6, Sir Dick might well bring this matter up. Hoover has not so far given any indication that he will himself take the initiative. Unless he asks for them, Hoover will not be shown our reports on CAIRNCROSS as they reached me, but will be given a short summary.
4. When I delivered the report to the Bureau this morning I again showed no anxiety over Hoover's sudden interest to see it, but merely said I was glad to have got the material so quickly for him from Head Office. The case officer gave me the same reason for Hoover's interest and was very grateful for the service.
5. I am to meet Sir Dick socially before he visits the Bureau.

H. C. M. Stone

H. C. M. Stone.

Sir Roger H. Hollis, C.B., O.B.E.,
HEAD OFFICE.

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TOP SECRET

H157110/1
595A

PF.72493/D.G.

PF.735

11th March 1964.

^{591A}
Your telegram no. 93 of 9th March was something of a relief to me and dispelled the vague fears to which I had referred in my letter of 6th March. As Mr. Hoover is planning to discuss the CAIRNCROSS case with Dick White, I have arranged with him that I would ask you to show him the copy of the brief which we sent you with our letter of 6th March (PF.72493/D1/JRK) so that Hoover and Dick White can base their discussion on the same material.

2. There is another reason for letting Dick White see the brief. During the Ministerial discussions of the CAIRNCROSS case here it was agreed, though with some reluctance on the part of the Foreign Office, that the CAIRNCROSS story should be given the most limited circulation and that the Ambassador should not be told. The Foreign Secretary has continued to have doubts about the wisdom of this decision and we are therefore taking advantage of the opportunity of Dick's visit to Washington for him to have a private talk with the Ambassador on the matter and to brief him for his strictly personal information.

R. H. HOLLIS

H.C.M. Stone Esq.,
S.L.O. Washington.

TOP SECRET

12/8
2/1/64
D. H. H. H.
11-3-64

*D.L. F to me
11/13 12/16.3*

*Copy for
PF.72,493*

Reference.....
*original at 1354
in P.F. 702,335
v3.*
D.1/ASM for consideration

*I think it a very good idea
that F2 should talk to
CAIRNCROSS. Then should
be a CDV do extract on
the F Branch side.*

NOTE

*E. J. D. H. W.
17/iii*

A. cum.

F told me this evening that he had been discussing with D.G. the case of Alexander CAIRNCROSS in the light of John CAIRNCROSS' confessions, and the question of getting some admission out of John about his brother's Communist associations had been canvassed.

F said he had suggested that if Mr. Martin was not due to have any further talks with John CAIRNCROSS, we might consider taking advantage of David Whyte's presence in the U.S. in April for Whyte to have a 'general' talk with John CAIRNCROSS.

We agreed this should be discussed with Arthur Martin before any action was taken.

M.E.D. Cumming

D.

10th March 1964

*12/85
22/7/64*

Hist/1 CIA

594A

D.

Note.


Sir Bernard Burrows told me today with reference to Sir Burke Trend's note at 590b, that the Foreign Secretary was still worried that the Ambassador was not to be told about CAIRNCROSS and might well raise the question again. He felt that the Ambassador would be in a very awkward position if the story were to be mentioned to him in the States and he were to be entirely ignorant of it. I said that 'C's forthcoming visit to the States would give an exceptional opportunity for briefing the Ambassador, and I would be prepared to speak to 'C' about this. Burrows thanked me for this and said he would like to mention it to Trend in case Trend should think it necessary to consult the Prime Minister again as this represented a change in the procedure already suggested to the Prime Minister.

Roger H. Stollis

D.G.

10.3.64.

RHS
22/7/64
11-3-64



10, DOWNING STREET,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

*With the Private Secretary's
Compliments.*

(Sir T. Bligh)

10 MAR 1964

593A

Copy.

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

TOP SECRET
STRICTLY PERSONAL

March 9, 1964

Russell
10/3

590B

Thank you for your letter of March 6 about
the Cairncross case.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to
me and your minute to him of the same date.
He concludes that there is no sufficient reason
to justify taking any further action in the case.

I am sending a copy of this letter to
Cunningham, Burrows, Hollis and Philip Allen.

(Sgd.) T.J. BLIGH.

Sir Burke Trend, K.C.B., C.V.O.

Handwritten signature
10-3-64

TOP SECRET AND
STRICTLY PERSONAL



SIR ROGER HOLLIS

Recd
1973

592A

With the Compliments

of

Sir Charles Cunningham

10 MAR 1964

Home Office.
Whitehall.

592a

10th March, 1964.

TOP SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

The Home Secretary has now seen Trend's minute to the Prime Minister of the 6th March about Cairncross. He has no comments.

5908

I have sent a copy of this letter to Trend, Allen, Hollis, and Burrows.

C. C. CUNNINGHAM.

R/L
22/7/64
Discont
10.3.64.

Sir Timothy Bligh, K.B.E., D.S.O., D.S.C.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1/8
10/3
591A

Precedence.....**IMMEDIATE**..... Security Classification.....**SECRET**.....
 From :.....**WASHINGTON**..... File Nos. **PF 72493/DG**..... Originator's No.....**93**.....
 To :..... Date of Origin.....**9.3.64**.....
 Passed for Action to **D.G.**..... Date of Receipt.....**10.3.64**.....
 Info..... Copies to..... Decyphered by.....**JMD**.....

Following for D.G.

587A

Reference your letter Pf 72493/DG of 6th March, 1964.

Understand HOOVER wanted brief in case "C" raised it at their meeting on _____ 1964. Letter follows.

R.F.S
22/7/64
KAD
10/3/64

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 ACT 1958 JANUARY 2024

CABINET OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
S.W.1

29 MAR 1964

Di. Inv.
L10/3

With the
Secretary's Compliments

D. Ross

Sir Roger Hollis, *9/3.*
C.B., O.B.E.

41571C/D

5908

TOP SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

6th March, 1964

I attach a submission to the Prime Minister about Cairncross, on lines which I agreed at a meeting yesterday with Cunningham, Hollis, Burrows and Philip Allen.

At this meeting we also reached the tentative conclusions that:-

- (a) There was no particular need to inform our Ambassador in Washington about the case, although we might consider doing so privately if he paid a visit to this country.
- (b) If, by some means or other, the case became public knowledge, we should have to decide, very quickly and in concert with the United States authorities, what might be said to the Press. Our provisional view was that it might be enough to say that we had been conscious of the case for a considerable time but had never had any evidence on which proceedings could be instituted. (To go any further than this, e.g. by saying that we had attempted to secure Cairncross's return to this country, might have embarrassing consequences for the United States authorities, who had decided to let him stay and teach in their country.)

I am sending copies of this letter, together with copies of the submission, to Cunningham, Burrows, Hollis and Philip Allen, who will, no doubt, consider whether their respective Ministers would wish to offer any comment to the Prime Minister.

BURKE TREND

Sir Timothy Bligh,
K.B.E., D.S.O., D.S.C.

R/L
22/7/64
JGMMH
10.3.64

PRIME MINISTER

CAIRNCROSS

Now that Cairncross has rejected the proposal that he should return to this country and make a statement under caution you will wish to consider whether any purpose would be served by referring his case to the recently established Security Commission. The terms of reference of this body, you will remember, are:-

"If so requested by the Prime Minister, to investigate and report upon the circumstances in which a breach of security is known to have occurred in the public service, and upon any related failure of departmental security arrangements or neglect of duty; and, in the light of any such investigation, to advise whether any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable."

In your statement on 25rd January announcing the setting up of the Commission, you explained that under these terms of reference "the Commission could be called upon to act if there had been a breach of security even though there had been no conviction - perhaps because the individual had fled the country". You also said that, before asking the Commission to investigate a particular case, you would consult with the Leader of the Opposition. Nevertheless, the initial words of the Commission's terms of reference leave the initiative in your own hands.

In reaching your decision, you will wish to take account of the following considerations:-

(a) If the Cairncross case were referred to the Commission, this would undoubtedly increase the chances of its receiving publicity. (The Commission are empowered to hear cases in camera; but the mere fact that they were meeting would almost certainly become known.) For this reason, if for no other, you would no doubt think it essential to arrange for the United States authorities to be informed that we intended to make a reference to the Commission. Since the F.B.I. have decided that Cairncross is not a security risk and can be allowed to remain in the United States and to continue teaching at the University of Cleveland, we cannot think that they would welcome the increased likelihood of publicity. They

themselves are confident that, if no further action is taken, the facts will not become known; and they no doubt take into account that, if the case did become public knowledge, they could well be subjected to much criticism for allowing an individual of such uncertain loyalties to continue to teach the American young. If, therefore, we were to be instrumental in allowing the news to break, this would not help the close and confidential relations between M.I.5 and the F.B.I.; and it could not but damage Anglo-American relations in general.

(b) Disclosure of the facts would be bound to call in question, to some extent, the position of Cairncross's brother. Quite apart from the distress and embarrassment which this would inflict on an individual whose integrity we have no reason to question, we have to ask ourselves what would be the probable result, in terms of public policy in the widest sense, if it became known that the Government were employing, as their Chief Economic Adviser, a man who was the brother of a self-confessed Communist spy. This is a harsh and crude way of putting it; but that is how, I fear, it could, and probably would, be represented.

In judging whether these are sufficient reasons to justify you in taking no further action in the case, you should have in mind one further consideration, which is relevant not only to the merits of the case but also to the situation which may arise if, for whatever reason, the facts subsequently become known and you are asked whether you considered consulting the Leader of the Opposition or referring the case to the Security Commission. Thus:-

(c) Quite apart from the fact that Cairncross is not (in the judgment of the F.B.I.) a current security risk, the period during which he was such a risk ended, so far as we are concerned, at least twelve years ago. (He left the public service in 1952). The information which he has now disclosed, although of interest and value from the point of view of intelligence, has no relevance, therefore, to present security arrangements, which have been very substantially changed and strengthened in the last twelve years. It is true that there is no time limit on the cases which may be referred to the Security Commission. On the other hand all the

recent cases which have been the subject of special enquiries (and were therefore the justification for creating the Commission as a permanent "court of enquiry" for the future) have been cases of current risk - the Portland case; Blake; Vessall; and the Denning enquiry. Cairncross has little, if anything, in common with these. A closer parallel, as regards both time and other circumstances, is Philby. But we have not referred the Philby case to the Commission; nor has anybody suggested that we should.

BURKE TREND

6th March, 1964.

590a



SECRET.

British Embassy,
Washington 8, D.C.

Our Ref: P.F.735.
Your Ref: P.F.72,493/D.1.

4th March, 1964.

Dear *Arthur,*

I understand that Hoover has now asked when the promised full background report on CAIRNCROSS is expected. He was told soon, so the sooner the better.

Hope you had a good trip back and that all is well.

Yours *by*
Harry

H. C. M. Stone.

A. S. Martin, Esq., C.B.E.,
HEAD OFFICE.

[Signature]
10/3/64

~~EXCL~~

10 - 9 MAR 1964

TO: *[Handwritten]*

REF: *Pf 72,493*

[Handwritten notes]
413
2/2/64
D/102
10/5

55/4/81

589a

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

PF. 72,493/D1/JRK

6th March, 1964.

John CAIRNCROSS

As spoken. I am enclosing a copy of
a report on Arthur Martin's last meeting with
CAIRNCROSS.

585a

Yours

JRK

J. Russell King.



Enc: 6 pages.
JRK/WAO

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

JRK
22/7/64
WAO

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 *September 223*

588a
TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

PF. 72,493/D1/JRK

To: S.L.O. Washington.

John CAIRNCROSS.

Reference your telegram number 90, paragraph 5, I am enclosing copies of a note of our information on CAIRNCROSS.

Also enclosed for the F.B.I. and C.I.A. - 585a are copies of Arthur Martin's account of his last interview with CAIRNCROSS.

J. Russell King.

6th March, 1964.

Encs.
JRK/WAO

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

RJK
2/25/64
2/27/64
2/28/64
3/1/64
3/3/64

John CAIRNCROSS

John CAIRNCROSS was born at Lesmahagow, Lanarkshire, Scotland on 27 July, 1913. He was the son of Alexander Kirkland CAIRNCROSS who kept a general store and his wife, Elizabeth. He was educated at Hamilton Academy from 1928-1930, Glasgow University from 1930-1932, the Sorbonne from 1932-1934, and at Trinity College, Cambridge from 1934-1936.

2. In 1936 CAIRNCROSS passed first in the Civil Service examination and was posted to the Foreign Office in April. In 1937 he worked in the department dealing with Spain and there met Donald MACLEAN for the first time.

3. On 1 October, 1938 he was transferred to the Treasury and on 23 September, 1940 was appointed Private Secretary to Lord Hankey (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Paymaster General). On 5 March, 1942 he left this post and was lent to the Ministerial Committee on Reconstruction Problems.

4. On 11 May, 1942, CAIRNCROSS enlisted in H.M. Forces and was posted to G.C. & C.S. at Bletchley. He was released from G.C. & C.S. on 31 May, 1943, and joined Section V of S.I.S. on 14 June 1943. His work in Section V was Analysis, Collation and Circulation of Intelligence Reports, particularly those dealing with Germany. He was later transferred to Section I of S.I.S. where he dealt with political intelligence.

5. On 21 June, 1945, CAIRNCROSS was released from S.I.S. and returned to the Treasury and began work in the Defence Material Division. In June, 1947, he transferred within the Treasury to the branch dealing with questions of Service personnel. On 3rd March, 1948, CAIRNCROSS offered his resignation in order to take up an appointment with a business firm. However, the job fell through and CAIRNCROSS withdrew his resignation. In January, 1950, he was appointed U.K. representative on Western Union and N.A.T.O. Finance and Economic Committee. In August 1950, he was transferred to the Exchange Control Division of the Treasury but on 1 May, 1951, he was transferred to the Ministry of Supply. In December 1951, he transferred back to the Treasury.

Security case against CAIRNCROSS.

6. 1938 An unsigned letter dated 5th August, 1938 addressed to CAIRNCROSS was delivered to the wrong address and handed to the police. The letter referred to the sudden death of one of HITLER's staff officers and said that a highly placed Italian visitor to Germany had been responsible. It started "Dear Mr. CAIRNCROSS" and ended "Fraternally".
7. 1939 In 1939, CAIRNCROSS came to notice in connection with a German called Victor Hermann HAEPNER. In 1937 HAEPNER, who was then in Spain, wrote to CAIRNCROSS suggesting that he should intervene to cause arms to be supplied to the Spanish Republicans.

8. 1947 A report was received that CAIRNCROSS belonged to a group of near-communists and held left wing views of a fairly advanced nature.

9. 1951 After the disappearance of Guy BURGESS and Donald MACLEAN in May 1951, CAIRNCROSS' name, address and telephone number were found in MACLEAN's office diary. CAIRNCROSS was interviewed on 24th August 1951 and admitted acquaintance with MACLEAN from 1937. The diary then referred to a party to which he had invited MACLEAN. He volunteered that he had known BURGESS vaguely since about 1937. He was not able to give any explanation about the anonymous letter or about HAEFNER.

CAIRNCROSS was interviewed again in December 1951 in a further attempt to examine the context of the anonymous letter.

10. 1952 In February 1952 a manuscript document which was found in Guy BURGESS' flat after his disappearance was identified as being in CAIRNCROSS' handwriting. The document had the appearance of being an intelligence report. Investigation of CAIRNCROSS revealed that he certainly moved in communist circles while at Cambridge and was probably a communist at the time.

CAIRNCROSS was interrogated on 31st March 1952. He admitted writing the BURGESS document but denied that it had any kind of intelligence purpose. He agreed to make a statement. There followed five more interrogations during which CAIRNCROSS gave some limited information about his communist associations at Cambridge, but made no admissions in connection with espionage. During the course of these interviews he was under observation and on 7th April 1952 he was seen to make a journey to the Sunnersbury Lane area when he travelled by taxi, underground train and a bus. Having reached his destination he stood on the corner smoking cigarettes for twenty-five minutes. He was not contacted and eventually returned home. Since this appeared to have all the earmarks of an attempted rendezvous with the R.I.S. CAIRNCROSS was taxed about it and said it was entirely due to his agitated state of mind and there was no question of his meeting anyone. On the next day he requested a further interview and then stated that he had had a liaison with a French woman about a year before and that although the liaison was ended she had telephoned to him appealing to him to meet her once again. It was to meet her that he had made his journey to Sunnersbury. He described the woman but she proved impossible to locate or identify.

CAIRNCROSS left the country after he had resigned from the Treasury in April 1952 and went to live in Rome doing research and writing a book. He also obtained employment as a translator and précis writer with UNO in Geneva on a temporary basis.

11. 1954 In August 1954 CAIRNCROSS visited the U.K. and the opportunity was taken to re-interrogate him. This produced no new information and was entirely unproductive.

In 1957-1961 CAIRNCROSS was working for the ECAFE Secretariat in Bangkok. He returned to Rome in 1961. He was known to have been in Pakistan in 1963 but his occupation there is not known.

TOP SECRET

Seen by D. ~~W~~/ENV.

~~W~~/JRW

587a

PF.72493/D.G.

6th March 1964.

I have just seen your telegram no.92 of 5th March in which you say that Hoover wishes to see our report. Perhaps I have attached too much significance to the fact that you mention the great man's name, but I have an uncomfortable feeling that it may mean that Hoover is showing signs of restiveness about the line which the F.B.I. took and which you reported in your telegrams nos. 84 and 85, on which I have of course subsequently reported to Ministers. I can only say that we shall be in considerable difficulty if the F.B.I. change their mind now and take overt action to remove CAIRNCROSS from his job and perhaps from the United States. I quite realise that the F.B.I. cannot be expected to shape their policy to meet our convenience, but I want you to know the position.

2. Arthur comments on your telegram that he is sure that Hoover was aware of the F.B.I. line which you gave in the telegrams to which I have referred above and so it is possible that I am seeing dangers which do not exist.

H. H. HOLLIS

H.C.M.Stone Esq.,
British Embassy,
Washington D.C.

TOP SECRET

Per RW
22/7/64
21/1/64
9/3/64

PA

586a

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Precedence.....**IMMEDIATE**..... Security Classification.....**SECRET**.....

From :.....**WASHINGTON**..... File Nos.....**PF 72,493**..... Originator's No.....**92**.....

To :..... Date of Origin.....**5.3.64**.....

Passed for Action to **D.G.** Date of Receipt.....**6.3.64**.....

Info..... Copies to..... **D.** Decyphered by.....**JMD**.....
D.1/Inv.

HOOVER wishes to see our full background report on **CAIRNCROSS** as soon as possible.

by 65
22/7/64

01/02
2/3/64

585a

NOTE FOR PF.72,493

Paras 1 & 2 ext'd to PCF11-55-1-13
LAP

I interviewed CAIRNCROSS for the second time in Cleveland, Ohio, on Sunday 1st March. I took with me the briefs at 563a and 571a and the instruction at 574a.

2. I told CAIRNCROSS that it was my duty to put to him a formal question to which I required a formal answer. Was he prepared to return voluntarily to the U.K. where he would be asked to make a statement under caution describing his intelligence work on behalf of the Russians, which might thereafter be used as evidence in his prosecution under the Official Secrets Act? After some hesitation, he said he would not be prepared to do so. I told him that this answer would make no difference to our relationship or to his relationship with the F.B.I. I hoped that he would now answer some questions which I had brought with me.

3. I began by showing him photographs of Russian Intelligence Officers with a view to identifying his controllers. The results were as follows:

First Controller - "Otto"

His first reaction to photograph No.1 (Arnold DEUTSCHE) was to say that he had never seen this man. When I suggested to him that I had expected him to identify this photograph as that of "Otto", he agreed that this was just possible. He explained that his most vivid recollection of "Otto" was that he had a very large head on a short stocky body. Since the photograph showed only the head, he was unable to relate its size to the body. He thought the wavy hair was wrong - his recollection was of a full head of straight black hair. He said the age was also wrong. He judged "Otto" to have been in his late 30s or early 40s when he knew him. The photograph appeared to be of a man in his late 20s. He said that the "reflective expression" in the photograph was not typical of his recollection of "Otto" who was a tough extrovert. He added that his "Otto" was less handsome than the man in the photograph. On the

/whole

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copied to
PF 796285

whole he thought the two were not identical but he was left with a slight doubt.

Second Controller - "Robert"

He identified him at once and positively as Anatole GROMOV.

Third Controller - Man with military bearing.

He said positively that this man was not among photographs 1-6.

Fourth Controller - Swarthy man possibly Georgian.

He said positively that this controller was not among photographs 1-6.

Fifth Controller - E.M. worker declared p.n.g.

He said positively that this controller was not among photographs 1-6. He added that the man had a long name which he thought began "BELA" He repeated that he was sure this man had been declared p.n.g. and that his photograph had appeared in the U.K. press.

Sixth Controller - Declared p.n.g. in connection with William MARSHALL.

He positively identified this controller as Pavel KUZNETSOV.

4. I questioned CAIRNCROSS on his statement that he did not know BURGESS while at Cambridge. CAIRNCROSS maintained that this was true while he was an undergraduate. After he joined the Foreign Office he spent occasional weekends at Cambridge and it was during one of these, as far as he remembers, he first met BURGESS. He recalled a tea-party in Anthony BLUNT's room at Cambridge at which, besides himself, Louis McNEICE and Guy BURGESS had been present. He thinks this was the first occasion on which he met BURGESS. He said that it probably took place shortly before KLUGMAN made his intelligence approach to him. He said that politics were not discussed at this meeting. He remembers other parties at BURGESS' flat in London - in particular, one which must have taken place in late 1936 or early 1937 at which Harold NICOLSON, PUTLITZ and Sir Somebody MOUNSEY, Head of the Spanish Department of the Foreign Office, had been present.

5. We moved on to CAIRNCROSS' Communist associations in Cambridge. He said that he attended a few Communist Party meetings but he was sure that he did

/not

not formally join the Party. His attitude was that of a confirmed Communist sympathiser who nevertheless had some reservations about the Communist system as practised in Russia. He remembered that he was a member of some pacifist society at Cambridge (he could not remember the title).

6. We then went over again the terms in which KLUGMAN persuaded CAIRNCROSS to become a spy. He said that KLUGMAN had not used the phrase "You have been chosen to do some work for the movement" - rather did he say "I want to put you in touch with one of our friends who will keep you in touch with things". He said that he did not understand that "one of our friends" meant a Russian but he assumed that "keeping him in touch with things" meant discussing with him Communist affairs and the Russian point of view. He admitted that he had realised at once that by agreeing to KLUGMAN's proposal he was putting himself, as a member of the Foreign Service, in a very delicate situation but he did not at the time realise that it was the prelude to spying. He said that KLUGMAN did not exert any pressure on him. He made the decision to accept of his own free will. KLUGMAN had no hold over him other than his knowledge that he had fairly deep Communist sympathies.

7. CAIRNCROSS' first meeting with "Otto" was in Regents Park. KLUGMAN arranged the meeting and was present to effect the introduction but left immediately afterwards. At this first meeting they discussed trivialities and arranged to meet one month later. The first few meetings were in daylight but later they were held after dark. They were usually in London parks. At about the fourth or fifth meeting, "Otto" asked general questions about the work CAIRNCROSS was doing in the Foreign Office. Later he began to ask specific questions, usually phrased "Do you think that so and so is likely to happen". The first request for documents came after about one year. The documents were handed over in the early evening, taken away (presumably for photographing) and handed back later the same evening. CAIRNCROSS said that he was always able to return them to the Foreign Office the following morning.

8. I then referred to CAIRNCROSS' admission that he had on one occasion received money from "Robert". I asked him how much the sum was and he said, rather shamefacedly, £100. This had happened after he had passed a piece which "Robert" had said was particularly valuable. It related to an impending German attack on a Russian town. He repeated that this was the only money he had ever accepted. He could not remember the date but thought it was probably in 1942.

/We

9. We discussed the controller who took him over after he had returned to the Treasury. CAIRNCROSS explained that he had seen this man's photograph in the Press a long time after his contact with him had lapsed. He thought it might even have been after the BURGESS/MACLEAN flight but he was not sure of this. He said that the caption explained that the photograph had been taken in Prague after the man's expulsion from the U.K. He could not date the period during which he worked with this controller, although he thought the contact started soon after he joined the Treasury.

10. We discussed the events after the flight of BURGESS and MACLEAN. CAIRNCROSS thought that his last meeting with KUZNETSOV must have taken place between June and August 1951. He thinks that it was after he had had his first interview with me. He could not remember whether he told KUZNETSOV about this interview but he certainly conveyed his fear that he might have been compromised by the BURGESS/MACLEAN defection. He agreed that he probably made the chalk mark on the same day that he was interviewed about the document found among BURGESS' possessions.

11. CAIRNCROSS repeated to me that he had never been recontacted by the Russians since he left the U.K. He said that he had no contact with any Russians while working with the United Nations in Geneva. In Bangkok he had met Russian delegates to E.C.A.F.E. I reminded him of the name LESIOVSKY and he said at once that he knew him. He remembered, in particular, parties which LESIOVSKY had attended at the E.C.A.F.E. Conference in Lisbon during which, it was popularly supposed, the restoration of diplomatic relations with Australia was negotiated. It was said at the time that LESIOVSKY had played a leading role in these negotiations. I then mentioned the name Cesar ORTIZ Tinoco. CAIRNCROSS said that he knew ORTIZ Tinoco, who was a friend of LESIOVSKY. He had an English wife. I mentioned Paul ALPEN. CAIRNCROSS said that he had met him once or twice but did not really know him. I mentioned William MULGRUE. CAIRNCROSS said he knew him quite well, having first met him in Rome. He remembered that MULGRUE had been accused by the Americans of being a Communist. CAIRNCROSS said that his impression was that MULGRUE was not noticeably left-wing but he knew that he had quarrelled with some Americans and he (CAIRNCROSS) thought that the accusation that he was a Communist derived from this quarrel.

12. I asked CAIRNCROSS about his relationship with BURGESS after 1940. CAIRNCROSS said that he occasionally met BURGESS during the war and afterwards but no reference was ever made to their earlier

/espionage ...

espionage connection.

13. I asked CAIRNCROSS whether he had ever been used to recruit or talent-spot his colleagues. He said that in the early days of his espionage career he had been asked to suggest likely recruits but he had never done so and the subject was not pressed. I said that surely he must have been asked to give information about his colleagues, even if not in the context of their recruitment. CAIRNCROSS said that this had been so at G.C. & C.S. but not at the other offices where he worked. At G.C. & C.S. he had been asked in general terms who his colleagues were and for some background information about them. At the time he did not regard this as a prelude to their recruitment. He remembers that he named the three or four persons who were working in his group. The only name he can now remember was [redacted] When he was in M.I.6. he remembers discussing David FOOTMAN with his controller. He had the impression that his controller knew all about FOOTMAN.

14. I asked CAIRNCROSS whether he could describe any of the Foreign Office documents which he passed to "Otto". He said that they were almost all circulating telegrams. When he was in the private office of Lord HANKEY, he had handed over some Cabinet papers but he could not remember the subject matter.

15. I asked CAIRNCROSS about his travels before and during the war. He said that they had all been for holidays and that on no occasion had he met a member of the R.I.S. while abroad. Asked specifically about his travels between 1939-1946, he remembered that in the spring of 1940 he visited Les Baux in the South of France, returning via Paris where he met Donald MACLEAN. In June 1946 he went on holiday to Stockholm. He remembered also that at some time after he rejoined the Treasury (it might have been late 1945 or 1946) he took a holiday in Brussels at a time when Anthony EDEN was visiting (they came back on the same plane) and Geoffrey HARRISON was a Counsellor at the Embassy.

16. I asked CAIRNCROSS whether at any time he had had the impression that the Russians were alarmed for his safety. He said that he remembered that on one

/occasion

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 ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
 IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
 ACT 1958 JANUARY 2024

period /
occasion he was warned not to bring documents to the next meeting. He thinks that this was in the early post-war/and that there may have been some public scare at the time. I suggested that this might have been the defection of GOUZENKO. CAIRNCROSS could not remember whether this was so and, in racking his memory, wondered whether he might not have become aware of the public scare after the warning that he should not bring documents. He certainly associated the warning with a public scare but no amount of prompting could make him more definite on this point.

17. I asked CAIRNCROSS whether his work at the Treasury in the 1945/46 period took him abroad. He said that it did not but he did occasionally have to travel into the provinces. He remembered a journey to Liverpool to see a factory where penicillin was being made.

18. I asked CAIRNCROSS if the Russians had ever suggested to him that he should copy documents himself. He remembered that during the war - either just before or just after his arrival at Bletchley - he had been asked if he was any good at photography. He had told his controller that he was not and his controller did not press it.

D.l.

AM
A.S. Martin

6th March 1964

Miss A. Kirk Wilson.

The Common.
Parbold.
Lancs.

Parbold
376

A Confidential Clerk at
No 10.

A cousin to Cairncross
(she has never met him).

583c

Reference D.G......

D. The answer to X is NO.

RCS 6/3/64

D.1/In ^{RCS} 4/3

Sir Timothy Bligh, P.P.S. to the P.M., told D.G. today that when a note upon the CAIRNCROSS case fell to be typed at No. 10 recently, the confidential clerk concerned (particulars attached) let it be known that CAIRNCROSS was a cousin of hers, though she had never met him.

X D.G. would like to know whether her name has ever cropped up in the CAIRNCROSS case - or any other security context.

M.E.D. Cumming

D.

5th March 1964

^{RCS} There is no likely trace in CR for X. The white carding sheets on CAIRNCROSS, Train & Supp vols, also show no trace. ^{D.I.} _{6/3} J.R.K.

Can you please let me have the answer to X.

(The card has to be returned) — No.

RCS 4/3/64

Handwritten notes and dates: 6/3/64, 18/3

Copy of information on visiting
card

Miss A. Kirk Wilson.

The Common,
Parbold,
Lancs.

Parbold 376

This page only old #1511

D. Sur.
108

5835
McB.
9/3

D.

9/3/64

Note.

With reference to the attached copy of a letter from Sir Burke Trend to Sir Timothy Bligh, Sir Burke Trend called a short meeting this evening with Sir Charles Cunningham, Sir Bernard Burrows, Philip Allen and myself to consider whether a recommendation ought to be put to the Prime Minister that the CAIRNCROSS case should be referred to the Security Commission. The general feeling was that this should not be done, partly at least because it would be difficult for the Security Commission to consider the case without the matter coming to public notice. After some discussion it was felt that there was little point in referring such an old case to the Security Commission as one of the main duties of the Commission was to advise whether any change in security arrangements was necessary or desirable. The security arrangements existing in 1951 at the time when CAIRNCROSS left the public service had changed so much that there could be little advantage in the Security Commission examining the case.

2. Sir Burke Trend will put a minute to this effect to the Prime Minister.

Reg. H. H. H.

D.G.

5.3.64.

12/15
22/7/64
9/13

CABINET OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
S.W.1

55 MAR 1964

*With the
Secretary's Compliments*

Sir Roger Hollis,
C.B., O.B.E.

TOP SECRET
AND PERSONAL

4th March, 1964

There is one aspect of the situation summarised in the attached letter which I think we must discuss before any further advice is given to Ministers.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Cunningham, Burrows, Nellie and Phillip Allen; and I will try to arrange a discussion tomorrow, if possible.

BIRKE TREND

Sir Timothy Bligh,
a K.B.E., D.S.O., D.S.C.

TOP SECRET

4th March, 1964

You will be interested to have the enclosed copy of a letter of 2nd March from Roger Hollis which is, I think, self-explanatory. I should add, however, that:-

- (a) The decision (indicated in paragraph 2 of Hollis's letter) that the F.B.I. should not be asked to put the CAIRNCROSS case specifically to the Department of Immigration was approved by the Prime Minister after discussion late on Friday evening.
- (b) I have since heard from Hollis that Cairncross has now been asked whether he would be prepared to return to this country voluntarily and to make a statement under caution and that he has rejected this proposal.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Cunningham, Burrows, Hollis, Philip Allen and the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions.

BURKE TREND

Sir Timothy Bligh,
K.B.E., D.S.O., D.S.C.



5830

~~70e~~

SECRET.

British Embassy,
Washington 8, D.C. 583ab

Our Ref: P.F.735.
Your Ref: P.F.72,493.

3rd March, 1964.

ENCL. _____

Att. - 4 MAR 1964

TO DG

REF P.F. 50/6/118

Dear

Director General

Thank you very much for your letter dated 24th February in which you gave us the background information to your telegrams. What a galaxy there was at the P.M.'s meeting! Now that Arthur Martin is back in the fold again you will have heard all the news from him at first-hand. He certainly had a most successful trip. Although I think we need not have any fear that Mr. Hoover has become a dangerous liberal it can certainly be said that he and his Bureau are now true partners with us and are determined to help and seek help in return whenever the needs arise. - SGA

2. [redacted] will be with you by the time this letter arrives. He too had a very successful visit to Washington last week and has already done much to repair the damage to RCMP/FBI relationships which occurred in the last two or three years. I hope he will follow through on this good start by getting his officers into a closer working relationship with the Bureau. I think I can help in this direction.

Yours

hms
Stone

H. C. M. Stone.

Sir Roger H. Hollis, C.B., O.B.E.,
HEAD OFFICE.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 September 20 23

Perkins
23.64
SGA

Reference... PF 72,493

5830

Note

[redacted] G.C.H.Q. telephoned from Cheltenham today in connection with PF 72,493/D.1/EMcB of 25.2.64 enclosing extracts and asking for comments and questions. 567a

2. The answer on both counts is in the negative.

Message taken by D.1/GMcN

3.3.64.

CODE 18-76

hls
22/7/64
D.1/GMcN
5/10

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 *SEPTEMBER 2023*

2/3
D.
D.1/Inv.
----- 2/3

To see the attached letter.
Could this copy please be put on
the file?

D.G. Sec.
2.3.64. VHA.

TOP SECRET

582A

PF.72493/D.G.

2nd March 1964.

Following the meeting recorded in your note of 28th February, I addressed an enquiry to the F.B.I. whether they could send CAIRNCROSS to this country by deportation or other means, and received the following reply from my representative in Washington :

"1. F.B.I. have no jurisdiction over deportation. All they could do would be to submit summary of security information to Department of Immigration who would decide whether deportation proceedings should be instituted.

2. Hypothetical case has been put to Department of Immigration who say :

(a) Even if they are satisfied that case for deportation exists it is still open to subject to contest it in Court. This could take several months and would almost certainly attract publicity. One case took 13 years.

(b) Even if deportation order is obtained subject has right to choose country to which he is deported, providing that country will have him. In other words a deportation order cannot be used to circumvent extradition treaties.

3. F.B.I. will not put CAIRNCROSS case to Department of Immigration unless we confirm that we wish it".

2. I have subsequently advised my representative that we do not wish the F.B.I. to put the CAIRNCROSS case to the Department of Immigration, but that Martin, our counter-espionage officer who carried out the original interrogation of CAIRNCROSS, should see him again and find out if he is prepared to return to this country voluntarily and make a statement under caution.

3. I will advise you when I hear the result of this interview.

4. I enclose five extra copies of this letter in case you wish to circulate them.

R. H. HOLLIS

Sir Burke Trend, K.C.B., C.V.O.,
Cabinet Office.

Encs (5)

TOP SECRET

R/H
2/17/64
WA D
2/23/64

581b

Draft

John CAIRNCROSS

John CAIRNCROSS was born at Lesmahagow, Lanarkshire, Scotland on 27 July, 1913. He was the son of Alexander Kirkland CAIRNCROSS who kept a general store and his wife, Elizabeth. He was educated at Hamilton Academy from 1928-1930, Glasgow University from 1930-1932, the Sorbonne from 1932-1934, and at Trinity College, Cambridge from 1934-1936.

2. In 1936 CAIRNCROSS passed first in the Civil Service examination and was posted to the Foreign Office in April. ^{in 1937} In 1937 he worked in the department dealing with Spain and there met Donald MACLEAN for the first time.

3. On 1 October, 1938 He was transferred to the Treasury and on 23 September, 1940 was appointed Private Secretary to Lord Hankey (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Paymaster General). On 5 March, 1942 he left this post and was lent to the Ministerial Committee on Reconstruction Problems.

4. On 11 May, 1942 CAIRNCROSS enlisted in H.M. Forces and was posted to G.C. & C.S. at Bletchley. He was released from G.C. & C.S. on 31 May, 1943 and joined Section V of S.I.S. on 14 June, 1943. His work in Section V was Analysis, Collation and Circulation of Intelligence Reports particularly those dealing with Germany.

He was later transferred to Section I of SIS where he dealt with political intelligence

5. On 21 June, 1945 CAIRNCROSS was released from S.I.S. and returned to the Treasury and began work in the Defence Material Division. In June, 1947 he transferred within the Treasury to the branch dealing with questions of Service personnel. On 3 March, 1948 CAIRNCROSS offered his resignation in order to take up an appointment with a business firm. However, the job fell through and CAIRNCROSS withdrew his resignation. In January, 1950 he was appointed U.K. representative on Western Union and N.A.T.O. Finance and Economic Committee. In August 1950 he was transferred to the Exchange Control Division of the Treasury but on 1 May, 1951 he was transferred to the Ministry of Supply. In December 1951 he transferred back to the Treasury.

Security case against CAIRNCROSS

6. 1938 An unsigned letter dated 5th August, 1938 addressed to CAIRNCROSS was delivered to the wrong address and handed to the police. The letter referred to the sudden death of one of HIMMLER's staff officers and said that a highly placed Italian visitor to Germany had been responsible. It started "Dear Mr. CAIRNCROSS" and ended "Fraternally".

7. 1939 In 1939 CAIRNCROSS came to notice in connexion with a German called Victor Hermann HAEFNER. In 1937 HAEFNER, who was then in Spain, wrote to CAIRNCROSS suggesting he should intervene to cause arms to be supplied to the Spanish Republicans.

8. 1947 A report was received by a ~~strongly reliable~~ and delicate source which said that CAIRNCROSS belonged

RF 27/1/64

to a group of near-communists and held left wing views of a fairly advanced nature.

9. 1951

After the disappearance of Guy BURGESS and Donald MACLEAN in May 1951 CAIRNCROSS' name, address and telephone number were found in MACLEAN's office diary. CAIRNCROSS was interviewed on the 24th August, 1951 and admitted acquaintance with MACLEAN from 1937. The diary then referred to a party to which he had invited MACLEAN. He volunteered that he had known BURGESS vaguely since about 1937. He was unable to give any explanation about the anonymous letter or about HAEFNER.

CAIRNCROSS was interviewed again in December 1951 in a further attempt to examine the context of the anonymous letter.

10. 1952

In February 1952 a manuscript document which was found in Guy BURGESS' flat after his disappearance was identified as being in CAIRNCROSS' handwriting. The document had the appearance of being an intelligence report. Investigation of CAIRNCROSS revealed that he certainly moved in communist circles while at Cambridge and was probably a communist at the time.

CAIRNCROSS was interrogated on 31st March, 1952. He admitted writing the BURGESS document but denied that it had any kind of intelligence purpose. He agreed to make a statement. There followed five more interviews during which CAIRNCROSS gave some limited information about ~~the communist woman he had known at Cambridge~~ but made no admissions in connexion with espionage. During the course of these interviews he was under observation and on the 7th April, 1952 he was seen to make a journey to the Gunnersbury Lane area when he travelled by taxi, underground train, and bus. Having reached his destination he stood on the corner smoking cigarettes for twenty-five minutes. He was not contacted and eventually returned home. Since this appeared to have all the earmarks of an attempted rendezvous with the R.I.S. CAIRNCROSS was taxed about it and said it was entirely due to his agitated state of mind and there was no question of his meeting anyone. On the next day he requested a further interview and then stated that he had had a liaison with a French woman about a year before and that although the liaison was ended she had telephoned to him appealing to him to meet her once again. It was to meet her that he had made his journey to Gunnersbury. He described the woman but she proved impossible to locate or identify.

CAIRNCROSS left the country after he had resigned from the Treasury in April 1952 and went to live in Rome doing research and writing a book. He also obtained employment as a translator and precis writer with UNO in Geneva on a temporary basis.

11. 1954

In August 1954 CAIRNCROSS visited the U.K. and the opportunity was taken to re-interrogate him. This produced no new information and was entirely unproductive.

In 1957-1961 CAIRNCROSS was working for the ECAFE Secretariat in Bangkok. He returned to Rome in 1961. He was known to have been in Pakistan in 1963 but his occupation there is not known.

*his Communist
associations at
Cambridge.*

*draft dictated but not seen by EMB on
28 Feb 1964*

P.A.
581A

TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH

Precedence **EMERGENCY** Security Classification **TOP SECRET**

To: **S.L.O. Washington** File Nos. **PF.72493** Section of Origin **D.G.**

..... Signed **A. H. HOLLIS**

Originators
Inf.: No. **470** Date **28/2/64** Date **28.2.64.**

Copy to Sections..... **D.**

Reference your letter No. **90** of **27.2.64.** **D.I/Inv.** (For file)
our telegram **xxx**

From DIRECTOR GENERAL.

1. Reference your paragraph 3. We do not wish F.B.I. to put CAIRNCROSS case to Department of Immigration.
2. MARTIN should see CAIRNCROSS, preferably not in the presence of F.B.I., and put question exactly as quoted in paragraph 3 of my telegram 466 of 27 February. If reply is negative MARTIN can return to London.

574a

[Handwritten signature]
22/1/64
Wall D
2/3/64

CABINET OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
S.W.1

28 FEB 1964

*With the
Secretary's Compliments*

Sir Roger Hollis,
C.B., O.B.E.

Hest/c/d

4
580 B

TOP SECRET AND
STRICTLY PERSONAL

28th February, 1964

Trend has asked me to send you the enclosed record which he has made of the meeting on Wednesday about the Cairncross case.

I am also, on his instructions, sending a copy to Cunningham, Burrows, Hollis, Philip Allen and the Director of Public Prosecutions.

W. I. McINDOE

Sir Timothy Bligh,
K.B.E., D.S.O., D.S.C.

RF
2/2/64
K...
3.64

to establish that Cairncross would fall within the category of "deportable aliens".

In discussion there was general agreement that, even so, we must not appear reluctant to take any measures which might secure Cairncross's return to the United Kingdom. It was true that, even if the statements which he had made so far were admissible as evidence, it would be difficult to prosecute him in respect of action which he had taken some 20 years before and allegedly in support of a country which was, at the time, our ally in the war. On the other hand he had admitted that his contacts with the Soviet Union had been maintained over a long period; and there was little doubt that at least some of the information which he had revealed to them would provide grounds for prosecution, if his confession were in a form which made it admissible evidence. In these circumstances the Attorney-General felt that we were now bound to make a further attempt to obtain a confession of this kind.

Nevertheless, if we sent a police officer to the United States in an attempt to obtain from Cairncross a statement which would be admissible as evidence and subsequently discovered that the United States authorities were unable to deport him, we should have needlessly increased the risk of a leak and, if the facts became known subsequently, we should expose ourselves to criticism for having failed to seize the earlier chance to interrogate him when he passed through the United Kingdom on his way to the United States. For these reasons it would be advisable, before reaching a final decision on the desirability of attempting to obtain an admissible confession from Cairncross in the United States, to verify whether the United States authorities would, in fact, be able to deport him.

It might be made clear to them that, if they could do so, we should try to prosecute him; and there might also be some advantage in asking Cairncross himself whether he would be willing

TOP SECRET

4
580b

John Cairncross

A further discussion of this subject took place at 10 Downing Street at 6.00 p.m. on Wednesday, 26th February. There were present:-

Prime Minister (Home)
Foreign Secretary Burke
Chancellor of the Exchequer Handley
Home Secretary Brooke
Attorney-General Mathew
Sir Burke Trend
Sir Charles Cunningham
Sir Bernard Burrows
Sir Roger Hollis
Mr. Philip Allen
Deputy Director
of Public Prosecutions Crump
Sir Timothy Bligh

Those present had before them copies of a letter of 25th February from Sir Roger Hollis to Sir Burke Trend, reporting that an approach had been made to the United States authorities in order to ascertain whether they would be able to deport Cairncross, if we pressed them to do so, and that they had replied unofficially that, since he represented no security danger to the United States, they would not recommend his deportation or his removal from Cleveland University. A study by the Foreign Office legal advisers of the United States law on deportation (as reported in a letter of 26th February from Sir Bernard Burrows to Sir Roger Hollis) tended to confirm that the United States authorities might find it difficult

580b.

to return to the United Kingdom in order to make a confession in circumstances which would make it admissible evidence and to face subsequent prosecution. Having taken these steps, we might feel that we had done all that could reasonably be expected of us; and we should be better placed to meet criticism if Cairncross finally evaded us but the incident became subsequently known.

It was agreed that the Security Service should make the necessary enquiries of the United States authorities through their own channels.

(Signed) BURKE TREND

Cabinet Office, S.W.1

28th February, 1964

580A

NOTE

With D.G.'s agreement I gave by telephone to Charles Bates, F.B.I. London at 5.15 p.m. today, the gist of paragraphs 1 and 2 of our telegram No. 466 of 27th February and of paras. 1 and 2 of S.L.O. Washington's telegram No. 90 of 27th February.

I said there was nothing we wished him to do, and my purpose in contacting him was solely to keep him in the picture. He expressed his gratitude.



M.E.D. Cumming

D.

28th February 1964

h. s.
2/27/64
MA D
2/3/64


TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL 579a

PF 72,493/D.1/EMcB

To: S.I.C. Washington

I attach some photographs of Russians who have served in the Soviet Embassy in London and who may be identical with one or other of CAIRNCROSS's R.I.S. controllers.

28 February, 1964.


E. McBarnet

Encs.

EMcB/JG

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

Handwritten notes:
RHS
2/1/64
D/1/64
28/7

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

- PF. 603385
- (7) Igor Yakovlevich MELEKH, attached to the office of the Soviet Naval Attaché, London 1943 - 1946. Candidate for 1945 controller.
- P.F. 68,000
- (8) Nikolai Aleksandrovich KOPTYELOV, chauffeur to Military Attaché, Soviet Embassy, London 1944 - 1947. Candidate for 1945 controller.
- PF. 68725
- (9) Viatcheslav Arkadievich TSCHERKULAEV, clerk, Soviet Embassy London 1944 - 1950. Candidate for 1945 controller.
- PF. 68489
- (10) Petr Nikolaevich KHUTIKOV, clerk to the Soviet Military Attaché, London 1944 - 1950. Candidate for 1945 controller.
- PF. 68218
- (11) Ivan Vladimirovich RODICHEV, member of the Soviet Trade Delegation in London 1945 - 1949. Candidate for 1945 controller.
- PF. 103959
- (12) Alexander Gavrilovich TSCHERNOUSANOV, Secretary to Soviet Naval Attaché, London 1941 - 1944. Candidate for possible member of the Military Attaché's staff.
- PF. 67956
- (13) Yuri Stepanovich ZHENCHUZHIKOV, Secretary Interpreter to Soviet Military Attaché, London 1942 - 1946. Candidate for possible member of the Military Attaché's staff.
- PF. 700759
- (14) Alexandre Fedorovich SIZOV, Soviet Military Attaché to Emigré Governments in the U.K. 1942 - 1945. Candidate for possible member of the Military Attaché's staff.
- P.F.R. 4398
- (15) Konstantin STUKALOV, Assistant Naval Attaché, Soviet Embassy, London 1941 - 1945. Candidate for member of Military Attaché's staff.
- PF. 603326
- (16) Ivan Ivanovich AGAPONOV, Secretary to Soviet Military Mission, London 1943 - 1949. Candidate for member of Military Attaché's staff.
- PF. 63319
- (17) Boris Mikhailovich KROTOV, Secretary and Consul, Soviet Embassy London 1941 - 1947. Possible candidate for the swarthy Georgian controller.
- P.F.R. 4397
- (18) Vladimir Evexievich MAKHLUEV, attached to Soviet Naval Attaché, London 1941 - 1946. Possible candidate for the swarthy Georgian controller.
- PF. 68720
- (19) Vassili Sergievich PODOLSKI, door-keeper clerk, Soviet Embassy, London 1943 - 1948. Candidate for 1945 controller.
- PF. 603310
- (20) Boris Ivanovich KARAVAEV, Cultural Attaché, Soviet Embassy, London 1943 - 1948. Candidate for 1945 controller.
- PF. 63512
- (21) Pavel Dmitrievich YERZINE, clerk and secretary, Soviet Embassy, London 1941 - 1947. Candidate for 1945 controller.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

578A

Precedence... **IMMEDIATE** Security Classification... **TOP SECRET**

From: **S.I.O. WASHINGTON**... File Nos... **PF. 72,493**..... Originator's No... **90**.....

To: Date of Origin... **27.2.64**..

Passed for Action to **D.G.**..... Date of Receipt... **28.2.64**..

Info..... Copies to... **D., D.1/Inv.**..... Decyphered by... **AB/DEF**..

Reference your telegram 466 of 27th February, 1964.

1. F.B.I. have no jurisdiction over deportation. All they could do would be to submit summary of security information to Department of Immigration who would decide whether deportation proceedings should be instituted.
2. Hypothetical case has been put to Department of Immigration who say:
 - (a) Even if they are satisfied that case for deportation exists it is still open to subject to contest it in Court(? s.) This could take several months and would almost certainly attract publicity. One case took 13 years.
 - (b) Even if deportation order is obtained subject has right to choose country to which he is deported, providing that country will have him. In other words a deportation order cannot be used to circumvent extradition treaties.
3. F.B.I. will not put CAIRNCROSS case to Department of Immigration unless we confirm that we wish it.
4. As an alternative to your paragraph 3 have you considered possibility of prosecuting KLUGMAN? If charge against KLUGMAN could be sustained MARTIN believes he might be able to persuade CAIRNCROSS to give evidence for Crown.
5. Whether or not we wish F.B.I. to pursue for deportation they would like full summary of our information on CAIRNCROSS in order to interrogate him. They have received MARTIN's report and list of questions from D.1 but they would like in addition details of summary of our file.

KE
2/27/64

TOP SECRET

Reference PF.72,493.✓

NOTE.

DNA
to see
L28/2

577B

I spoke with the Director General last night who told me he was going to a further meeting and he wished to get his facts right.

2. I told the Director General that as I saw the position if a Police officer was sent to America and CAIRNCROSS did in fact make a statement under caution, the probability would be that he would be willing to return to the United Kingdom to face his trial. If such in fact turned out to be the case, then no question of deportation would arise as he would be leaving America of his own free will. If he was not prepared to make a statement, then similarly there would be no point in trying to deport him to this country, and in any event I said as I understood the American law if CAIRNCROSS wished to resist deportation he could insist upon the Hearing, at which he could be represented by Counsel, and I read to the Director General the gist of paragraph 150.6. on the Discretionary Relief Procedure in Expulsion Proceedings filed at page 263 of serial 98a in SF.231-2-3 vol. 3.

B. A. Hill

B.A. Hill.

L.A.
27.2.64.

RHS
2/27/64

TOP SECRET

577a

TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH

Precedence EMERGENCY Security Classification TOP SECRET

To: SLO Washington File Nos. PE. 72493 Section of Origin D.G.

..... Signed R. H. HOLUS

Originators
Inf.: No. 467 Date 27. II. 64 Date 27. 2. 64.

Copy to Sections D.

Reference your letter No. 466 of 27. 2. 64. D.1/Inv. (for
our telegram file)

From DIRECTOR GENERAL.

On receipt of F.B.I. reply to paragraph 2 we will send further instructions re paragraph 3, pending which you and MARTIN should take no action.

Handwritten:
R. H. HOLUS
227/164
12/15/27

576a

D.1/Inv. Mr. Symonds.

566b, 5672

I think you may like to have for the file the attached copies of two papers which D.G. has in his folder on CAIRNCROSS. In due course this can be replaced by the original copy which I will send to you.

I have also let D have copies of these two for his own information.

D.G. Sec.
27.2.64.

DA

R.R.
22/1/64
D/1/102
27/2



TOP SECRET

Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

February 26, 1964.

27 FEB 1964

D. J. MCB
Copies taken for
DG.
LA - Destroyed 3/9/64
BS/RS
575a
D.
D. J. MCB
27/2
(for PA)
Dear Roger

You asked me whether we could discover what would be the position under American law with regard to the Cairncross case with particular reference to:-

- (a) whether the U.S. authorities could deport to a country of their choice or to the country of origin of the person concerned whether or not he wanted this;
- (b) whether the procedure prior to deportation involved a public hearing.

(a) seems to be answered by Section 1253 of the Law on Aliens and Nationality, the effect of which is that the deportee may say where he wants to go, and if that country accepts him the U.S. authorities have to send him there unless the Attorney General considers that deportation to such country would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. If the country chosen by the deportee does not accept him then the U.S. authorities can send him compulsorily to the country of which he is a national. We would have no means of knowing whether or not a country to which the person concerned might wish to go would accept him until this was put to the test.

As regards (b) Section 1252 of the Law lays down that proceedings shall be held before a special inquiry officer in the presence of the deportee who can be legally represented. There seems to be no express provision for appeal, but there is a reference to judicial review of an order of deportation (Section 1252(c)) and it is likely that at any stage the person to be deported can fall back on habeas corpus proceedings to contest the legality of his detention. There is nothing to show whether the hearing before the special inquiry officer is in public

/but it can

Sir Roger Hollis.

TOP SECRET

Handwritten initials and date:
27/2/64
27/2

TOP SECRET

but it can probably be assumed that it would be in public since there is no provision to the contrary.

From a quick reading of the law it seems that there may be a further difficulty in securing deportation at all on the grounds of previous membership of the Communist Party or previous activities on behalf of a Communist Government or organisation, since most of the specified grounds for deportation refer to such membership or activities in the present time or after entry into the United States and none so far as I can see refers specifically to periods previous to entering the United States. In other words if it is accepted that the person concerned gave up his activities many years ago and no longer adheres to communism it might on the letter of the law be difficult to prove that he fell within the category of "deportable aliens".

I must emphasise that the above is based on a reading of the relevant United States law as available to us here. We do not have any information about United States practice in applying the law or about any judicial decisions with regard to it, some of which might possibly have influenced its interpretation to a significant extent. While therefore the views in this letter represent the best advice that our Legal Advisers can give on the material available to them, these views must be used with caution pending a final expression of opinion by the U.S. authorities themselves.

I am sending copies of this letter to Trend, Cunningham, Bligh, Allen, and to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Yours ever

Bernard Burrows

B.A.B. Burrows.

TOP SECRET

J.H. Hobbs

574

TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH

Precedence EMERGENCY Security Classification TOP SECRET

To: SLO Washington File Nos. PP-72493 Section of Origin D.G.

Signed R. H. HOLLIS

Inf.: Originators No. 466 Date 27-2-64 Date 27.2.64

Copy to Sections D.
D.I/Inv.

Reference your letter No. of
our telegram

file for pt

From DIRECTOR GENERAL.

1. You should tell F.B.I. in strict confidence we would feel it necessary to try to prosecute CAIRNCROSS if (a) he can be brought to this country;
(b) after arrival he makes a statement under caution.
2. Please ask F.B.I. if, with reference to (a), they can send CAIRNCROSS to this country by deportation or other means.
3. For your own information, if F.B.I. answer is negative, we shall want MARTIN to see CAIRNCROSS and ask him quote Are you willing - and it is for you to say - to return to U.K. and make a statement under caution with a view to prosecution unquote.
4. MARTIN should not therefore return to U.K. without my permission.

R.H. Hollis
22/7/64

NOTE FOR FILEThe Career of John CAIRNCROSS after April, 1952.

After CAIRNCROSS resigned from the Treasury in April 1952 he let his flat in Lansdowne Court and he and his wife went to France and Italy for a holiday. By October, 1952 they were living in Rome at via dei Pamphili 6. Gaby CAIRNCROSS got a job with the Food and Agricultural Organisation, U.N.O. Economic Section. CAIRNCROSS was doing research and writing a book on Moliere. He was at the same time looking out for some kind of job in business. In December 1952 CAIRNCROSS paid a brief visit to the U.K. He returned to Rome on 20 January 1953.

2. Towards the end of 1952 CAIRNCROSS was negotiating for a job with U.N.O. as a translator and in April 1953 he was nominated as the 'Observer' representative in Rome and was in fact taken on by the 'Observer' in May not as their representative but as a stringer. In June 1953 CAIRNCROSS was in Geneva working as a translator for U.N.O.; it was a temporary job only and he later returned to Rome. He lost the 'Observer' job in December 1953 but was to continue to work for them until March 1954. In February 1954 he became correspondent for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and he continued to do occasional interpreting and precis writing for U.N.O. in Geneva and Venice and freelance writing for the 'Scotsman' and the 'Economist'.

3. CAIRNCROSS returned to the U.K. on 8 August 1954 and it was then decided to interrogate him again in a further attempt to get the truth from him. The interrogation took place at Room 055 on 13 August 1954 and was totally unproductive and produced no new information. CAIRNCROSS left the U.K. on 23 August and continued to work as before in Geneva and Rome and by October had taken up residence in Geneva where it was thought Gaby CAIRNCROSS had now got a job in one of the U.N.O. organisations.

4. In June 1956 we received what appeared to be a visa application for CAIRNCROSS to go to the U.S.A. This was in fact a disguised vet relating to his employment in an international organisation. In November 1956 CAIRNCROSS was still in Geneva and had acquired a translating job with the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration. He was also representing the Italian newspaper, Corriera de la Sera and had obtained a temporary job as a translator and precis writer with the Inter-Parliamentary Union. It was learned that in this capacity he would attend a conference in Bangkok.

5. CAIRNCROSS visited the U.K. on 29 August 1957.

6. In 1958 we learned that CAIRNCROSS was on the staff of ECAFE Secretariat, Bangkok as Editor of Documents and in 1959 his name was included in a list of delegates to an ECAFE conference in Australia. It is not clear from the records that he actually went to Australia. Both the CAIRNCROSS' went to Paris on leave in October or November 1959 and later returned to Bangkok; they eventually returned to Rome in February 1961 and were living at Viale Quattro Venti, 5.

/7.

RK/RS
22/7/64
D/K/L
27/2

- 2 -

7. CAIRNCROSS visited the U.K. on 14 June 1961.

8. In October 1961 we learned [redacted] that CAIRNCROSS was associated in Rome with the firm of Italconsult where he was described as Commonwealth Economic Adviser. It was proposed that he should travel in Africa and was likely to have access to classified economic and financial information both Italian and British.

[redacted]

"John CAIRNCROSS is known to have been a Communist in his youth and we suspect that he may have been involved in Russian espionage".

This was considered to be sufficient to put the Italians on their guard. At the same time the question was considered of making a further attempt to re-interrogate CAIRNCROSS either in this country if he came here for any visit or in Rome. It was proposed that this should be preceded by an interview with CAIRNCROSS' brother Alexander who was about to be PV'd. For various reasons this project fell through and we next heard of CAIRNCROSS when we learned from the Treasury in November 1962 that there was a proposal by the Government of Pakistan to create a post to be paid for from the funds of Department of Technical Co-operation and filled by CAIRNCROSS. The Department of Technical Co-operation decided that they would discourage the Pakistanis from recruiting for this post and stated that they would not have appointed CAIRNCROSS in any case.

9. In November 1963 we received a U.S. emigration visa vetting enquiry which showed that CAIRNCROSS had applied for a visa in Karachi.

10. CAIRNCROSS received his visa in London on 11 February 1964 and flew to America later the same day.

D.1
27.2.64.


E. McBarnet

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IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 JANUARY 2024

572a

NOTE FOR FILE

CAIRNCROSS had been interviewed in this country on nine separate occasions:

- (1) on 21 August, 1951 by Mr A.S. Martin. This was with reference to his name, address and telephone number having been found in MACLEAN's office diary.
- (2) On 10 December, 1951 by Mr D.H. Whyte. This related to a 1939 trace of CAIRNCROSS.
- (3) On ³¹21 March, 1952 by Mr W.J. Skardon. This was in connection with the identification of CAIRNCROSS as the writer of a document found in BURGESS' flat.
- (4) On 2 April, 1952 by Mr W.J. Skardon. At this interview CAIRNCROSS made a statement admitting having written the BURGESS document.
- (5) On 9 April, 1952 by Mr W.J. Skardon and Mr C.A.G. Simkins.
- (6) On 16 April, 1952 by Mr W.J. Skardon. CAIRNCROSS gave his first explanation of his activities on 7 April.
- (7) On 17 April, 1952 by Mr W.J. Skardon. Interview at CAIRNCROSS's request and he provided his second explanation of his activities on 7 April.
- (8) On 28 April, 1952 by Mr W.J. Skardon.
- (9) On 13 August, 1954 by Mr J.C. Robertson and Mr B. Russell Jones.

Evelyn McBarnet
 E. McBarnet

D.1
 27.2.64.

by B
 27/2/64
 D/B
 2/2


TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

571a

PF 72,493/D.1/EMcB

To: S.L.O. Washington

I attach a further brief for the questioning of CAIRNCROSS. Also attached are some more photographs of possible candidates for his R.I.S. controllers.



E. McBarnet

26 February, 1964.

Encs.

EMcB/JG

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

[Handwritten initials]
22/7/64
D/152
26/2

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

Further Brief for Interrogation of John CAIRNCROSS

Talent Spotting

It is presumed that CAIRNCROSS may have been used by his R.I.S. controllers as a talent spotter. If so can CAIRNCROSS tell us whose names he passed to the R.I.S. as possible candidates for recruitment:

- (i) From the Foreign Office?
- (ii) From the Treasury?
- (iii) From G.C. & C.S.?
- (iv) From M.I.6?

2. Does CAIRNCROSS know of any member of the Civil Service who was recruited by the R.I.S.?

Documents

3. Can CAIRNCROSS describe any of the Foreign Office documents which he passed to "Otto"?

4. When CAIRNCROSS was working for G.C. & C.S. at Bletchley who was he working with? Did he mention the names of any of his colleagues to "Robert"? Did he give "Robert" any details about the technique of the work he was doing, or did he only give him the finished product?

5. CAIRNCROSS is known to have travelled considerably up to the outbreak of War in 1939. Were any of his foreign visits connected with the R.I.S.? Did he ever meet a member of the R.I.S. abroad? Did CAIRNCROSS ever travel abroad between 1939 and 1946, if so where did he go to and when and for what purpose?

6. Attached are some photographs:-

No (4) Simon Davidovitch KREMER, Secretary to the Soviet Military Attaché in London 1937 - 1946. Candidate for "Robert".

No (5) Alexei V. MEDVEDEV, Secretary to Military and Air Attaché 1943 - 1948. Candidate for CAIRNCROSS's controller between 1945 and 1948.

No (6) Konstantin Mikhailovich KARNAUKHOV, chauffeur to the Military Attaché 1943 - 1951. Candidate for CAIRNCROSS's controller between 1945 and 1948.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

TOP SECRET

D
Copy to LA Per int
570a

FF.72493/D.G.

25th February 1964.

If the future handling of the CAIRNCROSS case is to be negotiated between the Security Service and the F.B.I., I think it is essential that I should be able to convince the F.B.I. that we are not trying to find a way out of taking action but, on the contrary, that we are anxious to prosecute if this proves possible. We can then say that with this in view we are seeking the assistance of the F.B.I.

2. In order to be in a position to bring a prosecution we need :

(1) to have the facts of the case in legally admissible form,

and (ii) to get CAIRNCROSS within our grasp.

3. As a possible way to fulfil (i), we would ask the F.B.I. if they would allow a police officer to interview CAIRNCROSS in the United States to try to obtain a statement under caution.

4. In fulfilment of (ii), we would ask whether the F.B.I. would be able and willing to deport CAIRNCROSS to this country. We could proceed from this to establish what are the conditions attaching to deportation, e.g.:-

(a) Can the deportee be directed to a particular country?

(b) Does the reason for deportation have to be given publicly?

(c) Does the deportee have a right of appeal?

(d) Is the appeal heard in public?

5. Faced with a direct invitation to help us in getting hold of CAIRNCROSS, the F.B.I. would certainly give clear answers to these questions. If it should prove that they are unable to have CAIRNCROSS deported to this country, I do not think they could object to the Government making a statement to this effect if at some stage the CAIRNCROSS case should become publicly known.

6. You should perhaps know that Bernard Burrows is enquiring whether the Foreign Office Legal Adviser has details of the United States deportation Act and procedures.

Copies of this letter were subsequently sent to all mentioned in para. 6 of 569a.

R. H. HOLLIS

Sir Burke Trend, K.C.B., C.V.O.,
Cabinet Office.

TOP SECRET

K.H.
27/6/64
2572

TOP SECRET

Destroyed
3/19/64
bx/ks
Copy to W.A. P. inf. 5 79a

FF.72493/D.E.

25th February 1964.

As I told you on the telephone yesterday, Friday to Sunday was a public holiday in the United States and we could not therefore get the official view of the F.B.I. in answer to our question whether they would be able to send CAIRNCROSS to this country by deportation or other means if requested by us. Their unofficial answer was that CAIRNCROSS represented no security danger to the United States and therefore that the F.B.I. would not recommend deportation or removal from the university. This was not an exact answer to our question.

2. I have now received their official view. The F.B.I. point out that the information about CAIRNCROSS is exclusively ours, but on the basis of the facts that they have at present and influenced by our current assessment of them, they do not consider that in present circumstances CAIRNCROSS represents a security danger to the United States.

3. I do not know exactly what has been given by our Washington representative as our "current assessment", but I imagine it is that CAIRNCROSS has had no opportunity to spy since 1952 and appears no longer to be in sympathy with the Russian Intelligence Service. I would agree with this assessment.

4. I am also informed by my representative in Washington that the F.B.I. are confident that the CAIRNCROSS story could be kept secret in the United States.

5. I do not think we ought to assume that, in the event of publicity, the F.B.I. would be prepared to allow us to say that they had been unwilling or unable to deport CAIRNCROSS. I believe we would first have to test this by a request that they should deport him to this country, and I think it possible that the F.B.I. are now trying to test how determined we are to pursue this spy.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Cunningham, Burrows, Bligh, Philip Allen and the D.P.P. Copy also sent to Attorney General.

R. H. HOLLIS

Sir Burke Trend, K.C.B., C.V.O.,
Cabinet Office.

TOP SECRET

bx/ks
27/2/64
4152
267

568a.

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT
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THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL 567a

PF 72,493/D.1/EMcB

25th February, 1964.


Dear [redacted]

John CAIRNCROSS

I understand that you have heard of the recent events in the case of the above-named and I am sending you an extract from the report on CAIRNCROSS which refers to his employment in G.C. and C.S. at Bletchley (11 May, 1942 - June, 1943).

2. I should be grateful for any comments you may care to make on this and for any questions which you would like me to include in a brief for CAIRNCROSS.

Yours sincerely,



E. McBarnet

[redacted]
G.C.H.Q.

Enc. 1.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

RIB
29/2/64
25F

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ACT 1958 September 2023

5672 6

24 FEB 1964

21st February, 1964

TOP SECRET AND
EXACTLY PERSONAL

I have tried to summarise in the enclosed record the general sense of yesterday's necessarily inconclusive discussion between Ministers about the Cairncross case. You may like to have a copy; and I am sending copies also to Charles Cunningham, Bernard Burrows, Philip Allen and the Director of Public Prosecutions.

As a precaution we ought perhaps to begin to consider possible guidance for the Press, on the two hypotheses that the news leaks either while Cairncross is still in the United States or after he has been returned to this country. I have therefore attached to the record of the discussion a draft note based on my original submission; and I should welcome comments. I have not had a shot at possible supplementaries, and here again, it would be helpful if you and the others could suggest what they might be and how they would best be dealt with.

BURKE TREND

Sir Timothy Bligh,
K.B.E., D.S.O., D.S.C.

Handwritten signature and date:
27/2/64

Amended copy.

5677

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Precedence.....**IMMEDIATE**..... Security Classification.....**TOP SECRET**.....

From :.....**S.L.O. WASHINGTON**..... File Nos.....**PF 72,493**..... Originator's No.....**85**.....

T..... Date of Origin.....**24.2.64**.....

Passed for Action to.....**D.G.**..... Date of Receipt.....**24.2.64**.....

Info..... Copies to.....**D.**..... Decyphered by.....**SFW**.....

Reference your telegram 462 of 22nd February, 1964.

1. F.B.I. point out that information about CAIRNCROSS is exclusively ours but on basis of facts so far presented and influenced by our current assessment of them they see no reason to disagree with our view that he does not in present circumstances represent security danger to United States.
2. F.B.I. are confident CAIRNCROSS story could be kept secret here.

PK PS
227/64

DEWAT
11-3-64

TOP SECRET AND
STRICTLY PERSONAL

SIR ROGER HOLLIS



5668

With the Compliments

of

Sir Charles Cunningham

24 FEB 1964

Home Office.
Whitehall.

HOME OFFICE, WHITEHALL

21st February, 1964.

TOP SECRET AND
STRICTLY PERSONAL

872
Thank you for the note of the meeting yesterday about Cairncross.

As regards the draft guidance for the press, I doubt whether it would be right to refer to the possibility that Cairncross was a security risk in the years up to 1952 if no charge has been brought against him. Might we say "Information has recently come to light which suggests that he may be able to assist in the investigation of security matters in the years up to 1952". As regards the last paragraph, something depends, I think, on the stage that has been reached when Cairncross returns to this country. If he is not charged on arrival, could we say "He has now returned to this country and is assisting the police with their enquiries. Pending the result, there is nothing more to say"?

If, on the other hand, he is charged on arrival, it would seem sufficient to state merely that he was arrested on arrival and has been charged under the Official Secrets Act.

I have sent a copy of this note to Sir Bernard Epps, Mr. Allen, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Timothy Bligh and Sir Roger Hollis.

C. C. CUNNINGHAM

Sir Burke Trend, K.C.B., C.V.O.

RP
22/7/64

566b

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

TOP SECRET

566a

PF.72493/D.G.

24th February 1964.

We may well be exchanging further telegrams on the CAIRNCROSS case and these may be more intelligible to you if I give you the background for yourself and Arthur Martin.

2. On receipt of Arthur's telegram no.81 saying that CAIRNCROSS had admitted to spying, I notified Burke Trend, Bernard Burrows and one or two other senior officials. Trend immediately called a meeting to consider notifying Ministers and as a result a monster meeting was called by the Prime Minister on Thursday evening, 20th February. In addition to the Prime Minister there were present the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Attorney General, Sir Charles Cunningham, Sir Burke Trend, Sir Timothy Bligh, Sir Bernard Burrows, the D.F.P., Philip Allen and myself.
3. The Attorney General pointed out that Arthur's interview, the admirable note of which had by this time been received, was not admissible as evidence. Before he could consider whether there could be a prosecution it would be necessary for a statement to be taken from CAIRNCROSS under caution by a police officer. There was considerable discussion whether such a statement could better be taken in the United States or in this country. No final conclusion was reached at the meeting.
4. There was also discussion whether the case could be brushed under the carpet. I expressed the view, which everyone seemed to share, that Mr.Hoover would not tolerate a confessed Russian spy remaining in the United States and still less would he allow him to teach the American young at Cleveland University. Acting on this assumption it was felt that there was bound to be publicity for the case in the fairly near future, and that the Government must therefore demonstrate either that it had tried to get hold of CAIRNCROSS or that, having failed to get an admissible confession from him, there was no purpose in trying to get hold of him. I was therefore instructed to put the question whether the F.B.I. would be able to send CAIRNCROSS to the U.K. by deportation or other means if requested by us. This I did in my telegram no.460 and got the reply in paragraph 2 of your telegram no.84 of 21.2.64. which greatly surprised us all. Indeed, if you later confirm that this is the official view I shall begin to wonder if Mr.Hoover has become a dangerous liberal.

/5.

H.C.M.Stone Esq.,
British Embassy
Washington D.C.

TOP SECRET

Handwritten notes:
R/S
24/2/64
D.H.H.
2/7/64

- 2 -

5. An additional problem which concerned us was that of deportation and extradition. Espionage is not of course an extradictable offence. If therefore we were to invite the Americans to deport CAIRNCROSS, after receiving his admission that he had been a spy, we might be running into the same criticisms which fell upon the Home Office in the [redacted] case.

6. In the political conditions which exist here there are of course some Ministers who would like to brush the case under the carpet if they could be sure that it would stay there. I imagine that if the F.B.I. is prepared to countenance CAIRNCROSS remaining at Cleveland University, they will take every possible step to see that the story does not leak for there surely would be an outcry to have him removed if it became public.

7. We shall no doubt be having further meetings when I get your confirmation of the official F.B.I. view. On the assumption that this does not vary from the unofficial line you have already given me, it is at least possible that the Government will decide not to make any public statement about the case, but in that event I may well be told to ask you to find out from the F.B.I. whether they or the Immigration authorities would allow us to say, if the story were to become public :

- (a) that as a result of co-operation between the British and United States security authorities, certain information about CAIRNCROSS' past activities had come to light; and
- (b) that the American authorities did not consider that this information justified deportation.

We would of course only want to make such a statement if our hands were forced by press publicity.

8. There is nothing for you to do at the moment about the point in the last paragraph, but I have set it out at length in this letter so that any subsequent telegram I may send may be more intelligible.

R. H. HOLLIS

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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 SEPTEMBER 2023

PF.72493

5662

D. *Diace*
25/2

Note.

With reference to S.L.O.Washington's telegram no. 84 of 21.2.64., I spoke to Sir Burke Trend, Sir Bernard Burrows and 'C' and gave them the unofficial view of the F.B.I. recorded in paragraph 2 of the telegram. I said that I had asked for official confirmation which I expected to get late this evening.

D.G.

Done 10/2/64

24.2.64.

IR/RS
22/2/64
D/11/2
25/2

PF.72493

D.H. Burrows

5664

E. L. 25/2

Note.

When I was speaking to Sir Bernard Burrows this morning about the CAIRNCROSS case, he said that there was a feeling in the Foreign Office that they should have been given an opportunity to know in advance of our plan to interrogate CAIRNCROSS in the United States. I said that they had known in advance for Cumming had told Street. Burrows said that he knew they had been consulted about the grant of a visa, but I said that we had no concern with the visa save in connection with the intention to interrogate, and I was quite satisfied that this intention had been mentioned. Burrows then looked at his papers again and apologised, admitting that they contained a reference to our intention to interrogate.

Rosa Istaitia

D.G.

24.2.64.

R.P.
22/7/64
D.H. Burrows
25/2

NOTE FOR FILEKLUGMANN, Norman John (James)

Born: 27.2.12.

School: Approximately 1927 - 1931 Greshams School, Holt.
1931 - 1935 Trinity College, Cambridge.

1933: Joined the C.P.G.B.
 1936-1939: Closely associated with the World Student Association for Peace, Freedom and Culture.
 1940-45: In Middle East; undertook secret duties and ultimately served in Yugoslavia with S.O.E. and U.N.R.R.A.
 1947 and 1948: Stood unsuccessfully for election to the National Executive.
 1948-50: Editor of "World News and Views".
 1950-57: Political Committee, B.C.P.
 1952-63: National Executive Committee, C.P.G.B.
 1957-62: Head of Education Department, C.P.H.Q.
 1957- : National Cultural Committee, C.P.G.B.
 1962- : Editor of "Marxism Today".

Said to speak 10 languages. Father naturalised British of German origin. Party expert on the Balkans and on Marxist theory. He is at present engaged on the preparation of a history of the C.P.G.B. He suffers from chronic asthma. He lives with his sister, Kitty CORNFORTH, and her husband (PF 42,752), who are both Party members.

It is known that KLUGMANN and Donald MACLEAN were friends at school and at Cambridge. KLUGMANN is slightly older than MACLEAN and is said to have had much influence on him.

It is known that KLUGMANN worked for the R.I.S. at some time "fairly early in my career" (presumably in about 1936). It is believed that he did not wish to engage in espionage but preferred to be a normal Party member. He was however recontacted during the 1940-45 War but because he was very fully occupied in exercising Communist influence in Yugoslavia was not in fact used directly by the R.I.S. at that time.

John CAIRNCROSS has recently told us that KLUGMANN, whom he knew at Cambridge, recruited him to espionage in 1936.

E. McBarnet
 E. McBarnet

D.1
 24.2.64.

Handwritten notes:
 R/L
 22/2/64
 D/L
 24/2

5652

TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH

Precedence PRIORITY PHILOSOPHER Security Classification TOP SECRET

To: S.L.O. Washington File Nos. PF 72493 Section of Origin D.C.

Signed R. H. HOLLIS

Originators

Inf.: No. 462 Date 22.2.64 Date 22.2.64

Copy to Sections D.

Reference your ~~letter~~ our telegram No. 64 of 21.2.64

XXX

From Director General.

1. Your paragraph 2. Please confirm F.B.I. view officially.
2. Do you consider it likely that CAIRNCROSS' story could be kept secret?
3. Reply early Monday.

RH
22/1/64
D/H/S
257

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

564b

PF.72493/D.G.

21st February 1964.

I think you and Laurence Helsby may like to have the attached copy *— see 554a* of a very brief note based on the first report from my officer who interviewed John CAIRNCROSS.

2. I have given copies to Charles Cunningham, Burke Trend and Bernard Burrows.

R. H. HOLLIS

Philip Allen Esq., C.B.,
Treasury Chambers.

Enc.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

Key file
22/7/64
D1/82
5/2

457/19d

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

564A

Precedence..... **IMMEDIATE/PHILOSOPHER** Security Classification..... **TOP SECRET.**
 From:..... WASHINGTON. File Nos..... PF.72493 Originator's No..... 84.
 To:..... Date of Origin..... 21.2.64.
 Passed for D.G. via N.D.O.
 Action to Date of Receipt..... 21.2.64.
 Info..... Copies to..... Decyphered by..... PWF/SFW.

Following for Director General.

Reference your telegram 460 of 21st. February, 1964.

1. This Friday to Sunday is public holiday. We cannot consult F.B.I. officially until Monday.
2. Your paragraph 1. F.B.I. have said unofficially that CAIRNCROSS represents no security danger to United States and therefore they would not recommend deportation or removal from University. We cannot estimate their reaction if requested by us to deport.
3. MARTIN thinks CAIRNCROSS might be persuaded to return U.K. voluntarily if he could be assured that he would be serving national interest, would be immune from arrest and would be allowed to return to the United States. This would mean MARTIN personally seeing him again in Cleveland. He goes to Canada Sunday so will be unable to do this until Wednesday earliest.
4. Your paragraph 2. They will not start interrogation until they receive brief from us. Thereafter only a matter of days.
5. Your paragraph 3. In view foregoing this is unlikely but confident F.B.I. would not court embarrassment.

KLS
22/7/64

SECRETD.1/E.McB.John CAIRNCROSS.

As spoken. Could you please include the following questions in the brief for the F.B.I.

- 1) CAIRNCROSS appears to have been in touch with BURGESS from 1938 until just after the early days of the war, when he was handed over to "ROBERT". Did CAIRNCROSS remain in contact with BURGESS as well after this date?
- 2) Paragraph 10 of the CAIRNCROSS statement shows that after he went to the Defence Material division of the Treasury which took place in June 1945, and where he remained until 1947, he was turned over to yet another controller. Can CAIRNCROSS be more precise as to when this exchange took place? ie: was it soon after his move to this appointment, or at a much later stage?
- 3) Can CAIRNCROSS say whether his job in the Defence Material division kept him in London or did it entail travelling? If so, can he give any information on his whereabouts in September 1945? (The Treasury papers may, of course, give the answer to this one.)

J. Russell King

J. Russell King.

21st February, 1964.**SECRET***R, RS
2/17/64
R/RS
2512*

PF.72493

D.

D1/1w. 24/2

Note.

With regard to the suggestion that a statement should be taken from CAIRNCROSS by the police under caution in the United States, the arguments advanced in the meeting with the Prime Minister in favour of this were that, if he refused to make such a statement, there would clearly be no prospect of a prosecution and therefore no need to try to get CAIRNCROSS returned to this country. Arguments in favour of an interrogation in the U.K. rather than in the United States were that, if he made a confession, he could be arrested and charged immediately. This would avoid any difficulty which would occur if he had made a confession in the United States but then could not be arrested until he landed in this country, with the risk that if the aircraft were deflected by bad weather he might never reach this country. Even if we failed to get a confession in the U.K. we would at least have demonstrated that we had tried our best.

2. The Home Office also saw some difficulty in suggestions which might be made that we were encouraging the Americans to use deportation in the place of extradition though espionage was not an extradictable offence. This argument would be strengthened if we had obtained a confession from him before he was removed from the United States.

3. Subsequent to the meeting Sir Charles Cunningham told me that he had made enquiries and he believed that the Americans would probably take the same line as we ourselves would about interrogations, i.e. they would probably agree to a police officer conducting an interrogation of a British subject in the United States, but might well insist that a representative of the F.B.I. should be present. Sir Charles felt that if this were done it would inevitably make the whole proceeding more formal and would increase the risk of leakage.

R. J. St. John

D.G.

21.2.64.*R. J. St. John*
22/7/64D1152
2572

TOP SECRET

Hest/19/d

PF.72493.

5636

~~D.~~ D/H/w 24/2

Note.

The Prime Minister held a meeting at No.10 last night to discuss Sir Burke Trend's minute of 19th February on the CAIRNCROSS case. There were also present the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Attorney General, Sir Charles Cunningham, Sir Burke Trend, Sir Timothy Bligh, Sir Bernard Burrows, the D.P.P., Philip Allen and myself.

140
PPS
DUS FO
(Mackenzie)
Treasury
5566

2. The Attorney General said that none of the information given by CAIRNCROSS to Arthur Martin was admissible as evidence. Before he could consider whether there could be a prosecution it would be necessary for a statement to be taken from CAIRNCROSS under caution by a police officer. He was however in some doubt whether in any event it would be right to bring a prosecution against CAIRNCROSS for acts committed 12 or more years ago.

3. It was agreed that there was a likelihood that the Americans would not allow CAIRNCROSS to remain in the United States or to go on teaching at Cleveland University, and that the action they might take to remove him would be likely to cause publicity. There therefore appeared to be no opportunity to brush the case under the carpet.

4. There was discussion of the relative merits of a police interrogation of CAIRNCROSS in the United States and in this country. No final decision was taken, but I was instructed to enquire through our channels to the F.B.I. whether, if requested, the Americans would be able to send CAIRNCROSS to the U.K. by deportation or other means.

5. Ministers questioned me as to why CAIRNCROSS was not interrogated during his times in Bangkok and Rome or during his recent transit of this country, on the way to the United States. I explained the reasons.

6. The Prime Minister said that he would call another meeting on Monday to consider the question further in the light of the reply to our telegram.

Rec. Hest.

D.G.

21.2.64.

TOP SECRET

R/K
21/2/64
D/M
25/2

Copied to PF 796,285

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL


563a

PF 72,493/D.1/EMcB

To: S.L.O. Washington

Please refer to your letter of 17 February, 1964.

2. I attach herewith a preliminary brief for the further questioning of CAIRNCROSS. Attached also are photographs of three possible candidates for some of his R.I.S. controllers. These happen to be the most obvious and easily found. More photographs and a further brief will follow as soon as possible.



21 February, 1964.

E. McBarnet

Encs.

EMcB/JG

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

12/1/65
22/7/64
D1/1/72
2/1/72

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

Preliminary Brief for Interrogation of John CAIRNCROSS

1. CAIRNCROSS has said that he did not know BURGESS while at Cambridge. There is some reported evidence that he did. Can he be pressed on this?
2. At an earlier interview CAIRNCROSS said that he moved in Communist circles at Cambridge and attended one or two Party meetings. Can he be asked again if he did in fact belong to the Communist Party?
3. What pressures were used by KLUGMAN to persuade CAIRNCROSS to become a spy? He appears to have accepted his introduction to "Otto" immediately. Did KLUGMAN have some hold on him?
4. What were the arrangements for CAIRNCROSS to meet "Otto"? Where did they meet and how often?
5. CAIRNCROSS has said that he accepted some money from his Russian controller, "Robert". Can he say how much money he received and as nearly as possible when he received it?
6. CAIRNCROSS has said that he returned to the Treasury his controller was a young Russian whom he believes was later declared p.n.g. in connection with emigres. Can he say when he was taken over by this controller (CAIRNCROSS returned to the Treasury on 21 June, 1945) and how long he continued to work with him? Was he still in contact with this Russian at the time when he saw his photograph in the paper; can he say when this was?
7. BURGESS and MACLEAN left for Russia on 25 May, 1951. Can CAIRNCROSS say when he had his last meeting with his Russian controller, which he describes as being shortly after the disappearance of BURGESS and MACLEAN? It seems probable that CAIRNCROSS made his chalk mark calling for an emergency meeting on the afternoon of 31 March, 1952, the same day on which he was interviewed in respect of the document in his handwriting which had been found amongst BURGESS' possessions. Can CAIRNCROSS be asked if he did make the chalk mark on this day? CAIRNCROSS has said that he has never been recontacted by the Russians; he must, however, have come in contact with some during his employment as an interpreter with U.N.O. in about 1954 and in Bangkok when he was employed by ECAFE (1957 - 1960). Can he be asked if he was ever approached, if so by whom? Can he give any information about Viktor Mechislavovich LESIOVSKIY who was First Secretary in the Soviet Delegation to ECAFE; Cesar ORTIZ Tinoco, Mexican, Chief U.N. Information Officer, Bangkok; Paul ALPEN, Australian of Belgian origin, of SEATO; William MULGRUE, Australian, of F.A.O.?
8. CAIRNCROSS has implied that his R.I.S. contact with Guy BURGESS was limited to the period between 1938 and approximately 1940. It is known however that he continued to see BURGESS from time to time. Can he be asked if he continued to have espionage connections with BURGESS throughout?
9. Attached herewith are photographs:-
 - (1) Arnold DEUTSCHE. Illegal spy for the R.I.S. in the U.K. from 1934 - 1938. Possible candidate for "Otto".
 - (2) Anatole Borisovich GROMOV. ^{Yes} Possible candidate for "Robert".
 - (3) Pavle Stepanovich KUZNETSOV, ^{Yes} Russian Intelligence Officer. Arrived in the U.K. on 2 February 1949 and was arrested on 13 June 1952 with William Martin MARSHALL. Left the U.K. and returned to Russia on 12 July 1952. A candidate for CAIRNCROSS' last controller.

Copied to
PF-796, 285

562a

TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH

Precedence PRIORITY Security Classification TOP SECRET

To: SLO WASHINGTON File Nos PP 72493 Section of Origin D.C.

R. H. HOLLIS

Originators Signed

Inf.: No 460 Date 21. II. 64 Date 21. II. 64

Copy to Sections D.

Reference your letter our telegram No. of

From DIRECTOR GENERAL.

1. Please ask F.B.I. if they would be able to send CAIRNCROSS to U.K. by deportation or other means if requested by us.
2. When do you estimate interrogation by F.B.I. will be completed?
3. Assuming that F.B.I. will not allow CAIRNCROSS to remain at Cleveland University, what cover story have they for arranging departure without embarrassment?
4. Reply PHILOSOPHER.

Refs
2/2/64
D/M
2/17

~~in CAB~~

561b

PF.72,493

See
109

NOTE FOR FILE

J. CAIRNCROSS

Following D.G.'s meeting at top official level on the afternoon of 19th February 1964 at which - inter alia - the possibility/necessity of getting CAIRNCROSS back to within the U.K. jurisdiction was considered, and a decision reached to put a paper to Ministers, D.G. asked me:

(a) To brief L.A., and invite him to put D.P.P. fully in the picture. I did this early on 20.2.64. and L.A. went to see D.P.P. immediately.

(b) To signal Mr. Martin to ascertain what short term or long term steps had been taken to secure that CAIRNCROSS's absence from the University did not cause comment and lead to publicity. Before I had despatched such a signal Mr. Martin's report of 17th February was received indicating that interrogation had been conducted, and was continuing, in circumstances which were designed to avoid giving rise to questions in University circles. It seemed to me therefore that there was no purpose in despatching such a telegram. (I spoke D.G. on 20.2.64., who agreed).

M.E.D. Cumming

D.

20th February 1964


Re: LF
27/2/64

2/17/64

561a

NOTE FOR FILE

With reference to the D.G.'s comment on paragraph 4 of the attachment to 560a, the letter to which Mr Street refers was given to us by the Foreign Office in February, 1952 in order that a comparison might be made between CAIRNCROSS' handwriting in this letter and the handwriting of certain documents found in BURGESS' flat. Expert examination showed that the handwriting was identical. The letter is filed at 111a in Volume 3.



E. McBarnet

D.1
20.2.64.

R/S
22/7/64
D1186
2/12

PF. 72493

560a



Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

20 FEB 1964

February 19, 1964.

~~D. HCB~~

D. HCB
20/2 20/2

Dear Roger

Burrows
20/2

.....
I enclose a copy of the minute by John Street which I showed you very briefly this afternoon about the record of Cairncross's service in the Foreign Office. This also contains the information about his work under the United Nations in the Far East which may help to complete your records.

Yours ever

Bernard Burrows

B.A.B. Burrows.

Sir Roger Hollis.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

Handwritten notes: k R, 22/2/64, D/HCB, 21/2

TOP SECRET

John Cairncross

This question was discussed at a meeting at No. 10 Downing Street at 5.00 p.m. on Thursday, 20th February 1964. There were present:-

- Prime Minister
- Foreign Secretary
- Home Secretary
- Attorney-General
- Sir Burke Trend
- Sir Charles Cunningham
- Sir Bernard Burrows
- Mr. P. Allen
- Director of Public Prosecutions
- Sir Timothy Bligh

There was general agreement that it was unlikely that Cairncross would be allowed to remain in the United States. The United States authorities would be reluctant to permit a self-confessed spy to stay indefinitely on American territory; and it must be assumed that the University of Cleveland would not be prepared to confirm Cairncross's appointment to their staff.

It was also agreed that we could not afford to connive at his evading our jurisdiction or to appear reluctant to have him sent back to the United Kingdom if this could be arranged.

On the other hand:-

- (a) It was not clear whether he could, in fact, be returned to this country. The offence was not extraditable; and the United States Government might therefore be reluctant to deport him to the United Kingdom, even if they had power to do so (which was itself uncertain). Nevertheless, they might find means of returning him

to us, just as we had found it possible to decide to return Soblen to the United States.

- (b) Even if he were returned to this country, we should not necessarily be able to secure his conviction. The confession which he had made in the United States had been volunteered in return for certain inducements; and it would not, therefore, be admissible as evidence. Moreover, it was doubtful whether we could properly initiate, or a court was likely to endorse, action in respect of espionage which must have ceased at least 12 years ago - the more so since it could be represented as having been directed to the benefit of a country which, for a large part of the period in question, was an ally of both the United Kingdom and the United States.

For these reasons we should not at this stage close our minds to the possibility that the most expedient outcome of the affair might be for Cairncross himself to decide to leave the United States for some third country without ever returning to the United Kingdom - as he was perfectly entitled to. But we should equally keep open the possibility that the right course might now be to send a police officer to the United States, who would seek to extract from Cairncross a confession under conditions which would make it admissible evidence. The choice between these alternative courses - in so far as developments allowed us any real choice at all - would depend to some extent on the ability of the United States Government to deport Cairncross, if we pressed them to do so. This point should be clarified.

In further discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) Had it been imprudent to take the initiative in questioning Cairncross in Cleveland? No. His visit to the United States provided the first opportunity to interrogate him under favourable conditions since he left the United Kingdom in 1952; and, so long as it remained

uncertain whether, and how far, he had engaged in espionage before that date, suspicion might continue to attach to other individuals.

(b) Why had we not taken the opportunity to interrogate him during the brief period when he was passing through the United Kingdom (in order to collect his U.S. visa) on his way to the United States of America? Because we had known, at that point, virtually no more about him than we had known before then; and this did not provide sufficient grounds for interrogating him. The Security Service had judged - rightly, as the event showed - that, if he were questioned in the United States, he would be more willing to discuss his past and to provide us with information which we could not otherwise obtain.

(c) Cairncross was now being interrogated by the F.B.I.; and the representative of the Security Service in the United States believed that, so long as this process continued (perhaps for a couple of weeks or so), there was little risk of premature disclosure of the case. But it was agreed that, if speculation began in the Press, the initial reaction should be as outlined in 2. on page 3 of my minute of 19th February, adapted as necessary to the circumstances in which the speculation started.

BURKE TREND

21st February, 1964

TOP SECRET

Guidance for the Press

Cairncross is a British subject, who served in the Foreign Office, the Treasury and, for a short while, the Ministry of Supply from 1936 to 1952 but left the public service in 1952 and has lived abroad (mainly, so far as we know, in Italy and in Thailand) ever since. As a result of co-operation between the British and United States security services, information has recently come to light which suggests that he may ^{be able to assist in the investigation of security matters} [have been a security risk] in the years up to 1952.

[If Cairncross is still in the United States when the news leaks] The necessary enquiries are now being pursued; and, pending the result, there is nothing more to say.

[If Cairncross has already been returned to this country when the news breaks] He has therefore been deported [N.B. Check the accuracy of "deported"] for further interrogation in this country; and, pending the result, there is nothing more to say.

*He has now returned to this country and is awaiting the
results with their enquiries. Pending the result there is
nothing more to say.*

560a

TOP SECRET

JOHN CAIRNCROSS

I have examined Mr. Cairncross' Indiv file. This shows that when he first came into the Office in October 1936 he was put into American Department, but that he was not very successful there and was transferred to Western Department early in 1937. In June of that year Mr. Hoyer Miller recorded that Mr. Roberts, the Head of Western Department, was not satisfied with Cairncross' work, which was slipshod, inaccurate and untidy; the result of this was that a lot of his work had to be filtered through Maclean. All this added to the work of an already busy department.

2. In January 1938 Mr. St. Clair Roberts, in a report on the first year of Cairncross' probation, said that he felt considerable doubt about Cairncross' suitability for the Service. He showed little sign of sound judgment or ability to conform to office routine. As a result of this report Cairncross was seen by Mr. Oliver Harvey, who said that Cairncross' reports had been unsatisfactory; he would be transferred on January 24 to Central Department, and his future would come up for further consideration at the end of the year. In fact, however, though the Indiv does not say why, negotiations were begun with the Treasury in the summer of 1938 and the latter wrote to him on July 26 offering him a permanent appointment on transfer from the Foreign Office from October 1.

3. In November 1939 Cairncross came to see Mr. W.I. Mallet to ask whether the Foreign Office would have him back. He said that after a year in the Treasury he was quite clear that Foreign Office work was more in his line even though so far his job at the Treasury had been quite interesting. Mr. Mallet said that this application would be considered. The day after this conversation, Cairncross wrote to Mr. Mallet to say that on further consideration he now wished to suggest that he should be taken back by the Foreign Office on trial for about a year on the understanding that if it was not found suitable to keep him he would hand in his resignation; if, however, his work were thought good but not quite good enough, he hoped that the Foreign Office would use their good offices to help him obtain a post in the "Code School or P.C.O." If this suggestion was not acceptable, he asked for a post in the foreign relations section in the Ministry of Economic Warfare. ~~with hindsight~~; this looks like Russian direction.

4. The request was considered by the Promotions Board and Mr. Mallet wrote to Cairncross on December 1, 1939 saying that the Foreign Office could not have him back and that they thought he would be well advised to stay on in the Treasury. There is a note in the file that Cairncross replied to this in a letter of December 5, 1939 which was sent to the Security Service in 1952 and has not been returned.

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TOP SECRET

5. During his time in the Foreign Office, therefore, Cairncross worked for six months in American Department, which dealt with North, South and Central America; for nine months in Western Department which dealt with the League of Nations, Portugal, Spain and Morocco and for eight months in Central Department which dealt with Western Europe including Germany. His work in the last department, the Head of which was of course Mr. W. Strang, would have been of most interest to the Russians, as it covered the first nine months of 1938.

6. The Security Service seem to have been under the impression that Cairncross has lived in Italy since resigning from the Civil Service. This is not so; Mr. Maddocks has just told me that he knew Cairncross well at Bangkok, where the latter served in ECAFE under Nara Simhan, the Executive Secretary, from 1956 to about 1960. When it was known that Cairncross was coming, senior members of the Embassy staff were warned by [redacted] to be careful with Cairncross. Nevertheless, he and his wife had a good deal of social contact with the Embassy and with members of British firms and, if he were at that time still working for the Russians, he would have been very useful as a talent spotter. In about 1961 Cairncross sent Mr. Maddocks a Christmas card saying that he was settling in Italy.

7. The only other point of security interest is that Cairncross was guilty of a security breach in November 1936, when he left a cupboard open. It did not contain the most secret papers; but Sir R. Vansittart directed that Cairncross should be reprimanded, and this was done.

J.E.D. Street
February 19, 1964.

Sir B. Burrows.

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ACT 1958 September 2023

559a

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
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THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

John CAIRNCROSS

John CAIRNCROSS was interviewed on Sunday, 16th February, 1964, in a hotel room in Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A. by an experienced member of the British Security Service. The interview was arranged with the co-operation and goodwill of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with whom it had been agreed that if CAIRNCROSS proved to be co-operative, his interrogation would be continued by an officer of the Bureau.

2. The Security Service officer told CAIRNCROSS that he believed that it would be in his own best interests to talk frankly but he could make no promises and no forecast of what the United States Government might do. The question of a possible future prosecution was not mentioned.

3. CAIRNCROSS accepted the position and confessed that he had been recruited by Norman John KLUGMAN, a member of the British Communist Party, to work for the Russian Intelligence Service soon after he entered the Foreign Service in 1936 and continued to work for them until the disappearance of BURGESS and MACLEAN in May 1951, from which time the Russians made no further attempt to contact him.

4. No precise estimate of how much information he passed to the Russians can be made but, since he was under R.I.S. control throughout his Civil Service career during which time he had wide and varied access to secret information, it can be assumed that he passed to the Russians everything that came his way which might be of interest to them.

5. At the end of this first interview an officer of the F.B.I. was introduced to CAIRNCROSS and CAIRNCROSS agreed that he was willing to answer any further questions which might be put to him by this officer. The interrogation will be continued on briefs to be supplied by the Security Service in such a way as not to come to the notice of the University authorities.

6. The ultimate attitude of the U.S. authorities to CAIRNCROSS' continued presence in the U.S. cannot be foreseen, but the F.B.I. are clearly prepared to let him remain while he is being interrogated. There does not at present seem any reason to suppose that the Americans or CAIRNCROSS himself are at all anxious that there should be any publicity about the case but the risk of a leakage cannot be discounted.

20th February 1964

R.P.
1964
D.H.
207

557a

Note of Conference with
Sir Theobald Matthew, Director of Public Prosecutions
and Mr. Maurice Crump,
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions

I called on the Director this morning and handed to him:-

- (i) a note prepared by the Security Service giving the background of CAIRNCROSS, and
- (ii) the letter of the 17th February from Arthur Martin to Head Office.

2. I told the Director that a paper was being circulated to Cabinet and that the Attorney General would no doubt be brought in and that, therefore, it was necessary for him to know the facts of the case. We discussed the legal aspects of the case and we all agreed that there was as yet no admissible evidence which could be used in a prosecution. Our officer had made inducement to CAIRNCROSS which could render any statement inadmissible but apart from this there was no formal statement taken at all. All that we had at the moment was our officer's report of the interview he had had with CAIRNCROSS. The Director said he would see the Attorney General this afternoon and would advise the Attorney General we had as yet no admissible evidence which would justify a prosecution and further if H.M.G. decided they wanted to bring CAIRNCROSS back to this country for trial, before so doing an experienced Yard officer should be sent to America with a view to him taking a statement under caution. If, on the officer's arrival, CAIRNCROSS refused to make such a statement, we should have to accept the fact that he could not be prosecuted and this would have a material bearing in the Director's mind as to the line of action H.M.G. should take. In other words the Director does not think that we should move the Americans to bring CAIRNCROSS back to this country until we know whether or not we can prosecute him. This we can only do by taking a statement under caution by an experienced Police officer.

B. A. Hill

B. A. Hill.L.A.

20.2.64.

R/S
 19/2/64
 D/H
 20/2/64

556a

D.

D. L. P. S.
L. D. S.
To see - and for p.a.
please.

D.G. Sec.

19.2.64.

V. H. -

CABINET OFFICE,
1
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.W.1

20 FEB 1964

*With the
Secretary's Compliments*

Sir Roger Hollis,
C.B., O.B.E.

Hest/c/a

no. 10

5568

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER

We have received word from Washington that a former British public servant called Cairncross, whose brother is the Economic Adviser in the Treasury, has confessed, under interrogation by a representative of M.I.5 in Washington, that he spied for Russia between 1936 and 1951. During those years he served in the following Government Departments: Foreign Office, Treasury, G.C.H.Q., M.I.6 and the Ministry of Supply. He left the Government service in 1952 by which time the Security Service had established a link between him and Maclean and had, on that score, interrogated him without obtaining a confession or securing any positive evidence of guilt. Cairncross went to live in Rome whence he showed no sign of moving until early this year when it was learned that he had obtained a post at the University of Cleveland, Ohio. The United States authorities gave him a visa and agreed to his being interrogated on his arrival in the United States of America by a representative of M.I.5. He passed through this country on his way to the United States - and this was known to the Security Service - but it was thought that an interrogation in the United States might secure better results.

A full report is now awaited from the M.I.5 representative in Washington. In the meantime, we have received a short telegram to the effect that there is no immediate question of publicity and that the F.B.I., who are apparently very pleased with the results of the interrogation, are likely to comply with our wishes about future handling of the case.

The case, if and when it becomes known, could give rise to some political embarrassment. Why did the confession have to be obtained in the United States and not in London? During his time as a public servant did he have access to important or highly classified material? Was the link between him and Maclean (if this is disclosed) followed up with sufficient vigour?

Subject to any fresh light which may be thrown on the matter by the full report which we expect from Washington, Ministers are likely to be called upon at short notice to decide two questions:-

A. What action should we take?

There appear to be two possible courses of action:-

- (i) Should Cairncross be discreetly encouraged to leave the United States and settle where he will (but not in this country)?
- or (ii) Should we ask, and, if necessary, put pressure on, the United States authorities to deport him to this country in order that we may be able to interrogate him further and so try to establish evidence (any confessions made in the United States being insufficient for this purpose) on which we could bring him to trial?

I have discussed with the Departments concerned the merits of these alternative courses. We feel that (ii) would be politically more defensible, in so far as the Government will no doubt be expected to have done all that they can to secure the facts and bring the man to justice. We must recognise, however, that, if this course of action is followed, the United States authorities may take the view that it would be wrong for them to deport Cairncross merely as a means of circumventing our legal inability to secure his extradition (since espionage is not an extraditable offence); and, if their law is the

same as ours, they may feel that their duty is discharged if he agrees to leave the United States voluntarily and go wherever he pleases. We must also recognize that if they are prepared to co-operate with us (as seems likely) and to secure his return to the United Kingdom, it will remain to be seen whether his interrogation on his arrival in this country produces any evidence on the basis of which he could be brought to trial; and that, if we cannot get anything out of him, he will be free to leave the United Kingdom and to go where he wishes. Finally, we must recognize that if he does talk, the matter may not end with his own trial and conviction: he has told his interrogators in Washington that he was recruited by an official of the British Communist Party, who is living in this country and whom he has named.

B. What should we say to the press?

On the assumption (which the message from Washington seems to confirm) that there is no risk of premature disclosure, we have to consider what should be said to the press if and when the case becomes public knowledge as a result of Cairncross's deportation. On present information, we suggest that the line might be as follows. We could confirm that Cairncross is a British subject who served in the Foreign Office, the Treasury and, for a short while, the Ministry of Supply from 1936 to 1952 but left the public service in 1952 and has lived in Italy ever since. As a result of co-operation between the British and the United States security services, recent evidence has come to light that he may have been a security risk. He has therefore been deported for further interrogation in this country; and pending the result, there is nothing more to say.

We should have to clear with the United States authorities whatever line we take with the press. We do not think that this would be a suitable case for a D Notice.

I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary and, in view of the Treasury's interest, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

BURKE TREND

19th February, 1964.

TOP SECRET

H57/101/d

556a

Extract from note of D.G.'s discussion with the Home Secretary.

Complete copy on SF.50/24/101/Supp.A

I saw the Home Secretary this morning. Sir Charles Cunningham was also present.

.....

2. I showed the Home Secretary the note about John CAIRNCROSS (PF.72493) and gave him a brief account of the position. We spoke about the possibility of publicity and of the likelihood that the Americans would not be prepared to allow him to remain in the United States. Cunningham said that in that event they might deport him to this country and we should then have to consider whether we should be in a position to bring a charge against him.

R. H. HOLLIS

.....
D.G.

19.2.64.

RHS
19/6/64
20/2/66

TOP SECRET

Reference... PF.72,493

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D.1/Inv.

(Head of Security Branch G.C.H.Q.) rang to say that John CAIRNCROSS came to them in 1942 after holding a post with Lord Hankey in the Cabinet Office.

M.E.D. Cumming

D.

19th February 1964

CODE 18-76

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19/2/64 *J11/07*
25/2/66

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2	" L.A. (1 for D.P.P)
1	" D.
1	" D.1/Inv.
1	" [redacted]
1	" D.3
2	" D.1/EMcB

5540

Our Ref: FF.95(R).

British Embassy,
Washington 8, D.C.

ENCL 6 pages

17th February, 1964.

19 FEB 1964

TO: [redacted] 19/2
REF: 72493

paras 1, 2 & 3 ext'd to
POLFII-55-1-13
LA/2.

To: HEAD OFFICE. REF.

On Sunday, 16th February 1964, I interviewed John CAIRNCROSS in Cleveland, Ohio, under arrangements made by the F.B.I. It had been agreed with the F.B.I. that, in urging CAIRNCROSS to be frank with me, I could say that I would do my best to intercede with the F.B.I. on his behalf but that, under no circumstances, should I hold out any promise that he would be allowed to stay in the United States. It had also been agreed that, if CAIRNCROSS proved to be co-operative, I should introduce to him Mr. Milton Mandt of the Cleveland F.B.I. as the officer who would continue his interrogation.

2. When I met CAIRNCROSS I asked him if he knew what I had come about. He said that he could guess. I then asked him if he was on "our side" and he said that he was unreservedly. I said that, in that case, I presumed he would tell me truthfully all I wanted to know. He said that before he could answer that he wanted to know why I had chosen to see him in America rather than England. I said that he had had earlier opportunities to talk on British soil but he had not done so. I had thought therefore that it might be easier for both of us if we met on neutral ground. He said that this raised difficulties for him because, while he was ready now to make a clean breast of it, he could not calculate what action the Americans might take as a result. He could understand that we would feel bound to inform the Americans of his case but he wished that we had done so before he had taken a post at an American University. To have had his visa refused would have been unpleasant but understandable but to be faced with the prospect of disgracing his new employers was a cruel blow which made it difficult for him to speak. I said that, cruel or not, it was the position and I believed it was in his own best interests to talk frankly, first to me and then to the F.B.I. I could make no promises to him and no forecast of what the United States Government might do but, if I was convinced that he had told me the whole truth and was genuinely anxious to make amends, I would certainly use such influence as I had with the F.B.I. to present his case to them in the fairest possible light. Nevertheless I was quite sure that the F.B.I. would wish to interview him themselves and he must face up to this if he was going to rid himself of the burden he had been carrying for the past twelve years.

3. He accepted the position and his story is set out in the attachment.

4. I did not attempt to cross-question him. He is vague and unpractical by nature and the events he was describing took place a long time ago. He has promised to answer any questions we put to him and to go through photographs in an effort to identify his Russian controllers. I am sure that he will do so to the best of his ability.

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ACT 1958

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/5. ...

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ACT 1958 *September 2023*

TOP SECRET



- 2 -

5. I do not feel any doubt that he has told the whole truth. He is not a good liar as his earlier interrogations showed. It seemed to me that as his story unfolded I could watch the weight lifting from his mind.
6. When he had finished I asked him if he would like me to introduce him to the F.B.I. officer who would be handling his further questioning. After some hesitation he agreed and I telephoned Mr. Mandt to ask him to join us. During the half-hour or so that it took Mr. Mandt to reach the hotel CAIRNCROSS and I had coffee in a local shop. He was much more relaxed. He talked about his favourable first impressions of America; of how he had feared that he would find it garish and brash but how different it had turned out to be. I think he was being sincere.
7. When Mr. Mandt joined us I explained to him that CAIRNCROSS had told me much of what I had wanted to learn but that there were still many points of detail which would have to be gone over again. CAIRNCROSS signified that he would be ready to fall in with Mandt's wishes. He made two points: he asked if future meetings with Mandt could be outside the hotel so that the staff should not know and gossip about the F.B.I.'s interest in him; and he asked that everything possible should be done to spare the University embarrassment. He said that if he had to leave the United States he hoped it could be done in such a way that the University would not be made to suffer. Mandt assured him that he would do his best.
8. There is one other point. Mrs. CAIRNCROSS is still living in Rome but CAIRNCROSS had planned that she should join him as soon as he had settled down at the University. He told me that she had never had any interest in politics. I asked him if he would now tell her of his involvement with the Russians. He said he would have to think about it.
9. I am sending a copy of this letter and attachment to the F.B.I. and to C.I.A. I would be grateful if you would prepare a brief for the F.B.I. on which they can base their further questioning.

A. S. Martin

A. S. Martin.

TOP SECRET

1458/11/10

Copied to
PF 45,597, PF 79,6285
Copied to PF 45,597

This is the story John CAIRNCROSS told me on Sunday 16th February 1964 as we talked in his bedroom at the Commodore Hotel, CLEVELAND, OHIO.

2. He was an undergraduate at Trinity College, CAMBRIDGE, from 1934-36. During his second year he began to move in left-wing political circles. As far as he remembers he did not join any political society but he took part in discussions with the more prominent left-wingers, among them James KLUGMAN. At this period he did not know Guy BURGESS or Donald MacLEAN. He knew of Anthony BLUNT but did not move in his circle.

3. He entered the Foreign Service in 1936 and was posted to the American Department in LONDON. Soon afterwards he was contacted by James KLUGMAN who told him that he had been chosen to do some active work for "the Movement". CAIRNCROSS agreed and was introduced to his first Russian contact. He was a small, burly figure called "Otto". All that CAIRNCROSS has so far remembered about "Otto"'s background is that he said he was married. They met once a month until 1938 in conspiratorial fashion. At first CAIRNCROSS was asked to give oral accounts of the work he was doing and the papers he saw. Later he handed over documents which "Otto" copied and returned. During these two years CAIRNCROSS was transferred to the Western Department of the Foreign Office where for the first time he met Donald MacLEAN. He had no suspicion at all that MacLEAN was engaged in the same conspiracy.

Copied to PF 45,597

4. In 1938 "Otto" disappeared without warning. At roughly the same time CAIRNCROSS was transferred to the Treasury. CAIRNCROSS said that this transfer was a relief to him because he no longer had access to interesting papers. He explained that by this time he had realised that he was "in the toils". "Otto", before he left, had kept him up to the mark by threatening his exposure. The ideological urge which had led him to accept KLUGMAN's offer in the first place had given way to fear.

(1 Oct 1938)

5. For several months he was completely out of touch and he began to hope that the Russians had dropped him. Then one day in 1938 Guy BURGESS contacted him. He had seen a certain amount of BURGESS socially since leaving CAMBRIDGE. He remembered in particular a party BURGESS had given at which, besides himself, Tom WYLIE, Anthony BLUNT and a man named KATZ had been present. It was at this party that he had first realised BURGESS was a homosexual but he had had no idea that he was involved with the Russians. Now BURGESS not only revealed his own involvement but also his knowledge of CAIRNCROSS'S involvement. He told CAIRNCROSS that in future he was to report to him. Their meetings were overt and no documents were passed. CAIRNCROSS would write his own reports for BURGESS of which the one found among BURGESS'S possessions was an example.

Ext'd to
Gen. 12/67/51/1418
(WYLLIE)
Ext'd to
PF 47,638
(KATZ)

(23 Sept. 40)

Copied to PF 796,285

Copied to PF 796,288

Copied to PF 796,285 Ext. 1 sent to G.C.H.Q. on 25.2.64.

6. This continued until the early days of the war, by which time CAIRNCROSS had been transferred to the Private Office of Lord HANKEY. Then - and CAIRNCROSS does not remember exactly how - he was transferred to a new controller named "Robert". Possibly "Robert" took the initiative by telephoning CAIRNCROSS or possibly BURGESS introduced them. "Robert" was small and stocky and wore spectacles; but the thing which CAIRNCROSS remembers most vividly is that all "Robert"'s finger-tips were brown. CAIRNCROSS is sure that this was not from nicotine and thinks that it might have been the result of handling chemicals. "Robert" spoke English with an accent but CAIRNCROSS thinks he was not a Russian. He might have been a Czech. "Robert" mentioned that he was living with an English family.

(11.5.42) to (14.6.43)

14.6.43-21.6.45

7. Meetings with "Robert" continued until 1943 or 1944 and covered CAIRNCROSS's service in Lord HANKEY's private office, at G.C. & C.S. and part of his time in MI6. CAIRNCROSS was employed by G.C. & C.S. at their Headquarters at BLETCHLEY and worked as a German translator. The information he was able to supply during this period produced for the first time real enthusiasm from his controller. Despite his being stationed at BLETCHLEY his meetings with "Robert" were always in LONDON at intervals of approximately one month. CAIRNCROSS did not pass copies of decrypts but he wrote summaries of their contents. In particular "Robert" asked for anything which revealed German intentions on the Eastern front. For the first and only time CAIRNCROSS accepted a sum of money (which he has not yet brought himself to name) from his Russian controller.

8. In 1943 CAIRNCROSS was transferred to Section V of MI6 in LONDON. "Robert" was displeased by this move. CAIRNCROSS worked in the section which dealt with the "order of battle" of the Abwehr and S.D. and handled ISOS. "Robert" seemed not to be interested. As far as CAIRNCROSS remembers he passed no documents during this period though he continued to provide summaries of his work. It was at this point that CAIRNCROSS met PHILBY for the first time. He was considerably junior to PHILBY and saw little of him. Neither then nor thereafter had he any idea that PHILBY was working for the Russians.

9. Soon after his move to Section V "Robert" handed CAIRNCROSS over to another new controller. He was a tall, well-built Russian with military bearing. He gave no name but CAIRNCROSS said that once, when he was visiting the War Office, he ran into him and therefore assumes that he must have been a member of the Soviet Military Attache's office. After only two or three meetings CAIRNCROSS was handed over to yet another new controller, a swarthy man, possibly Georgian. At approximately the same time CAIRNCROSS himself was transferred to R.1 of MI6, where he worked under David FOOTMAN. The Russians still showed little interest in his product.

.../10.

* This in fact was Cambanis.

RS/7

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21-6-45

10. After the war CAIRNCROSS returned to the Treasury where he dealt with "Defence material and personnel". The work was largely unclassified. While in this job he was turned over to yet another controller - a young Russian who spoke unusually good English. CAIRNCROSS believes that his photograph later appeared in the Press as that of a Russian diplomat who was declared p.n.g. for improper conduct connected with persuading emigres to return to Russia.

11. In 1948 CAIRNCROSS tried to leave the Civil Service and enter industry. He says that he did it primarily to break the hold which the Russians had over him. He received an offer from * COATS, the textile firm, but, after informing the Treasury of his intention to resign, the offer fell through. He believes the Treasury were responsible. This having failed he made enquiries about emigrating to Canada but, before any firm offer materialised, he was transferred to the Ministry of Supply and decided to give this a trial. Soon afterwards he was turned over to the last of his Russian controllers.

23-5-51

12. This man was big and burly and spoke with an American accent. Neither his name nor nickname are known to CAIRNCROSS but CAIRNCROSS believes (again from a press photograph) that he was expelled from the U.K. as a result of the prosecution of William MARSHALL, the DWS operator.

13. His meetings with his last controller were rare - not more than three or four a year. His last meeting was shortly after the flight to Russia of BURGESS and MacLEAN. CAIRNCROSS himself had been interviewed by the Security Service and was frightened that he had been compromised. But his controller assured him that he had nothing to worry about and that they could go on meeting as before. Arrangements were made for the next meeting and for a reserve one month later. CAIRNCROSS duly turned up on both occasions but was not met. He did not try again.

14. By this time CAIRNCROSS had met the woman who was to become his wife. They married at the beginning of 1952. Almost immediately afterwards he was summoned to the War Office and asked to explain the document in his hand-writing which had been found among BURGESS's possessions. He made a formal statement denying that he had knowingly written it for the Russians and then resigned from the Civil Service.

15. He now found himself with a wife, no job and no money. He decided that he would seek help from the Russians. There was a long standing arrangement whereby he could call an emergency meeting with his controller. He had to make a chalk mark on the pavement in a street near Westbourne Park Underground Station. It meant that he would attend a meeting at a prescribed time and place on the following Monday or the Monday following that. He was expected to allow as much time as possible for the Russians to see the chalk mark and therefore he would try to make it towards the beginning of the preceding week.

.../This

This he did. He attended at the prescribed place in GUNNERSBURY on the following Monday evening but his controller did not appear. He did not try on the following Monday or indeed ever again.

16. Shortly afterwards CAIRNCROSS and his wife left the U.K. for Italy. He eked out a living by writing and translating. Later he took a post with ECAFE in BANGKOK and more recently a post with the Pakistan Government. He has never been contacted by the Russians again.

17. There are a few foot-notes to this story arising from questions I put to him:-

- (a) He has never before told this story to anyone. At the time of his resignation from the Civil Service he told his wife, his brother, and his friends that he had fallen under suspicion because of his friendship with BURGESS and that, unfair though it was, he thought it best to leave. He is sure he was believed by his wife.
- (b) His contact with HAEFNER was unrelated to his spying. He genuinely believed HAEFNER had something to offer H.M.G. and did his best to sponsor his admission to the U.K.
- (c) The letter from Germany is still a mystery to him. He concludes that it was from some casual acquaintance, possibly a refugee, who wrote to him as a Foreign Office official. He is sure it had nothing to do with his spying.
- (d) He did not know Peter SMOLKA alias SMOLLETT.
- (e) The only hint he was given that the Russians had other sources besides himself came very early in his career when "Otto" was upbraiding him for not making better progress in the Foreign Office. "Otto" said something like this: "We have a man who is a cynic like CALDER MARSHALL who tells us that your work in the Foreign Office is not up to standard". At the time CAIRNCROSS was mystified. Later he concluded that "Otto" must have been referring to BURGESS. Later still, he wondered if it was MacLEAN.

