

PF 72,493

V19

PF

72,493

V19

C A I R N C R O S S JOHN

FILE CLOSED

FILE CLOSED

TRAY No.

10204

S Form 924A rev 10.74

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date
KV2 / 4696								

S. 960 Edn2

PF 72,493

V19

Reference PF 72493

837

9.6.72

To FCO

837a

838

16.6.72.

Minute from K6A, attached to Source Report, serial 839a.

838a

839

~~16.6.72.~~

~~Source Report re KUZNETSOV. Transferred + attached to serial 838a~~

~~839a~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

841

18.7.72.

Ext. from F.2./URG report re Jakes EWER

841z

19.7.72

Loose Minute to K1 re CAIRNCROSS and Miss CHEVALLIER.

841a

842

25.7.72.

Note for File re Miss CHEVALLIER

842a

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ACT 1958 February 2024

844

8.8.72. Loose Minute to K3/6 from K1/8 re request to Peter Joce in Brussels re Miss CHEVALLIER. 844a

845

16.8.72. To FCO re Miss CHEVALLIER. 845a

846

K.3./C.P.C. de W

3. It would seem that in 1968/69 CAIRNCROSS must have invested about £20,000 to £23,000 in the building of the villa at Anacapri, and taken care to do it in his friend's name rather than in his own. It was at about this same date that he invested the original £23,000 or so with BUYERS, of which he has complained to the Police of being defrauded. This implies that he was then able to dispose of £40,000 - £46,000, about double what we previously thought.

4. I suggested before that CAIRNCROSS's girl friend mentioned by Peter Wright and Cecil Shipp after their visit to him in 1969, might be the one referred to in

see 799a & 14a in Vol. 3)

see para. of 801a)

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/letters . .

Min 846 Cont.

Letters between him and BUYERS and Mrs de CENT as
'Liselotte',

*B. Palliser*B. PalliserK.3./6

22 August, 1972.

848

K.3./SE

You should see the present state of
this case, which will now pass to your care.

2. I do not think the general approach
to CAIRNCROSS's financial affairs is likely to
be very profitable. Although he was, I under-
stand, without resources when he was in the
United States he clearly has substantial assets
now; one can hardly believe that the £23,000
he passed to BUYERS represented all his dispos-
able capital. K. Adviser cannot believe,
knowing him as he does, that he is a financial
wizard and what we know of him seems to confirm
this view; for example, shows some naivety,
and I doubt if dabbling in early manuscripts and
printing without knowing the market is a very
safe line.

3. If we are to make progress on this side of
the case we shall have to identify suspicious heads
and their sources. I understand that Angleton and

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/Rocca have.....

Minute 848 cont.

Rocca have offered to make enquiries in Italy independently of the Italian authorities and K. Adviser has accepted this.

C.P.C. de Wesselow

C.P.C. de Wesselow

K.3./0

11th September, 1972

5.73

Note for File

850a

850

851

9.1.73

Copy of Brief for D.G.'s Meeting

851a

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18.1.73	From John CAIRNCROSS	852a
	853	
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7.2.73	Note on financial history of John CAIRNCROSS	857b

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K3/C.P.C. de W

*K3/EWP. Thanks. Please send 856a 6
+ arrange a meeting on 857f.
P. 8/2*

1. You will wish to see my report on our latest interview with John CAIRNCROSS at serial 856a.
2. We are in no doubt he is concealing vital information - presumably in order to protect one or more people. He left us a worried man and it is evident from his letter (serial 852a) that he is preparing (the ten points to which he refers) to try to clear himself when he next comes here in the Spring.
3. One point we need to consider before we see CAIRNCROSS again is what can be said about BLUNT; we must try to establish whether he is trying to protect BLUNT or someone else. My own view is that although he must know more about BLUNT than he has said there is somebody else involved in his recruitment so far not mentioned. Perhaps we could discuss this with K.7 (to whom I am sending a copy of this report) to agree a tactical line on this.

5. We have now agreed to take up Angleton's offer to look at CAIRNCROSS's finances in Italy. I have summarised our knowledge of his financial history in a Note at serial 857b

E W Pratt

E W Pratt

K3/7
MS Ext 660
7 February 1973

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ACT 1958 FEBRUARY 2024

860

12.2.73

Note on Ring of Five Recruitments

860c

861

15.2.73.

Loose Minute to F2/DCD

861a

862

~~KX~~

You will wish to see 856a, which brings out very clearly our reasons for believing that CAIRNCROSS is lying.

2. One point which might be emphasised more strongly is that he has always glossed over the occasion when BURGESS revealed himself as "Otto's" successor. He must have been more than staggered when an agreeable young Englishman with whom he had a slight acquaintance at Cambridge "turned up" to take over as his new spymaster; was he not most thoroughly frightened? The story is told with hindsight and as it stands does not make sense.

3. Some of his presumed lies can be interpreted as shielding BLUNT, who claims to have talent-spotted him. I have considered whether an analysis on these lines would be profitable but because of internal contradictions and our lack of precise dates I have decided that it would not be worthwhile; e.g. given that he did not want to reveal the true story of his recruitment and therefore introduced the story of KLUGMANN in the park, what relevance have the discrepancies in his knowledge of KLUGMANN's position in Paris? and what is the significance of the missed rendezvous with BURGESS at Hotel Selecte?

/.....

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Minute 862 cont.

Moreover we must bear in mind that BLUNT was probably consciously involved in the original compromise of CAIRNCROSS.

4. We are continuing to rack our brains for a solution, if indeed there is a straightforward one, but I am inclined to think that we shall not find it unless and until we can reinterrogate CAIRNCROSS himself.

Plakman

C P C de Wesselow
K3/0
16 February 1973

864

16.2.73

Letter to SLO Washington

864a

865

21.2.73

Note for File

865a

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866

21.2.73

Letter to S.L.O Washington

866a

867

21.2.73 Letter from CAIRNCROSS

867a

868

22.2.73 Letter to CAIRNCROSS

868a

869

~~K3~~ ~~K3/ESP through K7/5c.~~

856a makes very interesting reading. I am left with the conviction that we have never really had the measure of CAIRNCROSS. Is there no close acquaintance to whom we can go for a reliable reading of his character and abilities? There is much that is perplexing about the case and we need all the help we can get. Has CAIRNCROSS the calibre to be entrusted by the KGB with a leading part in a deception operation such as Mr Pratt suggests in paragraph 87 of 856a? If he has, the estimate of his character made by Mr Martin and others in the past has been wide of the mark.

2. We shall need to prepare for the next interview with great care; I should like to discuss paragraph 3 of minute 858 with you and K7 when you are ready.

J A Allen
J A Allen
KX

28 February 1973

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Feb Rudy 324

~~K3/EWR~~ through K3

1. I am not well informed on the case of CAIRNCROSS but I have read volumes 18 and 19 carefully. CAIRNCROSS is clearly untrustworthy in financial matters and, I suspect, generally. He does not seem to be the sort of person to whom we should confide sensitive information in relation to BLUNT unless it is very clearly in our interests to do so.
2. I see that CAIRNCROSS will be bringing a list of 10 points with him at the next interview; might it not be worth trying to get these on the day before the interview for study. We for our part might consider politely tabling the major inconsistencies brought out in the detailed report at 856a.

J. Cradock
 J A Cradock

K7
 MS Ext 470
 5 March 1973

871

12.3.73

Note for File

871a

872

13.3.73

Copy of Loose Minute to F2/PAMH

872a

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873

14.3.73

Loose Minute from K7/4

873a

875

22.3.73

Note for File

875a

876

22.3.73

Letter to Mr. Wallace, The Treasury

876a

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878

27.3.73

Note for File

878a

880

6.4.73

Loose Minute K3/CPC de W

880a

881

6.4.73

Loose Minute K3/CPC de W

881a

882

9.4.73

Loose Minute K7/

882a

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ACT 1958 *FEBRUARY 2024*

883

Secretariat/BS
 through Director KA
 through K3/C P C de *W 11/4*

1. You last saw this file at Minute 813 after which you advised in the discussion referred to in Minute 816.

2. To summarise the background, in the course of preliminaries to mounting Operation ACRE (the confrontation of KLUGMANN and CAIRNCROSS) it was agreed that CAIRNCROSS should enjoy a limited degree of immunity from prosecution (serial 42a in Link B, attached). In effect CAIRNCROSS was assured that should he visit this country he would not be prosecuted in respect of espionage he had already admitted.

3. CAIRNCROSS visited this country in December 1972 and contacted us to ask whether we wished to see him (serial 849z). We did so on 4 January and if you care to glance at the conclusions to the report (paragraphs 73-87 of serial 856a) you will see we think that in the course of interviews since his "Confession" he has told only part of the truth: in certain important respects over the years he has either lied or deliberately withheld information that matters.


4. He is due to be seen again on 25 April (serials 867a and 868a) and has offered to bring with him a list of some - presumably exculpatory - ten points (final paragraph serial 852a). This interview could well develop into something of a showdown; with luck he might be persuaded to enter areas beyond those covered by his immunity assurance. Clearly we do not wish his knowledge of the terms of his immunity to be an impediment to his making further admissions.

5. I think you would wish to be aware of the present situation in this case and we would welcome your advice and guidance on the implications of his going beyond the terms of his immunity and what we should do if he does.

E W Pratt

E W Pratt

K3/7
 MS Ext 660
 10 April 1973



Sect(Home) Mr Sheldon

I hope your advice on paragraph 5 of the above minute will give Mr Pratt the freedom to hear CAIRNCROSS out whether or not he admits to espionage not covered by the immunity. In a case as complex as this there could be no question of calling in the police immediately - unless CAIRNCROSS chooses to say that he is currently a Russian agent - and you would no doubt have to consider very carefully whether any additional admissions he made provided a basis for criminal proceedings.

J A Allen
J A Allen
KX

11 April 1973

Copy of Loose Minute K5

11.4.73

884b

885

K3 / Mr Pratt

We spoke. I agree that you should hear Cairncross out at that this is not a case in which it should be standing by or need be called before we have decided any further admission.

You cannot give him any new assurances as to prosecution - and I would prefer you not to reveal to him who he is based on as there were no doubts who he is based on. Cairncross was then all right. If he is worried about the position of himself...

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any statement for his name not be admitted
in evidence against them. [As he does not live
in this country he could scarcely be compelled
to give evidence.]

Dennard Shuler
12/4/73.

887

13.4.73

Note for File

887a

888

17.4.73

Loose Minute from K5/

888a

889

24.4.73

Copy of Minute Re: HAEFNER

889a

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890

24.4.73

Note for File

890a

893

1.5.73

Brief for DG's Meeting

893a

894

2.5.73

Copy of Loose Minute to A1C

894a

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896

7.4.73.

Note for File

896a

897


7.4.73.

Loose Minute from A.I.C.

897a

8.5.73.

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







900

9.5.73

To Mid Anglia Constabulary

900a



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ACT 1958 *MARCH 2024*

904

21.5.73 To Immigration Branch, Home Office

904a

905

21.5.73 From John CAIRNCROSS

905a

907

23.5.73 From Mid-Anglia Con.

907z

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908

4.6.73

To CC Mid Anglia

908a

910

4.6.73

To CAIRNCROSS

910a

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5

915

8.6.73

Note for File

915a

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916a - 920a.


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915a

PF 72493

NOTE FOR FILE

1. Consultant/Peter Wright told me that during the evening of 29 April a telephone call from Rome was received in his house in Cornwall. Peter himself was out and the call was taken by a member of his family; I gather the caller said he would try again.
2. Peter said he knew no-one in Rome other than CAIRNCROSS and assumed the call had come from him. Stella Rimington and I had seen CAIRNCROSS on 25 and 27 April and he was due to have returned to Rome on 28 April.
3. I asked whether CAIRNCROSS would have the Cornish telephone number as Peter had moved there since he had last seen CAIRNCROSS; Peter confirmed that he had.
4. I understand that nothing further has happened.


E W Pratt

K3/7
MS Ext 660
8 June 1973

911a.
912a.
913a.
914a.

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910a

File ✓
Float
LB
Room 055

J Cairncross Esq
Via Armando Spadini 16
Parioli
Rome

PF 72493/K3/7/EWP

4 June 1973


Thank you very much for your letter dated 7 May 1973; I quite agree it would be a good idea to communicate through a more reliable channel.

I am very grateful to you for putting more thoughts on paper; I am sure these will be helpful. I have made the following arrangements for getting your letter to me; would you please use two envelopes - the outer addressed

Head of Chancery
British Embassy
Rome

and the inner one addressed to me by name as you normally do. Perhaps it might be best if you could drop it into the Embassy.

I look forward to seeing you again when you are next over here.


E W Bratt

909a.

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908a

The Chief Constable,
Mid Anglia Constabulary

MAS 63/73/IPC/UC

PF 72493/K3/7


4 June 1973

Dear Sir,

Etienne TAMBOURI

1. Thank you very much for your letter of 21 May 1973. We are ~~most~~ grateful to you for turning up traces of Camille PRIOR which are most useful; your help in this is much appreciated.


Yours faithfully


for Director General

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ACT 1958.



CONFIDENTIAL

MID-ANGLIA CONSTABULARY

9072

Criminal Investigation Department,
The Manor, Brampton, Huntingdon. PE18 8PG

Telephone: Huntingdon 56111 Telex: 32246

All communications to be addressed to the Detective Chief Superintendent

Please quote **MAS 63/73/IFC/UC**

Your Ref. **PF 72493/K3/7**

21st May, 1973

ENCL 5 Pages
Gw 23 MAY 1973
TO: K3
REF: PF 72493

Dear Sir,

Etienne TAMBOURI

900a

I refer to your letter of 9th May, 1973.

The alien records for the 1930's have unfortunately been destroyed and we have no trace on TAMBOURI in any of our indexes. The very limited enquiries which we have been able to make in connection with this enquiry have also proved negative.

I enclose for your information copies of some old security documents referring to a Mrs. Camille PRIOR who is no doubt identical with the Mrs. PRIOR with whom TAMBOURI stayed during his spell in Cambridge.

There is no trace of Mrs. Camille PRIOR in the Cambridge area at the present time and one can presume that she has either died or moved away from this area.

Yours faithfully,

(C.C. Naan)
Detective Chief Superintendent

CONFIDENTIAL

29/2/K3/7



Camille Prior

ple and express them with a gesture, a turn of the head, a sudden look of anxiety and alarm. In any second-rate actress, this would have been unforgiveable. But Pop knew what



SECRET

Telephone No.
VICTORIA 352-3-4-3

L. 168/16/B. 4.

Recd

Dear Sir
Dear Sir 50/221

BOX NO. 500,
PARLIAMENT STREET, E.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

17 NOV 1938

Ed. L. and 16th November, 1938.

Dear Mr. Pearson,

Mrs. Camillee FRICR, 8 Scroope Terrace, Cambridge, formerly of French nationality, has offered her services for confidential work in the event of an emergency.

I should, therefore, be very grateful if you would kindly have some quiet enquiry made with a view to ascertaining whether she is a suitable person for such employment.

Yours sincerely,

John Vernon Kell
Colonel Sir Vernon Kell.

R. J. Pearson Esq., O. B. E.,
Chief Constable,
Borough Constabulary,
CAMBRIDGE.

*48 years married
ambulance driver.*

26/9/38 registered for ARP

D.O."S". EAB.
L.168/16/B.4.

21st November, 1938.

Colonel Sir Vernor Kell,
Box No, 500.
Parliament Street, B.O,
London, S.W.1,.

Dear Sir,

Re:- Mrs Camille PRIOR. 8, Scroope Terrace.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th instant, relative to the above named.

Enquiries have been made by my Detective Sergeant, and it has been ascertained that Mrs Prior is aged 49, years. She teaches French & German, and also takes in Foreign guests.

During the crisis, Mrs Prior enrolled under the A.R.P. as an Ambulance Driver. She is in possession of first aid certificates. There appears to be nothing known to her detriment.


Yours faithfully,

Chief Constable.

Garden House Hotel

Cambridge

Dec. 20. 1940



To the Chief Commissioner

Criminal Investigation Dept.

New Scotland Yard. S.W.1

INDEXED

Sir

May I draw your attention to the following facts:-

1. A Mr and Mrs Parsons are staying in this hotel. He is said to be a British subject who has been in business in Barcelona, she is said to be French. He speaks very little English, she speaks like an Englishwoman.
2. They claim to have "escaped out of France by the last cargo boat that left France".
3. They have become extremely friendly with Group-Captain Walker and his wife.
4. During War-weapons Week Mrs Parsons was looking at the mobile canteen and said to Mrs Prior who was in charge, "I should like to help with that". Mrs Prior at once said, "I shall be delighted to have you". (This is Mrs Parsons' own account of the interview).
5. Mrs Parsons, who is quite unknown and does not appear to have been vouched for, now goes to all the outlying searchlight stations and gun stations.
6. Mrs Prior is herself a foreigner and has the reputation of collecting round her foreigners who are undesirable.

Yours truly

Margaret Alice Murray (D.Lit. Lond.)
Fellow of University College, London.


SECRET

Telephone No.
CAMBRIDGE 54237.

BOX No. 500,
CAMBRIDGE.

F.A./22.

5th October 1941.



R. J. Pearson

I have received a letter today from Mr Steel, the Eastern Regional Officer for the British Council, in which he tells me that on the 1st October, Mrs Camille Prior visited his office and talked at some length to one of the senior officers there about the "iniquities" of a certain Czech establishment in Cambridge from the political point of view.

I understand that a great deal of importance should not be attached to Mrs Prior's statements but pass you this information in case you think it worth while paying the establishment in question a little extra attention.

Yours sincerely,

C. E. Dixon

Major C.E.Dixon.

R.J.Pearson Esq., O.B.E.,
Chief Constable,
Borough Constabulary,
Cambridge.

906a.

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Pratt

905a

Via Armando Spadini 16
Parioli
Rome

7 May 1973

Received: 21-5-73

Dear ~~Mr Pratt,~~

In the light of our talks, I have jotted down a few comments, but given the present state of the Italian mails (there has been a strike lasting almost a month, now ended), I am not keen on sending the letter by the usual channels. Perhaps you would be kind enough to suggest some other way.

Yours sincerely,

John Cairncross
John Cairncross

Mr E W Pratt

✓ FILE
LB
CASE FOLDER/K3/7 case

904a

Ext 1366

PF72493/SH/9

21 May 1973

CAIRNCROSS John
No 3713

KW/MME

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ACT 1958 February 2024

RESTRICTED

904a

Copy to Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Special Branch

DRAFT

Immigration Branch
Home Office

May 1973

To the Immigration Officer

CAIRNCROSS John

Born: 25.7.13 Leemahagow, Lanarks
Nationality: British
Occupation: UN Official
Location: Rome
Information: Movements of interest to Box
Action: J

H J G Richards
HM Chief Inspector

Entry for the British Suspect Index:

CAIRNCROSS John M/25.7.13/Br/-/J/BSC

FILE
LB
CASE FOLDER

RESTRICTED

9042

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901a
902a

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ACT 1958.

File
900a

CONFIDENTIAL

The Chief Constable,
Mid Anglia Constabulary.

PF72493/K3/7 ✓

9 May 1973

For the attention of Inspector Frank Cox

Dear Sir,


Etienne TAMBOURI

We are anxious to know whether you have any record of TAMBOURI who, we understand, stayed in Cambridge (but not as a member of the University) for some months during 1935.

2. TAMBOURI was a French national who was born in about 1909 or 1910 who had just qualified as a lawyer when he came to stay in Cambridge to improve his English. We believe he stayed as a paying guest with a Mrs. PRIOR, widow of Professor PRIOR who had held a University Chair in French. Mrs. PRIOR, who is not on record with us, is said to have been closely connected with French circles in the University and to have produced French plays.

3. It is just possible that as TAMBOURI was an alien you might have some record of his presence in Cambridge; whatever you may have about him would be of interest to us.

Yours faithfully,


for Director General

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

897a

LOOSE MINUTE For PA on PF 72493
Copy: PF 72493/Link C

~~K3/EWP~~

WARNING

REFER TO APPROPRIATE
OFFICER BEFORE USING

John CAIRNCROSS

894a

1. Thank you for your Loose Minute of 2 May and for the four letters of authorisation to Barclays Bank Ltd signed by CAIRNCROSS.

2. Enquiries have now been made at the Barclays branches at which CAIRNCROSS banked between 1936 and 1952 namely Benet Street, Cambridge, 137 North End Road, W14, Vauxhall Bridge Road, SW1 and 227 Holland Park Avenue, W11. Unfortunately records going so far back are no longer available at the branches or centrally

It is however useful to have CAIRNCROSS's assurance that he never had bank accounts in this country other than with Barclays. This tends of course to strengthen the financial implications against him, incomplete though these must remain on the information available.

3. I have discussed the disclosure aspect once more with my Barclays contact. In view of the circumstances of the case generally and in particular the signing by CAIRNCROSS of the authorisations to examine his accounts, the way is now clear if you so wish, to speak to CAIRNCROSS on the following lines:-

'We have now completed a preliminary look at the financial information which you authorised us to obtain. This information is not complete but it appears at present that between 1937 and 1951 you earned salary amounting to £11,175 and had other credits of £4,600, making your total receipts some £15,775. For the same period your outgoings appear to have been no more than £3,850. We would be interested to know:-

- a. Where the £4,600 came from.
- b. Whether you did in fact spend the £15,775 over 15 years, on living expenses, or,
- c. If the outgoings of £3,850 over 15 years is all that you spent how did you subsidise the remainder of your living expenses?'

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ALC
MS Ext 534 7 May 1973

K3/52
137b

4/15/11/1962
896a

NOTE FOR FILE

PF72493

In the chapter "Stalin's hand in Spain" in his book "I was Stalin's Agent" KRIVITSKY describes the way in which he organised arms shipments to republican Spain from European countries during the Spanish Civil War.

2. He says that in August 1936 Stalin decided to intervene in Spain by providing aid for the Republicans. He decided, however, that such aid must be unofficial and handled covertly. Consequently KRIVITSKY, who was put in charge of the foreign end of the business, mobilized all his agents and facilities to create a system for the purchasing and transporting to Spain of arms. Soviet orders were that there was to be no possibility of the Soviet Government becoming associated in the arms traffic. KRIVITSKY's group of head agents met in Paris on September 21 1936. They decided that all cargoes must be handled privately through business firms created for the purpose. They established a chain of import/export firms in various European cities but the difficulty was to get licences for shipment of the arms to Spain. Their first plan was to consign them to France and trans-ship them from there to Loyalist ports but they could not get clearance papers from the French Foreign Office. Another way was to secure consular papers from overseas Governments certifying that the arms had been purchased for import into their countries. KRIVITSKY was able to secure large numbers of certificates from certain Latin American Consulates and with these he obtained clearance papers from the countries of origin of the arms. Then, instead of the ships going to South America, they went to Loyalist Spanish ports.

3. KRIVITSKY says that success in this whole operation depended on getting the right men. He had such men at his disposal, numbers of them were in the societies allied with the various Communist Party centres abroad, for example the FSU and the Leagues for Peace and Democracy. Both the OGPU and the military intelligence looked upon certain members of these societies as reserves of civilian auxiliaries of the Soviet defence system.

4. KRIVITSKY's account seems to make nonsense of CAIRNCROSS's claim that his 1937 involvement with HAEFNER and TAMBOURI in an attempt to cause arms to be shipped to Spain and his involvement in 1939 with HAEFNER, RAAB and the Greek arms firm of AEKKA had nothing to do with his work for the R.I.S.

Sella Rimington

S Rimington

K3/8
Ext MS 654
7 May 1973

*1/3/73
7/5/73*

895a

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TOP SECRET

Loose Minute

Copy: PF 72493 ✓

" PF 72493/Link C

A1C,

John CAIRNCROSS

2. CAIRNCROSS proved extremely willing to sign the letters of authorisation for access to his UK Bank accounts which you had kindly prepared. I return them herewith; you will wish to insert the date (27 April) and the address of the relevant Branch. He stated that he has never had accounts in this country other than with

3. He offered to give similar authorisations in respect of his accounts with Banks abroad - in Rome and Geneva. I thanked him and said we thought it best to concentrate on accounts in the UK first.

4. I am most grateful for your help in this matter and look forward to hearing from you soon whether or not have been able to produce anything

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see 897a

E W Pratt


K3/7
MS Ext 660
2 May 1975

TOP SECRET

Via Armando Spadini 16
Parioli,
Roma,
Italy

The Manager,
Barclays Bank Ltd.


I hereby authorise you to allow the
bearer access to, and if requested copies
of, all my accounts and dealings with
your branch of Barclays Bank Ltd.



John Cairncross

Note:


CAIRNCROSS signed for letter
(as we know he had four accounts) on
27th April 1978.



Via Armando Spadini 16
Parioli,
Roma,
Italy

The Manager,
Barclays Bank Ltd.

I hereby authorise you to allow the
bearer access to, and if requested copies
of, all my accounts and dealings with
your branch of Barclays Bank Ltd.




John Cairncross

Via Armando Spadini 16,
Parioli,
Roma,
Italy.

The Manager,
Barclays Bank Ltd.

I hereby authorise you to allow the
bearer access to, and if requested copies
of, all my accounts and dealings with
your branch of Barclays Bank Ltd.




John Cairncross

Via Armando Spadini 16,
Parioli,
Roma,
Italy.

The Manager,
Barclays Bank Ltd.

I hereby authorise you to allow the
bearer access to, and if requested copies
of, all my accounts and dealings with
your branch of Barclays Bank Ltd.



John Cairncross

TOP SECRET

Brief for DG's Meeting

1 May 1973

John CAIRNCROSS

1. John CAIRNCROSS was interviewed nine times between 1951-1956 primarily as a result of notes in his handwriting found among BURGESS's possessions after the latter's defection in 1951. Throughout these interviews he strenuously denied involvement with the Russians. In Cleveland Ohio in 1964 however he admitted working for the Russians between 1936-1952; since then he has been seen another dozen times. Since 1970 he has enjoyed assurances of immunity from prosecution for espionage he has already admitted.

2. As a result of an interview in January this year by two K3 officers (Brief of 9 January 1973) doubts about the sincerity of CAIRNCROSS's co-operation with us substantially increased; there were good reasons to think that on material points he was either lying or withholding essential information.

3. It was therefore decided to interrogate him when he next visited this country and on 25 and 27 April the same two K3 officers spent seven-and-a-half hours trying to break through in those areas where it was felt he was holding back. He was told we found it difficult to believe he was being frank with us and was confronted with information in support of this from various (unattributed) sources. This led to certain admissions - for example he has now admitted that he received payment from BURGESS during the time the latter controlled him - but for the most part he took the line that our information was wrong.

4. He was confronted with the fact that there were firm indications that in 1937 and 1939 he was involved in arms traffic to Spain - a matter which had not been raised with him since 1951. The network responsible - Etienne TAMBOURI, Victor HAEFNER and Antonius RAAB - had the hallmark of being part of the GPU operation to get arms to Spain described by KRIVITSKY. He was shown PHIDIAS (correspondence between HAEFNER and RAAB in 1939) which related to "original papers" from CAIRNCROSS, and was told about references to a bank account in Valencia about which "CAIRNCROSS is ready to help" and would be told "what reward he would get for his help". CAIRNCROSS, who knew that HAEFNER had been imprisoned by the French authorities, (in fact HAEFNER had a long record of imprisonment on criminal, including espionage, charges) was asked why in these circumstances he had chosen to be instrumental in arranging for HAEFNER to meet Robert WATSON-WATT about some aspect of the development of radiolocation

TOP SECRET

5. CAIRNCROSS strenuously denied involvement in arms traffic and claimed that the references to him in the correspondence were "lies". He had put HAEFNER in touch with WATSON-WATT from purely patriotic motives.

6. It was pointed out that from 1951 until 1964 he had denied all involvement in espionage; his denials, in the face of documentary evidence of involvement with HAEFNER and RAAB seemed reminiscent of his earlier denials. His reaction was to say that he had confessed when he had because he had felt himself to be "in a jam". The clear implication was that he would continue to deny additional aspects of his involvement because he did not in present circumstances feel himself to be "in a jam". There was, however, no doubt he was a very worried man.

7. The interrogating officers were left with the impression that the basis of the account of his involvement he gave in his "confession" and which he has not varied materially since, could well be specious. There are now reasons to think that the time he spent in Europe both before going up to Cambridge and while he was there (he travelled a great deal as an undergraduate) is more significant than he has so far cared to admit. It is interesting that our thinking in this regard in CAIRNCROSS's case received unsolicited general support from Maurice DOBB (see also this Brief) who took the view that trips to Europe rather than student Communism at Cambridge were perhaps more relevant to RIS recruitments.

8. In the course of his interrogation CAIRNCROSS admitted that the information he gave in 1964 did not cover the facts as we now know them but even so refused to provide additional relevant information or alternative explanations.

9. We can only guess at his motives for maintaining this posture of defiance. There could well be an element of playing an intellectual game in which he avoids admitting anything unless confronted by incontrovertible evidence. But there remains the possibility that he is shielding someone. Furthermore in the light of the terms of the assurances of immunity from prosecution he has been given he may feel inhibited from making what could amount to new admissions in respect of his espionage activities and thus put himself at risk.


10. This case is one of considerable importance. It is adding a new dimension to our thinking on the RIS exploitation of the intellectual in the 1930s - particularly in highlighting the significance of Europe rather than of Cambridge. It is necessary to keep up pressure on CAIRNCROSS. He has given us written authorisation to examine his UK Bank accounts and proposals will be prepared

to dig up more information with a view to creating a situation where CAIRNCROSS feels - as he did in Cleveland in 1964 - that he is being "jammed".

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11. Although there were periods during the interrogation when he was clearly in considerable emotional distress, his interrogators were left with the impression of a totally a-moral man but also of a man as tough as whipcord.


E W Pratt

K3/7

1 May 1973

891a.
892a.

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ACT 1958.

PF 72493

NOTE FOR FILE

1. I rang CAIRNCROSS at the Crescent Hotel (387-1515) this morning.

2. Having confirmed arrangements for tomorrow's MEETING (10.30 in Room 055), I referred to the letter he had written following our meeting in January (serial 852a). In this he mentioned a list of ten points he had prepared. I told him it would be helpful if we could have the list in advance of tomorrow's meeting. He agreed and promised to have it ready for collection if I sent somebody round. I had already arranged with B3/ [redacted] that a car should be available and my secretary [redacted] duly collected the attached.

E W Pratt
E W Pratt

K3/7
MS Ext 660
24 April 1973

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ACT 1958 February 2024

810a

List of Ten Points prepared by John CAIRNCROSS

Collected from Crescent Hotel 24 April 1973

Attractions held out at initial meeting with Otto.

Discussion on train journey from Cambridge.

Ideological commitment in 1936.

Meeting with agents since 1952.

Social circles of BURGESS and MACLEAN.

Savings and money (statement was: I had savings - which is true - but we need to be clear on all this).

Idea there were others like myself.

Question of my non-surprise at being left to my own devices in 1952.

Whole reconstruction of psychological atmosphere of 1936-38(39) years and assumption that I understood establishment reactions.

(All above is of course sketchy but it gives an idea of considerations in my mind.)

Attractions held out at initial
meeting with Otto.

Discussion ~~at~~ ^{on} train journey from
Cambridge

Ideological commitment in 1936

Meeting with agents since 1952

Social circles of B & W.

Savings and money [statement was:

I had savings - which is true - but
we need to be clear on all this]

Does there were others like myself

Question of any non-surprise at
being left to my own devices in

1952.

Whole reconstruction of psychological
atmosphere of 1936-38(39) years +
assumption that I understood
"establishment" reaction

[All above is of course sketchy
but it gives an idea of
considerations in my mind]

DDG
through KX
through K3/C P C de W

1. At our interview with John CAIRNCROSS tomorrow we would like to show him the intercept letter from HAEFNER to RAAB at serial 42x which, in the last paragraph, mentions original papers from CAIRNCROSS and implies that CAIRNCROSS has done something for HAEFNER and RAAB in the past.
2. The letter was intercepted as a result of a HOW on either HAEFNER or RAAB (it is not now clear which) which were in operation because HAEFNER was an alien under suspicion of espionage and was involved in arms dealing business with RAAB.
3. We now think it possible that HAEFNER and RAAB's arms dealing might have had some connection with the RIS.
4. At previous interviews CAIRNCROSS has denied anything more than social involvement with HAEFNER whom he sponsored in this country in 1939. We think that by confronting him with this letter we might get him to admit that his involvement had a greater significance.

S Rimington

K3/8
MS Ext 654
24 April 1973

Loose Minute

K3(7)/EWP

Le Select

1. Two establishments seem to me to be likely candidates for your "Le Select" - described as a hotel or cafe with possibly homosexual connections:-

(i) Select-Raspail Hotel
259 Boulevard Raspail, Paris 14e

(ii) Le Select
99 Boulevard Montparnasse, Paris 6e.

2. (i) meets the description but I have no evidence of any homosexual connections. It is, of course, near 216 Bld Raspail which housed the World Youth (Peace) Congress in 1936 and the World Youth News Service in 1938.

3. (ii) meets the description in every way and has homosexual connections. It is located at the corner of the boulevard and rue Vavin, well known as a meeting place of homosexuals for fifty years or more. It is also within easy walking distance of 216 Bld Raspail, and 38 Bld Raspail which from January 1937 housed the World Anti-War Movement. Possibly significant too is its proximity to James KLUGMANN's residence at 71 rue du Cherche-Midi. The offices of the World Student Association from 1935 to 1938 at 97 Bld Arago are not far away either and Le Select would have been on KLUGMANN's route to and from the office. Above the cafe are some furnished rooms entered via 54 rue Vavin. In the cafe itself a block-up door behind the cash-desk previously communicated with the hallway of 54 rue Vavin which leads me to believe that the cafe was once combined with the hotel above.

4. Marcel Chalet of the DST confirmed my feelings about this cafe and its homosexual connections. He also mentioned that La Coupole, on the opposite side of the boulevard had been a pre-war meeting place of progressives. I told Chalet that we believed BURGESS used Le Select in the late 1930s and that there could be an RIS connection. Chalet promised to have a look at his records and let us have anything of interest.

5. A source of mine reported that he knew Le Select, of bld Montparnasse, to have been a meeting place of left-wingers in the 1930s and in 1937 to have been a place where volunteers for the International Brigades were recruited. He recalled having met Guy BURGESS there in late 1934 or early 1935. La Coupole was a famous meeting place of left-wing intellectuals; Barbusse, and the like, held court there to expound their views. Andre Philip and Paul Langevin were other regulars. Source confirmed that Le Select, and other cafes in the area were frequented by homosexuals as far back as 1930s.



K5/B1
MS Ext 780
17 April 1973

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887a

PF 72493

NOTE FOR FILE

1. On the 21 April 1952 CAIRN-CROSS rang Rupert HART-DAVIS the publishers to ask about the possibility of doing translation work for them. He told them about a book on Shakespeare that he and his brother had written. They asked him to submit anything he might write on 17th century France and told him that Anthony BLUNT was writing a book on the painting of the period. He said he knew this and had had an argument with BLUNT about his ideas on the subject.

See S
192a

Srella Rimmington

S Rimmington

K3/8
MS Ext 654
13 April 1973



886a.

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884c.

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SECRET

884b

Loose Minute

Copy: PF 72493

K5/ 

1. Following our conversation yesterday on the CAIRNCROSS case we would be grateful for any information you may be able to get for us on:-

Etienne TAMBOURI

Born: Possibly c.1900
(this is a guess)

Address: 1937 & 1939: Paris
1940: Possibly at
26, Avenue Kleber,
Paris.

2. He is thought to have spent a great deal of his spare time in England in 1938 and 1939 where he may have been in contact with the BURGESS group. He was frequently visited in Paris during the same period by a contact of Guy BURGESS.

3. It is possible he may have had something to do with the business of obtaining aeroplanes for Spain in 1937.

4. For your own information the contact of BURGESS is John CAIRNCROSS.

Sella Rimington

S Rimington

K3/8
MS Ext 654
11 April 1973

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
Loose Minute

Copy: PF 72493 ✓

K7/Miss Sparks

John CAIRNCROSS

1. I am most grateful to you for letting me have a copy of your note dated 2 February which I now return having, as we agreed, taken a xerox copy for personal retention.
2. Your digging and delving into this matter has been most helpful as it provides the basis of an acceptable explanation for the delight GROMOV seems to have expressed at CAIRNCROSS's work for him in Spring 1943 and for the gift of £200 he made to CAIRNCROSS.
3. It does, however, underline the question: Why in these circumstances did GROMOV allow CAIRNCROSS to leave GC & CS? It would surely be reasonable to assume that unless he had other sources there GROMOV would have brought pressure to bear on CAIRNCROSS to stay. But according to CAIRNCROSS's story he left GC & CS at his own initiative and GROMOV brought no pressure to attempt to dissuade him.
4. Someone - possibly yourself? - is no doubt looking at GC & CS in the light of this sort of thing. It would be very helpful to us in our preparations for what we anticipate will be something of a show-down with CAIRNCROSS to have as much background as we can on this part of his life. For example it would be helpful to know with whom he worked in Hut 3 at Bletchley and where Isos (with which he was involved in Section V of MI6) fitted into the work of Hut 3.
5. Stella Rimington and I would be most grateful if you could throw light on these things and any other relevant aspects of this period either orally or in the form of a background brief which we can build into our preparations for our interview with CAIRNCROSS.


E W Pratt

K3/7
9 April 1973

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SECRET

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Loose Minute


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K3/C P C de W

John CAIRNCROSS

1. You will recall that when Stella Rimington and I saw CAIRNCROSS in January he sounded us out on the question of whether or not he was likely to be granted a US visa if he were to be offered an academic post there. We temporised by saying it would not be right for us to offer any views but we would take note.

2. I would be grateful if you would please advise how we should respond to any follow-up enquiry he might make when we see him on 25 April 1973.



E W Pratt

K3/7
MS Ext 660
6 April 1973

K3/EXP.

We agreed the line should be that if we cancelled an answer will be coloured by our assessment of whether he has cooperated fully.

Pratt

K3 9/4

SECRET

Loose Minute

Copy: PF 72493
Room 055.

K3/C P C de W

John CAIRNCROSS

1. Yesterday I confirmed with Room 055 that accommodation would be available for the forthcoming interviews with CAIRNCROSS on 25 and 27 April 1973. I had already booked a room but in the light of the structural alterations at present affecting the interview rooms I thought it wise to check.

2. [redacted] warned me that she could not guarantee that "facilities" would be available by the 25 April; their re-installation depended on the completion of the structural work.

3. You will, I am sure, agree that technical coverage of the next interviews with CAIRNCROSS is most desirable; in my view it is essential. In the circumstances therefore would you consider it a prudent precaution to alert A Branch and B3 to the fact that if "facilities" are not available in Room 055 by 25 April we will be asking for temporary coverage to be installed for this particular operation?

E W Pratt

E W Pratt

K3/7
MS Ext 660
6 April 1973

K3/Ext. P

We are looking into whether the workmen, if still there, can be excluded for these interviews.

Platt
K3 9/4

Note.

426 [redacted] telephoned today + confirmed coverage would be possible on a temporary basis if the practical necessary. It would commence on 25 April 1973 when the workmen are in Room 055 should be checked. K3 11/4

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PF 72493

NOTE FOR FILE

1. Between 19 December 1951 and 25 February 1952 CAIRNCROSS was absent from the Treasury for some sixty days. As he had sent no medical certificate he received a request for one. As a result a certificate was received in the Treasury dated 8 February 1952 from:

Dr S SIMON
30 Kensington Park Road
W11

2. This certificate, [redacted] states that CAIRNCROSS was suffering from catarrholic jaundice; it did not state from when.

3. I have been entertaining some doubts about this and I therefore asked my wife (who has been practising medicine for some twenty-seven years) to tell me about catarrholic jaundice. She said at once there was no such thing. She added there was a condition of hepatitis which used to be described as catarrhal jaundice; use of this term reflected an imprecise diagnosis of the cause of the hepatitis. The word catarrholic made no medical sense.

4. To make doubly sure my wife consulted various medical reference books and confirmed that the term "catarrholic" did not turn up in them. It is possible that I had misread SIMON's writing and in fact had written catarrhalic (although it does not look like that). But even if this is so it seems that he would not have been using the adjectival form normally used by doctors.

5. The handwriting looked to me to be that of a foreigner and I took steps to try to trace SIMON. I first consulted the 1948 Post Office London Directory, and in the Street Directory section under 30 Kensington Park Road, W11 found the following entry:

SIMON Siegfried, Physician and Surgeon

In the 1958 edition of the same Directory, the entry under this address had changed slightly to:

SIMON Sidney, Physician and Surgeon

6. I then consulted the earliest Medical Directory in the Library - for 1960 - which contained the following information:

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/

SIMON Sidney: 30 Kensington Park Road
W.11 (Tel: PARK 9650); M.D Munich 1908;
L.R.C.P., L.R.C.S Ed., L.R.F.P.S Glas.,
1935. (Munich, Berlin, Vienna). Late
Chief Orthop. Surgeon Kinderheilantalt
Municipal Hosp., Berlin; Director-in-
Chief Inst. for Care of Crippled
Children, Berlin-Pankov; Cons. Orthop.
Surgon, Hospl. Berlin-Buch.

7. A look-up based on the above information did not throw up any trace in our records.

8. Assuming, from his history, he was a refugee from Hitler's Germany it is perhaps odd that someone with what appears to have been a fairly distinguished orthopaedic background did not gain an appropriate qualification to continue to practise orthopaedics here; it appears from his UK qualifications he turned into a GP. His use of the word catarrholic may simply have derived from the fact that it took him a long time to familiarise himself with British medical jargon.

E W Pratt
E W Pratt

K3/7
MS Ext 660
27 March 1973

Note:

CAIRNCROSS remained in contact with SIMON.
PHIDIAS at 482a indicates that in 1962
SIMON was continuing to advise CAIRNCROSS
(Ken in Italy) by letter. SIMON signs himself
"Siegfried".

J. K3/7 3.4.73

877a.

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876a


R J Wallace Esq OBE
The Treasury
Great George Street
London
SW1

1108

PF 72493/K3/7/EWP

22 March 1973

1. Very many thanks for letting
me have your file No: 1108 for
John CAIRNCROSS which I now return.
It has proved very helpful.


E W Pratt

Enc

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PF 72493

Copy: PF 72493/SuppB

NOTE FOR FILE

CAIRNCROSS's Treasury Papers

2. In outline his service up until the end of the war was as follows:

i. October 1936

He entered the Foreign Office having passed out top of the Civil Service First Division Competitive Examination.

(Note: One of his referees was A H J Knight, Fellow of Trinity Cambridge, under whom CAIRNCROSS had studied German throughout his time at Cambridge.

This is interesting not only for the praise it bestows on CAIRNCROSS but the emphasis it gives to the positive side of his character.

Knight is No Trace; he read Classics then Modern Languages at Trinity (BA 1924) and was elected to a Fellowship in 1930. He no longer appears in the record books so must be presumed dead.)

ii. 1st October 1938

Transferred to Treasury in the rank of Assistant Principal.

(Note: He had had three adverse reports in the Foreign Office.)

iii. 23rd September 1940

Became Private Secretary to Lord Hankey; granted an additional allowance of £120 pa.

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- iv. 1st January 1942
Promoted Acting Principal.
 - v. March 1942
Left Hankey's service; Hankey wrote a Note for the record which although containing the standard phrase "to my entire satisfaction", in other respects was couched in less than enthusiastic terms.
 - vi. 11th May 1942
Joined HM Forces.
 - vii. 1st September 1942
Lent to Foreign Office for duty with GC & CS and served there until his release on 31st May 1943.
 - viii. 14th June 1943
Began working for MI6.
 - ix. 21st June 1945
Resumed work in Treasury; posted to DM (Defence (Materiel) Department).
3. From that time his career never seems to have prospered; indeed it was marked with a series of what must have been great disappointments which in turn could well have been a major cause for resentment.
4. His post-war career was as follows:
- i. April 1947
Following exchanges with Establishments indicating that he wished to work abroad "to indulge his interests in things foreign", he applied for the post of Chief of the Finance Section in PICA0. The Treasury supported his application in a rather negative way and the appointment did not materialise.
 - ii. June 1947
He moved from DM to DP (ie Personnel). His superior in DM, a Mr Blunt, according to CAIRNCROSS, had formed "a low view of his capacity".
 - iii. March 1948
CAIRNCROSS informed Establishments that he wished to resign from the Treasury with effect from 8th March 1948 as he had been offered a job in Courtaulds. This fell

through owing to "a last minute hitch". Geoffrey Courtauld, Director of Personnel, wrote to the Treasury explaining the circumstances of the "hitch". It had been the intention that CAIRNCROSS should become Assistant to the Overseas Director. Courtauld explained that although CAIRNCROSS was "ideally suited to the job and we liked the look of CAIRNCROSS very much indeed from a character as well as a proficiency point of view" the job had changed in character since originally conceived; "the appointment would require substantially more of a technical background than Mr CAIRNCROSS possessed The appointment, originally visualised as being a commercial one with technical implications, quickly veered towards a technical appointment in which commercial background would be useful". It had been mutually agreed that CAIRNCROSS should not proceed further.

The Treasury agreed to the withdrawal of his resignation.

iv. 31st January 1949

CAIRNCROSS saw a Deputy Establishment Officer (J A C Robertson).

Objects of talk:

- a. to seek a job more directly concerned with international affairs;
- b. to discuss career prospects; was he likely to be promoted?

He was offered various possible openings:

- a. Number 2 to the Financial Adviser, Middle East;
- b. O and M Officer to the Ceylon Government;
- c. Absorption into Customs and Excise.

(Note: None of these suggestions involved, or had prospects of, promotion.)

v. June 1950

Confirmed (Note: after eight years acting) as Principal.

Transferred from DP to DM and worked on:

- a. Western Union Finance and Economic Committee;

b. Permanent Working Staff
North Atlantic Defence,
Financial and Economic
Committee

At this time CAIRNCROSS made strenuous efforts to get his job up-graded; he argued that higher status would help with the foreigners. This was rebuffed with such comments as: "They don't know him as a person".

vi. July 1950

The post held by CAIRNCROSS was up-graded to Assistant Secretary but he was told he would not be appointed to it.

vii. August 1950

CAIRNCROSS expressed the wish to be transferred to MOD. He maintained he would get on well there as he was persona grata with Service personnel.

Sir Harold Parker however commented that CAIRNCROSS would not be suitable for MOD as he was not persona grata with Service personnel.

viii. 11th September 1950

Moved from DM to EC (Exchange Control) Division.

ix. October 1950

Applied for post of Head of Personnel, OEEC Paris. His application was supported, reasonably strongly, by the Treasury (Thomas Padmore) but OEEC decided to appoint someone else. "..... CAIRNCROSS impressed all the senior officials who interviewed him here, both by his likeable personality and by his evident intellectual qualities". But OEEC added: "one question was whether a man of his age would long be satisfied, having regard to his very high intellectual calibre, with the comparatively humdrum problems with which Head of Personnel is, for the most part, required to deal". This letter was written in March 1951.


(Note: His brother Alexander had for some-time been Board of Trade Adviser to OEEC and John CAIRNCROSS, had he been appointed, could have taken over his brother's flat.)

x. 26th January 1951

Married Gabrielle Susan nee OPPENHEIM
(British by naturalisation).

- xi. February 1951
Negotiations between Treasury and Ministry of Supply prior to transfer of CAIRNCROSS.
- xii. 1st May 1951
CAIRNCROSS transferred to Ministry of Supply on one year's probationary period.
- xiii. November 1951
Wilkinson of Ministry of Supply wrote to Griffiths, Treasury Establishments: CAIRNCROSS "has not settled down at all well here. Indeed we have come to the conclusion he will never take roots in any part of the Ministry of Supply". Wilkinson suggests that CAIRNCROSS should make an immediate break and return to the Treasury then rather than complete the probationary year.
- xiv. 12th December 1951
CAIRNCROSS returned to the Treasury, LB Division.
- xv. 19th December 1951
CAIRNCROSS went off duty first on annual and then on sick leave. He sent no medical certificate until asked to do so in February 1952. He then sent a certificate dated 8th February 1952 from Dr S SIMON, 30 Kensington Park Road, W.11 which simply stated he was suffering from catarrholic jaundice but did not state from when.
- xvi. 25th February 1952
Resumed duty.
- xvii. 17th April 1952
Letter of resignation. He asked whether the Treasury had any objection to his applying for a situation with the BBC or UNESCO.
- xviii. 19th April 1952
Effective date of resignation. He was informed that permission of the Treasury was not required before he applied for a position in the organisations he mentioned.

5. Details of CAIRNCROSS's Annual Leave from 1940
are set out in Annex B.



E W Pratt

K3/7
MS Ext 660
22 March 1972

Details of CAIRNCROSS's Annual Leave

6	20.8.45	-	25.8.45
3	29.10.45	-	31.10.45
3	1.11.45	-	3.11.45
1	27.12.45		
7	23.4.46	-	30.4.46
6	24.6.46	-	29.6.46
1	10.9.46		
6	18.10.46	-	24.10.46
1	29.1.47		
6	22.2.47	-	28.2.47
3	9.4.47	-	11.4.47
9	2.7.47	-	15.7.47
1	18.8.47		
7	23.8.47	-	30.8.47
13	1.9.47	-	15.9.47
1	20.11.47		
6	1.12.47	-	6.12.47
1	7.1.48		
$\frac{1}{2}$	20.1.48		
$\frac{1}{2}$	21.1.48		
15	9.4.48	-	26.4.48
$\frac{1}{2}$	27.4.48		
5	10.8.48	-	14.8.48
7	17.9.48	-	24.9.48
$\frac{1}{2}$	22.4.49		
1	23.4.49		
5	26.4.49	-	30.4.49
7	2.5.49	-	9.5.49
15	14.7.49	-	30.7.49
$\frac{1}{2}$	8.11.49		
2	5.12.49	-	9.12.49

/

6 1.4.50 - 11.4.50
2 25.5.50 - 26.5.50
14 16.8.50 - 31.8.50
10 1.9.50 - 12.9.50
1 14.10.50
3 4.12.50

1 17.1.51
15 12.3.51 - 31.3.51

Sick Leave 27.12.51 - 25.2.52 (ie 61 days)
(catarrholic jaundice)

874a.

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873a

LOOSE MINUTE

~~K3/EVR~~

Claim

You will wish to note

John CAIRNCROSS

JK

856a

Thank you for your minute of 7 February and the report of the CAIRNCROSS interview.

2. You will wish to note that extracts from the report have been made for files as follows:

paragraphs 41-43 PF 604589
(FOOTMAN)

PF 604584
(PHILBY)

paragraphs 46, PF 604582
72-79, (BLUNT)
84-87

M Fleay

M Fleay

K7
14.3.73

TOP SECRET

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872a

Loose Minute

Copy: PF 72493 ✓

F2,

John CAIRNCROSS

1. I would be most grateful if you could ask your contact in the Treasury if we could have a sight of the personal file of CAIRNCROSS who was transferred to the Treasury from the Foreign Office in 1938 and served there until joining GC & CS in 1942; he returned to the Treasury after the war and continued to serve there until his resignation from the Civil Service in April 1952.

2. It would be helpful if we could borrow the papers, but if this is difficult I would be happy to go there to read them.


E W Pratt

K3/7
MS Ext 660
13 March 1973

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NOTE FOR FILE

1. Peter Wright discussed with me today various aspects of the Conclusions to my report at serial 856a. In the course of this he reminded me of some KAGO information which could be relevant.

2. I have gone back to the original which is on Tape B9 pages 9-11. KAGO recalls a day, a Sunday in early Spring 1952 when he was on duty in KGB Headquarters. A telegram which had some connection with the Ring of Five arrived from London (he did not know its contents) for which he had to call in GROMOV (GORSKIY). He recalled that GROMOV dealt with it at once by sending a telegram back to London.

3. Although KAGO could not be more precise as to the date it is possible that the Sunday in question could have been early in April, which again could have been the day before CAIRNCROSS's activation of emergency procedure for a meet would have taken effect - he expected as a result of activating these procedures to meet his controller on the first Monday in April. *

E W Pratt
E W Pratt

* i.e. 6th April 1952

[Handwritten mark]

K3/7
MS Ext 660
12 March 1973



868b.

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868A

Room 055
File ✓
Float
L.B

J Cairncross Esq
Via Armando Spadini 16
Parioli
Rome

PF 72493/K3/7/EWP
22 February 1973


867A

Many thanks for your letter of 13th February; it was good of you to let me know the dates of your next trip in such good time.

I agree the Easter weekend is not a good idea for our meeting. If you are not too heavily committed I would suggest we meet on the morning of Wednesday 25th April - at about 10.30. And taking up your point about time for reflection, perhaps you would be kind enough to keep an hour or so free for us either the following day or on Friday 27th April.

May we leave it like that? If I do not hear from you that your plans have changed I shall ring you at the Crescent Hotel fairly early on Tuesday 24th April and confirm things.

Like you I look forward to continuing our discussion.


E W. Pratt

task agreed with
K3/cpc J. W.
K3/7 22.2.73

VIA ARMANDO SPADINI, 16
ROMA

867A

13 February 1973

Rec: 21-2-73.

~~Dear Mr Pratt,~~


Many thanks for your letter. I am happy to say that I have fixed my next trip to England, and will be in London from ²⁰ April to ²⁸!

It is all the same to me when we see each other, though preferably not over the weekend (only a preference however), and I suggest that we start our talks early on during my stay so as to leave you as much time for reflection as possible.

I shall be staying, unless I inform you to the contrary, at the Crescent Hotel, Cartwright Gardens, W C 1 (Tel 387 1515).

I imagine that you will be writing to me about precise arrangements. IN any case, I look forward to continuing our discussion.

Yours sincerely,


John Cairncross

Mr E W Pratt

✓

TOP SECRET

866a

C O Shipp Esq OBE
SLO Washington


PF 72493/K3/7/EWP

21 February 1973

John CAIRNCROSS

1. I enclose three copies of my report on our latest interview with CAIRNCROSS.

2. We have no objection to you passing it to the C.I.A and F.B.I if you wish to do so; you are obviously the best judge of whether it is suitable in its present form - if you consider anything should be changed perhaps you would let me know and I can then provide the necessary amendments.


E W Pratt

Enc (3)

EWP/SDO

*seen & agreed
by K3/CPC de W.*

*Not passed to liaison.
see 5/3/74.*

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865a

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
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NOTE FOR FILE

1. In the version of the report at serial 856a sent to S.L.O Washington for liaison purposes the final sentence of paragraph 86 was amended to read:

"It is with this in mind that we have decided to probe further CAIRNCROSS's finances to see where this may lead us."

2. This change reflects the decision to accept the offer to undertake further enquiries in Italy rather than that of Angleton to do so.



E W Pratt

K3/7
MS Ext 660
21 February 1973

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864A

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C O Shipp Esq OBE
S.L.O Washington

PF 72493/K3/7/EWP

16 February 1973

John CAIRNCROSS

1. You will recall that when you were with us on 22nd January we discussed whether or not we should take up Angleton's offer to make enquiries in Italy about CAIRNCROSS's finances. We left it that subject to [redacted] concurrence we should accept the offer and we undertook to prepare a Note setting out the information we have which bears upon CAIRNCROSS's finances for briefing Angleton.
2. I gather that you did not get round to this case during your visit to [redacted] on your last day, so it will be news to you that they are strongly opposed to CIA coming into the act. They point out that [redacted] has only made rather superficial enquiries so far and are confident that he can produce more if he has a thorough brief.
3. I hope this does not put you in a difficult position with Angleton; we appreciate his offer to help, but as CAIRNCROSS is a U.K national and [redacted] has already been in touch with his Italian liaison about this case and as we do not know anything about the channels Angleton would use, we can only agree with CX that it is safer - and indeed more proper - to stay within the family.
4. We are sending copies of the report separately.

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C P C de Wesselow

Copy to: [redacted]

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863a.

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
*Mary Healy - I found it
fascinating reading.*

D.

16/2

John CAIRNCROSS

1. I attach, as promised, a copy of my report on the latest interview with CAIRNCROSS. I would be grateful if you would please let me have it back when you have read it.



E W Pratt

K3/7

MS Ext 660

15 February 1973



TOP SECRET

copy: PF 72,493

860c

"Ring of Five" Recruitments

1. In considering the recruitments to the R.I.S of members of Cambridge University in the 1930s it is important to remember that there are no hard facts. We have only the stories of those who were involved to go on and it is very likely that the information we have been given in several cases is false.

2. The attached chart lists those from Cambridge who we have reason to believe were recruited to work for the R.I.S in the 1930s, in order of the date of their recruitment as far as this can be surmised. The chart gives in the first column the story the person himself has given of his own recruitment, the second column any relevant information given by others and in the third column our comments.

Sella Rimington

S Rimington

K3/8

MS Ext 654

12 February 1973

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Name	Own Story	Information from Other Sources	Comments
PHILBY (Trinity, 1930-1933)	Recruited by "Otto", whom he identified as Arnold DEUTSCH, in Regents Park, London in spring or summer 1934. The meeting was arranged by Lizi PHILBY (Source: PHILBY's "Confession" in 1963).	i) BLUNT said he thought Edith TUDOR-HART had first recruited PHILBY. ii) Later on he said he thought Edith TUDOR-HART had recruited Lizi and Lizi had recruited PHILBY.	It seems likely that PHILBY may have become involved earlier than he has said and may have been instructed to conceal his Communism at Cambridge. Though he was an official of the Socialist Society in his last year at Cambridge (1932-1933) he took no part in extreme left wing activities yet in autumn 1933 in Vienna he lived and worked with Communists e.g Lizi FRIEDMANN (whom he married in spring 1934) and Edith TUDOR-HART.
MACLEAN (Trinity Hall, 1931- 1934)		i) PHILBY said he recruited MACLEAN just before or just after MACLEAN's entry into the Foreign Office (i.e c. October 1935). ii) BLUNT said BURGESS told him MACLEAN and PHILBY were in the conspiracy. He did not date this information.	MACLEAN dropped out of Communist Party activity at Cambridge at about Easter 1934, which might indicate that he had been recruited by that time. He told his mother that he had decided to give up Communism in the late summer of 1934.

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BURGESS
(Trinity,
1930-1933/35)

i) PHILBY said he recruited BURGESS shortly after MACLEAN (i.e. after October 1935).

If BLUNT's story is true BURGESS was recruited much earlier than PHILBY claimed.

ii) BLUNT said that BURGESS told him he was leaving the Communist Party under R.I.S orders. This was presumably early in 1935, the date at which BURGESS broke with the Communist Party.

iii) BLUNT also said that BURGESS gave up his research and left Cambridge for London under R.I.S orders during the 1934/35 academic year.

iv) Goronwy REES said he thought KLUGMANN might well have got BURGESS into espionage.

KLUGMANN
(Trinity,
1931-1935)

In a conversation with another prominent Communist he said "fairly early" in his career he "got very mixed up in it" (i.e. in R.I.S work). This may have meant early in his Communist career (which started in 1933) or early in his career after leaving Cambridge (i.e. 1935).

i) BLUNT said that KLUGMANN attended meetings in BURGESS's rooms in 1934 and 1935 at which candidates for recruitment were discussed. He explained later that he meant for recruitment to the C.P. but this may have been an attempt to cover up a slip.

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KLUGMANN
(cont'd)

To the Security Service he said that the Communist Party was an illegal organization in the 1930s in many countries and much of his work in the anti-Fascist movement was therefore clandestine.

ii) BLUNT said that KLUGMANN was privy to the discussions before STRAIGHT's recruitment (late 1936/early 1937). Later he altered this and said he was sure KLUGMANN was not aware of plans to recruit STRAIGHT.

BLUNT
(Trinity,
1926-29/38)

i) BLUNT's first story (23rd April, 1964) was returning to Cambridge from a year in Italy and Germany he found a strong Communist group had developed among undergraduates led by KLUGMANN, CORNFORD and BURGESS. He had always admired BURGESS's intellect and under his influence began to take an academic interest in Marxism. With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War this interest became stronger. In about 1936 BURGESS told him that he had joined the 3rd International and suggested then or shortly afterwards that BLUNT should join too. He agreed and was introduced to "George" in a Cambridge cafe. The meeting was before June 1937.

It seems very likely that in dating his recruitment at early 1936 BLUNT is putting it later than it was. If his story of attending meetings with KLUGMANN and BURGESS in 1934 and 1935 at which candidates for recruitment were discussed did refer to espionage recruitments he was obviously involved before 1936. Even if his story that BURGESS told him of his own orders to leave the Party in early 1935 is correct it seems unlikely that, having this information, he was not himself brought in until a year later.

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BLUNT
(cont'd)

ii) On 1st May, 1964
BLUNT said that:
BURGESS was recruited
during his post-
graduate year (1934/
1935) at Cambridge and
told to leave the Party
and go to London.
BURGESS after he had
left Cambridge returned
with "George" and re-
cruited BLUNT sometime
between the autumn of
1935 and the summer of
1937 (probably in the
summer of 1936) as a
talent-spotter.

CAIRNCROSS
(Trinity,
1934-1936)

Introduced by KLUGMANN
to 'Otto' (unidentified)
in Regent's Park in
autumn 1936.

i) BLUNT said he
talent-spotted
CAIRNCROSS in Cambridge
and set up a meeting
with BURGESS after which
BURGESS recruited him on
the train journey from
Cambridge to London.
Research has dated this
journey as mid-August
1936.

ii) KLUGMANN said he did
not deny CAIRNCROSS's
story of the introduc-
tion. He had from time
to time been asked to
introduce people to
others without knowing
why.

CAIRNCROSS has recalled
the meeting with
BURGESS, mentioned by
BLUNT, and the train
journey but not the
recruitment approach
by BURGESS.

It seems likely he is
trying to protect BLUNT
or someone else.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

WATSON
(Kings,
1926-1929/
39)

i) He claimed to suffer from a mental block on the subject but accepted that he must have been approached at Cambridge by BURGESS or someone closely associated with BURGESS with a proposal that he should work for the Russians. He could not remember who had approached him or in what terms.

ii) He also thought he remembered being introduced to a foreign friend of BURGESS's, possibly called 'Otto', in London in the presence of BURGESS and possibly BLUNT or Richard LLEWELYN-DAVIES. He implied that this might have been a recruitment or a briefing for R.I.S work.

WATSON's mental block makes it practically impossible to sort out what his own story is. He would not give any date for his recruitment.

STRAIGHT
(Trinity,
1934-1937)

i) In about January 1937 he was recruited by BLUNT in BLUNT's rooms at Cambridge. He was told to drop out of the Communist Party and go to the U.S.A to work in Morgan's Bank from where he was to provide economic information for the Russians.

BLUNT agreed he recruited STRAIGHT but could not remember anything about telling him to go into Morgan's Bank.

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STRAIGHT
(cont'd)

ii) In spring/summer 1937 he was visited at Dartington by BURGESS, SIMON and BLUNT.

iii) In June 1937 he went to a Road House on the Great West Road with BLUNT and BLUNT's Russian controller.

NORMAN
(Trinity,
1933-1935)

i) In December 1967 BLUNT said "Herb. NORMAN was in the game".

ii) In 1969 BLUNT denied even knowing NORMAN.

LONG
(Trinity,
1935-1938/
39)

Recruited by BLUNT. In 1936/1937 he met "George" at Warwick Avenue underground station after being briefed by BLUNT to attend.

BLUNT said he recruited LONG at Cambridge after discussing it with BURGESS.

ASTBURY
(Christ's
1935-1938/
39)

In 1972 he denied ever having been involved with the R.I.S.

In 1943 he said in C.P.H.Q that he had been passing information to SPRINGHALL.

BLUNT said that SIMON told him that ASTBURY was recruited as a G.R.U agent in summer 1939.

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SIMON
(Trinity,
1933-1937)

i) BLUNT said BURGESS suggested SIMON as a useful recruit in summer 1939. BLUNT went ahead to recruit him as a talent-spotter. He did not tell his controller that he had done so, as he was out of touch at the time.

ii) BLUNT later said it might have been 1938.

It seems more likely that SIMON was recruited earlier than 1938, probably while he was still at Cambridge.

GREENBERG
(Trinity,
1933-1936/
39)

He denied that he had ever worked for the R.I.S.

STRAIGHT said that he recommended GREENBERG to his controller as a likely recruit in about January 1943. His controller appeared to know all about him already.

Elizabeth BENTLEY said GREENBERG was in her network in U.S.A; 1941/1942.

COSTELLO
(Trinity,
1932-1934)

i) BLUNT said he had never heard of him.
ii) CAIRNCROSS thought he might have been recruited at Cambridge where he was a tough and militant Communist and a close associate of KLUGMANN.

iii) KLUGMANN said he was "a good comrade" whom he had known from his Cambridge days.

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Nunn MAY
(Trinity
Hall, 1930-
1933/36)

In 1949 he said he was recruited literally hours before he left the U.K for Canada by someone "now out of reach". (He went to Canada in 1942).

Nunn MAY was working in the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge with Engelbert BRODA et al in 1942, just before he went to Canada.

12th February, 1973

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THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

Financial History of John CAIRNCROSSIntroduction

19th April

Having had to resign from the Civil Service with effect from ~~31st March~~, 1952, apart from a little translation work, CAIRNCROSS apparently had no alternative source of income. According to his own story he was almost penniless and it was for that reason he tried to make contact with his Russian controller; he had been led to believe that if things went wrong he would be looked after and it was in the hope of getting money that on two successive Mondays in April 1952 he activated emergency procedures to effect a meet but claims he was unsuccessful on both occasions.

The checks operating on him at that time serve to confirm that he was badly off and indeed urgently needed money. They also suggest he was not over-scrupulous where money matters were concerned; he seems to have had some shady dealings in currency and in whisky, presumably on the black market. In order to raise the money to get to Rome to start life afresh it seems he had to sell quite a lot of his possessions.

He is insistent that he was never re-contacted by the Russians ^{where} ~~whether~~ directly or indirectly.

Background to his life after moving to Rome

In his early days in Rome, according to his own account, he made a somewhat precarious living by translation work; he also became a stringer for the Economist (a weekly) and the Observer (a Sunday) and, in addition, had some connection with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

(In a curriculum vitae he prepared in 1960, CAIRNCROSS perhaps aggrandised what he had been doing following his arrival in Rome; he described himself as having been "Rome Correspondent" for the journals quoted above and for the C.B.C. This suggests he was employed as a staff representative there which apparently he was not; he seems to have operated strictly on a freelance basis.)

He moved into the field of United Nations work in the mid-1950s. During 1955-1956 he became a Consultant in U.N Technical Assistance in Geneva, and from 1957-1960 served in the U.N Economic Commission to Asia and the Far East based in Bangkok.

Returning to Italy he worked in the Management Consultancy firm of ITALCONSULT from 1961. In February 1964 he took up his appointment as Chairman, Romanic Languages Department, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.

/Later that . . .

Later that same year he returned to Rome and to U.N work, joining F.A.O. In July 1972 he was reported to be a Category I employee and as such, Director of the Air Services Division. His salary at that time was one million lire a month. He is believed to be still holding the same position but it is possible his salary might have increased since then.

Since the summer of 1964 CAIRNCROSS has lived alone (he is separated from his wife) at Via Armando Spadini 16 (Flat 14), telephone: 804575. He is owner of a D.K.W motor car registration number: CD 3 2187 which he is said not to have used since an accident in 1970.

Object of the Enquiries

The indications are that CAIRNCROSS is now in a position to invest and speculate on a fairly large scale; such details as we have of his ventures are considered individually below.

It would be of great assistance to have full details of these and whatever other financial interests he might have, and particularly to know how, when, through whom and in what circumstances he originally acquired the capital to embark on his investment programme.

Unless it can be shown to the contrary the thought must remain that a possible element in the origins of this programme was some reward from the Russians in recognition of his services to them.

Known Financial Ventures

(i) Olive Grove in Tuscany

In 1969 he told us that he had recently bought an olive grove in Tuscany; he hoped to convert a farm house on the land which he could either live in himself occasionally, or let.

In 1972 he told a complicated story to the effect that he had sold the olive grove to a couple who had reneged on the bargain because they wished to buy a house in London. In order to recoup his loss on this deal CAIRNCROSS hoped to get his hands on some land near Rome belonging to this couple.

In 1973 he said he had not received any money in respect of his olive grove.

It is regretted this is so incomplete: we do not know the location of the olive grove (except it is in Tuscany), the name of the couple, nor any details of the parcel of land near Rome CAIRNCROSS was hoping to acquire in lieu.

(ii) Villa at Anacapri

First mention of this villa was made in 1972 when it cropped up in the context of, and as being in some complicated way connected with, the transaction relating to the olive grove in Tuscany ((i) above).

CAIRNCROSS described this as a "millionaire's villa" which although he claimed he owned he could never afford to live in himself.

We recently learnt through liaison channels, that CAIRNCROSS does not appear to be the owner of any house property in Anacapri, nor have traces been found that he has visited the island. It came to light, however, that Valentine CHASSAIGNON de CAZES obtained a building licence for the construction of a villa at Tuoro Orrico in Anacapri worth 30-35 million lire. The work was begun in 1969 and should have been completed in the autumn of 1972.

Valentine CHASSAIGNON de CAZES, whose address is Via Celimontana 28, Rome, like CAIRNCROSS is employed in F.A.O. From various indiscretions there are reasons to believe that funds for the building were given to her by CAIRNCROSS, although his name does not appear in any of the files of the building business or of the project itself. We understand that on completion of the building, when registration takes place it should be possible to deduce the identity of the owner.

There is no record of Valentine CHASSAIGNON de CAZES

(iii) Alleged Fraud by Peter Dover BUYERS

The background to this alleged fraud, so far as we know it, shows this to be a very complicated affair. The outline of this case is as follows:

- 1967 Mrs. DE CENT met BUYERS when they were both working as consultants for a company - went into financial partnership (his expertise and her money) and bought up the company.
- About 1967 CAIRNCROSS introduced to BUYERS by Mrs. DE CENT in Rome.
- About 1968 CAIRNCROSS received a letter (with her signature forged, according to Mrs. DE CENT) purporting to come from Mrs. DE CENT, informing him of a business proposition and inviting him to invest in it.
- About March/
April, 1969 CAIRNCROSS again met Mrs. DE CENT and BUYERS in Rome and discussed investment possibilities with BUYERS, particularly one concerning disposal of quantities of Nigerian oil. After this conversation and later correspondence with BUYERS, CAIRNCROSS agreed to invest about £20,000. He gave him in two instalments in Italian currency over £10,000; he paid to him through his bank in Geneva Swiss cheques worth over £4,000; also to BUYERS' London bank through his own bank in London about £10,000 (i.e. over £24,000). He was promised a return of 20% to 30% on his capital. He raised the capital by borrowing at 10% to 15% on the security of land he owned in Italy.

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(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 FEBRUARY 2024

End June,
1969.

CAIRNCROSS received as receipt from BUYERS a cheque on a Swiss bank for a sum representing his capital and some interest (dated 15.12.69) (about £31,000 in Swiss francs).

After March/
April, 1969

CAIRNCROSS met BUYERS (alone) eight or nine times socially in Rome. Lent him a total of about £350 in Italian currency, in return for which he was given cheques. One, English one, was returned marked 'Payment Countermanded'. Two Swiss ones were returned marked 'No funds'.

3.11.1969

Letter to CAIRNCROSS from BUYERS re activities in Nigeria. Asks if CAIRNCROSS wants his money back now, plus 35%, or would he prefer to stay in. BUYERS recommends staying in.

March 1970

Cable from BUYERS saying 'Stopped all cheques following theft'. After this CAIRNCROSS never heard from BUYERS again.

April 1970

CAIRNCROSS sent cheque (dated 15.12.69) to Swiss bank. On hearing nothing from them he wrote again.

12.5.1970

Letter to CAIRNCROSS from BUYERS' Swiss bank to say the cheque never received.

3.8.1970

CAIRNCROSS wrote to Swiss bank again.

11.8.1970

Letter from BUYERS' Swiss bank to say BUYERS' account closed in 'Spring' 1970. CAIRNCROSS's letter of April 1970 enclosing BUYERS' cheque never reached them - they suggested he take this up with the Italian Post Office.

1.9.1970

CAIRNCROSS wrote to Highgate Police, alleging fraud against BUYERS. Message forwarded to Rome Police as the offences took place in Rome. CAIRNCROSS would not disclose any details to them and referred them back to London.

5.12.1970

CAIRNCROSS made statement to Highgate Police.

7.6.1971

CAIRNCROSS made statement to Rome Police to whom he had been summoned because of message forwarded to them from Highgate (see item of 1.9.1970 above). In this he merely identified a photograph as being one of Peter Dover BUYERS, by whom he had been defrauded, and added that full details had been given to the English Police and that he intended to ask them to forward the relevant documents to the Rome Police.

8.6.1971

CAIRNCROSS wrote to Highgate Police, complaining that the Rome Police had asked him about his original letter of 1.9.1970, which was now out of date and asking Highgate to bring Rome up to date so that they could arrest BUYERS if he went to Rome.

14.7.1971

CAIRNCROSS wrote to Highgate Police asking for news of his last letter. Has lost touch with Mrs. DE CENT who appears to have moved. What is her new address?

According to the above summary CAIRNCROSS claims he has been defrauded of some £30,000 as a result of his association with BUYERS and Gillian DE CENT. Although he was in touch with us in December 1970 when he visited Highgate Police Station, he made no mention of his trouble to us or even that he was in touch with the Police. In 1972 he was given every opportunity - indeed encouraged - to tell us about this business but deliberately refrained from doing so.

We have no security record for BUYERS but he is described by the Police as "a persistent and elusive criminal whose convictions go back to 1950".

We have been able to find some background to Gillian Alice DE CENT nee WEATHERDON, born 20th August, 1920 - although we have no security record of her. In 1939 she married an Italian, GENSINI (f.n.u) from whom she was divorced after the war. During the war she was interned by the Italians but was released in 1943 and made her way to the British lines with a number of prisoners of war including DE CENT, a Regular Army officer, whom she married in 1956.

After the war she worked for the Foreign Office for a time and then went to Switzerland. While there it is believed that in 1952 she became friendly with Donald HISS brother of Alger HISS.

After her marriage to DE CENT she accompanied him in 1957 to Ventiane where he served as Military Attache. In 1958 she is said to have had an affair with CAIRNCROSS who was then based in Bangkok but visited Ventiane to lecture on behalf of U.N.E.S.C.O. We have no further information about DE CENT but he and his wife seem to have separated. Gillian's association with BUYERS does not seem to have been confined to their business interests; they were living together during the time BUYERS is alleged to have been in contact with CAIRNCROSS and defrauding both him and Gillian of large sums of money.

As will be seen from the chronology of the case against BUYERS set out above, CAIRNCROSS raised the money for the investment he made in BUYERS' schemes on security of land he owned in Italy. It would be interesting to know whether this land was that referred to in either (i) or (ii) above - or something different, and if so, what and where this was.

(iv) Maintenance of Wife

It is believed that CAIRNCROSS continues to provide a generous allowance to his wife from whom he is separated; it would be helpful to know how much this amounts to.

General

When interviewed in January 1973 CAIRNCROSS made light of the loss he had sustained as a result of the alleged fraud by BUYERS; he also made light of what seems to be a confused situation - but one which is unfavourable to himself - in relation to the disposal of the Olive Grove. His line was that he had, or would, recoup the losses of the fraud and of the Olive Grove deal from what he would make from his other ventures. His attitude was in essence: what he lost on the swings he would gain on the roundabouts - and the implication was that he had a lot more roundabouts than swings. Indeed he reckoned with the lump sum he would receive from F.A.O plus the capital which would have accrued as a result of his specualtions he would have sufficient for his retirement.

RS/2
7th February, 1973

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CONSULTANT
K.7/J A Cradock } Separate copies

John CAIRNCROSS

1. I attach hereto a copy of the report on the latest interview with CAIRNCROSS. Stella Rimington and I would be pleased to discuss at any time should you wish to do so.


E W Pratt

K3/7
MS Ext 660
7 February 1973

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REPORT ON INTERVIEW WITH

John CAIRNCROSS

CAIRNCROSS rang this Office on 28th December, 1972 to say that he was visiting the U.K for a short time and would be in London until 5th January, 1973 - did we wish to see him? It was arranged that he should come to Room 055 at 5 p.m. on Thursday 4th January, 1973. He arrived fairly punctually and was interviewed by K.3/Stella Rimington and myself; the interview lasted a little over two-and-a-half hours.

2. We began by saying we appreciated the fact he had contacted us as we welcomed the opportunity to discuss certain points with him which were still bothering us. Our continuing study of the R.I.S effort in this country in the 1930s and 1940s had thrown up a certain amount of new information and we would like to consider various aspects of his own involvement in the light of this. CAIRNCROSS said he understood perfectly and would do all he could to help.

Recruitment

(a) Guy BURGESS

3. We said we would like to start by considering the chronology of the events which led to his recruitment. He commented that the chronology had become rather vague; it was a bit of a haze - but he would apply his mind carefully.

4. He confirmed what he had said at earlier interviews that he had first met Guy BURGESS in the rooms of Anthony BLUNT in Trinity. After some consideration he said he was sure this meeting, at which Louis MACNEICE had also been present, had taken place before KLUGMANN had introduced him to 'Otto' in Regent's Park. Could he date this first meeting with BURGESS? It must have been very soon after he had completed his Civil Service examination; he had sat this about mid-August 1936. Having completed his Tripos he had come down from Trinity in June; CAIRNCROSS had then spent the next two months cramming in preparation for the Civil Service examination which he had sat in London.

5. He must have gone to Cambridge from London to visit BLUNT's rooms and had certainly returned to London the same day. We spent some time considering the circumstances which had led to this visit. Had he been on dropping-in terms with BLUNT? Definitely not. Although he had lived on the same staircase as BLUNT and had of course known who he was, he had not known him personally. During the time he was up he had on only one occasion been in BLUNT's rooms, but this was not at BLUNT's invitation but to attend a meeting of a University debating society

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which had been held there. How then had he come to visit BLUNT's rooms in mid-August? CAIRNCROSS pondered over this and said he must have been invited. By whom? He started by saying an invitation could not have come from MACNEICE and he was equally certain it had not come from BLUNT. It must therefore, he thought, have come from BURGESS. When we pointed out that over the years he had repeatedly said he had not met BURGESS until the occasion of the meeting we were now considering CAIRNCROSS shook his head and muttered something about this being a grey area, but conceded that in the light of the points we had made it now seemed to him that he must have met BURGESS earlier as BURGESS would have been the only one who could have invited him to BLUNT's rooms. Despite returning to this point on several occasions during the interview CAIRNCROSS was unable (or unwilling) to throw further light on when, where and in what circumstances he had known BURGESS before the meeting in BLUNT's rooms.

(Comment: The admission that CAIRNCROSS "must have known BURGESS" earlier than the gathering in BLUNT's rooms is new and requires examination. From the earliest interviews in 1952 he has maintained - and did not change his story at the time of the 'Confession' in 1964 - that he met BURGESS for the first time on that particular occasion. This new admission could therefore be regarded as throwing possibly significant new light on the origins of his relationship with BURGESS; on the other hand it could equally be regarded as a cover-up for an undisclosed association with someone else; possibly with BLUNT or possibly with someone hitherto not mentioned, either of whom could have been responsible for bringing him together with BURGESS. In suggesting the possibility of an earlier association with BURGESS, CAIRNCROSS may have been letting us in on a new aspect of the full story (and why has he hitherto concealed it?); it is equally possible he was getting himself out of a corner; perhaps he considered this admission (or perhaps invention) to be the safest way out.

We feel it may be significant that CAIRNCROSS played down his association with BLUNT to the point that he had not known him personally until the gathering in the latter's rooms in Trinity in August 1936 (on previous occasions he has dated

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this rather later - early 1937). It is interesting he should have denied personal knowledge of BLUNT in view of the fact that, according to BLUNT, CAIRNCROSS's recruitment followed talent-spotting by BLUNT himself; it is inconceivable that BLUNT would have brought matters to the point where BURGESS set the scene for a pitch unless he had known CAIRNCROSS reasonably well - certainly better than the situation now described by CAIRNCROSS.)

6. Continuing in the context of the date of this meeting. CAIRNCROSS said it must have taken place very soon after he had completed the Civil Service examination as almost immediately after that he had set off for Berlin. He had spent a month or more there - possibly as much as two months - when a telegram had arrived telling him of his success in the examination. He had returned to London at once.

7. Had he travelled to Berlin via Paris and if so had he broken his journey there? At first he could not be sure. Gradually he came to the conclusion he had, in fact, stayed in Paris on his way to Berlin and in some way associated this stay with BURGESS. It became clear that he had had a message from BURGESS asking him to meet him in the Hotel Selecte. He had not gone to meet BURGESS but could not now recall why; he concluded it must have been due to some misunderstanding.

8. Was he certain that the invitation from BURGESS to meet him in the Hotel Selecte had come after the gathering in BLUNT's rooms? Could it perhaps have preceded that occasion? CAIRNCROSS appeared to give this thought and decided that this message from BURGESS had come after the meeting in BLUNT's rooms; he associated it fairly definitely with his stop-over in Paris en route Berlin. He could not recall how he had received the message but thought it most unlikely he had had a letter; a telephone call would have been the most likely thing.

9. Later in the interview we asked if he had ever made a train journey with BURGESS. He said he had. After the meeting in BLUNT's rooms he and BURGESS had travelled from Cambridge to London together. No one else had been in the compartment and they had talked about a number of matters including politics. He said he had a very clear memory of this journey and indeed recalled an anecdote BURGESS had recounted about a waiter who had been screamed at by a customer about the quality of a meal. In answer to a specific question CAIRNCROSS told us that these early meetings with BURGESS had made no impact on him in the context of preliminaries to his recruitment; BURGESS had given him no hint of his own involvement. We pointed out that if this was the case it was strange he should have recalled this train journey so

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clearly, yet at the same time could not recall any earlier meetings with BURGESS which, according to what he had now told us, must have taken place if indeed it had been BURGESS who invited him to BLUNT's rooms. He repeated that this was a grey area.

10. We asked what political subjects had been discussed in the course of the train journey and what BURGESS's apparent political views had been. CAIRNCROSS described BURGESS as a rather detached observer who plugged the line that war was inevitable; he had not however argued this from the left-wing point of view. The impression BURGESS had made upon him was that he was someone established, articulate, confident and with a certain charm; someone who had known everybody. He did not regard him as particularly impressive intellectually. CAIRNCROSS added gratuitously that he had a good memory and the picture of this journey was still there in his mind.

(Comment: It is evident that his memory of that day in Cambridge is still sharp. On this occasion, however, he did not say (as he did in 1952) that the main object of his trip to Cambridge was to see his old tutor Dr. ASHTON.

It is the contrast between the clarity of this memory and his apparent inability to recall who invited him to BLUNT's rooms, and in what form and in what circumstances that invitation was given, that leads us to suspect that he is deliberately concealing certain vital things. Moreover when we pressed on these points his manner changed; it became hesitant and unsure - indeed evasive.)

(b) James KLUGMANN

11. We turned our attention from BURGESS to KLUGMANN. He had known KLUGMANN at Trinity but had not been particularly close to him. Had they kept in touch after KLUGMANN had gone down? They had not. Had he seen KLUGMANN in Paris? Again he had not, nor, in reply to a further question could he throw any light on what KLUGMANN might have been doing in this country when they had met in October 1936. CAIRNCROSS, in response to the line of our questions, said that he did not recall that KLUGMANN had been based in Paris; he thought he had been working in London. He had known KLUGMANN had been involved at that time in political work but had not discussed this with him. We asked what sort of political work: work for the COMINTERN or straight Party work for the C.P.G.B? CAIRNCROSS said he did not think that there had ever been any suggestion that KLUGMANN had been involved with the COMINTERN; he had assumed he had been working for the British Party. He repeated he had not discussed with KLUGMANN the work he had then been doing.

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12. We asked him to reconstruct the circumstances of the meeting with KLUGMANN which led to his first meeting with 'Otto'. KLUGMANN had somehow contacted him. He did not think by letter. He had probably telephoned to say to meet him in a pub. This he had done and KLUGMANN had told him he would like him to meet a friend of his but had told him nothing about the friend. They had gone together to Regent's Park where they had met 'Otto'; after he had made the introduction KLUGMANN had disappeared.

13. We said we thought it strange that he did not associate KLUGMANN with Paris; CAIRNCROSS however was sure that he did not. He added that he associated BURGESS with Paris because of the incident of the invitation to meet him at the Hotel Selecte and added he thought 'Otto' had been in Paris at the same time. But not KLUGMANN.

14. Later in the interview when we reverted to this subject CAIRNCROSS said that had he met BURGESS in Paris, he thought looking back, he would have been approached there; KLUGMANN had appeared on the scene because he had missed the Paris meeting.

15. We discussed further his knowledge of KLUGMANN at Trinity. He could not recall when KLUGMANN had gone down and indeed was not sure whether or not he had still been up during his (CAIRNCROSS's) last two terms; he rather assumed he had been. He recalled that John CORNFORD had been up until the end of the 1935-1936 academic year and commented that CORNFORD and KLUGMANN were fairly close; it had not occurred to him that there had been a time when CORNFORD had been up and KLUGMANN not. He added in response to a further question that after the meeting with KLUGMANN which had led to his introduction to 'Otto' he had not seen him again "for years".

(Comment: His evident lack of knowledge of KLUGMANN must make us look again at the implications of the story CAIRNCROSS has told about his initial meeting with 'Otto'.

KLUGMANN completed his Tripos in June 1935. Although Cambridge records do not show him to have been at Trinity after that time, there is reason to think he was around the college at least some of the time during the Michealmas term that year. The rest of his time during that term seems to have been spent in King Street. In December 1935, having visited Paris on a number of occasions, KLUGMANN finally moved there. He no doubt undertook a certain amount of academic work but primarily went there to settle in as Secretary of the COMINTERN organisation, The World Student Association. Although we know he visited this country, particularly London and Cambridge, from time to time, KLUGMANN remained based in Paris until 1939.

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What is odd about CAIRNCROSS's memory is that KLUGMANN's position in Paris was extremely well known to left-wing youth of that day. More than one source (it is typical of many) has said that going to Paris at that time and not seeing KLUGMANN was like going to Rome and not seeing the Pope. In addition we know he kept in close touch with the leadership of the Cambridge Student Branch. It is almost inconceivable that as a member of the Cambridge Student Branch and as someone who was very much Europe-minded and a frequent visitor to Paris (he spent from 1932-1934 at the Sorbonne) CAIRNCROSS could have been unaware that KLUGMANN sat there as a key figure manipulating the COMINTERN lines to students.

There seem to be two obvious alternative explanations: either he is, consciously or unconsciously concealing his knowledge of KLUGMANN, or he hardly knew him at all. The questions arise: if he is concealing his knowledge why should he be doing so? and, if he had hardly known him would he not have indicated greater surprise when out of the blue KLUGMANN appeared to introduce 'Otto'? or alternatively is there confusion as to the date - could this have happened before KLUGMANN went to Paris?

Again if he had only known KLUGMANN slightly, why did he show such enthusiasm when it was suggested to him that he should meet KLUGMANN to confront him about his recruitment? And why did he continue to keep up the pressure (by letters to Peter Wright) when this meeting was delayed? It is true that the carrot was the promise of a certain degree of immunity from prosecution, but if he realised, as he would have done, that nothing useful from our point of view would come out of such a meeting this of itself does not put him in a very good light.

He has a lot to explain in the context of his associations with KLUGMANN.)

/CAIRNCROSS's R.I.S

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CAIRNCROSS's R.I.S Service

(a) Motivation

16. We asked him to tell us about what had happened at the first meeting with 'Otto'. We were interested to learn the nature of the proposition made to him; the factors which had caused him to decided to continue the association; and the degree of his ideological commitment at that time.

17. CAIRNCROSS picked up the last point first. He stressed that at the time he had met 'Otto' his earlier Communist sympathies had disappeared; he had been in the Party and to some degree had been committed to its ideology but all that had ceased by the time we were considering. He analysed his position as follows:

- (1) He had been very anti-Nazi and had therefore felt an emotional attraction to Communism.
- (2) He had been attracted - and to some extent still was - by certain aspects of Marxist analysis, particularly as this related to the analysis of historical problems.
- (3) He had for a short time felt some attraction to Communism as practised in Russia, but this had passed by the time we were considering.

18. He summed up by saying that although he had been in the Party, by the time he came down from Cambridge he had ceased to be a Communist.

19. In the light of this last statement we asked how he thought KLUGMANN regarded him. He replied that he was not of course in a position to know this but reconstructing the conversation when he met him prior to being introduced to 'Otto' KLUGMANN had concentrated on the first two of the above factors and had carefully avoided the third. On reflection he thought KLUGMANN must have been aware that he had no longer been committed but at the same time must have regarded him as being 'worth taking a risk on'.

(Comment: On the face of it this account of KLUGMANN's preparation of CAIRNCROSS for his meeting with 'Otto' suggests that KLUGMANN knew sufficient about him to play on

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those points where his sympathies remained and to avoid the rest. This in turn suggests that KLUGMANN had a reasonably up-to-date knowledge of CAIRNCROSS. This hardly squares with CAIRNCROSS's apparent lack of knowledge of KLUGMANN.

KLUGMANN was no doubt briefed. The question is by whom? If we accept that CAIRNCROSS's apparent lack of knowledge of KLUGMANN makes it unlikely that the latter would have adequate personal knowledge, we seem to be left with BURGESS and BLUNT. According to CAIRNCROSS he had only met BURGESS and BLUNT on one occasion (apart from his deduction that he "must have met" BURGESS before that but has no memory of having done so). If this is to be believed neither BLUNT nor BURGESS would appear to be in a position to brief KLUGMANN adequately.

There is something wrong with CAIRNCROSS's story. For one thing we suggest that it is questionable whether he had, in fact, shaken off his commitment to Communist ideology at that time.)

20. The progression towards commitment to 'Otto' had moved along in stages. CAIRNCROSS described his first meeting as "relatively innocuous" but went on to say even at that early stage 'Otto' had to some extent revealed what he was. He had told CAIRNCROSS he was interested in obtaining information and that he wanted them to keep in touch; another appointment was fixed then and there. Other than that no specific proposition had been made to him.

21. We pressed CAIRNCROSS on the factors which caused him to agree to a second meeting and to continue to meet him after that: what had attracted, or compelled, him to allow this association to develop? He explained that the fact that he had been connected with the Communist Party had been the root of the matter. At the time he thought that had he reported 'Otto's' approach to the Foreign Office, as he had been fully aware he should have done, his earlier Communist activities would have come to light and he would have been "damned for life". From the outset, although this had not been brought into the open, there had been an implied threat of blackmail. Because of this he had felt he had had no option but to continue to meet 'Otto'; he had done so from "craven fear". He now recognised his "tremendous error" but at the time he had felt that had he disengaged at any point in the course of his association, his Communist past would have been reported to the Foreign Office and his career would have been finished.

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22. Later in the interview we reverted to this situation. We made the point that in the mid-1930s large numbers of young intellectuals were attracted to Communism largely for the same reasons as he had been. At that time, for practical purposes, it had almost come to be accepted by the Establishment that Communism was a phase through which young intellectuals were likely to pass. Like measles, Communism was regarded as a disease they were liable to get and having recovered were unlikely to get again. In support of this line of argument we quoted figures of known Communists who had been in the same Cambridge college as himself during the years he was up, pointing out that among them there were very few cases where those involved had suffered materially as a result of youthful enthusiasm for Communism.

23. In these circumstances we wondered whether there had been need for his "craven fear" to which his first meeting with 'Otto' had given rise and whether he could not in fact have broken off in the early stages, without undue adverse repercussions.

24. CAIRNCROSS said he fully accepted the general principle on which we were basing that argument. In his own defence he said he had been guided in his actions by psychological not historical considerations. At the age of twenty-three he had been rather a raw young man who had had no experience of the world.

(Comment: On this last point we feel that after some six years at three different Universities - two years each at Glasgow, the Sorbonne and Cambridge - it is perhaps pushing it a bit to say he had no knowledge of the world.)

25. He developed his point by saying that in circumstances different from his own there might have been less need to fear. His own position was that he had not been a member of the Establishment (note: he was presumably referring to his relatively modest background) and had started work in a sensitive post. He thought we should take account of the fact that at the time there had been considerable unemployment and indeed many graduates had been looking for work; he felt he had been fortunate to have a job on coming down from Cambridge and did not wish to lose it. His feelings at that time had been clear - even if in retrospect they had been misplaced: he had been very frightened that had he reported 'Otto's' approach his career would have been ruined. He wished us to understand that he had been confronted by something totally new quite unexpectedly; he had had no time to think it out.

(b) Modus Operandi

26. We suggested that we should turn our attention to the mechanics of CAIRNCROSS's service to the Russians. He said he was quite happy to talk about this but as we went along we both felt he was somewhat ill at ease and was in a bit of a hurry to move away from the details so as to get on with the next subject.

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27. In the early stages 'Otto' had talked to him about ideological matters and particularly about Russia itself. He could not recall 'Otto' had instructed him in the tactics of espionage but he did recall that he had gone out of his way to reassure CAIRNCROSS by telling him that none of their people were ever caught. We observed that this must have been a hard line to sell. Had he bought it? He said that he supposed 'Otto' must have been referring to "their people in places like Germany"; he thought he must have accepted what 'Otto' had said but did not think it had affected him particularly.

28. We asked what requirements 'Otto' had laid upon him; what sort of brief he had been given. CAIRNCROSS told us that unlike 'Robert', 'Otto' had not given him a precise brief; his instructions had been very general: anything he could pick up in the context of relations between England and Russia. How had he passed this information? In the early stages at least 'Otto' had not pressed for written information; CAIRNCROSS had simply given him oral reports. He commented that 'Otto' had been pretty easy going. What had interested 'Otto' most had been what CAIRNCROSS could tell him about the atmosphere within the Foreign Office - what people thought; what the climate was and who was thinking what.

29. After a while however 'Otto' had asked for documents. After handing them over he presumed 'Otto' had photographed them before returning them later the same evening. He made the point that this had been standard procedure during the time he had worked for 'Robert' and he was fairly sure 'Otto' had done the same thing on those occasions when he produced documents.

30. Sometimes he had met 'Otto' in a park or in a pub and sometimes in a cinema. When the meeting had been in a cinema CAIRNCROSS would follow 'Otto' in and when 'Otto' got up to leave would follow him - possibly into the lavatory where the hand-over (CAIRNCROSS carried documents in an envelope) would take place. Sometimes, however, they would meet in a quiet place in a street and the exchange would take place there. These meetings, which usually took place about once a month, particularly on those occasions when he had to meet his controllers a second time to recover the documents, had taken up a whole evening.

31. Had 'Otto' given him any guidance on ways in which he might influence the formulation of policy in the course of his work at the Foreign Office? He had not; 'Otto' had brought no pressure to bear in that direction nor in respect of his own actions and behaviour at his work. We asked whether his association with either 'Otto' or 'Robert' had affected the course of his career in the Civil Service. He thought not. His controllers had certainly made certain suggestions as to where he would have been of greatest use to them, but after some consideration CAIRNCROSS said he did not think the course his career had taken would have been different had he not been under control.

32. Reverting to the chronology of his R.I.S activity we asked when 'Otto' had disappeared from the scene. He thought he had last seen him early in 1938 (note: at earlier interviews he had been less precise; he has placed 'Otto's' disappearance somewhere between Autumn 1937 and Spring 1938). Nothing had happened for

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a little while and then Guy BURGESS had turned up. From the outset of this re-appearance BURGESS had made it clear he was conscious of CAIRNCROSS's involvement and had told CAIRNCROSS in future to pass information to him.

33. We tried to reconstruct CAIRNCROSS's meeting with BURGESS. We approached this by asking how often he had seen BURGESS between the meeting in BLUNT's rooms followed by the train journey with BURGESS in mid-August 1936, and the meeting with BURGESS at which he assumed control of CAIRNCROSS. Not frequently. There had been a lunch party in London, which he thought had been early in 1937, at which in addition to BURGESS and himself BLUNT, Tom WYLIE and Helmuth KATZ had been present. Diverting slightly we asked two questions about this. First had he read any significance into this party? He had not. Secondly had he seen Tom WYLIE again? Never but he had heard echoes of him probably through BURGESS. Some time after this lunch party CAIRNCROSS had been invited to a party at BURGESS's Chester Square flat about which he had spoken before; Harold NICOLSON had been there but he could not recall who the others had been. This party had been some time before 'Otto's' disappearance; it had been the only occasion CAIRNCROSS had visited the Chester Square flat.

34. We tried to date the meeting at which BURGESS took over control. CAIRNCROSS finally placed it as very shortly after he had transferred from the Foreign Office to the Treasury; he had started work in the Treasury in September 1938.

(Comment: If CAIRNCROSS's dating is anything like accurate there must have been a gap of around six months between 'Otto's' departure and BURGESS's arrival. Had the basic reason for his agreement to work for the R.I.S been "craven fear" then in the course of the months between his two controllers he must have wondered whether he was being let off the hook; in these circumstances one might expect that he would have felt a sense of cautious relief. If this had been the situation the appearance of a new controller, to make sense of his story, should have been wholly unwelcome and indeed a bit shattering - particularly as BURGESS was someone he knew. But in discussing this with him none of this came through; there was no indication that he had felt displeasure or regret at the fact that he was re-contacted at a time when, it might be assumed, he would have thought he might have been free.)

35. While he was under BURGESS's control he could only recall meeting him on two occasions. The first he thought had taken place in his own flat in Warwick Square, but he could not recall where they had met on the second occasion. How long had he been

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controlled by Guy BURGESS? Less than a year (the implication was it had been appreciably less than a year). CAIRNCROSS went through the occasions when he had been in the company of BURGESS; this summarised what he had already told us as follows:

- (a) August 1936: In BLUNT's rooms at Trinity followed by the train journey from Cambridge to London.
- (b) Spring 1937: Lunch party in London.
- (c) 1937-1938: Party at Chester Square flat.
- (d) 1938 (mid to late): BURGESS visited Warwick Square flat and took over control.
- (e) 1938-1939: One meeting with BURGESS at unspecified date at unremembered address.

These were the only occasions on which CAIRNCROSS had met BURGESS except for the conclusion he had come to earlier in our talk that he "must have known him" before the meeting in BLUNT's rooms ((a) above).

36. He had not been in Guy's social circle and had not met any of his friends other than those he had mentioned or could not remember. We asked whether during the war years he had ever visited the flat to which Guy had moved. He said quite positively he had not; he had, however, known he had left Chester Square. We mentioned that he had moved to a flat in Bentinck Street but at this CAIRNCROSS shook his head and said that meant nothing to him.

(Comment: We were particularly interested in two aspects of CAIRNCROSS's account of the time he worked under the control of BURGESS:

- (a) The fact that the period of his control lasted less than a year; and,
- (b) That he only met him twice during that time.

In the context of the first point, if he is right that BURGESS appeared on the scene after 'Otto' had disappeared - say September or October 1938 - and controlled him for less than a year, it would suggest that 'Robert' arrived to take over during the summer of 1939. 'Robert' has been fairly firmly identified as GORSKIY @ GROMOV who, according to our records was out of the U.K between February

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and December 1939. The timing therefore does not quite fit. This could be accounted for by an omission in our records of GROMOV's travels, by inaccuracies in CAIRNCROSS's memory, or by some factor which CAIRNCROSS is concealing.

In the context of the second point CAIRNCROSS has told us that he was normally in contact with his controllers about once a month, sometimes more frequently. It is odd therefore he should have seen BURGESS only twice during a period of something less than a year. It is true this was the time when CAIRNCROSS was in the Treasury but it would not be unreasonable to think that the information to which he had access there would have been of interest to the Russians. This lack of contact also seems to be out of character with what we know of BURGESS.

In this context it is relevant to quote Goronwy REES. "Guy would say what a marvellous person John CAIRNCROSS was and took a great personal interest in him and went to great lengths to cosset him because when he went into the Foreign Office he did not get on very well there. Guy used to go out of his way to cosset him, to look after him in the kind of way that always made one think that perhaps he had some practical interest in doing so".)

37. We asked whether his regret at having left the Foreign Office had led him to take any steps to return to it.

(Comment: CAIRNCROSS's Foreign Office Indiv. file shows that in 1939 he made determined efforts to re-transfer from the Treasury to the Foreign Office.)

CAIRNCROSS said he had found the Treasury dull beyond words; Foreign Office work had been much more in his line (note: reports on his performance in the three departments of the Foreign Office in which he worked were consistently adverse). He had therefore made application to return there but had been turned down. We asked whether such a move had been suggested to him by either 'Otto' or BURGESS. He conceded that his controllers would have far preferred to have him in the Foreign Office but he could not recall that any pressure had been brought upon him or indeed that it had ever been suggested that he should try to return.

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38. Continuing in the context of his career we asked how he had come to work at Bletchley. As we would know while working in the Treasury he had been put into Lord Hankey's Private Office. While working there he had spoken to a Colonel or Major (he could not recall the name) who sat on one of Hankey's Committees. CAIRNCROSS had mentioned to him that he would shortly be called up and hoped he would be put into something where his linguistic capabilities would be put to good use. He thought it was largely due to this conversation that when he was called up he went straight to the training establishment which had prepared him to start work at G.C. and C.S. at Bletchley. CAIRNCROSS was emphatic that 'Robert' had played no part in this; it would have been no different had 'Robert' not been there.

39. Once at Bletchley however 'Robert's' demands on him had become much more precise than they had been hitherto; his requirements had related to information on specific aspects of the intentions of the German military machine on the Eastern front. He had met 'Robert' once a month during this period, always in London; sometimes he passed over the gist of decrypts and sometimes the decrypts themselves. 'Robert' had been very pleased with his work then.

40. What were the factors which had led to his leaving Bletchley? He had been working under intense pressure, largely on night shifts, and had been in a state of collapse. On his days off he had sometimes slept for as much as twenty hours at a stretch. He could not keep it up and it had been entirely on his own initiative that he had moved. He added that the Russians would have preferred him to stay where he was.

41. He had joined M.I.6 and had gone into the C.E. side in Section V which he had found very dull. But then David FOOTMAN had come over and said he could do with someone like CAIRNCROSS, as a result of which he had moved to R.I. of which FOOTMAN, whom he had never met before, was then head. CAIRNCROSS had found the work in R.I. more agreeable as political work had always been more in his line.

42. It was during his time in Section V that he had first met Kim PHILBY. He had known him to some extent socially - on one occasion he had visited PHILBY's house and had there met Aileen, and on another he had given a lunch party for PHILBY. In recalling this party he had first used the words: ". . . with some people he wanted to meet" but at once changed this to ". . . with some people I thought would make up an interesting group".

43. CAIRNCROSS said that Robert had not been a bit happy about his move to M.I.6. When we asked him to elaborate on this he said Robert had been displeased by his being in Section V - he had liked the military stuff he had been providing from Bletchley; he had shown slightly less displeasure when he had moved to R.I.

(Comment: Robert's displeasure over CAIRNCROSS's move to Section V of M.I.6 presumably has its roots in the fact that by virtue of the presence there of PHILBY the Russians

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had adequate coverage already. His continuing - if decreased - displeasure at CAIRNCROSS's move to R.I. is interesting if by following the same line of thought it could be related to the presence there of FOOTMAN.)

(c) Remuneration

44. In previous interviews CAIRNCROSS has said he accepted money from his controllers on one occasion only. We took the opportunity to look at the implications of this point again.

45. He confirmed he had been presented with, and had accepted, a gift of £200 from 'Robert' on a specific occasion. The background to this was that he had provided information which had given the Russians prior knowledge of German plans for a large-scale air attack on Kursk. Because of their advance knowledge the Russians had had time to deploy their defences in such a way that they were able to beat off the attack with heavy German losses. He regarded the information he had given 'Robert' as having been not only to the immediate advantage of the Russians but "to the whole allied war effort"; the Russians had felt very grateful to him and it was for this reason that they had made him a present. Had he signed a receipt for the money? He was quite sure he had not.

(Comment: The German air assault on Kursk was in June 1943. We propose to go into the matter of this information with G.C.H.Q in the hope it may be possible to gain greater insight into the background of this affair - particularly whether the Russians were given this information through official channels.)

46. He insisted that this was the one and only occasion he had accepted money from his controllers. In response to our further questions he admitted that from time to time he had been offered money, but emphasised that as he had had neither prior to nor subsequent to the attack on Kursk information of comparable importance and excitement, he had not accepted money from his controllers. He thought that the question of money had first been raised by 'Otto' some six or eight months after he had started to work for him; 'Otto' had pointed out that CAIRNCROSS needed to keep up living standards and money was available for this. CAIRNCROSS added that there had been no insistence that he should take anything, nor had the subject been mentioned regularly, but from time to time it had cropped up.

(Comment: BLUNT has told us the following story which could well be relevant. During the time CAIRNCROSS was working for BURGESS the latter approached BLUNT saying he wanted money to enable CAIRNCROSS

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to entertain some people. BLUNT in turn wrote to Michael STRAIGHT, then in the U.S, asking for £100 for "a friend in the cause". BLUNT received a cheque from STRAIGHT's mother, Mrs. Elmhirst, who gave no reason for sending it other than Michael had asked her to do so. It is not clear how BLUNT transmitted the money to CAIRNCROSS - whether he did so directly or through BURGESS - but CAIRNCROSS has been adamant that he never accepted money from BURGESS, and as has been recorded above has denied association with BLUNT other than the two social occasions about which he had told us.

There is much room for speculation on the implications of this story. The first thought that comes to mind is that although responsible for running CAIRNCROSS as an agent, BURGESS unlike other controllers, did not have access to R.I.S funds.

We were inhibited from examining these points and its implications in greater detail with CAIRNCROSS as we had been instructed to steer away as far as we could from BLUNT's involvement.

The main point however seems to be that as CAIRNCROSS has admitted he accepted money from 'Robert', and according to BLUNT also accepted it while under the control of BURGESS, the presumption is raised that despite his protestations he might also have accepted it from 'Otto' at the beginning of his career as a spy and continued to do so from his later controllers. It is perhaps worthy of note that throughout our record of CAIRNCROSS there are indications which give rise to doubts as to his integrity in financial matters.)

47. We asked if not having accepted offers of financial reward for his services, he had accepted reimbursement of expenses incurred on behalf of his controllers. He tried to brush this question aside by saying that any expenses he had incurred had been so trifling he certainly had not claimed anything.

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(Comment: According to his own account particularly during the time he was at Bletchley, he must have incurred a certain amount of expenditure: train fares from Bletchley to London and incidental expenditure such as on bus and taxi fares, meals etc., all of which over a period of time would have added up to a tidy sum. CAIRNCROSS impressed us as a hard-headed lowland Scot and it would have been out of character for him to have spent that sort of money without seeing to it that he was reimbursed.)

48. What about after the war? From the time he had returned to the Treasury right up until he left the Civil Service the information to which he had had access had been of very little value or interest to the Russians, consequently although he had continued to have fairly regular meetings, he had passed over very little during these years.

(Comment: We question whether this should necessarily be taken at its face value. We shall attempt to find out what his Treasury responsibilities were during these years. It is conceivable the alleged lack of Russian interest in CAIRNCROSS's Treasury information is not unrelated to the presence in the Treasury during the material time of Denis PROCTOR.)

He went on to say that soon after the war ended he had tried to get a job in the business world; he thought that by doing so he would have been in a better position to break with the Russians. The threat of blackmail had continued but had he left Government service he thought he would have been less vulnerable. In the event however he had been unsuccessful in finding a suitable job in commerce and therefore had had to continue his association with the Russians.

49. There had been times during these years when he had found his controllers very jittery; from time to time people had been getting caught and some of their own people had been sent home. He made the point that at a meeting immediately after the defection of BURGESS and MACLEAN he had received re-assurance from his controller but at later meetings he had seemed very nervous. On the question of money CAIRNCROSS told us that during this post-war period, although vague mention had continued to be made of "keeping up appearances" he had not accepted anything as he felt he had not merited it as he had not been passing any information of significance.

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(d) Disengagement

50. As the immediately preceding paragraphs suggest we had begun to skirt around the question of the circumstances of his disengagement from the Russians: we therefore concentrated on this on the basis of accounts he had given in the course of earlier interviews.

51. He confirmed he had continued to maintain contact through fairly regular meetings with his controller until shortly before his resignation from the Civil Service. He had continued to do this simply to keep in touch; he had passed almost nothing. However, events which had then taken place had changed the situation fundamentally. He had lost his job and had had nothing in view - and this was at a time when he had only recently married. He had faced ruin on a number of planes; he had felt cornered and had become a victim of panic. That was why he had taken the action he had.

52. During the time he had served the Russians, although nothing specific had ever been promised, CAIRNCROSS had been left with the firm impression that although he had no idea what form their help would take, if things went wrong "they would see me all right". Because of this he had felt in the circumstances he had a right to expect the Russians to come to his aid. He had not wanted to go to Russia: "Going to Moscow was fine for the believers but it was the last thing I wanted to do"; but he thought he could look to them for financial help; at the time he was penniless. "It was getting to be a question of suicide; returning to them was the only thing I could think of".

53. It was against this background that early in April 1952 he had decided to activate previously arranged emergency procedures to contact his controller.

(Comment: Details of these procedures have been recorded in reports of earlier interviews.)

No one had turned up and a week later CAIRNCROSS had tried a second time, but again without success. He thought the explanation of the non-arrival of a Russian probably lay in the fact that as he himself had been under suspicion at that time he had no doubt been watched, and because of this they had not answered his call - he concluded that they had decided it had not been worth the risk to themselves to keep the meet.

54. We pointed out that even if his activation of emergency procedures had proved unsuccessful our experience suggested that it was probable he would have been contacted later; the Russians had a good record for looking after those who had helped them. Looking rather uncomfortable he said: "I suppose I was not one of the faithful and might have out-lived my usefulness; I thought they were afraid". We said that for them permanently to have ignored

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him did not accord with the behaviour pattern of the Russians in so far as we knew it; it would be reasonable to suppose that even if for some reason they had not made contact through his operation of emergency procedures they would have contacted him later, particularly in view of the fact he had left the country soon afterwards. The opportunity would have been there in Rome, Geneva or later in Bangkok - or indeed anywhere else. He was adamant he had never been contacted again. We pressed him further: was he quite sure he had never been contacted, however indirectly, had never received any rewards from them at any time? He was quite sure and in amplification of this he said he recalled that at a previous interview he had been asked about some one he had met in Kuala Lumpur - although a Russian the man in question had in no way "made contact" in the sense we were meaning. We checked he was referring to his acquaintance with LESIOVSKY; he agreed he was.

(Comment: CAIRNCROSS has previously admitted meeting Victor Mechislavovich LESIOVSKY when he himself held the appointment of Chief Editor of Documents, U.N Economic Commission to Asia and the Far East. LESIOVSKY is an identified K.G.B officer.)

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55. CAIRNCROSS continued to develop the line that he had not been recontacted by saying that this was consistent with the fact that the Russians could not have thought much of him. We said we did not think this could be right taking account of all the years they had been in contact with him; from what he had told us it seemed evident that they had valued his services and had, particularly during his Bletchley days, regarded him as a very useful source; it was most unlikely they would not have looked after him. He agreed it was curious. We pounced on this observation making the point that it was not merely curious, in our experience such a situation was virtually unique. The implication of this last remark seemed to get through to him; he looked discomfitted and we both felt he realised we did not believe his story.

56. To keep up the pressure we switched to the present. We said we understood he had been having trouble over recent land transactions and investments. He looked rather surprised at this and tried to brush the matter aside much in the same way as he had tried to brush aside an earlier question about claiming expenses from his controllers (vide paragraph 47). He said he realised the particular matter we were referring to - it was just a case where he had over-invested; he added he was impressed with the efficiency both of the Police and of ourselves that we should be aware of the dealings he had had with the Police. We asked whether there were any prospects of getting his money back from this particular venture; he thought the chances were pretty remote. He had heard, however, that BUYERS, the man who had defrauded him, had been arrested and was now in custody - but on a bigamy charge and this did not help from the point of view of getting his money back. We suggested that his loss in this venture represented a large sum of money; how had he been able to withstand such a loss? With some hesitation and embarrassment he explained that he dabbled in

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real estate in order to raise capital against his retirement. He had interests in several speculative land development schemes in Italy and as land prices were appreciating all the time things looked fairly promising that he would come out of his deals successfully. Although he mentioned his villa at Anacapri "my biggest venture" he was cagey about this as he was about his olive grove in Tuscany. We had insufficient information to put him under pressure on this.

57. Throughout this part of the interview it was quite clear he did not wish to talk about these matters. He made light of losing a large amount of money on the grounds that taking account of his other investments it was simply a case of what he lost on the swings he would gain on the roundabouts. He was planning to retire next September and if all went well, with the lump sum he would get from F.A.O and the capital which he would by then have built up from his investments, he would have sufficient for his needs in retirement.

(Comment: CAIRNCROSS was in this country at our invitation in 1970 in connection with Operation ACRE. While here he called at Highgate Police Station to allege fraud against BUYERS. Large sums of money were allegedly involved - his own loss amounted to £30,000 and that of his friend Mrs. De CENT to £32,000. Although he had every opportunity to do so he made no mention of these problems to this Service.

He was given every opportunity, and indeed encouraged to tell us about his financial troubles, first when he was here in 1970 and even more positively in 1971. He declined to take these opportunities. In the light of this and of what he has now - albeit unwillingly - told us that he is in a position to recoup the loss of some £30,000 from gains on his other speculations, and still have put together sufficient capital for his retirement (and presumably continues to provide generously for his estranged wife), we must look at this aspect of his story critically. The final sentence of the comment following paragraph 46 could be relevant, and the scope and success of his land and property speculations seem to support our assessment of his character in the comment following paragraph 47. The important question is how did he acquire the funds to enable him to embark on this programme of speculative

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investment? The fact that he is so reluctant to talk about these financial matters must give rise to the thought that help from the Russians can not be excluded. If it could be shown that there is any basis for this the whole question of his account of his disengagement must be called in question.)

(e) Inter-consciousness

58. In the course of questions aimed at clarifying the sequence of events leading to his recruitment we asked whether, either at the time or later, he had felt that in addition to himself, anyone else he knew was also being put on the hook - if so who? Or alternatively whether he thought it was just himself who had been singled out. His reply was quite definite: "I thought it was just me". He explained that he did not think there could have been many in the same situation as himself; indeed he had probably been exceptional among his university contemporaries in that he had had a background of Communism at Cambridge but had nevertheless gone into a sensitive post. He was quite sure he had not "eyed any of his friends and wondered".

59. At various other points during the interview we returned to this general theme. We stressed that in the context of different aspects of his life he had been associated with BURGESS, PHILBY, MACLEAN and KLUGMANN. Accepting the fact that he had been unaware of the involvement of PHILBY and MACLEAN he had known that two of his Cambridge near contemporaries, BURGESS and KLUGMANN had been working for the Russians because by his own account they had revealed themselves to him. In these circumstances it was surely not unlikely that he had concluded there must have been others? Looking back with the benefit of all he now knew, who else did he think might have been involved? He had been asked this before; he had racked his brains thoroughly and no thought had ever come to him on this point. After a pause he added: had he thought of anyone he would certainly have reported it.

(Comment: From the time of his earliest revelations about the existence of a Ring of Five, KAGO has drawn attention to the fact that inter-consciousness was a characteristic of those recruited in this rather special field. It is necessary to be cautious in considering this point and not to take it too far. But apart from KAGO there are indications from other sources which support the general theory of inter-consciousness.

CAIRNCROSS's denial of knowledge of the involvement of others, when taken against the background of other aspects of his story, tends to support the thought that he is covering up.)

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Miscellaneous Points

(a) Donald MACLEAN

60. We asked CAIRNCROSS to tell us about his knowledge of Donald MACLEAN. He had first met him when he had been transferred to the Spanish Section of the Western Department of the Foreign Office. They had in fact shared a room and for a number of months had sat opposite each other.

(Comment: During his first six months in the Foreign Office CAIRNCROSS worked in the American Department. In April 1937 he was transferred to the Western Department where he worked for some nine months (with MACLEAN) before being transferred to the Central Department.)

61. During the months they had worked in the same room they had come to know each other fairly well. He had found MACLEAN friendly and sympathetic and had enjoyed their many discussions. Politically he had regarded MACLEAN as a man who took a tough right-wing line consistent with Real Politik. He had heard whispers in the Foreign Office that MACLEAN had been a Communist as an undergraduate; he had however detected no sign of this during the time they had worked together. We asked whether having known about MACLEAN's political background CAIRNCROSS had confided in him that he too had been a Communist at Cambridge. He certainly had not; he had never mentioned his Communist past to MACLEAN or to any one else while he was working in the Foreign Office.

62. He had seen something of MACLEAN socially at that time, but had not really been in his social circle; he had not for example ever been with him to the Gargoyle Club but of course much later had read about MACLEAN's escapades there.

63. He was quite sure that he had no reason to associate BURGESS with MACLEAN at that time; so far as he could recall BURGESS's name had never been mentioned. We asked if while he was working on the Spanish desk he recalled ever having come across PHILBY's name - PHILBY had then been in Spain reporting for the Times. He could not recall having done so and the name would have meant nothing to him; he had never consciously heard the name until he had met PHILBY when they were both working in Section V of M.I.6.

64. Had he kept up with MACLEAN when he himself had moved from the Western Department? He had not but had had news of him from time to time. He went on to say that he had however seen him in Paris in about May 1940 - not long before Paris had fallen to the Germans. CAIRNCROSS had been on holiday in the South of France at Les Baux. He had returned to this country via Paris; while

/there he . . .

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there he had reported to the Embassy and had met MACLEAN and had been roped in to help burn Embassy documents before the Germans arrived. During his stay in Paris he had met Melinda but could not recall whether this had been just before or just after she married MACLEAN.

65. He had not seen MACLEAN again for many years, or not until shortly before the latter's defection. He confirmed that he had had the MACLEANS to a party and agreed this had been in April 1951. We asked why, having been out of touch for so long, he had suddenly surfaced and had taken the initiative in recontacting MACLEAN. CAIRNCROSS explained that a friend of his, an American doctor, had been in London, and as he had known that MACLEAN had then been head of the American Department and had of course worked in Washington, CAIRNCROSS thought the presence of the MACLEANS would make up a pleasant group - as indeed it had. He repeated he had had no idea that MACLEAN had been involved with the Russians and had been astonished when he had learnt of his defection and his association with BURGESS.

(b) Other individuals

66. In the context of his acquaintance with BURGESS's Chester Square flat we put two names to him. The first was Alister WATSON. We explained he had been at King's as a young Don while CAIRNCROSS was at Trinity and had been associated with BURGESS. The name appeared to mean nothing to him.

67. The second was Goronwy REES. He had certainly met REES but not until about the middle of 1945 either just before or just after the end of the war. He had a clear memory of meeting REES on one occasion then, but now had the impression that at the time he had done so he had not had the feeling that he had met him before. Although CAIRNCROSS could not rule out that he had met REES earlier, such as at the Chester Square party he had gone to, he had no recollection of having done so; moreover he was quite positive that his meeting with REES in 1945 had had nothing to do with BURGESS.

(Comment: But see the final paragraph of the comment following paragraph 36. Although REES did not claim to know CAIRNCROSS well he is sure he met him through BURGESS; CAIRNCROSS, according to REES sent him poems to look at and later sent him more when living in Rome. He had been in touch with CAIRNCROSS until about 1960.)

(c) United States Visa

68. CAIRNCROSS said he had one matter he would like to raise with us. He did so with diffidence. He began by saying that the situation in which he found himself was, thanks to our Service, "miraculous", and he was extremely grateful to us. Because of this what he was about to say we would perhaps think naive.

69. A friend of his had suggested that on his retirement from F.A.O. CAIRNCROSS, as a temporary measure, should take his place at an American university; the friend thought he could then probably lay on a permanent university job for him. In bringing up this matter CAIRNCROSS realised it had been made clear to him originally that there would be no chance of an American visa ever being granted to him. The matter was not vital to him but now he had the prospect of an offer of a university job in America he hoped we would not mind him raising the matter to see how the land lay.

70. We told him we would take note of what he had said but that we were not in a position to make any comment upon this and it would not be right for us to do so. Again expressing appreciation for the attitude of our Service he said that if and when he received such an invitation he would let us know before taking any other action. We agreed to leave it like that.

71. We took the opportunity to ask him whether he had any plans as to where he would settle down after his retirement. He said he had not yet made up his mind. He had no thoughts of trying to return to the U.K and he regarded the situation in Italy as too explosive; he thought he would probably settle either in France or in Germany.

The end of the Interview

72. As we brought the interview to its close CAIRNCROSS offered to give further thought to various points we had discussed. He would give his mind to such things as the date of his visit to BLUNT's rooms and who had invited him there; his recollections of KLUGMANN at Trinity, when he had gone down and what he had then done. "I should be able to fish something up and will write and let you know". He thought he would be visiting this country again in the not too distant future and when he was due to do so would let us know in advance.

Conclusions

73. It is our impression that CAIRNCROSS contacted us for two reasons: to keep on the right side of us in the context of his limited immunity, and if we decided to see him, to cast a fly over us on the question of a U.S visa. What he was not bargaining for was detailed probing - and indeed some pretty straight talking - of the fundamentals on which the story he has been telling since 1964 has been based. There is no doubt that at various points in the course of the interview he was acutely uncomfortable. That he was more than a little surprised at what happened is reflected in the final paragraph of the letter (serial 852a) which arrived after the body of this report was written and therefore its contents have not been taken into account; his thoughts on the chronology of his recruitment will be referred to in passing in these conclusions but their significance will be analysed fully in the context of preparations for the next interview.

/We both . . .

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74. We both thought on certain crucial points he was lying. There were obvious limits beyond which we could not go in pressing him on these matters: it was essential to keep relations cordial, and we were under instructions to keep off BLUNT's involvement. Notwithstanding these limitations we have now identified a number of areas discussion of which causes him discomfort.

75. Looking at these points individually and as nearly as possible in chronological order there is first the question of who invited him to BLUNT's rooms to meet BURGESS. He rejected any thought it could have been BLUNT himself and fell back on what seemed a singularly unconvincing line that it must have been BURGESS and therefore he must have met BURGESS earlier. For the last nine years he has consistently maintained that it was on this occasion that he had first met BURGESS and by implication this was the purpose of the meeting.

76. Whether or not he is conscious of BLUNT's involvement, and if he is whether he is conscious of his confession, we think he is playing down his association with him below an acceptable level of credibility. There can be little doubt that he knows more about BLUNT than he admits and his dilemma over accounting for the initiator of the invitation to BLUNT's rooms could have its roots in a desire to protect BLUNT - although it could be argued that by acknowledging some Trinity association, having lived on the same staircase, a visit to his rooms would appear more natural and at the same time would not necessarily have involved BLUNT in what followed - any more than it would Louis MACNEICE. It seems possible therefore that someone else could have been involved and it is that person he is trying to protect. Should this be the case it is vital we should persuade CAIRNCROSS to tell us who it is.

77. At our insistence he gave considerable thought to the date of this incident - which of course was immediately followed by the train journey with BURGESS - the particular point of interest being whether it preceded the meeting with KLUGMANN or came later. Not only did he come down firmly on the side that it had preceded the KLUGMANN meeting but went further to date it between the narrow margin of the completion of his Civil Service examinations and his journey to Berlin; this puts it fairly definitely in mid-August 1936.

78. In considering this date we have as a first step tried to establish whether BLUNT and BURGESS were then in this country. BLUNT seems to have been; he seems to have been here until leaving for Scandinavia later in the month; he arrived in Denmark on 26th August and left there on 12th September. BURGESS however was not in this country after the 4th August. His passport shows he went to the continent to Germany, Austria and France returning to this country via Calais where he embarked on 3rd September. This is supported by papers in "The Correspondence". Papers found in BURGESS's Bond Street flat show that this trip - at least part of it - was made as a member of a group from the Fascist organisation which he had adopted - Britannia Youth - organised from an address in Hove, Sussex.

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79. In the light of this there can be no doubt that CAIRNCROSS's meeting with BURGESS in BLUNT's rooms could not have taken place in mid-August 1936. In his letter written after our interview he has now suggested that the BLUNT room incident occurred after the KLUGMANN incident and therefore after CAIRNCROSS had started to work at the Foreign Office. This may be so. An alternative reconstruction could be that it happened earlier, while CAIRNCROSS was still at Trinity. We base this thought on various indications. First the general tenor of BLUNT's account of his talent-spotting of CAIRNCROSS seems to us to suggest that BLUNT was speaking as though it had all happened while CAIRNCROSS was at Trinity. Secondly by the middle of 1936 BURGESS was ostentatiously parading his Fascism; it is odd therefore that CAIRNCROSS made no reference to this, despite his clear memory of the conversation they had on their train journey together. Thirdly in the course of his second, and final, year at Trinity (1935-1936) CAIRNCROSS's Party activity seems to have tapered off. When taken together with the other factors this last point could be construed as being consistent with his having been approached and told to give the appearance of back-sliding. None of these points would carry much weight on its own, but collectively they add up to a measure of support for the thesis that he was recruited earlier rather than later than he has said. The question is why? Again the answer most probably lies in an attempt to cover up.

80. Turning to the question of the meeting which was proposed he should have in Paris with BURGESS, once again we found some unsatisfactory features. CAIRNCROSS could not recall how, where, by whom and in what circumstances the arrangements for this meeting were set up, nor could he recall the reason why he did not go. All he can now recall is the rendezvous for the meeting; he recalls he was to go to the Hotel Selecte. It is interesting to speculate why this should be the only memory of this non-incident. Perhaps he himself was well acquainted with the Selecte - possibly from his days at the Sorbonne - or there was something sufficiently important about this whole affair to keep the venue clearly in his mind for some 35 years. Another point: how did he know 'Otto' was in Paris at that time? The answer to that could be illuminating.

81. In his recent letter he now thinks this arrangement was not made until the spring of 1937; he explained it by saying that BURGESS might not have known about the KLUGMANN episode. In addition by that time he might have come across BURGESS through someone at the Foreign Office - not MACLEAN. Checking up on the feasibility of this story we found that BURGESS arrived in Le Bourget on 12th March and flew out again on 15th March 1937. CAIRNCROSS arrived in Dieppe on 28th February and left from there on 15th March 1937 - the same day that BURGESS flew from Le Bourget. The meeting was therefore possible. The significance of its purpose is something we can only guess at. On the face of it the double recruitment story does not seem very likely.

82. The question of Paris is of itself another strange - and unsatisfactory - element of this story. From the end of 1935 until the war from the point of view of student Communism the key figure in Paris was James KLUGMANN; the seedy offices with the romantic

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address of 1 Cite Paradis (from January 1938 they were in Boulevard Arago) were the mecca for left-wing students visiting Paris; KLUGMANN and his co-organiser of the World Student Association, Andre VICTOR, held court there. CAIRNCROSS, very much the European, had been a student at the Sorbonne and continued to visit Paris fairly frequently, knew KLUGMANN for upwards of a year at Trinity but appeared to be unaware of KLUGMANN's position in Paris.

83. We find this difficult to credit as we can think of no-one else among the large numbers of those who have been interviewed in the context of university ramifications of the Ring of Five - and we are not confining our thinking on this to those who were at Cambridge - to whom KLUGMANN's position during those years was not well known. We found CAIRNCROSS's apparent ignorance of KLUGMANN perhaps the most astonishing single aspect of the interview - and it could be significant; it simply does not make sense in the context either of his Cambridge background or of his recent (1970) willingness to confront KLUGMANN on the subject of his recruitment. In consideration of the latter point we cannot escape the thought that he was willing - indeed anxious - to have a confrontation with KLUGMANN because he knew that KLUGMANN was not in a position to throw light on the true facts of the circumstances of his recruitment. No doubt KLUGMANN did meet him and introduce him to someone in Regent's Park; there now seems room for doubt as to whether this was in fact 'Otto'. We are led to wonder, when examining CAIRNCROSS's story in this light and taking account of KLUGMANN's own reactions, whether the whole question of introducing KLUGMANN in the way he did was a red herring.

84. Then there is the complicated question of his finances. He continued to maintain the line that during the long period he served the Russians he accepted money from them on one occasion only: £200 in recognition of information he had given them about the German intention to mount a major air onslaught on Kursk. We are trying to get further insight into the background of this from G.C.H.Q in order to assess more objectively the significance of its implications. The manner of his denial that he had received reimbursement for any expenses added to our growing doubts about his truthfulness. For one thing we felt it out of character that he should have allowed himself to be out of pocket as a result of providing a service. Moreover his denial that he accepted other payments, although he admitted it had been made clear money was available, should be considered against BLUNT's story that CAIRNCROSS received £100, as a result of BURGESS's initiative, directly or indirectly from Michael STRAIGHT's mother. We would have liked to press him on this, but it was not desirable that we should do so as this would have inevitably brought in BLUNT and also would almost certainly have changed the character of the interview to a point where it would in effect have become a hostile interrogation.

85. The doubts to which all this gives rise however bulk large in an assessment of his relationship with his controllers; this in turn has direct bearing on the account he has given of his disengagement. We have no new information which helps us satisfy ourselves

/one way . . .

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one way or the other about this aspect of his story. He maintained that when he had to resign from Government service, which was when he did require financial assistance from the Russians, he did not get it because he was unable to make contact even though he twice activated emergency procedures for a meet. Nor was he ever contacted subsequently. All this could be true but in the light of the significant doubts to which this analysis gives rise, we remain far from satisfied on these points.

86. For one thing there is his evident current affluence; only a man of considerable substance would find himself in a position where he could recoup a £30,000 loss on one investment from his other investments and speculations. For another there is no doubt that he was acutely uncomfortable when we touched upon this matter. There could be a variety of explanations for this discomfort; an obvious thought is that he has been sailing closer to the legal wind than he should and has been indulging in some form of skulduggery - which is not our concern. On the other hand he must have had his hands on considerable funds - and could draw upon considerable credit - to have been able to embark on a programme of investment and speculation on the scale he evidently has. In this there could be an element of reward for services rendered over a long period to the Russians. It is with this in mind that we have now decided to take up an offer made by Jim Angleton to have CAIRNCROSS's finances again probed in Italy to see where this may lead us. *

87. In the meantime, notwithstanding anything this might throw up, we must not lose sight of two things the answers to which seem to be fundamental to this case: why did BLUNT allow us to find papers in CAIRNCROSS's handwriting in BURGESS's flat after the 1951 defection, and why in 1964 did CAIRNCROSS so readily admit to working for the Russians having denied this for the previous twelve years? Were these two points elements in a complex controlled pattern following the defection of BURGESS and MACLEAN? If so how do they fit into the larger and later aspects of what is possibly the same pattern reshaped post-KAGO which could have included the sequence of events leading to PHILBY's defection; STRAIGHT denouncing BLUNT; and after CAIRNCROSS's "confession", that of BLUNT himself? CAIRNCROSS has told us he is planning to return to this country in the spring; we shall have to be in a position then to probe in depth the ten points in the paper he says he is going to bring as a basis for our next discussion.

E. W. Pratt

E. W. Pratt

* This sentence was changed with copies sent to SAC Washington via serials 865a + 866a

K.3/7

6th February, 1973

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
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PF 72493

NOTE

The following extracts have been made from serial
856a:-

PF 604529	BURGESS	Paragraphs 4,5,7,8,9, 10,13,14,32,33,34,35, 36,37,75,78,79,80,81.
PF 604582	BLUNT	Paragraphs 4,5,8,33,75, 76,78,79.
PF 45597	KLUGMANN	Paragraphs 4,11,12,13, 14,15,16,19,77,82,83.
PF 607183	WYLIE	Paragraph 33.
PF 47638	KATZ	Paragraph 33.
PF 604589	FOOTMAN	Paragraphs 41,43.
PF 604584	PHILBY	Paragraphs 42,63.
PF 604558	MACLEAN	Paragraphs 49,60,61,62, 63,64,65.
PF 748528	LESIOVSKY	Paragraph 54.
PF 47496	WATSON	Paragraph 66.
PF 604583	REES	Paragraph 67.



K3/A7

23 July 1973

855a

LOOSE MINUTE

K3/ Mr. Pratt

As you requested I have searched the B Branch records for any indication that John CAIRNCROSS was employed in this Service. We have no card in any index for him.



B1/1

31st January 1973

Note:

This enquiry arose from an interview with CAIRNCROSS reported at 856a. He said that after he left Betchley he was engaged "in C.F. work in 7/6". We understood this to mean Section 6 of 7/6 but wished to make quite sure he had not worked in 7/5 for a short period.

6/18/K3/7

K3/7 5.2.73.

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NOTE FOR FILE

When S.L.O Washington visited K.3 on 22nd January, 1973, among other things we took the opportunity to discuss the present situation in the CAIRNCROSS case at some length and in doing so straightened out what has been something of a misunderstanding.

2. Shipp referred to a discussion about this case which had taken place in Washington in September 1972; K. Adviser, K.6 and S.L.O had met Angleton and Rocca of C.I.A. Angleton had reverted to his offer (serial 825a) to use his Italian connections to try to find out more about the background to, and details of, CAIRNCROSS's investments and financial speculations - particularly to try to throw light on how he originally acquired the capital to do what he seems to be doing. It was left that if we decided to accept the offer Angleton would need to be seized of all information we had on these matters.

3. I regret that in the light of the final sentence of Minute 848 I had got rather the wrong end of this particular stick.

4. We discussed the offer with K.3/C.P.C de Wesslow and it was agreed we should accept Angleton's offer. We would go ahead and prepare a brief for S.L.O Washington to pass to him as soon as possible.

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E. W. Pratt

K.3/7

24th January, 1973

853a

Copy: Room 055

PF 72,493/K.3/7/E.W.P

19th January, 1973.


Dear Mr. Cairncross,

Thank you very much for your letter of 14th January, 1973. I am grateful to you for searching your memory yet again; we have taken note of the points you have made.

I am very glad you are planning to come to the U.K again fairly soon and that we shall be able to meet then to sort out those points which still bother us; I am sure your list of ten such points will prove to be very helpful in this.

I look forward to hearing from you again when you have decided on the dates for your visit here.


Yours sincerely,


E. W. Pratt

J. Cairncross, Esq.,
Via Armando Spadini 16,
Parioli,
Rome.

Note

The original was typed on Room 055 paper; before sending I checked with Secretariat / Bernard Sheldon who agreed this should be used.

 22-1-73

8520

Via Armando Spadini 16
Parioli
Rome

14 January 1973

Received 18-1-73

Dear Mr Pratt,

As promised in the course of our talk, I have gone over the question of the timing of various points in the B story. On reflection, I feel fairly certain that the visit to Cambridge and the train journey back the same day must have taken place after I took up service in London. And it was probably after the approach by the foreign friend. I realize that this may seem strange, but it occurs to me that it is just possible that B was not informed of that approach. Moreover, this would account much more plausibly for the fact that I knew B at all, for I certainly did not know him at Cambridge, and must have got to know him through some FO source, ~~certainly~~ not McL. The trip to Paris must have been some time after I settled in London, on this hypothesis, for it took some time to accrue leave, and indeed I have the feeling that it was in the spring. (1537)

As to K1, I can add nothing to what I said, which was that I cannot remember his having been away. The probably truth is that he was up at least for one term.

I should add that I might be coming over to London some time in the spring, and in that case I would let you know in advance and hold myself ready for a further talk. In fact, I would welcome one since I was frankly somewhat disturbed at being asked (often in the form of statements, usually by your colleague) questions to which I had categorically replied earlier, and I had nothing to withdraw of what I have declared from 1964 on. I have made a list of some ^{new} points of this kind. I think that, if you have in fact indications that my earlier statements are not confirmed, a thorough examination on all the relevant points would be useful for all concerned.

Yours sincerely,

J. Cairncross
John Cairncross


Mr E W Pratt

Brief for D.G.'s Meeting9th January, 1973John CAIRNCROSS

Shortly after Christmas John CAIRNCROSS telephoned to say he was visiting this country and was due to be in London for a few days - did we wish to see him? We arranged that he should come to Room Q55 on the evening of 4th January where he was seen by two K.3 Officers.

2. He was taken through in detail certain specific aspects of his admissions relating to his involvement with the R.I.S: the chronological sequence of events leading up to his recruitment; the modus operandi under his various controllers; his account (or lack of it) of his disengagement; and his apparent current affluence which allows him to speculate in land and property in quite a big way.

3. As a result of this interview we now have substantial doubts about his frankness over his involvement; there are positive indications that he is covering up for someone in the context of his recruitment and there are grounds for thinking he has not come clean about his financial arrangements with the Russians.


E. W. Pratt

K.3/7

9th January, 1973

8500

72,493
PF.96,118

NOTE FOR FILE

I rang Bob Bryan this morning to obtain confirmation that Special Branch would have no objection to our confronting CAIRNCROSS with our knowledge that he had reported being swindled out of a large sum of money by BUYERS. Bryan said that he could see no possible objection as the communication of the information to us was privileged.

C.P.C. de Wesselow

C.P.C. de Wesselow

K.3./0

5th January, 1972

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849a.

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ACT 1958.

LOOSE MINUTE

K.3/Mrs S. Rimington


John CAIRNCROSS rang today through Room 055 and said that he wished to contact us. I asked him if there were any specific points he wished to raise, but he said that it was merely a routine call and he wondered if there was anything we would like to discuss with him. I told him that I was not able to give an on-the-spot reply and said that one of my colleagues would be better able to answer the question on Monday. He agreed to ring back on Monday afternoon.

2. He will be staying at the Crescent Hotel, Cartwright Gardens, W.C.1., 387-1515, until the 5th January.

3. I did not give CAIRNCROSS any name to ask for, so you may wish to ask Room 055 to channel his call to you.

4. I shall leave you to make any Note for File you think necessary after having spoken to CAIRNCROSS.

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Room 055 rang
back to say C.
has moved his
label to
Devon House Hotel
387-1719
(56, Cartwright Gd)

K.3/1

28th December 1972

Room 055 rang today to say that the main door of Old War Office shuts at 5 pm. They agreed to ring C. at his hotel to arrange that he comes to the side door. I gave them the number.
SRZ.
3/1/73.
AB

Note
I rang CAIRNCROSS this morning at about 0930. He arranged that he should come to Room 055 at 5 o'clock on Thursday 4th January. I returned Room 055 accordingly.

J. K. 21



865a

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BF 72,493/K3/6

16 August, 1972.

Simone Christine CHEVALLIER

1. As I understand Bill Pratt told you on the telephone, while I was on leave, we have now made the enquiry of Peter Joco in Brussels which we promised to make. Peter Joco was able to draw Miss CHEVALLIER's file discreetly and has informed us that Miss CHEVALLIER gave CAIRNCROSS as one of her three character and qualifications referees when she applied for employment with N.I.T.O. (The other two referees both had addresses in the United States). She described him as an Economist with the Food and Agricultural Organisation in Rome, for which organisation she was a secretary from 1966 to 1968.
2. Miss CHEVALLIER was interviewed by N.I.T.O. last April. She failed her shorthand and typing tests and made so bad an impression in the interview that it was reported that she should only be considered as a candidate for employment if no one else was available. Presumably for this reason her references had not been taken up and there was therefore no further information about the nature of her association with CAIRNCROSS.
3. If Miss CHEVALLIER is not to be employed, the question of the completion of her P.V. is presumably no longer urgent and perhaps can be allowed to lapse altogether?

BP.

B. Palliser

Patrick Walker, Esq.,
Security Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

EJS/BP



K3/D3
17872

TOP SECRET

844a

LOOSE MINUTE

68/8.
K.3./6./Miss B. J. B. Palliser

Reference your Loose Minute of 19th July 1972,
copied to PF 72493. 841a

2. I duly put your request to Peter Joce in Brussels on Friday 4th August. He was able discreetly to draw Miss CHEVALLIER's file and confirmed that she had given CAIRNCROSS as one of her three character and qualifications referees when applying for employment with N.A.T.O. The other two referees both had addresses in the United States.

3. CHEVALLIER described CAIRNCROSS as an Economist with the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations in Rome. An Organisation with whom she herself was a secretary from April 1966 to December 1968.

4. CHEVALLIER was interviewed by N.A.T.O. in April 1972. She failed her secretarial and typing test and made so bad an impression in the interview that the interviewing officer recorded that she should only be considered as a candidate for employment in N.A.T.O. if no one else was available! Possibly for this reason, her references have not been taken up and I regret that there is no further information about her association with CAIRNCROSS in the N.A.T.O. files.

J. Knight

J D. Mackenzie Smith

8th August 1972

K.1./8.

TOP SECRET

✓ K.3./6.
10.8.72

843a.

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958.

842a

PF.72,493

NOTE FOR FILE

K.3./DCS told me that F.C.O./ Patrick Walker had telephoned to enquire about progress in our enquiries about Simone CHEVALLIER.

2. I spoke to K.1./David Mackenzie Smith who told me he planned to go to Brussels early next week to see Peter Joce on the basis of the brief provided by Bridget Palliser (841a). I later rang Walker who, although he said he hoped to get an answer as soon as possible, said he was quite happy with this arrangement.

E. W. Pratt

E. W. Pratt

K.3./7

25th July, 1972

✓
K3/7
25/7/72

TOP SECRET

LOOSE MINUTE

Copied to: PF 72,493

MS
K.1./Mr Mackenzie Smith

1. We spoke. K.3./Peter de Wesselow has asked me to let you have a brief regarding the question we would like you to put for us to Peter Joce. This I now attach.

2. The case of John CAIRNCROSS is, as I am sure you are aware, a very delicate one. We have informed the F.C.O., through Patrick Walker, of the fact that Miss CHEVALLIER is a friend or acquaintance of CAIRNCROSS, but have not told them and do not wish to tell them that we have had the information from him himself. They have asked us to expand on our report a little so that they can assess Miss CHEVALLIER's reliability for P.V. We have told Patrick Walker that we are quite unable to do this unless possibly you can find for us in Brussels anything bearing on the matter.

B. Palliser

B. Palliser

K.3./6

19 July, 1972.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

841a

Attachment to Loose Minute
to K.I./Mr Mackenzie Smith

Copied to: PF 72,493

Simone Christine CHEVALLIER

born 20 October, 1930

1. The above-named is the subject of a P.V. vetting enquiry, dated 14 February, 1972, submitted to us by the F.C.O. Her proposed employment is that of shorthand typist at N.A.T.O. in Brussels.
2. We should be very grateful if Peter Joce could be asked orally:
 - (i) whether he had himself seen papers about her; and, if not,
 - (ii) whether he would be able to gain access to her file in N.A.T.O.'s Personnel Department without drawing undue attention to it and to his desire to see it.
3. The reason for our interest is this: John CAIRNCROSS, resident in Rome (where Miss CHEVALLIER has also been resident for about the last six years), informed us recently that she was a friend of his, was up for a post in N.A.T.O. and had asked him for a reference. This he had gladly given her. His name does not appear anywhere in her P.V. papers in the F.C.O. in London and his reference must presumably have been given, before February, at the stage when she was first applying to Brussels.
4. What we are anxious to establish, without revealing outside this Office that we have the information about the reference and the friendship from CAIRNCROSS himself, is whether there is any record on the N.A.T.O. files of his friendship with her, its length, closeness etc. and of the terms of the reference he gave her.

B. Palliser

B. Palliser

K.3./6

19 July, 1972.

TOP SECRET

EXTRACT FROM F2/URG INTERVIEW REPORT

8412

PA

Extract for File No.: ..PF 72, 493.....

Name: ..CAIRNCROSS.....

Original in File No.: ..PF 55, 637.....

Vol .4..... Serial 211a... Dated 18.7.72

Extracted by: AH /F2/URG

Date ...26.7..72.....

Subject: Jakes EWER

University, College and dates: Trinity College, Cambridge 1931-37

Position in Student Movement or other significant involvement:

1936: member of Secretariat, Cambridge Student Branch.

Reliability:

Believed to be reliable within the limits of his memory although probably playing down extent of his own involvement.

Date and Place of Interview: 20th March 1972 at Room 070

Interviewing Officer: J.M. Knight

@ (if used)

.....

David LAYTON's circle

18. We asked him whether he had any memory of John CAIRNCROSS (Trinity 1934-36; PF 72,493) but the name meant nothing to EWER in terms of political activity; he only had a vague memory of him at all and did not particularly associate him with David LAYTON (Trinity 1933-36; PF 844,067). We went on to ask EWER whether he had known LAYTON in Cambridge and in London. EWER thought he had been in the house in London once. LAYTON had been younger than EWER who regarded him as a nice young Liberal. Judy FISCHER-WILLIAMS (Newnham 1935-38; PF 701,776) had been a friend of LAYTON and when we asked him whether he thought Margot HEINEMAN (Newnham 1931-35; PF 53,236) had also, he replied that she had.

.....

✓
K3/2
11/9/72

840a.

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT
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ACT 1958.

SECRET

838a

Attached to K.6.A/RPW
Source Report No. 1702

K.3/BP

We are required by KX to produce an assessment of the value of the information provided by the source of the attached report. In your comments on the value of this report would you please indicate the extent to which the report yields :-

- (a) New factual information making a significant contribution to current security problems.
- (b) New factual information which although of no apparent use in relation to current security problems is very likely to make a significant contribution to security problems in the future.



R. P. Whitby

K.6.A.

Date: 16 June 1972

4/3/K3/6

SECRET

K3/D15
6.7.72 ✓

SECRET

Part 1

Section and Officer of origin... K.6/RPW... Report No. 1702

Action copy to... K.3/BE for... Information copy to... Typing Date 16.6.72
p.a. on PF for CAIRNCROSS

REPORT

KUZNETSOV

KUZNETSOV was not a professional Intelligence Officer in 1952 but only a co-opted agent of the K.G.B. He was then controlled by the K.G.B. Resident in London, KOROVIN. The exposure of the MARSHALL case and the compromise of KUZNETSOV caused no 'flap' in the British Department of the First Chief Directorate.

Part II

COMMENTS BY SECTION OF ORIGIN

Source produced this information in late 1970. Although the source is believed to be reliable, his information should not be read as confirming any other information already on record. K.6.A. must be consulted before it is used in any way and will, if necessary, be able to help in its interpretation.

1. KUZNETSOV is the subject of PF.604,129
2. MARSHALL is the subject of PF.604,739

Part III

COMMENTS BY CONSUMER SECTION

(Value, interest, probability, extent to which confirmed by other sources etc.)

1. John CAIRNCROSS said that one of his controllers was a man who was P.N.G.'d in the MARSHALL case.
2. We spoke and I said I would not put this on CAIRNCROSS's file. On second thoughts, perhaps I will, for if KUZNETSOV was merely a co-opted agent this suggests that CAIRNCROSS's real controller at

103/105
6.772

SECRET

(Continuation sheet)

REPORT (continued)

- 2 -

the time was the Resident, KOROVIN, and this perhaps is of interest to CAIRNCROSS's file (PF 72493).

3. The idea that KUZNETSOV was not a professional I.O. is presumably 'new factual information': without it one would certainly have thought that he was a professional, to have played the part he did with quite an important agent like MARSHALL. I cannot see that it makes a significant contribution to any problems at the moment but it might I suppose help in some assessment later on of e.g. the tactics of the K.G.B. and the role of KOROVIN.

4. PA'd in PF 72493, CAIRNCROSS, copied to PF 604129, KUZNETSOV and PF 604739, MARSHALL.

BP/k3/6
3.7.72.

642

PF 72,493/K3/6

9 June, 1972.

Simone Christine CHEVALLIER

born 20.10.30.
via della Lungaretta 66/6, Rome.

1. We spoke about the above-named, who is currently the subject of a P.V. enquiry as a preliminary to her employment as a shorthand-typist with N.A.T.O. in Brussels.
2. It has come to our notice - very recently - that Miss CHEVALLIER is an acquaintance or friend of John CAIRNCROSS, who is well known to you and has been the subject of correspondence between us in the past (see for instance our PF 72493/D1/McB of 3.3.65.). I understand that, apart from this, there is nothing recorded against her. We are in no position to say whether or not her friendship with CAIRNCROSS reflects adversely on her but considered you should be informed of it.

BP.

B. Palliser

P.J. Walker, Esq.,
Security Department,
F.C.O.

BS/RS
14/6-
K3/RS
2/16/72

