

PF 72,493 /

LB

PF 72,493 /

LB

C A I R N C R O S S ,  
-----

JOHN. - INFORMATION IN  
CONN/W - OPERATION ACRE.

TRAY No.

S Form 924A rev 10.74

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date
KV2 / 4699								

S. 960 Edn2

PF 72,493 /

LB

1.  
9.6.69. Note for file. 1a.
2.  
17.6.69. Ext. from Interview report. 2a.
3.  
22.1.70. Copy of letter from FAO Rome. 3a.
4.  
6.2.70. Copy of letter from FAO Rome 4a.
5.  
13.2.70. To FAO Rome. 5a.
6.  
13.2.70. Note for file (Copy) 6a.
7.  
16.2.70. Ext. from Minute. 7a.
8.  
4.3.70. Ext. from Note for file. 8a.

		9.	
5.3.70.	Copy of Loose minute.		9a.
		10.	
23.3.70.	Note for file. copy.		10a.
		11.	
24.3.70.	Note for file copy.		11a.
		12.	
6.4.70.	Note for file.		12a.
		13	
27.4.70	Brief for DG		13a
		14	
27.4.70	Note on CAIRNCROSS handed to Trend		14a
		15	
27.4.70	Copy of Note on D.G.'s mtg with Trend		15a

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

17

4.5 70

Copy of note for Acre file

17a

18

12.5.70

Loose Minute from Bernard Sheldon to K3/HWA

18a

[Redacted]

20

15.5.70

Draft

20a

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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958 *FEBRUARY 2024*

~~D.G.~~

*I suggest that the words in brackets be omitted in page 1*

21

A 20a  
19/5/70

DG through Secretariat/L.A. through KY

Reference your note at 17a, I have placed a draft synopsis at serial 20a. My original draft was much more detailed on the lines of the note at 19a but L.A. felt that for the objects of the present exercise we only need present the essential considerations which were (a) that CAIRNCROSS' confession in America was not permissible evidence, and (b) that even if we did get him back to the U.K. there was no real possibility of obtaining an admissible confession or other evidence to mount a prosecution.

*H.W. Arnold*

K.3

H. W. Arnold

15 May, 1970.

22

Copies: PF.45,597/LINK/D  
POL.F.50/6/312/SUPP/A

*Seen 14/11/70  
by 27/5*

*Handwritten initials and marks*

*ITold Helkenston that we could do nothing until after the election.*

KY through SECRETARIAT/LA

*26/5/70*

Sir Burke Trend rang me a few days ago and said that he was finding it increasingly difficult to see the Prime Minister and he would prefer not to send him a note. He recommended that, unless there was great urgency, we should postpone action until after the Election. I am sure this would be wise. If the present Administration is returned to power, 20a would be a satisfactory note for the Attorney General on which he could speak to the Prime Minister.

*Handwritten signature*

D.G.

26th May 1970

*Vertical list of handwritten notes and numbers*

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ACT 1958  
February 2024

23

12.6.70 Copy of minute on PF.45597 Link D 23a

24

20.7.70. Copy of note for file from PF.45,597 Link D. 24a

25.

30.7.1970. Copy of note for file from PF.45,597 Link D 25a  
re discussion on proposed interview

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29

3.9.70

Copy of note for file

29a

30

3.9.70

Copy of Minute

30a

32

7.9.70

Copy of Minute

32a

33

8.9.70

Copy of Minute

33a

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ACT 1958 *February 2024*

KX

(Copied to PF.45,597 Link D)

" " POLF 11-55-1313

x/ In his Minute 70 in KLUGMANN's Link D (Operation ACRE) the D.G. says that if CAIRNCROSS wishes to return to the UK for good we should have taken a conscious decision on the matter; and I would like to suggest that we come to that decision before he is seen later this month. Although I do not believe that CAIRNCROSS at present is thinking much beyond the possibility of freedom to come and go, (he may shortly be sent on a mission to the UK by FAO), he may of course change his mind when he is given the assurance that he will not be prosecuted. I would, therefore, be grateful for a ruling on this matter before we proceed further.

*P. F. Stewart*

P. F. Stewart

K.3

11.9.70

35.

D.G.

Copy on PF.45,597 Link D

Copied to POLF 11-55-1313 ✓

Reference Minute 34, it seems to be that there are the following points which must be taken into account when making this conscious decision:-

- (a) Could CAIRNCROSS still be on the R.I.S. hooks? Manifestly he could be. The possibility was considered in May 1969 (paras. 28, 29 of 2a) and steps were taken to get to make some enquiries. Nothing came of this and I doubt whether it is worthwhile to revive it. Any enquiries on the lines suggested could only be superficial and would delay matters yet again.

7(b) ...


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ACT 1958 February 2024



Minute 35 continued

- (b) Against the above possibility we must set the fact that CAIRNCROSS has confessed, co-operated and appears penitent. He certainly had an almighty fright in 1952, lost a good career and might well have put his brother's career in jeopardy. He would never get access in this country but he could be used in other ways by the R.I.S. - notably as a penetration agent against us. In essence we already decided that this was unlikely when we broached Operation ACRE with him.
- (c) Could he manoeuvre us into a public scandal? I do not think he could do so without doing serious damage both to himself and his brother. In any case he could do this just as well, or even better, if he were not in the U.K.
2. I think all the actions we have taken in respect of CAIRNCROSS are defensible.
3. I do not think that there are any risks which are so serious as to prevent us from taking a conscious decision.

KX

  
A. M. MacDonald.

11 September, 1970.

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D.G.

Reference Minute 35.

x | I do not doubt that the Attorney realises that CAIRNCROSS may decide that he can safely settle in the U.K. permanently, but I do not think he would wish us to give away more than is necessary to achieve our objective - namely CAIRNCROSS' co-operation in the forthcoming interview with KLUGMAN. I think that the promises should be made in writing so that there can be no subsequent argument about them.

Bernard Sheldon

Secretariat

14 September 1970

KX through SECRETARIAT

Copy on PF.45,597 Link D

Copied to POLF11-55-1-13

I am inclined to agree with you that there would be no serious objection on our part to CAIRNCROSS settling in the U.K. In the light of 'X' of Minute 34 and 'X' of Minute 36, however, the drafting of the promise, unless it says no more than is contained in sub-paragraph 3(a) of 25a, is not going to be very easy. We should, if possible, avoid bargaining with CAIRNCROSS.

D.G.

15th September 1970

KX

*14/9.*

(Copy in PF.45,597 Link D)

Copied to POLF11-55-1-13

I am not quite sure what Mr. Sheldon means at X in Minute 36. In sub-para 8(e) of serial 7a I set out the position as follows:-

"CAIRNCROSS, as a self-confessed spy, may not be in a position to lay down conditions, but the plain fact is that he will be unwilling to co-operate with us by confronting KLUGMANN in this country unless he has some reassurance that he is unlikely to be prosecuted for his activities, however serious, which ceased nearly 18 years ago".

2. In order to achieve our objective, therefore, we need to give the assurance set out in sub-para.3(a) of 25a. If we start hedging this around with 'ifs' and 'buts' I am sure that we will run into trouble.

3. The D.G. has said that he is inclined to think that we would have no serious objection to CAIRNCROSS settling in the UK. (I note the adjective 'serious', and I must emphasise that we are going into this with our eyes open). If anything has to be put on paper, is there any objection to sub-para 3(a) of 25a as it stands? This will avoid the bargaining that a limited promise is bound to provoke.

*P. F. Stewart*

P. F. Stewart

K.3

17.9.70

39.

copy on PF.45,597 Link D.

D.G. through Secretariat/BS

Copied to PCRF11-55-1-13

Reference Minutes 36 - 38, like K.3., I do not readily see how we can produce any gradations of time in the promise we give to CAIRNCROSS. He is an intelligent man and must appreciate that if we promise him immunity from prosecution in respect of offences which he has already admitted, that immunity must apply whether he is within the jurisdiction for one day or for the rest of his natural life.

2. We can in my view make the proviso that any promise is confined to admissions which he has already made and would not apply if it transpired that he had committed similar offences on other occasions which he has not divulged.

3. If promises are to be made in writing (and I agree with this), I suggest that it would be appropriate for L.A. to produce a draft: neither K.3. nor myself are lawyers, and I have no doubt that he is most competent to produce a formula which would satisfy the Attorney - and also meet our K.3. requirements.

A. M. MacDonald.

KX

17 September, 1970.

40.

Copied to PCRF11-55-1-13

K.3

We spoke about the promises to be made to CAIRNCROSS and the answers to be given to other points which he might raise. I have placed a note at serial 41a, copy inside the cover.

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ACT 1958 February 2024

Secretariat

Bernard Sheldon

30th September, 1970



42

1.10.70 Note for file

42a

43

14.10.70 From Bailey's hotel

43z

15.10.70 Note for file.

43a

44

26.10.70 Note on interview with C.

44a

45

28.10.70 Copy of Minute to KX

45a

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46

28.10.70

Copy of Minute to D.G.

46a

47

3.11.70

To C - Rome

47a

48

6.11.70

To C - Rome

48a

49

11.11.70

From Cairncross

49z

13.11.70

To C - Rome

49a

50.

AB.  
 K3/11/70.

I would be grateful if you could try to sort out the confusion (largely my fault) between this link & the main file. There are already plenty of references to the project of ACRE on the main file, so that it can continue to have papers about it - provided there is no detail of time, place, & plan. Additionally there should be something on the main file - perhaps a note cross-referenced to this link - about the negotiations which ended in CAIRNCROSS'S immunity.

I am sorry to land you with this tiresome chore, but I am sure it will an advantage to have the files rather tidier than they are.

K3  
 13:11:20.

P. J. Inman

		51	
16.11.70	From Cairncross		51z
17.11.70	Note for file		51a
		52	
23.11.70	From C - Rome		52a
		53	
30.11.70	Copy of min to DG		53a
		54	
4.12.70	Copy of note for file		54a
		55	
4.12.70	Copy of note for file		55a
		56	
4.12.70	C's expenses		56a

57

8.12.70

From Cairncross

57a

58

9.12.70

Note for file

58a

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6la.

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT  
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ACT 1958.

PF.72493 Link B

Copy to: PF.72,493

: POLF11-SS-1-13

*580*

NOTE FOR FILE

When I saw CAIRNCROSS on the morning of Friday 4th December he raised with me once again the question of his immunity. On the previous occasion he had asked whether there would be any objection to him taking up a post in the UK and I pointed out to him that although there appeared to be no technical legal reason why he should not, I had a moral obligation to my superiors to consult them as I had put forward the proposal for CAIRNCROSS's immunity on the grounds that he was only likely to make periodic visits to the UK. On this occasion CAIRNCROSS said that there was a possibility that he might be offered a job in a publishing house in Hong Kong and he asked if there was any objection to him accepting an offer if one was made. I told him that the same considerations applied and that he should let me know if the situation arose.

*P. F. Stewart*

P. F. Stewart

K.3

9.12.70

*5/1/71*  
*9/12/70*

# TAVISTOCK HOTEL

Tavistock Square, London, W.C.1.

Telegrams  
Tavisotel, London, W.C.1.

Telephone  
01-636 8383  
Central Res. 01-278 7871/2/3

TELEX  
263951 Rusimp London

Rec'd 8/12/70

*[Handwritten signature]*

*5th Nov 1970*

*Dear Madam,*

*Funds received  
for order (782)*

*Many thanks  
Yours  
J. Lawrence*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*8/12/70*



IMPERIAL PRESIDENT BEDFORD TAVISTOCK COUNTY ROYAL NATIONAL

# TAVISTOCK HOTEL

TAVISTOCK SQUARE  
LONDON WC1H 9EU



Personal



Mr Patricia Stewart  
Ministry of Defence  
Old War Office Building  
Room 055  
Whitehall  
London SW1

K.3.

Delivered to Tavistock Hotel by  
K.3 Sec on 4/12.

PA on PF.72493

Link B

4 December 1970

Dear John,

Herewith your expenses.  
Please let me know in writing in  
due course that you have received  
them.

*Handwritten:*  
K2/A  
7/2/70

PF.45,597 Link D  
PF.45,907 Link C  
PF.72,493 Link B

550 ✓

NOTE FOR FILE

I met CAIRNCROSS this morning at his hotel as arranged. Because of the possibility that KLUGMANN might have alerted the Russians by some means I arrived early and spent some time scanning the area for possible surveillance. As A.4 found yesterday it is an easy area to cover and I am under no illusion that, if the Russians had been alerted, they would not have seen our meeting.

2. CAIRNCROSS joined me in my car and we drove to the far side of Tavistock Square and parked near a group of workmen mending the road and where I could watch the passers-by on the opposite pavement. (Unfortunately the windows of my car rapidly misted over and it was impossible to see out). I then debriefed him on his meeting with KLUGMANN, the discussion lasting about 25 minutes.

3. In general CAIRNCROSS's account tallied with the conversation as monitored in the Ops Room yesterday afternoon. There were the following additions:-

(i) During the journey to the hotel, and throughout lunch the conversation was limited largely to academic literary subjects, though KLUGMANN also talked about his time in SOE & UNRRA, the state of his health, the treatment he had received in Russia and his present interest in the Marxist-Christian dialogue. CAIRNCROSS said that he made a point of not providing too lavish a meal in order not to arouse suspicion that his expenses were paid.

(ii) When he made his proposition to KLUGMANN he noticed that the latter looked at the telephone and radio, as if, CAIRNCROSS said, he thought they were bugged. In case this had been in his mind CAIRNCROSS put the proposition to him again when they were walking to the underground station. Again KLUGMANN denied that he had any knowledge of the individuals involved, and when CAIRNCROSS stressed that he must have known the man with the middle-European accent to whom he had been introduced by

UP  
2/11/50  
Belle

KLUGMANN, the latter replied that he was merely some cosmopolitan gentlemen who had expressed a desire to meet CAIRNCROSS. Because he had known CAIRNCROSS at Cambridge, KLUGMANN had obliged. CAIRNCROSS commented that this story was patently untrue, but he did not press the issue.

(iii) CAIRNCROSS said that it was on the walk to the station that KLUGMANN had expressed concern about any trouble he might have had in his career. CAIRNCROSS said he had not exploited this opportunity as he was still trying the "soft sell". In his view, however, it was certain that KLUGMANN was aware of the disruption in his career.

(iv) CAIRNCROSS said that he had the feeling that KLUGMANN was expecting the approach. He emphasised that he did not mean by this that KLUGMANN had foreknowledge of CAIRNCROSS's involvement, but that he had clearly made up his mind, or had been briefed in the past, on the line he should adopt, and that this explained his immediate and negative response.

4. We then went on to discuss what action still remained open to us, and whether or not we still required CAIRNCROSS's services. I said that it seemed to me that it was unlikely that he would get any further with KLUGMANN and that he had in fact created a situation which we could now exploit ourselves. CAIRNCROSS stated his willingness to reopen the dialogue with KLUGMANN and to utter the implied threat that the option was open to him to report to the authorities KLUGMANN's involvement in introducing him to espionage. I said that if we were to make an approach ourselves the inference would readily be drawn that he had informed us without the necessity of him having to tell KLUGMANN that he was going to. I emphasised that this would of course have the effect of compromising him totally with KLUGMANN. His reaction was that he was quite unconcerned about this.

(Note

This somewhat heroic attitude is somewhat out of character in someone of CAIRNCROSS's apparently timid disposition. The interpretation may be that, having committed himself so far, he feels that he should complete the job; or on a more sinister level, that he feels quite safe in behaving in this manner, i.e. that he is still under control and has made this assertion under instruction).

5. I told CAIRNCROSS that I would like to think about what he had told me and asked him to ring me at 3 p.m. He said that if we did not wish to use him further he planned to stay one further night at the hotel and then stay the weekend with friends in Ascot, returning to France on Monday. He repeated his willingness to cooperate if we wished. I said that my preliminary view (based largely on my assessment of CAIRNCROSS's weakness of character and the belief that he would be a handicap rather than an asset at a further confrontation) was that we would be unlikely to want him; and we calculated his expenses on the basis that he would only be staying one more night in the hotel.

6. When I dropped CAIRNCROSS at his hotel he remarked that he wondered whether KLUGMANN could have arranged for our meetings to be covered by the Russians - though he supposed it would not much matter if they were! I did not tell him that I wondered the same thing, but merely said that I very much doubted whether we would have been observed.

7. I find it difficult to assess CAIRNCROSS. He struck me much as he did on the first occasion when I met him with K/Adviser - intelligent, sharp, but essentially weak. What does not seem in keeping with his character is his disregard of the dangers inherent in his notional - or actual - dealings with us; and his alertness to the possibility of "bugging" and surveillance.

P. F. Stewart

K.3

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4.12.70



PF.45,597 Link D  
PF.45,907 Link C  
PF.72,493 Link B

*Handwritten signature*

NOTE FOR FILE

After trying all afternoon on Wednesday 2nd December to get hold of CAIRNCROSS at his hotel, my understanding being that he was going to arrive about lunchtime, I finally left my home number at the hotel with a request that CAIRNCROSS should telephone me when he arrived. He eventually rang me at about twenty to eleven and told me that he had still received no answer from KLUGMANN to the letter which he had written some weeks before to Cambridge. He asked for advice on the action he should take. I promised to meet him at his hotel at 9.30 the following morning.

2. I met CAIRNCROSS as arranged and we drove in my car and parked some distance away from the hotel. I told CAIRNCROSS that there were only two J. KLUGMANNs in the telephone directory, one of whom lived in an extremely smart part of London where a Communist was unlikely to reside and that the other lived in Clapham. I suggested that he should look both these up in the telephone directory so as to verify this fact himself, and that he should then ring up the Clapham KLUGMANN and ask if that was James, and that if it was he should ask whether he had received the letter from Rome; and in any case see whether he could arrange a meeting. I told CAIRNCROSS in answer to his question that I would prefer the meeting to take place on Thursday or Friday this week rather than after the weekend. CAIRNCROSS seemed perfectly happy about this arrangement and said that he would ring up KLUGMANN straightaway and that if he failed to make contact he would try at various times throughout the day. He pointed out, however, that he had a date with his BBC producer from 4 p.m. till at least 10 p.m. and that he would be out of touch during that period. He promised to let me know as soon as he had made contact with KLUGMANN and for this purpose I gave him the Room 055 telephone number. We also ran briefly through the scenario for the interview which we had rehearsed at our previous meeting.

3. When I got back to the office after my meeting with CAIRNCROSS I discovered that he had already been on to KLUGMANN, had made a date for lunchtime that day and intended to meet KLUGMANN at Collets Bookshop at 12 noon. The Ops Room and A.4 were accordingly alerted.

*Handwritten notes:*  
13/1/4  
2/10/70

CAIRNCROSS and KLUGMANN eventually met and were seen into the hotel by A.4 and their conversation after lunch in CAIRNCROSS's bedroom was monitored in the Ops Room. From their discussion it was apparent that KLUGMANN had turned down CAIRNCROSS's proposition that he should unburden himself to the authorities about his connections with the RIS and also that CAIRNCROSS having emphasised that he had not given KLUGMANN's name when he had himself confessed, failed to tell KLUGMANN that the option was now open to him to inform the RIS of KLUGMANN's responsibility for involving him in espionage. It remained possible, however, that CAIRNCROSS might have said this to KLUGMANN when he subsequently accompanied him from the hotel to the nearest underground station. When CAIRNCROSS rang me later to report on his meeting with KLUGMANN I checked whether he had in fact uttered this implied threat and he confirmed that he had not.

4. It seemed to me that whether or not CAIRNCROSS had uttered the threat it still remained open to us to take action on the grounds that notionally he had done so. I discussed this idea and the proposal that we should make a direct approach to KLUGMANN, roughly simultaneously with the approach to SIMON in Leicester, with the DG and DDG. After considering the pros and cons of this action the DG agreed that we should go ahead and plan such an operation though this would necessarily be to some extent dependent upon any reactions which we might pick up in our coverage of KLUGMANN and SIMON. I subsequently discussed the matter further with K/Adviser and we both thought that if Mr. McCaul was available he might be the appropriate officer to carry out the approach we had in mind. I consulted both KY and K.7 who agreed to release Mr. McCaul for this purpose and I therefore asked him if he would be prepared to undertake the task. He said that he would be.

5. In his telephone call to me reporting the interview CAIRNCROSS asked whether we would be likely to wish him to take a further part in the confrontation with KLUGMANN because if not he was anxious to return to the Continent. I told him that I wished to consider the implications of the interview and that I could not do this fully until I had discussed matters with him. I therefore arranged to meet him at 10.30 the following day in the same place.

P. F. Stewart

K.3

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4.12.70

TOP SECRET

LOOSE MINUTE

Copied to: PF.45,597 Link D  
PF.45,907 Link C  
PF.72,493 Link B ✓

D.G. through D.D.G.

You may wish to be reminded that we hope this week to launch our operations against KLUGMANN and SIMON.

2. CAIRNCROSS arrives tomorrow, Tuesday. Owing to the difficulty of rapid communication with Rome we do not yet know whether KLUGMANN has responded to his invitation to meet. If he has not, we will brief CAIRNCROSS on an alternative method of making contact.

3. We are planning the approach to SIMON on Friday or Saturday. Whether we will, in fact, go ahead with this depends on the CAIRNCROSS/KLUGMANN situation. Although we would prefer simultaneous confrontations this may not be possible to arrange. We are trying therefore to be as flexible in our thinking as possible.

85  
P. F. Stewart

K.3

30.11.70

TOP SECRET

FAO(Room A 353)  
Viale delle Terme di Caracalla  
Rome

23 11 70


Dear Patrick,

So far, (Monday morning 10 45) no reply from our friend ,  
but, unless instructed otherwise, I think we must go ahead , and I ll try  
and phone him from London. I will of course consult P before doing anything  
after my arrival.

The absence of a reply is not particularly strange, since it  
takes at least a week between despatch from here and arrival of a letter  
from London. I am therefore still not without hope.

Kindest regards,

Yours ever

  
John Cairncross

Mr P Stewart

✓  
11/3/70  
11/12/70



Room 055

Mr Patrick Stewart  
Ministry of Defence  
Old War Office Building  
Whitehall  
London SW1  
England

TOP SECRET

PF.45,597 Link D  
PF.45,907 Link C  
PF.72,493 Link B

510

NOTE FOR FILE

Having learned from K/Adviser that he had received a letter from CAIRNCROSS saying that he had heard nothing and asking if the operation was still going ahead, I telephoned CAIRNCROSS (Rome 5797 ext. 3024) yesterday afternoon. I gathered that he had in fact received my letters, and that he had written to KLUGMANN, posting his letter at noon on Friday 13th November. He said that he had also written to me. Judging by the time my letters were taking to get to him he estimated that the postal delay was about four days.

2. What CAIRNCROSS really wanted to tell me, however, was that he had found that he had to attend a Council meeting during the period we had planned for him to be in the UK. He asked if we would accept a postponement for a week - i.e. till the period 2nd - 8th December. Although our preparations are well advanced I had no option but to agree.

3. CAIRNCROSS asked whether we thought there would be advantage in a further briefing session when he arrived - although we had not thought this necessary at our previous discussion. I suggested that he should report his arrival to K/Adviser, and we would take it from there. A discussion may in fact be required if KLUGMANN fails to reply to CAIRNCROSS' letter asking for a meeting and a new means of bringing KLUGMANN to the starting gate must be devised.

AS

P. F. Stewart

K.3

17.11.70

TOP SECRET

✓  
K3/AA  
17/11/70

512

FAO

16 November 1970

Dear Patrick ,

A command performance from our Council has prevented me from adhering to my dates. We therefore have to postpone everything for exactly a week. It is extremely annoying, and entirely unforeseen. Please let me know at once, if need be by telephone to the office if there is any snag on your part. If not, a letter will do, and we can proceed as previously on the lines arranged.

The one point I am not clear about is whether I should have a talk with you first immediately on arrival before we go ahead.

With renewed apologies,

Yours ever,

John

Mr Patrick Stewart

*If I'm waiting to hear from K before telling him of change of date.*

*Handwritten notes and a green checkmark in the bottom right corner.*

PER VIA AEREA  
PAR AVION

Mod. 24-R



Mr Patrick Stewart  
Ministry of Defence  
Room 055  
Old War Office Building  
Whitehall  
London S.W.1

VIA AEREA  
Inghilterra



Ministry of Defence,  
Room 055,  
Old War Office Building,  
Whitehall, S.W.1

13 November 1970

Dear J.

We have booked you into the Tavistock Hotel, Tavistock Square, W.C.1 from midday 25th November to midday 1st December. The room is small but reasonably comfortable, with its own bathroom, telephone, wireless and television; and there is a restaurant on the premises.

I hope all goes well.

J. Cairncross, Esq.,  
F.A.O.,  
Rome

✓  
103/14  
13/11/70

FAO(Room A 353 )


11 November 1970

Dear Peter,

I ve not had any news, and it may be quite a tight fit if I can't take action fairly soon. Please send me a wire if you have the address or if the visit has to be postponed -- cor ring me at the office - 5797 (3024) between 8 30 a m and 5 30 p m.

I hope things are going well. In any case I am all set to come over if needed.

Yours ever,

  
John Cairncross

Mr P M Wright

✓  
103/11  
24/11/70

PF.72493 Link B ✓  
PF.45597 Supp D

Ministry of Defence,  
Room 055,  
Old War Office Building,  
Whitehall, S.W.1

6 November 1970

Since writing my letter of 3rd November it has occurred to us if you were to tell J. so long in advance that you were booked into a specific hotel he might wonder how you had managed to arrange this. It might therefore be more sensible (and more natural) for you to say that you were coming over to the UK for a few days at the end of the month - roughly 25th November-1st December - to see your BBC Producer and to listen to your play. You could say then that because of a particular crisis of conscience which you had experienced you would like to have a chance of seeing and talking to J. You might then continue that you were not yet sure where you would be staying so could J. give you an address and telephone number where you could get in touch with him when you arrive.

The only disadvantage of this scheme that I can see is that you run the risk of getting involved in a telephone conversation before the meeting but I imagine it would be easy enough to avoid getting locked in argument over the telephone by saying that you wished to discuss the matter personally.

~~5/11/70~~  
11/3/70  
9/11/70

If you are happy to proceed in this way I think it might be a good idea to get a letter off to J. as soon as possible. If you could let us have a copy of what you send I would much appreciate it.

I will follow this letter with details of the accommodation we have arranged for you.

J. Cairncross, Esq.,  
F.A.O. (Room A 354)  
Rome

PF.72493 Link B ✓

PF.45597 Link D

Ministry of Defence,  
Room 055,  
Old War Office Building,  
Whitehall, S.W.1

3 November 1970

This is just a short note to tell you that we are now ready to go ahead with the plan you discussed with Peter and myself. J's current address is on the Trinity List so you can write to him there, asking for the letter to be forwarded.

We have found a modest but comfortable hotel and propose booking you in from Wednesday 25th November to Thursday 1st December. I will confirm booking and give you the name and address in the next couple of days. There is, of course, no point in your writing to J. till you hear again from me, but I wanted you to know that things were going ahead.

J. Cairncross, Esq.,  
F.A.O. (room A 354),  
Rome

PF.45,597 Link D.

KLUGMAN

copy: PF.72,493 Link B) ✓

81.

D.G.

---

Please see Minute 80. Following the successful meeting with CAIRNCROSS, we now have a fairly simple operational plan and a "libretto". (I hope there will be more recitative than duets!)

2. I think there is a fair chance that at least the first part of the plan will succeed and that we shall be able to show KLUGMAN the fence. Whether he will jump it, or run out, is anybody's guess. K.3. and K./Adv. are impressed by the intellectual calibre of CAIRNCROSS and this allied to curiosity, self-protection and a desire to protect the Party may well prove to be a bait which KLUGMAN will feel compelled at least to examine.

3. The matter of technical coverage and other mechanics will be dealt with in consultation with A. Branch.

KX

---

A. M. MacDonald

28 October, 1970.

✓

KX

(Copy to PF.72493 Link B)✓

At 79a is a report on the discussion which K/Adviser and I had with John CAIRNCROSS last week.

2. With regard to para.2 I have now found out that KLUGMANN's current address is on the Trinity list and any letter sent to Trinity would therefore be correctly forwarded. With regard to para.4 we have now found a reasonably modest hotel in the Bloomsbury area and we have checked with [redacted] to make sure that there would be no problems in bringing out the product of any technical coverage. We have also made a recce of the hotel together with [redacted] and believe that the rooms are suitable for our purposes. What we would in fact like to do is to book two rooms, one for a period of about six days for CAIRNCROSS, and an adjoining room for the same period plus two days earlier, the second one for A Branch technical purposes.

3. I am anxious to get a letter off to CAIRNCROSS as soon as possible giving him the information about the Trinity list and the address of the hotel so that he can write to KLUGMANN at the earliest opportunity. Before doing so, however, we shall require clearance to go ahead. I am ready to discuss any time that you may wish.

AS  
P. F. StewartK.3

28.10.70

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ACT 1958

11/11/70  
H. J. [unclear]

PF.72,493 Link B ✓

Copy to: PF.45,597 Link D

*Handwritten initials: HHA*

Operation ACRE

K/Adviser and I saw John CAIRNCROSS on Monday 19th October at Bailey's Hotel, Gloucester Road in order to discuss his participation in Operation ACRE, and the main points in our discussion are set out below, not in the order in which they were discussed, but in the sequence in which they will fit into the planned operation.

Initial Contact

2. We discussed first the method by which CAIRNCROSS could most naturally get in touch with KLUGMANN. CAIRNCROSS's first reaction was to say that he would ring KLUGMANN up, but not only had he forgotten KLUGMANN's initials but also even if he had remembered he might have found difficulty in establishing contact with KLUGMANN who appears in the telephone directory with his initials the wrong way round and with his name wrongly spelt. We therefore rejected the idea of a straight telephone call to KLUGMANN's private address and equally an approach through King Street. CAIRNCROSS himself put forward the suggestion that the most natural thing for him to do would be to write to Trinity, Cambridge, asking for his letter to be forwarded. I subsequently agreed with K/Adviser that I would check to see whether KLUGMANN's current address was known at Trinity.

Proposed Date of the Operation

3. We then considered the date when the operation should take place. By a stroke of luck CAIRNCROSS was in touch with a producer at the BBC who was putting on one of CAIRNCROSS's translations on the 29th November. While we were with him he spoke to this producer who expressed a wish to see CAIRNCROSS on 26th or 27th November prior to the broadcast. We therefore suggested that CAIRNCROSS should come to the UK on 24th or 25th November and stay for the inside of a week, this period to carry him over the weekend of 29th November. He would then be able to write to KLUGMANN saying that he was visiting the UK for that period and hoped they might find a mutually convenient date to meet, possibly over the weekend.

Venue

4. We agreed that we should try to find a fairly modest hotel, or at least more modest than Bailey's Hotel, where CAIRNCROSS would meet KLUGMANN and where he should

/be able.....

*Handwritten notes:*  
11/3/70  
27/10/70



be able if possible, to give him a meal in a restaurant on the premises. We undertook to let CAIRNCROSS know which hotel we had selected so that he could put the suggested venue in his letter to KLUGMANN. K/Adviser and I subsequently agreed that we would take steps to have technical coverage of CAIRNCROSS's room.

Libretto for the Meeting

5. Our main discussion centred round the approach to KLUGMANN which CAIRNCROSS should adopt and whether he should attempt to give the idea that the approach was prompted by private enterprise or was at the bidding of M.I.5. CAIRNCROSS had no doubt at all, and we agreed with him, that the approach should be one of private enterprise because KLUGMANN was almost certainly bound to react unfavourably if he suspected that CAIRNCROSS was an emissary of this Service. We agreed therefore that CAIRNCROSS's line should be that he had for many years harboured doubts about his ideological conversion in the '30s and that these doubts had come to a head shortly after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. As a result of this he would, notionally, have written to, or called at, Room 055, War Office, an address which he would naturally have well remembered from his interviews in 1952, and asked to be put in touch with a security official. He would say that he had told this official of his recruitment in the '30s, of his contacts with the RIS, and of the work he had done for it. He would make the point that he had not told the official that KLUGMANN had been instrumental in introducing him to his first contact; and that he had, when pressed, put the blame on BURGESS. He would then tackle KLUGMANN on the basis that the genuine idealism which had prompted them both in the '30s and thereafter had been distorted and corrupted by the secret police in Russia who were an entity outside and above the Communist Party. He would make the point that he saw no reason why the original ideas which had motivated both KLUGMANN and himself should not still be entertained, but that any thinking person should be aware of the way in which those ideals were now being exploited and corrupted. As CAIRNCROSS himself put it his object would be "to redeem" KLUGMANN. He fully appreciated, and it was agreed completely between us all, that the important thing was to initiate a dialogue with KLUGMANN and that this would inevitably take the form of an intellectual debate. K/Adviser and I both believe that it is important that it should take this form because CAIRNCROSS has undoubted intellectual stature and stands a chance of holding his own in an intellectual disputation, but is unlikely to come out best in a conflict of personalities. We did, incidentally, do our best to build up CAIRNCROSS's confidence (but not unduly, I hope) by telling him that however forceful KLUGMANN may have been as an undergraduate

/he was.....

he was now little more than a Party hack and a creature of the Party leadership.

6. In the light of the discussion recorded above we agreed that CAIRNCROSS should include in his letter to KLUGMANN, which should be very brief and no more than about ten lines long, some indication that he had undergone a crisis of conscience as a result of the events in Czechoslovakia and that this was a subject which he very much wanted to discuss with KLUGMANN.

7. On more general subjects, CAIRNCROSS did not require any particular briefing about KLUGMANN's current philosophical attitudes or his writings in the Party press, on the basis that it would be unnatural for him to be too well acquainted with KLUGMANN's present attitudes. CAIRNCROSS is fortunately still sufficiently interested in Communist affairs to be fully aware of what is taking place both in the Italian and French Parties following the Czechoslovak crisis, and is therefore capable of engaging in an informed discussion of the subject. We also agreed that the nearer that CAIRNCROSS could stick to the truth about his own career the easier it would be for him to sustain his role. We therefore suggested that he should feel perfectly free to mention the suspicions which fastened upon him in 1952 as a result of which he lost his job and found himself virtually compelled to live abroad.

8. The last stage in our discussion was concerned with KLUGMANN's possible reactions if a meeting between the two men ever came off. The first possibility was that KLUGMANN would refuse outright to have any further dealings with CAIRNCROSS and would leave. If this were to happen we agreed that CAIRNCROSS should say that although he had not yet told the authorities that it was KLUGMANN who had introduced him to his RIS controller he might feel that it was his duty now to do so. If nothing else this would plant a seed of worry in KLUGMANN's mind, and would leave the door open for a direct approach from the Security Service. Secondly, KLUGMANN might temporise, in which case CAIRNCROSS should seek to have a further meeting at which the dialogue should continue. Thirdly, KLUGMANN might agree to speak to the authorities, in which case CAIRNCROSS should say that he would try to get in touch with the official to whom he had spoken in the past and should ask KLUGMANN how he would like a meeting arranged, possibly a dinner a trois. We all felt it important that CAIRNCROSS should not give any impression that he was currently in touch and that he would have to go through his normal Room 055 channel in order to re-establish contact.

#### Miscellaneous

9. There are two further points which should be noted. While discussing whether CAIRNCROSS should give

/KLUGMANN.....

Uya

KLUGMANN the details of his career since the '30s he asked what he should say about the time that he was "booted out of America". Inadvertently I mentioned that he was not in fact going to be booted out of America, and CAIRNCROSS fastened on to this in a flash. I think that eventually we managed to persuade him that he would in fact have had to leave America, but that no immediate pressure would have been put upon him because of the very considerable publicity which would have followed on any precipitate action and which would have been disadvantageous to all concerned. Secondly, CAIRNCROSS asked if he was likely to be subjected to security checks if he applied for and was given an academic post in, for example, Oxford. We told him that he would not be subjected to such checks provided the post he sought had no connection with national security. We pointed out, however, that although there were no legal bars on him coming to the UK we had in fact put forward our submission on his behalf on the understanding that he merely wished to visit the UK from time to time and to be free to come and go. Although therefore there was in theory no ban upon him settling in the UK, to do so would be to some extent against the spirit of the agreement which had been reached. CAIRNCROSS accepted this reasonably and with good grace. We added that we did not rule out the possibility of a modification of this attitude if the projected operation was successful or if CAIRNCROSS was able to help us in other ways and become a continuing and useful source. (X)

Assessment

10. CAIRNCROSS was obviously delighted to be in the UK, and grateful for the efforts that had been made to enable him to come here. He was, I think, also impressed by the comfort and courtesy extended to him by Bailey's Hotel where his accommodation had been arranged by [redacted]. This may have explained the aura of mild euphoria surrounding CAIRNCROSS and the air of confidence with which he discussed what is almost inevitably going to be a very trying experience. Both K/Adviser and I were, nevertheless, struck by CAIRNCROSS's intellectual alertness and quickness of mind, and believe that in an intellectual argument he stands a better chance of holding his own with KLUGMANN than almost any officer in the Security Service. Our reservations are concerned with the strength - or lack of it - of his personality and his ability to sustain the role for which we have cast him.

11. We think that, provided he can couch his initial letter to KLUGMANN in the correct terms, there is a

/reasonable.....

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ACT 1958 February 2024

reasonable chance that the two will meet. Thereafter the conduct of the operation lies with CAIRNCROSS, and we do not rate the chances of success very high. We feel, however, that it is important to make the attempt to persuade KLUGMANN to talk and that this is as good a method as can be devised.

*P. F. Stewart*

P. F. Stewart

K.3

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26.10.70

TOP SECRET

43a

PF 45,597 Link D.

Copy: PF 72,493 Link B.

POLP 11-55-1-13

NOTE FOR FILE

I saw John CAIRNCROSS in Paris on Saturday 3rd October 1970 in connection with Operation ACRE. Having told him that he was now free to come to the U.K. if he wished, I invited him to visit the U.K. on 18th and 19th October. This he agreed to do.

2. I said that we had had many discussions about the problem of tackling KLUGMAN. The first aspect was how to get the horse to water. We had now come to the conclusion that perhaps the best way of doing it was to use John himself to make contact with KLUGMAN. I said that roughly the scenario that I envisaged would be that John would come to England, set up suitable premises and invite KLUGMAN to come and see him. When KLUGMAN arrived John would tell him that his views had changed, that he had now made a clean breast of his espionage activities to the authorities, that he had not been involved in it since 1952, and that in the course of his talk with the authorities he had, of course, told them that it was he, KLUGMAN, who had got him into it. CAIRNCROSS would then proceed somewhat on the following lines: that he still respected people who believed in Communism. This was not the issue today. The issue was, was the present Soviet State by using secret police and espionage methods to be allowed to penetrate and overthrow Western institutions in their own interests? This was the reason why he, John, had gone to the authorities. (The exact date that John went to the authorities is for decision). John would then try to persuade KLUGMAN that he too should help strictly in the problem of Russian police penetration of the U.K. If KLUGMAN showed any signs of being willing to co-operate, he should be assured that everything he said would be kept strictly secret, and be invited to see me.

3. CAIRNCROSS was much taken by this proposition. He said that he had given the whole matter a lot of thought, and he was convinced that any attempt to blackmail KLUGMAN or trick him in any way would result in disaster in the sense that KLUGMAN would have nothing to do with us. If KLUGMAN had not changed in

/character

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5/11/70  
16/11/70

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- 2 -

character from the KLUGMAN he knew at Cambridge, and he did not believe he would drastically have changed, he believed that within his lights KLUGMAN was essentially an honourable man and would resent strongly anything that savoured of double dealing by the authorities. It was always the theme of the past that the authorities were double dealers. We had got to overcome this somehow. CAIRNCROSS went on to raise many questions basically on what his replies should be if KLUGMAN asked certain questions. I said that I thought the best plan was to have a meeting in London as suggested above where we would spend some considerable time in developing the whole scenario. He agreed with this and said he would come.

4. CAIRNCROSS seems very eager to go through with this project. He is a weak man but, I think, courageous and very anxious to do penance for his sins. He is intellectually able and I think quite capable of arguing with KLUGMAN given an agreed line. CAIRNCROSS does not put it any higher than 50/50 for him being successful. I would have thought the odds were much more like 10-1 against, but I see no other way of doing it. On the other hand, the stakes are high if we succeed.

PETER M. WRIGHT

K. Adv.

P.M. Wright

15th October 1970

TOP SECRET

*K3/Alan Bowen Int F. 50*

The Manager's Office of **BAILLEY'S Hotel**

*per in PF 72, 493. LmkB.* Gloucester Road  
London SW7  
01-373 8131  
Telex: 216733  
(Quote Baileys)

HBT/mc.

14th October, 1970.

Dear \_\_\_\_\_

Thank you for your letter of the 8th October confirming your reservation of a suite for Sunday, 18th and Monday, 19th October, 1970.

I confirm that this has been reserved on behalf of Mr. J. Cairncross, and the hire charge will be £12. 0. 0d per day, plus 12½% tax and service charge.

I also note that you require lunch for 3 in the sitting room on Monday, 19th October, and that the final account is to be forwarded to you for settlement.

X I look forward to meeting you again.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Henry A. Gauber,  
General Manager.

X *He'll call in and see him probably on Friday.*

An **Express Hotel** ©

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*[Handwritten signature]*

NOTE FOR FILE

After discussion with Secretariat/BS it was agreed that the attached Form of Assurance could be used by K/Adv in his discussions with John CAIRNCROSS in Paris this Saturday.

2. The attached answers to possible supplementary questions were also approved.

*P. F. Stewart*

P. F. Stewart

K.3

1.10.70

*[Handwritten notes: checkmark, K3/KA, 1/10/70]*



Form of Assurance

You will remember that when you signified your willingness to assist us in a particular operation in the UK you were worried about your own position if you visited the UK. In the circumstances I can now assure you that you will not be prosecuted in respect of the espionage already admitted by you.

Supplementaries

(1) If J asks the authority for the assurance, you can say it is the DPP.

(2) If J asks if he will be named in court, in the unlikely event of K being prosecuted and J being called as a witness, you should say that it is not within our power to guarantee this but that we would make strong representations that he should not be named because he was a continuing and valuable source.

(3) If J is concerned about possible publicity at any stage you can say that we are concerned as he is, and that we will do everything we can to avoid publicity. We cannot, of course, guarantee that K and his friends will not make some announcement once the operation has taken place, but we believe this in the highest degree unlikely.

80.9/9  
KX through SECRETARIAT

Original in  
 PF 45,597 Link 1

320

I too prefer this simpler plan. The wording of sub-paragraph 3(a) of 65a implies that CAIRNCROSS could, if he wished, return to the U.K. for good. I dare say we would have no objection to his doing so but before we give him the assurance we should have taken a conscious decision on the matter.

D.G.

A. R. F. ...

8th September 1970

10/3/70  
 11/9/70

Original in  
PF 45,597 Link 1)

320

69.

D.G.

1. I think you will wish to know of the new orientation to operation ACRE as outlined in 67a. I personally much prefer this more direct and tidy approach to the problem. It should simplify planning, eliminate some potential embarrassments (notably for F. Branch) and is less devious than the original ploy.

2. I shall consult you again before we make any positive move.



A.M. MacDonald

KX  
—

7th September 1970

103/14  
11/9/70

Reference PF.45,597 Link D  
300

68

KX 4/9

For a variety of reasons, of which you are aware, the operation against KLUGMANN has been at a standstill for several months. I have been giving considerable thought to methods of getting it moving again, and in particular of improving and simplifying the original plan (with which none of us was ever very happy). I believe that the Attorney General's ruling which gives CAIRNCROSS freedom to come and go has created a new situation which we could exploit, my idea being that (provided we think he is up to it) we should use CAIRNCROSS to make the first approach - thus eliminating the need to use the F.4 agent and the consequent paraphernalia of Marxist/Christian dialogue etc. as a method of getting alongside KLUGMANN. I have discussed the basic outline with K/Adv and we think it is worth pursuing this further. I have put a note on our meeting at serial 67a.

2. At our last meeting on this subject with the D.G. he said that he wanted to see a "scenario" before he agreed to the operation going ahead. Although we have got nowhere near that stage yet he might wish to be acquainted with the shift in our thinking, particularly as it involves inviting CAIRNCROSS to the UK.

3. I am ready to discuss this further with you whenever you wish.

*P. F. Stewart*

P. F. Stewart

K.3

3.9.70

NOTE FOR FILEOperation ACRE

K/Adv and I discussed the future of this operation on 2nd September. We agreed:-

- (a) that the Attorney General's agreement that we could assure CAIRNCROSS that he would not be prosecuted created a new and more favourable situation in which to plan the operation, and
- (b) that the original plan was too complicated and consequently insecure.

2. I suggested to K/Adv that a possible alternative, which would have the virtues of simplicity and security, would be for CAIRNCROSS to come to the UK, telephone KLUGMANN and introduce himself as an old acquaintance from before the war, and invite him out to a meal for a talk over old times with another friend who was with him. If KLUGMANN responded CAIRNCROSS would ask him to a flat (which he could say he had been lent) or to a hotel room where he would be met by CAIRNCROSS and K/Adv (or whoever was chosen for the interview). I asked K/Adv if he thought CAIRNCROSS would be able to sustain this role.

3. K/Adv said that it largely depended on whether the marked change in CAIRNCROSS had persisted since the last time he had been seen. If it had, then there was a good chance that the plan would work. The only way to find out was to see CAIRNCROSS in Paris, put the matter tentatively to him, and ask him if he would come to the UK for more detailed discussions. CAIRNCROSS's reactions to these proposals would give us some indication of his ability to get KLUGMANN to the starting gate, and subsequently contribute, if only by his presence, to the confrontation.

4. We both agreed that, if CAIRNCROSS measured up to our hopes, this plan was a considerable improvement on the first. It was simple, reduced the number of those who had to be involved, could be carried out on controlled premises, and would make possible complete recording of the interview. Provided CAIRNCROSS made it clear in his initial invitation that a third party would be present it would reduce (but not eliminate) the element of trickery which was one of the major drawbacks of the first plan.

5. We did not discuss at this stage the programme or conduct of the interview, but we tentatively agreed that initially the approach should be friendly, using CAIRNCROSS as an example of a man who had seen the light, perceived the wickedness of the KGB, told the truth, and yet was not behind bars. We were opposed to using threats except as a very last resort.

6. As far as timing was concerned we thought that CAIRNCROSS should be seen in Paris towards the end of September, and that he should be invited to the UK for a discussion either just before or shortly after K/Adv's trip to America (last fortnight in October). The date of the operation would depend on his availability thereafter.

*P. F. Stewart*

P. F. Stewart

K.3

3.9.70

25a

Note for File

I discussed the proposed interview with KLUGMAN and SIMON with the Attorney General, the D.P.P. and Mr. Hetherington, Legal Secretary, this afternoon. The Attorney had read the note at serial 42a and the papers of the previous administration.

2. Two general points came up in conversation:-

- (a) I said that we could by no means guarantee that our interview with KLUGMAN would be successful but if he were willing to talk to us the information in his possession was likely to be of very great value;
- (b) I could not guarantee that CAIRNCROSS would not, at some time, wish to give publicity to these events but this seemed unlikely and we had found him very co-operative.

3. After discussion the Attorney General agreed that we could

- (a) assure CAIRNCROSS that he would not be prosecuted in respect of the espionage admitted by him;
- (b) give KLUGMAN and SIMON as necessary assurances as to their own position in terms to be agreed with the D.P.P. (these terms are likely to be the more far reaching of the two authorised in the case of [redacted] namely  
"I am authorised to tell you that no criminal proceedings are to be taken against you in respect of any of the matters disclosed by you in your statement to us for any offence under the Official Secrets Acts or for any offence of a like nature."  
(c) tell KLUGMAN and SIMON as necessary that as a matter of law their statements to us would not be admissible for evidence against third parties and that we would not call them as witnesses for the prosecution against third parties without their consent.

4. The Attorney then asked whether these various inducements and promises would be delivered in formal terms. We agreed that

(a) we would.....

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250

- (a) we would not name the source of our authority unless asked to do so and in this event would mention the D.P.P.
- (b) to avoid subsequent argument it would be desirable to have written acknowledgement of the terms of the inducements but that this was not essential if it would adversely affect the outcome of the operation.

BERNARD SHELDON

Bernard Sheldon

Secretariat

30 July 1970

24a

PF.45,597

LINK D.

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NOTE FOR FILE

Having confirmed that Hetherington, Legal Secretary to the Attorney-General, still retained a copy of the note at 42a, I spoke to the D.P.P. who promised to raise the subject of our interview with KLUGMAN and SIMON with the Attorney-General.

BERNARD SHELDON

Bernard Sheldon

Secretariat


20th July, 1970.

✓  
Sent/mc  
21.7.70

240

K.3/HWA

(Copy on: PF.72493  
Link B)



2. Will you also be prepared to send off the note about CAIRNCROSS which the D.G. has approved as soon after the Election as may seem appropriate provided, of course, the Labour Party are returned to power. If by any chance the Conservatives win the Election there will of course be a new situation because the new Attorney-General will need to be briefed all over again with a detailed brief by L.A. I see no reason, however, why he should not have an identical brief to the one shown to the present Attorney-General.

P. F. Stewart

K.3

12.6.70

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ACT 1958  
February 2024

KS/A  
12/1

Draft Letter/Minute to

Grading

Copies to

Date 15 May, 1970.

Our Ref. PF 72,493

Their Ref.

For Signature by

Approved by D.G.

20a

John CAIRNCROSS

In February, 1964, CAIRNCROSS was interrogated in Cleveland by a Security Service officer to whom he confessed that he had spied for the Russians from 1936 to 1951. The then Prime Minister and *some* other members of the Cabinet were informed of the case on 19 February, 1964, and subsequently discussed what action should be taken. The principal difficulty was that CAIRNCROSS' confession to a S.S. officer was not admissible evidence for the purposes of a prosecution. Thus, even if he could be got to the U.K. - and the offence was not extraditable - a prosecution could not be brought unless CAIRNCROSS was prepared to make a further, admissible, statement. Nor was there any guarantee that if the Americans (who knew about his confession) were prevailed upon to deport him he would in fact come to the U.K. - he would be legally free to go to any country prepared to take him. It was ascertained that the Americans were in fact not inclined to deport him

/as . . .

KB/WL  
15/5/70

Draft Letter/Minute to

Grading

Date

Copies to

Our Ref.

Their Ref.

For Signature by

Approved by

- 2 -

as he did not represent a current security risk to the U.S. An attempt was made to persuade CAIRNCROSS to return to the U.K. <sup>voluntarily</sup> ~~of his own~~ <sup>in a statement with caution</sup> ~~volition~~ in order to make ~~an~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~admissible~~ <sup>admissible</sup> confession but, ~~not unnaturally,~~ <sup>he</sup> declined. In these circumstances the Prime Minister took the view that no further action was justified.

18a

Loose Minute  
Reference.....

K.3./HWA <sup>7/2/70</sup> 13/5

PR. an PF. 72493 Teil B (CRIPMCROSS)  
Copied to POLFLI-55-1-13

We spoke.

2. I attach herewith a list of papers held by the Attorney-General's Legal Secretary. He tells me that he has shown none to the Attorney-General.

Bernard Sheldon

Secretariat

12th May, 1970.

CODE 18-76

324/11/K3

✓  
K3/WL  
4/5/70

SECRET

Copies:

PF.72,493/LINK/B ✓  
POL.F.50/6/312/SUPP/A

---

*17a*

NOTE FOR PF.45,597/LINK/D

Sir Burke Trend told me this afternoon that he had now read the papers relating to John CAIRNCROSS. He did not think that it would be proper to make these available to the Prime Minister but there would be no objection to letting him see a synopsis of them which omitted ~~the~~ argument with a political slant. He did not want to see our synopsis but would tell the Prime Minister what he had decided.

D.G.

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

4th May 1970

SECRET

*13/A*  
*6/5*

SECRET

Copies:

PF.72,493/LINK/B ✓  
POL.F.50/6/312/SUPP/A

ISA

NOTE FOR PF.45,597/LINK/D

When I called on Burke Trend this afternoon, I left with him and he read in my presence the note at 14a. He recalled that he and William Armstrong had mentioned John CAIRNCROSS to the present Prime Minister in the context of the appointment of his brother as Economic Adviser. He thought that there would be no difficulty about giving this further information to the Prime Minister but he would want to read the papers to which I had referred.

D.G.

E. M. BURNIVAL JONES

27th April 1970

SECRET

DGJ  
27/4



TOP SECRET

14a

COPY NO. 3

Copy No. 1 : Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Office  
Copy No. 2 : PF, 45,597/LINK/D  
Copy No. 4 : POL.F.50-6-312/SUPP/A  
Copy No. 5 : D.G. Letter Book

John CAIRNCROSS

The Security Service is planning to interview James KLUGMANN, who is known to have been involved with the R.I.S. before and during the war, and who is believed to have played an important role in the recruitments which took place in the Universities in the 1930s. One of the methods it is hoped to use to persuade KLUGMANN to talk is to confront him with John CAIRNCROSS whom KLUGMANN recruited for the R.I.S. at Cambridge and who in February 1964 confessed to a Security Service officer that he had worked for the R.I.S. from 1936 to 1952, during which period he had served in the Foreign Office, the Treasury, GC & CS, and M.I.6. CAIRNCROSS has expressed his willingness to co-operate in the operation against KLUGMANN.

2. CAIRNCROSS made his confession in America. His case was considered by Ministers and it was agreed that, as he could not be deported under American law, he should be formally invited to return to the U.K. and make a statement under caution with a view to prosecution. CAIRNCROSS rejected the invitation and has not visited the U.K. since 1964 for fear of prosecution. He has recently raised the question of immunity: he does not wish to settle in the U.K., but to be free to visit this country for the purpose of the KLUGMANN operation, in which his presence is considered to be an essential element, and to visit his family on other occasions in the future. In CAIRNCROSS's favour is the fact that he has, in the view of the Security Service, been wholly co-operative by way of making redress for his espionage.

3. The Attorney General has been consulted and, while sympathetic to the proposition that CAIRNCROSS should not be prosecuted for offences which were committed over eighteen years ago, is unwilling to promise immunity without first having discussed the matter with the Prime Minister. Because the case had been considered by the previous administration he does not wish to approach the Prime Minister until Sir Burke Trend has been consulted on the constitutional propriety of making available to Ministers the papers of a previous administration.

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✓  
DGM  
3

TOP SECRET



SECURITY SERVICE

27th April 1970

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
TOP SECRET

Loose Minute

130a

~~D.G.~~  
\_\_\_\_\_

Herewith the brief for which  
you asked in connection with operation  
ACRE.



A.M. MacDonald

KX  
\_\_\_\_\_

27 April 1970

TOP SECRET

✓  
102/FA  
6/0

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See 14a

The Case of John CAIRNCROSS

The Security Service is planning to interview James KLUGMANN, who is known to have been involved with the R.I.S. before and during the war, and who is believed to have played an important role in the recruitments which took place in the Universities in the 1930s. One of the methods it is hoped to use to persuade KLUGMANN to talk is to confront him with John CAIRNCROSS whom KLUGMANN recruited for the R.I.S. at Cambridge and who in February 1964 confessed to a Security Service officer that he had worked for the R.I.S. from 1936 to 1952, during which period he had served in the Foreign Office, the Treasury, GC & CS, and M.I.6. CAIRNCROSS has expressed his willingness to co-operate in the operation against KLUGMANN.

2. CAIRNCROSS made his confession in *by Ministers* America. His case was considered ~~at Cabinet level~~ and it was agreed that, as he could not be deported under American law, he should be formally invited to return to the U.K. and make a statement under caution with a view to prosecution. CAIRNCROSS rejected the invitation and has not visited the U.K. since 1964 for fear of prosecution. He has recently raised the question of immunity: he does not wish to settle in the U.K., but to be free to visit this country for the purpose of the KLUGMANN operation, in which his presence is considered to be an essential element, and to visit his family on other occasions in the future. In CAIRNCROSS's favour is the fact that he has, in the view of the Security Service, been wholly co-operative by way of making redress for his espionage.

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27 April 1970

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PA on PF-72493 (link B) ✓

PF 455-97 (link 1)

Copied to POLF11-55-1-13 ✓

12a  
SS. Working  
Party Folder

K.3. (2 copies) ✓

NOTE

Claxton, D.D.P.P. telephoned today to say that at the request of the D.P.P. he had been to see the Attorney General to discuss the KLUGMANN interview. The Attorney wanted further particulars which Hetherington would provide if he had earlier papers. I promised to let Hetherington have a copy of the note dated 23rd March, 1970 which I had given the D.P.P.

2. I subsequently spoke to Hetherington who by then had discovered his papers and duly sent the copy of the note to him. We agreed that if any constitutional difficulty arose from the need to inform the Attorney of decisions of the previous administration he would get in touch with me. In all the circumstances we thought that any clearances should be handled by D.G. with Burke Trend.

BERNARD SHELDON

Bernard Sheldon

Secretariat

6th April, 1970. ✓

PR on PF 45597 Link D

43a

HWA 15 Sec 4/26

BS. Working Party Folder.

Copy to K.3.

NOTE

11a

I discussed the proposal to interview KLUGMANN and SIMON with the D.P.P. today and drew his attention to his own papers on John CAIRNCROSS. He says that he will at least have to discuss CAIRNCROSS's position with the Attorney General and will try to do so next week. His initial reaction was that a promise not to prosecute would cost us little, as in the absence of such a promise CAIRNCROSS would not come within the jurisdiction and there would be no prospect of prosecuting him anyway. He fully accepted the desirability of getting KLUGMANN's information and I think it likely that he will meet our needs.

BERNARD SHELDON

Bernard Sheldon

Secretariat

24th March, 1970.

P.A. in Pf. 72, 493 Link B.

Orig. in Pf. 45, 597 Link D.

Vol. Serial 43a Receipt date

24/3/70  
103/1043  
2/4/70

TOP SECRET

PF.45597 Link.D ✓  
PF.45907 Link C

Copy No. .2 of 5 copies

NOTE. PREPARED BY K3 FOR LEGAL ADVISER  
TO GIVE TO DPP. AT MEETING ON 24.3.70

*1970*

Proposed interviews with Norman John KLUGMANN  
and Brian SIMON

INTRODUCTION

KLUGMANN is currently a member of the National Cultural Committee of the CPGB and editor of "Marxism Today". He is known to have been involved with the RIS before and during the war and he is thought to have been connected with the spy network of which PHILBY, BURGESS and MACLEAN were members. He undoubtedly has information which would be of considerable value. Hitherto there has been no reason to believe that he would be prepared to talk. For reasons set out below it is now considered that there is a chance that he might be induced to do so. One of the reasons is the expressed readiness of John CAIRNCROSS, a self-confessed spy for the RIS from 1936 to 1952, to confront KLUGMANN provided he can be given a reasonable assurance that he (CAIRNCROSS) will not be prosecuted if he comes to the UK for this purpose - he is currently resident in Italy.

2. Concurrently with the operation against KLUGMANN it is intended to interview Brian SIMON, Director of the School of Education at Leicester University. SIMON is a member of the National Executive Committee of the CPGB and is also believed to have had connections with the RIS before and during the war. The reason for wishing to conduct the two interviews concurrently is to prevent either subject passing a warning to the other, directly or through the CPGB.

KLUGMANN'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE RIS

3. CAIRNCROSS has stated that he was recruited for the RIS by KLUGMANN in the Autumn of 1936 and was introduced by him to the man who became his RIS controller. This man appeared to be well known to KLUGMANN. Another source has described meetings in BURGESS's rooms at Cambridge in 1934/35 when KLUGMANN and BURGESS discussed possible candidates for RIS recruitment. According to another reliable source KLUGMANN has referred to having been approached by a Soviet Intelligence Officer during the war whilst in SOE and to having passed him information. This approach had arisen out of his earlier contacts with the RIS before the war, when he had apparently been considerably involved with them by his own account.

SIMON'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE RIS

4. There is less information about SIMON's involvement /with ....

P.A. in pf. 72, 493 link B.

Orig. in pf. 45, 597 link D.

Yol. - Serial 42a Receipt date 23/3/70  
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*K3/1/11  
24/3*

- 2 -

with the RIS. He joined the Communist Party at Trinity College, Cambridge in 1935 and according to one source was recruited to talent spot for the KGB in 1938. It is believed that during the war he worked for Soviet Military Intelligence and made at least one recruitment approach on their behalf to another Communist.

REASONS WHY KLUGMANN & SIMON MIGHT BE PREPARED TO TALK  
& THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS

5. (1) There is evidence that KLUGMANN was disillusioned by the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. At a recent CPGB Congress he was associated with the official Party leadership in the critical attitude adopted towards the invasion of Czechoslovakia which is thought to reflect the increasing power of the KGB in Russia.
- (2) There is some reason to believe that KLUGMANN has not told the CPGB leadership the full extent of his involvement with the RIS and that he would be vulnerable to an implied threat that this might be leaked to the CPGB; or alternatively that it might be leaked to the public that he had worked for the RIS whilst a Party official, this being damaging to the Party's desired reputation as a respectable political organisation.
- (3) CAIRNCROSS has agreed that on certain conditions he would be prepared to confront KLUGMANN in person with the fact that he had conspired to introduce a Government official to the RIS for purposes of espionage.
- (4) SIMON is reported like KLUGMANN to be disillusioned with aspects of Russian policy, particularly the invasion of Czechoslovakia and action taken against Russian writers and intellectuals. It is thought that he also would be vulnerable to a stated or implied threat of exposure and consequent embarrassment to the Party.
6. It is the Security Service view that the combination of the above circumstances offer a reasonable chance of success; and that the dividend to be derived from such a success would be great.

CAIRNCROSS

7. The availability of CAIRNCROSS for a confrontation is regarded as an essential element of the operation. Since

/confessing ....



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LOOSE MINUTE

P.A. in Pf. 72,493 link B.

Orig. in Pf. 45,597 link D.

Serial 38a Receipt date 5.3.70

Copy to: PF.45,597 Link.D ✓

Sect/BS

I am sending you herewith

(a) those volumes of CAIRNCROSS's file which contain his confession and the discussions which have subsequently taken place on the legal implications of it. Miss Palliser's loose minute of 9th February pinned to the current volume provides a convenient guide to the relevant serials and minutes; and

(b) a copy of my Minute to the D.G. and of the draft operational plans for the confrontations with KLUGMANN and SIMON. You may wish to have these by you when considering what should be said to the DPP about them and what formula we may be able to use to persuade them to talk about the others who may have been involved;

2. I would be grateful if we could discuss these problems as soon as you can extract yourself from your present preoccupations. I realise that you are heavily committed at present but I am extremely anxious to get this operation off the ground as it has already been far too long in preparation. I am, moreover, reluctant to embark on the detailed operational planning which the D.G. has requested without having made these preliminary moves with the DPP.

P. F. Stewart

K.3

5.3.70

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Extract from Note for File/Interview Report

8a

Extract for File No. P.F. 72,493 Link B. Name .....

Original in File No. P.F. 45,597 Link D. Serial 37a Dated 4.3.70

Date and Place of \*Interview/Meeting 2.3.70

with (also give security context of person being interviewed) .....

Subject Operation ACRE

Officer P.F. Stewart using @ of Section K3

Extracted by J.G. Section B5 Date 10.4.70

.....

3. In answer to a question from the D.G., K.3 said that KLUGMANN's disenchantment with the KGB was merely one aspect of the approach and that if it failed to persuade him to talk there remained the possibility of the confrontation with CAIRNCROSS and the implied threat of the exposure of KLUGMANN's past involvement with the RIS. Because of the legal problems to which CAIRNCROSS's presence would give rise the D.G. asked why he should be used rather than, for instance, STRAIGHT. After discussion it

was accepted that STRAIGHT's current connections with President Nixon and the advantage of confronting KLUGMANN with someone whom he had introduced to a Russian Intelligence Officer made the use of CAIRNCROSS preferable.

4. CAIRNCROSS's legal position was then discussed and Secretariat/BS thought it likely that the DPP, when the facts of the case were explained to him, would agree to CAIRNCROSS being given an expression of our opinion that he would not be prosecuted, even though there could be no absolute assurance. It was agreed that Secretariat/BS should take the matter up with the DPP, and at the same time discuss the question of the immunity of KLUGMANN and SIMON and the formula which might be employed to persuade them to talk about others. The D.G. drew attention to the fact that some Ministers and officials were aware of the case and would presumably need to be consulted.

.....

\*Strike out inapplicable.



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7a

8. CAIRNCROSS poses a problem because:-

(a) There still remains the possibility that he would be prosecuted if he visited the U.K. This was last considered in May 1967 when CAIRNCROSS asked what was likely to

happen to him if he came to the U.K. either in the course of his work or to visit his relatives. This was a personal initiative on his part and unlike the previous occasion on which the matter had been raised in June 1965 when the initiative lay with us since we wished to confront BLUNT with CAIRNCROSS. The then L.A. pointed out that there was still no change in the legal position and doubted whether we could refrain from reporting CAIRNCROSS's presence to the D.P.P. He pointed out that this would not necessarily result in a prosecution because there was no independent admissible evidence against him; and if he declined to make a statement under caution to a police officer he would not be in jeopardy. You subsequently instructed K/Adviser to tell CAIRNCROSS that the situation had not changed; that we could not say whether CAIRNCROSS would be prosecuted because the matter would not be in our hands; and that he had admitted to serious offences and would therefore come here at his peril. You subsequently mentioned the case to Sir Philip Allen who confirmed the line taken - adding that Ministers "would not thank us for referring the matter to them".

(b) Although a number of Ministers in the Conservative Administration were made aware of the CAIRNCROSS case after he confessed, the only Ministers in the Labour Government who seem to have been informed of the case are the present Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1966, when he was Home Secretary; and the present Home Secretary in 1968. CAIRNCROSS's curriculum vitae was included in the paper on the "Ring of Five" which was shown to both by Sir Philip Allen and subsequently returned to us. The question of prosecution, or possible immunity from prosecution, has not been raised with Ministers, and this presumably will be necessary.

(c) There is the danger of publicity if the operation fails and KLUGMANN informs the C.P.G.B. of his own and CAIRNCROSS's involvement with the R.I.S. For the reasons given in para.8 of 32a we

P.T.O.

P.F. 72,493.  
702a.

Min. 706.

Min. 709

710a.

Min. 649.

Minute 33 contd:

believe it unlikely that KLUGMANN will report his own involvement, or that if he does the C.P.G.B. will make capital out of our approach to him. They are similarly unlikely to make capital out of CAIRNCROSS's involvement because this would inevitably implicate KLUGMANN. The possibility of publicity has, however, been a sensitive issue in the past not least because of the position of CAIRNCROSS's brother, Alexander, and needs to be considered.

- (d) In the unlikely event that CAIRNCROSS is involved in court proceedings as a result of his co-operation he has asked that his name should not be given in open court. I have discussed this with L.A. whose opinion is that it would be for us, rather than CAIRNCROSS, to make this request on the grounds that he has been a useful and continuing source whose anonymity we wish to preserve.
- (e) CAIRNCROSS, as a self-confessed spy, may not be in a position to lay down conditions, but the plain fact is that he will be unwilling to co-operate with us by confronting KLUGMANN in this country unless he has some reassurance that he is unlikely to be prosecuted for his activities, however serious, which ceased nearly 18 years ago. He is under no illusions that this will be easy to acquire; but I am sure that if we want his help in this operation we need to face the problems set out in the preceding sub-paragraphs.
- .....

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P.A. in Pf. 72, 493 link B.

PF 45,597 Link.D

Orig in Pf. 45,597 link D.

Serial 32a Receipt date 13.2.70

Operation ACRE

Proposed interview with Norman John KLUGMANN

Operational Plan

A. BACKGROUND

Norman John @ James KLUGMANN, born 27th February, 1912, was at Trinity College, Cambridge from 1931-35. He joined the Communist Party in 1933 and is now engaged on writing the history of the British Communist Party. He was a close friend of Donald MACLEAN, a contemporary of his at school, and according to LASCAR he was responsible for recruiting Guy BURGESS to the Party.

2. In 1935 he went to Paris on a research scholarship on French literature and there became active in the international student movement. In 1936 he became Secretary of the World Student Committee against War and Fascism working with the Communist International (COMINTERN) and, later, the Young Communist International until 1939.

3. In November 1940 KLUGMANN was called up and served as a private in the R.A.S.C. until February 1942. He then joined S.O.E. in which organisation he remained until April 1945, achieving the rank of Major and serving in the Middle East, Italy and Yugoslavia. On leaving S.O.E. he was employed in a civilian capacity by U.N.R.R.A.

4. In a conversation with Bob STEWART at C.P.H.Q., reported by source LASCAR on 8.8.45., KLUGMANN recounted how, when working in S.O.E. in the Middle East and in Yugoslavia, he had been able to use his intelligence function to manipulate support for the Communist Partisans under TITO by forming a group of pro-Partisan, if not pro-Communist, I.Os and recruiting left-wing agents. This was at the time that official British support was being given to the Chetnicks under MIHAILOVITCH. He also referred to his involvement with the R.I.S.

KLUGMANN's Involvement with the R.I.S.

5. According to KLUGMANN a "Soviet Intelligence person" approached him during the war and pressed him to assist. KLUGMANN agreed, albeit reluctantly because he did not want to endanger what he considered to be his more important task for the Party in S.O.E., and passed information to him. This approach arose because the

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R.I.S. knew of KLUGMANN from before the war. On his own admission to STEWART, KLUGMANN had been asked to work for the Russians fairly early in his career and "got very mixed up with it".

6. By "fairly early in his career" it seems probable that KLUGMANN was referring to his early Communist career between 1933 when he joined the Party and 1939. The suspicion that he was involved with the R.I.S. in this period is strengthened by the following:-

- (a) BLUNT said on one occasion that he used to meet KLUGMANN and BURGESS in BURGESS's rooms in 1934/35 to discuss candidates for recruitment and one of these was Michael STRAIGHT. STRAIGHT was already a Communist when he went up to Cambridge in 1934, so the recruitment envisaged cannot have been to the Party. BLUNT later denied that he had made this statement.
- (b) John CAIRNCROSS stated that he was recruited by KLUGMANN and introduced by him to his R.I.S. controller, "Otto" in the Autumn of 1936. CAIRNCROSS added that he had been convinced that KLUGMANN knew "Otto" well and "was in cahoots with him".
- (c) According to BLUNT, BURGESS called on KLUGMANN in Paris in 1936/37 and confessed to him that he was working for the R.I.S.
- (d) According to Stuart HAMPSHIRE, BLUNT introduced him to KLUGMANN in Paris for what HAMPSHIRE afterwards described as a "looking over operation". The date of this incident is not precisely established, but it was probably in 1937 by which time BLUNT was, by his own admission, a recruited R.I.S. agent. It was certainly earlier than a recruitment approach by BURGESS to HAMPSHIRE in 1937.

#### KLUGMANN's Current Attitude to the Russians

7. There is evidence both from LASCAR and an F.4 source that KLUGMANN was disillusioned by the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and that he had little faith left in the Soviet Union, feeling that he must judge each situation as it arose and refuse to accept anything without critical analysis. At the recent Party Congress, KLUGMANN was associated with the official Party leadership in the critical attitude adopted towards the action of the Soviet Union in relation to Czechoslovakia. Like a number of other anti-liberal moves this is thought to reflect the

increasing power of the K.G.B. within Russia.

KLUGMANN's probable reaction to the threat of exposure

8. There is reason to believe that KLUGMANN has never told GOLLAN the full extent of his involvement with the R.I.S. and that he would not wish this to be known. He might therefore be susceptible to the implied threat that this information could be leaked to the C.P.G.B. Alternatively whether or not KLUGMANN has revealed to the Party leadership the full extent of his involvement, it is thought that, were he to be told that we were prepared to give publicity to the fact that he had been engaged in espionage whilst a Party official, he might think it in the best interests of the C.P.G.B. to co-operate with us in order to avoid serious damage to the Party's image as a political entity working within the framework of the Constitution. At the same time if the operation were to fail and if KLUGMANN were to report the approach to the leadership, it is unlikely that the Party itself would seek publicity for the same reason.

KLUGMANN and CAIRNCROSS

9. CAIRNCROSS has said that if necessary and on certain conditions he would be prepared to confront KLUGMANN thereby providing a living witness of a Government official who had been introduced into the world of espionage by KLUGMANN. (See para.17b below).

B. OBJECT

10. The object of the operation is to exploit KLUGMANN's current disillusionment with the Soviet Union, his possible fear of exposure, and our knowledge of his recruitment of CAIRNCROSS, to persuade him to talk about his involvement with the R.I.S. He will be told that his political beliefs are his own affair and that we are not interested in his Communist friends and acquaintances except insofar as they may also have been involved with the R.I.S.

11. Specifically the operation will be aimed at extracting from KLUGMANN:-

- (a) the details of his own recruitment by and work for the R.I.S.;
- (b) the names of those whom he talent spotted or recruited, or knows to have been talent spotted or recruited by others to work for the R.I.S., with dates and comments;
- (d) such information as he may have which

will enable us to identify past or current R.I.S. agents and agent-running officers.

C. METHOD

Place of Interview

12. It is clearly desirable to interview KLUGMANN in circumstances where he is most likely to be persuaded to talk, that is to say in an informal rather than official atmosphere. The proposal, therefore, is to interview him in the home of the F.4 agent M.572 who has established a friendly relationship with KLUGMANN, who is prepared to invite him to his house in the country for a weekend and who has already tentatively suggested this to KLUGMANN. The use of M.572's home would also provide the interviewing officers with the advantage of surprise which would be absent if KLUGMANN were to be summoned to an official interview.

Choice of interviewing team and method of introduction

13. As the main object of the interview is to elicit information about the activities of the R.I.S., it should be conducted by a K. Branch officer. Although he will specifically assure KLUGMANN that he is not concerned with the Communist side of his career and although he will be at pains to avoid getting involved in a dialectical argument he should be accompanied by an F. Branch officer with a knowledge and understanding, not only of KLUGMANN's personality and past history, but also of the problem of Student Communism in the 1930s and the current ideological stresses within the Party

14. KLUGMANN's character ( [redacted] has called him a "very likeable gentle soul"), together with the necessity of avoiding any impression of strong-arm tactics which could be exploited by the C.P.G.B. if the operation were to fail, and the need to mitigate, as far as it is possible, the consequences of M.572's double-dealing, make it desirable that the initial approach should be a friendly one. The interviewing team should therefore already be in position as fellow guests at M.572's home, and therefore able in an initially sociable atmosphere to lead up to the interview proper in the course of general conversation. M.572's [redacted] career could possibly be used as an introduction to KLUGMANN's S.O.E. experience, and the conversation could then be led to KLUGMANN's Russian contacts, and thence to his R.I.S. involvement. The tactics of the interview proper will require detailed discussion with the selected interviewing team.

Interview arrangements

15. (a) M.572's family should not be present at the interview. This will require


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careful briefing of M.572's wife who may not be as enthusiastic to have KLUGMANN as her guest as he is.

(b) After the initial exchanges M.572 also should not be present at the interview, and a reasonable excuse for his absence could be a telephone call

(c)



(d) The interviewing team should have their own transport. If KLUGMANN insists on breaking off the interview and on leaving M.572's house he will require transport to [redacted] In M.572's absence, notionally or really, [redacted] the interviewing team will be in a position to provide this transport and therefore have KLUGMANN under physical control for a further period.

Related interviews

16. No subsequent interview programme can be drawn up until the results of the interview with KLUGMANN are known. It is possible, however, that he may report the approach to GOLLAN, and that either he or GOLLAN may take steps to warn the/other important Party member known to have been recruited by the R.I.S. - Brian SIMON. Arrangements should therefore be made for SIMON to be interviewed simultaneously with KLUGMANN.

/one

Legal and Political Considerations

17. (a) Although there is no intention of threatening KLUGMANN with court proceedings, it will be necessary to discuss with the D.P.P. KLUGMANN's responsibility for introducing CAIRNCROSS to his controller, and the

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/possibility.....

possibility that he may talk about the talent spotting and recruitment of individuals who have current access and who may be spies. KLUGMANN's position in any prosecutions which may subsequently be brought, either as a witness or as the person responsible for, or cognisant of, the recruitment needs to be clarified.

- (b) If CAIRNCROSS is to be used in the confrontation with KLUGMANN it will be necessary to consider whether or not he will be liable to prosecution if he visits the U.K. on this and subsequent occasions. CAIRNCROSS has made it clear that the condition on which he is prepared to assist is a measure of immunity which at present we are unable to guarantee. He has also asked that, if as a result of his agreement to co-operate he is involved in court proceedings, he will not be named in open court.
- (c) The possibility that the CPGB may publicise the incident, if the operation fails and KLUGMANN or SIMON report the approach made to them as examples of the Security authorities hounding Communists on the basis of their activities more than 30 years ago, needs to be considered. It is thought that, on balance, KLUGMANN's involvement with CAIRNCROSS, SIMON's present position as a member of the E.C., and the Party's desire to retain its constitutional image make it unlikely that the C.P.G.B. will seek publicity.

Other considerations

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- (b) M.572 has indicated that he would like some financial reward for his part in the

/operation.....

operation. Whether the operation is successful, with the consequent intelligence dividend, or whether it fails, with the possible consequential damage to M.572's prospects, the amount of any such reward is difficult to calculate. In either case, however, his career as an agent will have come to an end, and there is therefore a case for an ex-gratia payment on termination of employment. It is recommended that this should be generous.

- (c) It is necessary to consider to what extent the interviewing team can implicate CAIRNCROSS, BLUNT and HAMPSHIRE, each of whose testimony forms part of the case for believing in KLUGMANN's involvement with the R.I.S.

Support action and facilities required

19. Whatever the outcome of the interview it will be necessary to check on KLUGMANN's reactions and be prepared to follow up leads given during the interview or as a result of KLUGMANN's subsequent contacts. In addition therefore to the recording facilities in M.572's home there will be the following requirements:

- |              |   |
|--------------|---|
| (a) KLUGMANN | Telephone check (already in operation). |
| (b) BLUNT    | Telephone check (already in operation)  |
| (c) SIMON    | Telephone check                         |
| (d) M.572    | Telephone check                         |

The possibility should also be considered of applying for an omnibus Home Office Warrant to cover any individuals named by KLUGMANN/having been involved with the R.I.S.; and making arrangements with the G.P.O. for prompt action in putting the telephones of such individuals on check.

20. Metropolitan Special Branch and C.C. Leicester will need to be informed in advance of the interviews, and asked to have an officer at readiness to take a formal statement should either KLUGMANN or SIMON make admissions which might render them liable to prosecution under the O.S.A.

21. Consideration should also be given to alerting Special Branch officers at the ports to detain any of the

/individuals.....

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/as

individuals named above, or who may be named in the course of the interviews of KLUGMANN and SIMON, if they are suspected of leaving the country for destinations behind the Iron Curtain. In earlier cases it has been possible to make arrangements without Special Branch officers having to be told the names of suspects in advance.

ADMINISTRATION

22. The Ops Room should be manned throughout the interviews of both KLUGMANN and SIMON, and K.3/F Branch officers should be available to monitor and provide support facilities to the interviewing teams.

23. HR should be consulted in advance on the provision of facilities for lock-up and file requisition.

K.3

13 February 1970

PF.72493

Copy to: PF.45597 Link D ✓

F.A.O. No. PF. 72,493 link B  
 Orig. in PF. 72,493  
 Vol. ... Serial ... Receipt date 13/2/70

Butlers,  
 Littley Green,  
 Gt. Waltham,  
 Chelmsford,  
 Essex.

3/10  
 5a

13 February 1970

Dear

Many thanks for your letter of 2nd February. You are quite right when you say that it is difficult to see far ahead and I hesitate to forecast how long it will take us to clear all the hurdles that lie ahead. It may, however, help you to know that we are hoping to go into action some time in April.

Cecil will be passing through Rome on Monday 2nd March and I have asked him to give you a ring at 9.30 that morning at F.A.O. in the hope that he can meet you for lunch and bring you up to date on our progress.

Yours sincerely,

(P. M. Wright)

J. Cairncross, Esq.,  
 F.A.O. (Room A 354)  
 Viale delle Terme di Caracalla,  
Rome.

113/DA  
 16/1

Copy to: PF-45397 (initials) ✓

765a

*Handwritten signature/initials*

FAO (Room A 354)

2 February 1970

Recd: 7.6.2.70.

Dear Peter,

It looks as if, to the extent that anything is certain, I will not go on a mission, and hence will be here till about the beginning of June except for a brief spell of holidays around Easter. However, I could use even the holidays to come over if need be. In June I'll most probably be in Holland on a congress, and in the summer in Switzerland.

Anyway, I would of course help me if I knew roughly when you will be coming on me, but I realize that it is difficult to see very far ahead these days.

All best wishes,

Yours ever,

John *[Signature]*

Mr P M Wright

<p>P.A. in PF 72,493 - kinde B.</p> <p>Orig. in PF 72,493</p> <p>Val. 765a Receipt date 6.2.70.</p>
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*F3/KAS*  
*9/2/70*

PF.45,597 Link D  
Original in: PF.72,493

FAO (Room A 354)  
Viale delle Terme di Caracalla  
Rome

*26ba*

19 January 1970

Received: 22.1.70.

Dear Peter,

I was most pleased to get your letter. I had been thinking of writing to you as I'm going up to Geneva tomorrow, and am almost certainly going on to Paris where I would then be Friday Saturday and Sunday. If you felt that a further talk would be useful, could you leave a message for me c/o Mrs Th Dominguez, 70 Avenue Pierre Grenier 92 Boulogne sur ~~Mar~~ Seine. (The 92 indicates the province). You would be a business friend looking me up during a visit to Paris. I'm not sure what hotel I'll be staying at, certainly not my previous one.

I don't imagine there is any need

As to my future movements, they are now clearer though not definitive. I plan to stay here till end of June and spend the summer in Switzerland. I will probably be on a mission to Morocco from mid April to mid May. If that mission doesn't come off, I'll be out of FAO probably much sooner, say end of April, and spend May and June in Crete. I'll keep you posted when I'm more certain - which I should be in a fortnight or so. Please, on your side let me know when I should stand by. The only real impediment at present would be the Morocco mission which would take six weeks and two weeks before with two weeks after to write up the report.

Kindest regards,

Yours ever,

John Cairncross

Mr Peter M Wright

P.A. in	PF. 72,493	link B
Orig. in	PF. 72,493	
Vol.	Serial	Receipt date 22.1.70

*WMS/KCX  
22/1/70*

p.a. in: ~~PF. 72,493 link B.~~

Original in: PF 72,493

Dated: 17.6.69.

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2a

Extract from report of interview with John CAIRNCROSS held in Rome on 13.5.69 conducted by K.3/P.M.W. and F2/URG/COS.

.....

2. We first asked CAIRNCROSS to describe once more his contacts with "Otto". CAIRNCROSS said that James KLUGMAN had taken him to meet "Otto" in some gardens which he thought were part of Regents Park. He could not remember how KLUGMAN had got in touch with him but he presumed that he had simply rung him up. KLUGMAN'S approach was not initially conspiratorial in nature and he had not prepared him in advance in any way for meeting "Otto" rather than a member of the British Communist Party. He had merely said that he would introduce him to someone who would "keep an eye on him". From the very brief discussions before KLUGMAN left them alone, however CAIRNCROSS had been quite convinced that KLUGMAN knew "Otto" well and, as he put it, "was in cahoots with him".

.....

24. Towards the end of the interview we referred to the earlier discussions with CAIRNCROSS concerning the possibility of a confrontation with James KLUGMANN (para. 12 of 675a refers). Peter Wright said that we were considering mounting an operation against KLUGMANN in the near future with the object, at least initially, of persuading him to talk about his own involvement with the R.I.S. The basis of the approach would be that we had hard evidence that he had been responsible for introducing at least one person in Government Service to a Russian in the full knowledge that that Russian was a member of the R.I.S. whose purpose was to recruit the person concerned as a spy. The Communist Party of Great Britain had for years represented itself as a Party which worked only within the framework of the Constitution and in our view the Party leadership, particularly in the present post-Czechoslovakia climate, would be most reluctant to be seen to have been involved with espionage. It was therefore our hope that when the position was made clear to him KLUGMANN would decide that he could best serve the interests of the Communist Party by co-operating with us as far as his knowledge of espionage was concerned. An approach to KLUGMANN would almost certainly involve a confrontation with CAIRNCROSS and for that purpose it would be necessary for CAIRNCROSS to visit the U.K. It was important that KLUGMANN should be made to realise that any threats we made were real ones and we must therefore be prepared if necessary to take the case to court. Before submitting our proposals to our masters - and thence in all probability to Ministers - we wished to discover how far CAIRNCROSS himself was prepared to go in assisting us. We said that if court proceedings were found necessary later we were confident that we could arrange for CAIRNCROSS' name to be suppressed. We emphasised that at this stage we could make no promises concerning the likely reactions of our masters and of Ministers but we hoped that if their reactions were favourable it might also be possible to arrange for the present restrictions on CAIRNCROSS visiting the U.K. to be lifted.

25. In complete contrast to his attitude on the last occasion, when we had finished our introductory statement CAIRNCROSS said that he had no hesitation whatsoever in agreeing to our suggestion. He was "all in favour" and accepted it entirely. He fully agreed that in preparing such an operation we must be ready to go the whole way if necessary, i.e. to take the case to court. He had no objections whatsoever to appearing in court providing he could be referred to as "Mr X". On several occasions CAIRNCROSS said that he was with us "up to the hilt". As there was no doubt whatsoever that KLUGMANN had been responsible for bringing him into the sphere of espionage and for introducing him to "Otto" he believed that there was a good chance of the operation succeeding and he commented that in his view the timing was very propitious. As for his being able to visit the U.K. again, CAIRNCROSS said he would welcome that if it were agreed. Although he had no wish to live in the U.K. he would certainly like to make occasional visits to see his brother, etc.



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EXTRACT

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Extract No. 5,527. LINK D Name: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Original in File No.: \_\_\_\_\_ Vol.: \_\_\_\_\_ Serial: \_\_\_\_\_ Receipt Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Original from: \_\_\_\_\_ Under Ref.: \_\_\_\_\_ Dated: \_\_\_\_\_  
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He would also welcome the opportunity of being able to travel to British territories abroad, for example to Hong Kong. He realised full well, from his own experience of how the Government machine worked, that we could make no promises and that the operation would in all probability have to be sanctioned by Ministers. In answer to a question, we made it clear to CAIRNCROSS that we could not guarantee in any way that the American embargo on him would also be lifted. In a discussion about the possible timing of the operation, CAIRNCROSS said that November would be a very bad month as far as he was concerned as the annual F.A.O. Conference took place then. He would be prepared to come to the U.K. at any other time, however. If the confrontation was not successful and if court proceedings had to be initiated he would prefer these to take place after his retirement from F.A.O., say after the 1st February, 1970, but he emphasised that he was not trying to make conditions. We left it that we would now submit the case to our superiors and that in due course we would either communicate with him by letter or call on him again in Rome to arrange further details.

CONCLUSIONS

26. There were a number of important dividends from the interview with CAIRNCROSS. Not only were we able to secure his full agreement to the proposed operation against KLUGMANN but, in spite of his very poor memory of members of the student branch outside Trinity, his comments on certain individuals at Cambridge were both new and of great interest. Perhaps of almost equal importance, however, were two factors bearing on CAIRNCROSS himself. Firstly, his position in the communist student movement at Cambridge can now be seen in better perspective: what he had to say about COSTELLO, NORMAN and others clearly shows that as well as being a dedicated Communist he was himself closely connected with the "hard-core" of the student branch. The second factor was the marked change in CAIRNCROSS' attitude at this interview. CAIRNCROSS was throughout very lucid and precise in his statements and in his replies to questions. Although his memory failed him on certain matters there was absolutely no trace of the vagueness, confused thinking and indecision which had been commented on at earlier interviews. Furthermore, on this occasion CAIRNCROSS was smartly dressed and obviously in a reasonably healthy financial state.

visit the U.K. again, CAIRNCROSS said he would be prepared to do so if it were agreed. Although he had no wish to live in the U.K. he would certainly like to make occasional visits to see his brother, etc.

EXTRACT

20

Extract for File No.: P.F. 45,597. LINK D Name: .....

Original in File No.:\* ..... Vol: ..... Serial: ..... Receipt Date: .....

Original from: ..... Under Ref: ..... Dated: .....

Extracted on: ..... by: ..... Section: .....

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28. In searching for the cause of the marked change of attitude on CAIRNCROSS' part we concluded that there were three possibilities. Firstly, we considered that the circumstances of his personal life might recently have altered to such an extent that he had been able to rid himself of the strong guilt complex from which he had suffered for years and to regain his self respect. His improved financial position and the indications, mentioned in para. 1, that he might have acquired a girl friend might be relevant in that context. We felt, however, that two other possibilities, albeit less likely, could not be entirely ignored, namely that the change in his attitude could conceivably be explained either by his having been under R.I.S. control until very recently and having now succeeded in "getting off the hook" or, conversely, by his having been recently brought back under R.I.S. control. In view of the importance of the operation planned against KLUCMANN and the potentially serious consequences to that operation should CAIRNCROSS be, or recently have been, in touch with the R.I.S., we judged it essential to attempt to obtain more background information on CAIRNCROSS in the hope that we would then be able to discard the latter two possibilities.

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NOTE FOR FILE

On the 5th May K.3/P.M.W. and I discussed with F.4/G.H.L. our thoughts on a proposal to use John CAIRNCROSS in a confrontation operation against James KLUGMANN. We said that the primary object of such an operation would be to get KLUGMANN to talk about his involvement with the R.I.S. We hoped, however, that it would be possible also to cover his Cambridge period generally and there might conceivably be dividends subsequently for F. Branch as a whole. Before we saw John CAIRNCROSS in Rome on the 13th May to obtain his agreement to our plan, we wished to discover whether the proposed operation would in any way jeopardize F.4 interests or indeed might be altogether inadvisable because of progress made in the F.4 operation. F.4/G.H.L. said that whilst their agent had been a useful "sounding board" he had not produced any information suggesting that KLUGMANN was disaffected with the C.P.G.B. He therefore felt that there was no likelihood of major dividends in the future from the F.4 operation and, accordingly, saw no reason why our proposed operation should not go ahead. It was agreed that K.3, in close consultation with U.R.G. and F.4, would be responsible for preparing the case and submitting it formally to Directors.

2. F.4 and I subsequently gave Director F. a resume of the proposals for the operation involving John CAIRNCROSS. Director F. saw no objection to our proceeding as suggested. I understand that K.3/P.M.W. also discussed the matter with Director KX. At a later date F.4/G.H.L. briefed the case officer, Tony Hewlett, and I briefed F.1.A./Maurice Williams, in particular asking him to let me see any material in future from sources LASCAR and [redacted] which might bear on KLUGMANN's attitude of mind. Maurice Williams commented that in his view KLUGMANN was perhaps more opposed to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia than most other officials at C.P.H.Q.

P.A. in PF 72,493 hinc B  
 Orig. in PF 45,597 Link D  
 Vol..... Serial 3a Receipt date 9/6/69

*Cadiff*  
 C.O. Shipp

F2/URG

9th June, 1969.

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