

W
408

PF 604582 / V6

FILE CLOSED

BLUNDEN, JAMES.

HISTORICAL

FILE CLOSED

PF 604582 / V6

S Form 924A

Box 105

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date
KV2 / 4705								

S. 960 Edn2

PF 604582 / V6

310

28.2.64.

Note re STRAIGHT

310a.

311.

28.2.64.

Telegra,m from D1/Mr. Martin Washington.

311a.

312

28.2.64.

To Washington Tel. No. 468

312a.

28.2.64.

Report from Washington re STRAIGHT's statement

312b.

313.

2.3.64.

Note of DG's discussion with Home Secretary.

313a.

314.

D.1./Inv./EMCB.

Please see serial 312b, which I should like to discuss with you on your return from leave.

R. C. Symonds

R. C. Symonds.

D.1./Inv.
5.3.64.

A 16/3 319.
145 1873

LA. (through D.I. and D.I. Inv)

I think you may, possibly after discussion together, wish to comment further to D.G. in the light of my note on a talk D.G. had with me on 12th March 1964 - a copy of which is now at 316b.

[Redacted]
M.E.D. Cumming

D.

13th March 1964

320.

18.3.64.

Note for file on plans to investigate and interrogate BLUNT. 320a

321.

[Signature]
A 19/13
D.D.G. through D.I.

With reference to D.'s note at 316b, please now see my note at 320a. I am not referring the file back to L.A. at this stage, since a prosecution is not being advocated.

2. I should be grateful for early approval of the plan set out in 320a.

[Signature]

R. C. Symonds.

D.I./Inv.
18.3.64.

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322.

193
D.D.G.

I have discussed the note at 320a with D.1./RCS. We feel that :

- (a) the presence of STRAIGHT in this country is not essential to the interrogation of BLUNT; confrontation between the two men is a card which we would hope not to have to play but if, as a last resort it is necessary, STRAIGHT has said he will come whenever we wish.
- (b) It would be advantageous if we could interrogate BLUNT before Kemball JOHNSTON whose interrogation is now scheduled for the week beginning 6 April.

2. We feel that, if we start at once, there is time to organise the interrogation of BLUNT for the week beginning 31 March, 1964.

D.1.

A.S. Martin
A.S. Martin

19.3.64.

323.

20.3.64. Note of meeting.

323a.

324.

20.3.64. Copy of L.M. sending copy of 323a to D.G.

324a.

325.

2/3
D.1. Mc.B.

Reference 323a, would you please apply for H.O.'s and let L.A. see the file. I will speak to D.4,

R.C. Symonds.

D.1/Inv.


20 3.64

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315.

D.1/Inv ^{MS}
"13

L.A. commented to me today that he thought we ought to consult D.G. about the necessity for us to inform D.P.P. of the case against BLUNT in the light of Michael STRAIGHT's statements. To this end L.A. would be grateful for a sight of the files.



M.E.D. Cumming

D.


10th March 1964

316.

L.A.

With reference to minute 315, your previous report to the D.P.P. is at 264a.

2. If you decide that a further report is necessary, may we discuss the case before any course of action is proposed?



R. C. Symonds.

D.1./Inv.
11.3.64.

12.3.64.

Note for file

317

316b

D.

We spoke yesterday about minute 316 when you said that you did not wish me at the moment to discuss this case with the D.P.P. I have looked at this file and it is clear therefrom that we have evidence that BLUNT was recruited to act as a Russian spy. This being the case it has to be decided as a matter of policy how we are going to handle this case. Are we going to handle it purely on the basis of obtaining intelligence or do we want a prosecution? This matter of policy I suppose

Minute 317 to D. (cont.)

must ultimately be decided by the Director General.

2. If we want a prosecution Rule IV of the new Judges Rules will apply as does also Rule II. The D.P.P. has ruled that where we know a man is a spy and if we want a prosecution we must comply with the Judges Rules; that is to say a man must be cautioned at the outset of the interview and again cautioned before he is charged. Such being the present legal position, the Office has to make up its mind what line it wishes to adopt. Only if it is decided that we want a prosecution do I think it necessary for me to consult the D.P.P.

B. A. Hill

L.A.
13.3.64.

B.A. Hill. /

By all means - I did this when I saw the paper at 313 A 318 13/3/64

This file has come to me by chance. I would like to be included in any future discussions of this case.

D.I.
13.3.64

A-S Martin.

326.

Recd 24/3.
 D.D.G. through ~~D.~~ through D.1. *Res* Inv. 23/3

I wish to apply for Home Office Warrants, Telephone Check and Letter Check, on Sir Anthony Frederick BLUNT of 20 Portman Square, W.1., telephone Nos. Welbeck 1388,1389,4181, and 1074. I should like the Letter Check to operate on letters addressed to and emanating from BLUNT. Sir Anthony BLUNT was for many years a close friend of Guy BURGESS and, although he was some years older, was a member of BURGESS' circle of intimates at Cambridge in the 1930s. It is known that he held left-wing views at that time and it has long been believed that he knew more of BURGESS' activities as a communist and a spy than he has ever admitted.

2. We have recently learnt of the interrogation of Michael Whitney STRAIGHT by the F.B.I., and STRAIGHT was later interviewed by D.1. in Washington. Michael STRAIGHT has made a categorical statement that BLUNT was himself a member of the Communist Party at Cambridge and that in 1936 BLUNT recruited him to work for the R.I.S. STRAIGHT has made full admissions to the F.B.I. about his own involvement with the R.I.S.

3. It is proposed that BLUNT should be re-interrogated on the basis of the information supplied by Michael STRAIGHT with a view to obtaining a confession about his own activities and in the hope of obtaining information from him that may lead us to other spies.

4. Cmdr. Aubrey, A.3.A., has been consulted and I have also discussed the possibility of a Letter Check with Mr. Saunders, G.P.O. We should only operate a Letter Check on incoming mail subject to Mr. Saunders' advice as to any difficulties or dangers that may be involved.

5. I suggest as a short reason: -

This man is known to have been an intimate associate of the Russian spy, Guy BURGESS. It has recently been learnt that he was himself in contact with the R.I.S. in the past and it is desired to examine his present contacts and activities.

D.1.

23.3.64.

Evelyn T. Barnett
 E. McBarnet

327.

24.3.64.

Note of D.G's conversation at Home Office.

327a

24.3.64.

Note for file re conversation with D.4.

327b.

328.

26.3.64. Short Reason for H.O.W. (T/C)

328a.

329.

26.3.64. Short Reason for H.O.W. (Letter Check)..

329a.

330.

26.3.64. To G.P.O. re H.O.W. (T/C)

330a.

331.

26.3.64. To G.P.O. re H.O.W. (Letter Check).

331a.

332.

A 2/3
D.D.G. through D. and D.I./Inv.

I very much regret that the telephone numbers given in minute 326 are incorrect, due to my fault in not checking with the G.P.O. May I please have your authority to amend the Warrant to telephone numbers:-

WELBECK 9292/5 and
WELBECK 1074

Evelyn M. Barnet
E. McBarnet

D.I./Inv.
31.3.64.

333.

31.3.64. Amendment to H.O.W.

333a.

334.

31.3.64. To G.P.O. re amendment to H.O.W.

334a.

335.

8.4.64. Note for file re O.P.

335a.

336.

9.4.64. Note for file re T/C.

336a.

337.

9.4.64. Note for file, information given by D.4.

337a.

9.4.64. Note re letter check - *conversation with G.P.O.*

337b

9.4.64. A.4 briefing sheet

337c

9/4/64
338.

L.A. through D.

This file should have reached you earlier and I am sorry it has not done so.

2. Please now refer to minute 317, serial 323a and serial 327a. You will see that although this Service does not want a prosecution of BLUNT, the D.G. nevertheless wishes the Law Officers to be consulted. I shall be grateful if this can be done as soon as possible.

R. Symonds.

R. C. Symonds.

D.I./Inv.
9.4.64.

10.4.64.

Extract from T/C

338b

339

13.4.64

Note for file

339a

340.

15.4.64.

L.A. note of consultation with Mr. Crump re assurances and subsequent conversation thereon.

340a.

341.

D.G.

To see serial 340a. I hope that this will be satisfactory.

J.A. Allen.

L.A.
15.4.64.

342

4.64

D.I. note re O.P.

342a

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17/4
19/4/64
343.
22/4
L.A.

Copied to ROLF 11-55-1-13

With reference to 340a, I told Sir Charles Cunningham of L.A.'s discussion with Crump, and subsequently Cunningham and I saw Sir Michael Adeane. I told him that we had interviewed BLUNT on a number of occasions, largely about his dealings with BURGESS, but that now we had received information from Michael STRAIGHT about his recruitment by BLUNT on behalf of the R.I.S. This made it important that we should interview BLUNT again. I then told him of our talk with Crump, with particular reference to paragraph 3 of 340a, and read him the authorisation which Crump had given us. I said that I thought this would effectively prevent BLUNT from becoming so alarmed at the possibility of prosecution or other publicity that he might do a bunk. Sir Michael Adeane thanked me for letting him know the position. He said that he did not propose to tell anyone else about it, but asked that we should let him know if there later appeared any possibility of publicity so that he could at that stage take the necessary action.

2. It is obviously important that we should take all possible steps to avoid frightening BLUNT into embarrassing action, and from this point of view there seems to be some advantage in D.1 telling BLUNT at the outset that he will not be prosecuted for any activities on behalf of the R.I.S. up to the end of the war.

D.G.

16.4.64.

R.H.Hollis.

344.

16.4.64. Extract from T/C on BLUNT.

344a

345.

16.4.64. Extract from T/C on BLUNT.

345a.

346.

17.4.64. Note re conversation with Crump.


18.4.64 Extract from T/C

346b

347.

The nickname STATE LOTTERY allotted to the subject of this file was to-day carded in R5.

R5/JB
22.4.64.



348.

4.64. Extract from T/C on BLUNT 348a

349.

.4.64. Int. letter from John BASHFORTH 349a

350.

.4.64. Memorandum for interview with BLUNT 350a

351.

.4.64. List of photographs to be shown to BLUNT 351a

352.

7.4.64. Note re identified photographs 352a

353

7.4.64. Extract from T/C 353a

354.

.4.64. Extract from T/C 354a

355.

.4.64. A.4. Surveillance Report 355a

7.4.64. Note of interview with BLUNT 355b

7.4.64. Note of interview with BLUNT 355c

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356.


28.4.64. Suspension of T/C

356a

~~A.1~~ ~~L 30/4~~ 357. ~~MS 29/4~~
D.D.G. through D. through D.1/Inv.

I am reminded that the Home Office Warrants PS/12871 and TS/2508 on Sir Anthony Frederick BLUNT are due to expire on 12 May 1964. It has been decided not to operate a letter check and I therefore propose to cancel PS/12871 forthwith.

2. The telephone check has provided useful information about BLUNT's contacts and movements and I should be grateful if it could be revalidated for six months. The Courtauld Institute numbers WELBECK 9292/5 have been suspended and I wish to operate the Warrant on the flat telephone number, WELBECK 1074 only.



E. McBarnet

D.1
29.4.64.

358.

~~A.3.A~~

Please cancel the Home Office Warrant PS/12871, letter check on Sir Anthony Frederick BLUNT.


E. McBarnet

D.1
29.4.64.

359.

29.4.64. Notes for the interrogation of BLUNT

359a

360

6.5.64. Vetting enquiry from British Council.

7.5.64. Note of D.1.'s interview with BLUNT

7.5.64. Minute re Gurov

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ACT 1958

360 21
27
36
27
36
17.

361.

~~D. through D.1./Investigation~~ ^{ACS} _{7/5}

I think you will like to see D.1.'s record of his interview with BLUNT on Friday, 1 May.

D.1.

7.5.64.

E. McBarnet
E. McBarnet

362.

8.5.64.

Note of interview on 3.5.64.

362a

9.5.64.

To Foreign Office with vetting enquiry

362b

363

~~D.G.~~ ^{14/5}

Although there is necessarily much work to be done in processing BLUNT's revelations, you may wish to read, at 360a and 362a, Mr. Martin's accounts of further interviews with him.

M.E.D. Cumming
M.E.D. Cumming

D.

11th May 1964

364.

1.5.64.

List of photographs to be shown to BLUNT

364a

5.64.

Transcript of Mr Martin's interview with BLUNT

364b

5.64.

Note re BLUNT's meeting with PETER

364c

5.64.

Note re MODIN

364d

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365.

21.5.64. Note for file

365a

366.

25.5.64. Note of meeting between Mr Martin, BLUNT and STRAIGHT

366a

368.

27.5.64. Extract from T/C

368a

369.

~~28.5.64. Source report re SIMON~~ *Transferred to link vol for SRs 1/8/69 K3/B*

~~369a~~

28.5.64. Note re conversation ASM/AFB 25.5 and of meeting 26.5

369b

370.

3.5.64. Note re interview on 26/5

370a

371.

8.5.64. Note re RALEIGH

371a

372.

28.5.64. Note re FLANAGAN

372a

373.

29.5.64. Note for file

373a

374.

9.5.64. Note re BLUNT's interview with LONG

374a

9.5.64. Note for file

374b

375.

~~1.6.64. Source report re REVAI~~ *Transferred to link vol for SRs 1/8/69 K3/B*

~~375~~

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20

377.

5.64. Extract from T/C

377a

379.

6.64. Note re interview between Mr Martin and LONG and BLUNT

379a

6.64. Report on interview between Mr. Martin and BLUNY
380.

379b

6.64. To Passport Office re HEDLEY- **Filed in error**

381

6.64. Report on interview between Mr Martin and Leo LONG

381z

6.64. Note for file re D.l.'s meeting with BLUNT

381a

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TOP SECRET

3812

Original at serial 91b in PF 604,789

Transcription of an Interview between D.1./Mr A.S. Martin
and Leo LONG on Monday, 8 June, 1964.

TOP SECRET

W/K
D.1.

TOP SECRET

M Well, I imagine the story really starts at Cambridge.

L Yes, when I first went down, in '35 I think.

M You were '35 to '37.

L Yes, they were my undergraduate years, then I went for a year to Frankfurt University which brought me up to the beginning of the war, and I was still technically in residence, indeed, I lived in for a term or two until I was called up in the army, in 1940 I suppose.

M Now, did you gravitate towards the communist group in your first year, or did that come later.

*Did you go to Frankfurt
TU 1935/39*

L No, it was in my first year because I hadn't had any contact with the Party until I went up in '35. But I was very radically inclined - of course I went to a college with a very active communist group which made contact with me fairly quickly - of course all the activities in those days were under the guise of the United Front and the communist tactics were to penetrate the University Socialist Club, so that one must try to be a member of both, and a member of the Cambridge University Socialist Club I think as it was then called, CUSC, and at the same time going from person to person, more or less overtly, a member of the Communist Party.

M Who have you known as the person who drew you in. Was it KLUGMAN? I thought KLUGMAN was a bit - you were a bit late, weren't you?

L Oh, KLUGMAN was there when I went to Trinity, and I - undoubtedly he was the most notable, the most active, communist in Trinity, indeed in the University. I can't honestly say that anyone in particular drew me in. KLUGMAN in fact had very little as I remember it to do with routine meetings of the Trinity Party, which was quite an active cell in itself, and, well, looked at with hindsight, obviously he had a lot of other fish to fry. He was quite an active person.

M Well, now, as far as we are aware of your activities were concerned, spying had never entered into it at all - never crossed your mind.

L No, no.

M And this really stemmed from Anthony.

L Oh, entirely, yes, yes. And then only again in a very sort of oblique sense that I think it may have come up at one time that I was thinking of going into the Civil Service. Partly because as a Modern Linguist with a Cambridge degree there's not very much else you can do, apart from being a school teacher and I think at some time - but don't ask me when - they possibly suggested that I was going into the Civil Service it might be as well to be cautious and so on. Which would appear to be on ordinary reasonable grounds.

M But did it come to you as a surprise that this should come from Anthony? I mean were you aware by that time of what was Anthony's general involvement

L Hmm.

/Well, when I asked...

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-2-

- M Well, when I asked this question of Michael STRAIGHT he said it came as a complete surprise to him. A shock.
- L This is very difficult to answer. I think partly because as a habit of mind I don't cultivate being shocked easily. It could have been that, you know, in a sort of search for sophistication, that I didn't allow this to shock me. It was very evident from Anthony's lectures and from his general tone of thought; my contact with him was that for a time he was my superior, that his whole mode of thought was Marxist.
- M What about Guy? Were you involved at all with Guy BURGESS?
- L I was hardly involved with Guy at all, I never had any discussion on political matters with Guy. I merely knew him as a man who was a friend of Anthony's and could occasionally be seen in his rooms. I think very occasionally turned up at a meeting of the Society once I was introduced into the Society. I certainly knew he was a member of the Society. But he wasn't my generation - any more than Anthony was, but Anthony of course had an academic position and stayed on at the College - I don't really know about Guy at all.
- M Well, I think this must have been about 1936, I would guess, the end of 1936, possibly '37.
- L Possibly '37.
- M Well, no, just a moment, Anthony was - spend a year travelling, didn't he. He went to Germany, I think. Then I think he was away most of the academic year '36-'37.
- L I don't remember this at all.
- M Well I believe this is so.
- L It could be, yes.
- M It was probably be in your last year then.
- L Well I wasn't - I don't think I really had any - didn't have any contact. My first contact with Anthony was an official one when he was my supervisor. And I certainly wouldn't have had any reason for being attached to him in my first year. So therefore it can only have been in one of the two latter years.
- M Yes, yes, well I think I have got my dates muddled, I think he was away '35-'36. But I think he would have been there for your last year '36-'37..
- L Yes, yes, this figures..
- M .. but I imagine that that was when it happened - but it was no more than saying lie low because one day it would be useful.
- L Yes, yes, yes.
- M Well Anthony himself said that - of course that this was the primary object in talking to you. But I think he also had it in mind that since you were - let's see - you stayed on - you went to Frankfurt and then came back to Cambridge ..

/That's right, yes.

TOP SECRET

L That's right, yes.

M Well I think he had it in mind - or at any rate his controller had it in mind - that since he was leaving the university where he had - I mean - his job as far as the Russians were concerned was to talent spot. To look for others who might be suitable. But he probably suggested this to you. To do the same after he left.

L Well I can't remember that specifically. My impression of it looking back now is that it hadn't progressed to that stage.

M Well then, he is pretty sure that you must have met his own contact while you were still at Cambridge but he is not sure of that.

L No, no, I certainly ..

M This was certainly later ..

L I met nobody at Cambridge, ever, in fact the one thing I am quite categorical about, as I told you the other day, I only ever met anyone other than Anthony on one occasion.

M And that was after war had started ..

L .. yes, in London.

M Well now, did Anthony come and see you while you were at Cambridge, I mean did the contact with Anthony continue and if so was it in a conspiratorial sense?

L Yes, I think he came and saw me once or twice. The weekends and the meetings of the Society of course were always a reason for being in Cambridge. I think Anthony normally was staying with Victor ROTHSCHILD at that time. And we were all in the sort of spirit of long-term alert. As far as I can remember there was never anything specifically said about talent spotting - or indeed any sort of clear line of development foreseen at that time. Of course once the war had started I was waiting to be called up. The whole atmosphere was one of uncertainty in any case.

M Well, were you at Cambridge until war broke out?

L Oh yes, you see I went back from Frankfurt for that last academic year when I was a research scholar, having reported to the military authorities in Cambridge that I am volunteering..

M .. and you're waiting to be called up.

L And I think I waited practically two terms in Trinity. Sort of Winter 1939/1940. Until I was called up in the spring some time.

M And Anthony was aware of this presumably, and by this time were your meetings beginning to become - to have more point to them?

L I can't think at that stage of any particular part or indeed I can't remember very much about any meetings. I would have said, looking back at that time, that Anthony had written me off or that the whole thing had died and that nothing very much was happening anyway.

/At any rate...

- M At any rate there was no suggestion that you should go into any particular branch of the Services.
- L None at all. And as the circumstances were I don't think that it was in my power in any way at all. Indeed in the event I was called up as a Private into the Oxford and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. And that's all there is to be said about it at that stage.
- M Well, what did happen then? You did your basic training.
- L I did my basic training. Went to an OCTU which was a Guards OCTU, which most people were going into the Infantry and as far as I could see this was going to be my future in the army, with which I was quite happy. And there was a drive to get people into the Intelligence Corps and a man came round and they called for people with linguistic qualifications, gave them a very elementary language test and in the course of time when we passed out from OCTU I was commissioned into the Intelligence Corps. Without any seeking on my part really except that I had reported my linguistic qualifications which would have been rather difficult to conceal in any case, as a Modern Linguist from Cambridge, and ..
- M Had your political views changed at all while you were there?
- L That's a very difficult one to answer ...
- M ... by this time we had the Russo-German Pact.
- L Yes. I don't think in my basic political views I was all that shaken by the Russian action in Finland or indeed in view of the deep suspicion with which I had grown up some years then against the Chamberlain government, that this made a lot of difference to me but I think against this there was a background, if you like, a sliding away from active political participation on my part the whole time. And I think looked at quite realistically that such overt political activities I engaged in in Cambridge was part of a drive for power, an attempt to assert myself, create something, a personality and so on. This was largely irrelevant within the context of the forces and so on. I'm a tremendous conformist, you know, I liked being in the depths of the army.
- M Then you hadn't resented what had happened, I mean, you hadn't reached the stage where you ...
- L Oh, no, no.
- M Well, you went into the I. Corps.
- L Yes.
- M And what happened then?
- L A fairly normal development. I was sent on a course at Matlock and from there I was - people were posted to various appointments, and I was posted into the War Office, to M.I.14. Probably I suspect as much as anything else because they were looking for people with academic backgrounds for that sort of approach to it that they wanted and that was probably why I was sent to M.I.14.

/Well, by that time...

- M Well, by that time, I suppose, it was late '40?
- L Yes, yes, I should think about December 1940.
- M Now, your relation to Anthony throughout this period had been what? I mean had you kept in touch?
- L As far as I can remember, no. Certainly when I was a private and a newly commissioned officer I had no contact with Anthony at all and I think that the first contact I had with him must have been some time in the following year when as far as I know, only by accident, he came into the office to see my superior officer, Brian Melland, and happened to see me there. He may - there may have been more in this but as far as I know this was what happened.
- M I don't think he had forgotten you, I mean from what you've told me, I mean, I think he had seen you right the way through as a source, and I imagine had been generally aware of how you were faring, and although I hadn't asked him this question directly it may very well be that that visit was premeditated.
- L Well I don't know where he got the information from. As far as I remember there was some month when I was out of contact with him.
- M Would you say that up to this time you really hadn't given him any information at all?
- L No, I hadn't any information.
- M You hadn't anything to give.
- L No.
- M Well, what happened, did he - I suppose he said come and have a drink or...
- L I should say almost certainly, or come and have lunch, or something like that. This is awfully vague I'm afraid, Arthur...
- M Well, don't worry, it'll all...
- L ... and the dates are very remote.
- M ... it'll all fall into shape. At some stage he must have made it clear that he was still working and that you were now in a position to help.
- L Yes, obviously. When you say still working, you see, I don't think he had ever put it to me before that he was working because this wouldn't have made sense - what was he working on? Except, you know, in the sense that he had a brief to look out for people and take a long-term view, but he was an academic, I mean there was no question in his conversation with me that he had any sources of information or at that stage was particularly interested in direct information...
- M .. even that he was working in touch with the Russians?

/Well I knew....

L Well I knew, obviously, that he was in touch with somebody, of course, either the Russians or the International, and from the care he took to avoid any association with the Communist Party in this country, and naturally I assumed it was the Russians. But in terms of passing information it all seemed to me a sort of long-term, if you like, safeguarding action. Obviously some time after he renewed contact with me in 1941 I suppose it was he must have said that he was passing information. '41 I suppose.

M He invited you then to - well, work through him, I suppose.

L Yes, yes. There was never any question of working through anyone but through him.

M Although you did have a single meeting but this presumably was later.

L I don't remember how much later it was, I shouldn't have thought it was later than '42, and I think it was put purely on the basis, as I told you the other day, I have no idea what name was used, it could have been "George", it seems to ring a bell, that "George" would like to see me or something like that. And a peculiar sort of meeting was set up, as far as I remember my going to some obscure station like Warwick Avenue and then walking round the block and I would be overtaken, and nothing very much passed in this.

This would have been Henry's is George's not Paul's - George's - AF B or rather - I don't see it's Henry's on

M Well, I think this might have been the chap you saw but they were three separate photographs, I mean the same man.

L Well, he didn't have spectacles. (Long pause) He certainly didn't give the impression of being as fat as he is in this picture without the spectacles, I mean he didn't have as much double-chin as that. But...

M Well, that one is almost a caricature of a man ...

L Really he was just a - not a face even. He was almost a sort of film extra. Wrapped up in the peculiar circumstances of the meeting I don't suppose I ever looked him full in the face anyway, apart from the fact it was in the black-out and you couldn't see. I wouldn't say it couldn't have been him. It could have been.

M Well I'm pretty sure it was. I think it must have been. I mean this is "George" and...

L "George" was the name?

M It was the name he used.

L Yes, I mean the name Anthony would have quoted to me. I mean I couldn't have been sure about this but it was one of the sort of ...

M Yes, "George" was the name and that is our identification of "George". So I think that must be the chap. Well, this really came after you had as it were committed yourself to Anthony, I mean agreed that you would help him. And this was really just to fortify you I suppose. --- (talking together) --- and what sort of conversation did you have, do you remember? I mean with "George", what sort of things did he say?

/Well this is an...

- L Well this is an extraordinary blank. I think, you know, it was just ...
- M He spoke pretty good English.
- L Yes. He spoke good English, but rather too good English. Well, not too good English but neutral English that couldn't be identified with class or region or so on. The sort of person if he spoke to an uneducated person could clearly be taken as speaking perfect English. If you had any education you were suspicious straight away. That sort of English. The thing that really struck me about it is that when I was leaving him he showed a very precise knowledge of London bus routes, and I don't know whether it stuck in my mind because it was always written of Karl Marx that he knew his way about London. When Lenin came to London he could always find his way around it terribly well and it struck me that this was sort of part of the basic drill.
- M Well I'm quite sure that this chap knew London like the back of his hand. But was the purpose of the meeting to encourage you or was it to upbraid you for ...
- L No, there was no upbraiding. It was a sort of, I think, purely a - you see I'm not as you've possibly gathered, not all sold on the ways of intelligence services, not even our own, and it could have been just part of the normal job, and I suppose if it had to have a reason it was a morale-fortifying one, one to show there was some substance behind it, quite possibly to enable him to check on Anthony, form his own opinion, sum me up, something like that. It wasn't a very long interview, it was conducted walking the whole time, it was all really rather unreal, a scene from a Graham Greene film.
- M Were you frightened?
- L Yes I was, I suppose. Yes, I certainly was.
- M Were you married then? Was it awkward, this is what I'm really getting at, or was it natural that you could go to Warwick Avenue without worrying.
- L I can't .. I think I probably was married then. I can't quite remember whether it was then or shortly afterwards, but from that point of view it wasn't awkward, my wife was a journalist and hours were very irregular on both sides. From that point of view in a way it wasn't difficult.
- M And what effect do you think it had, I mean did it encourage you or did it..
- L I don't think so...
- M ... make you more worried?
- L I don't think it - it may have made me a little more conscious of sort of pressure, that one should produce something.
- M Well were you in fact producing, I mean I suppose in M.I.14 you had a fair amount of - you were doing Order of Battle of the German Army.
- L In the widest sense we were the Order of Battle, we were the Section responsible for analysing German military intentions and broke it down into little parts - indication of German reinforcements, in different directions. anything up, in the sort of appreciations we wrote for the Director, what the German Army was going to do next. Long-term stuff.

- M But still, this was good stuff from the point of view of the Russians, I suppose stuff which one might very well feel was going to help them. I'm not trying to ...
- L No, no, I'm trying to think back now on this ...
- M ... I'll tell you frankly that Anthony said that you never tried, but I don't know if this is true or not.
- L Well I think this is a bit of both, yes, that I didn't try, that I wasn't all that convinced in any case that anything that came into my purview could be of any use. No, I think this is it basically, being looked at from outside it would be assumed that I have access to a lot of information which could be of use, but in terms of Order of Battle - the thing that is difficult in my mind is that I can't get the chronology of this right as to whether the Russians were in the war or not.
- M Well they were in by '41.
- L By '41, yes, well. I think it was comparatively later that I went over where I was concerned broadly speaking with ? of the German Army. I spent quite a lot of time on very detailed work on the German paramilitary formations, details of the S.S. and so on. One has to remember that a subaltern who came into the War Office, into M.I.14, certainly in the early stages did a great deal of work that clerks would feel rather ashamed of doing now merely because it was all labelled secret and there was very little you could drop from it. But I was probably the first person who kept a complete list of all members of - all officer members of the S.S. Well when you think of the sort of hours and hours of putting these very junior officers on cards, it wasn't of any particular significance at that time.
- M Did you meet Anthony regularly for the purposes of passing stuff?
- L Not in the sense as I remember that there was any sort of set date. I think it was ad hoc.
- M And presumably no particular sort of secrecy. I mean it ...
- L No, no, I think usually we used to have lunch at the Reform - usually lunch at the Reform or occasionally a drink or something like that.
- M Did you as it were write your own appreciation of what you felt was useful or did you copy documents or what?
- L I'm pretty sure that I never copied a single document. This was partly because I was scared and partly the sort of documents that I saw weren't of interest, really.
- M So it was much more a summary of -
- L Yes.
- M ... of what was taking place as you saw it.
- L Yes.

/Which you simply...

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M Which you simply wrote or passed orally?

L I wrote.

M Well now this would have gone on for what - really until you went to Germany?

L Well before I went to Germany and when I got out of the War Office before the invasion of France when I went to Psychological Warfare Department at SHAFE. Moved out of the War Office, and at that time as I remember I had no contact with Anthony, I wouldn't say this categorically but I don't think so.

M This was preparing for the invasion?

L Yes.

M This would be about '44 I suppose.

L Yes, yes. I think from shortly after the, sort of, winter - well the invasion was the Spring of '45, wasn't it? About sort of Winter/Spring '44/'45. When I no longer lived in the War Office and of course eventually we moved down to Portsmouth the following May.

M Well I suppose this was - I mean the sort of thing you were doing then were rather more delicate than ...

L Psychological Warfare?

M Hmm.

L Oh no, not in the least, it was a question of writing leaflets to the German troops on the Western front, I mean it wasn't the sort of high - it was tactical psychological warfare and trying to restrain the Americans from bombing our own troops with leaflets in German.

M Was it your own wish that you transferred or..?

L Oh yes, yes.

M You got bored with M.I.14?

L Well again I think it was a combination of motives. I think that I was quite anxious to get out and get a bit of movement. It was also an attempt to break away from this situation. I'm not here trying to estimate ...

M No, no, this is what I've been getting at ..

L ... retrospectively, but this played a part in it the whole time, that I only wanted to escape from this, actually.

M It was worrying you in fact?

L Oh yes, oh yes.

/And this was...

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M And this was something which built up gradually?

L Well I was always worried about it, from that sense. I didn't see very much point in it, frankly, and naturally I was worried and scared. I was probably afraid that if I said well look it stops here I might come under all sorts of pressures, and it seemed to me the good combination of other motives, careerism and so on that the thing was to sort of buck sideways out of it.

M Well, perhaps this is a good moment to mention a curious episode which I think Anthony has already mentioned to you which is still worrying us. This must have happened I would think in about '43 and concerned Peter ASTBURY. Now, that name - I mean you knew Peter ASTBURY.

L I was at one time very close to Peter ASTBURY.

M During the war, you mean?

L No, before the war, at University.

M At Cambridge.

L In fact for a short time I was his closest associate. Before in fact he joined the Communist Party. I never quite knew exactly at which point he did join the Communist Party. There is no doubt that we used him as a front man for quite a time in the University Socialist Club and that at one time he was joint Secretary of the University Socialist Club with myself. The idea being that the members of the Party knew I was a Party member and ASTBURY was meant to be a sort of non-Party member. But he was so near to the Party that it didn't make any difference. But this sort of intimacy didn't last because as we were very much more committed to open political life than I was, and certainly when I left to go to Germany for a year I more or less lost all contact with him.

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ASTBURY

M Well now, did you ever cross him again during the war?

L I ran across him, as I mentioned the other day, as far as I remember on two separate occasions, each entirely by chance. One was when I was with the Psychological Warfare Branch, that I had occasion to go to Richmond Park to inspect some units that we had there and I met him purely by chance in the grounds because he was in PHANTOM and there was a PHANTOM unit there. And the next time was when we were at Southwick Park, S.K., which was Monty's HQ outside Portsmouth, he was there as part of the HQ with his unit and I'm not sure, I think they had their own mess, but I think I saw him occasionally in the mess and we had a drink together. But his approach to me was definitely evasive I think at that time which I merely basically put down to the thought, well, he had gone off me.

M Well now, the first of those occasions can't have been earlier than '44, if you were in Psychological Warfare.

L No, no, definitely not.

M And the second occasion was presumably early '45?

L Yes, yes.

/He made no...

- M He made no intelligence pass at you?
- L No, no.
- M Well, I imagine that Anthony told you the story that he told me, did he?
- L Well I'm not too clear about this.
- M Well, let me repeat it. What he said - you know Brian SIMON?
- L Yes.
- M Well, Anthony had made up a pass, similar I suppose to the one he made to you, to Brian SIMON before the war. Now as far as we can date it, and Anthony isn't sure about this, but as far as we can date it it was either '38 or '39 and in effect Brian SIMON was asked whether in his capacity as a sort of student organiser in the Party he, on behalf of Anthony, could look out for useful sort of recruits. Now he did this, Anthony did this, without precise instructions from the Russians. This was free-lancing, this was initiative, private initiative, and Brian agreed to do this but in effect, according to Anthony, nothing happened, and Brian was of course an open communist at that time. Well then the war came along and Brian became involved in it and as far as Anthony was concerned this attempt which he had made had turned out to be a failure and that was the end of it. Well then during the war, and Anthony places this as '43, you went to Anthony and said that you were in trouble because Brian SIMON had come to you and had said on behalf of Peter ASTBURY that Peter ASTBURY wished ^{you} to work for him and he was in touch with the Military Attache, the Soviet Military Attache. Well you went to Anthony with this story saying what on earth do I do. Here I am working for you and now Peter ASTBURY is asking me to do the same thing for him. What do I do. Well Anthony says that he is quite certain that he reported this to his Russian controller i.e. to "George", and it was agreed that Peter ASTBURY would straight away lay off. And as far as Anthony knows this happened, that is to say you were not bothered any more. Well now does this ring any bell at all with you - you see, we can't think - I mean Anthony couldn't have dreamt this, because it makes sense, I mean Peter ASTBURY I'm sure was working, and I am sure - I know - he was in touch with the Soviet Military Attache, and this was a separate Service from the one for which Anthony was working. There are two, you know, Russian Intelligence - Offensive Intelligence Services in competition with one another, well this was the other side trying to get you, taking the story at its face value.
- L Vaguely somehow, although I have to confess - at the back of my mind there's some sort of vague echo of something like this, what I'm quite clear about is that it certainly had nothing to do with Brian SIMON whom I have not seen since I was at Trinity, I'm quite categoric about this. The only thing I can remember, this only came back to me the other night, is a very unexplained - a completely unexplained incident of a man called MEREDITH who I knew briefly at Cambridge, and as far as I remember was not a Cambridge man but came up there when some London colleges were ...
- M He was a scientist?
- L I think so yes.
- M Working at RAE, Farnborough?
- L This I wouldn't know. I know nothing about him since then at all but he was very prominent in the Student movement at that time, he was a

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L Communist and he ...

M ... still, go on, it may not be the same one.

L And I think I only knew him because - for one of two possible ways. One I think that at the beginning of the war a number of London colleges were evacuated to Cambridge and I think I met him there, and I think also that he was very active in the University Labour Federation either as Secretary or he did a lot of work in their Headquarters. I knew him there. Once when I was in the War Office he rang me up and asked to see me, and I met him and had a completely pointless sort of interview in which he didn't come to any point at all with me. Looked at afterwards he may have been sounding out whether I had communist affiliations. And the whole thing just passed off, and that was that, and I might very well have reported this to Anthony. It's quite possible in some way this led back to ASTBURY.

M Well when you say led back to ASTBURY you mean that you would have recognised from your meeting with MEREDITH that it led back to ASTBURY?

L No, I wouldn't, because I'm only reconstructing now, but others might have reconstructed it.

M You mean Anthony might have reconstructed it?

L Could have done, yes. Or somewhere along the line this might have been done. But certainly - with all the reservations of memory of course - it's years, but this isn't on the whole the sort of thing one would forget. I cannot remember any overtures from ASTBURY at all.

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ASTBURY

M Well, taking Anthony's story, I mean the thing you can say categorically is that Brian SIMON never came to you.

L This I can say categorically.

M Yes. Well now the thing Anthony remembers - because as I say I'm sure he's not making this up, I mean dreaming it - the thing that he remembers is having to confess to his Russian controller that without instructions he had made this pass at Brian SIMON and this was the thing that stuck in his mind because it was difficult to do. You see I accept from Anthony's story that there must be something in the Brian SIMON/Peter ASTBURY relationship. I don't think he can have dreamt that ...

L retrospectively, I would accept that there was some tie-up between them, yes. But certainly ...

M Well when you say a tie-up, in a communist sense or in an espionage sense?

L Well no, I only know in a communist sense but if it then developed into espionage it would seem fairly logical, that there was a personal tie-up between them there. But I'm being quite categoric, that I had no contact with Brian SIMON and he made no overtures to me.

M Well, that part then just isn't right in Anthony's story. Now it is conceivable I suppose that you told him about this strange meeting with MEREDITH and that in some peculiar way he got the two things mixed, but at any rate in your meeting with MEREDITH there was nothing which connected it either with SIMON or ASTBURY?

L No, nothing at all. No, in fact the whole meeting with MEREDITH was

L completely pointless and abortive.

M And this is the only occasion upon which anybody could conceivably have been making a pass at you.

L I must have had an extraordinary lapse of memory if this is so about Brian SIMON but, you know, I'll be quite categoric then and say that I haven't seen him since ...

M Yes, and I think the other interesting thing is that Peter ASTBURY, unless he was making some private enquiries behind the scenes, had not kept up with you, in other words he was not aware of your potential, as far as you knew.

L Yes, yes, yes.

M But I agree he could have been making enquiries behind the scenes.

L Unless he'd been warned off.

M Was your relationship with ASTBURY such that - I mean at Cambridge - that he would, you know, feel that he was on safe ground in - I mean supposing he had had designs upon you, I mean ...

L I find this a little difficult to say, certainly yes, until I began gradually to defect away from the Party, and I suppose, I didn't have any contact with him after I left for Germany.

With ASTBURY?

L With ASTBURY.

M Yes, but I mean before you left for Germany there were only these two occasions when you met ...

L No, I'm talking about when I left - I left for Germany when I went to the University.

M Yes, yes, I see, in 1939, after that you didn't really have any contact with him. Well that hardly makes sense, does it.

L No, there's a big gap here, but I'll wrack my brains as I can, it's hardly a thing ...

M I was going to say, it's not the sort of thing one forgets is it?

L ... a categoric story on both sides here isn't there? This is, er...

M Well I think - I'm prepared to think that Anthony is muddling - I mean he hasn't got the story straight, but I am sure there is a basis of truth to it.

L Well, if he was hauled over the coals for making a sort of illegitimate contact one can imagine that this must have had some real basis, it must have stuck in his mind, this I accept. I can't honestly ...

/Well, at the moment...

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M Well, at the moment then that remains a mystery. Well then you went to Germany, when, I suppose late '45, or did you go over - I mean did you go straight to Germany or did you ...

L Well I went to France in the invasion, that's when my jeep overturned and I came back to London and was out of action for quite a long time, I had a fractured skull and ...

M This was still Psychological Warfare within SHAFE?

I Yes. Well actually we were within 21 Army Group but we had a sort of departmental link with SHAFE, and I was out of a job for a number of months and during that ...

M You mean you were recovering from this accident.

I I was recovering and I was also on the reserve list, and at that time the new G.I. of M.I.14 said, however seriously I don't know, "oh we might make a move to get you back", and then I don't quite know what the lead was, but it would not have been an unnatural one with my qualifications, that in Norfolk House they were setting up an Intelligence Department of the Control Commission with with Ronnie Haler was concerned and Geoffrey Wellerhead. And I was posted to them and in due course we were posted over to Germany where there was a fair free-for-all, and fighting for power between the SHAFE element, the Control Commission element and, above all, the people who held the power which was the 21 Army Group element. We sort of sorted ourselves out there for a few months until those who were being demobilised went home and the whole thing was rationalised, for a time under Dick White, then Dick went home, then the Intelligence Division as such was set up. At this time I was being divorced or I was divorcing my wife. I had little if any links to this country and the only time in fact when I had any contact with Anthony was when he came out to deliver PUTLITZ back.

M Well it was to deliver PUTLITZ was it, because Anthony made several journeys to Germany at the end of '45 the beginning of '46 and we haven't really been able to sort this out, but it is quite true that after he left the office, he was demobbed in October '45, he did have this special job to deliver PUTLITZ, and I think he probably did come out in - he's not sure about this - but the beginning of '46 I would think.

L To deliver PUTLITZ?

M Hmm. But he had been out previously in '45, September. Well don't let's worry about precise dates.

L ... I should have thought that the - well I can't say quite honestly.

M Well I think it doesn't really matter, as a matter of fact he could - it is a thought which has only just struck me - that it could be quite important whether it was '45 or '46. Well perhaps we can get together with Anthony on this. Or perhaps we can date it as we go along from what you were doing at the time, but at any rate, Anthony came to see you in Germany?

L Well he came to see me only in the sense that I was the official contact to receive him with PUTLITZ and I would have to be dealt with as far as Intelligence Division was concerned on a fairly high level and I arranged with them both to the safe house that PUTLITZ was being delivered to, and this was the whole object of the visit. to take

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TOP SECRET

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- M Well now, did you have a private chat with Anthony then?
- L I can't recall one specifically. I should think it is highly probable that we did. Obviously PULITZ wasn't following us around all the time. It could very well have been.
- M Well now, have you between - well it's really I suppose - the question I was going to ask was - I mean had you been passing any information to Anthony or indeed to the Russians in any way between your leaving M.I.14 and the date we are talking of now?
- L No, no.
- M You'd had no contact in Germany or no contact when you were in France, and nothing when you came back to London.
- L No, no.
- M So you had dropped out completely?
- L I had - the only contact I had with Anthony I remember is that he must have found out somehow that I'd been invalided back from France and he rang me up at home and we had a meeting, at the time when I wasn't posted anywhere, and I suppose he talked in general terms about what was happening next. I don't know what passed between us but I know my chief concern was not to get back into M.I.14.
- M Yes, yes, or not to get back into his clutches, this is what you really mean?
- L Which I really meant, yes.
- M Well the next thing I don't think Anthony has told you and may come as a shock to you, but it is important that we get this straight, Anthony tells me that he was sent to Germany, I mean he was going to Germany anyway but the Russians gave him a particular task to accomplish when he was there, and this was to persuade or at the very least to encourage you to join M.I.5.
- L Well, if this was so, I think there could have been some general talk about what are you going to do, and surely you'll have a good chance of getting into M.I.5. and so on, I'm only - I'm prepared to accept this as a reconstruction, but ...
- M Yes, but would you be prepared to accept that he revealed to you the purpose?
- L Well yes, certainly, you know, if he was talking about, or if we were talking about going into M.I.5. it was clearly with that view in mind, certainly, yes.
- M Well what - was your reaction to that - well you tell me.
- L Well, I'm finding this terribly difficult to place this in context at all when these things came, the whole thing was a great muddle as far as I was concerned. Basically I didn't want to be in a position of having to pass information to Anthony, on the other hand, I'd never had a job, the war was coming to an end, the only qualifications I had was in Intelligence,

/where was I...

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- L where was I going to be employed? A number of offers were being held out to me in various departments of the Control Commission and so on, and I couldn't say at this stage what motive was dominant at the time. I disliked doing this, I was afraid of it, but on the other hand I suppose I was ambitious and seeking some sort of security and wanted a job. I think certainly if Anthony talked about it to me in those terms I would have played along with it.
- M Well I know what you did do, I don't know whether you remember or not.
- L Well I can't ^{write} remember in great detail, but there was some talk I know of, I think Dick was looking for some people for 5, I think Williams wrote him a letter about the sort of possible candidates and it may be that I applied to Dick for a job, as I applied to a number of people at that time for jobs. You touched on this the other day and this could very well be so. E.T.W. -
- M Well, yes we did. Well you did in fact, I mean I know you wrote a letter to Dick. I know that Dick wrote back in fairly careful terms, that is to say he wasn't committing himself, but on the other hand he agreed that, you know, there would be vacancies and when you got back to London, look him up, and he'd do what he could, it was that sort of reply. And you wrote back and said by this time you had been offered the number two position I think in whatever it then was, CIB.
- L CIB or D - B I think.
- M And you'd decided that you were going to give this a chance.
- L Ha, hm.
- M But you didn't close the door to, you know, appealing to him again later. Well I don't offhand remember the precise date of your letter, I think it was '46 but I'm not absolutely sure. But the date upon which Anthony suggested this to you would be important if we can place it.
- L Well it could be, I accept this, but also as far as one can be accurate in my memory, in one's memory here, I'm quite sure that anything I did in relation to Dick and getting a job was to get a job and not on Anthony's prompting.
- M Yes, yes, well I accept that.
- L Well it could very well have been that a break on my activities was that I didn't want to get back under Anthony's control, but as I say, one's motives were entirely mixed on it but the dates might tie up but this would be coincidence more than anything else.
- M Yes. Yes. But the date upon which Anthony put it to you - well do you remember where you were? Were you in ~~Sinhausen~~ ^{Oeynhausen}?
- L I should say almost certainly we were either in ~~Sinhausen~~ ^{Hauptfort} or in ~~Hauptfort~~ ^{Hauptfort}, we moved our headquarters at that time, but I think probably in ~~Sinhausen~~ ^{Hauptfort}.
- M On both - I'm assuming that there were two visits, I mean I know positively that there was one visit in August '45. Now I think this PUTLITZ visit may have been later but this I'm not sure about.
- L You could be right, I wouldn't dispute this, I only have memory really of

- L seeing him with PUTLITZ, and partly because this was quite a romantic episode his returning in this manner.
- M But do you not remember seeing him in Germany other than on the PUTLITZ occasion. I mean could you have seen him on the first occasion?
- L I could have done. I wouldn't dispute this but I think probably in memory the two have run together, overshadowed by the mission of bringing PUTLITZ back.
- M In other words even though we're able to prove the date on which Anthony went to Germany to deliver PUTLITZ, even though we could prove that date, we couldn't then say, we couldn't necessarily say that that was the occasion on which he made this proposition to you.
- L No, no.
- M It could have been on an earlier occasion.
- L Yes, this could be so. What stuck in my memory really was only the one visit and it was connected with PUTLITZ.
- M Well now, you stayed on in the Control Commission Int. Div., I suppose?
- L Yes, it became Int. Div. and not long afterwards as they were deploying themselves regionally I was sent down to Dusseldorf to be the new Regional Intelligence Officer in this newly created province, where I was also a representative of the Political Division and the local intelligence man.
- M So this went on really for quite a long time, six or seven years?
- L It went on originally to '52 I think which was when my original contract expired. By that time the whole regional level had run down considerably, partly in the general run-down of the Control Commission, obviously it didn't make sense any longer to have a vast Intelligence Division deployed all over Germany, and the other point was of course when I went there the highest form of German political government was at regional level and this had an importance then when we started setting up the German security offices at land level. As soon as the Federal Government was set up importance passed away from this level and this reflected itself again in the delegation of power within Intelligence Division.
- M Yes, yes. Well now, throughout that period in Germany there was no contact of any kind and nobody ever made a pass at you?
- L No.
- M And haven't done to this day?
- L No, no.
- M Well you're jolly lucky.
- L So I think - yes, yes.
- M Because I can't think why they didn't.
- L Why is that?

- M Well I mean, they had you in the palm of their hand. I mean they'd only got to threaten you with exposure.
- L Surely, yes.
- M And they were home and dry.
- L Yes, yes.
- M Well now, before the end of this period the flight of BURGESS and MacLEAN blew up. This must have frightened you?
- L Well, I'd never heard of MacLEAN until then. When BURGESS was involved - well obviously I didn't have to have powers of second sight to see that this couldn't be very far away from Anthony. And this did frighten me, certainly.
- M But you had no communication with any of them - with Anthony or anyone else?
- L No, no. In fact I think the only time I've seen Anthony since then was once at one of the Society's dinners, when there was no sort of personal contact at all.
- M Well when you came out, just to complete the story, when you left Germany, you came back, got a job whatever it was outside government service and haven't been back since.
- L Yes.
- M So in that way you succeeded in getting yourself off the hook.
- L Well I hope so, I mean this is basically what I was trying to do the whole time.
- M But the German period must have been - well I would have thought touch and go, I mean I can't really see how they ...
- L Looked at retrospectively now, I can see just how vulnerable I was, yes. And of course in the early days there I had a very considerable power, and indeed a considerable influence.
- M Yes.
- L But certainly at no time did anyone ever make any overtures.
- M Well now going back to my theme of looking at other colleagues. Well first of all there were the Cambridge days when I'm sure you can be helpful on the communist group there - you know, filling in gaps in our own record. Whether you could also be helpful on looking at members of the group and their subsequent careers, and judging, you know, whether they might have succumbed, I take it this is something which from time to time must have occurred to you, I mean you must have thought about it, and nothing has come to the surface.
- L Well, you mean in terms of any news that has broken, whether it meant anything to me. The only thing I remember vaguely once, and I could

- L almost have dreamt this, was of some reference I think, something I picked up out of the American press to Michael GREENBERG having been involved in something, and then it vanished as if there was a security close on the whole thing, and all this meant to me was in fact I had known Michael GREENBERG ...
- M ... you remember Michael GREENBERG at Cambridge?
- L Yes, at Trinity as a communist, and I didn't know what had happened...
- M .. He went to America.
- L I think he went on a Fellowship or something to America and I had some sort of vague idea of this. Otherwise of course in terms of people even being in the government service, by and large I had very little knowledge of it, if you could say well so-and-so whom you used to know has now gone into the Government Service it would neither be a surprise nor the reverse to me because I wouldn't know it on the whole and most of my career has been distancing myself from this.
- M Well at any rate this is a field in which we could delve.
- L Yes, surely.
- M Well the next one is M.I.14., and again from what you've said this would be no more than personal impressions, and there is no reason to suppose that you have any.
- L The only man I know who came into M.I.14. when I was there and came in pretty late in the day, posted in from a regiment somewhere, was a man whom I'd known quite well at Cambridge, Van ABBE, who had been a communist at school, and went to Zurich University at the same time I went to Frankfurt, and was very much a sort of academic, long-winded Marxist, and he came rather late in my career in M.I.14. into one of the substations there and in fact stayed there after I went. Now I certainly made no overtures to him, because I didn't want to extend my field of influence anyway, I would have regarded him in any case as a security risk as I regarded ..??..... he was rather naive and - a very nice chap actually and he came to see us after the ? not long ago when he was back on a sabbatical year from either New Zealand or Tasmania - from New Zealand I think this time because he went up to Hobart University and I think to Melbourne afterwards. And he was looking for an academic job in this country, but I haven't heard from him since and for all I know he's gone back again.
- M How did you judge his political views then - when you saw him again?
- L Well I think he was sort of leftish, certainly, but I had no knowledge whether he was in contact with the Party or not.
- M Well what I could do is get a list of M.I.14. people, and we could run through it ...
- L Yes, indeed, yes. I think that I could probably remember most of them out of my head across the years and certainly none of them springs to mind.
- M Well the next phase is Psychological Warfare. I don't know whether we could reconstruct that, I suppose we could? But again if you feel

/Well I can...

L Well I can tell you straight off the bat the few people I was connected with. I was connected very remotely and indirectly with Dick CROSSMAN who was at SHAPE and was one of our sort of technical superiors. My own department to start with was run by Geoffrey MUIR the Philosophy Don at Merton, I think he was a tutor at Merton or something now, who was so much a philosopher that he just didn't know what was happening at all and in the end I think he got axed because he left a top secret file out overnight, purely by carelessness or something like that. And then we had a very distinguished Colonel, Gavin de Beer, who's a Fellow of the Royal Society - all of these people I've known in the War Office who had all been in the press department of the War Office, that's where they came from, who hadn't the slightest idea what it was all about. And my immediate sort of colleague and opposite number, Gordon BROOK-SHEPHERD as he now calls himself, was Daily Telegraph correspondent in Vienna who, although I hadn't known it at the time had been a contemporary of mine at Cambridge, and was a very brilliant scholar. A tremendous careerist. Certainly any political affiliations he had I think were for SHEPHERD and not for anybody else. I should have thought that would be a very unfruitful field to follow altogether, really.

M Yes.

L And basically, as tactical psychological warfare, we weren't really concerned very much more than producing leaflets, arranging for them to be shot from guns or dropped from the aircraft, or doing intelligence reports sending back through SHAPE sort of ideas how this could be exploited towards the Germans. And it wasn't like psychological warfare in London during the war, sort of part of the - if it ever was - sort of the innermost secrets.

M And then finally Control Commission and Int. Div.? Well there was a field which I imagine was full of holes?

L Well I think really the holes turned up from time to time as one reads but they mostly were [redacted] in the field and this was one that more and more Intelligence Division was shut out from. They intended to go their own way. And I had, once I'd gone down to Dusseldorf, very little to do with them except from time to time, meetings with [redacted] to keep both sides sweet and ensure maximum cooperation and so on, and my general opinion of them was that all the things I could see they were doing were very silly and it could have been they were doing other things I didn't know about and they were probably less silly, sort of longer-term things, but I had grave suspicions that this wasn't so.

M Well do you feel there would be any point in our attempting to reconstruct lists of that period.

L You see in that sphere there if there was anybody of whom I had any suspicions at all I would know now and tell you.

M Hm. And indeed you would have reported it at the time.

L Yes, yes. I mean if you go back to the university I can say yes, this man was a Party member, or I know this man had communist affiliations but he didn't come into the open for this or that reason, and then what happened to him subsequently you have to take up from your own records, but, you know, I was in a different field altogether at that time, and -

M Well I think the only two fields in which there is any possible - well as

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10th Interview

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Note for file

I met Professor BLUNT at 18 Chandos Court, S.W.1., at 5 p.m. on Saturday, 6 June. The meeting lasted until almost 8 p.m. Most of our conversation was recorded.

2. The only matter of substance in our discussion which was not recorded related to the forthcoming interview with Kemball JOHNSON. BLUNT volunteered to collaborate in this interrogation either by having a private meeting with him (as he had done in the case of Leo LONG) or by joining my interview with him. This offer to participate followed a pretty frank exchange between us (most of which was recorded) when I said that I still had suspicions that he was ~~still~~ not being fully frank with me. He said that he could understand my continuing doubts about him but he protested that he was telling me everything he knew. I think it possible that his offer to help with Kemball JOHNSON was made as a demonstration of this. We agreed that we would both consider this offer over the weekend and meet again on Monday to discuss it. BLUNT telephoned me on the morning of 8 June and we met at 1.15 p.m. at 11 Lyall Mews, S.W.1. This meeting was not recorded. Our discussion was confined to three subjects.

had much
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649. 6 PF 604. 711 (JOHNSON)

3. BLUNT said that he had thought a lot about his proposal to collaborate with me in the Kemball JOHNSON case and had come to the conclusion that the best chance lay in his talking alone to Kemball JOHNSON along the lines that he had talked to Leo LONG. He thought that the chances of success were not great but, on the other hand, he felt that Kemball JOHNSON respected him and might listen to his advice. He thought that, while he would have to reveal to Kemball JOHNSON that the Security Service was aware of the meeting, he could still play it as a personal appeal. He made the point that, even if he were unsuccessful, he would not have damaged our prospects if we later decided to re-interrogate Kemball JOHNSON ourselves. I said that I was happy to accept this offer and recommended that he should telephone Kemball JOHNSON and try to arrange a meeting in London some time next week. I would have a further discussion with BLUNT before the meeting in the course of which we would work out tactics.

4. We next discussed the identity of Guy's friend "David". BLUNT explained that when at our previous meeting he had turned down the possible identification with David HEADLEY he had been under a misapprehension. He had been thinking of another HEADLEY who had later returned to Eton as a master. He was quite certain that this was not the right man. He now realised, however, that the David HEADLEY about whom I had been talking might

re 370a.

* Now identified as David Armstrong HEADLEY. PF -

/very well ...

30/8/66

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very well be the person in question and said that, if I could provide a photograph, he was sure he could confirm or reject the identification. I showed him the letters from David HEADLEY to BURGESS which we had in our possession. He read them all but could find no significant clue in them. I promised to try to provide a photograph at our next meeting.

5. Finally we discussed the identification of "Henry" with Boris Anatoliyovich YASTREBOV. I showed him the D.3. card for YASTREBOV together with an additional photograph. BLUNT said that the name YASTREBOV did not strike any chord in his memory and that the new photograph did not help him. On the other hand the two photographs he had seen at the previous meeting showing YASTREBOV wearing spectacles still seemed to him to be right. He agreed that for the identification to be correct YASTREBOV would have had to arrive in the United Kingdom before 1945.

6. We agreed that our next meeting should be at 5 p.m. on 12 June.

D.1.

9.6.64.

A.S. Martin
A.S. Martin

10th Interview
IOP SECRET

3796

17th Jun 1964

Transcription of an Interview between D.1/Mr A.S. Martin
and Sir Anthony BLUNT on Saturday, 6th June, 1964 at 18
Chandos Court, Caxton Street, S.W.1.

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M Major MUGGERIDGE.

B Yes.

M Like to talk about him?

B Well, I've very little to say. But he was a very puzzling and peculiar character. Am I right in saying had been Communist and then went Catholic?

M I think so. Well, had been Communist I think is right.

B Well, then I think he went - oh, then he ended up as Editor of Punch didn't he?

M Yes. Well he is the famous Malcolm MUGGERIDGE.

B Yes. Well I don't know.

M A T.V. personality.

B Yes, I'd forgotten that.

M You didn't know him well?

B I didn't know him at all well, no. He incidentally is a sort of cousin of Tess'. I don't know that she knew him very well though.

M Is he?

B And I don't think she liked him very much. No, I would only say Communist who turned Catholic - and I don't think I have invented the Catholic part.

M Would he have known Guy? Did Guy ever talk about him?

B (Long pause) Not that I can remember. I should have thought they might very well have known each other, but I don't remember him talking about him. (Pause) But he went at the end of the war, didn't he?

M I don't think you have anything

*Muggeridge turned
Christian but not,
think, P.C.*

M Major R. BROOMAN WHITE.

B Well, of course I knew him well.

M Yes. Well now I wonder if you would like to talk about him, BROOMAN WHITE, because he was a friend of all of you wasn't he?

B Yes. Well, he was a great friend of Tommy's. I never got on with him - he didn't like me, And I don't know to what extent he knew Guy. He certainly knew him of course, but not I should have thought at all intimately. He was violently anti-queer - I mean really hostile and trouble; ^{making} putting stories about and causing trouble. I should have guessed that he disliked Guy a good deal and didn't see him very much. He was a member of Whites, but not a member of the Reform or the Travellers - I mean not in that, not that the Travellers was particularly relevant; but he wasn't in the kind of circles where one automatically met over a drink. He was - I had always assumed and I've no reason to doubt that I was right - that he was real, solid Tory of a rather reactionary kind. (Pause)

I doubt if I have much more.

M He was a friend of Kim's I think.

B Oh, a friend of Kim's yes. A friend of Kim's and Tommy's yes. I doubt if he was a very close personal friend of Kim's - I would be very surprised if that was the case. In fact I'm fairly sure it wasn't.

M Anyway you feel confident there's nothing there?

Exr. to Sf. 44-UKS(1) Lmk N(16)

B It was certainly something that was assumed.

M By you all?

B Well by Kim and me and in conversation and I should have thought that we didn't say it because it would have been so peculiar and if the reverse had been the case then he would have had to say it.

M Yes, did Guy ever worry about it?

B Not that I remember. We were all very worried about the Aileen situation on purely personal grounds. This business of self-inflicted wounds - which we were none of us supposed to know about.

M You mean Kim never told you?

B Well, Kim eventually told me. Guy was frightfully indiscreet about that with Tommy, I remember. Tommy knew, actually I believe it was one of the things that made Tommy suspicious of the whole relationship between Guy and Kim, Guy in fact told me after, I should say, after he'd been to Istanbul when one of the episodes took place. She overturned the lamp. And Guy told me and it so happened - Tommy knew from Kim, I think - and Guy did one of his very sort of blundering attempts to get information about this and made it perfectly plain to Tommy that he knew all about this and was trying to find out more and I don't think then but quite a lot later I remember Tommy saying "It seemed very odd to me that Guy clearly had been told all about this".

M But you think that Guy learnt from Kim?

B From Kim. Oh certainly. That I think I know, in fact I'm sure I do because Guy came back from Istanbul and told me this rather appalling story.

M Was this a sort of professional confidence. Professional in the sense that it spelled danger?

B No, I think not. No I think it was simply "Kim's in an awful position, Aileen's in this terrible state". No, no I think it was entirely personal. As far as I can remember the only thing that had any professional connection was this one story about Mrs BASSETT and the implication, which was obviously a general one, that anything that Aileen knew she might - not necessarily maliciously - almost certainly repeat to [redacted] You see, in the case of something about myself

GUYD. W. PF 6041584 - PHILBY

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TAPE CONTINUES

M Well, we're on the air again. Well, let us just record for the record that you think that the man with spectacles numbered 33 for whom we haven't got a crib is HENRY --

B Might very well be HENRY. Immediate reaction.

M I mean, your reaction was so immediate --

B Was immediate

M that I would take that as --

B Yes

M -- almost certain, unless we have something about him which makes it impossible.

B Makes it excluded -- and the reaction was quite different from the ones I had to --

M Yes. Well this is number 33.

B 33 - yes. And it was also a reaction strongly to one and moderately to the other photograph.

M Yes. Well, we also discussed, off the record, the identity of David.* I suggested David HEDLEY and you remembered David HEDLEY but you're quite certain --

B Certain

M that he's not the person you were thinking of - and indeed, you have nothing that you want to say about David HEDLEY.

B No.

M Well, I wonder if you could just summarise what you do know about the 'query' David who did go to America. I say 'query' David because you're not absolutely sure -

B I'm not a hundred per cent certain - I think - about the Christian name --

M -- about the Christian name.

B What I remember was that there was a friend of Guy's -- certainly Etonian - certainly a near contemporary - he might have been a year older - he might have been a year younger but anyhow right in that generation, and probably an exact contemporary - because I believe that makes a great difference - I believe they only really know their own year. --- who was I think not at Cambridge - and I say that simply on the grounds that if he'd been at Cambridge I think I should

YASTREBOV

* Now identified
as David
Armstrong
HEDLEY
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30/8/66

B (cont) have known more about him and therefore I assume probably at Oxford or indeed perhaps went to America immediately. What I'm clear is that he went to America; was involved in straight open left-wing activity, organising Labour Movements in factories etc., and that Guy saw him a certain number of times before and I should have thought during the war in this country. He used to come over, and that he - his comment to me was, so to speak, "Well I'm sure that David (if that was his name) is doing it" not "I know" but "I'm convinced". This was a deduction from his conversations with David.

M Did you ever meet David yourself?

B I met him not very often - must have met him once or twice at Cambridge before the war. I should guess that he might even have come up to stay a weekend with Guy in Trinity. That I wouldn't be quite certain. My recollection is that he was rather short and rather broad - sort of stocky build and rather fair. But I can't do more than that. The surname was quite definitely a rather obvious, solid English name.

M And to the best of your knowledge then, he stayed in America?

B I think he stayed in America. I've got a very faint recollection that he may even be dead. I've got a sort of idea that he died soon after the war. I'm not the least certain of that but I'm fairly sure he stayed there --

M You don't associate --

B -- and must have had American family connections

M You don't associate him with Michael STRAIGHT?

B No - not a bit - no, not the least. No. But I do, and this is an extremely uncertain memory, I have the very faint recollection that Guy saw him when he went over on that fantastic trip with which was in --

M Which we dated as '40.

B '40, yes. That, I think, might be the case.

M Yes. Right, well, we'll go to work on that again. Now when we were looking through the sequence of events - it's the other one, I think.

- M (cont) You were puzzled that George should have left as early as February '39 and not returned until November 1940, although you agreed that the return in November 1940 might have -
- B That makes sense. Mm
- M -- coincided with the end of your being out of contact - the end of your Lizzy/Bob STEWART phase, but, on the other hand, you had thought that that ended in the summer rather than the autumn.
- B Yes - I think that's probably completely false recollection --
- M Yes.
- B -- I mean, looking at it logically, I should have said that the contact through Lizzy went on only a matter of relatively few months.
- M Yes.
- B That's to say from - it might be June '40 till till - well till November.
- M Yes. But you were still surprised that George was not here in '39 because you know that Guy was still in contact although you, yourself, were not - you had no direct contact yourself - but you're quite certain that Guy was still in contact and, therefore, in that -
- B In the first months of the war.
- M And in '39 as well, I think you said.
- B Oh, well, I meant in the first - in September/October '39
- M Yes.
- B What I'm not sure - what I've no recollection about is so-to-speak the early part of '39.
- M Yes.
- B But I'm perfectly clear about the autumn.
- M Yes. So that if that sequence of events is right then -
- B There must have been another -
- M So that if that sequence of events is right then there must have been another George - there was somebody standing in for George and you would find it surprising that Guy hadn't mentioned it to you.
- B Well, I think he must have.
- M I see, you're surprised that you haven't remembered it.
- B Yes. But as I never met him -

M Yes. Well, I think we must check those dates again. Now, was there anything else on that sequence of events you thought odd. Oh, one thing I would like you to record because I know I haven't got it on a tape, is your story about Theo and the last night that he spent in London.

PAUL HARDY

B Yes. It was - I think you agreed - it was when the GLADING story broke wasn't it?

No -

M Yes.

in fact Wallace Court 300 Marylebone Road NW1

B - that Theo had to leave very hurriedly. Theo lived in Edgware Road one of those big blocks called -

M Not - well Park West wasn't up then but Maida Vale way.

B But I think it was Park West. Yes I think it is that. Half way up

M No on the left hand side.

B I think you'll find it was Park West, I may be wrong but I think so.

M Not as far as Maida Vale.

B No. Half way to Praed Street. I think it is called Park West. I think I'm right in saying he lived there and that I think I learnt from the newspapers, not internally. And he took fright, reasonably enough when the GLADING thing broke, and spent the last night with Kim and presumably with Lizzy - and I imagine this was in the Lizzy -

M This was in the Hampstead flat, I suppose -

B In the Hampstead flat, I suppose, yes - which I never went to or -

M You didn't -

B No. I didn't know Lizzy at all, I suppose, at that stage. And I remember that this was regarded, rightly by Guy as very shocking.

M You mean - Kim's behaviour

B Oh - it was perhaps necessary but it was taking a considerable risk on Kim's part

M Yes. And Guy would have regarded himself as responsible for Kim's safety, would he?

B Well, he would have been very much concerned only he wouldn't have regarded himself as responsible in the sense of being a boss, in any way

M No. But, you think it's possible then that Kim was, even as late as

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M (cont) that, being run by Theo - although you don't know - I mean, you think that that's possible

B I think it's possible George we know was here by then, yes.

M Yes.

B But, it's not inconceivable I think that Theo should have been -

M But is it inconceivable that Theo should have been running Guy as well?

B No. Not inconceivable, I think it's quite possible. I'm quite clear that both Kim and Guy knew Theo and I know Guy knew him and had a great admiration for him but I couldn't be certain on the date.

M No.

B But I think it quite possible that -

M But if that were so then it would mean that you were, at that time, in touch with George -

B With George - yes

M And the other two -

B And the other two with Theo

M You think that is possible?

B Well, I think it's conceivable - I know that Guy, and I assume Kim, were - I know that Guy was in touch with George but I don't think it's inconceivable that he'd been in touch with both.

M Yes.

B I think it's a little bit unlikely, I mean my recollection of Guy's conversation about Theo, and with Kim I never talked to until much much later, it was so to speak in the past. But Theo was the one person for whom they both had an enormous respect as an intellect and as a personality, of course he was a - he may have been a thug, but he was obviously a remarkable character.

M Yes, must have been. Well I think those were the only two major comments you had to make on that sequence of events?

B I think so. It is the - George leaving in February '39 -

M Which surprises you, yes.

B If that could be checked.

M Yes. Well, then you went on to look at Brian SIMON's career. You said positively that you were quite sure that he didn't go to America for the Ministry of Information.

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B Well, I can only say it seems to me inconceivable.

M Well I think this probably is a mistake.

B I suspect you find it's his father.

M But you were equally surprised that he - or perhaps not equally - but you were surprised that he'd been in North Africa and Italy?

B I'm afraid I had simply forgotten that.

M You think it may very well have happened but you didn't know?

B It may have happened - I should be grateful if you could check it on papers. But it's true that during that time '42 - '44 - I mean I'm not prepared to say I was in contact with him and therefore know he was in England - but I didn't remember that there had been a particular break. There may well be a failure of memory.

M Yes. You did agree that the most likely period for the Peter ASTBURY incident, however one may reconstruct that incident and we must wait for Leo LONG to say what he has to say on Monday, but that it was an incident you're quite sure whether Leo was aware of it or not?

B I can't have invented it.

M No. You think it most likely then that this would have happened after he went to London District Signals?

B Yes.

M Which is 1942.

B Well, he went in 1941, from October 1941 until, leaving out New York, November 1942. That I think is the most likely time.

M Yes. Well the alternative is 1944 and we agreed that that seems unlikely.

B Yes, it doesn't seem likely.

M And by the same token we agreed that 1939, the period when he was obviously closely connected with the Student Movement, would have been the moment when you first went to him - I mean on Guy's implicit invitation as it were.

B Yes. I think it must have been summer 1939.

M But if it was summer 1939 then this was a period when you were out of touch.

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ASTBURY

B Out of touch yes.

M And this would make sense in terms of George being away, but on the other hand it doesn't make sense - or George's absence rather doesn't make sense in terms of a few months later, when he was certainly, at any rate there was a contact which Guy had -

B Which Guy had, yes.

M - than in the early days of the war.

B That I'm quite certain of, yes. And my recollection of the approach to Brian SIMON was that it was more likely to have been in summer 1938.

M You still think '38?

B Well I think - (speaking slowly) well, I put that as a possibility because then -

M There's nothing inconsistent with that on the thing you are reading now?

B No. 1938/1939 he was at the Institute of Education, and here it says "on the 4th March, 1939, was member of the Student Commission" etc., and I'm pretty certain he was all that time, '38/'39, in close connection with the N.U.S. You see on the 4th March, 1939, he was vice-President of it and I'm pretty certain he was in contact with it before; so that on the whole, and without wanting to infer anything, I should be inclined to think it was summer 1938, more likely to have been summer 1938.

M Yes. Well, if it was summer 1938 then for some reason or other you were out of touch?

B Yes. And that could be accounted for by the GLADING.

M Yes.

B I think that is the - I'm sorry to have to reconstruct with this - but I think that is the more plausible, the more consistent version. Because I'm perfectly clear that it took place in the summer. I know it took place in a flat which I only moved in to in November 1937 and left after the beginning of the war - it must therefore have been summer 1938 or 1939 and I think summer 1938 from this point of view makes more sense.

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HUBBACK

H/K 2/9/01

- M Yes.
- B What is not, on this showing completely clear to me, is why nothing further happened, I mean why it didn't develop. And I suppose the answer was simply that Brian didn't find any people worth spotting.
- M Yes. Because of course, I remember when you said that you favoured 1939 because the war happened so soon afterwards and he wouldn't have had any time, doesn't really apply because as you can see he was around, until 1942.
- B Yes. Until 1942, quite. Though of course he was doing -
- M He was tied up, O.C.T.U. and whatnot.
- B Yes. And wouldn't therefore be able to do this particular thing. He was no longer in touch with the N.U.S.
- M While we are on the subject of Brian SIMON, do you know David HUBBACK?
- B I knew him at Cambridge. I've hardly seen him since. (Long pause). He was part of that group and married - didn't he marry the sister of, not James KLUGMAN - was it James?
- M James who?
- B KLUGMAN. No, but he married, didn't he marry the sister of someone in the Communist group then? I've got it wrong then.
- M No I don't think you have. I think you are absolutely right. You can't remember who it was ?.... Because it is in fact very interesting?
- B (Long pause) Sorry.
- M I'm not prompting you because I want you to come out with it. (Long pause). Well, he married a girl called Judith FISCHER-WILLIAMS - now? Can you take it from there.
- B Oh. Herbert HART's sister-in-law. Yes.
- M Can you talk about that.
- B Only in rather general terms. I mean, all the whole lot high minded Popular Front left-wing.(Long pause)
- M Tell me about David HUBBACK.
- B What's he done since?
- M Civil Service. Yes, I suppose since the war really. (Long pause). You knew him when he was at Cambridge. He was at King's.
- B I knew him at Cambridge. He was at King's? I'd forgotten that. I knew him not very well. He wasn't an Apostle, was he? Well, you

TOP SECRET

B (cont) shouldn't know (laughs). He may have been, I simply can't remember but he was very much in that group. I should have said - I mean my reaction would have been straight labour - rather left-wing labour. Not, I should have thought - he never belonged to the Party, did he?

M That I don't know.

B I should have guessed not.

M Have you ever talked about him to Brian SIMON?

B To Brian. I don't think so, no.

M Has Brian ever mentioned him?

B No. Did they know each other very well?

M Yes, very close.

B Did they? I'd no idea of that. No, that I didn't know at all

M Yes, they were family friends, I think. In fact, he's the god-son of Brian's father.

B I'd no idea of that. Comes from Manchester? --

M Well - no, he doesn't appear to. He was at Westminster. I'm not absolutely sure about this - his Prep. School was in Hampstead

B I've never connected him with Brian at all. The fact that Brian hasn't mentioned him to me doesn't mean anything because I've only seen Brian so to speak once every couple of years - over a long period. But I've never associated them at all. And they knew each other closely at Cambridge?--

M Well --

B That I - that I might well have known and forgotten.

M He went up to King's in '34.

B Mm. And Brian went up in the same year.

M Don't know.

B Wait a second it's here. Well, he went up the year before.

M You thought that he'd married a sister of James KLUGMAN.

B I thought he'd married into that group - but somebody else married the sister of James KLUGMAN

M Who? I don't know. I mean I'm not being clever. I don't know that.

B Em - ^{that} /will come to me in due course. Oh - well, I mean - em -

Hell - one of the really intellectual Communists of that group - em -

M That implies that you would put David HUBBACK as an intellectual Communist.

B No - I think - no, I'm sorry I think this was simply a confusion. No - no I should never have put David HUBBACK. I should have put him as left-wing -- Socialist rather than Labour.

M What about the FISCHER-WILLIAMS girls? They were really (coughs)

B Well, again I should have thought high minded, "New Statesman" Socialists. And I'd never thought of anything else at all.

M This is - I mean you're not fencing them.

B No - no - no - I'm not, sorry. No I'm not. I hadn't thought about them at all. No I promise you I'm not.

M Mm. Well you knew that Herbert HART's wife was Jenifer.

B Yes. And I should have said exactly the same

M Well, you're wrong - I mean I know you're wrong.

B I'm wrong? (Very surprised)

M Well, when you say they were no more than "high minded Socialists" - you're certainly wrong. I don't say that -- I'm not talking about today but I mean at the University.

B But - but - but they were Communists, were they?

M Oh, yes.

B I didn't know that. Herbert wasn't?

M I've no reason to suppose so.

B I didn't know that - because - I mean I didn't know them then but - but I'm surprised in retrospect. And I'm not fencing this, sorry

M Well, it's inevitable that when one, you know - when we get near the knuckle I'm bound to wonder

B Yes - of course - no, I promise you.

M Well, I am interested.

B What - they were actually - they were Party members and - er -

M Well,

B Or at any rate right in it.

M Jenifer was, I'm sure. And I'm equally sure that Judith was

END. to PF 6067 150 - HART

B I suppose - now I come to think of it, I suppose it doesn't surprise me as much as I thought it was surprising^{me} so to speak. But - but - er this would have been after all in - again - in the late Thirties?

M Middle Thirties; middle to late

B Yes.

M Did Guy ever talk about it?

B I don't think I knew that. - I mean Guy knew Herbert but - er - through the office or through me. Shouldn't have thought he knew - Herbert and Jenifer were then living together but not married - or sort of loosely attached, weren't they?

M Yes

B But, I shouldn't have been certain that Guy knew Jenifer at all. He may have.

M Have you seen HUBBACK? -- Since the war?

B I shouldn't have thought so. And yet when you say that - em - I mean his face seems so familiar that I must have.

M Yes

B I'm trying to remember whether he was - er - you see, so many of these people, in fact, I've met at dinners of the Apostles but I cannot remember -

M I can't -

B No - no I can find that out -- but I - I don't think I've seen him. I should have thought - em -

M What surprises me is that Brian has never talked to you about him. This is, as I say - as far as I can see they must have been pretty close

B Mm. At Cambridge and ~~at~~ ^{Calver?}

M And before.) I mean, they were family friends.
B Before?)

B Oh, sorry - you said that, yes. Yes. But, do you see I have really seen Brian very, very little - I have seen him but at intervals of - what - on the whole, two or three years - since the war. And I last saw him a few months ago - but -

Exd. to PF 606.150 - HIKT

Exd. to PF 45, 907 link B

Together

9th Interview

379a

Copy for PF.604,582 (BLUNT)

Note for PF.604,789

On 4 June, 1964, I entertained to lunch at 11 Lyall Mews, S.W.1., Professor BLUNT and Leo LONG. The meeting lasted from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m.

2. I told LONG that BLUNT had described to me their meeting of the previous week and asked him if he had reached any decision about his attitude towards us. He said that he thought he had little, if anything, to say which BLUNT had not already said but, before he could talk, he wanted some reassurance that action would not be taken against him. I said that while it was difficult for me to explain my position - I would have to choose my words very carefully - I thought it was easy for him to understand it with BLUNT, a living example of our policy, sitting there beside him. I could not give him any absolute assurance of immunity from prosecution but, on the other hand, I could say that I thought it extremely unlikely that any action would be taken against him if he showed himself willing to co-operate. I explained that our object in investigating the past was to find leads into the present. This seemed to satisfy him for, without formally committing himself, he said that he understood my position perfectly well.

3. I then turned to the problem of loyalty towards his friends saying that, if I was to serve my object, I must ask him about his friends. This he said presented no difficulty. He had been asked before about Communist contemporaries at Cambridge and he had found no difficulty about speaking freely. I said that it was espionage as well as communism which I wanted to discuss and he again said that there would be no difficulty although he had been so far out on the fringe of things that he did not think he would be able to help very much. I said that this satisfied me and then suggested that we should not on this occasion talk any more about personal involvements but leave this for a detailed debriefing.

4. The rest of the lunch was taken up with chatter and in so far as it touched on our interests LONG spoke with growing freedom and indeed enthusiasm. BLUNT's earlier remark that LONG flaunted his "bourgeois" background defiantly was certainly borne out. He sells advertising time for the A.B.C. Independent Television Company and defends the system stoutly. He is a church warden and gives much time to church affairs. He plays squash regularly once a week.

5. We discussed the problem ^{and} whether or not he should tell his wife about his interviews with me and agreed that it would be wiser not to do so. He did not seem unduly troubled by this decision.


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11/15/64

6. In a momentary aside after the meal BLUNT commented that the change in LONG's attitude was remarkable. He was sure we had won him over.

7. I arranged to see LONG at 4 p.m. on Monday, 8 June. He agreed that I should bring a tape recorder.

D.I.

5.6.64.


A.S. Martin

378a

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377a

S. Form 81/rev. 11.62

EXTRACT

Extract for File No.: PF 604,582 Name: Anthony BLUNT

Original in File No.:* PF 604,582 Supp Vol.: 11 Serial: 853a Receipt Date: 3.6.64.

Original from: T/C Under Ref.: 4304 Dated: 2.6.64.

Extracted on: 4.6.64 by: JG Section: D.1/Inv.

Extract from T/C on Anthony BLUNT - Former R.I.S. Agent

Outgoing call JOHN GASKIN to Leicester 23261 to SAM.
 SAM had not been able to come down to London at Whitsun.
 They spoke about SANDRA's wedding on Saturday the 20th.
 BLUNDEN would be accompanying JOHN to Scotland for this.
 JOHN remarked that -'I've done lots of things for his family' -
 and for this reason BLUNDEN felt he wanted to go.
 JOHN would send SAM a cheque today towards his holiday.
 JOHN was thinking of giving up his work at the shop altogether.
 09.18

*If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner.

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HTB

376a.

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3746
PF.604,582


Reference.....

NOTE

After discussion with D.1. and D.1/Inv, I saw Superintendent Bill Kelly, R.C.M.P., before he left London for Canada today, when I put him appropriately in the picture in regard to the case of Anthony BLUNT, adding that we wished knowledge of this case to be confined for the present to the Commissioner, Bordeleau, himself and Higgitt, and assuring him that as soon as any aspect emerged directly touching Canadian interests we would inform the R.C.M.P.

We spoke in this context of accountancy for KAGO's 'Ring of Five'.

Kelly expressed his gratitude to us for bringing him up to date in this matter.


M.E.D. Cumming

D.

29th May 1964

TOP SECRET

16/1/65
16
D1153
H16

8th Interview

Copy on:- PF. 604,789
PF. 604,582

374a

Professor BLUNT telephoned me as arranged at 7.30 p.m. on 28th May, to tell me that he had seen Leo LONG. He invited me to join him at once, adding that LONG had now left.

2. He told me that LONG had arrived at 6 p.m. and they had chatted for ten minutes or so about trivialities while BLUNT summed him up. He has acquired, said BLUNT, the veneer of the incisive, slightly aggressive, business executive, conscious that he moves in another world than BLUNT's and, as though in self-defence, to some extent flaunting it. The preliminaries over, BLUNT asked LONG if he was still a Communist. LONG bristled and said "Good God, no". BLUNT then told him that they were both in a serious position. M.I.5. knew about their work for the Russians (at a later stage he explained to LONG the part that Michael STRAIGHT had played in this), he himself had been questioned and had admitted everything, thus implicating LONG. He, BLUNT, earnestly hoped that LONG would do the same because he was convinced that this was not only the right thing, but the only thing to do. LONG's jaw set hard and he said that before he would talk he would demand an absolute guarantee that no action would be taken against him.

3. BLUNT explained that he could not give such a guarantee but he thought that M.I.5. had been very far sighted in his own case. Their concern was to learn all they could about the past in order to gain leads into the present. His own conviction was that if LONG would collaborate he would be safe.

4. LONG then took the line that he really had nothing to tell which BLUNT had not already told, from which he drew the conclusion that M.I.5., when they found that they could get nothing new out of him, would turn on him. BLUNT said he felt sure they would not do this. LONG then said that it had all happened so long ago that it was unreal to him now - it was as though he was looking back on another person and he really did not think he would be able to force his memory to work.

5. By this time LONG was thawing and his next remark probably gives the clue to his earlier aggressiveness. He said that he would never be able to tell his wife about the past. He said that, after an unfortunate first marriage, he was now happily married but it all rested on complete mutual trust. If he told his wife he was sure that she would never understand. If he did not tell her the whole basis of their marriage would be undermined. BLUNT said that M.I.5. would be sympathetic to this problem if LONG decided not to tell his wife.

6. BLUNT then suggested to LONG that he should telephone right away to the M.I.5. officer concerned and invite him to join them. LONG pretended that he could not stay any longer without giving some excuse to his wife and suggested that the meeting should be postponed until the following week. He

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
asked if the/

374a

(2)

asked if the meeting could be in office hours so that he would not have to explain his absence to his wife. BLUNT said he was sure he could arrange a lunch-time meeting and undertook to do so.

7. BLUNT then told me one other thing which he had not included in the narrative. He said that he had mentioned the ASTBURY incident to LONG, who had disclaimed any knowledge of it. BLUNT was mystified by this. As he said to me, he could not have imagined the whole thing because he understood from me that it made sense and in any case it was not a story he had enjoyed telling, involving as it did Brian SIMON. If LONG was being honest in disclaiming knowledge, then it must have happened to some other contact of BLUNT's but he could not think of anyone else who fitted. He promised to think it over. BLUNT's attitude to this discrepancy did not suggest to me that he was hedging; rather that he was genuinely mystified and anxious to clear it up.



A. S. Martin.

D.l.
29.5.64.

8th Interview

PF. 604,582.

I met Professor BLUNT on the evening of 28th May, 1964. In the course of conversation he told me two additional items of information which he had remembered:-

Exd 604,582 - BURGESS
Exd 604,586 - PHILBY

- (a) He had remembered that BURGESS had normally met his Russian controller in the United States in New York, and not in Washington. This had come to his mind as the result of an incident when BURGESS' mother, Mrs. BASSETT, had visited him in Washington. BURGESS had suddenly dashed off to New York to the disappointment and annoyance of his mother. BLUNT knew that this journey to New York was for the purpose of meeting his Russian controller.
- (b) After his interrogation by M.I.5. in 1951, PHILBY had expressed surprise and relief that M.I.5. had failed to discover that he had gone back to Cambridge after taking his degree. BLUNT had the impression that the relief was so heartfelt that this later period at Cambridge must have some significance. He himself did not remember that PHILBY had returned to Cambridge.

A.S. Martin

A. S. Martin.

D.I.
29.5.64.

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15/15
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7th Interview

372a

PF. 604,589.

Copy on PF. 604,582. ✓

NOTE FOR FILE.

I called on Professor BLUNT at his flat on 26th May, 1964. Among other things, I told him that we intended to interview FLANAGAN in the near future and that, with BLUNT's permission, we would tell FLANAGAN of BLUNT's confession and of BURGESS' statement to BLUNT that he suspected that FLANAGAN was working for the Russians. BLUNT agreed that we should go ahead.

FOOTMAN

A. S. Martin.

D.1.
28.5.64.

OK 15/5
RUS 1/6

7th Interview

371a

PF. 604,583

Copy on PF. 604,582. ✓

NOTE FOR FILE.

REES

I called on Professor BLUNT at his flat on 26th May, 1964. Among other things, I told BLUNT that we intended to interview RALEIGH in the near future and I wanted his views on our telling RALEIGH of BLUNT's confession. BLUNT said that he had no love for RALEIGH any more than RALEIGH had for him. Therefore there was no personal relationship to be broken up. He did say, however, that he feared that RALEIGH might try to use this information to spite BLUNT. Therefore he did not welcome the prospect of our informing RALEIGH but he did not feel able to object if we were certain that it would further our interests.

2. He then asked me if we had considered RALEIGH's reputation for indiscretion. He said that, in so far as he could look at RALEIGH objectively, he regarded him as highly indiscreet. He did not necessarily mean that RALEIGH would publish the information in print but he thought it highly probable that he would gossip both at Oxford and probably among his journalist friends in London. RALEIGH, he said, was notoriously indiscreet in his cups.

3. I told BLUNT that I would not make a decision on this yet awhile and said that I would certainly take his warning into account. I promised to let BLUNT know if we did decide to use his confession when interviewing RALEIGH.

REES

A. S. Martin.

D.1.
28.5.64.

~~REES~~
1/16

370a

7th Interview

I called on Professor BLUNT at his flat on 26th May, 1964. BLUNT said that he had remembered two additional items of information which he thought might interest me. They were:

(a) Just before he left Cambridge in 1937 Roy PASCAL had tried to recruit him into the Communist Party. This, of course, occurred after BLUNT had been recruited by BURGESS into the R.I.S. and BLUNT therefore refused PASCAL's invitation.

DI source report 8177 A 30.6.66 to PF 852425 David Armstrong HEDLEY.

(b) At our interview on 21st May, 1964, when we were not being recorded, BLUNT had told me of a friend of BURGESS who had been his contemporary at Eton. This friend had later become an open member of the Communist Party and later still had gone to America. BLUNT believed that this friend had continued his Communist activities in America. BURGESS had once told BLUNT that he suspected that this friend, while in America, had been working for the Russians. BLUNT could not remember his name. BLUNT now remembered that this friend's christian name was David. He thought that if we could provide possible surnames, he might be able to identify the man.

20th 364b-

A.S. Martin
A. S. Martin.

D.1.

28.5.64.

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DJMS
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3696

NOTE FOR FILE.

On the evening of 25th May I telephoned Professor BLUNT and told him that I was ready to go ahead with the interrogation of Leo LONG. I gave him LONG's telephone number and suggested that he should make an evening appointment with him on any day this week except Tuesday. BLUNT said that he would do so.

2. I called on BLUNT at his flat on 26th May to discuss the arrangements for the interrogation ~~with~~ LONG. BLUNT told me that LONG would be calling on him at his flat at 6 p.m. on 28th May, 1964. We agreed that I should not be present in the flat but that I should be at the end of a telephone so that BLUNT could summon me at the appropriate moment.

3. We agreed that BLUNT should begin by asking LONG if he was still in touch with the Russians. If, as we expected, LONG's answer was "no", BLUNT would express relief and then go on to explain that he had confessed to the Security Authorities and in doing so had implicated LONG. He would propose to LONG that he should do likewise. Assuming agreement, BLUNT would then telephone for me.

4. If, however, LONG were to say that he was still in touch with the Russians, BLUNT would express dismay but would still proceed to explain his own position and recommend that LONG should make a clean breast of it. Assuming agreement, BLUNT would then telephone for me.

5. If LONG refused to see me, BLUNT would allow him to leave and would then telephone me and describe what had taken place.

6. I told BLUNT that I thought it would be inadvisable, both from his own point of view and our's, for him to tell LONG that he had been offered unconditional immunity from prosecution. I explained that, if all went as we expected, LONG would not be prosecuted and there was no objection to BLUNT holding out this inducement to LONG, citing himself as a living example of someone who had confessed and got away with it. I said that I would not myself be offering LONG unconditional immunity from prosecution but I would make it clear to him that such an eventuality was unlikely.

7. BLUNT described the telephone call he had made to LONG and told me that LONG's wife had claimed to have known him when they were both in the Office during the war. I told BLUNT that LONG's wife was formerly [redacted] who had worked in the Office during the war and who had later been seconded to S.H.A.E.F. in Germany, where, presumably, she had met LONG. BLUNT said that he did not remember her name.

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A. S. Martin

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D.1.
28.5.64.

S. Form 81/rev. 11.62

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(306) Wt.11364/7492. 200M. 1/63. K.C.N. Gp.61

EXTRACT

368a

Extract for File No.: PF 604,582 Name : Anthony BLUNT

Original in File No. : * PF 604,582 Supp Vol. : 11 Serial : 846a Receipt Date : 27.5.64.

Original from : T/C Under Ref. : 4304 Dated : 26.5.64. *Thur*

Extracted on : 27.5.64. by : JG Section : D.1

Extract from T/C on WEL 1074 - Anthony BLUNT, former R.I.S. Agent

Individual
er.

SECRET

NAME: BLUNDEN

Line No.: 4304

Tel. No.: WEL 1074

Date: 26.5.64
Tuesday

Responsible Section: D.I.



Outgoing call BLUNDEN to TUD 3593, for LEO LOFTUS.
Mrs LOFTUS answered to say that he had left and was
on his way to the office.

B. Oh - I see, could you possibly give me his office
number?

Mrs L. Yes, surely - it's HEIDE PARK 7222.
Would you like me to take a message in case
you don't get hold of him or anything?

B. In case I don't would you tell him that
ANTHONY BLUNDEN rang - I knew him at Cambridge,
I haven't seen him for years.

Mrs L. Yes, actually, I know you too - we worked in
the same office during the war.

B. Oh - really!

Mrs L. Yes.

B. (laughs) Oh - I didn't know - I didn't
realise it.

Mrs L. (laughs) Yes - I started working in the same
room as your secretary. In fact, I think -
if I strain my memory sufficiently I'll remember
that I did some work for you.

B. Well, how very funny, I didn't realise that.

Mrs LOFTUS ~~HEIDE~~ was almost sure he would be able to
get hold of LEO. If not, he ^{LEO} could contact him.
BLUNDEN gave her his own telephone number - WEL 1074 - for
LOFTUS to ring.

09.06

Outgoing call BLUNDEN to ELSA SCHERRER, letting her know
he was not going to the Gallery this morning.

09.23

Outgoing call BLUNDEN to HYD 7222, for Mr. LOFTUS.
He was put through by an operator. The conversation went
as follows:-

B. LEO, a voice from the past, ANTHONY BLUNDEN.

L. Oh - hallo ANTHONY.

B. How are you?

L. I'm very well, thank you.

B. Good. Ehm - you're now - not I.T.V. - B.D.C.
T.V.

L. It's part of I.T.V.

- B. Oh part of I.T.V. - I thought I heard them say B.B.C.
- L. No, A.B.C. - like the bread company.
- B. (laughs) - never heard of it.
Look, LEO, I wondered if you'd like to come round and have a drink-sometime.
- L. Er - yes, eh.
- B. Any good - today is, what, Tuesday. Any good tomorrow, or, Thursday?
- L. Er - I can't do it tomorrow, I've got a discussion meeting in the evening. Thursday I could.
- B. Thursday, good. Well, I live in Portman Square over the shop so to speak, -
- L. - Over the shop, yes.
- B. - so, would you like to look in on - after work?
- L. What - about sixish?
- B. Sixish.
- L. Eh - eh.
- B. Good, very nice, at that time there'll be a girl on the door, so, simply push the door - it's 20, Portman Square - you've been there, I think.
- L. It's above the Courtauld ?
- B. Above the Courtauld. Simply push the door and you'll find a girl there and she'll ring me.
Right - jolly
- L. /Good, I'll look forward to it.
- B. Good - goodbye.

10.53

Outgoing call BLUNDEN to A. MARTIN, reporting that he had been on to LEO.

It was arranged that MARTIN would come at 5 this afternoon. BLUNDEN spoke of having a very hard day on tomorrow.

10.56

L.E.

367a

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Copy for PF.44,592 (STRAIGHT)

5th Interview

Note for PF.604,582

By arrangement with Professor BLUNT and Michael STRAIGHT, the three of us met in BLUNT's flat on the evening of 19 May, 1964. STRAIGHT arrived at 7.15 p.m. I joined them at 8.15 p.m. and we continued until nearly midnight.

2. As I learned afterwards ^{from} STRAIGHT, the first hour during which they were alone together was spent largely in small-talk about pictures and family affairs. The only questions BLUNT asked were : how did STRAIGHT come to confess his past to the F.B.I.? and when did he do so? STRAIGHT told me that he answered the second question with deliberate vagueness saying it was eight or so months ago.

3. After I arrived the conversation inevitably steered itself closer to our interests, but at no time did I attempt any formal questioning. They chatted about mutual friends and I listened. I got the impression that, if they had met by chance, BLUNT would have found STRAIGHT a bit of a bore. However, there were no positively awkward moments and, as the drink began to do its job, the exchange of gossip became quite animated. I think STRAIGHT felt rewarded for his pains and grateful that we had demonstrated that his collaboration had resulted in no hard feelings; and I think BLUNT - though glad when the evening was over - was probably pleased that his relations with STRAIGHT had been "rounded off".

4. No important new intelligence emerged as a result of the meeting. The following isolated items are probably worth recording :

(a) STRAIGHT said that his recruitment by BLUNT had taken place three or four weeks after CORNFORD's death - say, January 1937 at the latest. BLUNT agreed.

(b) STRAIGHT remained at Cambridge until the end of the academic year 1936/1937. He spent the last six months as one of a triumvirate which took over leadership of the Communist Group of the University from KLUGMAN and CORNFORD. Jaques EWER was another of the triumvirate and the third I noted as "George B." I cannot now remember who "George B." is.

Extracted
to
PF 55637
EWER.

BARNARD (I think ^{was})

/(c)

BS/B.S.
16/17

TOP SECRET

DJUG
24/5

- (c) STRAIGHT remembered that, on BLUNT's instructions, he began to show signs of disillusionment with the Communist Party in the Spring of 1937. This was to pave the way for the complete (though notional) break which he was to make when he left Cambridge. Arising from this STRAIGHT remembered that in the spring of 1937 he shared a room with Hugh GORDON who was a fellow member of the Communist Group.
- (d) STRAIGHT remembered that he had met BLUNT's Russian controller before he left Cambridge. It was not a business meeting. Apparently the three of them drove in BLUNT's car along the Great West Road to a roadhouse where there was a swimming pool. BLUNT agreed that he dimly recollected this episode and that the Russian was in fact "George". He could not remember why it happened but agreed that it was not for business purposes. He presumed that "George" had expressed a wish to have a look at STRAIGHT.
- (e) STRAIGHT told me privately that before I arrived he had mentioned Leslie HUMPHRIES to BLUNT who had said that the relationship was homosexual and had no other significance. This indeed was what BLUNT had already told me. STRAIGHT indicated that he still did not accept this unreservedly. Personally I do. I reminded ~~him~~ that, contrary to what he had told me, HUMPHRIES had not died until 1949. BLUNT showed surprise and I think the mistake was due to genuine confusion.

BLUNT

Extracted to PF. 94.026 GREENBERG

(f) STRAIGHT told me that, after he had returned to the United States, he had recommended Michael GREENBERG for recruitment. He explained that his Russian controller, the illegal, Michael GREEN, had pressed him to suggest likely recruits. STRAIGHT had known GREENBERG when they were both undergraduates at Cambridge and both members of the Communist Group there. STRAIGHT said that he did not know whether the Russians had made any approach to GREENBERG but he presumed the F.B.I., to whom he had told the story, would have looked into this. STRAIGHT said that he was ashamed of this incident but on the whole thought it likely that GREENBERG would not have succumbed.

(g) We talked about Pat RAWDEN-SMITH and it became clear that STRAIGHT suspected that she might have been recruited. Both BLUNT and STRAIGHT agreed that

Extracted to PF 94.026 Dares

SR. NO 7895

RAWDEN-SMITH was a mistress of Philip NOEL BAKER. STRAIGHT thought that this might have been for the purpose of obtaining information from him. BLUNT on the other hand thought it was to further the political career which RAWDEN-SMITH hoped to enjoy. They both agreed that she was a nymphomaniac.

Exrd. to PF 605, 565
ROTHSCHILD

(h) They discussed Victor ROTHSCCHILD and his two wives. All that was of interest in this discussion was that BLUNT confessed that Tess ROTHSCCHILD was the only woman that he could ever have married. This sounded deep-felt and I would guess that there is still a close relationship between BLUNT and Tess ROTHSCCHILD.

(i) They discussed the abortive trip to Moscow on which BURGESS and Isiah BERLIN set out during the summer of 1940. STRAIGHT recalled that BURGESS had met him in Washington on this occasion and had asked for STRAIGHT's assistance in being put into contact with STRAIGHT's Russian controller. STRAIGHT had refused to help.

Exrd. to PF 604, 529 - BURGESS

(j) STRAIGHT recalled a similar occasion in 1951 when he had run into BURGESS by chance and realised that he was working in the British Embassy in Washington. STRAIGHT had then told BURGESS that if he had not left the Foreign Service within a month he, STRAIGHT, intended to inform the British authorities of BURGESS' past. STRAIGHT said that he did in fact, through his wife, denounce BURGESS to a member of the British Embassy (this of course has already been reported to us). BLUNT thought that this episode might be significant in that it provided BURGESS with an urgent reason for leaving Washington when he did.

5. After we had left BLUNT, I asked STRAIGHT if he would be prepared to talk to a colleague about his knowledge of Communist activities in Cambridge. He said that he would be pleased to do so and I told him that he could expect a call in Washington within the next two or three weeks. I subsequently informed Mr. Hamblen who said that he would take advantage of the offer.

D.1.

ASm
A.S. Martin

25.5.64.

TOP SECRET

A. McB.

PA

365a

Reference.....PF. 604,582.....

NOTE FOR FILE

I today informed L.A. that BLUNT had confessed and discussed with him what BLUNT had to say about Kemball JOHNSTON and Leo LONG. Separate notes are being made for their files on the points discussed.

A. Symonds

D.1./Inv.

21.5.64.

R.C. Symonds

*HS 1/5
15/72
D.1.1/5
22/5*

364d


Reference...EE.604,582.....

NOTE FOR FILE

BLUNT's description on page 26 of 364b of his meeting with PETER and the arrangement to contact PHILBY can, provided BLUNT is speaking the truth, be tentatively dated in the autumn of 1955.

2. This was a period which must have been one of great anxiety as far as PHILBY is concerned. The White Paper about BURGESS and MACLEAN was published in September 1955 and on 23 October an article appeared in the New York Sunday News which named PHILBY as the "Third Man". On 25 October 1955 PHILBY was named in the House of Commons by Lt. Col. Lipton. PHILBY gave an interview to the Press on 7 November 1955.

3. It is, I suppose, conceivable that it was reports of PHILBY's Press interview which appeared on 8 November which decided the Russians to send "PETER" (Yuri Ivanovich MODIN) to the U.K. MODIN applied for a visa on 16 November.


E. McBarnet


D.1.
20.5.64.

DTNG
26/10/64

364c

NOTE FOR FILE

With reference to BLUNT's description of his meeting with PETER in probably 1955 or 1956, see page 26 of 364b, it has been established from the file PF.70,617 for Yuri Ivanovitch MODIN that MODIN, who had left the U.K. apparently finally on 3rd November, 1954, applied for a visa for temporary duty at the Soviet Embassy on 16th November, 1955. He arrived in the U.K. on 11th December, 1955, and except for one or two brief visits abroad remained here until 30th August, 1958.



E. McBarnet


D.1/Inv.
20.5.64.

DKK
26/10/64

364b

6th Interview

Transcription of an Interview between D.1/Mr A.S. Martin
and Sir Anthony BLUNT on Wednesday, 20th May, 1964 at
18 Chandos Court, Caxton Street, S.W.1.



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ACT 1958

JANUARY 2023

Handwritten notes and signatures in the bottom right corner, including a green checkmark and the name "DILLON".

- M Well, it looks as though it's working - I think it is. Well, we've just had a look at the photographs and there's one chap there that I think you feel conceivably could be "Henry" although you are not sure.
- B No, I don't feel certain, but the one face that reacted slightly familiar so to speak is SVERLOV.
- M No. 22.
- B No. 22 - there are two photographs and each of them - I mean, didn't ring a bell but just arrested me for a moment. And also of seeing the name SVERLOV which is written below them, did seem to me not unfamiliar and, as I think I told you before, Guy once met "Henry" at a diplomatic party of some sort and discovered his name and was introduced there and therefore I have at one stage known "Henry's" real name and this didn't seem totally unfamiliar - I'm afraid I couldn't say more than that.
- M No. Well I think we ought to continue and produce more photographs that fit the general description.
- B Yes. I'm fairly sure about the Press Attache or Assistant Press Attache and I'm fairly sure that it was not Tass, but it was someone in the Embassy with diplomatic immunity.
- M Right. I think now that if we can pick up where we left off last time which was at the end of the war and work through until the present day or at any rate until the last contact. Well, your last job before you were demobbed was this trip to Italy and we have more or less dated this now as mid-September and we know that in -
- B It went on into October.
- M And we know that on 16 October you were ready to return; I mean you were signalling saying "Please send an aeroplane" or "Can I get on to an aeroplane".
- B Yes.
- M And you reckoned it took about a month - the whole thing, three to four weeks.
- B Yes.
- M So I would say that by the 20th September anyway you must have been on

M (cont) your way.

B Yes. I think so.

M And when you got back you were, immediately I think, demobbed.

B Yes. Technically I was demobbed before. I mean technically while I was doing this I was ..

M On leave - demob leave I think it's called.

B On demob leave, yes.

M Yes. Now, while you were on this trip to Italy, it lacked quite a lot of the going on in which Kim was very heavily involved. Well now, one of these things we have already discussed and this was his trip to Istanbul in connection with the man who offered to defect and told us -

B That was exactly at that moment was it?

M Yes. Kim left for Istanbul I think on the 22nd September and on 26 September the man was removed, finally removed, so in fact Kim had not arrived by the time he was removed. Well this was something which I think you said you didn't know about at the time -

B No, but I knew about later.

M Later. It was Kim or Guy?

B Er - Kim, I think. I think so -

M Yes. Kim told you in the context that this had been a frightful crisis.

B Yes. I can't remember how soon afterwards he told me and I couldn't be absolutely certain he told me himself but that's my impression.

M Yes. Indeed it must have been a ghastly crisis for him.

B Yes. Appalling.

M The other thing that was going on, and this in many ways from the K.G.B. point of view or from the Russian point of view at any rate must have been almost equally serious, was the defection of GOUZENKO in Canada.

B That was happening at the same -?

M That was happening at exactly the same time. Now Kim was at the receiving end of the intelligence coming out of GOUZENKO. By the early teens in September, by the 13th-14th September Kim was certainly aware that GOUZENKO had defected -

B And this was still completely secret?

M This was not made public until two or three months later. But one of the

Ext'd to PF 66, 962 - ELLI

things that GOUZENKO did say, and it's something that has never been solved because the information he gave was not sufficient, one of the things he did say was that British Intelligence was penetrated and the implication was probably us rather than '6'. I wondered if Kim had ever mentioned this to you?

(Long pause)

B No recollection of it but it seems incredible that he shouldn't have.

M Well, the two - I mean as far as Kim's life in those middle days of September 1945 must have been sheer hell -

B Torture -

M I mean they happened simultaneously.

B Exactly. I remember very clearly indeed his mentioning the other case. *in Karkov*

M Yes.

B But, as I say, I think it may have been quite a lot later. But I don't remember any specific . . .

M Any discussions of GOUZENKO at all?

B No. No, I mean it must have happened -

M Of course the other thing that GOUZENKO told us and which of course did get into the press was Alan NUNN-MAY. This came out later and of course was GOUZENKO.

B Yes.

M It was GOUZENKO who led us to - NUNN-MAY. There was no problem in identifying him.

B He actually named him?

M Oh yes. This was a perfectly straightforward arrest.

B Yes. And that happened soon after?

M Well this ^{was} kept quiet. I think one of the reasons why it was kept quiet for so long was that NUNN-MAY was due to return to London where he was going to make contact outside the British Museum.

B I remember it, yes.

M We kept it all quiet in order to arrest the Russian and in fact the Russian didn't turn up.

B Oh, he didn't turn up?

M No. NUNN-MAY was of course arrested but -

B The contact didn't turn up.

Extd. to PF 66, 962 - ELLI

M Yes, I mean it was his own confession that -

B Yes. I didn't er - get that. Wasn't the impression given that the Russian hadn't turned up in the press?

M I honestly don't know - this was all -

B I remember that - the contact outside the British Museum - that's very familiar - but from the newspapers. And I think - well I think remember wrongly, or assumed.

M I'm sure he didn't turn up in fact. And presumably he didn't because Kim had warned of what was afoot.

B Yes, I see.

M But what I was more interested in was whether there had ever been any discussion of the GOUZENKO case impinging upon your own security. Well now, whether or not it was discussed, it seems to me that the Russians themselves must have been exceedingly worried at this period, I mean here you had GOUZENKO defecting and a would-be defector in Istanbul. And I should have thought that there would have been some repercussions on their work in London.

B Well, I suppose from my own point of view there were - Guy was also in London at this time and Kim?

M Yes.

B Yes. I suppose from my own point of view I was supposed to be counted in at this stage; but out in Italy - actively.

M But can you recall - I mean, presumably before you went to Germany or for that matter Italy, they knew perfectly well that you were going to be demobbed in October.

B Yes.

M And had there been any discussion? I think you said before that you did continue to meet for a short time afterwards, I mean for two or three meetings. But if you have any more precise recollection of what happened then I think it might be useful. (Pause). You see they must have known that you were going first to Germany and then to Italy - presumably you would have told them that.

B Yes (hesitant). Germany obviously. Italy presumably, though it was not really very relevant.

Ext'd. 66,962 - ELLI

- M No. But I suppose they would have been interested in your whereabouts.
- B Presumably I told them where I was going. That I think we will assume - I don't remember it - but I think we can assume that.
- M Do you remember if you had any arrangement for a meeting after you had got back?
- B No, I don't. I don't at all. You see if Guy and Kim were both in London and I was more or less going to be out of action, I should have thought what would have happened would have been that if, for any reason they wanted to see me, the message would have come through one of those. I'm simply guessing - reconstructing - because I've no recollection of this period at all.
- M Presumably up to the time that you went to Germany - this is July/August 1945 - you were still reporting; you were still in the office and you still had useful things to say?
- B Yes. Very little at that stage.
- M I suppose so, but I imagine that -
- B It was very dead - I mean my section was almost totally dead.
- M Yes. But I suppose they were interested in the way the office was going to re-form?
- B (Pause). I don't remember that at all.
- M Do you think it possible then, at any rate before you went on the Italian journey, that you had really shaken hands and said good-bye?
- B Not in any formal sense. But I think it was assumed that I was in future useless.
- M Yes. Well now, do you think you did have any meetings after -
INTERRUPTION FOR TELEPHONE CALL
- M Well we are on again now. Because when we first discussed this I remember you said that you thought you did have two or three meetings after you left the office, but I'm not sure -
- B I don't think - you know, I think I probably meant at these long intervals. My main recollection you see is that I came back from Italy late for term - this place was opening up after almost total closure - I came back as you say October 16th or something, term had

Ext. to PF 66,962 - ELLI

already started and I was not very popular for being late and we were simply thrown into an absolute turmoil of activity here and I don't think I had any further contacts at that time at all. And I don't see why I should have because, if there had been any reason to contact, it could have come through Guy. It would have come through Guy, not through Kim. No, I've no recollection.

M Guy was still in touch with the office, I suppose?

B I think you probably were still running ORANGE and I daresay one or two others. But direct to the office, I mean not through me and - in fact through Graham.

B Through Graham, I imagine, yes.

M Well, you see the direction in which my mind is working; that if they didn't ask you about the shape of things to come I can't help feeling they must have asked someone. They must have been interested. ... fair to say that even after you'd left the office you must^{still}/have had contacts in the office. I mean, supposing they were bereft of any information on the office at all, I would have thought they would have seen you as somebody who still - -

B - - who was still meeting Guy Liddell and people like that, yes. I've no recollection of their doing so I'm afraid at all.

M Well, your belief is that you really did cut off completely - ?

B At that stage, yes. When I re-made contact I (pause) I can't remember any contact between - direct - between the end of the war and '51. I'm not saying categorically it didn't happen but I can't remember it.

M But if it did happen it wouldn't have been immediately after demobilisation, you think, because you were busy here and presumably it would still have been engineered by Guy. I mean, if, for some reason, they wanted to meet you Guy would have fixed it. Now, if that had happened then, presumably, it was HENRY because if it had been someone other than HENRY you would have remembered?

B Yes, it must have - or PETER.

M Ah, but could it be PETER? But I thought your recollection was that

(both speaking together) you and he didn't know each other until 1951 (?)

B Sorry, yes I think you're right. Henry, or the one who was really called Boris .

M Yes. He was really the number two to GORSKIY -

B To "Goerge". Oh, was he?

M Well, I'm only quoting you now - I thought that this was what we agreed.

B No. I think I thought he was the second to "Henry".

M Oh. Well I wonder if it's my memory.

B I may be wrong.

M I thought you said that GORSKIY introduced him - I'm sure you did because you said - No, no, I'm wrong.

B I remember that one or other.

M There was an overlap. I mean GORSKIY was still here after "Henry" took over.

B Yes. Well I don't know that I saw "George" after "Henry" took over. What I thought was the case, was that "Henry" produced Boris, as I say I can't remember for what reason, one day and that on occasions after that I sometimes again met "Henry", but my main contact was with Boris. But I think it was "Henry" not - that probably could be checked with dates - not "George" I think.

M5 Yes.

B Yes, that's right. "Peter" I think only came in in '51.

M Yes. Well, then accepting that there can only have been one or two meetings with "Henry" or Boris between the end of '45 and '51, is there anything relating to your continued contact with Guy, or for that matter with Kim? Or with Donald for that matter?

B No, Donald I didn't see at all during that period. Donald I hardly saw -

M Well, Donald came back from America - I don't know exactly when, I suppose in '46. And he went out to Cairo.

B He went out to Cairo fairly soon I think. And was there for some time?

- M Yes.
- B No. I very much doubt if I saw Donald in the interval from just before the war, or indeed perhaps some time before perhaps '37, and '51.
- M Did you see Donald at second-hand as it were - I mean was Guy worried about Donald?
- B Guy was, well in the later stages, Guy was very worried about Donald.
- M But in the Cairo stage?
- B In the Cairo stage. Yes. I suppose he just heard that in Foreign Office gossip. When did he leave Cairo? '50 something?
- M I can't remember. He came back - he had this nervous breakdown - I suppose about '50, yes.
- B And my recollection is of hearing that Donald had had this appalling outburst. He came back fairly soon after that didn't he?
- M Yes, I think he did.
- B It may even have been that Guy heard it from Kim or -
- M -- had at least six months sick leave after he got back. He was being treated by a psychiatrist.
- B And then went to the American Department?
- M Yes, yes. This was after he was cured, in quotes! Did you know Philip TOYNBEE?
- B A certain amount, yes. Not well. Oh, of course, he was involved in the -
- M He went out to stay with him in Cairo -
- B and he was involved in the - yes, yes of course. He was the wildest - I daresay he still is -. Not, I should have guessed, remotely involved.
- M No reason to think so, no.
- B A sort of bloody minded anarchist? Yes. I don't know him in that sense at all.
- M Certainly he did Donald great harm.
- B Great harm. I think he's done a great many people great harm. A real professional drunkard. Highly intelligent and I believe very nice fundamentally, but he is a real menacing, fighting drunkard and his normal reaction is to whip out a pistol and fire it off - not at someone.
- M Well, what about Guy during this period. You were still seeing a lot of him.

Exo. to RF 45, 515 - TOYNBEE

- B I saw a lot of him, yes, and things were getting more and more painful. Guy was getting wilder and wilder. Mainly, I think, from the strain of doing this -
- M But he was still as far as you know in regular contact.
- B Oh, I'm fairly sure of it. I mean, if he wasn't it was only due to some breakdown of communications but I don't remember any. Were there any crises that were likely to have broken?
- M No. None at all. The first was FUCHS.
- B That was when -?
- M '49.
- B Yes. Whether - I don't remember whether that led to a breakdown or not.
- M No. Did you hear anything about the FUCHS case before it actually broke? Because here again Kim knew about it.
- B Kim knew about it did he? Well!
- M Kim was in a position to have prevented that happening but I think, in fact, they were faced with - I mean they simply couldn't have taken action to prevent the arrest of FUCHS without blowing Kim. And, of course, if FUCHS had held out and no doubt they would have hoped that he would it wouldn't have happened. You don't remember Kim talking about it?
- B I'm fairly sure Kim didn't but I wouldn't be certain Guy didn't. You see during this time I was never nearly as close to Kim as I was to Guy. Whereas Guy and I - well, I mean, first of all shared a flat in Bentinck Street and so on and met - met at the Reform, had drinks together and so on as regular affair, Kim and I were never on that kind of relationship and I would have met Kim only through Guy or through - or as often as anything through Tommy - at a party, one of those big parties Tommy gave, Kim was always there, but in the normal course of events I didn't see Kim at all regularly except in moments like the later stages of the '51 crisis or the later crisis whenever it was.
- M But you think Guy might have mentioned this?
- B I think he might have.
- M What in terms that - of course he wouldn't - Kim was, this was '49, Kim was on his way to America then.
- B Kim was what?
- M On his way. He was in between postings. He was in Turkey and then went

M (cont) to Washington. But he was in a position to know. He could have stopped it, reported it.

B When was it Guy went out to stay with Kim in Turkey?

M About '47 I suppose.

B I see, not this time.

M No. Did you hear about that trip? I mean did Guy talk about it.

B Yes he did. I cannot remember - well (pause) it had some business purpose.

M This was to collaborate with Kim.

B Yes, yes. Whether it was conceivably even to re-establish contact for Kim.

M For Kim?

B For Kim? I'm guessing but I do remember quite clearly that Guy went out there on the job, and the trip was paid. That I remember absolutely clearly.

M But why do you think that Guy would be in any better position to re-establish contact.

B If he was in contact here he could then carry arrangements - and, you know, pass word . . . I'm not certain that that was the purpose but I know there was a purpose and I can't think of any other. I think that was the reason. How long had Kim been in - (Turkey)?

M I don't know. I shall have to look this up. Probably not very long.

B And he'd come?

M It's quite extraordinary isn't it that they should have failed to make contact with Kim, knowing full well -

B Where had Kim come from? From here?

M From London, yes. He must have been among their most valuable sources. You'd think that at the least they could devise a means of maintaining contact after a move to Turkey where I'd have thought they'd be very well placed.

B Well, I can't honestly - I mean I entirely agree (very puzzled) but I'm quite certain that Guy went out there with a plan. It was part of a job. That I'm perfectly clear about.

M Yes. It couldn't have been to re-activate Kim, in the sense that Kim was ~~w~~avering?

Card. to PF 604, 584 - PHILBY
Ex 10. to PF 604, 529 - BORSUSS

Extd. to PF 604, 584 - PHILBY
 Extd. to PF 72, 493 - CAIRNCROSS
 Extd. to PF 604, 529 - BORCHERS

- B No. No, I'm sure it wasn't that, no. I'm certain it wasn't that. Kim never wavered at all.
- M No. Well, I suppose that if Kim had by some mischance fallen out of contact - yes, it would be necessary to send a courier of some kind.
- B Yes, and Guy would have been an obvious one to go. Yes, I should think that probably was it, actually.
- M Yes. Anything more about Guy's (?) during that time? What about John CAIRNCROSS in all this?
- B Well I never saw him at all.
- M No. Did Guy never talk about him after the war?
- B Remind me where he was and what he was doing after the war? Was he back in the Treasury?
- M I think he was back in the Treasury. He was back in the Treasury immediately after the war, then he went to the Ministry of Supply. I don't think there was anything in between.
- B Was he mainly in contact through Guy, or was he directly in contact?
- M He was certainly directly in contact during the war and after the war. What he told me was that after the war his job was so dreary, I mean dreary from his point of view and also from their's, that he thought they began to get tired of him, that is to say his own heart was no longer in it although he was frightened to break off, but the sort of stuff he was producing, so he said, was so dull that the meetings began to spin themselves out.
- B Yes. Yes. I remember that Guy did see him a certain amount and - I'm right in thinking am I not that among Guy's papers there was found a report?
- M Yes.
- B Well, was that done during the war?
- M That was pre-war.
- B Oh pre-war?
- M Pre-war or early war, yes.
- B And he kept it?
- M Yes. It wasn't just one - there were seven or eight.
- B From him?

Exrd. WPF 72, 498 - CAIRCKROSS

M Yes.

B God!

M They weren't signed.

B No. Internal evidence?

M Handwriting.

B Oh, in handwriting were they?

M In handwriting, yes.

B I'm afraid my main recollection in relation to Guy after the last years, before '51, was of his getting increasingly bad, increasingly drunk, increasingly wild and, you know, sort of trying to keep him on the rails. There were a great many moments, well even before the end of the war, far more afterwards, when I simply could never have, when I just would have broken with Guy absolutely, but -

M But to put it brutally you couldn't afford to then?

B Er, well I couldn't, yes. Also that - I was going to say I was more conceitedly that I did occasionally have a slightly restraining influence on him - not very often - and it never lasted.

M Do you think this was the strain, or was it just Guy?

B It was both.(?)

M But he might very well have gone the same way, even without drink.

B He wouldn't have gone so fast. Not nearly, I don't think that is so.

M No.

B He was always wild -

M But this was strain to what extent? I mean was he fed up with them, or was it exertion?

B I should think it was leading the double life all the time -

M Which must have been exhilarating at times.

B Certainly. I mean it was enormously exhilarating; but that exhilaration also led him to drink, just as much as misery. The great trouble with Guy was that there was always a reason to drink. Either, I mean I'm not taking a moral line about this subject I much enjoy it myself, but either life was so awful for personal reasons that he would have a drink, or there was a major political crisis in the world, or things were so splendid.

Exrd. WPF 604, 529 - BURGESS

M Yes. I suppose the quality of what he was able to provide after the war must have deteriorated.

B Must have done yes.

M I mean they must have -. Well, Far Eastern ^{? department} development was he? No, it was McNeil, Hector McNeil.

B What happened immediately after the war? He was Press Department for a short time then -?

M Then Hector McNeil

B And then Far East, yes, and I suppose the Hector period -

M Useful, I suppose.

B I suppose so, yes.

M Well, by that time he can have had no sub-sources, at least none that we've got at.

B No, I think I should have known that.

M You remember we mentioned Peter SMOLLET, SMOLKA?

B Yes.

M Well, it's worth mentioning here that among Guy's possessions, papers, were some from SMOLLET - exactly the same kind as from CAIRNCROSS, but, of course, SMOLLET by this time - immediately after the war - returned to, well he became Daily Express correspondent in Vienna, I think - or Germany, I'm not sure, and then he ran this factory which, I think his father had owned. He made a lot of money, I believe. Well, going back to this question of sub-sources, I mean Guy running others, you can't think of anybody who would have been producing after the war, can you?

B No. except in the sense of ORANGE I suppose. Was he still here? I mean as a source, not as a conscious source; and Guy's extraordinary ability to mix in with diplomatic journalist circles which would only mean gossip and I simply don't know how valuable gossip would have been, But I'm quite certain that he used all the time - he used his contacts in the B.B.C., Press Department, etc. as a means of meeting people and discussing, the sort of one thing in the world he was interested in was - well he was interested in lots of things - but the thing that excited him most was, so to speak, talking politics, speculating on politics, and he would get

Cvd. to PF 604, 529 - BURS E88

B (cont) anyone, whether it was ORANGE or someone at the Home Office, anyone, simply talking. And it wouldn't necessarily be very indiscreet - thinking up the cover for this kind of thing. (?)

M Did Jackie know what he was up to?

B No.

M Never?

B No. I think the one thing that made him suspicious was finding - and I think he told you didn't he - large quantities of pound notes.

M I think he did.

B I think he told them, yes. In fact I know he told them.

M The sort of things that Jackie was doing during the war -?

B What, when he was working for me?

M Mm.

B Yes. No then -

M He was working for us?

B Oh yes entirely. No, Jackie I know was fallen under a great deal of suspicion and reasonably enough. But I'm 100% certain that he wasn't involved at all.

M But he finally finished up in Germany didn't he?

B Yes he did, I think, I think after - it might have been the end of '44 or '45. Yes, he was, that's quite true.

M But there couldn't have been anything?

B No. I'm quite sure of that. He worked for me for a short time - the cover name was DUMBO, and was perfectly hopeless. The thing that I think didn't make me suspicious because I'm absolutely clear about it, but the thing that puzzled me very much was Guy went off on a Friday night?, I think - yes Friday's right, and by 10 o'clock the next morning Jackie was on the telephone in, almost literally, hysterics saying "Something terrible has happened - Guy didn't come back last night and he's gone off with a suitcase". And I still don't understand why Jackie thought this so peculiar - I should have thought that for Guy not to come back at night and not to telephone was the most normal thing in the world. But apparently it wasn't. He and Jackie were living in the same establishment - Bond Street at the time, and he just did sense - he must have

Exrd. to PF 604,591 - HEWITT

Exrd. to PF 604,529 - BURGESS

B (cont) seen something peculiar about what Guy packed. But he didn't know - this was before the American boy Bernard had come round with his complicated story, because he arrived about half an hour later - even more hysterical. But Jackie had in some way sensed, and that did seem to me puzzling at the time, but I'm certain it wasn't sinister.

M Well, in spite of ourselves we have really reached the '51 period.

B Well, I'm sorry. I don't honestly think there's anything more going to come through.

M I think we ought to take the events of the '51 events in pretty great detail.

B Yes er - ehm. (Long pause)

M Had you any inkling that trouble was afoot before BURGESS came back.

B None at all. Absolutely none; I knew - it must have been just before, I knew that there was trouble of a different kind - I knew Guy was in trouble, from a letter from him and I think also I had a letter from Kim. I remember a letter, I think it must have been before Guy came back, saying that he was in trouble all the time and (laughs) I remember him saying "Try to get him transported to Australia where his mother could send him £10 a week. This would be a kindness for everyone concerned".

M This was Kim speaking.

B Kim saying, yes. By that time - I don't know how long -. How long had Kim been in the States?

M Over a year.

B A year, yes. Well it must have been just before that that Kim and I formed a society for the protection of Guy against himself.

M This was still by remote control. You were in England and Kim was in America.

B Yes. In fact the society didn't function but I mean that there was a sort of agreement that Guy really was getting hopeless and what could one do about it. Then I had a (?) follow up letter but it was very shortly before Guy came back saying - well whether it said that he had been arrested three times for speeding or whether it was for some other disaster I don't remember - but it had been (things were pretty awful) (drops voice, rest of sentence inaudible). | And then I suppose I must have had a letter from

B (cont) Guy, or perhaps it was a cable from Guy, saying I'm back - probably a letter because he came by sea didn't he?

M Yes.

B Saying I'm coming back on the Queen Mary - I think it was the Queen Mary. And I went down to meet him, and there was a confusion - Jackie was supposed to come down too but didn't. And I met him and we drove away; and on the ~~way~~ ^{way} immediately he said "Look, Donald's in trouble", and I must ^{contact} ~~help~~ him at once. And from then onwards, immediately, I was only in touch with Guy - I think I told you I was in fact due to have lunch with Donald almost by chance, I think I had seen him once about a fortnight or three weeks before, and we had arranged to have lunch again and I rang up to put it off and Donald said afterwards to Guy "I suppose ^{you told Anthony to cancel it} ~~turn left and go to (?)~~" which was the first that I realised, the first indication I had that Donald knew anything about me and, according to Guy, it was the first indication that he had, though undoubtedly Guy must have told him a long time ago that (mumbles). Then he, I remember exactly his explaining to me in great detail how he made contact with Donald. He wandered into the Foreign Office and he had written on a piece of paper which he was going to put down in front of Donald "Go on talking naturally as if nothing was happening but meet me, ^{as it might be,} ~~(S)~~ at the Reform Club at 1 o'clock"; and he went in and put this down in front of Donald and they had a little chat and he went out, and then they met and I think it was at that stage - Guy, I suppose, had a car, yes well, either he or Donald - and I think it was at that time they - what I can't remember is how many days this was after Guy got back, it was not many, two or three at the most - and he then explained - told Donald what was up and I think Donald then said that he had noticed that he was being followed, and there was some episode (??) or one of the other meetings, in which a car, the car tailing him, I think actually bumped into their car - it sounded as though there was slightly coarse technique. Then he and Donald met a number of times I think - not very many times because they were trying to be cautious, but I think they met more often than they should have - and at the same time Guy had an arrangement for meeting his contact here, it was in fact Peter.

Exrd. to PF 604, 528 - MACG EAV
Exrd. to PF 604, 529 - BORGESS

M Now was Donald himself in contact at that time?

B That I don't know. I should have thought ^{he - well} - no, I was going to say I should have thought he must have - because after all he had been in such trouble.

M ~~You~~ see the surprising thing is - I mean Kim or Guy -

B No, he can't have been -

M Kim and/or Guy must have been in contact in the States.

B They were. (very firm).

M Well, presumably they reported to the Russians in New York - "Donald is in trouble".

B That I know they did. (very firm)

M Therefore the Russians thereafter could have taken charge.

B If they were in contact with Donald.

M Yes.

B ~~But~~ ^{And} I think that is proof they weren't.

M Yes. Well, in that case, I suppose it's likely the Russians said to Guy "Well, you bloody well get back to London as fast as you can ^{and warn him}".

B Well, you know, I don't think - I've got a perfectly clear impression from Guy and nothing from Kim later to contradict it, that his coming back was entirely accidental. It's true that after something Michael said last night - he was saying that he had met Guy, I remember Guy saying that he had met him I didn't remember it was so immediately but Michael saying "Oh, you are still up to it". Well Guy never told me that; because that would have stuck in my memory clearly, and therefore Guy may not have been candid about other things.

M Yes.

B I'm sorry - where did we get to?

M Well, we were really debating whether Guy was a ^{plant, as it were,} (P) in this or whether he was acting under instructions.

B Well, my impression was very strongly that it was a series of accidents - if it was under instructions, it was brilliantly acted.

M Well, yes. He really behaved so outrageously, I don't think the Ambassador could have done anything but send him back. But whether this was deliberate or not we will never know.

B I can't conceive why he shouldn't have told me this - I mean on the

Exrd. to PF 604, 558 - MACLEAN
 Exrd. to PF 604, 529 - BURGESS

B (cont) contrary -

M No. He would have regarded it as -

B Yes. And ^{he} ~~I~~ well could have said "Look, you think I'm an old drunkard, but this time I was doing it for a purpose".

M Exactly.

B Yes. I think that is the case.

M So when he made this contact with Donald then the chances are that the Russians were not aware that he was going this far ahead.

B Oh yes. Because he and Kim were in regular contact in Washington and/or New York. And that was all being organised - that moment was very close indeed because ^{they were already} ~~we already were~~ panicking and they certainly knew that Guy was coming back-at the last moment because he had been given ~~in~~ contact here -

M I see - and presumably organised him to see Donald.

B Oh, yes, certainly. And Guy came back with some means of making contact.

M In other words the Russians could have looked after it themselves presumably but this fell into their laps. I mean Guy was

B It would have been very difficult for them if they were out of contact.

M If they were out of contact it would, I suppose.

B If they weren't - I tell you (gap in tape) They were very very shy about doing it.

M Yes yes. Yes I can well believe it.

B And particularly to someone in, er, our ~~(?)~~

M Yes, yes.

B No, I think that this was a -

M They had a lot to lose in Donald; I mean it must have been vital to them that he shouldn't be picked up.

B Yes.

M Well, Guy has now made contact with Donald. Donald

Band Guy has made contact with Peter

M Yes

B And then there were comings and goings. How long was Guy in England - it was a matter of - what ten days - jolly short -

M It wasn't very long. I really can't tell you - a week or so.

END. 604.529 - BORGERS [END. 604.528 - MACLEAN

- M Yes Now you said Guy made contact with Peter. This was the result of arrangements which had been made
- B Which were made in the United States beforehand, yes. That is certain.
- M Yes.
- B He came back with the means of making contact and did so. And then I saw him naturally a good deal and as you can imagine he was in an appalling state, ^{- and indeed so were we all -} and this is a point you touched on last night with Michael. He - I'll have to reconstruct a little now - but roughly speaking he came and said "I'm making arrangements for Donald to go" and then, I remember one day ~~his~~ coming to me after a meeting and saying "They've told me I must go too" and that's what I was - we just touched on last night.
- M And you think that he may not have been telling the truth?
- B Well, I think that he was misrepresenting the truth in the sense that I think he had said he had persuaded Peter.
- M That he would have to go too -
- B That he would have to go too. And, of course, in view of what Michael said last night it may be right, may be he did have to go too. But I know, and this we talked about very rapidly last night, -
- M Well, I can tell you that Michael's plot misfired. He did in fact - he told me this in Washington - think that he had reported it, he agreed that it was rather a cowardly way of doing it, but he thought he had reported it in such a way that he would himself not be implicated but that it was bound to reach the -
- B Oh I see.
- M But in fact it misfired - it never got there. He did it through his wife who was a psychiatrist or a doctor of some kind who knew somebody in the Embassy, and she reported to him and -
- B And she reported -?
- M Well I don't know exactly what she did report, nobody knows.
- B Reported to whom?
- M To this somebody in the Embassy - Australian, I can't remember his name, but he told me - but it never ^{or} rose. Whoever it was just sat on it - the end of the ~~fable~~ ^{tale!} Anyway I'm sorry - we'll go back to this later.

Exrd. WOPF 606, S29- BURGERS

B (cont) And that, I daresay in the very intemperate state he was in was, may have been, a correct judgement; but what I think was quite wrong was Guy, I remember, saying "I'm sure that plans have been laid for him to go to Switzerland or somewhere but I'm sure he won't be able to carry it out. I must go with him". That was before, I think, he came back and said "They've told me to go". I'm not quite certain how those two things interlock but both arguments were - - -

M They must have realised just as well as Kim what the results of Guy going would be, they must have realised that. They cannot have encouraged him to go and indeed I'd have thought they must have discouraged him to go. Therefore it is, you think, conceivable that he was, in fact, lying when he told you "They've told me I must go" - even a direct lie, even if he had said to them "I think I ought to go" I still think their reaction would have been "You will not go".

B Mind you, with the Michael threat - that would have been a strong argument but I'm fairly certain that he persuaded them to let him go.

M And by this time he simply wasn't thinking of you ^{or} ~~and~~ Kim.

B I don't honestly think he was thinking of anyone. I'm fairly sure of that because I think he simply wasn't calculating because he must have known that he'd got those trunkloads of papers, and didn't so far as I know destroy a single one. As I think I told you I abstracted two but he simply hadn't touched them and obviously didn't think at all. He was very, very nearly past that, mind working with incredible quickness but in a perfectly unpredictable way.

M Well, now your own part in this - at some stage you were introduced to Peter?

B Yes.

M By Guy?

B By, erm, well I suppose I was -

M Or possibly Guy wasn't there but at any rate the ^{link} - -

B ~~Q~~ was made, yes.

M When we discussed this before you said that you assumed that this was in case you were needed to play some part but in fact you didn't.

Card. W PF 604. 529- BURGESS

B I didn't play any - I didn't play any active part in the -

M So I suppose PETER was calming you, was he? When you saw him.
Telling you not to worry.

B Well I think that my mind wasn't working properly either at this stage.
I think we were mainly concerned with Donald's getting away - or Donald
and Guy and I'm pretty certain that it didn't really break on me what
the consequences and the dangers were till later on or till a later
stage. Then a good deal of calming.

M So that before the flight -

B I rather doubt that I saw PETER more than once. I don't remember that
I saw him ^{more} than just to make ~~the~~ contact before the flight.

M You weren't even aware of what the precise plans were, or were you?

B I was aware the last day - that they were -

M This from Guy?

B From Guy, yes. I was aware of the immediate moves in the sense that he
told me - there was one moment when he thought of asking me to go and buy
tickets for them and then said "no you can't afford the risk" but he
did tell me that he was booking on (?) I don't know whether he told
me the detail or not but he wasn't going ordinary straight cross
channel thing and I saw him on the morning before he went, he came in here
and he must I think have had (pause) er, I'm just wondering, I was going
to say he must have had an early morning meet^{ing} with PETER but I'm not
quite sure if that was the case because I think he'd been down that
week-end - for those few days - to stay with the other Peter - No,
no, I'm sorry, he went down to stay that week-end with Peter POLLOCK
and it was the Monday morning that he came round in a state of
really absolute total collapse and he'd been taking - oh, all the
wrong kind of drugs together with a lot of drink and so on. He was
really in a state of total collapse. No, the Friday - the Friday
morning he came in and I think he had had a sort of final meeting
to arrange the last details and he came in more or less to say
goodbye and then, either then or possibly even the day before he
told me they were going to make this cross channel thing and that
they were going towards Switzerland and that they were going to make

ROR Ex 10. WPF 604, 529 - BURSERS

Ext'd. to PF604.
S29-BUCCESS

B (cont) contact with someone at the Embassy. That was why I was very puzzled later to read all the stuff about Prague, but I suppose it's possible they went on from there to Prague. That was definitely his version of where they were going. (Brief discussion about the newspaper story of the disappearance).

B Then for a period after they'd gone I was, so to speak, permanently on tap. I had to go and look at a particular place to see whether there was a chalk cross, etc. and if so it meant I had to meet the next day or whatever it was, and I think that I only - no - I think I met PETER twice because all these arrangements went wrong and something that looked like a white chalk cross wasn't. But I met him, I think, twice and on the first occasion he said "You must go too" and gave me er, you know, sort of packets of dollars and pound notes and absolutely insane instructions which were roughly that I was to go to Paris - I was to leave the next morning, this was - no it wasn't in the middle of term - but I was to disappear next morning and go to Paris and go to, as it might be, the Finnish Embassy and get a visa to Helsinki and there go to Russia somehow and it became, quite apart from the fact that I had no intention of going, it became perfectly clear to me that they simply hadn't made any plans whatsoever.

End of Tape I

INTERRUPTION

M You were saying that at this first meeting after the flight PETER said you would have to go. Did he give any arguments?

B No, he just simply said they'll be after everyone and, and, well, you're for it - which I -

M By this time, I suppose, you had in fact made your number with Guy Liddell. You'd already started the process of explaining, of covering up things?

B I can't remember whether I had.

M You came in pretty quickly, didn't you?

B I came in - the weekend and - Tommy, yes. Tommy and I came in on the Monday - the Monday or the Tuesday. That's true, yes.

M So is it likely that you'd seen PETER over the weekend?

B No, no, I'm sorry.

- M So you had already started and presumably this had given you some confidence. Had you told PETER about this?
- B Oh, presumably yes.
- M But at any rate his advice was -
- B Was - yes. But I remember his simply saying "Well, you know they'll be raging after everyone".
- M And you said?
- B I said - at the meeting I think I said nothing but the arrangement was either he said "Orders are, go tomorrow morning but if you don't go we meet two months later" and - I didn't go and I did meet him two months later and that I think fairly certainly was the last - yes I'm sure was the last meeting of that period. I remember being faintly surprised at his not being more violent. I mean, he couldn't obviously force me to go, but I was rather surprised at his not being more violent.
- M At that meeting you had said you had made up your mind.
- B Yes. That I was not going.
- M And he just accepted it?
- B He just accepted it.
- M My God, we should have taken you to that meeting. Did you take enormous precautions?
- B Well -- at that time one was absolutely hopping, yes, and going down the back alleys and one way streets and so on.
- M But you were still meeting in the open? Parks and -
- B Yes, oh yes. This was somewhere right out at Hendon (?) or somewhere (spoken very quietly).
- M Did you take evasive action? Were you conscious of having to satisfy yourself you were not being followed?
- B Very much so.
- M Did they give you instructions or did they assume that -
- B In the very early days they sort of imposed the instructions. One met at a bus stop and then it was all extremely complicated. Both got on to the bus and got off at different stops and then re-met; but later it was left to one's -
- M You were not given a prescribed route to take? You were given a

M (cont) meeting place but not a route?

B I think in the early days one met at a particular bus stop and had to get into a particular bus going a particular way and that was all laid down. Later you simply met and usually walked for some little period - the other person led off and then you followed and then after a certain number of turnings they contacted

M Yes, yes. Well, having convinced him that you were not going, this you think was the last meeting?

B That was the last meeting of that phase, yes. The last, I think until this other episode which I find very difficult to date.

M Having left you at this meeting he gave you no instructions at all. You were on your own.

B No I wasn't left. One minute. I think it must have been (telephone interrupted). I think it must have been at this stage that I had long term instructions - - about if nothing happens ^{from up} at such and such a point - it might be a year late -

M Yes. Say if nothing happens you mean -

B If there is no direct contact.

M There were still chalk marks. You were still looking out for chalk marks?

B I suppose - yes. The instructions were to go on looking out for chalk marks and after a very few days I simply stopped this altogether and then there was one long term thing about, as it might be, meet at the Caledonian Road Station on the 1st December next year, which I didn't keep, and I daresay the instructions said "and if that doesn't work then the next year as well". Very long term.

M The next episode then is re-contact with PETER. At a time when Kim, at any rate, was uneasy. But not necessarily in '56, when the thing appeared in the Press? 55
swel

B I think it probably was, but when you said '56 that seemed a good deal nearer than my recollection. That was why I sort of reacted with surprise. I'd thought of it as longer ago but that is what - eight years. No, it must have been at that time.

M When the Press was?

*MODIN out of UK from
3-11-56 to 11-12-52*

EXD to PF604584-PHILBY

April 54
PETROV's recollections

? July 54?
PHILBY asked AFB
to contact Roman
for him
Aug 54 "The Clouds"
have left 4

S.R.

No. 7789

4 public lectures
May 54

? PETROV

Evrd. to AF 604, 584 - PHILBY

Bank
Ireland
21.1.56.

B I think it must have been now because I know that Kim was in a real panic and I don't think there was any other period.

M This was when he gave his conference.

B Gave his conference. When comments had been made in the House of Commons. Would there have been any other period when?

M No, I don't think so.

B I think it must have been then.

M Well, how did you get involved then?

B We have a series of public lectures here on Tuesday evenings and at the end of one someone, as I was coming out, stepped up and said - I didn't recognise him at all at first, it was in fact PETER, - with a little sort of picture postcard reproduction of a painting and said "I'm sorry, could I ask your opinion on this" and on the postcard was written ^{"Meet you"} in Guy's handwriting "Meet you (as it might be) eight o'clock tomorrow" and I wondered whether that place in the Caledonian Road or - and I went and they said that they were worried about Kim and wanted to contact him - - or rather, didn't want to see him because they were too frightened - were worried ... and I went, knowing that Kim was in a state, made an arrangement for him to meet them which they simply didn't keep (inaudible) and Kim, what I do remember is that I must have seen Kim between contact here and my meeting with PETER. I remember Kim saying "For God's sake, I'm really on the spot. Tell them they must arrange to get me out of here immediately". So it must have been at that moment. He was in a real panic.

M So he must have been out of contact presumably.

B Yes.

M Do you know how long?

B No I don't. He was in England ^{then?}

M Yes. He hadn't gone to Beirut.

B No, but wasn't there this period in Ireland at this stage. What I'm wondering is whether in fact he hadn't been out of contact since '51. There was this period I know when he went to Ireland. He was going to write the history of some big brewery - some big firm - was going to get him to write and he was there for some - there was a long period when I didn't see him at all - a matter of years. Aileen died after this?

M Yes, '57, '58. Well, let's not digress. Kim wanted to -- knowing that you were going to meet PETER was asking you to beg PETER to get him out.

B To get him out at once.

M And you conveyed this message?

B I conveyed this message and he said 'tell Kim to meet me next day or - and didn't turn up.

M And then?

B That was it.

M That was the end?

B That's the end. That's the end as far as I'm concerned and as far as Kim is concerned also I think till Beirut. Which is a long time. No, not all that long.

M There they made their own arrangements.

B There they did the dangerous thing. Someone from the Embassy came round to call on him.

M He told you this?

B He told me this, yes. And when that happened I don't know.

M But they played no part in his going to Beirut. He wasn't encouraged by them in any way?

B I don't think he could have been as he was out of contact. No I think as far as I know that was simply a spontaneous thing. He was desperately in need of a job and purely financially - and had through his father all these interests in the Middle East and -- and he had, I do remember his saying that he tried for various jobs and it was quite clear - journalism or whatever it was -

M It was just the reverse. I think they were trying to help him through-out.

B Then that was simply false deduction.

M I think that's right and whether they played any part in the Observer job - I think they probably did. Now there are two events in those intervening years '51 - '56 which you conceivably could have heard about later on. First is CAIRNCROSS. Did you know anything about CAIRNCROSS' troubles in '52?

Handwritten: Beirut 958

Handwritten: GVD 10 PF 604, 584 - PHILBY

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ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 JANUARY 23

- B Yes, I did. Yes, but only from Skardon not otherwise, no. I knew nothing about it at all. That was '52? Yes. No, on one occasion when Skardon came to talk to me he produced this.
- M He lost his job, of course (CAIRNCROSS). And tried to make contact with them. They had an arrangement whereby he could make an emergency chalk mark. Had you got that? An emergency -?
- B I did at one stage.
- M He had this. He made the chalk mark and it meant ^{to meet} the following Monday and they didn't turn up. This was a meeting we were covering and that, I suspect, is why they didn't turn up. So he had to make his own way. Now the other thing that I would like to ask you about is Melinda's journey.
- B Melinda? Of that I knew absolutely nothing. Nothing at all. I never met Melinda and knew nothing about it.
- M Was she aware? Was she conscious?
- B I don't know at all. No, as I say I never met her, knew nothing of -- no, wait a minute. I'm trying to think if I knew --. No, I don't even know what happened on the night when Guy and Donald went down there. I thought not.
- M Whether she knew, I don't know. She gave me the impression that she didn't.
- B I thought that was the case. But of her journey I know absolutely nothing except what I read in the papers.
- M Well, she was assisted. There's no doubt about that.
- B Well, that's obvious, yes.
- M How this was arranged, I don't know. This is something -
- B No, I don't know. I can't now remember when it was.
- M '53, I would think.
- B This is not a blank of memory but I know I've never known it. And I don't think Kim would have known it. I mean, in the sense, that I think I should probably have heard something from Kim. He may - he might have provided a means of contact or something but he certainly never talked to me about it.
- M Now you saw Kim when you went yourself to Beirut and presumably you had also seen him when he came back here after he'd taken up a job in

M Beirut. Did you come closer to Kim in the later years?
cont.

B Not really, no. I suppose probably for reasons of caution we kept apart. No, I didn't and -- I was going to say I didn't see him between, the supposing it was '56 episode and -- but I don't suppose that's true, in fact I'm sure we occasionally met at parties but I don't remember having any sort of conscious contact with him during those years at all, and then in Beirut I didn't get in contact with him. He rang me. He knew I was there (quite inaudible).

M Well, you were staying with the Ambassador.

B I was staying with the Ambassador.

M So he presumably ..

B And anyhow it was not difficult to find out. And we met and had a drink, and then he told me that he had done this business about someone coming round and knocking on the door, and then, as I have told you, I think, he said that he had been asked, instructed, to find out what I was doing.

M With a view to ..

B Yes. But whether there was anything in it ... and as I think I told you he -- didn't press for it. And I think it was a -- I suspect -- well he must have realised that it was very ..

M Yes. Yes. This was two years ago that .. sixty -

B ... exactly '62 - oh! -

M '62 I think.

B Not '63?

M '62.

B No - '62, I'm sorry.

M Had you any hint then that he might be thinking of going?

B None. None at all.

M In fact the opposite.

B I mean, he seemed sort of very settled and happy.

M Yes.

B No. Not a trace.

M Hmm. Did you meet Eleanor?

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ACT 1958

copy to PP 604, 584 - PHILBY

364b.

B Who?

M Did you meet Eleanor?

B I met - yes. Um, I met her - - my recollection is that we went - - we met at that hotel which he used as a club and we had a drink and then we went up to the flat and had a drink or a meal I forget which with her and the children, but no more than that; and then I met her again at a lunch one day [redacted]

M In Beirut?

B In Beirut, yes.

M This was while [redacted] was still -

B While he was still en poste, yes. And that, I think, was all, I might have seen him once or twice - - -. And that was presumably the last time I saw him. Did he come back? Well, I certainly didn't see him.

M I suppose that's really the end of the background story, as it were - the broad canvas - and now we fill in bits and pieces. There are still more names, names of people we want to throw in but what I'm really much more anxious to do is to get on to further interrogations.

B Yes. One thing I do want to say a propos of the story of Peter ASTBURY and Brian. On thinking it over I realise that there were elements of reconstruction in that. I mean it wasn't a straight memory. Actually my memory (?) because you mentioned the question of the G.R.U. and sometime afterwards suddenly what jumped to my mind was Peter ASTBURY - Military Attache and Leo, and then remembering the thing more carefully I remembered this came through "X" and what is surprising is that I didn't remember Brian SIMON immediately. That was what would appear to be reconstruction. I remembered that somebody had taken the notion to do Leo and Leo had come to me and that I had been able to do something about it because I'd known that there had been such (?) contact with. And I remember primarily that it was this that led me to tell George or Henry that I had in fact (recruited Brian?). I only say that because bringing Brian SIMON's name into it was not a direct memory, it was a reconstruction. I think - I still think it is right, but it was a deduction. From this story.

M I'm not entirely clear how you drew that ..

Ex 10 to PF 604, 586 - PHILBY

Ex 10 to PF 45907 link B

Ex 10 to PF 6114 - ASTBURY

Ex 10 to PF 604, 789 - LONG

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B Well I draw that conclusion because I remember as a result of this episode, when I reported the whole thing to Henry, I had to come clean about the fact that I had come clean to Brian. And therefore I remember that that was it. It might be important in the sense that I mean I might hate bringing Brian's name into it of course, but it wasn't a direct memory of remembering that Brian (??)

M ? That Leo came instead
(both talking together) - - -

B ... It wasn't that ...

M But the fact that you confessed that you had - makes you think

B Makes me fairly certain that it must have been Brian. And this of course we can get Leo - er - he can confirm, - it just occurred to me.

M Are you unduly sensitive about Brian. I mean you feel you are doing ...

B Well, I am very fond of Brian. I have got a great affection for him. But - I am sensitive about him, on the other hand my guess would be, you may know better, that his activities are so open that I should have thought that he wasn't involved in anything like that. But he is - there is no question - that he is now a member of the Central Committee, or something.

M I honestly don't know. I still haven't got round to looking at his file

B No - - (both talking together) - - there is certainly no concealment about him. And I think you said that Peter ASTBURY was the same.

M Yes. I'm told that he is still ... I don't know if he is a card-holding member but anyhow there seem to be strong affiliations.

END OF TAPE

Ext'd 16
PF45907 hmk B

copied to PF 61,141 - ASTBURY

Ext'd to PF 6044789 - LONG

Possibles for "Henry":-

- (36) Pavel Dmitrievich ERZINE (YERZINE)
PF 63,512
- (37) Georgi Alexandrovich SINITSIN
PF 603,344
- (38) A.A. ROSH alias ROSHIN
PF 68,748

364a

Photographs of Russians to be shown to BLUNTPossibles for "Henry":-

- (21) Mikhail BASHARIN: PF 603,439 X
- (22) A. SVERLOV: RL.8/3776 Possible - see Transcript of 20 May 1964
- (23) Mikhail Nikolaevich SVIRIN: PF 603,309 X 1364b
- (24) Mikhail Alexandrovich BURINSKI X
- (25) Mikhail Ivanovich BYCHKOV: PF 69,667 X
- (26) Boris Ivanovich KARAVAEV: PF 603,310 X
- (27) Mikhail Pavlovich KALUGIN: PF 154,498 X
- (28) Filipp Vasilievich KISLITSYN: PF 68,663 X
- (29) Petre Nikolaevich KRUTIKOV: PF 68,489 X
- (30) Daniel Fedorovich KRAMINOV: PF 68,691 X
- (31) Mikhail Fedorovich SHISHKIN: PF 67,955 X
- (32) Feodosi Danilovich YAROSHENKO: PF 68,611 X
- (33) Boris Anatolyevich YASTREBOV: PF 68,664 X See also 38/a
- (34) Alexei Alexeevich ZAVERTKIN: PF 603,335 X
- (35) Yuri Stepanovich ZHEMCHUZHNIKOV: PF 67,956 X

D.1

20.5.64.

D/ING
20/5

3642

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ACT 1958.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

File
LE
VR
362b

PF.604,582/C3B/1

8th May, 1964.

Dear Mr. Street,

Anthony Frederick BLUNT - 3602a

Please refer to the attached vetting enquiry submitted on behalf of the British Council for the above named.

There is nothing in our records which would warrant any objection being raised to the proposed British Council tour in Austria.

May we please be informed of the British Council's decision in due course.

Yours sincerely,

h

J. E. D. Street, Esq.,
Foreign Office.
NSP/BB Enc. 1

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

11 MAY 1964

2/1/64
12/1

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ACT 1958 JANUARY 2023

TOP SECRET

4th Interview

362A

Handed to D by WJL/KES on 8/5/64

Note for PF.604,582

Ext'd. to PF 604,711
(JOHNSTON) on 20.5.64
Ext'd. to PF 604,789
(LONG) on 14.5.64

name of fields
that

I interviewed Professor BLUNT at 3 p.m. on Sunday, 3 May, 1964 at 18 Chandos Court, Caxton Street, S.W.1. The meeting lasted until 5 p.m. Unfortunately I was unable to persuade the recorder to record and therefore this report is based on memory aided by notes.

2. I asked BLUNT to continue his account of his own career starting at the outbreak of war. He said that in September 1939 he applied to join the Intelligence Corps. He did this despite the advice he had received from his Russian controller (probably via BURGESS) to take no steps to shape his wartime career but to lie low and await instructions. BLUNT presumes that he wrote his application to the War Office. He remembers receiving by the same post two replies to his application. The first said that his application had been turned down. The other instructed him to report to a given place at a given time. BLUNT told me that he learned later (he thought from a colonel in the Intelligence Corps) that the rejection of his application was based on information from M.I.5. However, he carried out the instructions in the second letter and was duly commissioned in the Intelligence Corps and posted to Minley Manor for training. From there he went to France where he joined a Field Security Section in Boulogne. BLUNT said that he did not make contact with the Russians while in France but he did meet PHILBY and revealed to him that, like him, he was working with BURGESS for the Russian Intelligence Service. He passed to PHILBY a copy of the "F.S.S. Suspect List" with the intention that PHILBY should pass it to the Russians.

Ext'd. to PF
604,586
PHILBY

3. BLUNT returned to the United Kingdom two or three days before the evacuation of Dunkirk and went to an Army camp in Kent. Soon afterwards he visited Lord ROTHSCHILD in London who introduced him to Captain Liddell. BLUNT presumes that ROTHSCHILD looked him up in M.I.5. records, found the reference to his visit to Russia in 1936, informed Captain Liddell and together they decided that the record could safely be ignored. At any rate, BLUNT was invited to join the Security Service and is quite sure that neither ROTHSCHILD nor Captain Liddell suspected his connection with the Russian Intelligence Service.

1 Corps X
2 ml

Blunt 21/230
SF 441-0302-5-1
made in
PF 60556435
I have not
received at that
time

4. BLUNT entered the Security Service in June 1940 and was posted to Brigadier Allen's section at Wormwood Scrubs. At this time BURGESS was still in Section D. of M.I.6. but, a few months later moved to the B.B.C. PHILBY was in the process of joining M.I.6.

5. During the first few months in the office BLUNT passed material to Lizzie PHILBY who in turn passed it to Bob STEWART at Communist Party Headquarters. BLUNT presumes that Bob STEWART passed it to the Russians. He remembers being asked to provide copies of the

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
/Security

TOP SECRET

EWS. 6 PF 68.261-LIZY PHILBY

Security Service files for prominent members of the Communist Party. He did this although it involved taking risks which he did not welcome. By the autumn of 1940 contact was re-established with his Russian controller, almost certainly "George". However work in Brigadier Allen's section gave him little access to useful material and his controller urged him to try to move to B. Division (BLUNT interpolated that he had by this time given his controller details of the structure of the office). BLUNT finally left Brigadier Allen's section just before the move from Wormwood Scrubs. He became P.A. to Captain Liddell, Director B. Division. Here he had access to B. Division papers of a general nature but not to detailed case work. He remembers that his Russian controller was disappointed with his access at this time. In the event, the appointment was not a success and, after a few months BLUNT was asked to set up a new ^{sub}section, B.l.b. His brief was to study the activities of neutral diplomats in London. His senior officer was Herbert Hart. He ^{also} had an assistant whose name he ~~thought~~ ^{presumed} was Gibbs and who had previously worked in Censorship. He sat in the same room as Milmo.

6. BLUNT remained in B.l.B. for the duration of the war. We went through together the various types of material which he handled :



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Special Material

9. BLUNT said that he presumably passed items of Special Material when he thought them interesting but his recollection was that most of it was of little value.

XXX Material

10. BLUNT said that the Russians showed more interest in the methods by which this material was obtained than in its content.

/OO Material

7
3
2
9

OO Material

11. BLUNT said that he presumably gave a general account of the methods used to acquire the material and would have passed any items of interest.

Deception

13. BLUNT said that he was a member of a committee which concerned itself with the spreading of rumours. He thought it was called the TWIST Committee. BLUNT thought its efforts were futile. Apart from that, he did not remember being concerned with deception.

Surveillance Reports

14. BLUNT said that he certainly passed B.6 reports, particularly those covering Russian activities. He remembered that his controller showed interest in a report which indicated that one of the watchers, when engaged on a Russian case, had himself been 'tailed'.

D/A Cases

15. BLUNT said that he would have passed details of all D/A cases to which he had access. The only case he could remember was GARBO.

SHAEF, Norfolk House

16. BLUNT said that he would have passed any useful information obtained during his secondment to SHAEF. He certainly informed the Russians about D. Day. X

Russian PF.s

17. BLUNT repeated what he had said before that he did not normally have access to the files of Russian officials but he would have passed any information which came his way. He does not remember being asked to get such information nor does he remember passing any. He does remember reading some files of Russian activities in the immediate post-Revolution period which had been marked for destruction. He voiced his disagreement with the decision to destroy. (see

18. BLUNT answered specific questions as follows :

- (a) He did not think he was ever in a position to 'blow' an M.I.6. source. At any rate, he has no recollection of doing so. The only source he can remember 'blowing' was Max Knight's

/source in

PF 603,749

source in the British Communist Party (which he had already described).

- (b) He remembered being asked by his Russian controller to discover all he could about a burglary at the Soviet Military Attache's office in Addison Road. He thought this occurred in the latter stages of the war. He could find nothing to suggest that the Security Service had been involved and accordingly reported that it must have been an ordinary criminal at work. He remembers that his controller refused to believe this. I asked what enquiries he had made to get this information. He said that he doubted if he had made any because such information would have passed through B.I.B. in the normal way. If he had made any it would have been to F. Division and probably orally to Hugh Shillito.
- (c) He had no recollection at all of the case of Oliver Charles GREEN. He agreed therefore that this case could not have impinged on his own activities.
- (d) He had only a vague recollection of the SPRINGHALL case and could not call to mind the details. He agreed that this case could not have impinged on his own activities.
- (e) He could remember only one period of real panic although there had been other occasions on which he had been warned to be cautious. This was when KRIVITSKY's information was published. He (and presumably BURGESS) had known that one source described by KRIVITSKY was MACLEAN. He did not remember that PHILBY had been imperilled by KRIVITSKY nor, on prompting, could he believe that PHILBY had ever been told to assassinate Franco.
- (f) He remembered that much of the information he had passed came from gossip. He could not remember any specific item obtained this way but he commented that most officers were indiscreet.

a check on

ELLI

Exd. to PF
66, 962 - ELLI

19. I returned again to the subject of talent-spotting. BLUNT agreed that he must have passed pen-pictures of the main personalities in the office but he could not remember being specifically asked to do so.

/Nor did he

Extracted to PF 604, 711 (JOHNSTON) on 20.5.64

Nor did he think the Russians had ever asked him about a particular person. He repeated that the only name he had ever suggested for recruitment was Kemball JOHNSON. He was pretty sure that this had occurred after Kemball JOHNSON had moved to Blenheim and he associated it with "Henry" rather than "George". This led him to remember that he had been handed over to "Henry" while "George" was still in London. He also remembered that the talent-spotting of Kemball JOHNSON had almost certainly preceded his discussion with "Henry" about staying in the office himself after the war. I asked how he had got to know Kemball JOHNSON sufficiently well to recommend him if Kemball JOHNSON was working in Blenheim. He said that Kemball JOHNSON came to London fairly frequently and he and BURGESS would often spend evenings with him in the Reform Club. On the whole, he thought it was probably in 1942 that he had recommended Kemball JOHNSON.

Extracted to PF 604, 789 (LONG) on 14.5.64

20. We then turned to the wartime history of Leo LONG. BLUNT said that he contacted LONG soon after joining the Security Service and thereafter saw him approximately once a month when LONG would hand over material, if he had any. BLUNT said that he received so few reports from LONG that he suspected that he had had a change of heart and was not really trying. He remembered that his Russian controller had complained about LONG's material and, as a result, LONG was put into direct contact with "George" or "Henry" in order to ginger him up. BLUNT thought that LONG had only met his Russian controller two or three times.

21. BLUNT's next recollection (apart from the Brian SIMON/Peter ASTBURY incident which he had already described) was of a meeting with LONG at Bad Oenhausen in Germany at the end of the war. BLUNT remembered that he had paid three visits to Germany in 1945. Before leaving on one of them he had been instructed by "Henry" to encourage LONG to seek a job in M.I.5. BLUNT saw LONG and put the proposal to him. LONG was unwilling - he said it would be "boring" and, in any case, he wanted to go into politics - but nevertheless left BLUNT with the impression that he would apply to Dick White. BLUNT thought that he himself probably mentioned LONG's name to Dick White. BLUNT said that he did not know whether LONG had ever applied but he knew that he did not get into M.I.5. *Yeabe did.*

22. Before we parted I discussed with BLUNT the possibility of his helping in the interrogation of some of the people he had named. He said that this was the worst part of the business but he was prepared to go through with it. We discussed the following cases :-

Brian SIMON

E.H.'d

to PF 45907 link 3

23. BLUNT said that he was still a close friend of SIMON and was convinced that SIMON could never be induced to talk. He was now a lecturer at Leicester University and an open, dedicated member of the Communist Party.

/Peter ASTBURY

(F folder)
(ASTBURY)

Ext'd. to PF 61, 141
on 21.5.64

Peter ASTBURY

24. BLUNT said that he did not know ASTBURY very well but, to the best of his belief, he was still a convinced communist. He doubted if he could be induced to talk.

Ext'd. to PF 604, 789
(LONG) on 14.5.64

Leo LONG

25. BLUNT thought that this was a real possibility but, of course, he could not be sure that LONG was not still working for the Russians. He suggested that he might have LONG to his flat and try to establish that he had had a change of heart. I could be waiting in an adjoining room ready to join in if the prospects were good. I said that I would like to think this over.

Ext'd. to PF 604, 711
(JOHNSON) on 20.5.64

Kemball JOHNSON

26. I said that I had no precise plans yet for interviewing Kemball JOHNSON but it was a case which had to be cleared up. I said that I might wish to use information which BLUNT had given and probably to attribute it to him. We agreed to talk this over at a future meeting.

D.1.

A.S. Martin

8.5.64.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference PF 68,248

3606

Loose Minute.

D.1., Miss McBarnet.

In connection with the copy of the extract at 7c in this file, which I handed to you, I am now enclosing the complete note and covering minute with which it was concerned, taken from quite a different file. However, you might also like to see the serials concerned with the search of GUROV, which had taken place only a short time before, as you will see at 7b et seq.

Joan Russell King.

J. Russell King.

D.3.

7.5.64.

Encs.

CONFIDENTIAL

✓
D/K
1/46

Copy from L. 453-4, Volume 2, Serial 87a.

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

From B.1.B. Captain Blunt.

To F.2.B. Mr. Shillito.

I have received that attached lists from Swan, indicating the location and functions of various members of the Mission here. The people on List 2 between the blue lines are those for whom Swan would very much like to have some kind of official pass. Those ticked in red are members of the party whom Firebrace and Swan regard with particular favour.

Swan was again emphatic, indeed very emphatic, in his praise of everything connected with this mission.

Date 11.7.42.

Signed: A.F. Blunt.

LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION DEALING WITH WAR STORES.

<u>NAME</u> <u>DEPARTMENTAL</u> <u>HEADS</u>	<u>SPECIALITY</u>	<u>WHERE ORDINARILY RESIDING</u>
Borisenko, D.	Trade Representative	Head Office London
Filin, P.	Deputy Trade Representative	" " "
Feonov, N.	" " "	" " "
Soloviev, P.I.	Head of Military Engineering Section	" " "

MILITARY
ENGINEERS

Chovskiy, K.V.	Tanks (Head of Tank Sub-Section)	Head Office London
Timchenko, F.N.	Tanks	Depot, Chilwell, Notts.
Odintsov, S.N.	Tanks	" " "
Gurov, S.N.	Tanks	" " "
Nikolaev, V.A.	Guns	" Donnington, Salop.
Knysh, I.I.	Small Arms	Head Office London.
Eremin, I.S.	Ammunition	Depot, Longtown, Cumberland.
Zagudaev, N.S.	Aircraft (Head of Aircraft Sub- Section).	Head Office London.
Ivanov, S.	Aircraft	" " "
Ivanov, V.	Aircraft	" " "
Janushkevish, V.	Aircraft	" " "
Rumiantsev	Aircraft	" " "
Pashenin, M.M.	Aircraft	" " "
Bogomolov, V.K.	Aircraft	" " "
Siniak	Radio	" " "
Kuvshinov	Radio	" " "

SHIPPING SECTION (Not under R.L.G.'s care)

Mechantiev	Head of Shipping Section	" " "
Chilingiry	" " "	" " "
Gribkov	" " "	" " "

OFFICE STAFF (Interdepartmental)

Soloviev V.I.

Note for PF.604,582

Ext'd to
PF 66, 705 Link A

Ext'd to
PF 45907
link B

I interviewed Professor BLUNT at 6 p.m. on Friday, 1 May, 1964, at 18 Chandos Court, Caxton Street, S.W.1. The meeting lasted until 9.20 p.m.

2. I asked him if he now felt any revulsion at the idea of helping us, explaining that I could well understand that talking about his friends must be repugnant to him. He assured me that all he felt was profound relief. He was thankful to be able to tell me everything he knew - and indeed he had remember one completely new item of information which he wished to impart at once. He explained that his memory had been provoked by a reference I had made at our previous meeting to the Russian Military Intelligence Service.

7.5.64
Extracted to PF 604, 789 (LONG)
Folder ASTBURY on 2.5.64 Ext. to PF 604, 529. BURGESS

3. In the summer of 1939 he and BURGESS had been temporarily out of touch with "George". During one of their discussions BURGESS had said: "Wouldn't it be splendid if we had Brian SIMON looking out for likely recruits for us". SIMON was at that time a leading figure in one of the Communist Party youth movements. BLUNT, who was a close friend of SIMON, interpreted this as an invitation to try to recruit SIMON. This he did and SIMON showed himself willing (indeed, BLUNT said, SIMON was clearly overjoyed to discover that BLUNT was a dedicated worker and not the dilettante he had thought him to be). However, despite his promise, SIMON did not produce any likely recruits, probably because the war intervened (it was in order to find a reason for SIMON's non-productiveness that BLUNT dates the episode as 1939; in discussion later he agreed that it might have been 1938 in which case the GLADING arrest might have been the cause of the break in contact with "George"; however, if it was 1938, BLUNT could think of no reason why SIMON should not have produced recruits; he rejected my explanation which was that SIMON might already have been working for the G.R.U.)

Ext'd to PF 45, 907 link B

4. The next episode in this story occurred in about 1943 when Leo LONG came to BLUNT in some agitation to say that Brian SIMON had tried to recruit him on behalf of Peter ASTBURY. SIMON had explained to LONG that ASTBURY was working for the Soviet Military Attache. BLUNT reported this to "George" (or his successor) who promised to ensure that this did not recur. BLUNT also saw SIMON and told him to "lay off" LONG.

5. BLUNT went on to say that he had known ASTBURY during the latter period of his stay at Cambridge (say 1936). ASTBURY was then an anthropologist. He had joined the Army at the outbreak of war as a technician of some kind and had won some fame by inventing a rudimentary type of computer. After the war ASTBURY had worked as a scientist under Professor BLACKETT. He was now, BLUNT thought, a lecturer at University College, London.

360a

Not GEORGE but HENRY


Ext'd to PF 68705 Link A CHILCOZOROV
Ext. to PF 604, 529 - BURGESS SR 7796

6. Having finished with this story I gave BLUNT the photographs I had brought with me. He at once picked out no. 2 (KROTOV) as "George's" assistant. He said that "George" had introduced him to KROTOV as someone who might attend meetings when he "George", was unable to do so. BLUNT said that he did in fact do so once or twice.

7. BLUNT remember that "George's" successor (he and BURGESS nick-named him "flat-foot") had been called "Henry". His photograph was not among those I showed him. However, BLUNT remembered that BURGESS had once told him that he had run into "Henry" at some official party and that he held a position which was in some way connected with the press. BURGESS had thought he was Soviet Press Attaché or, at any rate, a member of that office.

8. I showed BLUNT a typewritten letter addressed to BURGESS signed "Georg" and a letter from BLUNT to BURGESS (which, by deduction, must have been written about 1938) in which mention was made of a certain "George". BLUNT identified "Georg" as KLIXBUHL, a Danish friend of BURGESS. He was unable to identify the "George" mentioned in his own letter except to say that it was neither KLIXBUHL nor GORSKIY; however, whoever it was, he was sure he was of no significance.

9. While discussing these miscellaneous items BLUNT remembered that Paul HARDT had been known to BURGESS as "Theo".



Ext. to PF 604, 529 - BURGESS
Ext. to PF 72, 493 - CAIRNCROSS

(a) BLUNT said that he had talent-spotted John CAIRNCROSS but had not recruited him. He had given CAIRNCROSS' name to BURGESS who had told him that the recruitment would be made by someone else. BLUNT had always understood that it was BURGESS who had made the recruitment and therefore was surprised when I had told him that it had been

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/which BURGESS

(c) BLUNT remembered that he had 'blown' and important source who was close to the Central Committee of the British Communist Party and was run by Max Knight.

Ext. 16 PF 603 749
Max Knight had told him that this source had written a book about aviation matters and he had duly reported this to his Russian controller. Shortly afterwards he heard from Max Knight that the source had been peremptorily dismissed from King Street. Max seemed in no doubt that it was the result of leakage. BLUNT was fearful that there might be an enquiry which would lead to his being exposed. However nothing more was heard of it. I asked BLUNT if there had been any other occasions on which the Russians had taken action on his information in such a way as to cause him alarm. He could remember none.

D.1.

A.S. Martin

7.5.64.

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ACT 1958 January 2023

3602.

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ACT 1958.

359a

Notes for the Interrogation of BLUNT

29.4.64.

Cambridge

It is quite certain from other sources that BLUNT moved in Communist circles before 1934. Was this perhaps the circle of Maurice DOBB.

BLUNT has said that KLUGMAN knew BURGESS was a spy. Did KLUGMAN tell him this; when.

Did BLUNT talent spot STRAIGHT to "George" or did "George" already know about STRAIGHT and tell BLUNT to recruit him.

Did BLUNT talent spot Leo LONG to "George" and recruit him with "George's" agreement. Could he describe the circumstances of LONG's recruitment and what exactly LONG was told to do.

Does BLUNT remember Paddy COSTELLO at Trinity; COSTELLO was there from approximately 1932 - 35.

BLUNT will no doubt remember Jim LEES, the miner's son from Nottingham who was a close friend of BURGESS and PHILBY and was certainly a Communist. Was LEES recruited for the R.I.S.

It has been said by SLATER (who was her lover at one time) that BLUNT recruited Margaret STEWART to the Communist Party. Did he do so or did he recruit her to the R.I.S.

GROMOV ("George") first arrived in the U.K. on 3 November 1936. BLUNT left Cambridge in June 1937; can he date his first meeting with "George" in Cambridge more precisely between these two dates.

In August 1935 BLUNT went on a trip to Russia and visited Leningrad and Moscow. He was presumably already a Communist by this time and there were a number of other Cambridge Communists on the same trip. Was Charles FLETCHER-COCK, who went on the trip, a Communist.

Later BLUNT corrected his id. of GROMOV as "GEORGE" - He had no doubts about GROMOV being one of his controllers but recalled that he was the second one, known to him as "HENRY"

London 1937 - 1939

Can BLUNT give more details of what he was actually doing for the Third International at this time; was he a courier; did he meet "George" regularly; where did he meet "George".

The Army (F.S.P.) 1939 - 1940

Was BLUNT acting as a spy during the period of his service in the Army. Was he in contact with Communists in France during this period or with the R.I.S.

M.I.5. - 1940

BLUNT has said that he was out of touch at the beginning of his service in M.I.5 and believes that this had something to do with a crisis in R.I.S. affairs. Could this have been the publication in late 1939 of KRIVITSKY's articles in an American magazine. KRIVITSKY surfaced in the U.S.A. in late 1939 after disappearing from Paris in 1937 and the appearance of his articles must have caused alarm and despondency to the R.I.S.

The contact with the R.I.S. via Lizy PHILBY and Bob STEWART presumably covered the period from July when BLUNT joined the office to the end of 1940, (GROMOV was out of the country from 25 April to 9 December 1940). Did BLUNT start passing material through this channel immediately he joined the office, or only after he joined B Division in about October 1940.

From the time BLUNT joined B Division he handled:-

C/E material about the Axis Intelligence Services.

Distribution of G.C. & C.S. diplomatic material including ISOS and ISBA.

XXX Material

Distribution of OO Material (diplomatic waste paper).

Operations against diplomatic premises.
Deception; being a member of a committee set up for this purpose.

In addition BLUNT received copies of all the B.6 (Watchers) reports. He was fully aware of the activities against the Spaniards dealt with by Brooman White and Harris; was involved in D/A operations against the Germans; took part in the investigation of leakages about S.O.E. operations; certainly handled some Russian PF's and could have called for any of these without arousing comment; took a particular interest in the case of Oliver Charles GREEN. Was aware of the date and place of D-Day well before the event.

BLUNT was lent to SHAEF on 12 May to 1 July 1944 working at Norfolk House. Presumably he handed over material which came to his hand during this period.

BLUNT visited Germany from 3 August to 15 August 1945. Did he make contact with the R.I.S. while he was in Germany. BLUNT visited Rome from some date in September to 22 October 1945; did he make contact with the R.I.S. in Italy during this period.

Photography

BLUNT has said that he photographed documents himself. How did he learn to do this; was he trained by the R.I.S. or did he perhaps learn this from

Knowledge of Russian Files

There is some hard evidence that BLUNT handled some Russian files and indications that he saw a great many more.

"Peter"

Can BLUNT remember where he first met "Peter". Can he say whether he always met him in the same place and if not where did they meet on the later occasions; how did "Peter" communicate with him after BURGESS had gone.

Visit to Beirut

BLUNT visited Beirut in 1961 or 1962. No doubt he went to stay with the Ambassador, his old friend Moore CROSTHWAITE (Sir Ponsonby Moore CROSTHWAITE). CROSTHWAITE is known to have associated with such people as Gerald HAMILTON in the 1930's i.e. HAMILTON's Comintern days. Did BLUNT know CROSTHWAITE at that time.

CROSTHWAITE certainly knew PHILBY in Beirut. Does BLUNT know if he knew PHILBY before.

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NOTE FOR FILE

List of Photographs of Russian Intelligence Officers
to be shown to BLUNT

- (1) Konstantin Mikhailovitch KUKIN
RL 8/2009
- (2) Boris Mikhailovitch KROTOV
PF 63,319
- (3) Alexei Varfolomecovich MEDVEDEV
PF 603,331
- (4) Vasili Alexeevich VALKOV
PF 21,953
- (5) Lev Petrovich SHIGALOV
RL 8/3874
- (6) Captain Grigori Georgievich SHIROBOKOV
PF 603,320
- (7) Yuri Dmitrievich MILOVZOROV
PF 68,705
- (8) Leonid Fedorovich TEPILOV
PF 746,338

D.1
29.4.64.

E. McBarnet

List of Photographs of Russian Intelligence Officers to be shown to BLUNT

- (9) Avtonom Petrovich BESSMERTNY
- (10) Konstantin Colestratovitch BOLABON
- (11) Dimitri Timofeevich DOROSHENKO
- (12) Andrei KONDRATIEV
- (13) Sergei Mikhailovich KOUDRIATSEV
- (14) Peter Klimovich NOVIKOV
- (15) Vladimir BARKOVSKY
- (16) Ivan Makarovich KOZLOV
- (17) Semene Spozidorovich CHAMOV
- (18) Lev Alexandrovich NELUBIN
- (19) Vladimir Nikolaevich ROGOV

SECRET

356a


C. M. A. HAWKINS,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEPT., (through A.2.A.)
G.P.O.

Box 500,
Parliament Street B.O.,
London, S.W.1

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Permanently (H.O.W. being retained) } from.....to.....
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2nd Interview

TOP SECRET

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355c

See by TC 28/4/64

28/4

Ext. to PF 604, 711
JOHNSTON on 20.5.64

I met Professor BLUNT at 2.30 p.m. on Saturday, 25 April, at 18 Chandos Court, Caxton Street, S.W.1. We talked for some three hours. The change in his manner since our previous meeting was remarkable. No longer did he hesitate before answering. He was relaxed, friendly and showed quick appreciation of the problems I put to him. He confessed that he felt overwhelming relief that he had owned up. By the end of the afternoon I was satisfied that he had no thought of defection and confident that he will co-operate, not only in telling us all he knows, but in operations based on his information.

2. Before we got down to business I showed him a selection of photographs. He identified "George" without hesitation as GORSKIY @ GROMOV (he thought the photograph without spectacles was the best likeness). He identified "Peter" as almost certainly MODIN. Although he would not commit himself finally, I think there is little doubt about this identification.

but no see later

3. I then reverted to the theme that my aim was to find leads into the present. I told BLUNT that we had recently received a most important Russian defector who had convinced us that British Intelligence was seriously penetrated. The defector believed that the seeds of this penetration had been sown by the "Ring of Five". I described the "Ring of Five". I pointed out that, even when we had identified its founder members, we had still to trace the recruitments which could have flowed from them; and, even when we had done that, we had to take into account further penetration by the Russian sister-service, the G.R.U. I painted a picture which seemed genuinely to alarm him. I pointed out that the very fact that the Russians had allowed him to leave the Security Service at the end of the war, indicated that they already had at least one other spy in position. This point seemed to convince him and he promised to do everything he could to help.

4. I then brought up the subject of homosexuality. I said that if we were to work together we must be able to discuss "queerness" without embarrassment and he, for his part, must recognise its relevance to espionage. I said that I thought the incidence of "queers" among spies was too high to be explained simply in terms of blackmail. He agreed and said that he was willing to talk frankly on the subject even when his friends were involved.

Ext. to PF 604, 584 (PHILBY) on 2.7.64
Ext. to PF 604, 529 (BURGESS) on 2.7.64
Ext. to PF 604, 558 (MACLEAN)

5. Thereafter we jumped from point to point and, for ease of reading, I will record what he said under subject headings :

The "Ring of Five"

6. BLUNT said that only four persons answered the definition that each should be known to the others. They were BURGESS, MACLEAN, PHILBY and himself.

TOP SECRET

Ext'd. to PF 72, 493 (CAIRNCROSS) on 6.7.64
Ext'd. to PF 604, 529 (BURGESS) on 2.7.64
" " PF 604, 558 (MACLEAN)
" " PF 604, 584 (PHILBY)

7. We debated the merits of various candidates for the fifth place. I suggested KLUGMAN. BLUNT said that KLUGMAN certainly knew that BURGESS was a spy but he doubted if he knew the others. In any case KLUGMAN had remained an open Communist.

8. BLUNT suggested STRAIGHT. I said that STRAIGHT had remained in England hardly long enough to qualify and, in any case, he did not know that PHILBY and MACLEAN were spies and had only guessed that BURGESS was.

9. I suggested CAIRNCROSS. BLUNT said that BURGESS had recruited CAIRNCROSS and had told him so but he doubted if he had told MACLEAN and PHILBY. In any case CAIRNCROSS had never been a member of their circle. I confirmed that CAIRNCROSS had not known about PHILBY and MACLEAN and had only guessed about BLUNT. I also corrected the statement that BURGESS had recruited CAIRNCROSS, pointing out that it was KLUGMAN who had done so. This surprised BLUNT.

10. I suggested SMOLLETT. BLUNT said that he had met SMOLLETT as a friend of PHILBY's and, to a lesser extent, BURGESS'. Neither PHILBY nor BURGESS had told him that SMOLLETT was a spy and, on the whole, he doubted it. I assured him that he was a spy but conceded that his background did not really fit that of a founder member of the "Ring of Five."

Ext'd. to PF 604, 529 (BURGESS)
" " PF 604, 584 (PHILBY)

11. BLUNT pointed out some anomalies among the original four. He himself had not revealed himself to PHILBY (although he knew from BURGESS that PHILBY had been recruited) until they met in France in 1940. He could not tell from PHILBY's reactions whether he already knew.

12. Similarly it was only in 1951 that MACLEAN had revealed to BLUNT that he had known about the latter's recruitment since his Cambridge days.

Ext'd. to PF 604, 558 (MACLEAN)

Homosexuals in the Ring

13. BLUNT said that MACLEAN was only partially homosexual. After Cambridge he probably did not practise until shortly before the flight and this only because he was drinking hard.

Ext'd. to PF 44, 592 (STRAIGHT) on 21.5.64

14. BLUNT said that PHILBY had never been homosexual. The same was true of Michael STRAIGHT.

Extracted to S.F. 44-41-16

Ext'd. to PF 604, 584 (PHILBY)

BLUNT's Russian Controllers

15. BLUNT said that he had remembered an important fact which he had omitted to tell me at our earlier meeting. When in 1940, at the beginning of his service in the office, BURGESS had been out of contact with the Russians, Lizzie PHILBY had acted as intermediary between him and the British Communist Party. His contact in the Party had been Bob STEWART. He and BURGESS had passed Her

Ext. to PF 604, 529 (BURGESS)
" PF 604, 584 (PHILBY)
Ext. to PF 68, 26 (LIZZY PHILBY)
Ext. to PF 604, 529 (BURGESS)
" PF 604, 584 (PHILBY)
SOURCE REPORT 7750

material over this channel for something like three months and it was through this channel that they were eventually put back into contact with the R.I.S. On reflection BLUNT was pretty sure that it was "George" who had controlled him from 1940 until about 1943. It was "George's" successor who had suggested that BLUNT should stay in the Security Service after the war. It happened soon after he took over, probably in 1943.

Edith TUDOR-HART

16. BLUNT said that TUDOR-HART was a close friend of Lizzie PHILBY but he had always believed that it was TUDOR-HART who first recruited Kim PHILBY. He thought PHILBY's recruitment preceded that of BURGESS. Certainly TUDOR-HART was involved in the whole affair and, as BLUNT put it, was probably "the grandmother of us all". He thought TUDOR-HART would know of his own involvement although he had never met her.

Paul HARDT

17. When the GLADING case broke and Paul HARDT's name and photograph appeared in the Press, BLUNT recognised him as the man BURGESS had described as his first controller. BLUNT himself had never met HARDT but he thought he remembered that PHILBY also had told him that HARDT was one of his early controllers.

The VOLKOV Case

18. BLUNT said that PHILBY had told him about VOLKOV's offer of defection many months after the event. PHILBY admitted that he had warned the Russians and said how near they had all been to disaster. However, the Russians had acted quickly and, before PHILBY arrived in Istanbul, the Russians had spirited VOLKOV away.

Talent-Spotting

19. I asked BLUNT whether the Russians had asked him to suggest likely recruits in the Security Service and, if so, whether he had responded. BLUNT admitted that they had but said that he had put forward one name only. It was Kemball JOHNSON. He had in fact discussed Kemball JOHNSON with BURGESS who had said that he regarded him as an anarchist rather than a Communist. However, BURGESS said that he would put the proposal to the Russians making it clear that he himself was not in favour of the idea. Later BURGESS told BLUNT that he had put the name forward but, since he had not been asked to proceed, he presumed the Russians had taken his advice and turned down the proposal. I suggested to BLUNT that this was far from conclusive since the Russians might have gone ahead themselves without telling BURGESS. BLUNT agreed that this was possible. I asked

/him when the

Ext. to PF 604, 584 (BURGESS) on 2.7.64
Extra dtd to PF 604, 711 - JOHNSON on 20.5.64

SOURCE REPORT 7751
SOURCE REPORT 7752

Extd. to PF604, 711
JOHNSTON on 20.5.64

him when the incident had taken place. BLUNT thought it was very soon after he joined the office - at the latest, early 1941.

20. I asked BLUNT whether he had reported on any of his colleagues, not in the context that they were likely recruits, but simply for information purposes. For example, had he provided a complete list of Security Service staff? He said that he could not remember doing so, but agreed that it was likely that he had. He also agreed that he would have mentioned many of his colleagues in the course of his normal reporting.

BLUNT's Movements at end of war

21. BLUNT had already told me that he had visited both Germany and Italy just before his demobilisation. I asked him how long the Italy trip had lasted. He said that he had gone there to examine some captured documents relating to the activities of the Italian secret police. He estimated that it would have taken him three to four weeks. I told him that our records showed that he was ready to return on 16 October, 1945. He agreed that he must therefore have arrived in Italy in mid-September 1945.

BLUNT meets PHILBY in Beirut

Extd. to PF 604, 584 (PHILBY)

22. BLUNT said that he visited Beirut in the Spring of 1961 or 1962. He had met PHILBY and they had discussed the secret side of their lives. PHILBY said that the Russians had recently asked him whether it would be wise for them to approach BLUNT again. He had replied that he thought it would be pointless because BLUNT had no access to useful information. In relating this to BLUNT, PHILBY made it clear that his real reason for discouraging the Russians was that he knew BLUNT would not welcome re-involvement. BLUNT had confirmed to PHILBY that this was so.

BLUNT's Change of Heart

23. I asked BLUNT when he had first regretted his involvement with the Russians. He said it was very difficult to date this; he doubted if he had ever been a convinced Communist. Certainly he had had serious doubts at the time of the Stalin purge and again over the Russo-German pact. On both occasions BURGESS' persuasive powers had pulled him through. After the war he certainly began to regret the past. His re-involvement in 1951 was motivated by loyalty to his friends rather than to Russia. After 1951 he bitterly regretted his involvement but was unable to bring himself to confess.

1937
1939

/BLUNT's Attitude towards Operations

BLUNT's Attitude towards Operations

24. I told BLUNT that we might need to take action on some of his information. For instance, I thought we might have to interview Leo LONG, Goronwy REES, Edith TUDOR-HART and possibly others. Moreover we might need his active participation in operations along the lines of Michael STRAIGHT's offer to confront BLUNT. What did he feel about it? BLUNT said that he would like to turn the question over in his mind. He certainly wanted to help us if he possibly could.

The BURGESS Papers

25. BLUNT admitted that he had censored BURGESS' papers before passing them on to us. He removed personal letters from himself and POLLOCK from the papers left at the Courtauld Institute; and he removed one letter from PHILBY from among the papers found in the flat. He averred (and I believed) that it was pure forgetfulness on his part which led to the delay in handing over the papers from the Institute.

26. BLUNT's Comments on Persons of Interest

Gustav GLUCK BLUNT had never heard of him.

Goronwy REES BLUNT thinks REES' statement to Guy Liddell was true. Certainly he has no evidence that REES worked for BURGESS (or the Russians) after the outbreak of war.

Leslie HUMPHREYS BLUNT did not recruit HUMPHREYS but he had a love affair with him at Cambridge which STRAIGHT might have mistaken for recruitment. HUMPHREYS died a year or two after leaving Cambridge.

John HUMPHREYS Leslie HUMPHREYS' brother. An eminent surgeon. An open Communist sympathiser or Party member. An Apostle. BLUNT still meets him but has no reason to think he was ever a spy.

Michael STEWART BLUNT dislikes him intensely but has no reason to think he was ever a spy (or indeed a particularly close friend of BURGESS).

Dennis PROCTOR One of BLUNT's closest friends. A good Socialist, married (for the second time) to a good Socialist. BLUNT admires them both greatly. Is as sure as he can be of any man that he is not a spy.

Ext'd. to PF 604, 529 (BORGESS)
Ext'd. to PF 143, 996 (Ext'd. to PF 604, 582 REES) (GLUCK)
S.R. No. 7795
S.R. No. 7797

Ext'd. to PF 604, 620 STEWART

Ext'd. to PF 604, 597 - PROCTOR

/Fred WARNER

Ext'd. to PF
604, 585-
WARNER

Fred WARNER

Homosexual, but not a boy-friend of BURGESS. BURGESS thought him a good drinking companion. No reason to think he is a spy. *Why not?*

Ext'd. to PF
605, 565 - Vicks
Tess ROTHSCHILD

Victor ROTHSCHILD

Inconceivable that he is a spy. *why?*

Tess ROTHSCHILD

Equally inconceivable but for different reasons. *Again - why not?*

Ext. to PF 48846
PUTLITZ

von PUTLITZ

BLUNT is sure he played straight throughout the war despite his later defection to East Germany.

Ext. to PF
302 - KESSLER

KESSLER

Homosexual and left-wing but BLUNT has no reason to think he ever worked for the Russians.

Tomas HARRIS

BLUNT met HARRIS long before the war through their mutual interest in pictures. BLUNT introduced him to BURGESS. It was probably not until Section D days that HARRIS first met PHILBY. They became the closest of friends and nothing could shake HARRIS' faith in, and admiration for, PHILBY. Even after PHILBY's defection HARRIS tried to persuade his friends that it must be an M.I.6. operation. BLUNT is sure that HARRIS was never involved.

Ext'd. to PF 604, 643
HARRIS

Ext'd. to PF 604, 677
MILNE

Tim MILNE

BLUNT scarcely remembered him and had no comments to make.

Ext. to PF 604, 589
(FOOTMAN) on I. 6. 64

David FOOTMAN

BURGESS once confided in BLUNT that he suspected FOOTMAN might be working for the Russians. He based this assumption on his judgement that FOOTMAN was a true Marxist.

However, FOOTMAN was certainly not a member of "the Ring" and BURGESS had no proof of Russian involvement. BURGESS admired FOOTMAN deeply.

Hector McNEILL

BLUNT scorned the idea that McNEILL could have been involved with the Russians.

Ext'd. to PF
604, 025 - BERLIN

Isaiah BERLIN

BLUNT said he had no evidence one way or the other and thought it improbable. He added that if Isaiah was a spy, he would be a very good one.

Kenneth SYERS }
John ENNALS }

BLUNT had never heard of them.

Paul WILLERT

BLUNT had never heard of him.

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/Andrew REVAI

Source Report No. 7733

Andrew REVAI

BLUNT was sure that REVAI was neither a spy nor a Communist. He said that REVAI and BURGESS had once quarrelled over a boy-friend and, as a result, BURGESS had informed Guy Liddell that REVAI was a Communist. At the same time BURGESS had told REVAI that Guy Liddell had told him that he had received information showing that REVAI was a Communist. BLUNT described this as one of the dirtiest tricks BURGESS had ever played. He said that REVAI was desperately anxious to obtain British naturalisation and he appealed to me to give any help I could.

D.1.

27.4.64.

A.S. Martin

A.S. Martin

1st Interview

9 discussed with
D & D, on 29/4/64

355b

see file 28/4/64
L 28/4

I interviewed Professor BLUNT in his ~~office~~^{flat} above the Courtauld Institute on the evening of Thursday, 23rd April, 1964.

2. I asked him if he knew what had brought me. He said that he could guess. I said that I had just returned from America but before I talked about that I wanted to find out where his sympathies lay in relation to my (and his old) office. I said that he had been interviewed eleven times since 1951 and that we for our part had entered those interviews on the assumption that he wished to help us and would be completely frank with us. Had this been a correct assumption? He said that it had. I said that I had interviewed a good many friends of BURGESS and McLEAN and that I had found there were two obstacles to frankness: the first was fear of personal repercussions: the second was loyalty to friends. I asked him to make the assumption that he had not been completely frank with us and then to say which of these obstacles would apply in his case. He said that he found it difficult to make such an assumption but he supposed loyalty to friends would be a powerful deterrent. I asked him again to say whether he had told us everything he knew and he looked me straight in the eye (rather too straight I thought) and said that he had.

Extracted to PF 44, 592 (STRAIGHT) on 21.5.64

3. I told him that in America I had met Michael STRAIGHT. I handed him a photograph of STRAIGHT, when an undergraduate, and asked him to tell me all he knew about him. He said that he remembered STRAIGHT as a very emotional young man who, in his second year at Cambridge, had come under the influence of James KLUGMAN and John CORNFORD. He thought that he had probably been a member of the Communist Party. He remembered that STRAIGHT had been shattered by CORNFORD's death and his impression was that this had caused him to leave the Party. He felt pretty confident that when STRAIGHT left Cambridge to return to America he was no longer a communist. I asked him if that was all he remembered and he said it was. I asked him if he had ever seen STRAIGHT since his Cambridge days. He hesitated and then said that he thought he had met him again after the war at an Apostles dinner. I asked him if Guy BURGESS had been present and he said that he could not remember positively but he thought it likely. I asked him if that was all he knew and he said it was.

4. I noticed that by this time BLUNT's right cheek was twitching a good deal and I allowed a long pause before saying that Michael STRAIGHT's account was rather different from his. I said that STRAIGHT had told me how, after CORNFORD's death, he had been summoned to BLUNT's rooms where BLUNT had appealed to him to make a sacrifice comparable to CORNFORD's. The sacrifice was to be a renunciation of open Communist Party activities and the acceptance of international work on behalf of the Third International. He was to go back to the States and join Henry Morgan & Co., the American bankers, where he would be able to provide the Russians with economic reports. He would be contacted in America by a member of the Third International and they would recognise each other by means of passwords which BLUNT gave him. I said that, under protest, STRAIGHT had gone back to the States and after a few months he had indeed been contacted by a man we knew to be a Russian illegal agent. They had exchanged passwords BLUNT had given.

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5. I asked BLUNT what he had to say about this story. Again he looked me straight in the eye and said: "what can I say? This is pure fantasy". I asked him what motive he thought STRAIGHT would have in inventing such a story. He shrugged his shoulders. I said that STRAIGHT had struck me as level-headed, truthful, and determined that the truth should come out. I said that STRAIGHT was in fact arriving in London in a few days' time and had asked that he should meet BLUNT in my presence.

6. There was a long pause and I then reverted to my opening theme. I asked if it was really loyalty to friends which deterred him from speaking or was it fear. I said that, if it was fear, I could give him an absolute assurance that no action would be taken against him if he now told me the truth. He sat and looked at me for fully a minute without speaking. I said that his silence had already told me what I wanted to know. Would he now get the whole thing off his chest. I added that only a week or two ago I had been through a similar scene with John CAIRNCROSS who had finally confessed and afterwards thanked me for making him do so. BLUNT's answer was: "give me five minutes while I wrestle with my conscience". He went out of the room, got himself a drink, came back and stood at the tall window looking out on Portman Square. I gave him several minutes of silence and then appealed to him again to get it off his chest. He came back to his chair and told this story:

7. He spent ~~the~~ ^{the} academic year 1933/4 in Italy and Germany. When he returned to Cambridge in October 1934 he found that a strong communist group had developed among the undergraduates led by James KLUGMAN, John CORNFORD, and Guy BURGESS. He had always had a great admiration for BURGESS' intellect and, under his influence, he began to take an academic interest in Marxism. This interest gradually became more emotional until, with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, he found himself committed to Communism both intellectually and spiritually. In about 1936 BURGESS came to him and said that he was leaving the Party. BLUNT was astonished until a few weeks later BURGESS came to him again and explained that he had joined the Third International. Either then, or very shortly afterwards, BURGESS suggested that BLUNT should join too. BLUNT agreed without hesitation and as a result was introduced by BURGESS to his first Russian controller called "George". They met in a rather shabby cafe in Cambridge. "George" was a heavy, squat man who spoke English with a thick accent. Between that day (not precisely dated but certainly before June 1937 when BLUNT left Cambridge) and BLUNT's joining the Security Service there may have been occasional meetings between "George" and BLUNT in London but, if there were, BLUNT has no precise recollection of them.

8. BLUNT came to London in 1937 to become a member of the Warburg Institute. He was in regular touch with BURGESS and knew that the latter was working for the Russians. He knew too (because BURGESS had told him in Cambridge) that Donald McLEAN and Kim PHILBY were in the conspiracy. He was aware (again because BURGESS had told him) that John CAIRNCROSS had been recruited but was not part of BURGESS' network. He himself contributed little because he was not able to do so. He was, as he told us originally, "BURGESS' respectable friend" who assisted at parties and generally gave support. All he could remember of BURGESS' activities at this time was that he moved around in respectable political circles (hence his effort to join the Conservative Central Office) and in not-so-respectable Fascist circles (e.g. the Dean of S.E. Europe and Jack Macnamara, M.P.).

9. At the outbreak of war BLUNT joined the army and went to France. When he returned in 1940 he was recommended by Victor ROTHSCHILD to

PF 604, 586 (McLean) PF 604, 586 (Philby) PF 604, 583 (Cairncross) Source Report No. 7735 (Gordon)

auto PF 604529 BURGESS

Guy LIDDELL and, as a result, joined the Security Service. He remembered that there was some delay between his joining the Security Service and being put in touch with the Russians because BURGESS himself was temporarily out of contact. He thought this was the result of some crisis in the affairs of the Russian Intelligence Service but he could not remember what. After some two or three months BURGESS arranged his first meeting with the Russians. His controller may have been "George" or it may have been someone else. Thereafter meetings took place in London monthly or occasionally at two monthly intervals. There were no arrangements for emergency meetings although, had he needed to do so, he could probably have reached his controller at any time through BURGESS. For the last year or two of the war he definitely had a different controller whose name he could not remember. He was even squatter and squarer and flat-footed than "George". He was, in BLUNT's words, "bloody" and by that he meant that he was an unimaginative and insensitive man.

BURGESS
SIB 604, 529

25.7.68

10. From the time of his reintroduction to the Russians to the end of the war BLUNT gave them all the information which came his way. He had no precise brief from them - he was told to provide anything he could get without taking undue risk. Generally he would himself write a report on the month's affairs and supplement it with original documents. Usually he would hand over documents at the beginning of a meeting and receive them back at the end of the meeting. For a short time, however, he did his own photography of documents (with his own camera) and simply handed over the film. At no time did he use D.L.Bs - all handovers were made directly to his controller.

Exhd for Dr/In/JED

11. Of the material he provided BLUNT said that they seemed not to be particularly interested in ISOS from which he assumed that they were reading it themselves. Nor did they seem particularly interested in Triple X material which did not surprise him because its content was generally parochial. He gave them all B.5 (surveillance) reports but again they showed no particular enthusiasm. They showed most interest in B.Js and once explained that this was because it helped them to break the cyphers themselves. BLUNT said that he tried to give them any German material which could conceivably help their own war effort and all Russian material. However he saw very little Russian material other than in B.5 reports and so was not able to give them much. He said specifically that he did not see P.Fs for Russian Embassy staff and so had never been able to try to identify his own controllers. Nor, he said, did he ever draw the P.Fs of his own recruitments (i.e. STRAIGHT and - as we shall see later - Leo LONG) *no file existed*.

Exhd to PE 66962
E.H.H.

12. In answer to a question BLUNT said that the only time there had been any break in contact was at the very beginning of the war (as already described). There were occasions when he was warned to be particularly careful but he could not relate them to known crises. For example I asked if there were any unusual precautions at the time of GOUZENKO's defection and gave him the date September 1945. He said that he could not remember any but this enabled me to question him about his own movements at that time. He remembered that he had paid an official visit to Germany in about August 1945 and another immediately afterwards to Italy in September/October 1945.

13. I asked him if the Russians had ever encouraged him to stay on in the Security Service after the war. He said that they had but this was long before the end of the war - he thought about 1943. His controller had said that they would like him to stay and he had said that he had no intention of doing so. His controller had accepted this and never mentioned it again.

14. He remained in close social contact with BURGESS throughout the war and they had discussed fairly freely their separate dealings with the Russians but seldom in great detail. When the end of the war came and BLUNT left the Security Service he remained in contact with his Russian controller for a further two or three months. However he had nothing to provide and, by mutual consent, the meetings ceased. From 1946 to 1951 he had no meetings with the Russians although, of course, he remained in contact with BURGESS throughout this time and was aware that the latter was still in touch.

SOURCE REPORT 7769

15. When in 1951 BURGESS returned from Washington he went straight to BLUNT and told him that PHILBY had warned him that the game was up with McLEAN. He, BURGESS, had come back to England to help McLEAN to escape and he hoped BLUNT would too. As a result BLUNT met his last Russian controller "Peter". "Peter" was tall and fair-haired, young, and spoke very good English. BLUNT cannot remember how they had made contact but he presumed BURGESS had arranged it. Nor could he remember exactly why he had met "Peter" but he thought he must have been acting for the sake of security as an intermediary between "Peter" and BURGESS. At any rate he, BLUNT, played no part in arranging the flight although he was of course generally aware of what was going on. He begged BURGESS not to go himself, arguing that it would bring disaster on himself and on PHILBY, and up to the last moment he had hoped that BURGESS would take his advice. After the flight BLUNT had two or three more meetings with "Peter". "Peter" urged him to follow BURGESS and McLEAN to Russia but BLUNT refused. His last meeting with "Peter" in June or July 1951 was his last with the Russians.

6-10-5 PF604,529 Burgess.

16. That is the outline of what BLUNT told me. It was not told as coherently as it is written here and at no time was BLUNT at ease. Every question was followed by a long pause during which BLUNT seemed to be debating with himself how he should answer it. Before the "break" came I had the impression that BLUNT was prepared for what I was going to throw at him (the deliberately early reference to America may account for this but at the time I did not think so). When the break came I felt that it was natural and unpremeditated - he seemed to be genuinely shattered. After the break I had the impression that he was still withholding or, at any rate, weighing very carefully what he could safely say. I decided not to press him any further but to give him time to recover.

6-10-5 PF 604,789 - LONG

17. I repeated my assurance that no action would be taken against him and explained that, although of course others besides myself would have to know of the confession, I would do my best to limit the numbers. I asked him not to tell anyone himself. He said rather ruefully that of course he would not. I then asked him if he would submit to further questioning over a series of meetings. He said that he would but he hoped that, having broken the ice with me, he would not have to talk to anyone else. I gave him that assurance. I then harked back to my opening homily on loyalty to friends and asked whether he would be prepared to talk about others who had been involved. I said that, from my point of view, digging up the past was a dull but necessary preliminary to finding leads into the present. He said that he thought he would be able to do this because he did not think that any other of his friends had been involved. I asked him if he could say categorically that this was so. He said yes in a curiously hesitant way and so I took a shot in the dark and said: "what about Leo LONG". He sighed and admitted that he had recruited Leo LONG at Cambridge and had tried to reactivate him during the war but was sure that he had failed. In any case, he said, LONG was not now in Government service.

Ext'd. to PF 604, 711 (JOHNSTON)

18. I said that I would take the Leo LONG story in greater detail later but I wanted before I left to be sure that there was no one still in my office or in M.I.6. about whose recruitment he knew. He said that he was almost sure there was not but would I give him names and he would tell me what he knew. I named Kemball JOHNSON. He said that he had talked to BURGESS about Kemball JOHNSON and BURGESS had thought he was too unstable to be used and therefore he was pretty sure that Kemball JOHNSON had not been recruited. I said that at the next meeting I would bring him many names and that, in the meantime, I hoped he would search his own memory. He said that he would.

Ext'd. to
PF 604, 789
LONG

19. We parted on fairly easy terms, joking about the idea of a dinner a trois (i.e. with Michael STRAIGHT) which BLUNT thought would be macabre. I said I would telephone him to arrange the next meeting.

D.1.

A.S. Martin
A.S. Martin

27 April, 1964.

SECRET

355a

A.4 SURVEILLANCE REPORT

Section D.1.

Subject STATE LOTTERY

Officer E. McBarnet

PF. No. 604,582

Copy to A.S. Martin

A.4 Ref.

[Handwritten signature]
27/4

Day Tue/Wed/Thur/Fri.....

Date 21/22/23/24 April, 1964.

Tuesday 21st April, 1964.

On Tuesday April 21st and Wednesday April 22nd we took the opportunity of imposing some observation on STATE LOTTERY from the cover of our O.P. and for the purpose of allowing a number of our officers to become acquainted with this man.

2. At 12.30 on the 21st April, STATE LOTTERY arrived home by taxi and entered 19 Portman Square. A current description of him is as follows:-

Looks 56. 6'2"-3". Slim build. Long face, but fuller than photo taken in 1945, though he still bears a good resemblance. Dark hair, rather long slightly receding and very noticeable grey streaks at both temples.

Wears:- Dark grey terylene raincoat, unbelted. Dark grey well cut trousers. Dark brown suede shoes.

Wednesday 22nd April, 1964.

3. On Wednesday April 22nd STATE LOTTERY left his address at 15.25 on foot and when all officers had fully identified him, observation was withdrawn.

Thursday 23rd April, 1964.

4. Observation was taken up upon 19 Portland Square at 17.45.

5. At 17.55 STATE LOTTERY arrived home by taxi and four minutes later a man believed to be John GASKIN entered carrying a large envelope.

6. At 18.00 the expected visitor entered the address.

7. At 20.00 a young male visitor rang the door bell and entered.

8. At 20.25 the known visitor of 18.00 was seen in the room on the third floor. This man left at 20.30.

9. Lights were on in the first floor window and three windows on the third floor, two in the sitting room and one in the bedroom. STATE LOTTERY could be seen walking about.

bx
d.66
DJS
28/4

SECRET

A.4 SURVEILLANCE REPORT

Section.....

Subject.....

Officer.....

PF. No.....

Copy to.....

- 2 -

A.4 Ref.....

Day.....

Date.....

10. At 21.45 an elderly woman left and the first floor lights went out. At 22.25 the curtains were drawn in the bedroom and five minutes later lights went out in the sitting room.

11. As agreed, observation was withdrawn at 23.00.

Friday 24th April, 1964.

12. Observation was taken up from our O.P. at 06.45 and at 06.55 STATE LOTTERY could be seen at his window looking up and down the street. Ten minutes later the curtains were pulled and this man was seen at the window dressing.

13. At 07.29 STATE LOTTERY was once again seen at the window and one minute later the young man of the previous evening, who went in at 20.00, left.

14. At 07.38 a woman entered aged about 40, wearing a white mac, high heeled shoes and carrying a tartan holdall. At 08.00 a second woman in a green coat, aged about 50 entered. She actually went to the basement of No. 20. Both women had some difficulty in gaining admittance.


15. At 08.20 the two women mentioned above left together.

16. At 08.30 the man we think to be GASKIN was seen at a window on the first floor in his dressing-gown.

17. At 09.10 the man aged about 50 went into the address and there was nothing further to report up to 11.15, when as agreed observation was withdrawn.

27.4.64.

RBW/JRD


R.B. Woodhouse.

SECRET
EXTRACT

354a

Extract for File No.: PF. 604,582 Name: BLUNT

Original in File No.:* PF. 604,582 Supp. Vol. Vol.: 11 Serial: 809a Receipt Date: 27.4.64

Original from: T/C Under Ref: 4304 Dated: 24.4.64

Extracted on: 27.4.64 by: J.G. Section: D.I./Inv.

idual

Extract from T/C on WEL 1074 - BLUNT.

Incoming call to BLUNDEN from A.M. who asked whether he would like to meet again.

BLUNDEN said he would.

A.M. suggested any time this week-end.

BLUNDEN agreed saying that it would be 'rather convenient' and he suggested tomorrow afternoon at about 5 o'clock.

He wondered whether there was a 'neutral ground' where they could meet. A.M. would ring him back tomorrow about this.

BLUNDEN asked if he could ring any time in the morning but on the other number - 9292.

17.33

.....

SECRET

289 DINK
289

353a

SECRET

NAME: BLUNDEN

Line No.: 4305

Tel. No.: WEL 9292

Date: 25.4.64
Saturday

Responsible Section: D;1.



Incoming call to BLUNDEN from A.M.
BLUNDEN took some time to come to the 'phone.
When he appeared he remarked-'sorry, I was just up
in the flat'.
BLUNDEN agreed to meet at Chandos Court. He asked,
however, if the meeting could be made earlier as,
in many ways, it would be easier for him.
They agreed upon 2.30.
10.47

L.E.

DINK
28/4

352a

NOTE FOR FILE

S.R. NO 7735

BLUNT has identified the photograph of Anatole Borisovich GROMOV alias GORSKIY (photograph numbered (3)) as his first controller "George".

No. Gromov was "HENRY"

2. BLUNT believes that photograph number (8), Yuri Ivanovich MODIN is identical with his R.I.S. contact in 1951 "Peter".

E. McBarnet
E. McBarnet

D.1
27.4.64.

✓
984 DJSK
27/4

NOTE FOR FILEList of Photographs of Russian Intelligence Officers to be shown to BLUNT

(1) Kirill Malveyevich ALEKSANDROV: PF 138,547 X
? "Peter"

(2) Alexander Garnlovich CHERNOUSANOV: PF 103,959 X
?"Peter"

(3) Anatole Borisovich GROMOV: PF 796,285
"George"

*Identified as George
No.*

(4) Lev Lvovich NELYUBIN: PF 776,228 X
"Peter"

(5) Arnold DEUTSCH: PF 48,871 X
"George"

(6) Vladimir Alexandrovitch LEGEYEV: PF 69,410 X
"Peter"

(7) Gleb Alexandrovich NIKOLAEV: PF 125,195 X
"Peter"

(8) Yuri Ivanovich MODIN: PF 70617
"Peter"

Identified as "Peter"

(9) Dmitri Mikhailovich SEROV: PF 141,775 X
"Peter"

(10) Viktor Pavlovich ROGACHEV: PF 124,093 X
"Peter"

D.1
24.4.64.

E. McBarnet
E. McBarnet

350a

Memorandum for Arthur Martin's Interview with BLUNT.

24.4.64.

OFFICE DATES

1 July 1940: Joined M.I.5 (on loan in Intelligence Pool) as G.S.O. 3. Posted to D Division as P.A. to D.D.S. 3 (Brigadier Allen).

Sept/Oct. 1940: Transferred to B Division (B(a) and B.1(b).)

12 May - 1 July 1944: Lent to S.H.A.E.F.

August 1945: Visited Germany.

18 September 1945: Visited Italy.

31 October 1945: Left M.I.5.

189 D1106
27/4

- (1) BLUNT visited Russia from 10 August - 12 September 1935 in a party which included besides Michael STRAIGHT a number of other Cambridge Communists. After he had been recruited for the R.I.S. was he ever asked to talent spot amongst his Communist circle at Cambridge? If so did he talent spot any of those who accompanied him on the Russian trip, i.e. Charles FLETCHER-COOK?
- (2) Guy BURGESS left the Party some time before December 1935. Can BLUNT date his recruitment by Guy more precisely with this in mind?
- (3) REES said that BURGESS recruited him in 1937 "or perhaps earlier". Does BLUNT know if they were both recruited at about the same time.
- (4) Did James KLUGMAN play any part in his recruitment?
- (5) John Herbert KING, Foreign Office Cypher Clerk was arrested on 25 September 1939. Was this/arrest that caused the breakdown in Soviet contact to BURGESS and BLUNT?
- (6) BLUNT was absent from the office, in S.H.A.E.F., during May and June 1944. Was his last controller the one who was "squarer and squatter" before or after that date?
- (7) During the years when BLUNT, BURGESS and Kemball JOHNSTON worked together they must have recognised each other as Marxist and JOHNSTON probably knew that they were spies. Is this the case?
- (8) Was Eric KESSLER a conscious spy for the R.I.S?
- (9) BLUNT collected BURGESS's briefcase from the Reform Club on 6 June 1951 and later handed this over to us. Did he examine the contents and remove any reference to himself? BLUNT later handed over boxes of BURGESS's papers which he had had at the Courtauld Institute. Presumably he examined all these beforehand.
- (10) Guy BURGESS arrived in the U.K. from Washington on 7 May 1951 and was met by BLUNT at the station. ~~They~~ immediately telephoned to REES and BURGESS went to see REES the same day. Does this mean that REES was also asked to help in the escape of MACLEAN and if so does this mean that he was also a fully conscious spy?

24 APR 1964

SECRET

F

7

013


3499

he's a member of the CLUB

THOMAS J. IRWIN.
152 SEVENTH AVENUE SOUTH
NEW YORK CITY 10016 NEW YORK

Bob Whelton says to say hello so hello

SECOND FOLD



DO NOT USE TAPE OR STICKERS TO SEAL
NO ENCLOSURES PERMITTED

FIRST FOLD

Very much and so far have had a
wonderful cruise in the Corribon for a
month I loved it and had a
wonderful time.

Must push now I am very
busy like good even and lots of
work with from

2612

2112
2112

24 APR 1964

SECRET

F

7

013

FOLD SIDES OVER AND THEN FOLD BOTTOM UP
MOISTEN FLAP WELL AND APPLY PRESSURE TO SEAL

Dear John, Anthony

Just a very quick note between clients to say thank you for a most welcome letter and also to bring good news, you will be having a visitor who is about to be based at North Audley Street U.S. N.C. Guard for the next three years name Tom Iovia 6' tall blonde and very nice, mail about a few among other things he will arrive about June 25 and will be looking for an apartment any help you may be able to offer in this regard would help I thought I should mention this as you may hear of a place, I am asking him to bring a package over for you both from me.

It would be nice if you wrote him before he leaves and I am putting his address at the end of the letter this will then give you first priority to him and the rest of the crowd he will meet (get what I mean)

I am liking my new job

1261

SECRET
EXTRACT

348a

Extract File No.: PF 604,582 Name: James BLUNDEN

Original in File No.*: PF 604,582 Supp Vol.: 11 Serial: 798a Receipt Date: 21.4.64

Original from: T/C Under Ref.: 4304 Dated: 21.4.64

Extracted on: 22.4.64 by: JG Section: D.1

Extract from T/C on James BLUNDEN - WEL 1074

Incoming call to BLUNDEN from A.M.
 A.M. introduced himself mentioning that he was a member of BLUNDEN's old office. BLUNDEN replied with-'Oh yes'.
 A.M. wondered whether he could come and see him sometime one evening. BLUNDEN answered -'Yes, rather!'
 Discussion as to which evening. BLUNDEN explained that tonight was no good and tomorrow he had someone coming round at 6.30 and he would not be free until 8 o'clock. They agreed upon Thursday.
 BLUNDEN suggested about 6 o'clock.
 A.M. agreed.
 BLUNDEN mentioned that the girl at the door would know where to find him -'and then, we'll go up to the flat'.
 They said goodbye.
 16.50

SECRET

9.64 DUN 23/4

The original is in the file of an interview include the name of the file owner.

EXTRACT

3466

Extract for File No.: PF 604,582 Name :
 Original in File No. :* PF 604,582 Supp A Vol. : 11 Serial : 788a Receipt Date : 18.4.64
 Original from : T/C material Under Ref. : 4304 Dated : 12.4.64
 Extracted on : 24.2.72 by : MAS Section : K7

Extract from T/C on BLUNT - 935 1074

.....

TESS, who mentioned being in London spoke of going to a Jewish golfers dinner. She invited herself to come for a drink before returning to Cambridge tonight. BLUNDEN gave her ARTHY's telephone number which she wanted - C.A.B. MARSHALL - SLO 0319.

.....

TOP SECRET

Copied to POLF11-SS-1-13


Reference PF 604,582

DI 17/4

346a

NOTE

Crump telephoned me this morning and said that the Attorney-General had no comments to offer on the course of action which Crump had approved at our meeting on 14th April, 1964.



J.A. Allen.

L.A.
17.4.64.

TOP SECRET

DI 17/4
21/6/66

SECRET

B.943 M.795766/7699. 3/60. 300M. H. E. & S. Gp.862/1

S. Form 81/rev. 12. 53

EXTRACT

345a

Extract for File No.: PF. 604,582 Name: BLUNT

Original in File No.:* PF. 604,582 Supp Vol.: 11 Serial: 793a Receipt Date: 16.4.64

Original from: T/C Under Ref.: 4304 Dated: 16.4.64

Extracted on: 21.4.64 by: J.G. Section: D.I./Inv.

Extract from T/C on WEL 1074 - BLUNT, suspected R.I.S. agent.

.....

Outgoing call BLUNDEN to OLIVER MILLER's secretary.
 OLIVER was away until Tuesday.
 BLUNDEN wished to arrange a meeting on Tuesday between
 OLIVER, himself and JEAN BOGGS (ph) who was staying at
 BROWN's HOTEL. He mentioned that he was giving her dinner
 on Tuesday and he suggested possibly meeting late in the
 afternoon.
 BLUNDEN said that he would be returning from Dublin -
 or, Belfast - by lunch time and would be going out
 immediately after lunch for an hour but a message could
 be left with ELSA SCHERRER.
 12.59

.....

SECRET

21/2
21/4/66

of an individual
file owner.

SECRET
EXTRACT

344a

Subject for File No.: PF. 604,582 Name: BLUNT

Original in File No.:* PF. 604,582 Supp Vol.: 11 Serial: 792a Receipt Date: 16.4.64

Original from: T/C Under Ref.: 4304 Dated: 16.4.64

Extracted on: 21.4.64 by: J.G. Section: D.I./Inv.

Extract from T/C on WEL 1074 - BLUNT, suspected R.I.S. agent.

of an individual
file owner.

Incoming call to BLUNDEN from his brother, (CHRISTOPHER?) who would not be able to see him today. It was agreed that he would come here to lunch on Tuesday at 1.15. BLUNDEN mentioned that he would get back on Tuesday midday - he was not sure of the time but would certainly be back by lunch-time.
08.44

SECRET

21/4/64

342A

NOTE FOR PF.604,582

Mr. MacDonald, A.I., reported this morning that the O.P. in Portman Square is entirely satisfactory. They will be in a position to use the Committee Room during the day, which is well placed, and the office closes at 5 o'clock, after which time they can use any part of the building.

D.I.

Evelyn T. Samuel
E. McBarnet

16th April 1964

964
DDB/m
16.4.64

NOTE.

After discussion with D.G. and D.D.G., I visited Maurice Crump, the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions, yesterday afternoon and gave him an account of our information about BLUNT as derived from REES' allegations, BLUNT's own statements to us and the statement made to the F.B.I. by Michael Whitney STRAIGHT.

2. I said that we now proposed to interrogate BLUNT once more; our objective was not a prosecution but principally to obtain leads to any other spies who might remain undetected. At the interview we should wish to do everything possible not only to encourage BLUNT to talk freely but also to discourage him from any dramatic action, such as flight, which would involve grave embarrassment for the Government. With this in mind the Director General had thought that subject to Crump's own views this would be a suitable case on which he and Crump might go together to see the Attorney-General. The Director General would then put to the Attorney-General the considerations which might be thought to justify offering BLUNT assurances that he was not now in jeopardy from the point of view of prosecution.

3. Crump replied that his advice was against making the matter the subject of formal consultation with the Attorney-General. On the basis of my statement that it was of importance to us to induce BLUNT to speak freely, he considered that he as D.P.P. would be justified in authorizing the appropriate assurances in respect of a period which was twenty years or more ago. The last Director had regarded it as within the province of his own Office to decide on any question of immunity which had been referred to him and Crump wished to preserve this position. Provided no direct reference was made to his own Office or to the Law Officers in general, Crump approved of our saying this to BLUNT: that we were authorized to inform him that no prosecution was contemplated in respect of his activities on behalf of the Russians in the years prior to the war. If we considered it necessary to extend the assurance to cover the period of BLUNT's employment by the Security Service that also had his approval. The point to be borne in mind in giving assurances of this kind was always to define the area of activity and the period covered.

4. I said that we were grateful he had felt able to approve the giving of these assurances to BLUNT; there remained in my mind the question whether the Attorney-General might nevertheless wish to be informed of what was intended. The Home Secretary knew and Sir Michael Adeane would be told shortly. Crump said that the course which he intended to follow was to provide the Attorney-General with a brief note telling him of this consultation, of our plans to interrogate BLUNT in an effort to extract Intelligence from him and of the fact that he had authorized us to give the assurances set out above in the course of the interrogation.

5. Crump spoke to me on the telephone this morning and said that he would be sending his note to the Attorney shortly. It would incorporate a paragraph indicating that if the Attorney wished to make any comments no doubt he would do so in the course of the next few days since the interrogation was likely to take place towards the end of next week. I asked Crump if this meant he expected the Attorney to comment. He said he did not.

6. Crump indicated that he would have liked the assurances to exclude offences of a very serious nature - this was presumably a thought he had had over-night since he did not raise it yesterday. I replied that I did not see how we could operate on the basis of an assurance as limited as that - it must be accepted that BLUNT might have committed, for example, offences against Section 1 of the 1911 Act. Crump then agreed to leave the assurances in the form he had approved yesterday.

Allen
J.A. Allen.

~~D.G.~~ to see

339A

NOTE FOR PF.604,582

- 5

HO.

I told Sir Charles Cunningham today of our intention to interrogate the subject of this file next week, if a suitable appointment could be made, and that we proposed to point out that, since no caution had been administered, what he said could not be used in any prosecution.

2. Cunningham, while not at all critical of our intention to proceed in this way, thought that such a statement would be tantamount to saying that he would not be prosecuted. What would we do if he made admissions of offences under the O.S.A. during the interview? He thought we should then have to tell the D.P.P. and that on this ground it would be as well to tell them in advance of our intentions.

3. Cunningham agreed that the D.G. and he should see Sir Michael Adeane together and he undertook to make an appointment at the end of this week or the beginning of next.

D.D.G.

[Handwritten signature]

13th April 1964

SC
1.6.64

SECRET

(306) Wt.11364/7492. 200M. 1/63. K.C.N. Gp.616/1.

3386

S. Form 81/rev. 11.62

EXTRACT

Extract for File No.: PF. 604,582 Name: BLUNDEN
 Original in File No.:* PF. 604,582 Supp. Vol.: 11 Serial: 787a Receipt Date: 10.4.64.
 Original from: T.C. Under Ref.: 4306 Dated: 9.4.64.
 Extracted on: 13.4.64. by: GMacN Section: D.1.

Extract from T.C. on WEL 9293 on BLUNDEN

Outgoing call BLUNDEN to PROF. WHITE, MANCHESTER
 Ardwick 3333.
 Distant said that he was not there but could be found
 at the Whitworth Art Gallery - Ardwick 1880 -.Call was
 put through there.
 BLUNDEN, after some business discussion, arranged with
 JOHN WHITE for him and JOAN to come to lunch next
 Thursday(16th).
 He would be lecturing in Ireland on the Friday but
 wanted to leave on the Thursday in order to be sure
 of getting there by the Friday, in case of fog perhaps.
 He said that he would add on one day at the end of his
 'holiday'-and would stay in Ireland-'the whole of Monday'.
 BLUNDEN discussed further details about art matters.
 JOHN agreed to come on Thursday next at a_n out 1 o'clock.
 15.25

*If the original is in the file of an indiv. include the name of the file owner.

SECRET

3c
266
D/K
20/16

NOTE FOR FILE

I telephoned to Mr. Fisher, G.P.O., (Mr. Saunders is away on leave) with reference to the Letter Check warrant on BLUNT which is not yet in operation. I had previously established with Mr. Saunders that letters addressed to BLUNT personally, as opposed to letters addressed to the Director of the Courtauld Institute, are fairly numerous. Mr. Saunders checked for two days and on the 24th March there were three items from London, four provincial, and one foreign, and on the 25th March four from London, five provincial, and one foreign.


2. I asked Mr. Fisher if operation of the check would involve a delay. He said that it would involve a delay by one delivery unless special arrangements were made to operate the check at the local office. Facilities for operating do already exist at the local office but they are fully occupied at the moment by two checks, one D.2. ~~one~~ and one E.2.A. It would be physically impossible to deal with BLUNT as well as the other two in the time available, but if the other two could be suspended it could then be done. This would apply to the first post. If later posts were required further arrangements would have to be made and in Mr. Saunders' absence Mr. Fisher would require authority to do this.

3. There is one further difficulty in that next week, 13th to 17th April, the local office is being painted and decorated and no special operations of any kind can be done during that period.

4. I thanked Mr. Fisher and told him that I would let him know, giving him as much notice as possible, if we wanted him to operate the check and full authority for any special arrangements.

D.1.

9.4.64.


E. McBarnet

E. M. R. to see

337a

NOTE FOR FILE.

D.4. has given me the following information:-

- (a) BLUNT has no car and D.4. is pretty certain that he cannot drive; *But see 2b*
- (b) There is no back door to the Courtauld Institute, which is used by BLUNT;
- (c) BLUNT enters and leaves his flat via one of the two front doors to which he has a key. This door is to the left of the main front door;
- (d) BLUNT has an office on the ground floor with an ante-room, which is occupied by his Austrian personal assistant;
- (e) BLUNT's flat is second floor up from the ground floor. It consists of a sitting room, dining room, two bedrooms, bathroom and lavatory.

R. Symonds

R. C. Symonds.

D.1./Inv.
9.4.64.


D.1. 10/6/64

NOTE FOR FILE.

336a

The telephone check on BLUNT has been in operation since 2nd April and has established that he is at home.

2. For the purpose of the interrogation, it is proposed to aim for a day in the week beginning 20th April.


E. McBarnet.

D.I./Inv.
9.4.64.


Handwritten notes:
D.I. Inv.
9/4/64

335a

NOTE FOR FILE.

Arrangements are in hand with Mr. MacDonald, A.I., to establish an O.P. in Portman Square.

2. It has been established that there is no back entrance to the building.


E. McBarnet.

D.I./Inv.
8.4.64.

D.I./Inv.
8/4/64

SECRET

334a

31 March, 1964.

PF. 604,582/D.1./EMcB.

Dear Mr. Hawkins,

Please refer to my letter of 26th March, 1964. I very much regret that owing to my failure to check the telephone numbers, they were given incorrectly. The correct numbers are:-

WELBECK 9292/5 and
WELBECK 1074

Yours sincerely,



E. McBarnet.

N. A. Hawkins, Esq.,
G.P.O.

EMcB./JG.

SECRET

7/14
D1/05
31/3/64

SECRET

333a

G.P.O.

[Redacted]

MR. C. J. SAUNDERS*
MR. N. A. HAWKINS*

Home Office Warrant Change of Address/Telephone Number

Please make the following amendment to H.O.W. No. ^{TS/2508}.....
in the name of Sir Anthony Frederick BLUNT.....:—

ADD:

WELbeck 9292/5

DELETE:

WELbeck 1388
WELbeck 1389
WELbeck 4181

Date 31.3.1964.....

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES
Signature E.M. Furnival Jones.....

Copy to: A.2

*Delete whichever is inapplicable.

S. Form 417 rev.3.59

SECRET

31/3/64

SECRET

331a

PF. 604,582/D.1./EMcB

26 March, 1964.

Dear Mr. Saunders,

I am applying for a Letter Check on Sir Anthony Frederick BLUNT at 20 Portman Square, W.1.

2. We have recently received some information which alleges that BLUNT, who is known to have been a close friend of Guy BURGESS, was himself involved with the R.I.S.

3. I should like the Letter Check to operate as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

E. McBarnet

*V.B.
Spoke Mr. Saunders
and told him
we did not
want the L/C
to operate
until further
notice.
M.B.
2/25/3*

C.J. Saunders, Esq.,
G.P.O.

EMcB/GMacN

SECRET

*26
166
DI/OB
26/3/66*

SECRET

330a

PP. 604,582/D.1./EMcB


26 March, 1964.

Dear Mr. Hawkins,

I am applying for a Telephone Check on Sir Anthony Frederick BLUNT at 20 Portman Square, W.1. Telephone Nos. Welbeck 1388, 1389, 4181, and 1074.

2. We have recently received some information which alleges that BLUNT, who is known to have been a close friend of Guy BURGESS, was himself involved with the R.I.S.

Yours sincerely,


E. McBarnet

N.A. Hawkins, Esq.,
G.P.O.

EMcB/GMacN

SECRET

31/05
26/3/66

Sir Anthony Frederick BLUNT

20 Portman Square, W.1.

329a

This man is known to have been an intimate associate of the Russian spy, Guy BURGESS. It has recently been learnt that he was himself in contact with the R.I.S. in the past and it is desired to examine his present contacts and activities.

R. H. HOLLIS

26 March, 1964.

264
DI/OB
26/3/64

Sir Anthony Frederick BLUNT

WELBECK 1388, 1389, 4181 and 1074.

328a

This man is known to have been an intimate associate of the Russian spy, Guy BURGESS. It has recently been learnt that he was himself in contact with the R.I.S. in the past and it is desired to examine his present contacts and activities.

R. H. HOLLIS

26 March, 1964.

964
26/3/64

~~EMUB~~

327B

NOTE FOR FILE

I spoke to D.4. to-day and told him of our plan to interrogate BLUNT.

2. D.4. has no information about BLUNT's plans for the immediate future but thinks it quite likely that he will be remaining in London during the Easter vacation.

3. To the best of D.4.'s knowledge, BLUNT still lives with a boyfriend called John, who works in South Audley Street. *GASKIN*

4. D.4. says that BLUNT is always very busy at the beginning of the University term. He, therefore, suggests that we should try to fix an interrogation for seven to ten days before the start of term.

R. Symonds

R. C. Symonds.

D.1./Inv.
24.3.64.

21/65
26/3/64

327A

D.1/Inv.

✓ *rec*
9/4

Note.

I saw Sir Charles Cunningham this afternoon and told him that I was putting through warrants on BLUNT and that we hoped to interrogate him towards the end of next month. Before doing this I intended to consult the D.P.P. and the Attorney General with the aim of getting their authority to conduct the interrogation on intelligence lines, and I hoped they would allow us to promise BLUNT that he would not be prosecuted. In addition I thought that I should tell Sir Michael Adeane before the interrogation took place. Sir Charles Cunningham agreed with these proposals.

Roger Hollis

D.G.

24.3.64.

Blunt
25.3.64.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

Reference... Loose minute...
(Copy on) PF. 604,582.

324A

Seen by DG.

~~D.G. through D.D.G.~~ P203

Sir Anthony BLUNT

I attach a note of yesterday's meeting
on this case.

2. I have informed L.A. of our discussions
yesterday.

R.C. Symonds :

R. C. Symonds.

D.I./Inv.
20.3.64.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

20
1964

ASTH old

TOP SECRET

323A

Reference PW 604,582.....

Note of meeting on the Case of Sir Anthony BLUNT
on the 19th March, 1964.

Present: D.G., D.D.G., D.1., D.1./Inv.

D.G. said that in view of BLUNT's position some clearances would be required before an interrogation. The following steps will be necessary:-

- (a) It will be necessary to obtain clearance from Sir Charles Cunningham.
- (b) Although we do not contemplate a prosecution, it will still be necessary to consult the Law Officers.
- (c) It will also be necessary to inform Sir Michael Adeane, Private Secretary to H.M. the Queen.

2. D.G. said he did not think any of these steps were likely to prove dangerous or difficult, but he was not sure that we could be in a position to interrogate BLUNT in the week beginning March 31st. He enquired how much importance is attached to interrogating BLUNT before Kemball JOHNSTON.

3. This point was then discussed and it was agreed that although there are possible advantages in seeing BLUNT before Kemball JOHNSTON, this is not essential.

4. In further discussion about the timing of BLUNT's interrogation it was agreed that:-

- (a) before approaching BLUNT we must do our best to ensure that we are going to be able to keep a watch on him after the interrogation;
- (b) there is a better guarantee of this if we interrogate him shortly before or during the next London University term, which begins on April 22nd;
- (c) we should, therefore, adhere to the original proposal for an interrogation towards the end of April.

5. On the question of who should interrogate BLUNT, it was agreed that D.1. would be the most suitable person, since he has seen STRAIGHT.

6. It was decided that D.1./Inv. should inform D.4. of what is in the wind and obtain from him any recent knowledge that he has about BLUNT's activities.

7. D.G. undertook to take action on paragraph 1 above.

8. D.1./Inv. will apply for H.O.W.s on BLUNT.

R. C. Symonds

R. C. Symonds.

D.1./Inv.
20.3.64.

NOTE FOR FILE.

320a

My appreciation of the BLUNT case and the action I propose are as follows.

2. We do not want a prosecution, still less publicity. We should, however, use the threat of exposure as a means of persuading BLUNT to talk.
3. The objects of getting BLUNT to talk are:-
 - (a) to obtain an account of his own work for the R.I.S.;
 - (b) to obtain any leads he can provide to other spies.
4. An interrogation of BLUNT will entail the risk that if he does know of other spies, he may succeed in tipping them off before we can get on to them. I think we should now accept this risk, while reducing it as much as we can.
5. The first requirement is that we should be in a position to keep close tabs on BLUNT before and after the interrogation. This will entail:-
 - (a) a preliminary investigation with H.O.W.s to get an up-to-date pattern of BLUNT's activities;
 - (b) the use of A.4., who will probably require an O.P. in Portman Square;
 - (c) eavesdropping facilities if at all possible.
6. A second requirement in my opinion is that from now on a "need to know" should apply strictly to all plans for the investigation and interrogation. It would, I suggest, be sensible to keep a special indoctrination list.
7. I think we should start action at once with the aim of being in a position to interrogate BLUNT under favourable conditions at the end of April, i.e. while Michael STRAIGHT is in England.
8. I should like to have checks operating on BLUNT before the interrogation of Kemball JOHNSTON, which is due to take place in the week beginning 6th April. Mr. Henley is briefed to show no suspicion of BLUNT in talking to Kemball JOHNSTON. BLUNT's name is, however, bound to come up and Kemball JOHNSTON may inform BLUNT of this. The two men are friends, BLUNT being godfather to one of Kemball JOHNSTON's sons.
9. I propose that Miss McBarnet should continue to be the Case Officer. I have not yet considered who should be BLUNT's interrogator.

R. C. Symonds.

R. C. Symonds.

D.1./Inv.
18.3.64.

21/15
18/3/66

TOP SECRET

11-51/10/d

316B

PF.604,582 ✓

Copy: PF.72,493

acs 1873

D/EMCB
Discuss acs 12/3
May we discuss?
acs.

D1 Sur/RCS
To see

NOTE FOR FILE

1. In a discussion with D.G. today on the case of BLUNT in the light of Michael STRAIGHT's information, I said:-

(a) The files had, by arrangement, been referred to LA/BAH in order that he could consider the evidence with a view to discussing with D.G. the desirability of consulting D.P.P. - if only to clear our yard-arm with the Law Officers.

(b) For reasons which D.1/Inv had discussed with me we were anxious to postpone any question of confrontation of BLUNT.

(c) Our present viewpoint was that the greatest intelligence advantage lay in persuading BLUNT to talk, and a corollary to this was an understanding, if not an undertaking, that he would not be prosecuted.

2. D.G. said he was impressed by these arguments, and in canvassing them we could usefully bear in mind:

(a) The F.B.I. willingness to have John CAIRNCROSS and Michael STRAIGHT in the U.S. despite their admissions.

(b) The early comment by the Attorney-General, when considering the John CAIRNCROSS confessions, that he was diffident about bringing a case in respect of offences committed a decade or more ago.

3. D.G. ended by saying he would be glad if:

+ (a) L.A. would consult him before taking any action with the Law Officers.

(b) D Branch would take an early opportunity of setting out on the file for his consideration the proposed plan for exploiting the BLUNT case, and the intelligence grounds for advocating it.

+ 1 spoke LA 12/3

M.E.D. Cumming

D.
12th March 1964

TOP SECRET

966m (M) (D)

Copied

P. 4/3/64

313A

Note.

Having first spoken to Sir Charles ^{Rooke} Cunningham I saw the Home Secretary this afternoon and told him briefly about STRAIGHT's statement recorded at 311a. I said that we had informed the D.P.P. about BLUNT in 1957 (see 264a), but that this was in connection with BURGESS rather than on the basis of BLUNT's own activities. I added that we should no doubt want to question BLUNT as a result of this new information but this might not be immediately, and I thought in the meantime there was no likelihood that the story would become public. We should no doubt have to discuss with the D.P.P.'s office how we were to handle the interview. For our part, our interest lay in getting intelligence rather than in bringing a prosecution.

2. The Home Secretary asked if Sir Michael Adeane had been informed. I said he had not but we would have to have this point in mind if BLUNT were to be interviewed.

Rooke 1st/3/64

D.G.

2.3.64.

103 4/3
 D. J. Sur (then D. J.) 4/3

You will doubtless in due course be recommending future line of action.

W. J. 4/3/64 D. J. Sur 2.3.64

TOP SECRET



British Embassy,
Washington 8, D.C.

Our Ref: P.F.95.
Your Ref: FF.44,592/D.1/EMcB.

312B

To: Head Office.
(Attention: Miss E. McBarnet).

I enclose a note on an interview which
I had with Michael STRAIGHT, the subject of
S.L.O. Washington's letter P.F.95 of 3rd July,
1963.

*RM 442
'D'*

A.S. Martin

26th February, 1964.

A. S. Martin.

ASM/EMN

ENCL 2 pages

D 28 FEB 1964

TO

REF

FF 44 592

Sched amended

STRAIGHT
R44592 - Held

D 28/2

RS

accept signed: *lz*

TOP SECRET

5/3/64

Copy ~~of~~ in P.F. 44592
STRAIGHT

3/26

Ex 161
to PF 45907
link B

At the invitation of Mr. Sullivan of the F.B.I., I lunched to-day at the Statler Hotel, Washington, D.C., with Michael STRAIGHT, whose account of his association with Anthony BLUNT has already been passed to us by the F.B.I. The object of the meeting was to learn anything more which STRAIGHT could tell me and to enlist his help in obtaining a confession from BLUNT.

2. I found STRAIGHT an amusing companion and, I would judge, a man anxious to make amends for a past which he now sees to have been misguided and fears may have been dangerous to the U.K. In particular he has on his conscience his failure to make known to the British authorities the fact that it was BLUNT who recruited him to the R.I.S. He said that he would do anything to help us. He is prepared to confront BLUNT with his story in our presence, or alternatively he has no objection to our using his name and his information if we prefer to confront BLUNT ourselves. STRAIGHT will be visiting the U.K. on 24th April 1964 and will make himself available to us then or, if we wish him to come earlier, he will do so. He will spend the night of 24th April c/o L. K. ELMHIRST, 42, Upper Brook Street, W.1 (Telephone MAYfair 6782). For the rest of the month of April he will be at Dartington Hall, Totnes, Devon, where his parents run the Dartington Hall Settlement.

PF 42747

3. STRAIGHT ran through his story with me again and I noted the following points as possibly being new to us:

(a) He saw no connection between the Left Wing undergraduate group (headed by CORNFORD and ~~GLUCKMAN~~) and the Apostles. As far as he was concerned he was invited to join the Apostles without any inkling that his sponsors, BLUNT and BURGESS, had any sympathy for Russia. When BLUNT invited him to work for the Comintern it came as a staggering surprise to him. To this day he has no first-hand knowledge that BURGESS was also involved although he suspected it from the beginning.

PF 42262

KLUKMAN P.F. 45597

PF 604529

no. it really was 1935

(b) He visited Russia in 1936 as one of a group of Left Wing undergraduates, among them Brian SIMON and Michael YOUNG. The latter, according to STRAIGHT, is now education expert in the Labour Party. (This second name means nothing to me. Thinking it over, I wonder if he meant Michael STEWART and, if so, whether he is muddling the two Michael STEWARTs.) Also in the party were BLUNT and Charles FLETCHER COOK. These two left the party after arrival in Russia and went off alone to, he thinks, Lubeck. He believes that BLUNT and FLETCHER COOK were homosexual lovers at this time and that there was probably no political significance in their leaving the main party.

Ex 161
to PF 45907 link B

(c) He said that when BLUNT recruited him, he seemed nervous and unsure of himself. He guessed that he might have been BLUNT's first recruit. He thinks that later BLUNT attempted to recruit an undergraduate named Leslie HUMPHREY, but that he probably failed.

PF 219970
Michael Dundoh Young
see also who's who
No

/(d) ...

Extracted for
RF 604,789
(LOR 6)
7-5-64

- (d) He thought, too, that BLUNT may have tried to recruit Leo LONG, an undergraduate with a working-class background. On the other hand this may have been a homosexual "pass".
- (e) He attended a meeting of the Apostles in 1946 or 1947 when BLUNT and BURGESS singled him out for interrogation about the political scene. He found ~~they~~ both were still vehemently pro-Russian and when he disagreed with them they became hostile and, he thinks, worried.
- (f) He met BURGESS in Washington some two months before his defection. BURGESS tried hard to borrow a car from him but STRAIGHT refused. Before they parted STRAIGHT threatened that, if BURGESS did not resign from Government service, he would expose him.
- (g) In 1957 BLUNT tried to contact STRAIGHT during one of the latter's visits to the U.K. He did so through Philip and Cicely HENDY, Director of the National Gallery. He refused to meet BLUNT and has not seen him since.

4. One other point might be worth recording. While we were chatting before getting down to business STRAIGHT mentioned various family problems which he was trying to sort out. One of them concerned his sister who, during the war, had married Louis DOLIVET, the film producer. DOLIVET had left his sister and was still trying to get money out of the family. I did not betray any knowledge of DOLIVET but I have an idea we have a file for him. STRAIGHT said DOLIVET was now living in Paris.

5. A final point. STRAIGHT said that he was not and never had been homosexual. I am inclined to believe this and I understand that the F.B.I. do so.

26th February, 1964.

ASM,
A. S. Martin.

312A

TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH

Precedence IMMEDIATE Security Classification SECRET

To S.L.O. WASHINGTON File Nos PF.604,582 Section of Origin D

Originators Signed H.E.D. Cumming

Inf.: No. 468 Date 28.2.64 Date 28.2.64.

Copy to Sections D.G. Sec.
D.1.
D.

Reference your letter No. 89 of 27th February.
our telegram

Your paras. 2 and 3, excellent; will discuss on Martin's return.

Your para. 4, well understood.

311A

Handwritten initials and numbers: 88, 48/1

Pa-BLUNT
copy for STRAIGHT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Precedence... IMMEDIATE Security Classification... TOP SECRET

From:..... WASHINGTON File Nos. FF. 72493 Originator's No. 89

To :..... Date of Origin... 27.2.64

Passed for Action to D.G. Date of Receipt... 28.2.64

Info..... Copies to..... D. Decyphered by... AB/DEF

D.1/Inv.

FOLLOWING FOR D.G.

Reference your telegram 466 of 27th February, 1964, paragraph 2.

1. I will consult F.B.I. today.
2. In the meantime, you should know that yesterday MARTIN interviewed Michael STRAIGHT, who has given full details of his recruitment by BLUNT into the R.I.S. in 1936/1937. STRAIGHT is willing that his information should be used in confrontation of BLUNT, and, if we wish, will take part in the confrontation himself. Report follows by bag today.
3. MARTIN formed excellent impression of STRAIGHT, and he believes BLUNT can now be induced to confess.
4. You will appreciate our fears that prosecution of CAIRNCROSS might prejudice BLUNT interrogation.

BLK
01/12
1964

3100

Handwritten signature/initials

NOTE FOR FILE.

STRAIGHT's allegations about BLUNT have been discussed between D.l. and myself on a number of occasions since they were first received here. As a result, we arrived at the following conclusions:-

- (a) On the face of it there is no reason to doubt the truth of these allegations.
- (b) They provide a basis for further interrogation of BLUNT.
- (c) It would be useless to attempt such an interrogation without a simultaneous investigation of BLUNT.
- (d) Even so, it is unlikely that BLUNT, who has been seen eleven times by the Security Service since 1951, could be persuaded to co-operate unless he saw he was faced with the risk of exposure if he did not do so.

2. We therefore felt that action should be deferred on the following grounds:-

- (a) D.l. has been fully occupied with other important investigations.
- (b) We still lacked sufficient ammunition to constitute a real threat to BLUNT.
- (c) If BLUNT has been a spy, there is no reason to suppose that he is still a spy or that he at present constitutes a risk to security.

3. Before D.l.'s departure for America earlier this month, I discussed the case with him again and we agreed that he should take this opportunity to discuss with the F.B.I. the extent to which STRAIGHT's information might be used in a possible future confrontation of BLUNT.

RC Symonds

R. C. Symonds.

D.l./Inv
28.2.64

Handwritten initials/signature

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