

POLF50-6-118/V6	LIAISON AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - GENERAL.	POLF50-6-118/V6
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BOX 25

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date

S. 960 Edn2

POLF50-6-118/V6

THIS FILE HAS BEEN

- RECONSTITUTED
FROM MICROFICHE
AND SOME OF THE
- PAPERS ARE OF POOR
QUALITY

POL F 50-6-118 / V6

P
F
50-6-118
/ V6

LIAISON AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - GENERAL.

FILED 1988

S Form 924

Serial

J



POLF50-6-118/V6

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date
	SA	17 JUN 1988	RSM		05 AUG 1988			
	SA	4 APR 1988						
	SATO	27 JAN 1988						
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	SA							

POL F 50-6-118

/ V6

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23.7.54.
 23.7.54.
 26.7.54.
REGIMENT
 CODE 18-75

345.

5.8.54.
10.9.54.

Copy of letter from SLO Washington re Dr. COOT.
To Mr. Hoover re D.G's visit.

345z.
345a.

346.

10.9.54.

Note of D.G's talk with Mr. Cattaneo, FBI representative
in Rome.

346a.

347.

14.10.54.

D. note re procedure agreed between S.B. and the
Security Service re reference of cases by F.B.I.

347a.

348.

D
D.I.
D.2.5.
15.10
I understand that you are issuing a D. Final Circular
about this.
Th 16/10

Several instances have recently come to my notice of the F.B.I. requesting us to carry out enquiries - generally interviews of persons in the U.K. thought to know the whereabouts of or to have background information about U.S. suspects - in cases in which the U.S. Department of Justice is launching or is contemplating launching a criminal charge, e.g. perjury. From the fact that the U.S. suspect in question has, or is deemed by the U.S. authorities to have, a security record it by no means follows that it is proper for the Security Service to undertake such enquiries or to conduct such interviews. Prima facie, enquiries relating to criminal charges are the business of the Police. In appropriate cases, therefore, the Bureau should simply be referred to Special Branch.

The note at 347a shows that Special Branch accept this position. Please ensure that officers in your sections refer to you all requests from the Bureau to undertake interviews or make other enquiries on their behalf and consult me in cases of doubt whether it is proper for us to comply with them.

G.R. Mitchell

D.
15.10.54.
(Copy in SF 50-6-20(9)).

G.R. Mitchell.

349.

25.10.54. D. branch circular re F.B.I. enquiries to be channelled to 349a. S.B.

350.

E. 27/10.
F.

I have issued a D branch circular as at 349a. It occurs to me that similar F.B.I. requests may have been addressed to your branches, in which event you may wish to consider issuing a similar circular.

G.R. Mitchell
G.R. Mitchell.

D.
26.10.54.

351.

... have of this kind do crop up in F. Branch. I welcome the suggestion of a Head Office circular. 27/10.

Reference minute 350 and the D. Branch circular at 349a, no such cases in E. Branch have been brought to my notice recently, but I nevertheless think that E. Branch (and F. may think that the same applies to F. Branch) is equally likely to be exposed to the same danger. Would there not, therefore, be something to be said for reissuing the D. Branch circular, modified as necessary, as a Head Office circular?

E.
26th October 1954

W.M.T. Magan
W.M.T. Magan.

352.

D.D.G.

You will see from minute 351 that E and F suggest an office circular on the lines of 349a.

G.R. Mitchell
G.R. Mitchell.

D.
27.10.54.

20657
25 437/4765
865,000

353.

1.11.54. D.G. Circular No.50/Home(54) - Enquiries on behalf of the F.B.I.

353a.

2.11.54 From F.I. acknowledging letter from DG.

353b

354.

10.11.54. Extract from Assistant Directors Minutes re visit of D.G. to U.S. and talks with F.B.I.

354a.

355.

10.11.54. Extract from Assistant Directors Minutes re 353a.

355a

Ol: 18/11
356.
Ex: 18/11
through D.G. 17/11
22/11
25/11
25/11
25/11
25/11
25/11
25/11

To see serial 355a.

Secretariat.
16.11.54.

J.A. Harrison
J.A. Harrison.

357

21.12.54. From American Embassy.

357a

See by all D.I. 1/3
12/3 through 1/3
4/3
D.
yes.
20.12

358.

See by all D.I. Com officers.
JCh / 5.1.55.

Please see 357a.

I assume that this request is covered by the principle that we should inform the Americans of matters which are likely to affect their own Security.

D.2./3.
29.12.54.

J.P. Morton
J. P. Morton.

	359	
19.1.55.	Note re WAINWRIGHT.	359a
	360	
19.1.55.	Note re WAINWRIGHT.	360a
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21.3.55.	Minute from A to D.G. re meeting between Skardon and Hoover.	361a
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25.3.55.	To S.L.O. Washington in reply to 363a.	364a
	365.	
25.3.55.	Copy of letter from British Embassy, Washington/re SWIFT Reports. to S.L.O. Hong Kong.	365a
	366.	
18.4.55.	From SLO Hong Kong re visit of Mr. Child.	366a
19.4.55.	Note for file re A.4.'s visit to Canada.	366b.

(2045)
W23439/4763
9/33 865,000
JCS 514
Gp 734/209
(REGIMENT)
CODE 18-75

367.

D.V.G.

Please see 366a. I can see no objection to S.L.O. Hong Kong having dealings with the F.B.I.'s Far Eastern representative, but it may be best to avoid much correspondence.

Before replying we should get the views of S.L.O. Washington. I propose to write and ask for them.

H.P. Goodwyn
H.P. Goodwyn.

Secretariat.
20.4.55.

22.4.55. A.4. loose minute

367b

368.

28.4.55. From S.L.O. Washington re F.B.I. Legal Attache, Tokyo.

368a.

2.5.55. Note of talk between DDG & Mr. Cimperman re use of our information.

368b

369.

D.D.G.

Sent. Approved R. 4/5.

You discussed minute 367 and raised the point that the F.B.I. prefer to have the main channels of liaison running through London and Washington. I have consulted the files and Mr. Thistlethwaite, but I do not find a precise statement of the preference. On the other hand it is fact that the main channels run through London and Washington, and where there is another stream - the Caribbean - it is carefully made a tributary of the S.L.O. Washington.

2. The matter has now been overtaken by letter at serial 368a from the S.L.O. Washington which conforms with the above outline and with your views.

3. I propose to reply to 366a as at draft at 370a.

Secretariat.
3.5.55.

H.P. Goodwyn
H.P. Goodwyn.

370.

~~3.5.55. Draft letter to SLO Hong Kong. - removed - see 371A,~~

~~370a.~~

371.

4.5.55. To SLO Washington enclosing copy of 368b. 371a.

372.

5.5.55. To SLO Hong Kong. 372a.

373.

27.5.55 Cutting from The Washington Post re Medal for FBI Chief. 373a

374.

7.6.55 To FBI chief re 373a. 374a

375. (Copy on PF.605,414)

copy 27.9
D.
Some difficulty has arisen recently in D.I.A. with regard to the interpretation and practice of the D.D.G.'s ruling in his letter to S.L.O. Washington at 371a.

An example is the case of Peter JONES (PF.605,414 attached). In this case, because of the possibility that the Consular Department of the U.S. Embassy might make an approach to JONES on the basis of information supplied by us, you ruled that Cimperman should be asked to "kill" the enquiry.

D.I.A. officers, and especially the officer responsible for investigation on 5 Kensington Palace Gardens, quite often obtain information about American subjects, who because they wish to visit Russia or for some other reason become of possible security interest to the F.B.I. It is the current D.I.A. practice to keep the F.B.I. representative informed of such cases, having in mind his special request that he should be kept informed in his letter of 21 December, 1954, at 357a in this file.

In the particular case of JONES, we have continued to keep Cimperman informed about JONES' activities, more particularly because there are indications that JONES may have been giving false passport particulars to the Home Office. We have, however, continued to ask Cimperman to avoid any action which would result in the American Consulate taking action direct with JONES.

My understanding of the position is that we should certainly continue to keep the F.B.I. representatives informed of cases of this kind, and that we ought to be able to rely on Cimperman's understanding of our wishes as conveyed to him in the talk he had with the D.D.G. on 2 May, 1955 (368b). It should only exceptionally be necessary to convey a special warning, as was done in the case of JONES. Do you agree?

(2055)
W23439/4765
9/53 865,000
JC-5L14
G9736 709
(M251M14NT)
CODE 18-75

D.I.
25.9.55

J. C. Robertson
J. C. Robertson

376.

Original on SF.50-6-118
Copy to: PF.605,414

D.1.

I agree with your understanding of the policy based on D.D.G.'s letter at 371a. We should certainly continue to keep the F.B.I. representative informed of cases such as that of JONES. That our confidence in his readiness and ability to safeguard our interests is well founded appears to be borne out by his handling of the JONES case. There need be no hesitation on our part to make doubly sure that he will do so by conveying a special warning, as was done on JONES, whenever we foresee the prospect of embarrassment resulting from intemperate U.S. action. In "embarrassment" I include publicity on U.K./U.S. security collusion.

G.R. Mitchell

D.
27.9.55.

G.R. Mitchell.

377.

D.1.A. / Mr. Harrison. *10*
Mr. Askew. *30/11*
Mr. Crassweller *10*
Mr. Foulkes. *7809*
Mr. Reed. *11/10*
Miss Small. *11/10*
Mr. Tolson. *11/10*
Mr. de Wesselow. *11/10*
Mrs. Galbraith. *11/10*

D.1.B. / Mr. Cliffe. *11/10*
Miss Chenhalls. *11/10*
Miss Hay. *11/10*
Miss Selmes-Taylor. *11/10*

To see Minutes 375 and 376.

Officers are also reminded of the Director General's instruction at 353a.

J.C. Robertson
J. C. Robertson.

D.1.
29.9.55.

378.

21.10.55. From British Embassy, Washington re F.B.I. Representative in Tokyo.

378a

"FILE CLOSED"

3789



BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Your: POL.51/1/4

Our: SF.1/3

To: S.L.O., Hong Kong.

Copy: ✓ Head Office
H/S.I.F.E.

20 October, 1955.

ENCL —

21 OCT 1955
TO: *See*
REF: SF.50/6/118. 24/10/55

Mr. Harold Lincoln CHILD
F.B.I. representative in Tokyo.

I notified you by cable today of the forthcoming re-visit of Harold Child to your office. Your letter to H/S.I.F.E. of 12th April, 1955, and the copy of mine to Head Office dated 22nd April, 1955 refer to Child's previous visit to Hong Kong. ²⁶⁸²

2. The F.B.I. told me yesterday that they have instructed Child to visit Hong Kong again at the earliest opportunity to re-establish his contacts there. By contacts is meant his own Embassy people and you. ^{See/SF50/6/118}

3. The main purpose of his visit is to prod his Embassy people to expedite action which appears to be pending in an over large number of F.B.I. cases. His visit to you will be for goodwill purposes but no doubt he will seek your guidance and possibly assistance over his current problems.

I am assured that Child's visit to Hong Kong will be for liaison purposes purely and have no operational motive!

Child's will not be concerned with FBI/SLO Washington cases still outstanding. There is in fact only one; that of WAN Tai Chuen; your PF 2429 refers.

H
H.C.M. Stone. *M.R. 25.10.55*
7123
2210M

Copy of Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee of
Appropriations - House of Representatives

Received on 21.05.66 under cover of letter from SIO
Washington filed in POLF 53-12-89 Supp F Vol 2 serial 81a

DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, JUSTICE, AND COM-
MERCE, THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED
AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1966

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, JUSTICE, AND COMMERCE,
THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS

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ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida

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JOHN J. FLYNT, Georgia

CHARLES S. JOELSON, New Jersey

JAY B. HOWE, *Staff Assistant to the Subcommittee*

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations



CODE No. 27-31

On Her Majesty's Service

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MERCE, THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED
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JAY B. HOWE, *Staff Assistant to the Subcommittee*

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1965

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KENNETH SPRANKLE, *Clerk and Staff Director*

PERSONAL.

7th June, 1955.

PA in SF 50/6/118.

2741
29

May I offer my most sincere congratulations on the award of the National Security Medal which has been made to you by President Eisenhower.

I can think of no one in the free world to whom an award for 'outstanding contribution in the field of intelligence relating to national security' could be more appropriately made. It has given the greatest pleasure not only to myself but to all members of this Service, past and present, who have cause to know and admire the work of the F.B.I.

D. B. WHITE,

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~DM~~
13.6.58

Sent to DG by SMO to You under
personal cover

37311
~~2040~~

Cutting from The Washington Post

27.5.55.

Ike to Give Medal To FBI's Chief

United Press
J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, will be honored by President Eisenhower today by presentation of a medal for outstanding contribution in the field of intelligence relating to national security.

The award will be made in the presence of Cabinet members just before the weekly Cabinet meeting at the White House.

The National Security Medal was authorized by former President Truman on January 19, 1953, his last day as Chief Executive.

The first recipient was Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.

~~OK~~
13.6.55.

372a

SF.50-6-118/sect.


POL.51/1/4/MBH.

To: S.L.O. Hong Kong.

Copy to: H/S.I.F.E.
H.C.M. Stone Esq.,
c/o British EMBASSY,
Washington.

366a - Would you please refer to your
POL.51/1/4/MBH of the 12th April, and to
S.L.O. Washington's comments contained in his
368a - letter SF.1/3 of the 22nd April 1955.

In the circumstances stated
by Mr. Stone, it is clear that we should not
take any steps to establish any formal liaison
with the F.B.I.'s Tokyo representative, Mr.
Child. It follows that we should not enter
into correspondence with him - though we should
oblige him personally if he were to turn up
again in Hong Kong or visit Singapore.


H.P. Goodwyn.
Secretariat.

5.5.55.

hky.
Secretary
31.

on PF. 704398 (RAVIETZ)
SF. 50/6/118

371A

SECRET

SF. 50/6/196/D.D.G.

H.C.M. Stone Esq.,
S.L.O. Washington.

3686

I attach a copy of a note reporting a recent talk I had with Cimperman. The case of RAVIETZ which gave rise to this discussion will be familiar to you as copies of correspondence between this office and Cimperman have been sent to you regularly since our first report on the case was forwarded to your predecessor on 12.7.52. under reference PF. 704398/B.1.G/CPCdew.

2. I should like you to take particular note of the first paragraph of my note. I do not want you to initiate any action with the Bureau here because the matter is already in Cimperman's hands and it might be tactless for you to intervene. If, however, the question is raised with you you will know how to proceed. If the Americans should reveal the fact that they have received a copy of the letter to SWINGLER, the effect in this country, and thus upon our relations with the F.B.I., might be very serious indeed.

255A-104-260A

3. With reference to paragraph 2 of my note, copies of the letters to which I refer were forwarded to your predecessor on 14.8.50 and 22.9.50. under reference SF. 50/6/118/D.C. You will note from paragraph 4 of the attached note the suggestion that you should make selective use, when supplying information to the Bureau, of a warning that no executive or administrative action should be taken on the information, nor should it be further disseminated without reference to us. You can use your own judgement as to when it is advisable to employ this warning. There is certainly no objection to your using it in connection with information deriving from D. Branch.

4. I propose to enquire of Cimperman during the course of the next few days whether he has had any answer from the Bureau to his telegram. I will of course keep you informed.

R. H. HOLLIS
R.H.Hollis.

4th May 1955.

SECRET

Rnc.

SECRET

Copy to S.L.O. Washington.

Original on SF.50/6/196, v.2, 96a.

3688

Note.

With reference to minute 93, Cimperman called on me today at my invitation. I told him that on reading the RAVETZ case (PF.704398), I noted that he had been supplied with a copy of a letter written by RAVETZ to Stephen SWINGLER M.P., and forwarded by him to the Home Office. I said that in this country any communication of this nature to a Member of Parliament was a privileged document, and it was of the utmost importance that Cimperman should ensure that it did not become known that the Bureau was in possession of a copy of this letter. If it did become known, members of all parties in the House of Commons would be critical. Cimperman told me that he had of course sent the copy to the Bureau and he had recommended the Bureau to show it to the State Department in order to illustrate the danger which arose from the action of the State Department in making available to their Consul the original information supplied by us. I asked Cimperman in these circumstances to do his utmost to ensure that a copy of the letter was not placed on the State Department files. I emphasised to him that this was a matter of importance not only for us but for the Bureau, as any indiscretion in handling this letter might well be followed by restrictions upon the communication of information between our two Services. Cimperman said he thoroughly appreciated the importance of the point and would ensure that the necessary warning was passed to the Bureau by telegram.

Cimperman v. 1
SF 50-6-118
254A
259A

2. // I then spoke about the general conditions for handling our information, reminding him of my earlier discussion with him in the GURNEY (PF.42397) and IATTIMORE (PF.119507) cases, and reading him the final paragraphs of my letter of 11th August 1950 to him, and his reply of 19.9.50. I said it was my understanding that all our information was safeguarded under this general procedure, and that it was not necessary for us to make a specific condition about the handling of separate items. Cimperman said that he appreciated the position but that, in addition, he took steps to place a warning upon every delicate piece of information he received from us. He said that he differentiated between information from our sources and information clearly deriving from Traffic Index, simply covering the arrival and departure of travellers transiting this country. He did not prohibit the latter type of information from being used until clearance had been obtained from us, though the fact that it was classified would of course prevent overt use being made of it. I said that we certainly wished to be consulted before overt use was made of any material deriving from us, because even in the case of Traffic Index material it was important not to give the impression to the public that British Government information was being made freely available to the United States Government for purposes of prosecution or other executive action.

3. Cimperman said that he did not place a restriction upon D. Branch information which he sent to the Bureau, because there was no other department in the United States interested in that type of information and therefore no likelihood of further dissemination by the Bureau.

SECRET

14. ...

overly
7-5-55

SECRET

- 2 -

4. Cimperman made something of a point that the original information in the RAVETZ case had gone to the Bureau through our S.L.O. Washington and I therefore asked him whether he thought that the S.L.O. ought to attach a warning to anything he passed to the Bureau. Cimperman said that he did not want to be quoted on this point, but he thought it would be ~~wise~~wise to do so if there was any likelihood that the Bureau would want to give it further dissemination. He suggested that the S.L.O. should be selective in his use of the warning as otherwise it would lose its force. //

5. During the course of our discussion Cimperman remarked that we tended to over-classify our information. He said that travel details derived from the Traffic Index which were clearly taken simply from the arrival and departure cards made out by the travellers themselves frequently reached him classified Secret, whereas the Bureau would certainly not classify these higher than Confidential.

D.D.G.
2.5.55.

R. H. HOLLIS
R.H.Hollis.

SECRET



BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

3680

SF.1/3

To: Head Office.

Copy: S.L.O. Hong Kong.
H/S.I.F.E.

TOKYO : F.B.I. Legal Attache.

3660
Please refer to letter PCL.51/1/4/MBH dated 12th April 1955 from S.L.O. Hong Kong about Mr. Child's visit to our office in Hong Kong. *Dr. SF 50/6/118 - Sect ..*

I had been informed by the F.B.I. of Child's posting to Tokyo but I was not told about his later instructions to visit Hong Kong to get himself orientated and make his number with the Police. The decision that he should make the trip was made during one of my visits to Canada and the F.B.I. forgot to inform me on my return.

The F.B.I. state that it is very unlikely Child will again visit Hong Kong. They are most anxious that no arrangements should be entered into with him which might have the effect of cutting across our existing lines of security liaison between Hong Kong, Washington and F.B.I.

I asked if Child was likely to visit Singapore, as if he was we might be in a position to be of help to him. I was informed that there was no intention at the moment to send him there.

I gather that the reason why Child was posted to Tokyo, and another of their agents to Rome, is that the F.B.I. considered they could not depend upon C.I.A. to serve them adequately in those capitals.

H.C.M. Stone.

22 April 1955.

ENCL _____

28 APR 1955

TU. Sect

REF. SF 50/6/118.

DDG - 21/4

Extract for SF.50/6/118. X
Original in SF.50/71/8 serial 5/a.

307B

A. (Lt. Colonel M.E.D. Cumming, O.B.E.).

On 27th March, 1955, Durrell and I left for Ottawa and we arrived there very late on the evening of the 28th March, after a hold-up at Sydney, Nova Scotia, due to engine trouble in our air-craft.

.....

In Ottawa I had the opportunity of meeting Glen Bethel, the liason officer from the F.B.I., who occupies an office in the R.C.M.P. Headquarters. I was also able to renew old associations with Inspector W.Kelly, now the Chief Preventive Officer, and Inspector Cecil Bayfield and other old friends. Before leaving, there was a dinner party presided over by Jim Lemieux at which Mark McClun, Charles Sweeney and Harry Durrell were present and this entertainment was typical of that provided throughout the visit by various officers of the R.C.M.P.

During the first few days in Ottawa I was greatly assisted by Harry Stone, who was on one of his periodic visits to Ottawa, and he arranged that following my private visit to New York, I should travel on to Washington to meet the F.B.I. on the 12th April. I travelled down to New York by air in the late evening of the 6th April, remaining in New York until 11.40 a.m. on the 12th, when I took a plane to Washington. During my first afternoon there I was shown around the capital by Yvonne Deuchar and in the evening I was entertained at his home by our old friend Bob Lamphere. The following morning, with Harry Stone. I went early to the Bureau and enjoyed a most interesting day. It might be quicker to set-down a list of the people I saw and to say that all were extremely affable, all equally interested in

DLW
6.4.55

discussing mutual problems and none of them asked a single embarrassing or indiscreet question.

Visit to Bureau

Carl Hennrich)
Don Parsons) Laboratory.
Iven Conrad)

Vic Keay
Carl Hennrich

Lish Whitson)
Bill Brannigan) C.E.
Bert Turner)
Bob Lamphere)
Stirling Donahue)

Joe Meehan)
Dan Callahan) Satellite

Tour - George Peet.

Late in the morning I was privileged to be received by Mr. Hoover himself and I was very much impressed by his friendliness and very open manner. He expressed his personal thanks for the assistance he believed I had given to his officers during the course of years and particularly to Hugh Clegg and Bob Lamphere during the enquiry into the FUCH'S case. He expressed the view that, but for our adroit handling of this man, the F.B.I. would never have been able to unmask the spy-ring in the United States. Mr. Hoover discussed World affairs, his relationship with kindred intelligence organizations, showing that he enjoyed excellent understanding with our own Director General, with the R.C.M.P., O.S.S., O.S.I. but omitted to refer in this way to C.I.A.

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
He was quite prepared to answer questions and indeed, arising out of his discussing the current public enquiry into the telephone "taps" I was prompted to enquire whether he issued his own warrants for listening to telephone conversations. He informed me that from the beginning and contrary to the practice of other intelligence agencies, he had always insisted upon obtaining the Attorney-General's authority for any line-tapping operation. Equally, he had never applied for such authority except in cases of grave national urgency (and occasionally when the life of a citizen was in danger - e.g. in a kidnapping case) and he assured me that at that date only twenty-two line-tapping operations were authorized.

I was given the opportunity of talking at length with Don Parsons and Ivan Conrad of the Laboratory and this shall be the subject of a separate note. During the evening of 13th April, Harry Stone entertained nearly all the people I had seen at the Bureau at his home and, in addition, four others were present - John Mannion, Ralph Roach, Bill Cleveland and Emory Gregg. A very pleasant evening.

On 14th April I spent the morning at the British Embassy discussing my visit with Harry Stone and left by air just after lunch on my way back to London. At Washington Airport I met Win Scott and Warren Dean and lunched with them. Whilst Harry Stone was making enquiries about my flight, Win Scott asked me for the latest news on the Affair BURGESS/MACLEAN. I was unable to make any useful contribution to his knowledge of this case.

As you know, my plans were interrupted by the weather and I was grounded for a further few days

in New York before returning to London on
17th April, 1955.


W.J. Skardon.

A.4.
22.4.55.
A.17.

2


366B

SF 50-71-8 .. Arrangements for Training
Courses for RCMP Personnel.


✓SF 50-6-118 .. Liaison with the F.B.I.

NOTE.

Saw Jim Skardon following his return to the U.K. on 17 April from his visit to Canada to train the new R.C.M.P. Watcher organisation. He said he had had the warmest of receptions both from the R.C.M.P. and from HOOVER and others in the F.B.I. The visit to the latter came about as a result of his visit to his daughter in the States.


Lt. Col. M.F.D. Cumming.

A.
19.4.55.





366A.

Security Liaison Office,
c/o Colonial Secretariat,
Hong Kong.

Our Ref.: POL. 51/1/4/1BHI

12th April, 1955.

Your Ref.

To : H/S.I.F.E.
Copy : Head Office ✓
H.C.M. Stone, Esq.,
British Embassy,
Washington.

13 APR 1955
Sec.
55 52/5/118 R7 18/4

On Thursday, April 7th, we received an unexpected visit from a member of the F.B.I., Mr. Harold Lincoln Child, Jr., who has been holding for a short time the post of Legal Attache at the United States Embassy in Tokyo. He tells me that he has been sent out by the Bureau to cover the Far East so I was rather surprised that I had not received prior warning of the intention of the F.B.I. to appoint such a representative who would be likely to visit Hong Kong. Mr. Child did not know how to get in touch with us, and I am not sure whether he realised there was a Security Service representative here before he was told by the Commissioner of Police. He got in touch with the Police first and fixed up liaison with them on criminal matters. On the security side he was referred back to the American Consulate General (C.I.A.) by the Police and to me.

We made Mr. Child very welcome and did our best to entertain him. He is very pleasant, enthusiastic and co-operative. He had a number of security briefs most of which we were able to answer on the spot and he made copious notes. I told him that I should be very glad to see him whenever he visited Hong Kong and would do all I could to assist him but I warned him that I could undertake no regular liaison with him by correspondence unless this was laid down by higher authority. I explained that in the first place I was already in touch with the F.B.I. through our representative in Washington and that most of our points for the Bureau were taken up by this means.

The position is therefore that we have dealt with him on a one-time basis but have entered into no regular commitments.

Mr. Child's brief did not go beyond the bounds of F.B.I. interest. He was interested in Americans living abroad and in Chinese residents, having connections with Hong Kong, in the United States. I gather that he spent a good deal of his time here with the American Passport and Visa Section. Exactly what he and C.I.A. had to say to each other I have not been told but I let the C.I.A. representative know what was going on. I also consulted him before I saw Mr. Child.

Although the manner of this visit was rather unusual, I personally welcomed it. Mr. Child was anxious to come here again, and no doubt he will be making regular visits. From here he is going on to Manila. I asked him whether he would cover Singapore but he had received no instructions to do that.

I should be grateful to receive authority to deal with Mr. Child during his visits but leave Head Office and Mr. Stone to decide whether we should enter into correspondence with him. I have no strong feeling either for or against this and only ask that the F.B.I. should inform Mr. Child of whatever decision is reached.

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M. B. Hanley

M. B. Hanley
S. L. O. Hong Kong

M.
P. H. K.
11/15/55

S. Form 81/rev. 12.53

S E C R E T

EXTRACT

(49864) WT. 33778 Gp. 698

Extract for File No.: S. F. 50/6/118. Name: _____

Original in File No.: S. F. 291/Hong Kong. Vol.: 2. Serial: 81a. Receipt Date: 25.3.55.

Original from: British Embassy, Washington. Under Ref.: SF. 50/Central & S. America/1(1). Dated: 22.3.55.

Extracted on: 31.3.55. by: K. M. Section: R. 7.

36511

• If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner

Copy of letter from British Embassy, Washington, re. SWIFT Reports, to S.L.O. Hong Kong.

SWIFT reports, in so far as they relate to South American countries, are not now required by the F.B.I.

However, in addition to information relating to the United States, they are still interested to receive SWIFT information concerning persons and organisations in PANAMA, CUBA and MEXICO.

4/12
31.3.55

TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH

364a

Precedence ROUTINE. Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL.
 To: S.L.O. WASHINGTON. File No. SF.50-6-118. Section of Origin A1E
 D.S. 6019 Signed E.P.H. Kraus
 Inf. : Date 25.3.55. Date 25.3.55.
 Copy to.....
 Reference ~~your letter~~ our telegram No. WASH/226 of 24.3.55 — 363w

No action. Skardon will discuss with Stone.

huff

A1E/E
26.3.55

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

363a

Precedence..... PRIORITY..... Security Classification..... SECRET.....

From : SEO WASHINGTON..... File No. SF. 50-6-118..... Originator's No. WASH/226

To :..... Passed for ATE 15/3..... Date of Origin 24.3.55.

Info..... Action to..... Date of Receipt 25.3.55.

Copies to SECT. B1. A1...... Decyphered by..... CMP.

Reference your teletam DS/6018 of 24th March - 362a

STONE left for Ottawa today. Please advise action.

Handwritten initials or mark

Urgent

Reference.....

361a

22.3

D.G. (through D.)

As you know Mr. Skardon leaves for Canada shortly to launch the R.C.M.P. watcher organisation, leaving one of the senior A.4. Assistants to continue the training for a further week or two.

We have arranged that, while there, Mr. Skardon should have a few days leave to visit his daughter in New York. He has mentioned this in social conversation to Cimperman who says he must certainly go to Washington as Hoover would welcome a chance of meeting him, principally from the angle of his part in the FUCHS case. Cimperman says in effect that the F.B.I. would be most hurt if he visited the States without going to see them.

May I please know if you agree that Skardon should do this ?

A.
21.3.55.

Lt.Col. M. E. D. Cumming.

(6343) A.O.St.
REGIMITE
Code 5-15-0

DC's reply. He ~~wrote~~ agrees Skardon must go & see FBI & Hoover personally if they wish, but only for half an hour or so. DC wishes to see Skardon ~~first~~ before he leaves. Cable to

MEll
21.3.55

Reference SF. 50-6-118

360a

Note

After our meeting with Mr. Cimperman on 19.1.55., he telephoned to say that the Congress-man WAINWRIGHT was in fact Mr. Stuyvesant WAINWRIGHT, Member of Congress for New York, born 16.3.21. He was in the U.K. for about a week in November. When he left, he went to Paris. During his stay here, he made numerous contacts including the Prime Minister. He had not received a U.S.S.R. visa by the time he left England. It is not known at the U.S. Embassy whether he ever got it. The Embassy was aware of his intention to visit the U.S.S.R. and knew that he had been to the Soviet Embassy in London.

- 2. No further action is therefore required.

C. J. H. Foulkes
C. J. H. Foulkes.

D. I. A.
19.1.55.

JH
2/11
To see.

Bill
Bill
19/1/55

12/27
7/3/55

REGIMITE
(1945)
JCS Ltd
Gp 736/210
Code S-75-0

Reference SF.50-6-118

359a


Note

Reference CHOIR R5/2 of 18.11.54, R.20-27.

2. On 19.1.55. D, D.1. and I spoke to Mr. Cimperman and asked him to confirm that there was a U.S. Congressman called WAINWRIGHT, that he had been in the U.K. in November 1954 and that the U.S. authorities were aware of the fact that he had been making enquiries with a view to obtaining a U.S.S.R. visa.

3. Speaking from memory Cimperman said that he was reasonably certain that he could give an affirmative answer to all these questions.

D.I.A.
19.1.55.


C.J.H. Foulkes

REGIMITE
(1945)
JCS/Ed
Gp736/210
Code S-35-0

1/15/27
7/3/55



TOP SECRET

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Embassy
1, Grosvenor Square
London, W.1, England
December 21, 1954

357/A

No. 5566-105-261

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO

Re: MAXWELL MAYERS
(SF.84/H/1/Supp.A/2153/D.2/DJM)

Dear [redacted]

Thank you for your letter of December 8, 1954, regarding the above person.

For your confidential information, the Bureau is very interested in receiving information as to the identity of any U. S. citizens who make contact with Soviet, satellite or Yugoslav officials or establishments while abroad.

Should you later develop any other information coming within this category, I would greatly appreciate being informed.

Sincerely,

J. A. Cimperman

J. A. Cimperman
Legal Attache

[redacted]
Leconfield House
Curzon Street, W. 1

D2/3. Our original letter was a scraggy report from King about an American in touch with the Hungarian Legation. Cimperman's reply raises a point of general principle which you will wish to see.

ENCL _____

21 DEC 1954

TO _____

REF _____

CONF. SF84/Hu-ga-1/Supp.A

Held by DE

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TOP SECRET

3550

Complete copy of minutes held by Secretariat.

Extract from Minutes of Assistant Directors Meeting held
on Wednesday, November 10th, 1954, at 2.30 p.m.

21-2

4.
SF 10/11/54

E.1. referred to D.G. circular No: 50/Home(54) on the subject of enquiries on behalf of the F.B.I. and asked whether it was the intention that all requests from the F.B.I. involving outside enquiries should be referred to a Senior Officer, or was it meant to apply solely to enquiries relating to criminal proceedings? Also did

"outside enquiry" include or exclude routine enquiries to the Police?

In discussion the following points were noted. The F.B.I. must state the reason for their enquiry when they make one; when it is necessary for us to refer to the Police we should make it clear that it is an enquiry originating from the Americans, and where necessary the onus is on us to point out to the Police what is behind the enquiry. If, however, the enquiry is of a nature in which we would have a legitimate interest for our own security purposes, there is no need to refer to its American origin. The crucial test of any F.B.I. enquiry was whether it was in connection with possible legal proceedings or of a purely intelligence nature; in the latter case there was a well understood convention that the F.B.I. would not use the information for other than intelligence purposes. It was agreed that the interpretation of "outside enquiry", which D. had understood, i.e. that it included any enquiry outside the office, should stand. It was also agreed that at least for the time being all requests from the F.B.I. of the nature specified, whether criminal or purely security, should be referred to a Senior Officer. D.G. considered that if this was found to be too much for Senior Officers the matter could then be reviewed.

In the course of discussion A. drew attention to the possibility of an enquiry from M.I.6. being passed to us without any American origin being attributed to it and our reply being passed verbatim to the Americans. There had recently been a case where this had happened and confusion had arisen because in response to a parallel enquiry from C.I.A. we had not said so much as we had said to M.I.6. D.G. felt this must be an isolated case for there was a standing agreement that replies to any enquiries M.I.6. might receive from C.I.A. about Americans in the U.K. should be cleared with us before issuing.

D.G. also asked whether the office was aware of the nature of the instructions issued by the Home Secretary following on his statement in the House. D.D.G. said that nothing had been issued to us and he doubted whether anything more precise had been issued to the Police than was contained in the Home Secretary's reply. He commented that Commander Burt seemed quite clear as to what he could or could not do, and was prepared to accept the risk of occasional slip ups, such as had happened in the case of LATTIMORE.

I believe that
S. F. Newman
has written
to the Commission
Re: Lattimore
17/11

10/11/54

X in the enclosed

Complete copy of minutes held by Secretariat. 354a
Extract from Assistant Directors Meeting Minutes, held on
Wednesday, 10th November 1954, at 2.30 p.m.

11.

*SK
50/6/18*

D.G. spoke of his visit to the U.S. and Canada. With regard to the F.B.I. D.G. said that it was Edgar Hoover's policy to collaborate closely with us and there was an immense fund of goodwill in the F.B.I. for us. Major Stone enjoyed excellent personal relations at all levels. Boardman, who had taken over from Micky Ladd, was not as good as his predecessor and in particular would not take responsibility to the same degree for authorising the release of information to S.L.O. Generally, it appeared that there was a certain unwillingness to talk in detail about their own internal security problems and this militated against close collaboration. The whole atmosphere in the F.B.I. was one of "attack", dictated by the need to keep ahead of Congressional Committees and to start court proceedings against suspects before Congressional Committees identified and arraigned them. As a result there was a major diversion of effort in the F.B.I. to the preparation of cases for prosecution with the result that the normal continuing processes of investigation were not receiving the attention they deserved. The F.B.I. was not geared to compete, for example, with an illegal espionage network. It was evident that we gave the F.B.I. far more than we received and D.G. feared that this state of affairs must continue. He had also formed the view that there was no hope of any detailed and intimate exchanges between desk officers. The simple fact was that a F.B.I. desk officer would find such a proposal embarrassing and would be afraid to release available information unless he had specific instructions from Hoover himself.

Speaking generally D.G. said that he felt it was best to recognise the limitations of liaison with American agencies, accepting, none the less, that apart from one isolated incident it appeared that we could trust them to look after our information.

h.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

353B
[Handwritten signature]

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

November 2, 1954

Copy in SF 80/18/A

Dick G. White, Esq., C.B.I.
Leconfield House
Curzon Street
London, S.W. 1, England

My dear Mr. White:

White in Washington

Your most thoughtful letter of October 25, 1954, has been received, and I want to express my gratitude for your kind and generous comments concerning the FBI and my administration of its activities.

I am indeed happy that I had an opportunity to meet you and discuss matters of mutual interest. My associates and I are certainly pleased that you enjoyed your visit to our facilities, and we earnestly hope that we will continue to merit your confidence and approbation.

The assistance received from your office by Mr. John A. Simpson is greatly appreciated, and you may be sure that we will help your representative, Mr. Harry Stone, in every way possible.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

*Th. H. [unclear]
9/14/54*

353d

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR-GENERAL'S
CIRCULAR

SF.50-6-118.

No: 50/Homo(54).

To be issued to:-

1st November, 1954.

All Officers (Homo).

Enquiries on behalf of the F.B.I.

In answer to a recent question about police enquiries on behalf of the F.B.I. in the LATTIMORE case, the Home Secretary stated in the House of Commons that he had given instructions which should ensure that in any comparable case which might arise in future, no action would be taken by the police in this country until there had been an opportunity for the matter to be considered at a high level.

2. Several times recently the F.B.I. have requested us to carry out enquiries in connection with cases in which the U.S. Department of Justice is launching or is contemplating launching a criminal charge, e.g. perjury. The requests generally take the form of invitations to us to conduct interviews of persons in the United Kingdom who are thought to know the whereabouts of or to have background information about the U.S. suspect, or about his relatives or associates. From the fact that the U.S. suspect in question has, or is deemed by the U.S. authorities to have, a security record it by no means follows that it is proper for the Security Service to undertake such enquiries or to conduct such interviews.

3. Any officer receiving a request from the Bureau to undertake an interview or to make any other outside enquiry on its behalf should refer the matter in the first place to his Senior Officer, and no such request should be complied with except on the authority of an Assistant Director, who should consult the Director General in cases of doubt.

Rome H.H. Jones
for DIRECTOR GENERAL
SECURITY SERVICE

bully

CONFIDENTIAL

*sect/LR
1/11*

Copy to be filed in SF 50-6-118 for office reference purposes.

G. R. MITCHELL

349A

GEN/D/54.

TO: D BRANCH OFFICERS.

D. BRANCH CIRCULAR NO. 9/54 OF 25.10.54.

F.B.I. ENQUIRIES.

Several times recently the F.B.I. have requested us to carry out enquiries in connexion with cases in which the U.S. Department of Justice is launching or is contemplating launching a criminal charge, e.g., perjury. The requests generally take the form of invitations to us to conduct interviews of persons in the U.K. who are thought to know the whereabouts of or to have background information about the U.S. suspect, or about his relatives or associates. From the fact that the U.S. suspect in question has, or is deemed by the U.S. authorities to have, a security record it by no means follows that it is proper for the Security Service to undertake such enquiries or to conduct such interviews. Prima facie, enquiries relating to criminal charges are the business of the Police. In appropriate cases, therefore, the Bureau should be referred to Special Branch.

Any officer receiving a request from the Bureau to undertake an interview or to make any other outside enquiry on its behalf should refer the matter in the first place to his Senior Officer, who should consult me in cases of doubt whether it is proper for us to comply with the request.

G. R. Mitchell

G.R. Mitchell.

D.
25.10.54.

Copies to:

D branch officers.
SF 50-6-118
SF 50-6-20(9)

M.

D/BSD
26/10/54

Copies in: SF 50-6-20(9) - Liaison with SPECIAL BRANCH. 3477
SF 50-6-118 - Liaison with the American F.B.I.
(other than on security of American
Factories).

PF 603406 .. LEE, D.C.

NOTE.

I gave Commander Burt by telephone today an outline of the F.B.I. enquiry at 85a,⁺ explaining that it appeared to us to fall outside the province of the Security Service and that, with his (Burt's) agreement, I would refer the Bureau to Special Branch. Burt readily accepted this. He said that, if future cases arose in which we felt that the Bureau were putting to us enquiries which seemed to be properly the business of Special Branch, he would be quite content that we should so inform the Bureau without prior reference to him.

G. R. MITCHELL

G.R. Mitchell.
H.

D.
14.10.54.

⁺
D. note. Related to interview FBI asked us to undertake with a friend of LEE's wife, LEE currently being the subject of a perjury charge brought against him by American Department of Justice. D/BSM
15/10/54

Reference.....

346a

Note.

Mr. Cattaneo, who is to be the F.B.I. representative in Rome, visited the Director General on 7.9.54. Mr. Cimperman accompanied him.

Mr. Cattaneo told the D.G. that he understood that his duties would be mainly concerned with criminal affairs and with the question of Italian emigration to U.S.A, and that he did not expect to have much security intelligence work to do.

D.G. told Mr. Cattaneo that the [redacted] handled our business with the Italians.

D.G. said that, if at any time Mr. Cattaneo was passing through London, he would be greatly interested to see him again and to hear his impressions of the situation in Italy.

D.G. Secretary.

[redacted signature]

10.9.54.

(6343) A.O.St.
REGIMITE
Code 5-15-0

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345a

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL.

LONDON,
10th September, 1954.

When I wrote to you on 20th July last in answer to your kind letter of June 29th, I said that I was greatly hoping to be able to visit the United States in October or November of this year.

I am now writing to send you personal word that I have been able to make some definite plans for a visit in October. These will allow me about eight days in Washington from October 19th - 26th approximately, when I shall be leaving for Ottawa.

I understand from Mr. Stone that these dates are likely to be convenient for you and your officers. I very much look forward to the pleasure of meeting you again.

A. G. WHITE.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Handwritten:
DG / PDL
10/9/54

EXTRACT

(49504) WT. 3377A GP. 698

3452

Extract for File No.: SF. 50/6/118. Name: _____

Original in File No.: PE. 78,361. Dr. CORT. Vol.: 4. Serial: 153b. Receipt Date: 5.8.54.

Original from: SLO Washington. Under Ref.: Z/C. Dated: 2.8.54.

Extracted on: 21.9.54. by: IDC Section: R.7.

Copy of letter from SLO Washington.

Thank you very much for your very helpful letter dated 26th July 1954.

With regard to the penultimate paragraph I must say that my understanding of the situation is that any individual Britisher, scientist or otherwise, who applies to come to the U.S.A. for any purpose which will involve his having access to classified information, or to a "sensitive" department, is first required to obtain a security clearance. To obtain this clearance the individual applicant must first obtain sponsorship of the appropriate Department.

(Sgd) H.C.M. Stone.

W.C.B.
21.9.54

* If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner

2195

Extract for File No. SP 576/118 Name

Original in File No. PP 78,361 DE CORG Serial 139a Vol 3 Receipt Date 26.7.54

Original from/to SLD Washington Under Ref. PP 78,361/21/EBR Dated

Extracted on 21.9.54 by MD Section 2.7

SECRET

139A

P.P. 78,361/21/EBR

H. G. E. Stone, Esq.,
British Embassy,
Washington

Attached for your information is a copy of a letter recently sent to Clapman. It may be helpful to you if we provide the background to this information.

2 In the course of a routine letter, Clapman drew attention to an item in the press stating that the National Council for Civil Liberties had made a fresh approach to the Home Secretary to allow Mr. and Mrs. GCM to remain in England. The item stated that this approach was on the part of 161 members of the teaching and research staffs of Cambridge University, including 19 professors of the University and 11 Fellows of the Royal Society. Clapman asked for the identities of the 19 professors and 11 Fellows for the completion of F.B.I. records.

3 As you know, it is not the ordinary policy of Her Majesty's Government to inform foreign governments or security matters relating to British subjects, but by agreement between the Security Service and the F.B.I. arrangements exist for the interchange of open information under certain circumstances. In providing the F.B.I. with security information on a British subject, therefore, it has been our practice to try to weigh the respective merits of our duty to the British subject concerned against our duty to inform the F.B.I. of matters of a security nature which are reasonably likely to affect the security of the United States. For our part, therefore, we test the information in two ways, viz: whether it is both reasonably reliable and of true security significance, and, secondly, whether it is reasonable to suppose that it affects or is likely to affect the security of the U.S.A.

4 At our request Clapman called on us and we discussed his request with him. He was told that in the absence of any other security record we could not in the ordinary way reveal the fact that a certain person had left papers to an agency of the Home Secretary on behalf of GCM. It was stated that we would not report such matters unless of security significance. Clapman was told also that in the event that one or more of these persons had done a security record with us, the information regarding his support for the apparatus of the Home Secretary would be recorded on his file. It would thus be a matter of record in the F.B.I. files and it was stated that the national information would not be available to the F.B.I.

5 Clapman has explained the F.B.I. point of view. (This was not of course, strictly correct in the.) He stated that it was their practice to record all such matters as information.

6 The main reason for his request, however, was that in the event that any of these persons proved to be trustworthy, we might later be in a position to share with British Government authorities as to previous arrangements, and the F.B.I.'s assistance would probably be asked in order to provide security clearance. They would then like to get a record for consideration by the F.B.I. and Home Government, and then a party to support the GCM.

SECRET

SECRET

It was pointed out to Clasperman that, so far as we knew, any Government which was going to be asked in connection with such work, would first be asked to give a statement of the nature of the support given to the system to the State Secretary in behalf of other scientific research, and that the previous security record for we should not be a sufficient basis for a statement of support to justify recording in relation therewith by the Government in the procedure.

The Government had the right to ask us to describe privately for such work and with the possibility of having access to such classified information as we had appreciated. We had thought that the Government would be interested in this information, but we had not thought that we should not think that this was the case.

As you will see, we have in our written reply to Clasperman, avoided giving a blunt refusal to his request. The discussion we had with Clasperman was frank and friendly, and both we and he appreciated the differing points of view. Clasperman and therefore have no difficulty in reading between the lines. We have however thought it right that you should be in possession of the full facts as far as possible that Clasperman may now, or at some later date, have to send a copy of our letter to Washington.



F. B. Kay

210 July 1951

FB/KV

SECRET

✓ Copy on SF. 50/6/118

SECRET

344a

PF. 78, 361, 361/E. 1./DLS.

5091-100-385

23rd July, 1954.

Dear

Please refer to your letter No. 5091-100-385 dated 9th July, 1954 which we discussed with you on 14th July, 1954.

I mentioned to you that we would not regard the fact that an individual had signed an appeal on behalf of Dr. CORT as constituting of itself an item of security interest. We should not therefore open files on the nineteen university Professors and sixteen Fellows of the Royal Society merely because they had signed this appeal; should any of them, however, already be the subject of an adverse security record, we should of course add this new information to their files.

We have not yet learned the names of the persons who signed the appeal on behalf of Dr. CORT to which you refer. When we do, we shall of course let you know should any of them be the subjects of a security record and should it appear that they may be in a position to offer a threat to the security of American interests.

Yours

Copy to:

H.C. Stone, Esq.,
British Embassy,
Washington.

J.A. Cimperman, Esq.,
American Embassy,
1, Grosvenor Square,
W:1.

D.L.

D.L. Stewart.

SECRET

*W.H. 4/21/54
30/7/54
27. 7. 54*

Reference.....344Z.....

Copy of minute 134 in FF. 78,361. Vol. 3. Dr. CORT.

E. 1.

As you will see from minute 133 (343z), F. agrees with the line taken in your draft letter at 131a(342z), and I shall be grateful if you will now sent it to Cimperman.

E.
23rd July 1954.

(Sgd? W. M. T. Magan.

mc/R7.
21.9.54.

(6343) A.O.St.
REGIMITE
Coda 5-35-0

W.M.T.
20.9.54.

D2.24/7

343a

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL.

SF.205/USA/D.D.G.

23rd July, 1954.

The D.G. asked me to write to you about the Home Secretary's visit to Washington and about plans for his own visit later on.

The Home Secretary is not due in Washington until September 6th. D.G. has supplied him with some background material, which included a summary of your letter of 26th May, and I enclose a copy of his letter covering this material.

With regard to the D.G.'s own plans it seems that his visit may have to be fitted in to a relatively short period. 'C' will probably be in Washington during the first fortnight of October, the Queen Mother early in November, and now it seems probable that Sir Percy Sillitoe will also be there in November. In consequence, the second half of October is the likely time and provisional bookings have been made for the D.G. on the Queen Mary, for the outward journey arriving in New York on 19.10.54 and for the return journey leaving New York on 3.11.54. This will give him fourteen clear days in North America. He suggests spending the first week in Washington, then going up to Ottawa - perhaps by car - for the inside of a week and back to New York by 3rd November. Would you consider these dates and let us know whether they are likely to be convenient for those concerned in Washington. Just before he went on leave the D.G. was able to have a word with Nicholson to confirm that they would suit him.

I expect you know that Mr. Dulles replied to Sir Percy's letter about his visit to C.I.A. suggesting that November of this year or April 1955 would be the best months. If the later date is chosen the D.G. may postpone his visit until November which would really be more convenient for him.

As to the people whom the D.G. should see in Washington you will be best able to advise. He does not want to be drawn into desk-level discussions and has suggested, as preliminary thoughts on the subject, the following: Sir Roger Makins; Mr. Hoover, Messrs. Boardman, Belmont and Keay at the Bureau; Mr. Dulles and Win Scott at C.I.A., and George Glazebrook at the Canadian Embassy.

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Reference.....3437

Copy of minute 133 in PP. 78,361. Dr. CORT. Vol. 3.

F. Seen A. J. Kellar./Cimpermans request was, of course, outrageous. The draft reply is temperate, almost too much so'. - but seems right./

Please refer to minute 132 (343B). It seems to me that this is a matter in which F. Branch must have a special interest, and I have therefore thought it proper to refer the draft at 131a (342z) to you before it is despatched. I should say that, when I first heard of the request made by Cimperman in the last paragraph of his letter at 113z I mentioned the matter to the D.D.G. and told him that I had arranged with E.1. that they should see Cimperman and make two points to him:

- a) That we did not regard the signing of a petition of this nature as being of security significance in itself;
- b) That we would not be prepared to pass our information to the Americans unless it affected their security.

The D.D.G. orally agreed that this was the proper line to take.

These are the two points which the draft at 131a(342z) makes and I am content to let it go as it stands.

Incidentally, I find it extremely hard to credit Cimperman's statement as recorded in the last paragraph of the note at 129a(341y), that the Americans would not vet people going to classified establishments by private invitation. If this is the case, they might spend a little time on improving their own security in places where there really is a necessity.

(6343) A.O.St.

REGIMITE
Code 5-35-0

E.
22nd July 1954.

(Sgd) W.M.T. Magan.

mc/R7. 21.9.54.

W.M.T. Magan
21.9.54

Reference 342b.....

Copy of minute 132 in PF. 78,361. Vol.3. Dr. CORR.

E. Seen by W.M.T. Magan. 22/7.

Please see folio 129a.

The discussion with Cimperman was entirely frank and friendly and both he and we fully appreciated the differing points of view of our respective services on this matter.

At the end of the interview Cimperman went so far as to offer to destroy his letter at 113z if this would help us. I said that I saw no reason why we should be embarrassed by a difference of viewpoint and that it was probably as well to bring it out into the daylight.

I have now placed at folio ^{342z}131a a draft letter to Cimperman. I have avoided giving a blunt refusal to his request but, after our discussion, he will read between the lines without any difficulty. The only grounds on which I continue to be anxious about all this are that Cimperman may find it necessary now or at some future date to send a copy of my letter to Washington and I fear that, should it arrive there at the wrong moment, it might perhaps be the cause of the Bureau's displeasure being vented on our SLO.

Though it will not obviate this latter possibility, it might help to meet it if we were to send Stone a copy of our letter with a covering note. If, therefore, you agree with the draft, I suggest that we do this.

E.1.
21.7.54.

(Sgd) D.L. Stewart.

(6343) A.O.St.

REGIMITE
Code 5-35-0

mc/R7.
21.9.54.

*mc/R7
21.9.54*

242

SF.50/6/118 21st July, 1954.

Dear Major Stone,

The Director General would be grateful if you would deliver the attached letter to Mr. Hoover. I enclose a copy of it, and of Mr. Hoover's letter to which it replies.

D.D.G. is writing to you with fuller details of the D.G.'s plans for visiting the U.S.A. and about the Home Secretary's visit.

Yours sincerely,

H.P.S.

Major H. C. M. Stone,
c/o British Embassy,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

unc 187
30.7.54

Copy for SF.50/6/118.
Original in EF. 78,361. Vol.3. 131a.

SECRET.

DRAFT

21.7.54.

34-22.

Dear

Please refer to your letter No. 5091-100-385 dated 9th July, 1954 which we discussed with you on 14th July, 1954.

I mentioned to you that we would not regard the fact that an individual had signed an appeal on behalf of Dr. CORT as constituting of itself an item of security interest. We should not therefore open files on the nineteen university Professors and sixteen Fellows of the Royal Society merely because they had signed this appeal; should any of them, however, already be the subject of an adverse security record, we should of course add this new information to their files.

We have not yet learned the names of the persons who signed the appeal on behalf of Dr. CORT to which you refer. When we do, we shall of course let you know should any of them be the subjects of a security record and should it appear that they may be in a position to offer a threat to the security of American interests.

J.A. Cimperman, Esq.,
American Embassy,
1, Grosvenor Square, W.1.

Copy to SLO Washington.

mc/R7.
21.9.54.

me/R7
21.9.54

346

D.G.

20th July, 1954.

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL.

Dear Mr. Stone,

It was very kind of you to write to me as you did in your letter of 29th June. I was delighted to welcome Mr. Brown here and to have the opportunity of a talk with him. I was also very pleased indeed with what you had to say about collaboration between our two Services.

Thank you too for your invitation to visit the Federal Bureau of Investigation when I come to the United States. I am greatly hoping to be able to arrange a visit for October or November and shall be asking Mr. Stone to advise me on dates which would be convenient for you.

Yours sincerely,

D. D. WHITE

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

W.K.7
30.7.54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3412

NOTE ON U.S. INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATIONS.

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The F.B.I. (originally the Bureau of Investigation) was set up in 1908 as a law enforcement agency. It was not until 1939 that it was given the additional responsibility for investigating espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters within the United States. As such it is the counterpart of the Security Service although, unlike the Security Service, it is an overt and executive organisation with the responsibility for the investigation of certain federal criminal offences. Although in the field of criminal investigation the F.B.I. has certain executive functions, its officers having the power of arrest, etc., in the loyalty and personnel vetting field its functions are similar to those of the Security Service. As a fact-finding organisation, the F.B.I. is charged to pass to other U.S. Government Departments the results of such enquiries for action by the Head of the Department concerned.

The F.B.I. maintains field offices throughout the United States and, in addition, has a number of overseas posts. It is represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (roughly the equivalent of our Joint Intelligence Committee) together with the Service intelligence departments, the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, is directly responsible to the Attorney General.

/Central....

CONFIDENTIAL

20/12/52

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20.7

Central Intelligence Agency.

SF 50/6/168

The official title of the Head of the C.I.A., at present Mr. Allen Dulles, is "Director of Central Intelligence". He is responsible to the President of the United States through the medium of the U.S. National Security Council, of which the President is Chairman. The C.I.A. was set up under the National Security Act of 1947. It is charged to carry out certain intelligence services, which the law describes as services of common concern, assigned to it by the National Security Council. In addition, it advises the National Security Council on intelligence matters that relate to the nation's security, and helps to coordinate intelligence activities throughout the Government and evaluate intelligence reports.

The Secret Service.

The organization known in the U.S.A. as "The Secret Service" has no direct connection with the intelligence organizations. It is responsible for the personal safety of the President.

CONFIDENTIAL

Held 430
Original filed on SF.50/24/101 and sent to the Home
Secretary by D.G. on 20.7.54. as part of
the brief for his visit to the U.S.A.

ExFac
Copy also filed on SF.50/6/168 at 221a in vol.6.

COPY

3417

Extract for File No. EE 50/6/11B Name

Original in File No. EE 78/361 Dr. COER Serial 329 Vol. 3 Receipt Date

Original from Under Ref. Dated

Extracted on 24.9.54 by Section R.7

map

24.7.54

NOTE FOR FILE

1. On 9th July, 1954, Mr. Gimperman (F.B.I.) wrote a letter (115) to H.C. concerning the case of Dr. V. H. ... In that letter he requested, inter alia, the identities of 15 professors of Cambridge University and 11 fellows of the Royal Society who were amongst 151 members of the teaching staff of the University said by 'The Press' of July 8th, 1954, to have been a party to a fresh approach to the Home Secretary on behalf of COER.

2. The names of these persons have not, so far as we know, appeared in the Press neither have they so far come otherwise to our knowledge but steps have been taken to obtain them, if present. Therefore, we do not know whether any of them has an existing security record.

3. It is not the ordinary policy of H.M.C. to inform foreign governments or security matters relating to British subjects but by agreement between the Security Service and the F.B.I. arrangements exist for the interchange of such information under certain circumstances.

In providing the F.B.I. with security information on a British subject, therefore, it has been our practice to try to weigh the respective merits of our duty to the British subject concerned against our duty to inform the F.B.I. of matters of a security nature which are reasonably likely to affect the security of the United States. For our part, therefore, we test the information in two ways, viz. whether it is both reasonably reliable and of true security significance and, secondly, whether it is reasonable to suppose that it affects or is likely to affect the security of the U.S.A.

4. On 14th July, Gimperman's request was discussed with him by Mr. Stewart and myself. Gimperman was told that in the absence of any other security record we would not in the ordinary way record the fact that a certain person had lent support to an approach to the Home Secretary on behalf of COER. In isolation we would not regard such action as being of security significance. Gimperman was told also that in the event that one or more of these persons had already a security record with us, the information regarding his support for the approach to the Home Secretary would be recorded on his file. It would then be a matter of consideration in each individual case as to whether this additional information would make it desirable that we should inform the F.B.I.

Gimperman then explained the F.B.I. point of view. (This was not, of course, entirely unknown to us.) He stated that it was their practice to record all such names and information. (In this connection it is significant that Gimperman said that should Wedgwood turn up in the future for a visit for America he thought he would experience some difficulty).

The main reason for his present request was that in the event that any of these persons proved to be scientists, who might later go to America, either with British Government sponsorship or by private arrangement, and who might there have access to atomic or other similar projects or information, the F.B.I.'s assistance would probably be asked in order to give security clearance. They would

S.121/210

then wish to put forward for consideration the fact that the persons concerned had been a party to support for COPT.

It was pointed out to Cimperman that, so far as we know, any Government sponsored scientist going to America in connection with such work would first be vetted by us. (Presumably this would be through Morton Evans). (Such a vet would not of course disclose the support given to the approach to the Home Secretary on behalf of COPT unless the scientist concerned had already had some previous security record for we should not otherwise have considered it of security significance sufficient to justify recording in isolation. Therein lay the difference in our procedure.

The suggestion that British scientists could go to America privately for such work and with the possibility of having access to such classified information was not one which, so far as F.I. were concerned, we had appreciated. We had thought that the American authorities would themselves request a vet in such a case, but Cimperman said that he did not think that this was the case.



E.I.
30.7.54


P. B. Ray.

Reference...

328

Note.

Mr. Cimperman brought a visiting F.B.I. inspector, Mr. Brown, to see the D.G. today. The D.G. had a general talk with him but as he is not concerned with the intelligence side of the F.B.I. no intelligence matters were discussed.

D.G. Secretary. 

4.6.54.

REGIMITE
(1945)
JCS Ltd
Gp736/210
Code 5-35-0

**THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958** July 2021

W. H. R.
30.7.54

POLICE PERSONALITIES

Assistant to the Director D. Milton Ladd retired from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on February 28, 1954, after completing more than 25 years' service.

The son of a distinguished Senator from North Dakota, Mr. Ladd accompanied his father to the Nation's Capital and while working days attended the George Washington University nights, receiving his law degree in 1928. The year 1928 was a significant one for Mr. Ladd. It was in that year that he was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar. He was also admitted to practice before the United States Court of Appeals and, on November 5 of that year, he entered the FBI.

Three years and three offices later, Mr. Ladd was designated Special Agent in Charge of the New Orleans, La., office of the FBI. During the next 8 years he headed the field offices at St. Louis, Mo.; St. Paul, Minn.; Chicago, Ill.; and Washington, D. C. An outstanding investigator and a superlative administrator, Mr. Ladd was promoted to the position of Assistant Director in 1939 and placed in charge of the Identification Division and the Laboratory. Two years later he became head of the Security Division, in which vital post he remained during World War II and the crucial years which followed. On May 5, 1949, he became an Assistant to the Director.

Other honors, outside his service in the FBI, have come to Mr. Ladd. On June 2, 1952, Mr. Ladd received an honorary doctor of laws degree from the North Dakota Agricultural College at Fargo, N. Dak., where his father, the late Dr. E. F. Ladd, had served as professor, dean, and president. Mr. Ladd delivered the commencement address and participated in the rededication of the chemistry building which was named Ladd Hall in his father's honor.

Mr. Ladd has had an outstanding record in his quarter century of service and his achievements have made a lasting contribution to the FBI's annals. He will be greatly missed by all his friends and associates in the FBI, as well as by the many police officers who have had occasion to

MAY 1954

D. M. Ladd, Ass't to FBI Director, Has Retired

work with him since he first entered on duty with the FBI nearly 26 years ago.

The proud owner of a Florida lakeside cottage, Mr. Ladd plans to make that his future base of operations, where he will undoubtedly do a little gardening and puttering in his workshop, and add to his collection of Indian artifacts.



D. M. Ladd.

* * *

OTHER TOPICS

State Police Work and Administration in Rhode Island

*by COL. JOHN T. SHEELAN, Superintendent,
Rhode Island State Police*

The Rhode Island State trooper wears no police badge. His hat bears a gold shield with the engraved pledge, "In the Service of the State." Since the department's inception by legislation in 1925, its personnel has endeavored in many and diverse ways to fulfill to the utmost the obligation of this commission.

From an original complement of 25 members assigned to three rented barracks in 1925, the troop has grown to a present streamlined organization of 84 members, occupying 6 barracks and 2 substations. The colonial-styled, red-brick barracks located on the main highways of the State, all similarly designed and constructed, have become a distinctive mark of State law enforcement and assistance to visitors and residents alike. Headquarters operations, once located in a not too imposing wooden structure at North Scituate, were transferred in 1931 to its present site on Louisquisset Pike in the town of Lincoln. This new building now houses the superintendent, his executive staff, the State Fire Marshal Bureau (which is by statute a part of the State police organization), the Bureau of Traffic and Supply, the Bureau of Criminal Identification, and a patrol of 11 men.

The unique and distinctive uniform of oxford-gray whipcord, trimmed with a military red doeskin cloth, contrastingly set off by a tan hat, highly polished brass fittings, and cordovan-colored Sam Browne belt and leather riding boots, has been worn by department members since its beginning and during many outstanding events in the history of Rhode Island law enforcement, ranging all the way from the violent 1934 industrial mill strikes to the 1938 hurricane which devastated most of the State's shoreline. Such events distinguished

personnel to positions of leadership in national police circles.

The application of the facilities of the department in conjunction with the personal sacrifices and abilities of its members has etched a record of enviable accomplishments. The phases of the department's activities subsequently described herein attest to the services rendered by the members in the performance of their duty and incidents beyond the call of duty.

Personnel and Training

The selection and training of personnel are considered a most important phase of the department's yearly duties.

Prior to conducting a recruit training school, the department has a statewide notice served through the newspapers and radio that the State police will consider applicants for such a school. Applications must be filed in person at headquarters. All applicants are then interviewed by preliminary boards appointed by the superintendent. Preliminary boards consist of a commissioned officer and a noncommissioned officer of the department. At each interview a "Qualification Report," which requires careful scrutiny and examination of the applicant, must be completely covered by the board. A large number of applicants are eliminated because of obvious deficiencies such as height, weight, speech, posture, deformities, condition and development. The board evaluates both the education and intelligence of the aspirant. A high-school education or its equivalent is desired. Oral problems in arithmetic, history, geography, current events, traffic, quick thinking, common sense, etc., are employed to aid the board in its judgment of the applicant. The board also inquires into the applicant's character, hobbies, spare-time habits, associates, family circumstances, criminal record, motor vehicle offenses, and military service records.

The preliminary physical examination is given only to those who survive the preliminary board.

S. Form 81/rev. 1.52.

Complete copy of Minutes seen by: -DG. DDG. C.D.E.&.F
Complete copy of Item 4. in SF 51/30/103.

EXTRACT.

CONFIDENTIAL

Extract for File No. S.F. 50/6/118 Name: _____

Original in File No.: SF 51/30/103 Serial: _____ Vol.: _____ Receipt Date: 28.5.54.

Original from: Cabinet Office Under Ref.: _____ Dated: 27.5.54.

Extracted on: 31. 5. 54. by: JRP Section: Secretariat.

337a

If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner

4. Visit of the Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force, to the United Kingdom.

.....
(c) Members of the Committee should accordingly notify the Secretary whenever the Director of their Corresponding U.S. Department was about to visit the U.K.

Incl 127
30.7.54
JA
1/6/54

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

336a

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 12, 1954

Mr. Dick G. White, Esq., O. B. E.
Box 500
Parliament Street B. O.
London S. W. 1, England

Dear Mr. White:

I have received your letter of May 1, 1954, and want you to know that I deeply appreciate your congratulations on my Thirtieth Anniversary as Director of the FBI.

You were most thoughtful to remember me on this occasion, and I am very grateful to you and your associates for your best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

D.D.G. Recd. 28/5
Sec'd

DWS 26/4

P.A. m/s 50/6/112

we R7
30-7-54
5/17/54



POLF50-6-118/V6