

POL F 50-24-101

/ V2

POL F50-24-101

/ V2

FILE CLOSED

MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
SECURITY SERVICE: 1952 THE HOME
SECRETARY.

FILE CLOSED

S Form 924

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date

KV 4 / 483

S. 960 Edn2

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Extract from note re D.G.'s meeting with
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THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 JANUARY 2023

SECRET
RESTRICTED

148B



HOME OFFICE
HORSEFERRY HOUSE, DEAN RYLE STREET
LONDON SW1P 2AW

QPE/66 1/3/19

COMPUTER BREAKDOWN
FILED, UNCONNECTED
ADDRESSEE REQUEST ON
RESUMPTION OF SERVICE

D V Mountain Esq
Box 500

Comm perf 50-6-40
22 June 1973

Dear Mountain

I enclose a copy of correspondence I have had with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about Departmental responsibility for answering letters on matters pertaining to the Security Service. You will see that, subject to your views, I have agreed that the Home Office would be prepared to agree in certain circumstances to certain kinds of such letters received in the FCO being transferred to the Home Office. Is this acceptable to you, please? I suppose there is no prospect of your replying to such letters from your Ministry of Defence cover address?

I am sending a copy of this letter to Goodall.

Yours sincerely

D H J Hilary

25 JUN 1973

D H J HILARY

P.A. in Perf 50-24-101
Orig. in Perf 50-6-40
Vol. 8... Serial 802 Receipt date 25-6-73

11 12 1
10 2
9 3
8 4
7 5

ENCL 5 papers
25 JUN 1973
TO
REF

PAF 50-6-40

SECRET
RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED
SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01- 930 2323 extn 1077

D H J Hilary Esq
Home Office
Horseferry House
Dean Ryle Street
LONDON SW1P 2AW

Your reference QEP/66/1/3/19

Our reference ZSS 1/1

Date 18 June 1973

Dear Hilary,

Thank you for your letter of 12 June.

2. Since we have not in fact received many letters from MPs or members of the public on security issues recently, I think all we need do is bear in mind your kind offer to accept responsibility for letters of this type if their number again reaches significant proportions. But I hope that we shall not have to bother you.

3. I think that it would be a good idea if you could, as you suggest, send copies of our exchange of letters to the Security Service.

Your sincerely

David Goodall

A D S Goodall
PUSD

RESTRICTED
SECRET

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED~~

QPE/66 1/3/19
ZSS 1/8

A D S Goodall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

12 June 1973

Dear Goodall

You wrote to me on 22 November 1971 (sic) about the handling of letters from the public on matters pertaining to the Security Service. I am very sorry that this has lain fallow for so long.

2. The problem from our point of view is that, as you say in your letter, the Security Service is not part of the Home Office although the Director-General is "responsible to the Home Secretary personally." In the past, the Home Office has been at great pains to resist attempts to place responsibility on the Home Secretary and his Department for all kinds of security matters which are not directly his concern, on a vague argument that the Home Secretary has a general responsibility for security. It is not always easy to see where Ministerial responsibility lies, and demarcation disputes have sometimes had to be decided by the Prime Minister personally. The Home Secretary cannot avoid responsibility where what is in question is the methods of the Security Service itself (eg a complaint that the Security Service has "spies" in the Universities); but it is important to us to maintain the position that the Home Secretary is not responsible for decisions in security matters taken by other Ministers.

3. The correspondence of which you enclosed copies with your letter consisted of suggestions that particular individuals might be security risks or might have information of value to the authorities concerned with Security. I do not think we could reasonably dispute that, if any Department has to reply to letters of this kind, it is more appropriate that it should be the Home Office than the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Naturally it is more convenient for the Home Office if such correspondence lies where it falls. But if in the future correspondence of this kind again reaches significant proportions and you see difficulty in continuing to deal with it yourselves, we should be prepared (subject to anything the Security Service may say) to accept it. I am sure, however, that you would bear in mind the points made in paragraph 2 above.

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED~~

~~SECRET~~
RESTRICTED

4. If you are content to proceed on this basis, perhaps I should send copies of this correspondence to the Security Service, in case they have any views.

Yours sincerely

D H J HILARY

~~SECRET~~
RESTRICTED

SECRET
RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01- 930 2323 Ext. 1077

Your reference

D. H. J. Hilary, Esq.,
Police Department,
Home Office.

Our reference ZSS 1/8

Date ~~RESTRICTED~~ 22 November, 1971

Dear Hilary,

LETTERS FROM THE PUBLIC ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE
SECURITY SERVICE

1. I raised with you on the telephone on 12 November a question of Departmental responsibility for answering letters from members of the public on matters pertaining to the Security Service and undertook to let you have, in due course, a dossier of letters illustrating the problem which arises.
2. This problem is to some extent, I suppose, a constitutional one. If a member of the public writes to one of our Ministers or to the Department on a matter which is clearly the responsibility of the Home Office, we normally pass the letter to you for action and inform the correspondent that this has been done. In the case of the Security Service, which is not part of the Home Office but whose Director-General is "responsible to the Home Secretary personally", we have not hitherto done this. Instead we have copied such correspondence to the Security Service for their comments and then replied on their behalf.
3. As such correspondence has, until recently, been relatively rare, we have seen no difficulty in this procedure although it is, strictly speaking, anomalous that we should deal with enquiries to a Department for which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office ~~Secretary~~ has no responsibility. Following the recent expulsion of Soviet spies, however, correspondence of this kind from members of the public has increased and we see some danger in continuing a practice which might encourage the public to think that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was in some way responsible for Security Service operations in this country.
4. No problem arises with letters calling only for a simple acknowledgment or for a reply to the effect that the contents have been drawn to the attention of the appropriate authorities. There would clearly be no advantage in transferring such cases to you. But where a substantive reply is required, the problem is a real one. The enclosed dossier, comprising recent

/letters

RESTRICTED

SECRET



~~RESTRICTED~~
SECRET

letters from Mr. Bernard Braine, MP, Sir John Arbuthnot, Squadron Leader Rogalski, Dr. G. R. Cooper and Mr. F. A. J. Walker will give you an idea of what it amounts to. (Copies of our replies to the first three of these letters are also enclosed; we are still awaiting the comments of the Security Service on the last two.)

5. I recognise the difficulties on your side about accepting responsibility for this kind of correspondence and it may be that, anomalous though it is, the present procedure will have to suffice. But I should be grateful if you could consider the problem and let me know what you think.

6. I am not consulting the Security Service at this stage. If however you decide that correspondence of this kind does come within the province of the Home Office, we should presumably need to take their view before making a change.

Yours sincerely,

David Goodall

(A D S Goodall)

Encs.

~~RESTRICTED~~
SECRET

FROM THE PRESS SECTION

Date...19 JUL 1972.....

148^a

THE TIMES

Mr Maudling resigns

Mr Maudling resigned yesterday as Home Secretary while the Metropolitan Police inquire into the affairs of Mr John Poulson, the architect. He is succeeded by Mr Robert Carr. Mr Maudling said it would not be appropriate to hold the office during the investigations.

Two civil servants, Mr W. G. Pottinger and Mr George Braithwaite, have been suspended. The investigation will be led by Commander James Crane, head of Scotland Yard's company fraud squad.

CONFIDENTIAL

147A

Loose Minute

Copies on :

POL.F.50-24-49

POL.F.50-24-87

POL.F.50-24-101 ✓

Secretariat - Mr. Young

There are three files held in my safe to which I think you should refer at some stage in the composition of the history. They are:-

POL.F.50-24-49 : The Findlater Stewart Report.

POL.F.50-24-87 : The Brook Report

POL.F.50-24-101 : Ministerial Responsibility for the Security Service - 1952 The Home Secretary

2. All three files contain information which ought not to receive general currency in the office and such parts of them as you think merit a mention in the history will need to be drafted with discretion.

D.G.

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

12th October 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

DG/MW
12/10



With the Compliments
of
Sir Philip Allen

Home Office
Whitehall

~~a Mr Hanley.~~
146a.

~~Mr. 23/8~~

~~KX~~ ~~Mr 23/8~~

K/Alv.

1st by para's original
to Sir J. ...
146a
By Stephens
Mr Graham
Mr ...



01-930 5422

CABINET OFFICE
LONDON S.W.1

17th August, 1971

Recd 23-8-71.
PF 41, 186 (JONES)

Dear Sir Philip,

~~DD~~
~~KX~~ MM
K. Adv.

5. With regard to the last paragraph of your letter, I am sorry you should have been surprised at the exchange in question. In this letter I don't want to be too specific and will therefore make only two observations: first, the Prime Minister and I have had discussions about this general subject - I refer to the one we have discussed on two occasions in Burke's office - and it is inevitable that the person in question should be discussed in this context. The Security Service provided the Prime Minister,

Sir Philip Allen, G.C.B.,

1654

146a

via Burke, with a memorandum on the person in question; but I thought, and told Burke and the Prime Minister that I thought, the memorandum difficult to interpret without further explanation on one word and one phrase in it. I therefore asked Furnival Jones if he could explain these two points to me.

6. Again I should be grateful for confirmation that this satisfactorily explains the situation.

*Yours
Robert Laid*



SECRET

HOME OFFICE
WHITEHALL · S.W.1

145a

19th August, 1971

~~DDG~~ Recd 20.8.71.

DDG
KX

PF 41, 186

Copy: BL.F.S. - 24-101 ✓

Dear Lord Rothschild

K.A.M. 30.

I am writing separately, for ease of filing, in reply to the second point referred to in your letter of 17th August. What you say makes entirely clear your concern in this matter, and I am grateful for this explanation.

But where you are wrong - and I think this is the trouble - is when you say that the Security Service provided the Prime Minister, via Burke, with a memorandum about this individual. This is not the channel of communication, and cuts right across the Home Secretary's responsibility. The Security Service did not have it in mind that the memorandum was to go to the Prime Minister, and did not send it to Burke for this purpose. This however is a matter I must discuss further with Burke, and this I will do when we are all back from leave.

Yours sincerely

Philip Allen

The Lord Rothschild, G.M., F.R.S., Ph.D., Sc.D.

SECRET

DDG/552

~~D.G.~~ *1.2*

1144 ^A

POL.F.50-24-101

NOTE

Sir Philip Allen telephoned on 29th January. He was looking at Lord Wigg's memoirs, in which the latter writes that operational responsibility for the Security Service rests with the Prime Minister, although it is administratively under the Home Secretary. We agreed that this was nonsense and Allen will try to correct it.

Belmont

D.D.G.

1.2.71.

DDM/PF
1.2.71.

143a.



D.G. 10/7
D.D.G.
10/7

POL-F-50-24-101

Copy :- POL-F-50-24-~~101~~ 48
POL-F-50-6-312/Supp A

With the Compliments
of the
Secretary of the Cabinet

Rec: 10.7.70

Sir Martin Furnival Jones, CBE

Cabinet Office,
London, S.W.1.

DG/598

TOP SECRET

143^a

9th July, 1970

Ref. A07549
Copy No. 3 of 3 Copies

This is simply to put it on record that I have submitted to the Prime Minister the directive to the Security Service and that he has approved its continuance in force without amendment. He would, however, wish any amendment of the list of public authorities for whom the Security Service may make enquiries, etc., as indicated in the supplementary directives which have been issued from time to time, to be submitted for his prior approval.

When Furnival Jones saw the Prime Minister the other day there was some discussion of the provision in the directive that "on appropriate occasions" the Director General has the right of direct access to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister confirmed that, in his view, this was a necessary arrangement and that if he or Furnival Jones ever judged it necessary to consult the other direct, there should be no question of their entitlement to do so. But he thought that such occasions should and would be very rare indeed; and he would always be concerned to ensure that the Home Secretary was kept informed as promptly and as fully as possible. I don't know whether you will think it necessary to say anything to the Home Secretary about this; but, if you do, I am very content to leave it in your hands!

I am sending a copy of this letter to Furnival Jones.

BURKE TREND

Sir Phillip Allen, GCB

SECRET

✓ POL.F.50-24-101

POL.F.50-24-48

142^a

Extract from Note of D.G.'s Meeting with Prime Minister
on 6th July 1970. Original on POL.F.50-6-312/Supp/A

Mr. Edward Heath

I called on the Prime Minister at No. 10 on Monday, 6th July, and talked with him for about three-quarters of an hour. Burke Trend and R.T. Armstrong were present.

- (a) The Prime Minister confirmed that he endorsed the Directive to me dated 24th September 1952. In discussion he agreed that Burke Trend should tell Philip Allen that in particular the Prime Minister had confirmed that on appropriate occasions I should go direct to the Prime Minister and that the Prime Minister could summon me directly without the intervention of the Home Secretary, and that on these occasions, which were likely to be rare, it would be usual that I or the Prime Minister would inform the Home Secretary. Exceptionally the Prime Minister might instruct me not to inform the Home Secretary, e.g. if a ministerial colleague were involved.

Mr. Reginald
Maudling

.....

D.G.

E. M. FURNIVAL IONES

7th July 1970

SECRET


TOP SECRET

141A

NOTE FOR POL.F.50-24-101

When I called on Sir Burke Trend this afternoon I told him that we had received further information about STONEHOUSE (PF.142,203) which appeared to cast doubts on his veracity in the context of his dealings with Czech diplomats in London. I thought I probably ought to report this but it raised again the question of my conflicting responsibilities to the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary which had never been formally resolved.

Burke Trend was in no doubt that I ought to report to the Prime Minister, at the same time seeking his agreement that the Home Secretary should be informed. He asked me to tell the Prime Minister that I had spoken to him.



D.G.

4th May 1970

TOP SECRET

De/min
5/5

SECRET

Copy on POL.F.50-6-312/Supp/A

140A

NOTE FOR POL.F.50-24-101

I called on Sir William Armstrong this afternoon and told him about 139a of which he had not previously heard.

2. I said he might wish to consider whether the enquiries the Prime Minister put to me from time to time about members of his personal staff ought to be taken into account. I had not mentioned them to Philip Allen thinking that neither he nor the Home Secretary knew anything about them, which Armstrong confirmed.

3. After a brief discussion, we agreed that these enquiries could be distinguished from those which were under debate between the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary and could be regarded as a form of P.V. which we were carrying out for No. 10 as a department.

D.G.

2nd December 1969

SECRET

DG/Maw
3/12

TOP SECRET

~~PP. 142, 203~~

Copies: ~~POL.F.50-6-312 Supp.A.~~

~~POL.F.50-24-101 Supp.A.~~

139A

~~D.G.~~ *10/12*

Sir Philip Allen told me on November 28th that the Home Secretary had discussed the STONEHOUSE affair at length with the Prime Minister and the result had been a drawn battle. Allen is to have a meeting about it with Sir Burke Trend and Michael Halls, but so far without instructions about what they are to do.

W. H. ...

D.D.G.

28.11.69

TOP SECRET

D. G. ...
1/12/69

SECRET

138A

NOTE FOR POL.F.50-24-101

I had a long talk with Sir Philip Allen this morning about my relationship with the Prime Minister in the context of the allegations against Mr. STONEHOUSE and Mr. William OWEN. What seemed to be worrying Allen was the failure of the Prime Minister to inform the Home Secretary but after some discussion he agreed that the point to clarify was my relationship with the Prime Minister. Allen was in no doubt that the phrase in the directive entitled me to go direct to the Prime Minister without the knowledge of the Home Secretary and he drew attention to the phrase in the Brook Report quoted by Denning:

"And on matters of supreme importance and delicacy, the Head of the Service should always be able, at his initiative, to arrange a personal interview with the Prime Minister."

2. Allen wanted to give further thought to the method by which the Home Secretary might raise this issue with the Prime Minister. His instinct was against a supplementary directive, thinking that whatever words were chosen they would fail to meet the next case.

3. For my part, I said that it would be wrong to limit my right of direct access to cases involving Ministers. It was not difficult to imagine other delicate issues on which I ought to go to the Prime Minister alone, e.g. on something affecting a member of his staff.

A.27

D.G.

30th September 1969

SECRET

DG/MAN
1/10/69

SECRET

137A

NOTE FOR POL.F.50-24-101

I called on the Home Secretary today.
Mr. Waddell was present.

2. We discussed at some length the reasons which led me to go direct to the Prime Minister about the allegations made by a Czech defector which implicated a named Minister* (PF.142,203) and Member of Parliament (PF.818,404) who it was at first thought might also have been a Minister. I said that the occasions when I should exercise my right of direct access had never been defined. It was therefore a matter of judgement and it was apparent to me that my judgement was thought right by the Prime Minister and wrong by him, the Home Secretary. I distinguished the present case, which was a clear allegation of espionage against a Minister, from the case against Lord CHALFONT when all that was at issue was an allegation of adultery, which I judged not to be of security significance. Nevertheless, I learned that the Prime Minister had thought I ought to have gone direct to him about Lord CHALFONT.

3. The Home Secretary accepted that I had acted properly within the terms of my own interpretation of the Directive and the matter was not one between him and me but between him and the Prime Minister. If it was the Prime Minister's wish that I should deal direct with him (the P.M.) about any Minister, would I be able to operate satisfactorily? I said I would. He said that on the return of Philip Allen from leave, he would raise the matter with the Prime Minister.

[Handwritten signature]

D.G.

15th September 1969

(*D.G. did not give Home Secretary the name of the Minister concerned.)

SECRET

*DC/MW
15/9*

TOP SECRET

136A

Extract from Note of D.G.'s Meeting with Prime Minister on 20th July 1969 (Michael Halls was also present) to discuss FROLIK/STONEHOUSE/OWEN. Original filed on PF.142,203 (STONEHOUSE).

Having consulted Burke Trend, I arranged with Michael Halls to see the Prime Minister at 8.45 p.m. on 20th July.

.....

6. I told the Prime Minister that I had not informed the Home Secretary. The Prime Minister said that he did not wish me to inform any other Minister for the time being.

D.G.

21st July 1969

E. H. FURNIVAL JONES

TOP SECRET

Copy: POL.F.50-24-101
POL.F.50-6-312/Supp.A

POL.F.299-24

135A

NOTE

When Heaton called on me on April 15th he confirmed that he had reminded Sir Burke Trend in writing that the notes from Thistlethwaite's Committee on Subversion in Industry were sent to him for information, and that they reached the Prime Minister through the Home Secretary.

MacLennan

D.D.G.

16.4.69

DG/MW
17/4

SECRET

F. to see

POL.F.299-24

134^A

Copies:

POL.F.50-24-101

POL.F.50-6-312/Supp/A

NOTE

I spoke to Sir Philip Allen on April 1st about providing the Cabinet Office with copies of the Notes on Subversion in Industry which are sent to the Home Secretary for the Prime Minister. I said it seemed clear from our papers that when new arrangements were made on Lord Wigg's departure it was intended that these Notes should go to the Cabinet Office as well. Sir Philip Allen confirmed this and said that he had an understanding with Sir Burke Trend that the latter would not himself take the initiative in bringing them to the Prime Minister's attention. I said that we would arrange with Heaton that the Cabinet Office should in future receive copies and ask him to remind Sir Burke Trend of his agreement with Allen.

C. A. G. SIMKINS

D.D.G.

1.4.69

SECRET

133A

Copies:

POL.F.50-24-101 ✓

POL.F.50-6-312/Supp/A

F.

Reference 65a. It seems that under the arrangements made after Wigg's departure, it was intended that Sir Burke Trend should get copies of reports sent to the Prime Minister through the Home Secretary - see 41a and 43a. This certainly seems the sensible arrangement, provided we can ensure that Trend does not get in the Home Secretary's hair by briefing the Prime Minister himself. Will you have a word with Heaton and see if you can straighten this out.

D.D.G.

28th March 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

132A

F. to see

Copies:

POL.F.50-6-312/Supp/A
POL.F.50-24-101-

NOTE FOR POL.F.299-24

Philip Allen spoken to me on the telephone this morning about my letter to him at 62a. I was not surprised to learn that he saw dangers in the suggestion that we should send copies of the notes direct to Michael Halls, fearing that they would then reach the Prime Minister before they reached the Home Secretary with embarrassing consequences. I agreed that we should in future send two copies to the Home Office, one to James and the top copy (on blue paper) direct to Philip Allen.

Note: Top copy despatched by F. to Philip Allen under cover of D.G.'s Compliments slip.

D.G.

21st January 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

DG/mm
24/1

F. to see

POL.F.299-24/DG

16th January 1969

We spoke recently about our reports on Communist activity in industry.

2. Since it was decided at the end of May 1968 that a small committee, chaired by us with representatives of the Home Office and Department of Employment and Productivity, should take the place of the old Paymaster-General's group, we have produced the following six reports:-

- (i) 25th June 1968 : Communist Party of Great Britain (C.P.G.B.) and the Railway Dispute.
- (ii) 5th August 1968 : The Engineering Wage Claim.
- (iii) 27th August 1968 : The Engineering Wage Claim.
- (iv) 23rd September 1968 : The Communist Party and the Engineering Wage Claim.
- (v) 22nd October 1968 : The Communist Party and the Engineering Wage Claim.
- (vi) 6th November 1968 : The Communist Party of Great Britain (C.P.G.B.) and the Engineering Wage Claim.

Although the committee has met formally only once (on 3rd September 1968), these papers were intended for the briefing of Ministers. I gather that through a misunderstanding the Home Office copies did not reach you.

3. This is all water under the bridge. The Prime Minister's minute, which you sent me with your letter dated 8th March 1968, asked that the reports should be sent to the Prime Minister without delay. I doubt whether the present arrangements, however smoothly they work, really meet this requirement. The reports go from us to Horseferry House, from Horseferry House to you,

/and

Sir Philip Allen, K.C.B.,
Home Office.

SECRET

POL.F.299-24/DG

16th January 1969

- 2 -

and from you to No.10. I wonder whether it might not be sensible, without prejudice to the existing arrangements, that we should send a copy direct to Michael Halls ?

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

SECRET

SECRET

130a



Treasury Chambers,
Great George Street,
London, S.W.1

Telephone 01-930 1234, ext.

29th October, 1968

Rec: 31-10-68

Dear F. J. [Signature]

127a

Many thanks for your letter of 14th October and the note which you enclosed about Ministerial responsibility for the Security Service.

This fills in a gap in my knowledge and will be very useful to us if the question becomes active.

I am sending a copy of this to Philip Allen.

Yours ever
William Armstrong

(W. ARMSTRONG)

Sir Martin Furnival Jones, C.B.E.

DG/651

DG/Mon
31/10


CONFIDENTIAL

129a

NOTE FOR POL.F.50-24-101

When I saw him today, Philip Allen told me that Armstrong did not propose to take any initiative over the paper at 126a but would hold it in reserve against the possibility of the Prime Minister raising it again.

Allen agreed with the conclusion of the paper that the only point at issue was the handling of information about Ministers and M.P.s but the Home Secretary would no doubt be unwilling to surrender this part of his present functions.



D.G.

24th October 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DG/MSW
25/10

~~D. G.~~



Rec: 16.10.68

POL. F. 50-24-101

128a

With the Compliments

of

Sir Philip Allen

Home Office
Whitehall

DG/624

DG/MV
10/10

SECRET

15th October, 1968.

127a
Furnival Jones has sent me a copy of his letter to you of 14th October about Ministerial responsibility for the Security Service.

I think that the Home Secretary might well have views about the possible change suggested in the concluding paragraph of Furnival Jones's note; but no doubt there will be some consultations before any question arises of submitting this proposition to Ministers.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Furnival Jones.

(sd) Philip Allen

Sir William Armstrong, G.C.B., M.V.O.

127B

A. ~~14.10~~
B. ~~12/10~~
C. ~~14/10~~
KY ~~14/10~~
F. ~~17/10~~
E. ~~14/10~~
KX ~~28/10~~

To see the note the D.G. has sent to Sir William Armstrong on "Ministerial Responsibility for the Security Service".

126a
127a

D.G. Secretary

14th October 1968



THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958
FEBRUARY 2023

SECRET

127a

POL.P.50-24-101/DG

14th October 1968

You recently asked me to send you a note about ministerial responsibility for the Security Service and this I now enclose. I have, as a matter of convenience, reproduced some of the relevant documents as appendices.

126a

2. I am sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to Philip Allen. I have an additional spare copy if one should be needed.

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

Sir William Armstrong,
G.C.B., M.V.O.,
Treasury.

Enclosure: 1

SECRET

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958
FEBRUARY 2023

**MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE SECURITY SERVICE**

Ministerial responsibility for security or for the Security Service has been examined in (inter alia) the following documents:-

- (a) Sir Findlater Stewart's "Report on the Security Service", November 1945, paragraphs 44-46. (See Appendix A.)
- (b) Sir Norman Brook's report on "The Secret Intelligence and Security Services", March 1951, paragraphs 41-43. (See Appendix B.)
- (c) A memorandum "A Minister for National Security" submitted by the Treasury to Lord Denning, August 1963. (See Appendix C.)
- (d) Lord Denning's Report, Cmnd.2152, September 1963, Chapter XVIII.
- (e) A note by Sir Charles Cunningham dated 17th October 1964 and submitted to the Prime Minister by Sir Burke Trend. (See Appendix D.)

2. Four Ministers have at various times been proposed for the Security Service.

- (a) The Minister for Defence. During the last war much of the work of the Security Service was closely related to the responsibilities of the Service Departments. It is probable that Sir Findlater Stewart, who was reporting in 1945, was influenced by recent history but even if, which is open to argument, his conclusion was right for time of war, it would seem to have no solid basis in peacetime conditions.

/(b)

SECRET

- 2 -

(b) The Home Secretary. The following arguments favour the choice of the Home Secretary:-

- (i) He has a responsibility for protecting the liberty of the subject. It is right, therefore, that he should be responsible for the operations of the Security Service in the U.K. since they are liable to infringe the liberty of the subject or may certainly be thought to do so.
- (ii) He has an interest in the Police. The work of the Security Service always has been, and is now increasingly, bound up with the Police.
- (iii) Although any Secretary of State is entitled to sign a warrant for the interception of communications, it has long been a function normally discharged by the Home Secretary for security purposes. He is better placed to do so if he has a general knowledge of the scope and objectives of Security Service operations as a whole.
- (iv) The Security Service has been responsible to successive Home Secretaries since 1952 and this arrangement has, so far as I am aware, worked satisfactorily and been subjected to very little criticism.

(c) The Prime Minister

- (i) It has been said that the Prime Minister has an "over-riding responsibility for the security of the State" (Hansard, 7th December 1964, column 151). It could be argued that, since the Security

/Service

73a

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- 3 -

Service is by definition in its Directive from the Home Secretary responsible for national security, the Prime Minister ought on that account to be in charge of the Security Service.

- (ii) Under its Directive, the Security Service has functions which are of no particular concern to the Home Secretary, e.g. to advise all Departments on their security and to "assist and advise colonial administrations" and to "meet appropriate requests for advice and assistance made by Commonwealth or allied foreign governments". Much of the counter-espionage work of the Security Service affects the responsibilities of the Foreign Secretary. It was argued in 1951 that for this reason the Prime Minister ought to be responsible for the Security Service.
- (iii) It has been necessary to devise machinery for keeping the Prime Minister informed of matters, such as major espionage cases, and of security intelligence which he wishes to receive, e.g. about subversive activities in industry. There could be some simplification of procedure if the Security Service was again placed under the Prime Minister.
- (iv) The Security Service may receive security information about Ministers and, indeed, in 1964 provided the Home Secretary with summaries of its records of Ministers and M.P.s which it has from time to time revised. It might be more convenient and effective if these summaries were held by the Prime Minister and if information subsequently reaching the Security

/Service ...

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- 4 -

Service was reported direct to him.

- (d) "Minister of National Security". I am not aware that any convincing argument has been advanced in favour of this arrangement which was rejected by Lord Denning and advised against in the memorandum at Appendix C. Hardly any of the advantages which flow from the existing arrangement, or might flow from the transfer of responsibility to the Prime Minister, would remain. (See also Appendix B, paragraph 43.)

3. The choice seems to lie between the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary. Since the war the Security Service has had experience of working to each in turn. In 1951 Sir Percy Sillitoe, then Director General of the Security Service, argued forcibly in favour of the Prime Minister continuing to be the responsible Minister, from which I deduce that that arrangement was as satisfactory to him as the present arrangement has proved to be to his successors.

4. Any arrangement could no doubt be made to work and it is open to doubt whether the objections advanced by Sir Norman Brook to putting the Security Service under the Prime Minister (Appendix B paragraph 43) would in practice prove very substantial. Nevertheless, the arguments in favour of the proposal are equally insubstantial. If it is true that Prime Ministers have an over-riding responsibility for the security of the State and if it follows from this proposition that they ought therefore to control the instruments for achieving security, it could be argued that Prime Ministers should control the whole security apparatus including the Police, C.E.S.D., and indeed departmental security branches. The Security Service is not the only organisation which provides services and advice to various parts of the Government Service or whose activities impinge on, or interlock with, those of other departments. The fact that special arrangements have had to be made to ensure that the Prime Minister is informed in good time about security issues is presumably only one instance among many.

/5.....

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

5. While the arguments in favour of leaving the responsibility of the Home Secretary for the Security Service undisturbed are not absolutely conclusive, there does not seem to be any sufficient reason for proposing a fundamental change. There may, however, be a case for making a change to deal with the topic referred to in subparagraph 2(c)(iv). In paragraph 241 of his report, Lord Denning recorded without dissent "the majority view that there should be a clear and unambiguous channel to the Home Secretary". There seems, nevertheless, to be some merit in the argument that a Prime Minister should have under his immediate control the security records of Members of Parliament from whom he is to select new Ministers and that any report about a Minister should be made to him alone in the first instance. I foresee no embarrassment in such an arrangement.

CONCLUSION

6. I should continue to be responsible to the Home Secretary and receive my Directive from him but consideration should be given to a separate arrangement for reporting direct to the Prime Minister on Ministers and Members of Parliament.

F. M. FURNIVAL JONES

SECURITY SERVICE

14TH OCTOBER 1968

SECRET

R E P O R T O N T H E
S E C U R I T Y S E R V I C E

by

SIR FINDLATER STEWART

27TH NOVEMBER, 1945

.....

Ministerial Responsibility.

44. The possibility of public criticism of the special methods of M.I.5 raises one of the major matters with which this report is concerned - the Ministerial responsibility for the Service. During the war it served many Departments on the preventive side, and they answered for action taken on its advice and sometimes with the help of its staff. It was controlled by the Home Secretary so far as it used the special postal powers, and the Treasury was responsible for providing it with funds. But the responsibility for its direction as a Service was a more difficult matter. From the summer of 1940 it rested with Lord Swinton, as Chairman of the Security Executive, (he was, of course, not a Minister) then with Mr. Duff Cooper, while he was Chancellor of the Duchy. It then went to Mr. Eden, but only in his personal capacity and not as Foreign Secretary.

45. I feel strongly that the time has come to regularise the position. It is not only constitutionally right that the Service should have a responsible Ministerial head: it is unfair to leave it without one to represent its case, e.g., for powers or supply. As I have already said, its purpose is Defence of the Realm and nothing else; it is in effect a branch (and in time of war, a vital branch) of the Defence organisation. It follows that the Minister responsible for it as a Service (though not directly for action taken by other Ministers on its advice) should be the Minister of Defence, or, if there is no Minister of Defence, the Prime Minister as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence.^ø M.I.5 could then feel that the interests of Defence, in the aspect with which they are concerned, would receive due weight as against civil interests, and the same secrecy for its essential operations as the fighting Services.

^ø This is not to say that a Minister other than the Minister of Defence should be debarred from the right of asking for a variation of M.I.5's practice in matters relating to his Office.

46. It has been argued that this would place an undue burden upon the Minister of Defence or the Prime Minister, and upon the staff of the Cabinet Secretariat. But from the very nature of the work the need for direction except on the broadest lines can never arise above the level of Director General. That appointment is one of great responsibility, calling for unusual experience and a rare combination of qualities; but having got the right man there is no alternative to giving him the widest discretion in the means he uses and the direction in which he applies them - always provided he does not step outside the law. The kind of question that I see emerging for higher decision would be a difference of opinion between M.I.5 and the Home Office about the grant of special powers of intercepting communications - in effect a conflict between the interests of Defence, and the broad rights of the public. Such a matter could best be dealt with on the advice of some such body as the Chiefs of Staff with the Permanent Under Secretaries for Home and Foreign Affairs added. On this view no considerable burden would fall upon the Minister of Defence or the Cabinet Secretariat.

.....

THE SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES

REPORT OF ENQUIRY BY SIR NORMAN BROOK

MARCH 1951

.....

V

CO-ORDINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES

MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

41. In past discussions on the co-ordination of these services the proposal has sometimes been mooted that the Security Service and S.I.S. should be brought under the control of a single individual. It is no longer necessary to set out the arguments for and against this proposal, for there is now one fact which is conclusive. These two services have grown so large and complex that no single individual could now exercise effective control over them both—particularly if, as I recommend, the head of S.I.S. is to continue to carry the additional responsibility of supervising G.C.H.Q. The secret intelligence and security services must continue to have two official heads—C., responsible for S.I.S. and G.C.H.Q., and the Director General of the Security Service.

42. For both S.I.S. and G.C.H.Q. C. is responsible to the Foreign Secretary. I see no reason to change this arrangement.

The Director of the Security Service is at present responsible directly to the Prime Minister. This results from a Report on the Security Service submitted by Sir Findlater Stewart in 1945 (dated 27th November, 1945), which recommended that, as this service is concerned to ensure "the defence of the Realm," it should be responsible to the Prime Minister pending the appointment of a separate Minister of Defence. I believe that Sir Findlater Stewart exaggerated the "defence" aspects of the Security Service and was mistaken in regarding it as an integral part of the defence organisation. In practice, the Security Service has little to do with those aspects of "the defence of the Realm" with which the Minister of Defence is concerned. And the arrangement by which the Security Service is directly responsible to the Prime Minister is now justified mainly by the fact that it enhances the status of the Service. I see no reason why this Service should enhance its prestige at the expense of the Prime Minister. And I see some positive disadvantages in this arrangement. First, it draws special attention to the failures and mistakes of the Service, which are bound to occur from time to time: it is a disadvantage that the Prime Minister should be drawn, directly and immediately, into Parliamentary discussion of these. Secondly, the Prime Minister cannot be expected himself to exercise any effective supervision over the work of the Service, and he has in his Secretariat no one who could do so on his behalf. Thirdly, it is wrong that the Prime Minister should be expected to champion the Security Service in any dispute or conflict of interests with other Ministers in which it may become involved. In such matters the Prime Minister should remain disinterested, so that in the last resort he can resolve differences between his Ministerial colleagues. This is all the more necessary if, as Sir Findlater Stewart assumed, there is risk that the

work of the Security Service may throw up conflicts between military and civil interests.

In practice the functions of the Security Service are much more closely allied to those of the Home Office, which has the ultimate constitutional responsibility for "defending the Realm" against subversive activities and for preserving law and order. I recommend that the Security Service should in future be responsible to the Home Secretary, in the same way as S.I.S. is responsible to the Foreign Secretary. This would not affect the direct relations maintained between the Security Service and the many other Departments which it serves or advises. Nor would it mean that the Security Service would in any sense become a part of the Home Office. It would, of course, carry with it the consequence that the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Home Office, would have the responsibility of advising the Treasury on the annual budget of the Security Service. I believe that it would be helpful to the Director-General of the Security Service to be able to turn to a senior Permanent Secretary for advice and assistance on the policy aspects of his work and on his relations with other Government Departments; and that he would receive from the permanent head of the Home Office support and guidance which the Prime Minister's Secretariat is not in a position to give. Incidentally, I believe that this relationship would also have a healthy influence in keeping before the minds of the senior officials in the Home Office their essential duty of countering subversive activities as part of the fundamental responsibility of the Home Office for preserving law and order.

The Prime Minister's personal contacts with the Director-General of the Security Service need not be wholly interrupted as a result of this change in Ministerial responsibility. The Prime Minister would doubtless continue to send for the head of the Security Service from time to time, as he would send for the head of S.I.S., to discuss the general state of their work and particular matters which might be of specially close concern to him. And on matters of supreme importance or delicacy the heads of these two Services should always be able, at their initiative, to arrange a personal interview with the Prime Minister.

43. It has sometimes been suggested that the Prime Minister might secure closer co-ordination between the secret intelligence and security services by inviting a Junior Minister to interest himself in their work on his behalf. I do not think that this would be a satisfactory arrangement. Many of the activities of these agencies cannot be publicly avowed, and must if necessary be disowned, by the Government: that being so, it is convenient that in time of peace Ministers (and particularly Junior Ministers) should know no more about them than they need. Moreover, the kind of assistance which the heads of these services might require, e.g., in disputes with Departments or efforts to secure facilities from them, can probably be given more effectively by Permanent Secretaries than by a Junior Minister.

I therefore recommend that, for general advice on the work and efficiency of these services, the Prime Minister should in future rely on the Committee of Permanent Secretaries whose appointment I have recommended in paragraph 36 above. Their primary function would be to advise on the allocation of resources between the various services; and I would prefer that their formal terms of reference should not go beyond this. But they would include some of the most senior heads of Departments; and through their individual contacts with the various parts of the organisation and through the collective duty imposed on them by their terms of reference they would acquire a broad knowledge of the work of the organisation as a whole. I would expect that the Prime Minister would find them a useful source of advice on all general questions of policy and organisation relating to the intelligence and security services. For the co-ordination of the day-to-day work of these services machinery is already available in the Joint Intelligence Committee.

.....

A MINISTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

1. It is not always clear what exactly those who advocate the appointment of a Minister for National Security have in mind: but it is perhaps reasonable to assume that there are two possible suggestions:

- (a) that there should be a Minister of Security responsible both for the Security Service and for Departmental security; or
- (b) that there should be a Minister of Security responsible only for the Security Service.

2. A Minister of National Security in the first of these two senses was considered by the Radcliffe Committee on Security Procedures in the Public Service. The Committee's conclusion is set out in its report (paragraph 13), as follows:-

"Up to the present each Government Department has been regarded as individually responsible for maintaining a proper standard of protective security within its own field, advised as necessary on technical questions by the Security Service. It has sometimes been suggested that it would be better if the security organisation throughout the Government service were to be brought under the direct control of the Security Service. In so far as this would secure a centralised and therefore a possibly more effective control and a greater element of professionalism in the security system this proposal has superficial attractions. But we are in no doubt that they are quite illusory. The transfer of responsibility from Departments to the Security Service would greatly encourage the dangerous tendency to regard security as something outside the normal business of the Department and therefore a matter of no real concern to the general body of departmental staff. Nothing would be more likely to damage security than the development of such an attitude and we share the view, which was expressed to us by Departments and by the Security Service with complete unanimity, that a policy of departmental responsibility is essential if an adequate standard of security is to be achieved."

This conclusion was accepted by the Government; and there seems to be no new consideration to throw doubt on its validity.

3. A Minister of Security in the second sense, as responsible solely for the Security Service, seems to be ruled out by the fact that he would not have an effective Ministerial job to do. In the nature of things, the great bulk of the work of the Security Service is of a highly professional and technical character. The functions of the Service are laid down in its directives; and it is no more practicable for a Minister to control the detailed execution of these directives than it would be for a Minister to control the operations of the police. There is the further consideration that a Minister who was responsible for the Security Service but not for the police would find himself in considerable practical difficulty because of the extent to which the two Services must cooperate with one another, and because of the extent to which some of the techniques they employ - in particular, the use of secret intercepts - ought to be considered by one authority, if the principles laid down by the Committee of Privy Counsellors on security intercepts are to be observed.

4. If the idea of a separate Minister of Security is rejected, the question remains whether the existing arrangements for the control of Departmental security on the one hand and of the Security Service on the other are adequate.

5. As regards Departmental security, the Committee on Security Procedures in the Public Service made a number of recommendations which have been implemented. The position is kept under review and some aspects of it were looked at again by the recent Radcliffe Tribunal appointed to enquire into the Vassall case. We have no ground for thinking that any fundamental changes are required at present.

6. As regards the Security Service, the first paragraph of the main directive to the Director-General of the Security Service reads as follows:-

"In your appointment as Director-General of the Security Service you will be responsible to the Home Secretary personally. The Security Service is not, however, a part of the Home Office. On appropriate occasions you will have right of direct access to the Prime Minister".

In effect, the day-to-day responsibility for the Security Service rests with the Home Secretary. The Director-General of the Service, or his Deputy, is in constant touch with the Permanent Under Secretary. There are regular submissions to the Home Secretary - in particular, intercept warrants are put

forward for his approval and signature; and from time to time both the Director-General and the Permanent Under Secretary of State inform the Home Secretary of important matters in which the Security Service is currently engaged. There is no reason why the Home Secretary's responsibility for the Security Service should not be made public; indeed it has already been mentioned in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister. It seems right that the Home Secretary should carry this responsibility below the Prime Minister. He is the Minister responsible for the police service, and the Security Service and the police must work very closely together. Both Services require in exceptional cases the use of secret intercepts; and it is not only convenient but in accordance with the principles enunciated by the Committee of Privy Councillors that one Minister should be responsible for the use over the whole field of the intercept method. In the case of both the police and the Security Service questions constantly arise which involve, or could involve, the liberty of the subject; and of these the Home Secretary is the appropriate guardian. It is also the case that, in practice, many of the matters on which the Director-General of the Security Service wishes guidance or advice are matters upon which that guidance and advice can most suitably be given - in view of its other interests - by the Home Office.

7. It would therefore seem to be right and appropriate for the Home Secretary's position in relation to the Security Service to be made known. This would enable him to give the Prime Minister even more support than at present, because he could then deal with Parliamentary Questions other than those of the most general importance. It seems most unlikely that the nature of the Security Service's business would produce any considerable number of questions of a kind which could be answered in Parliament.

8. It is presumably not in question that, whatever arrangement is made about Ministerial responsibility for the Security Service or for Departmental security, the Prime Minister, as the head of the Government, must have an overriding responsibility for security as a whole. Ministers are, of course, free to consult the Prime Minister as necessary on security matters affecting their Departments; and the head of the Security Service has direct access to him. This right is rarely exercised by the Director-General, and in practice (having regard to the practice whereby the Director-General keeps in close touch with the Permanent Under Secretary) it would not be exercised without

The Home Office being informed. It is hardly possible to define in advance the circumstances in which a particular matter should be reported to the Prime Minister; it must be a matter for judgment in relation to an individual case whether such a report should be made.

Treasury Chambers,
London, S.W.1.

22nd August, 1963

E.R.

SECRET

The history of Ministerial responsibility for the Security Service is set out in Chapter XVIII (paragraphs 235-242) of the Denning Report (Cmd. 2152). Since 1952, the Service has operated under a directive of the Home Secretary. This is quoted in paragraph 238 of the Denning Report. The first paragraph reads:-

"In your appointment as Director General of the Security Service you will be responsible to the Home Secretary personally. The Security Service is not, however, a part of the Home Office. On appropriate occasions you will have right of direct access to the Prime Minister."

2. The question whether responsibility for the Security Service should rest with the Home Secretary or be assigned to a special Minister was exhaustively considered at the time of the Denning inquiry. The conclusion, as the Denning Report records in paragraph 242, was that responsibility should remain with the Home Secretary. This conclusion took account of a number of considerations. The Security Service requires for many of its operations the authority of a warrant for the interception of communications which can, under statute, be granted only by a Secretary of State. It is important that the Secretary of State who grants the warrant should be able to judge the case for it in the light of full knowledge of the work of the Security Service; divorce of responsibility for the Service from responsibility for the issue of warrants would lead to duplication and difficulty. Secondly, the work of the Security Service which requires Ministerial sanction inevitably requires the Minister to balance the interests of security against individual rights which should not lightly be infringed. The Home Secretary, with his general concern for safeguarding the liberty of the individual, is the appropriate Minister to take these important considerations into account. Thirdly, the Security Service works closely with - and very often through - the Police Service; and the Home Secretary, as the Minister concerned with policy matters, is the only one who can keep effectively in touch with both Services, resolve differences, and ensure that in such matters as the use of secret intercepts a consistent practice is observed by both.

3. There are two other considerations of some importance. The work of the Security and Intelligence Services involves close links between the two; these are maintained by direct contact and official arrangements for co-ordination. Intelligence operations may raise issues affecting individual rights of precisely the same kind as security operations; where this happens, the Home Secretary is invariably consulted, and so common standards are maintained. If necessary in such cases, and in other matters of joint concern, the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary discuss the issues which arise against the background of their wider responsibilities. Such questions could not easily be dealt with by a Minister without these wider responsibilities.

4. The other consideration affects the day-to-day working of the Security Service. Sir Norman Brook said in his report (as quoted in paragraph 237 of the Denning Report):-

"I believe that it would be helpful to the Director General of the Security Service to be able to turn to a senior Permanent Secretary for advice and assistance on the policy aspects of his work and on his relations with other Government Departments; and that he would receive from the permanent head of the Home Office support and guidance which the Prime Minister's secretariat is not in a position to give."

This official contact, which is close and continuous, has in practice been found of value. The personal staff of a non-Departmental Minister would not have the type of experience required to maintain it, and could not easily acquire it.

5. This minute has so far dealt with the Security Service. Another security matter is, of course, Departmental security. This was exhaustively reviewed by the Radcliffe Committee on Security Procedures in the Public Service (Cmd. 1681) in 1962. The Committee endorsed the view that Departmental security should be the responsibility of the individual Department - drawing on the advice and experience of the Security Service as necessary - and not of a special Minister or Department. Lord Denning (paragraph 242) reached a similar conclusion. He said:-

"It is important that each Government Department should be regarded as responsible for its own internal security. It would lead to slackness if each Department could feel it could leave its security to others."

Home Office, S. W. 1
17th October, 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

125a

NOTE FOR POL.F.299/24

Copy on POL.F.50/24/101

Philip Allen today told me that the proposal that we, in the person of Director F, should chair meetings with the Home Office and the Department of Employment and Productivity to produce notes about Communist or other subversive activity in industry had been approved. Allen said that he hoped that an opportunity would be found to produce the first report sooner rather than later.

I said that something was already in train.

D.G.

21st May 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
S.W.1

D.G.

D. D. G.

T.

*With the
Secretary's Compliments*

Sir Martin Furnival
Jones, CBE

124a

30th April, 1968

Reference: A03589

Copy No. 3
of 4 Copies

Rec- 1-5-68

I am writing simply to confirm that, as I told you the other day, the Prime Minister agrees that your Secretary of State should be kept informed of all relevant covert intelligence about industrial disputes, particularly the periodical reports by the Security Service in this context. But she should be carefully briefed to the effect that all information of this kind is for her personal use only; that it is very sensitive in terms of its nature and its sources; and that she should not in any circumstances use it in discussion outside the Government - or even within it unless she is certain that others present are privy to it.

The Prime Minister would be glad if you would arrange to brief the Secretary of State yourself on these lines. If, for any reason, you think it would be desirable to invoke the Security Service, I should be glad if you would first let me know since the Prime Minister would wish to be informed before any arrangements of this kind were made.

I am sending copies of this letter on a strictly personal basis to Philip Allen and Martin Furnival Jones.

BURKE TREND

P.A. POL. F. 299-24

Copy POL. F. 50-6-312
POL. F. 50-24-101
SUPP/A

Sir Denis Barnes, KCB

Received 14-3-68



123a

~~F~~ R 15/3
to see
+ PA.

With the Compliments

of

Sir Philip Allen

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'P. Allen', written over a diagonal line.

Home Office
Whitehall

SECRET

POLF-299-24

123a
Allen

13th March, 1968.

Recid 14-3-68

121a
As promised, I have had a word with Furnival Jones about paragraph 4 of the Prime Minister's minute of 5th March.

First, as regards the periodic reports. I hope that there is no misunderstanding here; I see that the Prime Minister's minute refers to "the monthly report", but as my previous letter explained what we had in mind was a continuation of the arrangement which applied under the former Paymaster General whereby general reports were prepared from time to time. The precise frequency of these reports would depend to some extent on the degree of activity on the part of the Communists; but they have not in the past been sent forward at intervals as short as a month, and we had not thought to change this. I can, however, assure you that when these reports are prepared and discussed with the departments concerned, they will be sent forward without delay.

Then, in addition, Furnival Jones will at once bring to notice ad hoc information and comments of significance which emerge from their day to day operations and, as we agreed, will ask the Ministry of Labour to draw attention to points which in their view ought to be brought to Ministers' attention. When Furnival Jones forwards these ad hoc reports they will be sent on without delay - and indeed, on occasion, they may be very urgent indeed.

I think that these arrangements should meet the Prime Minister's wishes.

(sd) Philip Allen

Sir Laurence Helsby, G.C.B., K.D.E.

SECRET

15/3
F. to see

SECRET

122a/39

NOTE FOR POL.F.299/24

I spoke to Philip Allen on the phone about his letter at 42a. Although reports were not issued monthly, let alone daily, we agreed that if reports produced by the ad hoc committee reached the Prime Minister through the Home Secretary, this would probably meet the need. There might very exceptionally be some item of current intelligence which, if related to what the Ministry of Labour knew about Incomes Policy, would justify an immediate report. If such a need arose a note could be rapidly concocted and sent to the Prime Minister through the Home Secretary's Private Office.

Nothing in all this would affect the distribution of reports to Burke Trend and Denis Barnes.

D.G.

13th March 1968

SECRET

[Signature]
15/3/68

Pol F. 299-24

SECRET

1219



15/18/3

to see

HOME OFFICE
WHITEHALL · S.W.1

8th March, 1968.

Dear F.J.

Recd 11-3-68.

Helsby has had a minute from the Prime Minister about the arrangements to be made for keeping the Prime Minister informed of security matters in the post-Wigg era.

I did not see the submission which went to the Prime Minister, but it evidently included a paragraph, on the lines that you and I discussed, about submissions on Communist activities in the trades unions.

... Helsby has now let me have the relevant part of the Prime Minister's reply. I attach a copy; and should like to have a word with you about the advice which I should now tender to Helsby.

Philips

Sir Martin Furnival Jones, K.B.E.

SECRET

DG 167/64

SECRET

121a

4. As regards the arrangements which you have made with the Home Office for keeping me informed about Communist penetration in industry, here again I should be grateful if you would ensure that these reports are sent to me without delay and that if anything of significance is thrown up in any of the daily reports I am informed immediately without waiting for the monthly report.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
5/3/68

CONFIDENTIAL

F. to see

120^A

NOTE FOR POL.F.299/24

Copies: POL.F.50/24/101 ✓
POL.F.50/6/312/Supp/A

Philip Allen told me on 9th February that he had discussed with Laurence Helsby and Burke Trend, and the Home Secretary had discussed with the Prime Minister, the arrangements to be made for briefing the Prime Minister about Communist activity in industry.

117A
refers

2. There was no doubt that the Home Secretary wanted to have the job of briefing the Prime Minister. The only remaining question was how official meetings to settle the brief should be organised and which departments should be represented. Allen proposed that Waddell should take the chair with representatives of the Security Service, the Ministry of Labour and, subject to Burke Trend's views, of D.E.A. I said that the Ministry of Labour might think it a little odd that the Home Office were taking the chair since they were only concerned with industrial disputes in an emergency, and what we were concerned with here was security intelligence. I suggested, and Allen welcomed the suggestion, that we should provide the chairman.

3. I told Allen the history of D.E.A.'s representation, and the absence of it, on Wigg's Committee and said that on the whole I would prefer D.E.A. not to be represented having regard to the great delicacy of some of the sources and what I believed to be the inadequate state of security education in D.E.A. Allen did not dissent and said he would discuss the matter further with Burke Trend who retained an instinctive belief that D.E.A. should be represented.

4. Allen agreed that whatever arrangements might be made for meetings, copies of agreed statements should go to Burke Trend, in addition to the Home Office and Ministry of Labour, because of Burke Trend's chairmanship of the A.C.(H) Working Party - a matter which might be reviewed separately.

D.G.

12th February 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

119A

D.NOTE FOR PF.844,378/LINK/A

Copy on POL.F.50-24-101

I discussed D.D.G.'s note dated 9th February with Sir Philip Allen the same afternoon, taking the line that Foreign Office officials were not really to blame. They had themselves made the point that they hoped we would inform the Home Office and I thought that if anyone was to blame it was me.

2. Allen said that the Home Secretary's real complaint was that the Foreign Secretary had taken a decision on a matter, i.e. the publicity, which was really in the Home Secretary's domain. I said I naturally understood the Home Secretary's interest and explained what I thought had been the considerations uppermost in the Foreign Secretary's mind.

3. We agreed that the sensible solution was that in a similar case in future I would make a submission to the Home Secretary before the Foreign Secretary had taken his decision. I hoped that if Allen reported to the Home Secretary that arrangements had been made to avoid a repetition, a head-on clash with the Foreign Office could be avoided.

D.G.

12th February 1968

TOP SECRET

118A

D.G.
D.

✓ Copy for POL.F.50-24-101

Note for PF.844,378 Link A.

I told Sir Philip Allen on 8th February that the Foreign Secretary had now ruled that publicity about DROZDOV's arrest was to be avoided if possible and that new guidance had been agreed for the Surrey Police at a meeting attended by the Superintendent who was handling the business.

2. Allen asked what was biting the Foreign Secretary and I said I thought he was anxious that nothing should be done which might prejudice the success of the Prime Minister's efforts in Moscow on behalf of Gerald BROOKE.

3. Allen telephoned on 9th February to enquire how the operation had gone so that he could brief the Home Secretary. I told him that DROZDOV had been arrested and taken to the County Police station in Guildford. The Police got in touch with the Soviet Consul and, having been satisfied by him as to DROZDOV's identity, took DROZDOV to the station in a Police car and put him on the London train. I said I understood that DROZDOV had been searched with useful results.

4. Allen rang again to say that when he reported to the Home Secretary, Mr. Callaghan had commented on the fact that arrangements for this operation had been concerted between us and the Foreign Office, the Home Office being informed but not consulted, and had instructed Allen to take this up with Sir Paul Gore-Booth. I said that this had been the usual drill in operations of this kind. The position was not particularly easy as far as we were concerned and I felt sure the D.G. would want to speak to Sir Philip Allen before anything was said to Gore-Booth.

Acton

D.D.G.

9.2.68.

TOP SECRET

SECRET

117A

NOTE FOR POL.F.50-6-312/SUPP/A

Copy: POL.F.50-6-366
 ✓POL.F.50-24-101

POL.F.299-24
(C. to see)

At a meeting this afternoon with Sir Laurence Helsby, he told me that the Prime Minister had been discussing with him what arrangements should be made about the security responsibilities formerly discharged by Lord Wigg. The Prime Minister did not intend to fill the post of Paymaster General immediately and when he did fill it did not intend to give the occupant, or indeed any other Minister, any special responsibility for security. There were, however, three problems on which the Prime Minister wished to have advice :-

- (a) How was he to receive in future the briefings about Communist activities in the industrial field which he had previously received through Wigg ?

I described the history under the present Administration of our briefings and of the uncertainty of the present position in the light of the Home Secretary's attitude. Helsby said he would discuss the matter with Philip Allen.

- (b) How would chit-chat about the activities of Ministers now reach the Prime Minister ?

I said I hoped that I would not be instructed to seek out or report information on the morals of Ministers unless there were some security aspect to them. If there were a security aspect, my natural course would be to inform the Home Secretary but I suggested that it might be regarded as a function of the Whips to provide the Prime Minister with more regular fare.

- (c) How would the Prime Minister be informed about "security incidents in departments" ?

I told Helsby about the early warning system which had been introduced in the Ministry of Technology and extended to the U.K.A.E.A. and which operated on a somewhat less formal basis in the Ministry of Defence. I

/.....

SECRET

JG/MJW
1/2/68

SECRET

thought it would be better that the normal official machinery would be used; a view with which Helsby was quick to agree. He thought he would address Permanent Secretaries of sensitive departments in this sense.

E. M. FUENTAZA JONES

D.G.

31st January 1968

SECRET

116A

64

Copy: POL.F.50-24-101

F.

115A

You will note that 62a represents yet another change in procedure - or tactics. It is the result of a conversation I had with Philip Allen last night.

D.G.

30th January 1968

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

DG/w
30/1

Copy: ✓ POL.F.50-24-101
POL.F.50-24-101/SUPP/A

115A

POL.F.299/24/SUPP/A/DG

30th January 1968

I enclose for the information of the Home Secretary a note on the performance of Communist candidates in recent Trade Union elections. The note would no doubt be of interest also to Burke Trend and Denis Barnes and I enclose two additional copies which could be sent on to them.

2. Some time ago Richard Powell asked to be kept informed of the position in the National Union of Seamen and I shall be writing separately to him. I will send you a copy of my letter.

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

Sir Philip Allen, K.C.B.,
Home Office.

Enclosure: 1 in triplicate (not attached)

SECRET

Dr/MW
30/1

SECRET

114^A

NOTE FOR POL.F.50-6-366

~~POL.F.50-6-376~~ Dec 31-1-68

POL.F.50-24-101

I attended a long meeting this morning with the Home Secretary, Lord Shackleton and Sir Philip Allen when we reviewed the security functions performed by Lord Wigg and his relationship with the Home Secretary, Government departments and the Security Service. In the course of the meeting it was established:

- (a) That the Home Secretary need not concern himself with departmental security and therefore need not be informed about dealings I had with departments or with Lord Shackleton in this field.
- (b) That the Home Secretary would wish to be informed of any dealings I had with the Prime Minister direct or of any security problem which was likely to have political consequences.

2. The Home Secretary clearly believed that Lord Shackleton would not inherit any substantial part of Lord Wigg's security functions, which had been very personal to him, and was very anxious that there should be only one channel on security matters to the Prime Minister.

D.G.

22nd December 1967

SECRET

LDW

*DG/MRW
22/12*

113A

THE TIMES : 30 NOVEMBER 1967

Mr. James Callaghan last night became Home Secretary and Mr. Roy Jenkins became Chancellor of the Exchequer in a direct exchange of senior Cabinet posts. No other Ministers are to be involved in the present changes, and Mr. Wilson has no further ministerial moves in mind until the New Year.

The announcement from 10 Downing Street last night, concurrent with the exchange of seals, revealed that Mr. Callaghan's letter resigning the Chancellorship was dated Saturday, November 18, the day he published the statement on the devaluation of the pound and the Government's related economic measures. It is now known that he wrote the letter while he waited to make the devaluation announcement at the set time of 9.30 p.m.

DG/WTW
1/12/67

Copies to: POL.F.50-6-366
✓POL.F.50-24-101

112A

Sect. to see

Note for PF.856,202

Sir Philip Allen telephoned on 6th November to say that he had shown our note at 50a to the Secretary of State. Mr. Jenkins had been grateful for it, but had commented that he thought it was a mistake to have sent LAWSON's memorandum to the Paymaster General, and that we ought to have told him first that we thought it necessary to do so.

C. A. G. SIMKINS

D.D.G.

6.11.67.

Delmon
7/14

D. D. G.

11a



F.

CABINET OFFICE
LONDON, S.W. 1

WHItchall 5422

11th February, 1967

Rec: 13-2-67

CONFIDENTIAL

POL.F. 299/24

Dear Sir, *13.2*

This is just to let you know that, following our talk on Monday, I had a word with the Paymaster. He is content that the flow of security intelligence relating to industry should come to him (for the Prime Minister) via me, with a copy to the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour. The Paymaster himself will brief the First Secretary personally from time to time, and he has accepted my suggestion that the Permanent Secretary (Douglas Allen) should be present on these occasions.

This all seems satisfactory; and the mechanics can be settled between Thistlethwaite and Heaton.

Your own
Emile Jones

E. M. Furnival Jones, Esq., CBE.

Copy To:-

POL.F. 50-6-366

POL.F. 50-6-312/SUPP/A

POL.F. 50-6-101

DC/142

110a

Reference... Pol. F. 50-24-101.

CUTTING FROM "HANSARD" (HOUSE OF COMMONS) OF
TUESDAY, 13th DECEMBER, 1966, ON SECURITY
SERVICE (MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY).

**SECURITY SERVICE
(MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY)**

Q.7. Sir T. Beamish asked the Prime Minister what responsibility for the security services he has given to the Paymaster-General.

The Prime Minister: None. The arrangements for Ministerial responsibility for the security service remain as I described them in my reply to the hon. Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison) on 6th December. The functions of my right hon. Friend the Paymaster-General

are confined to advising me on such questions of security falling within my responsibility as I may refer to him from time to time.—[Vol. 737, c. 277.]

109a

Secretariat.
15 December, 1966.

DE/MAN

109a

Reference...Pol.F.50-24-101.

CUTTING FROM "HANSARD" (HOUSE OF COMMONS) OF
TUESDAY, 6th DECEMBER, 1966, ON SECURITY
SERVICE (MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY).

**SECURITY SERVICE
(MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY)**

Q17. Mr. Biggs-Davison asked the Prime Minister which Ministers of the Crown, besides himself, have been allocated any responsibility for the direction, administration or co-ordination of the security services.

The Prime Minister: The present arrangements for Ministerial responsibility for the Security Service remain as described in detail in Lord Denning's Report and as endorsed by the then Government at that time.

Secretariat.
8 December, 1966.

Dalton
8.12.66

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies: POL.F.50-24-101 ✓
POL.F.50-6-366

F. to see
F.1.

108a

POL.F.299-24/DG

20th October 1966

Thank you for your letter dated 19th October about the new arrangements for ensuring that the Prime Minister is kept informed about industrial security intelligence. The Security Service will be represented at the meetings by Mr. R. Thistlethwaite or Mr. J.S. Elliott, or by both.

2. I am copying this letter to Denis Barnes, Philip Allen, Douglas Allen and McKenna.

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

Sir Burke Trend, K.C.B., C.V.O.,
Cabinet Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
S.W.1

*With the
Secretary's Compliments*

E. M. Furnival Jones, Esq
CBE.

DG/61

19th October, 1966

Rec: 19-10-66

107a

SECRET

Original on POL.F. 299-24

COPIES - POL.F. 50-24-101 ✓

POL.F. 50-6-366

The Prime Minister has agreed on new arrangements to ensure that he is kept informed on what may be called industrial security intelligence. The Home Secretary has been consulted, since the Security Service is principally concerned. The two other Ministers concerned are the First Secretary and the Minister of Labour, and I am now writing to tell you and Denis Barnes what is proposed.

The arrangements are these. At appropriate intervals, as circumstances suggest, the Paymaster-General will be briefed on security intelligence relating to industry, for the information of the Prime Minister. For this purpose he will preside over a series of small meetings consisting of representatives of the Home Office, Security Service, DEA and the Ministry of Labour, together with a representative of the Cabinet Office. At each meeting those attending will have before them a brief note by the Security Service on the current state of industrial security intelligence; and this, amended if necessary during the meeting, will be made available afterwards to the participants as the basis for briefing the individual Ministers concerned. It will be necessary to ensure that documents stemming from these meetings are handled with special care and are seen only by those personally concerned with briefing Ministers. And it must be understood that no action may be taken on them without reference to the Cabinet Office. We will provide the Secretary for these meetings. He will be Mr. D. Heaton, who will usually also be the Cabinet Office representative.

I hope these arrangements will commend themselves to you and to your Minister. We are anxious that the first of the meetings should take place before the end of this month; and I should be grateful if you, Philip Allen, Denis Barnes and Furnival Jones would let me know who your respective representatives will be. I suggest that representation should be at Under-Secretary or Assistant Secretary level.

I am copying this letter to Denis Barnes, Philip Allen and Furnival Jones and also to McKenna in the Paymaster's Office.

BURKE TREND

D. A. V. Allen, Esq., CB.

Copy: Pol.F.50-24-101.
Pol.F.50-6-366/
Supp.A.

106a

F.

To see the attached note.

2. I have little doubt that David Heaton will be the Cabinet Office representative, and presumably Claro will represent the Ministry of Labour. I hope we shall be told who is to represent D.E.A. When we are, you had better check the security status and if we are not told we shall very easily be able to ascertain who is to represent the Home Office.

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

D.G.

14th October, 1966.

(F. copy filed on POL.F. 299-24)

105a


✓ NOTE FOR POL.F.50-24-101.

Copy to: Pol.F.50-6-366/Supp.A.
: Pol.F.299-24

At the Cabinet Office this morning in a discussion with Sir Burke Trend and Sir Philip Allen, Trend said that the Prime Minister had now said that he wished D.E.A. to be in on briefings we gave to the Paymaster General. Trend said he would now speak to the Paymaster General telling him what had been agreed and, at my suggestion, would propose that the first meeting should be held before the end of the month, when we should be able to brief him about the Communist influence or the lack of it in the present troubles in the motor-car industry.

2. I said that I had it in mind to leave an aide memoire (of which copies would also be available for the other participants) with the Paymaster General, so as to ensure that he got his facts right when briefing the Prime Minister. It might also be desirable to circulate a brief record of the meeting if points of substance arose and give it the same distribution. The aide memoire would be treated as an annex to the record of the meeting. This was agreed. Philip Allen asked that the aide memoire should not be addressed to the Paymaster General, which he thought would be offensive to the Home Secretary.

3. Burke Trend subsequently told me that he would let me know who the departmental representatives would be.



D.G.

14th October, 1966.

104A

NOTE FOR POL.F.50-24-101.

Copy to:
F. to see.
(POL.F.299-24)

Copy to Pol.F.50-6-366/Supp.A.

At a meeting at the Cabinet Office this afternoon Sir Burke Trend, Sir Philip Allen, Denis Barnes and I considered the note at 98a.

2. We thought that subject to clearance by the Home Secretary, which Sir Philip Allen would seek, there was really no escape from providing the briefings for the Paymaster General referred to in paragraph 3 of the note. It was however important that the Paymaster General should be aware that other Ministers were involved and it was suggested that in addition to the Security Service, representatives of the Ministry of Labour, Home Office and Cabinet Office should also be present. Burke Trend suggested that the meetings should be at set monthly intervals, but the meeting accepted my view that this would tend to set the arrangement in concrete. If the initiative could be left with us we might find it possible ultimately to space the meetings out of existence, and at particular times there might well be a case for more frequent briefings. This was accepted.

3. Burke Trend suggested that the Minister of Labour was unlikely to favour our briefings going to the First Secretary of State - which Denis Barnes confirmed - and in any event it was difficult to see for what purpose he would need them. Burke Trend said he would seek the Prime Minister's instructions.

D.G.

10th October, 1966.

D.G.
10-10-66


99A

NOTE FOR Pol.F.50-24-101.

Copy to Pol.F.50-6-366/Supp.A.


I left with Sir Philip Allen a copy of the note at 98a and we discussed the problem briefly. He agreed that in the first place a discussion with Burke Trend and Denis Barnes would be useful and suggested that Douglas Allen (D.E.A.) ought probably also to be brought in. I agreed that he should send a copy of the note to Burke Trend.

2. I did not know whether the request referred to in paragraph 3 of the note had in fact originated with the Prime Minister but I thought it more likely that the Paymaster General had taken the initiative. I did not really believe the argument I had advanced to the Paymaster General. The real danger in Security Service briefings of the Prime Minister through the Paymaster General was that action would be taken on them without reference to other interested Ministers. Allen agreed with this, adding that in the final resort we might have to comply.



D.G.

6th October, 1966.



Pol.F.50-24-101.
Copy to Pol.F.50-6.366/Supp.A.
Original destroyed.

SECRET

Copy to F-
POL.F.299-24

98A

At the beginning of July the Home Secretary instructed me to give the Paymaster General (for the information of the Prime Minister) copies of notes about important individual security cases, but not of general security briefings. Subsequently Burke Trend saw some general briefings I had given the Home Secretary, which the latter passed to the Prime Minister, and asked me to consider sending him copies of such papers in future. You arranged with him that he should receive copies of notes on individual cases supplied to the Paymaster General, and of papers sent by the Home Secretary to the Prime Minister.

2. At the beginning of September the First Secretary of State asked through departmental channels to be sent copies of reports on Communist activity in industry of the kind we produced during the Seamen's strike. This request was mentioned to Burke Trend and Denis Barnes by the Security Service representative after a meeting of the A.C.(H) Committee on 2nd September. He suggested that a distinction should be made between detailed intelligence of Communist manoeuvres during serious industrial disputes, which should be filtered through the Ministry of Labour to ensure that it was put in the correct perspective, and "situation appraisals" which we would wish to give to the Home Secretary. Burke Trend agreed with this proposed distinction; he asked to be given copies of "situation appraisals" which he thought might also go to the First Secretary of State. (No "situation appraisal" has been issued since this discussion.) The request for intelligence on Communist activity in industry has recently been renewed on behalf of the First Secretary of State.

3. At a meeting with the Paymaster General on 28th September he told me he had discussed with the Prime Minister a suggestion that, for the benefit of the Prime Minister, the Paymaster General should receive periodic briefings from the Security Service about Communist and other subversive activity in industry. By implication he had the Prime Minister's approval for putting this to me. I said that there might be a danger of such briefings producing a somewhat distorted view since we were looking at the problem through Communist eyes. The Prime Minister ought to have a more balanced picture which took into account legitimate Trade Union activities. It was left that I should discuss the proposal with you, Burke Trend and Denis Barnes.

5th October, 1966.

SECRET

DGP
10-66

Copy for POL.F.299-24

Reference.....

97A

Note for POL.F.50-24-101

F. informed the D.G. on 30th September that the Department of Economic Affairs had again asked F.2. for reports on communism in industry to give to Mr. Stewart. F.2. had replied that no such reports had been issued since the first approach.

D. D. G.

D.D.G.

4.10.66.

SECRET

96a

Extract from Note of D.G.'s Meeting with Paymaster General on 28th September 1966. Original filed on POL.F.50-6-366/Supp/A (Held D.G.)

I called on the Paymaster General this morning at his request when the following topics were discussed:-

.....
(v) The Paymaster General had discussed with the Prime Minister and with Sir Burke Trend a suggestion that for the benefit of the Prime Minister, he should receive periodic briefings from Director F, or from Mr. Elliott or from both, about Communist and other subversive activity in industry. It was his impression that there were disruptive forces at work in industry besides the Communist Party. They seemed to him to be nihilist or anarchist. He was also anxious to educate the Prime Minister about, as he saw it, the malign influence of Mr. Jack JONES. He gave me to understand that Burke Trend would favour such periodic meetings and was under the impression that Director F had given such a briefing recently to Burke Trend.

I said I would like to consider the implications of this proposal. There might be some danger of such briefings producing a somewhat distorted view of the situation since basically we would be looking at the problem through the eyes of the Communist Party. The Prime Minister ought to be presented with a somewhat more balanced picture which took into account legitimate Trade Union activities. It was left that I would discuss the question with Burke Trend, Philip Allen and Denis Barnes.

This discussion ranged fairly widely over the field of responsibility of the Security Service and our attitude towards our responsibilities. The Paymaster General said he had been much struck by our liberal attitude which contrasted strongly with his belief when in Opposition that

we were a neo-fascist organisation. I said that I thought we were better described as objective and gave illustrations. Our charter left a good deal of room for interpretation of what was subversive of the security of the State. This was not readily susceptible of precise definition and it was a question of judgement in each case whether a new organisation was or was not subversive. I instanced C.N.D. and the COMMITTEE OF 100. It was very important that a Security Service should be kept within narrow bounds in what it investigated. I sensed that the Paymaster General fully accepted the doctrine I described and I made it clear that I did not think that briefing him about subversive activities in industry went outside the terms of the charter.

D.G.

28th September 1966

SECRET

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

DG/MAN
28/9

POL.F.299-24

95a

4.

Copy:
POL.F.50-24-101

F. through D.D.G.

When the next occasion arises for sending a "situation appraisal" to the Home Secretary, I shall want to discuss with Philip Allen how the suggestion that copies should go to the First Secretary of State should be met. It is really very naughty of Trend to ask you to send him copies and you should not do so.

D.G.

20th September 1966

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

SECRET

Reference.....

Original on: POL.F.299-24

Copy on: POL.F.50-24-101

94a

NOTE FOR FILE.

On 30 August F.1. and I visited Denis Barnes at the Ministry of Labour to give him a note on the C.P.G.B. and the N.U.R. and also to discuss with him general arrangements about reporting on Communist penetration of trade unions.

2. I said I did not like the way in which during the seamen's strike we had been giving "instant intelligence" to the Prime Minister so quickly that it was not always possible for the Ministry of Labour to comment on it in advance. There was a danger that the Government would look at these problems through Communist eyes as we were forced to do. Barnes agreed. I said I proposed to raise this at the end of the forthcoming A.C.(H) meeting. In the meantime we received a message via F.2. from Mr. Hudson, the Establishment Officer at the Department of Economic Affairs, to the effect that the new First Secretary of State, Mr. Michael Stewart, had heard of our situation reports during the seamen's strike and would like to be given copies of any further reports we might produce on the subject of Communism in industry. On receipt of this message I consulted Sir Burke Trend who said very firmly that I should stall until we could discuss the matter further after the A.C.(H) meeting.

3. After the A.C.(H) meeting on 2 September Barnes and I stayed behind to discuss these matters with Trend. Barnes put forward the case, which we had already agreed upon, namely that information from our sources should reach Government with a Ministry of Labour gloss upon it. Trend agreed with this and also with my suggestion that we should make a distinction between "instant intelligence" which should go to the Ministry of Labour and "situation appraisals" which we would wish to send to the Home Secretary, as our responsible Minister. Trend asked to be given copies of these. He also thought it was reasonable that they should go to the First Secretary of State. The mechanics of doing this should be worked out when we next had a "situation appraisal" to present. He did not consider that it was necessary for our paper on the "Communist Party and the Incomes Standstill" to go to the Prime Minister because he was loath, as indeed was Barnes, to encourage any idea that there was a "red hand" behind the present industrial crisis. There is therefore no need for us to mention the existence of this paper to the D.E.A.

4. Mr. Shipp has informed Mr. Hudson that we have nothing on the stocks at the moment but that, when we have, the First Secretary will be given a copy. Mr. Hudson let it be known that he would not take it amiss if the correspondence by-passed him.

R. Thistlethwaite
R. Thistlethwaite.

F.

5 September 1966.

SECRET

8/24/66
R

CONFIDENTIAL

88a

NOTE FOR :

POL.F.50-24-101

POL.F.50-6-366

POL.F.50-6-312

Sir Philip Allen told me today that he had now spoken to Burke Trend about the papers for the Prime Minister and the Paymaster General.

2. It had been agreed that when under the terms of the arrangement with the Home Secretary at 85a I send a copy of a note to the Paymaster General, I should at the same time send a copy to Burke Trend, informing Philip Allen that I had done so. When the Home Secretary sent a paper to the Prime Minister, Philip Allen would either himself send a copy to Burke Trend or ask me to do so.

3. I confirmed that these arrangements were satisfactory to me.

D.G.

D.G.

21st July 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

87A

Extract from Note of D.G.'s Meeting with Sir Burke Trend
on 14th July 1966. Original filed on SF.452/51/Link/A

When I called on Sir Burke Trend this morning
the following points arose:

.....

(b) The Home Secretary had sent the Prime
Minister the three F. Branch notes I
gave to the Home Secretary on 8th July.
The Prime Minister hoped that material
of this kind was not going to the Home
Secretary exclusively. Burke Trend
asked me to consider sending him copies
of such notes that I gave to the Home
Secretary.

.....

D.G.
14th July 1966

SECRET

JG/mw
14-7-66

85a

Extract from Note of D.G.'s Meeting with Home Secretary on 8th July 1966. Original filed at 196a in POL.F. 50-24-101/Supp/A.

After first calling on Sir Philip Allen, I saw the Home Secretary this morning when the following matters were discussed :

- (b) I gave the Home Secretary an account of my meeting with the Prime Minister on 5th July during which I had advanced my arguments against holding any form of enquiry into Communist influence on the N.U.S. I told him that the Prime Minister had found the arguments impressive and was hoping that pressure for an enquiry would evaporate. I also told the Home Secretary of our fairly frequent meetings with the Prime Minister throughout the strike, adding that I hoped that the Home Secretary did not feel that I had failed to keep him adequately informed. He said he had no such feeling. 84a
- (c) I told the Home Secretary about my discussion with the Paymaster General and of the novel doctrine that Colonel Wigg had enunciated. After some discussion, in which Philip Allen joined, the Home Secretary instructed me to give the Paymaster General copies of notes about important individual security cases but not of general security briefings. I had previously agreed with Philip Allen that, if I were to do this, I would let him know that I had done so. 84a

D.G.

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

8th July 1966

TOP SECRET

DG/MWV
13.7.66

SECRET

84^A

NOTE FOR POL.F.50-6-366/~~SUPP/A~~
COPY FOR POL.F.50-24-101

When I called on the Paymaster General this morning, he referred to the case of REEN (PF,606,852), about which he had received a minute from the Minister of Defence for the Royal Air Force, Lord Shackleton. He renounced the theory that the Prime Minister was operationally responsible for the security of the country, the Home Secretary being responsible for the liberty of the subject, and that accordingly notes about cases such as REEN ought to be given to him, the Paymaster General, so that he could inform the Prime Minister. I said I would bear this in mind.

I subsequently informed Cunningham who said that the doctrine struck him as both novel and erroneous and agreed with me that I ought to mention the matter to the Home Secretary.

D.G.

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

30th June 1966

SECRET

DG/mow
30/6/66



SECRET

78A
10 Downing Street
Whitehall

January 25, 1966.

25 JAN 1966

Dear Furnival Jones,

I enclose for your guidance a note on Ministerial Responsibility for the Handling of Security Matters which has been agreed with the Home Secretary and approved by the Prime Minister.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Shuffrey (Home Office), McKenna (Paymaster General's Office) and Reid (Cabinet Office.)

*Yours sincerely
Derek Mitchell*

E.M. Furnival Jones, Esq., C.B.E.

*Derek Mitchell
27.1.66*

SECRET

Ministerial Responsibility for the Handling
of Security Matters

1. It would be convenient to record the arrangements which have been evolved, at Ministerial level, for the handling of security matters. These arrangements have proved so far to be satisfactory; and have met the essential requirement that the Prime Minister is not only made aware in good time of any important security issue but that it is clearly understood at all levels and by all concerned that the ultimate responsibility for security rests with the Prime Minister.
2. The existing directive to the Director-General of the Security Service makes it clear that he is responsible to the Home Secretary personally, although the Security Service is not a part of the Home Office; and that on appropriate occasions the Director-General will have right of direct access to the Prime Minister.
3. It is implicit in these arrangements (and clearly need not be spelled out in the directive itself) that the Prime Minister for his part may send for the Director-General at any time and, if he thinks it necessary and desirable, may give instructions direct to the Director-General.
4. If any such instruction is given to the Director-General by the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister's office will inform the Home Secretary accordingly and it will then be for the Director-General, subsequently, to keep the Home Secretary in touch with the matter under the normal arrangements.
5. The Director-General advises individual Ministers on

security matters falling within their departmental responsibilities, keeping the Home Secretary informed of important issues.



77A
LORD PRIVY SEAL
70 WHITEHALL
LONDON S.W.1

Seen by D.G.
& R.H.H.
& Directors.

1 JAN 1966
31st December, 1965

Dear Mr. ~~Mr.~~ Furnival Jones

Thank you very much indeed for your kind letter of 30th December. It is very nice indeed of you to write. I greatly enjoyed meeting you the day before yesterday. It would, as you say, have been pleasant had we had longer to work together, but I always felt that with Roger Hollis and yourself I had partners in a very difficult sphere who guided me and helped me in a way for which I cannot adequately thank you both. As you know, I always had the completest confidence in the advice you gave me and tried to follow it.

Please accept my warmest thanks for your kind wishes and may I reciprocate by wishing Roger Hollis a happy retirement and you a very long and successful tenure of the high office you hold. I am sure you will fill it with the greatest distinction.

Yours sincerely
Frank Drake

E.L.Furnival Jones, Esq.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

76A

Seen by Directors.

POL.F.50/24/101

D.G.

30th December 1965.

It was very kind of you to invite me to your farewell party yesterday evening and I greatly enjoyed it.

I am only sorry that I have had so short a time under you since you did me the honour of appointing me to my present post, but Roger Hollis and I are extremely grateful for the sympathetic interest you showed in our work during your term of office and the valuable support which you gave us. I hope that you will derive great satisfaction from your new and, as you told me, onerous appointment as Lord Privy Seal.

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

The Right Hon. Sir Frank Soskice,
Q.C., M.P.,
Office of the Lord Privy Seal,
70, Whitehall, S.W.1.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

75A

MR. JENKINS BECOMES HOME SECRETARY

MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT FOR MRS. CASTLE



Mr. R. Jenkins.

SIR F. SOSKICE STAYS IN CABINET

Mr. Fraser yesterday resigned as Minister of Transport and was succeeded by Mrs. Castle. Mr. Jenkins becomes Home Secretary in place of Sir Frank Soskice in a Government reshuffle announced last night from 10 Downing Street.

Sir Frank Soskice will continue to sit in the Cabinet as Lord Privy Seal, and among the duties to be allocated to him will be the chairmanship of some Cabinet committees.

The full list of the Government changes is as follows:

- HOME SECRETARY MR. ROY JENKINS (aged 45)
(Formerly Sir Frank Soskice)
- SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
THE COLONIES LORD LONGFORD (60)
(Mr. Greenwood)
- MINISTER OF OVERSEAS
DEVELOPMENT MR. ANTHONY GREENWOOD (54)
(Mrs. Castle)
- LORD PRIVY SEAL SIR FRANK SOSKICE (63)
(Lord Longford)
- MINISTER OF TRANSPORT .. MRS. BARBARA CASTLE (54)
(Mr. Fraser)
- MINISTER OF AVIATION .. MR. FREDERICK MULLEY (47)
(Mr. Jenkins)

The salaries of all the Ministers remain unchanged at £8,500 a year, plus £1,250 parliamentary allowance for those who sit in the Commons. Lord Longford will continue to lead the House of Lords.

