



105.

*Trans to 316-8-3*

~~6.59. P. V. - position as at 30.6.59.~~

105a.

106.

.6.59. Draft letter to Sir Norman Brook, forwarding six-monthly return of Positive Vetting.

106a.

*Replaced by 108a.*

107.

D.G.

Please see, at 106a, a draft of the usual six-monthly progress report on Positive Vetting. The backlog is represented by Kirby Green, Gee and McCaul.

*P. Norman*

B.  
30.6.59.

108.

*Trans to 316-8-3*

~~7.59. To Sir N. Brook with P.V. return.~~

108a

109.

*Trans to 316-8-2*

~~1.9.59 Note re Atomic P.V. Clearance for WINTERBORN and WRIGHT.~~

109a

110.

10.59 Minute from C.1. re Criminal Record Check (Home Office)

110a

*B.M.*

111.

10.59 To Home Office re 110a

111a

*B.M.*

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110.

10.59 B.M. re Home Office Criminal Record Check

110a

111. *Trans to 316-8-2*

~~2.10.59~~ Addition of names to ATOMIC list. 111a

*Trans to 316-8-2*

~~28.10.59.~~ Additions to ATOMIC list. 111b

112. *Trans to 316-8-3*

~~30.11.59.~~ Positive Vetting progress as at 30.11.59. 112a

113.

2.12.59. Draft letter to Sir Norman Brook, attaching P.V. return. 113a

*Removed. See 113a.*

114.

*can  
2.12  
D.D.G.*

Please see at 113a a draft of the usual six-monthly return of progress in Positive Vetting. The backlog is represented by with whom we should be able to deal during the first half of next year.

*1.11.59*

B.  
2.12.59.

115. *Trans 316-8-3*

~~3.12.59.~~ To Cabinet Office enclosing note re P.V. 115a

116.

*Trans 316-8-3*

~~7.7.60.~~ Statement of P.V. position. 116a

117.

7.7.60. Draft letter to Sir N. Brook ref. 116a. 117a

Replaced by 119a.

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118.

*copied to 316-8-3*D.G.

*Done 21/7*

Please see at 117a a draft letter to Brook covering the six-monthly return of progress in Positive Vetting. I must apologise for having allowed this to become a month overdue. The backlog consists of [redacted] and [redacted] with whom I will deal on their return to duty this month and in September respectively.

*11/7*B.  
7.7.60.

119.

*Trans to 316-8-3*~~7.7.60. To Cabinet Office with P.V. return.~~

119a

120.

12.7.60 Copy of Treasury Circular re positive vetting.

120a

121.

*Trans to 316-8-2*~~21.7.60 Copy of Special Branch enquiry form.~~

121a

122.

*Done 22/7*  
B.2 through B. *22/7*

To see 120a which was referred to us by C.1. The Treasury failed to send B.Branch a copy and even C.1 who helped to draft it had to ask specially for a copy.

2. As far as male staff are concerned sample Records of Service, supported by personal recollections, indicate that every candidate has been looked up on joining on the form at 121a. If in any particularly old Record of Service there is no S.B. enquiry form, the probable explanation is that there was a time when for over-nice reasons of delicacy they were not filed but kept under extra secret cover en bloc. In certain cases we also make local police enquiries.

3. Thus there will be no backlog of men to be cleared in C.R.O. I hope the same applies in the case of women staff.

B.1.

21.7.60

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*C.J.M. Foulkes*  
C.J.M. Foulkes

B.2  
1 Apr 1961

123.

B.1. through B.

With reference to minute 122, I find that the procedure whereby the names of applicants for employment in this Department were looked up in S.B. and C.R.O. records started at some time in 1942. I think we may take it that everyone joining the office after that year will have been so looked up. I hope you will agree with me that it would be a waste of time to research into records of service dating from before 1942 to see if any officer who joined before that date is on the Atomic List *was a member of "S.B."*

*and*

*C.S. Weldsmith*

B.2.  
25.7.60.

C.S. Weldsmith.

124. *Trans to POF 316-82*

~~29.7.60 To Special Branch Deputy Commander about searches for old members of staff.~~

124a

125.

~~B.1. 32/8  
B.2. GW 4/8~~

Jones, Deputy Commander Special Branch, rang me this afternoon on receiving my letter at 124a. He asked that, when we make an enquiry about existing members of our staff, we should omit from the usual enquiry form any reference to the individual's employment by us. He also asked that I should send the enquiry to him personally.

*Weldsmith*

B.  
29.7.60

126.

Note.

In connection with Minute 125 above Jones told me that he could very well remember as a young man in Special Branch before the war having searched the Yard records in respect of candidates for employment in this Service. This confirms our belief that, although the old Records of Service may not show it, we always cleared our staff with the Police.

B.  
29.7.60

*Weldsmith*

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127.

16.8.60 C.1. minute attaching Treasury letter about use of criminal record checks. 127a

128.

.11.60 Treasury D.E.O. letter about security education. 128a  
*Trans to Security of Personnel*

129.

21.11.60 Note of P.V. Progress as at 1.12.60. -- six monthly return for Cabinet Office. 129a  
*Trans to 316-8-3*

130.

21.11.60 To Sir Norman Brock enc. six monthly return - Draft. 130a  
Destroyed - see 132a.

131.

*em*  
D.D.G.

*copied to 316-8-3*

Please see at 130a a draft of the usual six-monthly return of our progress in Positive Vetting, due on 1 December. We have at last worked off the backlog of officers who were overseas, and this is therefore the last return which we shall need to make, (see 50a, para.c.).

*Ammanath*

B.  
21.11.60.

132.

*Trans to 316-8-3*

22.11.60. To Sir Norman Brock enclosing P.V. return. 132a

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~~B.~~ 130/11  
14. 30/11

134.

(replied to 316-8-10)

On 24.11.60 we discussed the question of P.V. in relation to some of our subordinate staff. There is a note at 133a showing the present position as regards P.V. of our garage hands and drivers. The lack of uniformity is partly accounted for by the fact that some had already been fully P.Vd when the recommendations made in Minute 71 were adopted, and partly by the fact that we tend when recruiting subordinate staff to seek P.V. written references as a means of obtaining some slight additional assurance of the candidate's good standing when we are less well assured of it than is generally the case by the time we have decided to make an offer.

2. I still think it proper, for the reasons originally given, not to regard the garage staff and the drivers as being in the P.V. category and not to put them through the standard P.V. process for TOP SECRET defence clearance. By the same token I do not consider it improper to call for P.V. references when we feel that it may serve a useful purpose to do so.

3. I do not consider that we are any less sure about the good security standing of subordinate staff who have not been fully through P.V. than we are of those who have.

*C.J.H. Foulkes*  
C.J.H. Foulkes

B.1.  
25.11.60.

135.

Trans to 316-8-3

~~12.12.60~~ From Cabinet Office ack. 132a.

435a

1.6.61. C.1. minute to B. enc. 136. copies of minutes about P.V.

136x

~~June 61.~~ Copy of Supplementary Security Questionnaire.

436a

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137.

Copied to 316-8-2

D.G.

You asked to be reminded of how we in this Service operate the P.V. procedure, the rules governing which are contained in Chapter IV. of The Manual of Personnel Security Measures (copy attached).

2. The position is as follows:-

(a) Definition of Posts to which P.V. applies.

You have ruled in Minute 65 that they are those in which staff have access to files and that the Watcher staff in A.4. (and some others specified in Minute 71) should be excluded.

(b) Method of carrying out P.V.

(i) All staff have been, and new recruits will be, normally vetted - Stage I.

(ii) All staff have completed, and new recruits will complete, the Security Questionnaire - Stage II.

We do not use the standard form, E.93 Estasec. (see Minute 3), but all questions required to be asked, together with a number of our own, are included in our own form of application for employment plus the Supplementary Security Questionnaire (136a).

(iii) In respect of all staff we have taken up, and in respect of new recruits we will take up, references in writing from at least two referees - Stage III.

In respect of all staff who joined after the introduction of P.V. these references are in the prescribed form, as are those in respect of all staff for whom no other written references were obtained at the time of joining (Minute 77, paragraph 2, and Minute 81, paragraph 1).

(iv) All staff have been, either at the time of recruitment or subsequently, and all new recruits will be, subjected to an interview directed inter alia to establishing their security status. You decided in Minute 77 that an interview of the foregoing character did in fact take place as part of the normal process of recruiting any member of the staff who joined either before or after the war. There being doubt about what may have happened during the war, all staff who joined prior to 1946 have subsequently been specifically interviewed by officers of B. Branch (Minute 81).

/You



Minute 137 contd.

You further decided (Minute 77. paragraph 2.) that our normal recruiting process set out in paragraph 3. of 63a, subject, in the case of wartime recruits and of others where there might be doubt, to the remedying of deficiencies which might be supposed or appear to exist, did constitute compliance with Stage IV of the P.V. procedure, and it is in accordance with that decision and in deference to the wish expressed in paragraph 1. of Minute 77 that our half-yearly returns to Sir Norman Brook (compare 132a) always show that P.V. is in all cases taken to Stage IV.

3. There is, I suppose, room for doubt about whether we really do, as we have been saying, comply with the requirements of Stage IV of the procedure. It is to be noted that Stage IV is not obligatory in normal P.V. (though it is in ATOMIC and there we are correct because we do interview referees) and it is no doubt for this reason that the instructions contained in Annex 3 to Chapter IV of the Manual are described as "guidance to investigating officers". Having re-read the Annex, the wording of which, in relation to the method by which information is to be obtained, is throughout permissive only, I personally feel little doubt that your decision was and is justified and defensible.

4. There remains the question whether, even if it be accepted that what we do can properly be described as constituting Stage IV, we nevertheless go far enough and ought to do more. I have no doubt, and I am sure you will have none, that in the case of Officer recruits, all of whom are interviewed by a Board of Directors presided over by yourself, there is normally no further investigation which would need to be made before you could with any clearer conscience declare yourself satisfied with their security status. In the case of women recruits, however, who are handled at a less senior level, there may be more to be said. Even so in their cases it nearly always happens that, as with the men, they are introduced to us by a person or organisation whom we already know, who have been briefed as to our position and who have done business with us before. We do not in general, and indeed it is very seldom that we do, interview a referee, but we do get a written recommendation from the introducer, normally a Headmistress or Principal of a training establishment, we do have a specific Police report if the girl lives outside the Metropolitan Police area, we do vet all four referees and we do have a full search in Police records. Moreover, although

/this is

Minute 137 contd.

*Copied to 316-8-2*

this is in general only applicable after joining, we do vet any person or persons with whom a girl shares accommodation other than in her own home. Since the majority of women recruits are girls who have only recently left school, and have no background other than school and home, we do not think that a personal interview with the referees would produce any more relevant information than we already obtain or would materially affect the judgment of those responsible for recruitment. When all is said and done, it is this latter which is the deciding factor.

5. Our whole position, as it seems to me and as you have yourself often said, has to be considered from the standpoint that, from the first moment that any candidate is thought of, the emphasis is on his or her security status and that in relation not merely to access to secrets but to work in a secret department, and that the whole recruiting process is conducted by persons who are conditioned accordingly. Furthermore, and this is relevant to the question whether P.V. like vaccination needs to be repeated at intervals, all entrants to the Service are inevitably and from the nature of the work the subject of continuous security scrutiny. In spite of this I can only recall one case ~~case~~ where subsequent disquiet about a person's security status had its origins in anything which further enquiries at the time of recruitment might possibly have been expected to reveal. I remain therefore convinced that not only in form but also in substance our P.V. enquiries are properly carried out.

*Inman*B.  
1.6.61.

138. *Trans to Polf 316-8-2*
- June 61. ~~Specimen P.V. forms as reprinted & amended in June 1961.~~ 138a
- 139.
- 26.6.61. ~~Note of P.V. progress as at 26.6.61.~~ *Trans to 316-8-3* 139a
- 140.
- 26.6.61. Draft letter to Sir Norman Brook enc: 6-monthly return of P.V. progress. 140a  
*Replaced by 142a.*

141.

D.G.

Please see at 140a a draft letter to Sir Norman Brook enclosing our six-monthly return of progress in P.V.

*Humawalk*

B.  
26.6.61.

142.

*Trans to 316-8-3*

~~27.6.61. To Sir N. Brook with P.V. progress return.~~

142a

143.

4/6.7.61 Minutes between D.G. and B. on the subject of Stage IV of P.V. and application to our staff.

143a

144.

*B.1. d 773.  
B.2. and 717*

Please see at 143a the important direction which the D.G. has given about the way in which in future we are to conduct Stage IV of the P.V. procedure.

In complying with this direction there are two important points to observe. First that before we can dispense with a personal interview of a sponsor or referee, there must be written evidence on the file that the sponsor is aware that we are the Security Service, that he knows what the P.V. criteria are and that he knows the candidate sufficiently well to say that he does not offend against them. Secondly that, even when a member of the staff is himself a sponsor and is, as naturally he would be, interviewed, we should make a written record in so many words to the same effect.

Except in the case of officers with the sort of background which recent recruits have had, I think that we shall in most cases find it necessary to conduct at least one personal interview outside.

*Humawalk*

B.  
7.7.61.

Copy in SF.50-36-3

Action taken on

Rs. of P.

B. *B. 1207*  
*B. 1207* 146.  
 2/1)

*Copied to ROLF 316-8*

There is an analysis at 145a of the present P.V. position of members of A.2/Lab., A.2.B./G.P.O. and A.2.C. All except [redacted] have been taken to Stage IV. (There is a note in each of the four Records of Service of the position reached and action to be taken to complete Stage IV.) The advice in Minute 71 that staff of these three sections should be included in the P.V. field does not appear to have been disapproved or subsequently amended. I consider the reasons for that advice still valid and recommend that the P.V. of the four men named should now be completed. Two written P.V. references ought in all four cases to suffice. It would be useful as well as convenient if one at least in each case were made by a colleague because we could then also interview the colleague.

*Hamm*  
 C.J.H.Foulkes

B.1.  
 20.7.61.

17.8.61  
 21.8.61.

C.'s comments to B. on Min. 137.  
 From Sir Norman Brook about P.V. figures.

147.  
*Trans to 316-8-3* 147x  
 147a

D.G. *Thank you*  
*Russ.*  
 22/6

148. *Copied to 316-8-3*

Reference 147a. The returns we made in 1957 and 1960 are set out below. I have added the current mid-1961 figures. I have arranged them in the form used by the Treasury at 147a.

	<u>Total P.V. Posts</u>		<u>Cleared to Stage 3</u>		<u>Cleared through Stage 4</u>		<u>Backlog</u>	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
June '57 (82a)	950	18	-	-	913	18	37	-
June '60 (119a)	926	30	-	-	924	30	2	-
June '61 (142a)	949	34	-	-	949	34	-	-

*Hamm*  
 C.J.H.Foulkes

B.1  
 22.8.61.

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149.

29.8.61. Note on analysis of vetting position of part time male translators.

149a

150.

B.

To see my note at 149a. I hope you will agree with paras. 7 and 8.

*C.J.H. Foulkes*  
C.J.H. Foulkes

B.1.  
4.9.61.

151

copied to 316-8-10

*B.1. 11/9*

The JG's ruling as to what in this service constitutes a P.V. category was based on access to our files. If these people have no such access, as I assume to be the case, I agree that their work, as described by Aubrey, does not make P.V. necessary, but it must be understood in A2 that they are not without reference to us, to be employed on any other work.

*P. Mansworth*

*B. 11/9*

152.

copied to 316-8-10

NOTE.

Reference Minutes 150 and 151. I have spoken to Aubrey and have told him that so long as these occasional translators do not have access to office files and do not participate in any exceptionally delicate operation in a way to indicate to them how it is conducted, we do not regard them as being in a P.V. category. He will be careful to ensure that they do not see files, and to let me know if they are required to take part in any particularly delicate operation.

B.1.  
12.9.61.

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*C.J.H. Foulkes*  
C.J.H. Foulkes

153.

~~Letter sent out in connection with field enquiries.~~

*Copied Trans to 316-8-2*  
153a

154.

*Copied to 316-8-2*

B.

We are running into a difficulty in connection with Field Enquiries on candidates, in that six or eight referees approached have taken umbrage at the letter, a copy of which is filed at 153a. They have assumed the wording of paragraph 3 to imply that they themselves are incapable of understanding the purport of the questions printed on the back of the letter without the aid of an Officer of this Service. In order to avoid the embarrassment which has been occasioned to our Officer conducting the Field Enquiry, I suggest we might make a slight alteration to the wording of the letter as I have indicated at 153a, that the P.V. questions should be printed on a separate sheet of paper and that these questions should be presented to the referee by the Field Enquiry Officer when he conducts his enquiry.

B.2.

31 October 1961

Copy on SF.50-36-3

*C.S. Wellsmith*

155.

*Trans to 316-8-2*

9.11.61 ~~Revised version of field enquiry letter.~~

155a

156.

*Copied to 316-8-12*

*I agree. To be seen by all B2 AOs.*  
*B.2.*  
*B.23/2* *Q.24/2* *AW22/2*

The matrimonial cases of RS.1718 and RS.4120 (on each of which I have minuted you) make me think that there is a lacuna in our fiancé/e vetting procedure.

2. A criminal record check is an integral part of P.V. (120a) and the yellow form (121a) is used for the purpose. It is in fact also an essential part of N.V. (127a) for certain classes of person. Such a check is made on all our staff.

3. By marrying a member of our staff in the P.V. category the spouse does not quite enter that category, but does in fact enter the N.V. category, though without necessarily having access to classified defence information.

4. If that does not seem sufficient cause for making the S.B. look-up on fiancé/es, in addition to local police enquiries where needed, I think the proposition may be looked at this way: when a candidate is looked up in S.B. particulars are also given of the spouse/...

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Minute 156 (continued)

spouse (if there is one) as well as of the parents; when, therefore, a member of the staff acquires a spouse that person should be looked up in S.B. - in the fiancé/e stage.

*C. J. H. Foulkes*  
C.J.H. Foulkes

B.1.

21.2.62.

Copied to SF.50-36-1.

157.

*Copied to 316-8-12*

28.2.62. C.Branch comments on 156.


157a

158.

*am*  
B.2.

Reference minute 156. Since that was written I have put some C.Branch opinions in the file at 157a, but I do not think there is anything in them to cause us to alter what has already been agreed.

I have also consulted B. who was away on 21.2.62. He points out that in some cases the Metropolitan Police are the "local" police force of whom we make background enquiries about fiancés and that in such cases we write to the Commander, Special Branch. It is important in those cases not to send the Yellow Form in addition to writing to the Commander.



*C. J. H. Foulkes*  
C.J.H. Foulkes

B.1.

8.3.62.

Copied to SF.50-36-1  
-----

159.

3.5.62. Loose minute and note re Review of P.V. procedure.

159a

*Page 2 Trans to 316-8-4*

160.

15.5.62 Copy of Particulars of Fiancé form.

*Trans to 316-8-2*

159b

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160.

Copied to 316-8-2

" " 316-8-4  
" " 316-8-12B.

You have asked me in connection with the P.V. review in RS.4575 whether it is our practice to card the fiancé(e) of a member of the staff. The answer is that we do not card fiancé(e)s, or spouses, of either sex. I recognise that this being so there is a slight risk that should adverse information develop subsequent to the look-up, it might not necessarily come quickly to our notice, or indeed it might not come at all. The danger is greater in regard to a spouse simply because the relationship is closer, and while it is possible that a look-up on a spouse might by chance throw up the card for a member of the Service, it is a matter of luck and there are many cuts in the Index where it would be most unlikely to do so.

I have discussed with Miss Deedes the B.1/B.2 practice in regard to the screening of fiancé(e)s:-

- (i) On engagement the member of the Service fills up the form, a copy of which is filed at 159b, giving the name of the fiancé(e) and his or her parents. In B.1. the fiancée alone is looked-up in the M.I.5. Index, in B.2. the fiancé and the parents are looked-up.
- (ii) On marriage, or in the case of women staff when marriage becomes imminent (about three months ahead) and the girl in question is asking permission to continue her employment after marriage, a SB/CRO look-up is carried out by B.2., and/or a Police report is requested on the fiancé and his family at our discretion, full details first having been obtained from the girl in question about her fiancé, his employment, his education, his politics, his tastes, and his family. M.I.5. look-up on the fiancé is checked. B.1. calls at discretion for a SB/CRO look-up but has not so far been in the practice of calling for a Police report nor of getting details of his fiancée and her family from the man in question.

Our practice in regard to fiancé(e)s admittedly carries a small risk of adverse information failing to come to our notice, but if this were to happen it would occur at a time, i.e. before marriage, when the likelihood of damage would not be very severe. The danger from the spouse after marriage is potentially greater, and we ought perhaps to consider whether we ought now to card spouses both of present and of future staff. This would be a fair sized job and would take us a little while in B. Branch; it would also add several hundred cards to the Registry, but it would by no means be an impossible task.

B.2.

15.5.62.

Copy to SF.50-36-1.

C.S. Held Smith



*161.7/15*  
B.2., through B.1.

161.

*Copied to 316-8-12*

I think your minute 160 is a useful statement of the position. I agree with what you say about the carding of Fiancés but the question of spouses is rather more difficult and I should like to discuss it.

B.  
16.5.62.

*P. Marshall*

(Copy on SF.50-36-1)

162.

21.5.62

Note re "Field Enquiry" being re-named "Referee Interview".

162a

163.

*Copied to 316-8-4*

B.

In the past few weeks B.2. has begun at your request to make a statement of the P.V. position of newly recruited staff asking for your clearance, and in addition has begun to review the P.V. position of staff already in post as directed by the Radcliffe Report. The procedure by which we present the position to you has so far been experimental and a little confused, and I should now like to clarify the requirements and our practice in presenting cases to you for clearance.

2. The D.G. has directed that in completing Stage IV of P.V. we must either have a statement from a trusted sponsor (a member of the Security Service or someone who is aware that we are the Security Service and can make an informed judgement of P.V. criteria) or a personal interview with at least one referee or sponsor (143a). The clearance of Stage IV for women is commonly done by Referee Interview, and I suggest that when this is so we should not duplicate matters by also quoting data about the candidate's introduction, whether it be by school, college, or by personal introduction, in the minute asking for clearance.

3. When reviewing staff in post for renewed P.V. clearance, we quote the original clearance completed at the time in question by the procedure authorised by the D.G. at that time. In such cases when there are no abnormal circumstances I suggest that we need not newly ~~to~~ apply more recently introduced procedure in requesting renewed clearance of the original P.V. If we were now required to apply present day practice in renewing P.V. clearance for all members of the staff now in post we should find ourselves involved both in B.1. and in B.2. in a prodigious operation of work quite beyond the capacity of the branch as constituted at present

or in/.....

Minute 163 (Continued).

*copied to 316-8-4*

or in contemplation.

4. The points in the two foregoing paragraphs are subject to our practice, which should continue, of drawing your attention to any notable episode, whether good or bad, when presenting you with a request for P.V. clearance, or renewal thereof.

5. The Radcliffe Report directs that discussion with supervisors of the subject should be an integral part of P.V. review. Such discussion is regular practice in B.1. and B.2. and when such discussion takes place consideration of P.V. points is implicit since supervisors are instructed to bring to the attention of B. Branch any point on no matter what subject which may be a matter of uneasiness. If, however, in requesting renewal of P.V. clearance we are categorically to state that the subject has been discussed with supervisors specifically on P.V. points, we shall be faced with the necessity both in B.1. and B.2. of renewed discussion with supervisors of the majority of present members of the staff, specifically clearing all P.V. points. This would be a very big operation. I shall be glad to know whether you think our present practice, which has I think proved efficient in bringing to the notice of B. Branch all matters of concern both P.V. and otherwise, may continue.

6. I should like to think that we should maintain identical practice in B.1. and B.2. on P.V. procedure. It is easy to get out of step unless we occasionally have joint discussions within the Branch. An example of this disparity lies in our present treatment of fiancé(e)s, as shown in Minute 160, the procedure in which matter we should agree when we discuss the question of spouses.

*C.S. Weldsmith*

B.2.  
24.5.62.

*DMJ-28/5. 31/5 164.*  
B.2., through B.1. *J 28/5*

*Miss Weldsmith on return.*

*copied to 316-8-12*

1. Your Minute 160.

We discussed this yesterday and agreed that we should continue not to card spouses or fiancés of either sex. We felt that the additional safeguards that such carding might theoretically provide were very slight indeed and would be outweighed by the dilution of the Index.

We will in all cases have a Police look-up on Fiancées. Subject to this, there is in fact no substantial difference in the way in which forthcoming marriages are dealt with in B.1. or B.2.

/2...

Minute 164 continued.

2. Your Minute 163.

*Copied to 316-8-4*

a. Existing P.V. clearance may be regarded as having been validly given if the D.G.'s directions prevailing at the time were properly complied with and on review I shall be prepared to reaffirm in the light of information received subsequently to the original clearance and without reopening the latter.

b. In the case of new recruits, I agree with what you say in your paragraph 2. It seems to me that in practice compliance with the D.G.'s ruling of 6th July last does involve our interviewing at least one person, whether it be a sponsor or a referee nominated by the candidate.

c. I do not understand your paragraph 5. At discussions with supervisors, it either is or is not the case that an individual's P.V. standing has been mentioned. If it has, then you should say so, and no further discussion with supervisors is necessary. If it has not, then you should not say so, and before you do say so, a formal discussion with the supervisor will be necessary. In fact it seems to me that, if the second sentence of your paragraph 5. correctly states the position, then you should feel no difficulty in every case in saying that the relevant discussion has been held with the supervisor. Incidentally, we have yet to receive specific instructions from the Treasury as to the way in which the various recommendations of the Radcliffe Report are to be implemented, and in particular as to the method and frequency of P.V. reviews.

*Humayun*

B.  
25.5.62.

165.

29.6.62. ~~Note of figures for annual P.V. return.~~

*Trans to 316-8-3*

165a

166.

29.6.62. Draft letter to Sir Norman Brook enc: P.V. return.  
**Replaced by 168a.**

166a

167.

D.G.

Please see at 166a a draft letter to Sir Norman Brook enclosing our annual return of P.V. progress. This return is in the revised form requested in the letter at 147a.

*Humayun*

B.  
29.6.62.

168.

~~29.6.62. To Sir Norman Brook with P.V. annual return.~~*Trans to 316-8-3*

168a

169.

*copied to 316-8-4*B. *30/7*

I have given further thought to paragraph 5 of my minute 163 and paragraph 2 of your minute 164. This matter of discussion with supervisors in connection with renewed P.V. clearance is not quite as clear cut as it might seem. Supervisors have been instructed, and have recently been reminded, that they should bring to the notice of B. Branch any matter which causes them uneasiness about members of the staff, and this of course includes all points of P.V. interest. In our constantly recurring discussions with supervisors about their staff we take it for granted that points of uneasiness will be raised by them, but we do not go through the P.V. requirements point by point in regard to individual members of the staff.

This will be a matter which we shall want to discuss when the full Treasury instructions are issued. Meanwhile you have asked us to go ahead with the P.V. review of existing staff; in B.2. we can do little of it at the present time because as you know we are heavily committed in recruiting new staff.

B.2.  
30.7.62.*C.S. Weldgath*

170.

~~27.7.62. Treasury circular on Reviews of P.V. Cases (filed 30.7.62.)~~*Trans to 316-8-4*

170a

171.

~~21.7.62. B. minute to C.1. enc: copy of 170a & asking for discussion. (filed 30.7.62.)~~

171a

172.

2.8.62. Treasury circular : check of character referees.

172a

173.

~~12.10.62. Copy of C.1. and C. minutes to B. on annual review of P.V. in consultation with supervisors.~~

173a

174.

~~22.10.62. Loose minute to C.1. on amendment to the Confidential Report form.~~

174a

175.

~~30.10.62. Loose minute from C.1. in reply to 174a.~~

175a

176.

~~1.11.62. Draft circular from D.G. to supervisors on amendment to Confidential Report.~~

176a

Copied to 316-8-4

D.G., through B.2.

I have consulted C. and C.1. about the way in which we should conduct the periodical review of our P.V. cases and in particular about the form in which we should consult Supervisors. The relevant papers are 170a, which is a Treasury Circular dealing with the implementation of paragraph 78(f) of the Radcliffe Report, and 173a and 175a which contain C. and C.1. advice. Consequent upon the latter I have drafted at 176a a circular, which I suggest should be signed by you, addressed to all Supervisors who make Confidential Reports. The occasion for this circular is the amendment, as therein shown, of our three confidential report forms (copies attached to the draft), but the circular would in future also be shown to all new supervisors and, if you accept C.'s advice, might be reissued annually. If we adopt this procedure, we shall in my view be doing all and more than anybody can reasonably expect of us.

2. The Treasury Circular at 172a dealing with checks on character referees introduces in paragraph 9. a change in the procedure relating to field enquiries which is of particular importance to us in that, in paragraph 9., it is now made mandatory, instead of as before permissive, to interview character referees. I do not know whether this was really intended nor, if so, why, but we must clearly comply. At present, as you may recall, we have in most cases since July 1961 been interviewing only one referee (143a and minute 144). The new requirement may involve an increase in staff.

3. Partly arising out of the foregoing and in connection with P.V. reviews generally, I should be grateful for your approval of my understanding of the position viz: that, in the absence of any new information tending to invalidate it, an original P.V. clearance is to be regarded as having been validly given if it complied with the rulings prevailing at the time. Our interpretation of how to apply P.V. procedures has been governed by two rulings given by you viz:

- (a) that recorded in minute 77 when you approved Simkins's note at 63a, and
- (b) that referred to in the preceding paragraph.

Thus, for example, a member of the staff recruited before 1954 will have been the subject

/of two

Minute 177 continued.

*Copied to 316-8-4*

of two written references but they will not have been in the form prescribed for P.V. nor, in general, will any referee have been interviewed. I take it that on P.V. review of such a case we are not required to get fresh references in the prescribed form and to interview one or both of the referees.

4. I accept, however, that on review we should comply with paragraph 6. of 170a. In fact as to (a) and (b) we always have done, and (c) has never arisen.

*Amman m.k.*

B.  
1.11.62.

178.

*Copied to 316-8-4*

D.G.

You asked me to look at the Treasury circulars at 170a and 172a and at the draft office circular at 176a.

I should be glad to discuss. Meanwhile it may be useful if I jot down some of the points that occur to me with regard to the draft office circular:-

- (1) Paragraph 1 - and the draft extra question in the Report forms. Perhaps 'entrusted' rather than 'trusted' conveys the right shade of meaning.
- (2) Paragraph 3. 'evidence suggesting Communist associations ....' Is not this too narrow? I suggest 'subversive' for 'Communist'; or adding the words 'or other subversive' after 'Communist'.
- (3) I am not entirely happy about the latter part of paragraph 3. Is anything gained by having the descriptive clause beginning 'which might jeopardise .....'? I should be inclined to put a full-stop after '... failings of character'.

The list of character defects now seems to include having more than enough money as well as not having enough; and I do not know what deviations from regularity are implied by 'irregular sexual behaviour'.

One way of handling this would be to end the paragraph at '....failings of character' and quote as an Appendix the official P.V. criteria (as in pages 7 and 8 of Chapter IV of Manual attached).

- (4) Paragraph 4. I suppose that a circular like this must be thought to encourage talebearing. The only things you do not want to hear are (a) the trivial and (b) the malicious - and perhaps you even want the trivial reported in case it should turn out not to be so trivial after all, but a pointer. I think the first two sentences of paragraph 4 should be deleted or re-drafted.
- (5) I think B. is right in paragraph 3 of minute 177, but this might well be discussed further.

*G.R. Mitchell*

D.D.G.  
8.11.62.

G.R. Mitchell.

*Copied to 316-8-4*

179.

B.

D.D.G., you and I had a discussion about the draft at 176a, and minutes 177 and 178. I should be grateful if you would have a circular prepared, which I will sign, in the terms of the amended draft at 176a.

2. With reference to your minute 177, I confirm your understanding of the position as set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of that minute.

3. I also confirm your view expressed in paragraph 2 that it is now necessary to interview two character referees.

D.G.

*Rose 10/11/62*

26.11.62.

180.

Copied to 316-8-4

B.1. *7/29/63*  
B.2. *2/29/63*

*A brief discussion would be useful.*

Please see from minute 177 onwards. With the issue by the D.G. of the circular in the terms of the draft at 176a and with the amendment there referred to of our report forms, we shall have put ourselves in a position to review P.V. cases in accordance with the Treasury circular at 170a. In my personal view I think that it will in practice be found to be more convenient to review all our P.V. cases annually rather than, in the case of the over 21's, five-yearly, but on this I am open to argument.

*Insofar as time  
and concerned,  
I agree. J*

2. You will observe the ruling given in paragraph 2. of the D.G.'s minute 179. There will nevertheless be cases where I think it would be right to take up written P.V. references in the prescribed form and even to interview referees. It would certainly be sensible to do this in any case where we have reason to anticipate that we may have to produce a P.V. certificate.

*Certainly. J-*

3. You will also see the D.G.'s ruling in paragraph 3. of his same minute, which means that from the date of that minute we must interview two referees.

4. Until present stocks of the three staff report forms run out, the new question will be added in the form of a sticker (which is now being printed) and this will be fixed to the report forms in accordance with my note at 174a. Where an annual report is requested in the form of a loose minute, the reporting officer should be specifically asked the new question in the minute.

*Noted. J-*

*Amasnik*

B.

27.11.62.

181.

29.11.62 D.G. Circular No.222/Gen/62 : amendment of confidential 181a  
report forms with P.V. question.

182.

*Trans to 316-8-4  
Copied to 316-*

NOTE.

Reference minute 180, B., B.1. and B.2. met on 3.12.62. when it was agreed that we would review all our P.V. cases annually.

*Copied to 316-8-4*

B.1.  
4.12.62

*Deedes.*

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In addition to minute 182, it was agreed by B. at the meeting held on 3.12.62 that:-

- (i) The circular at 181a should be shown to all new Grade IIs on promotion, and to J.A.Os promoted from Grade III;
- (ii) Specific P.V. interview with the subject need not take place on P.V. review unless there is a special point to clear;
- (iii) A candidate may be offered a post before the two R.Is have been carried out (and therefore before the written P.V. references are received) provided all other conditions are satisfactory and it is not planned to post the candidate to particularly sensitive work.

B.2  
12.12.62

*C.S. Belding*

184

.1.63 Note re forms used for P.V. reference.

184a

185.

*Copied to 316-8-4*

3.1.63 History of P.V. Practice in M.I.5. - Women Staff.

185a

186

*Copied to 316*

15.2.63 Note re rejoiners filling in new Personal Particulars form

186a

187

5.2.63 Note for file

*Copied to 316-8-4*

187a

188.

6.5.63. Copy of Minute

188a

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189

B.

I should like to have your ruling on the details which should be included under paragraph 4 of the Security Questionnaire concerning foreign travel. There seems to me to a certain ambiguity here in that a visit to a country of the Commonwealth is not strictly speaking foreign travel but is, of course, a visit to a country outside the United Kingdom. I am anxious that our procedure with the women should be the same as that practised with the men, and I should like to know whether you want us invariably to include visits to Commonwealth countries as well as purely foreign countries, and whether visits to Eire should also be recorded.

B.2  
30.5.63

C.S. Helsby

4/6 LS on 26/6  
190.

B2 through B.1. 4/6

Ref. 189 the question asked in the Treasury form and must I think mean what it says viz that a record is needed of all visits made outside the UK that includes Eire, Commonwealth countries & purely foreign countries.

Dunbar

B. 4/6

191.

4.6.63

Copy of letter from Sir Laurence Helsby to P.U.Ss.  
on security & P.V.

191a

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D.G.

You may wish to have my comments on the two points made by Helsby in his letter dated 15 May last at 191a.

As to the first point we here are completely in line. Any derogatory information available to us which affects a member of our staff is recorded in his or her Record of Service and is taken into account when conducting a P.V. investigation and making a P.V. assessment. In particular such information is made available to the officer, now In B.1., who conducts personal interviews with referees.

In the second place decisions with regard to P.V. clearance are and have for some time past been formally recorded by me on the Minute Sheet of each Record of Service. If there is any doubt or question I make a record as recommended by Helsby. The only doubt in my mind is whether it is right that, except in cases, which for one reason or another arising out of the particular circumstances I refer to you, I should be carrying the whole responsibility for P.V. clearances. I am perfectly happy to do this but since we are exhorted to act in a formal way I think that perhaps you may wish formally to record the extent to which you wish to delegate your responsibility.

*Lammart*

B.  
14.6.63

193.

28.6.63.

Note of figures for annual return of P.V.

193a

194.

28.6.63

Draft letter to Cabinet Office enc: annual P.V. return.  
**Replaced by 196a.**

194a

195.


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D.G.

Please see at 194a a draft letter to Trend enclosing our annual return of Positive Vetting progress. This is in the form required by Brook's letter at 147a.

The disparity between the number of P.V. posts and the actual number of staff employed is largely

/accounted for



Minute  
195 contd.

*Copied to 316-8-3*

accounted for by the fact that in clerical and secretarial grades we are 140 under strength, in Officers and A.O.s 30 odd under strength, and in Class B. Officers (mainly A. Branch) 20 under strength. This situation is of course characteristic of this particular season of the year.

*Manavur*

B.

—  
28.6.63

196.

~~28.6.63. To Treasury with annual P.V. return.~~ *Trans to 316-8-3 196a*

197

Director General

1. You asked for my views on the third paragraph of Minute 192 and more generally on P.V. practice in the Security Service in the light of Minute 137.

(a) Minute 192 paragraph 3. The clear implication of Helsby's letter dated 15th May 1963 is that you should personally record clearance of senior staff but may delegate clearance of junior staff. The only question is where to draw the line. In my view the most sensible place to draw the line would be below officers and A.O.s. You would delegate to B, Officers Class B, ? translators, women Grades I, II and III and locals overseas.

(b) Minute 137 paragraph 2(a). I have not seen Minutes 65 and 71 but subject to any arguments they contain I cannot understand why A.4. should be excluded from P.V. They have constant access to some of the most important information in the Security Service and could blow almost every C.E. investigation we conduct.

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316-8-10*

2. No doubt the Russians seek to penetrate our institutions at as many points as they can but penetration of the Security Service (and, for that

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/matter ....

Minute 197 continued

matter, of the [redacted] ) is likely to be a high priority. They may seek to achieve their object by recruiting someone already on our staff but we ought to expect them to be attempting all the time to insert someone as a candidate with a view to long term penetration. An agent anywhere in the Service would obviously be useful to them but a male officer would be their first choice. Because our defences are already good, their problem will be difficult and they will know that they will not have any chance of success unless their operation is very carefully prepared.

3. We should assume:

- (a) that the Russians know in outline how we recruit and what enquiries we make;
- (b) that their agent may therefore reach or have reached us through normal recruiting channels;
- (c) that he will seem to have an impeccable background.


4. On these assumptions, I suggest that:

- (a) We should conform to the letter and spirit of Treasury instructions but should regard them as a minimum.
- (b) We should tackle the problem of penetration by a continuous process of investigation.

5. It may be thought that the assumptions on which these suggestions are based present us with an impossible task. Obviously weaknesses in a seemingly "impeccable background", built up by the Russians over a long period, will not easily be found. But we must try to do it and I doubt whether our present procedures are adequate. It is not simply a question of making more and more P.V. type enquiries.

6. [redacted] has a section, one of whose tasks is to carry out an investigation when an operation has gone wrong. We ought to have such a section containing staff with D. Branch, and ideally also with C. Branch, experience. The head of the section ought to have access to the personal files of staff.

/7. ....




Minute 197 continued

7. These investigations ought to be supplemented by open investigation of some members of the staff and of some candidates, going beyond the existing system of P.V. enquiries. Many, and probably the great majority of them, will require no further scrutiny. In the interests of recruitment we should probably accept candidates after P.V. of the present standard has been completed, leaving further enquiries (if any) to be completed during probation.

8. On the face of it, there would be much to be said for combining in one section under a Senior Officer the functions referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7. If that were done, it would be logical to add to them normal P.V. enquiries and perhaps physical and document security. A strong case could be made for having operational security investigations in D. Branch and, since the object of the exercise is to discover penetration agents, for having the other investigations also in D. Branch. An equally strong case on different grounds could be made for having any investigations about our staff controlled by B. Branch and it must seem wrong to divorce security from recruitment. The Security Branch is, in fact, divorced from the Establishments Branch in several Departments, e.g. the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Aviation and A.E.A., but the Security Service is much smaller and all of us are steeped in security the whole time. Bearing in mind the important question of morale involved in these proposals, the right solution might be to combine all the domestic security functions in one section under your direct personal control.

9. I fear this minute has gone beyond the scope of this file and may have touched on problems which have already been considered elsewhere.



E.

E.M. Furnival Jones

5th July 1963

198.

Trans to 316-8-4

9.7.63. Note by B.2.

198a

9.10.63. Notes on candidate who at one time was a member of C.N.D.

198b

199.

29.10.63. Note by B. re birth certificates.

Trans to 316-8-4

199a

200.

copied to 316-8-2  
" " 316-8-4  
" " 316-8-10

D.G.

We have conducted a further review of the state of P.V. in this Service with the following results. Except where the context shows you that I am able to be precise I must ask you to treat the figures as approximate.

A. MEN.

(i) In each of all but 14 cases we have on record 2 written P.V. references in the prescribed form. In each of all but 2 of the above cases at least two written references were obtained on joining. The 2 cases where there is no record of any references having been taken up are your own and that of Harry Stone, whom you cleared yourself.

(ii) There are still some cases, the number of which I do not know but it is, I am confident, now very small, where there is no evidence of a search in S.B./C.R.O.

(iii) No staff have completed the P.V. form, Estasec, the Security Questionnaire. They have all however completed our own Personal Particulars form plus a Supplementary Security Questionnaire. These two forms combined have since May/June 1961 covered precisely, and since the end of the war very nearly, the same ground as, and indeed in some respects rather more than, Estasec.

(iv) In all cases where men have joined since November, 1962, and in a number of other cases as well, two referees have been interviewed. If 2 referees are to be interviewed in the case of all staff, I estimate that about 250 interviews may have to be conducted, of which however a number will no doubt involve other members of the staff and will not therefore present a major problem.

/ B.....

Minute 200 contd.

Copied to 316-8-2  
 " " 316-8-4  
 " " 316-8-10

B. WOMEN.

(i) We have obtained 2 written P.V. references in the case of all staff who joined since May 1954 and of some who joined before that date. Additionally in the case of all staff, irrespective of the date of joining, at least two ordinary written references were obtained. The number of staff in respect of whom written P.V. references have not been obtained is believed to be something less than 170.

(ii) It is believed that all women staff have always been the subject of searches in S.B./C.R.O.

(iii) The same considerations affect women as are set out in A. (iii) above.

(iv) The same considerations affect women as are set out in A. (iv). I estimate that approximately 900 interviews would be called for, of which however rather a larger proportion than with the men might well be able to be conducted with other members of the staff.

2. The present situation is in my opinion pretty satisfactory in that all staff have been the subject of written references from at least two people, very nearly all have signed the equivalent of the Security Questionnaire and all have, with trifling exceptions been cleared in S.B./C.R.O. In addition substantially all the male staff have been the subject of two written references in the form prescribed for P.V., while in a substantial number of cases one or more referees have been directly interviewed either as part of, or in anticipation of, ATOMIC P.V. or in accordance with practice since November, 1962. In the case of women too a good deal of interviewing of referees, mostly within the office, is going on all the time, partly for the same reasons and partly in an attempt to get on record something about the domestic circumstances of some of the older and more retiring members of the staff.

3. (i) I believe you to be of the opinion that, in view of all that has transpired in the past year or two and having regard to the current climate of opinion, we ought in the case of all staff in a P.V. post to have on record two written P.V. references and that both referees should be interviewed. I believe you also to be of opinion that members of the staff of A.4., hitherto P.V.'d only to Stage II or in some cases to Stage III, should now be P.V.'d to full current standards, i.e. to Stage IV. If this is done a further 170 odd interviews will be required making, together with those involved in A. (iv) and B. (iv) above, a total of  $250 + 900 + 170 = 1,320$ .

/ (ii)....

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Minute 200 contd.

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" " 316-8-10

(ii) If action is taken as in 3. (i) above, I propose that simultaneously any discrepancies between the information currently called for in P.V. form Estasec. and that on record in an R.of S. should be resolved by the completion of our modern Personal Particulars Form together if necessary with a new Supplementary Security Questionnaire.

4. If you wish the steps proposed in paragraph 3. to be undertaken, I must have staff for the purpose. Establishment provision has been made in next year's B. Branch estimates for an additional full Officer, whose primary task would be the conduct of P.V. for all staff, and one additional Staff Officer to assist with field enquiries. I am already looking for a recruit for the latter post and you know my choice for the former. It is very important to choose the right men for such posts if Office morale and our external relations are not to suffer. In addition the interviewing of referees for A.4. staff will raise very difficult questions of cover and exceptional care will have to be taken not to cause any compromise. Given the staff required, I think that, subject to no new obligations being laid upon us, the backlog might be worked off in eighteen months to two years.

5. Finally I may make two points. The first is that we never engage anybody about whose reliability we are in any doubt and that, if subsequently a doubt arises, it is immediately investigated and if it is not resolved the individual in question is disposed of. It follows that I feel no compunction about allowing staff to join even though some P.V. formalities - in practice these will always be the interviewing of referees - are still outstanding. Arising from this my second point is that, particularly in the case of women recruits where quick decisions are necessary, we must be free to postpone the interviewing of referees, which is a relatively slow process, until after the candidate has started work if we are not to run the risk of losing her altogether.


*Vannaruk*

B.  
25.11.63.

10.12.63

Treasury circular letter on C.N.D. etc.

201a



202.

2.1.64. Quarterly statements of field enquiries carried out

202a

Trans to 316-8-3

203.

Copied to 316-8-2

B. Discussed with Mr. [initials] 2/1

I have filed at 202a three quarterly statements on the progress of field enquiries. These shew that while he maintains a steady output the backlog is gradually increasing. The short answer is that we must not delay in recruiting or coopting a second enquiry officer.

1 nym

C.J.H.Foulkes

B.1.

2.1.64.

204.

27.2.64. Analysis of review of Rs. of S. of female staff.

204a

Trans to 316-8-4

205.

19.3.64. From Treasury re return of P.V. figures.

205a

Trans to

316-8-3

24/3  
52/1 to see [initials] 25/3

206.

Copied to 316-8-10

We have discussed on a number of occasions the matters dealt with in your minute 200, but I see that I have not answered it on paper. I therefore confirm that you should proceed as set out in paragraph 3 of your minute. I recognise that this will require the additional staff to which you refer in paragraph 4. It has up to now proved impossible to make available to you the man whom you want, but I understand that the position in this respect may change. While I am sure that we should complete the full process as soon as we can, I have no fear that we are taking any unacceptable security risk as things are at present.

[Signature]

D.G.

20.3.64.

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5.3.64. Treasury letter re classification of forms.

206b

Trans to 316-8-2

207.

Trans to 316-8-3

9.4.64. Breakdown figures re P.V. interviews

207a

208.

Copied to 316-8-2

B.

Reference Minute 203. statistics for the first quarter of 1964 are now at 207a. These shew that he conducted a total of 338 interviews in the course of one year; making allowance for leave, public holidays, Saturdays and Sundays, this works out at an average of about 1 1/2 interviews a day. As just over half of them were outside the Metropolis this is pretty good going.

2. The last figures indicate that the backlog is building up and the need for an additional interviewer, about which we are doing the best we can, is pressing, but belief and mine is that once the backlog is worked off P.V. interviewing will not justify the employment of two Officers full time.

3. Meanwhile, the important thing from our point of view is that assures me that the backlog is not "getting him down" or "keeping him awake at night".

*C.J.H. Foulkes*  
C.J.H. Foulkes

B.1.

10.4.64.

*JB 1/16/64 209*

Copied to 316-8-2

*... copes very well indeed it would not wish him to lower his very high standards in his interest of reducing the backlog. The only satisfactory way to do this is to get another ... understand you have just heard of a good candidate. My view is that we shall always need to employ two such officers in our field - though not necessarily on interviewing exclusively. In any event compliance with min 206 will take at least 2 years*

*Mumarril*

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ACT 1958

13.4.64.

210. D.G. minute about use of E.93 on P.V. review. 210a

*Copied to 316-8-4*

B.1. *15/4*  
B.2. *16/4*

211.

*Copied to 316-8-2*

*A. will be able to make some constructive suggestions.*

Please see the D.G.'s minute at 210a. He has told me orally that he is not requiring us to use the Form E.93 on the original P.V., although it will of course be necessary to ensure that our P.P. form and the Supplementary Security Questionnaire continue between them to contain all that is in the E.93.

I am inclining to the view that when the new E.93 is available we ought in fact to use it ab initio. If we do this it will be necessary, in order to avoid needless duplication and possible irritation of candidates, to construct a much simpler P.P. form somewhat on the lines of the curriculum vitae supplied to us by such agencies as the University Appointments Boards and the Resettlement Bureau. This form will also include all the information which we need but which is not necessary for the E.93. When you have had an opportunity of considering this, may we please discuss.

*T. Amworth*

B.

14.4.64.

212.

*Trans to 316-8-2*

14.5.64.

Copy of Treasury letter re Normal Vetting.

212a

**FILE CLOSED**

CONFIDENTIAL

210a

B.

Please see the attached copy of a note I have addressed to F and C. We have in the past agreed that our original application form together with the additional form constitutes the equivalent of the Security Questionnaire. There is now to be an obligation upon all departments to get all their P.V. staff to fill up the new questionnaire on the quinquennial review of their P.V. clearance, and I do not think we can avoid coming into line. This will mean that we should make each member of the staff fill up the form for the next annual review after the new form is issued.

*Ray J. [unclear]*

D.G.

---

13.4.64.

CONFIDENTIAL

F.  
C.

Note.

With reference to 115a, Sir Laurence Helsby called an impressive meeting today which included Sir Charles Cunningham, Sir Henry Hardman, Sir Bernard Burrows, Mr. Philip Allen and myself, with John Hunt as Secretary.

2. We agreed that there was advantage in retaining the wording of Question 16 on the present E.93A. It was also agreed that the new version of E.93 should be filled up at all new quinquennial reviews but that we should not normally ask for character referees in the case of P.V. reviews. Apart from this the form should be filled up in full.

R. H. HOLLIS

D.C.

---

13.4.64.

For P.A. on S.F. 50/24/4(100)

Reference... Loose Minute  
201a

B. Ought we to take  
any action on this  
Circular

B.1./Miss Deedes

? HD. 19/12/63

I return herewith, as promised,  
one copy of the D.E.O. letter of 10th  
December, 1963. The other is filed in  
Pol.F.91-1-4.

B. Russell Jones

C.1.

B. Russell Jones

18th December, 1963

l. app. L.L. 19/12  
B1 20/12  
B2 20/12

I do not think the attached calls for  
any action on our part which we are not  
already taking. The necessary directive seems  
to me to be merely declaratory, so far  
as we are concerned, of existing practice

B. 20/12/63

B. Russell Jones



201a

Treasury Chambers  
Great George Street, London S.W.1  
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext.

Our reference: 2-EM 700/197/01

Your reference:

10th December, 1963

SECRET

Dear Establishment Officer,

The Security Significance of Membership  
of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament  
(C.N.D.) and the Committee of 100

Our D.E.O. letter of 16th July 1962 (2-EM.354/197/02) indicated the prevailing view on the security significance to be attached to membership of the C.N.D. and the Committee of 100. This matter has recently been examined in the light of the "Spies for Peace" campaign; and the threats to security posed by the various organisations broadly covered by the heading "unilateralists" and the policies and procedures for countering them have been reviewed.

2. In assessing the threat which these organisations present a distinction must be made between:-

- (a) "Spies for Peace" and the Committee of 100 which are now virtually indistinguishable; and
- (b) The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (C.N.D.).

3. The "Spies for Peace" campaign was originally directed by a small London group whose primary objective was to acquire and publish official information thought to show the State in an unfavourable light. This group, which is composed of elements from the Committee of 100 under Trotskyist and Anarchist leadership, now dominates the Committee from which for practical purposes it is indistinguishable. The Committee of 100 has recently changed its name to the "Committee of 100 Against Tyranny"; it must be regarded as a subversive organisation; although it does not owe allegiance to a foreign power its activities are prejudicial to the State. There would be a risk to security if a member or supporter of the Committee of 100 were to have access to classified information.

4. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is a much larger organisation of an amorphous nature, which enjoys the sympathy and support of many law-abiding citizens; it does not seek deliberately to break the law. Individual supporters of the C.N.D. may, however, be prepared to assist the Committee of 100. Sympathy with the C.N.D. moreover may give rise to strain upon the loyalties of persons in official employment with access to classified information. There is, therefore a potential risk to security in the employment of C.N.D. sympathisers in posts affording access to classified information.

/5. Ministers



201a

5. Ministers have therefore decided, in the interests of security:-

(a) Members of the Committee of 100, and persons who are known to be in contact with the Committee of 100 and who are engaged consistently in furthering their subversive programme should be excluded, or if already so engaged, removed from work to which security vetting applies;

(b) Current supporters of the C.N.D. should not be employed in P.V. posts unless the department is satisfied that, having regard to the nature of their sympathy for the C.N.D., it is acceptable that they should have access to the classified information which would become available to the holder of the post in question;

(c) Current support of the C.N.D. should be regarded as a relevant factor in assessing the suitability of employment in other posts with access to classified information.

6. To a considerable extent this policy can be carried out under existing procedures and arrangements thus:-

(a) The present P.V. criteria are broad enough to justify the exclusion or removal from P.V. posts of people who fall into categories (a) and (b) in paragraph 5 above.

(b) Where a Civil Servant breaks the law in furtherance of unilateralism his removal from classified work or dismissal from the Service becomes a disciplinary matter. (Members of the Armed Forces could be dealt with under normal Service codes).

(c) Where a Civil Servant employed on classified work is known to have unilateralist sympathies his department will in many cases be able to transfer him to unclassified work without revealing that this is being done for security reasons. (This could however be difficult to do in departments where nearly all the work is classified or if the Civil Servant were either Senior or a specialist).

(d) An alternative way of dealing with a Civil Servant employed on classified work who is known to have unilateralist sympathies is for his department to ask him openly whether he is able to reconcile his sympathies with his duties and, if this is judged appropriate, to transfer him to unclassified work with his agreement.

(e) Because the normal vetting process is covert applicants for employment on classified work who are known to be supporters of unilateralist organisations can, if judged appropriate, be refused employment without explanation.

7. Ministers have also agreed that the existing purge procedure should not at this stage be amended in order to cover Trotskyists and Anarchists; departments should therefore continue to rely on existing procedures or arrangements at least until Ministers decide that an extension of the purge procedure is essential and unavoidable.

8. Departments are asked to adopt the procedure outlined in paragraphs 5 and 6 above. Cases where it is not possible, by voluntary transfer or by current administrative means, to remove from classified work a civil servant who, by reason of his membership of, or support for, unilateralist organisations is adjudged a security risk, should be reported to the Treasury.

Yours sincerely,

A. J. Collier

A. J. Collier

STAFF PERSONAL

199A

Separate Minutes:

- B.1.
- B.2.

-----

We do not seem to have been consistent in requiring all members of the staff to produce to us a copy of his or her Birth Certificate. I think that this should be done in all cases and a copy made for inclusion in the Record of Service.

In the case of existing members of the staff we should check on the occasion of the annual P.V. review whether a Birth Certificate has been produced and, if it has not, a copy should be obtained through A.4.

B. J. H. Marriott

—  
29.10.63.

STAFF PERSONAL

Copy for: S.F. 50-24-4(120).  
Original in: L.436/4079.

Reference.....L.436/4079

198'

Loose Minute.

F.1

The subject of the attached file is an applicant for employment in this department. In para. 32 of the Application Form she mentions that she was a member of C.N.D. during her first year at Cambridge, which was 1960-61. I should be grateful for your views on continuing with this application. We have not yet interviewed the candidate but it seems probable that she will tell us that she has no further interest in C.N.D. affairs at the present time. I should be grateful for an urgent reply.

(signed)

B.2.  
8.10.63.

B.2/

Providing she is questioned about the possibility of strained loyalties in the defence field, I see no reason for not proceeding.

(signed)

F.1.  
9.10.63.

Copied by DMD/B.2. 26.11.63.

CODE 18-76

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Copy for S.F. 50/24/4(120)  
Original on S.F. 53/8/262. Rec'd 4/6/63

HD/H-2  
191a

Treasury Chambers,  
Great George Street,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

14th May, 1963

--- I attach a copy of a minute which I have received from the Prime Minister about security arrangements.

Will you please consider the matters to which he draws attention?

If when you review your security procedures you come across any problems or any need for further general changes which you think ought to be examined, I should be glad to have a talk or arrange a meeting.

Yours sincerely,

LAURENCE HELSBY

Letter to Permanent Secretaries dated 15.5.63(attached)  
copied for SF.310-4  
SF.310-5  
SF.50-12-123  
SF.50-24-35(66)  
L.494-131 (BENNITT)

HD/HWZ

191a

ADMIRALTY HOUSE,  
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

191a

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL  
MINUTE NO. M.187/63

CONFIDENTIAL

SIR LAURENCE HELSBY

The Radcliffe report on the Vassall case, and the subsequent debates in both Houses of Parliament, have broadly vindicated the standard of security in the public service. It is accepted that there is no question of our introducing any fundamentally different security system. | x

Many of the shortcomings to which the latest report has drawn attention were faults in the system which had already been improved after the Portland and Blake cases. But the Vassall case has again demonstrated that no security system will work satisfactorily unless there is constant vigilance on the part of those concerned with secret work. I should like you to ask all Departments, first, to satisfy themselves that their current rules and procedures take full account not only of the recommendations made in Lord Radcliffe's earlier report but also of the lessons that may be learned from the Vassall case; and, secondly, to do everything possible to ensure that everyone understands the need to make a determined and continuing effort to carry out security requirements.

H.M.

May 11, 1963

Copied  
to HST/S

CONFIDENTIAL

191a

[To Permanent Secretaries] 21/3/63.  
Treasury Chambers,  
Great George Street,  
London, S.W.1.

15th May, 1963

I am writing about two points on our positive vetting procedure.

First, P.V. is in essence an open process, unlike N.V. which is covert, and I think that all of us who have to deal with these things must keep that point in mind throughout. If the process is to be as thorough as it should be, all information that may conceivably have a bearing on a particular case must be brought out into the open. This is especially true at the fourth stage, for experience goes to show that field investigations cannot be expected to yield reliable results if information is withheld from the investigators because of some doubt about its relevance or its accuracy. Clearly the process is not being allowed to operate effectively if a man who has been cleared is later found to have homosexual tendencies or to be a heavy drinker, and several people then say that they had suspicions or misgivings about this although nothing of it had emerged at any stage of the P.V. investigation.

It is of course most distasteful to any of us to mention things about colleagues which may be false, trivial or irrelevant, and I certainly do not want to encourage irresponsible gossip. But I am sure that the investigators ought to be told about any suspicions there may be, even though they are thought to have no substance. Only so can groundless suspicions be eliminated and doubts satisfactorily cleared up.

I shall therefore be glad if you will bring this point to the attention of your senior staff, down to and including Assistant Secretaries, in whatever way and in whatever terms you think fit, so that they will have it in mind in briefing the field investigators and in answering their questions.

Secondly, the decision to give or withhold clearance on a P.V. case is important and should be recorded with some formality. Permanent Secretaries (and those given delegated authority to act on their behalf in dealing with junior staff) ought to record their decision clearly on the papers, and when any doubt or question arises on a case the reasons for the final decision

/should

191a

should be clearly on record too. This may seem obvious, but practice has been erratic and I think it is time we had a clear rule on the subject.

In the nature of things, we shall from time to time come across points of this sort on which our procedure can be improved within the existing framework. If any such occur to you, I shall be grateful if you will tell me of them.

Yours sincerely,

LAURENCE HELSBY



Reference Minute 55. Knowing how these boys fret, I have told [redacted] on the telephone that his increment is approved and his establishment confirmed but I shall not be able to give him his letter for a few days owing to "occupation with other business.

I have spoken to A. about [redacted] P.V. position and he is going to consult A.1 with a view to trying to ascertain whether there is anything more secret in what [redacted] does than what the rank and file in A.4. do. I think it likely that we shall be advised that [redacted] ought to be deemed to be in a P.V. category and that all the rest of A.4 staff should also be P.V.'d. A. tells me that according to C.1 a decision has been taken that all the Police are in future to be subjected to P.V., partially on the grounds that they have so much access to information from us [redacted] and if that is in fact the case I cannot see how A.4 can possibly be left out. C.1, however, tells me that this is not exactly the case, and that only certain categories of the Police are to be P.V.'d, details being obtainable from C.3 whom I shall consult at some time.

B.1.

C.J.H.Poulkes

6.5.63.

(The above minute copied to SF.50-24-4(120))

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187a

Copies for: [redacted]  
SF.50-24-4(120)✓

Note for R. of S. [redacted]

I have consulted B. in regard to the preparatory work done in [redacted] case leading up to the review of her P.V. position. B. feels that owing to [redacted] service under the Foreign Office in Warsaw (which service gave her a knowledge of Polish and fitted her for work as a translator here) there is nothing abnormal in her continuing to have a few correspondents in Poland. He thinks that a M.I.5. look-up on these people will be adequate

B.2.  
25th February, 1963.

GSW/JG

*Law*

*2/27  
1963*

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1862

Copy for SF. 50-24-4(120) and SF. 50-36-3  
of a note based on minutes 58 and 60 in

B. has directed that when a former member of the staff rejoins the Service she should complete a fresh Personal Particulars form, S. Form 49, as this form in conjunction with the supplementary Security Questionnaire equates with ESTAPLOY; the two should be reasonably contemporaneous.

2. B. has also directed that this ruling need not be applied retrospectively in regard to old cases except where there is manifest error in the original S. Form 49, e.g. when the form was not properly completed on the first occasion.

B.2  
15th February 1963

*C.S. Weldsmith*

CSW/RMF

*B2/NF  
15/2/63*

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1850

## HISTORY OF P.V. PRACTICE IN M.I.5.

## WOMEN STAFF

<u>DATE</u>		<u>SF.50-24-4(120)</u>
11.3.52	Treasury introduction of Security Questionnaire.	1a
5.4.52	Introduction of S.Q. in M.I.5.	11a
20.4.54	P.V. of staff in post; request for names of two referees.	D.G. 37a
May 1954	2 P.V. written references to be obtained for candidates.	B.Min.39, 41a
29.11.54	P.V. of staff in post. Review of files; interviews of staff, certain written references.	Mins. 44,45,46
March '57	D.G. directed that current screening procedure on candidates, i.e.:- M.I.5. look-up Interviews S.Q. S.B./C.R.O. look-up and C.C. enquiries 2 P.V. references constituted P.V. clearance to Stage IV, as did review of staff in post recruited between the end of the War and June 1954, and subsequent completion of S.Q., earlier joiners having either been covered by satisfactory knowledge or having been subjected to the procedure.	D.G. 63a Mins.64,65,77
1957	P.V. action taken in 1957 in regard to staff in post:- (i) Rs. of S. scrutinized for everyone joining before June 1950, for rejoiners, and for certain candidates joining after that date. Normal intake since that date was handled by present (1957) members of B.2. under the agreed procedure. (ii) Everyone joining before January 1946 was interviewed, where necessary references were obtained and documentation in Rs. of S. completed. (iii) Every case with matter of security interest referred to B. (iv) ATOMIC P.V. conducted separately, in every case the candidate and two referees were interviewed.	Mins.46,51,52, 81,87a,D.G.Min.77

82/4  
21/163

(v) Staff overseas: all Rs. of S. scrutinized. Women who joined before 1956 and who were overseas in 1957 were interviewed on their return to the U.K. S.L.O.s instructed to apply the procedure in regard to local recruits.

(vi) When scrutinizing Rs. of S. personal identification particulars and other necessary data were brought up to date, if necessary by interview with members of staff.

- 3.5.60 Treasury directed that C.R.O. look-up was necessary for P.V. clearance (already covered by M.I.5. request for S.B./C.R.O. look-up on candidates). 120a
- 6.7.61 D.G. ruled that Stage IV of P.V. was fulfilled by at least one R.I., or by one interview with, and statement taken from, a member of the Service sponsoring the applicant, the sponsor's knowledge of the candidate and an informed judgement that the case met the P.V. criteria being set down in black and white. 143a, Min.144.
- 3.5.62 B. directed that when P.V. procedure was complete on a candidate the case should be minuted to him for P.V. clearance. The necessary steps then were:- 159a.
- (i) M.I.5. look-up
  - (ii) S.B./C.R.O. look-up
  - (iii) 2 P.V. written references (one obtained at R.I.)
  - (iv) Security Questionnaire
  - (v) 1 R.I. or interview of sponsor.
- Points of security interest to be drawn to B.'s notice.
- 26.7.62. Treasury directive that on P.V. review (among other points already enumerated) it should be ascertained whether the candidate has at some time been held captive or interned in Communist hands. 170a
- 26.11.62 Consultation with supervisors to be covered by additional P.V. point for inclusion in Annual Reports. B.Min.177, D.G. Mins.179,180.
- 26.11.62 2 R.I.s obligatory. B.Min.177, D.G. Mins.179,180.

- 26.11.62 Original P.V. clearance to be regarded as having been validly given if it complied with the rules approved at the time, but there will be cases where it will be necessary on review to get written P.V. references or R.I.s. This will be necessary if there is likelihood of our having to produce a P.V. certificate. Min.180,D.G.,B.
- 3.12.62 Review of staff in post to take place annually (on receipt of reports).

## SPECIAL POINTS FOR ATTENTION WHEN SCRUTINIZING

Rs. of S. on P.V. REVIEW.

1. Personal identification particulars of parents, brothers and sisters, husbands or fiancés.
2. Husbands, and potential husbands if employment is to be continued:-
  - (i) M.I.5. look-up
  - (ii) S.B./C.R.O. look-up or S.B. report
  - (iii) C.C. report at discretion (N.B. does not obviate S.B./C.R.O. look-up)
  - (iv)
  - (v) Curriculum vitae, including place of employment, to be obtained by interview with the member of staff concerned.
3. Minutes to B. to ask for renewal of P.V. clearance drawing his attention to earlier P.V. clearance and points of security interest.

STAGES OF P.V.

- (i) M.I.5. look-up
- (ii) Completion of the Security Questionnaire
- (iii) 2 written P.V. references
- (iv) Field Investigation, i.e. 2 Referee Interviews.

B.2.  
3.1.63.

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SF.50-24-4(120)  
Reference  
Copy to: SF.50-36-3.

184a

B. has directed that when we apply for a P.V. reference from a referee who has not already supplied a written character reference, we should use the long P.V. form which we also use for Atomic P.V.

When a referee has already provided a written character reference the short P.V. form may be used whether it is sent through the post or whether it is completed at a Referee Interview.

B.2.  
2.7.63.

CSW/JG

*C.S. Wells*

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184a

Personal and Confidential.

ROOM 055,  
WAR OFFICE,  
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

.....

Dear Sir/Madam,

A short while ago you kindly answered my request for a reference for  
.....of.....  
.....  
who is under consideration for employment in this department.

You may be aware that in 1952 the Government introduced a special procedure for checking the reliability of their staff who may have access to exceptionally secret information (*see copy of Press statement of 8th January, 1952, enclosed herewith*). The post for which ..... is being considered comes within the terms of the new procedure, and I am therefore writing to ask you to be good enough to answer certain supplementary questions concerning her in order to assist the head of the department to determine whether she is a person who could be trusted with exceptionally secret information.

Accordingly I should be grateful if you would complete the report form overleaf to the best of your knowledge and belief, and return it to me at your earliest convenience.

Your reply will be treated as strictly confidential.

Yours faithfully,

J. H. MARRIOTT,  
*Head of Establishments.*



- 1.\* Have you reason to believe that the candidate is or has been a member of, or associated with, either the Communist Party or a Fascist organisation?
  
2. Is the candidate to the best of your knowledge free from pecuniary embarrassment?
  
3. Are you aware of any circumstances which would tend to disqualify the candidate from Government employment of a secret nature?
  
4. Are you related to the candidate? If so, what is the relationship?

Date..... Signature.....

\*The Government have decided that no one may be employed in Government Service in connection with work, the nature of which is vital to the security of the State, if he is believed to be:—

- (i) either a member of the Communist Party or a Fascist organisation,
- (ii) associated with either the Communist Party or a Fascist organisation in such a way as to raise legitimate doubts about his reliability.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.

1. Are you well acquainted with the candidate?

---

2. Over what period have you been well acquainted with, and in what capacity have you known the candidate?

---

3. Do you know the candidate to be strictly

(a) honest?

(b) sober?

(c) conscientious?

(d) of good character?

(e) discreet?

---

4. Is the candidate to the best of your knowledge free from pecuniary embarrassment?

---

\*5. Have you reason to believe that the candidate is or has been a member of, or associated with the Communist Party or a Fascist organisation?

---

6. Are you aware of any further circumstances which would tend to disqualify the candidate from Government employment of a secret nature?

---

7. Are you related to the candidate? If so, what is the relationship?

---

To the best of my belief, the above answers are correct.

Signature of Referee.....Date.....

---

\*The Government have decided that no one may be employed in Government Service in connection with work, the nature of which is vital to the security of the State, if he/she is believed to be —

(i) Either a member of the Communist Party or a Fascist organisation.

(ii) Associated with either the Communist Party or a Fascist organisation in such a way as to raise legitimate doubts about his/her reliability.



Copy to C.I.  
2/8.

Copy for P.F.50/24/4(120)

Treasury Chambers  
Great George Street, London S.W.1  
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext.

172a

1st August, 1962

Our reference: 2-EM.354/358/01

Your reference:

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 AUG 1962

Dear Establishment Officer,

Security Procedures in the Public Service - Cmnd 1681  
(Radcliffe Report)

Implementation of Recommendation in Chapter 5, Para. 78(e)

Check of Character Referees.

The Official Committee on Security has approved the following method of implementing the recommendation referred to above.

2. In regard to the Positive Vetting procedure the Radcliffe Committee recommended that "Investigating Officers should be under standing instructions to satisfy themselves of the bona fides of character referees [by enquiring of the local police authorities or other local sources of information or by asking for Normal Vetting to be undertaken, if this is thought necessary]."

(NOTE: The words in square brackets do not appear in the White Paper).

3. The current instructions to Investigating Officers say (Manual of Personnel Security Measures, Chapter IV, Annex 3) -

"6.... In making enquiries of character referees investigating Officers should be careful to discover whether they are well acquainted with the individual and are fit persons to express an opinion on his/her reliability. They should pursue their enquiries until they are satisfied that they have interviewed persons who meet these requirements.";

and

"12. Investigating Officers will be able to seek assistance from Police Forces under arrangements authorised by the Home Office and the Scottish Home Department. These arrangements are as follows -

(a) Investigating Officers may refer to the police on the question whether the individual and his referees and any other person to whom they may have occasion to refer in the course of their enquiries are persons of good character and reliability.

(b) Opinions expressed by the police will be based on information in their possession. The police will neither make special enquiries themselves nor participate in the investigations of Investigating Officers.

....."

4. Thus existing instructions require Investigating Officers to satisfy themselves that character referees are fit persons, and authorise them to make enquiries of the local police if this would be helpful. They are also, by implication, authorised to make other discreet local enquiries about referees if they think this desirable in order to establish that referees are fit persons to express an opinion; and they do this on occasion. But they are not at present clearly authorised to do so.

5. It has not been a regular practice to check referees against Security Service records, and the Radcliffe Committee themselves do not recommend that it should be; it should only be done "if this is thought necessary".

6. There are three circumstances which might make a check desirable -

(a) if the NV of the subject of the PV enquiry reveals that he is suspected of Communist association or sympathy, but the Department decides nevertheless to continue with the enquiry;

(b) if the referee himself discloses to the Investigating Officer, or leads the latter to suppose, that he has or had Communist associations or sympathies;

(c) if any enquiries of the local police or other local sources reveal that the referee has or has had Communist associations or sympathies.

Experience suggests that these circumstances will not arise very frequently.

7. In the circumstances at (a) above, it should be the responsibility of the employing Department to check the referees before the case is referred to the Investigating Officer. This could conveniently be done by including particulars of referees in the form E.81. If an adverse trace is revealed, the Security Service should be consulted about whether the referee should still be interviewed. The interviewing officer should be told that the check has been made and of the result, and given any special instructions that are required. If the referee, against whom there is an adverse trace, is not to be interviewed and a substitute is required, or if a third referee is to be interviewed in addition to the suspect referee, the interviewing officer should obtain the name etc. of this further referee in the course of his interview with the subject. This further referee should also be checked by the Department. The subject should not be told the reason why an additional referee is required. If possible some other reason (e.g., inconvenience and delay in travelling to see the original referee) should be given.

8. In the circumstances at paragraph 6(b) and (c) above, the Investigating Officer should report his findings forthwith to the Department carrying out the PV and await instructions. The Department should, if they judge it to be necessary, carry out a check of the referee, explaining the full facts to the Security Service and then proceed as in paragraph 7. But Departments should realise that checks of referees, which will almost invariably be based on incomplete personal details, will inevitably give rise to delays while doubts as to identity are being investigated at the expense of other business. They should only ask for a check to be made if its result is likely to be a material factor in the PV enquiry. Requests for checks should invariably be made by letter and not in a vetting form.

9. To meet this recommendation the instructions to Investigating Officers must now be amended. Paragraph 6 of Chapter IV, Annex 3 of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures should be replaced by the following three paragraphs:-

"6A. The Investigating Officer should interview character referees and should be careful to discover whether they are well acquainted with the individual and are fit persons to express an opinion on his/her reliability. If the Investigating Officer is uncertain about the referee's fitness to express such an opinion, he may seek the assistance of the local police on this matter (see paragraph 12 below) and may make such other discreet local enquiries as may help to establish whether or not the referee is a person of good character and reliability. If, in the course of interviewing a character referee and of any limited enquiries about him that may be made, the Investigating Officer acquires information which suggests that the referee has or has had Communist associations or tendencies, he should report the facts to the Department forthwith.

6B. Interviews may also be held with present or previous employer(s), university dons or school-masters, police officers and such other persons as may be able to assist the investigation.

6C. Investigating Officers should pursue their enquiries until they are satisfied that they have interviewed persons who are both well acquainted with the individual and are fit persons to express an opinion on his/her reliability."

10. Additional paragraphs 6 and 7 should be inserted at the end of Annex 4 (Instructions relating to Referees) of Chapter IV of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures, as follows:-

"6. If the Security Service check of the subject of the Positive Vetting enquiry has revealed that he has or has had Communist associations or sympathies, and the Department decides nevertheless to proceed with the case, the Department should also check his referees with the Security Service. They should use for this purpose only such personal details about the referees as are readily available and should not seek to acquire any additional details from the subject or the referees. The Security Service should be informed of the reason for the checks and, if the checks reveal information adverse to the referee(s), should be consulted about the acceptability of the referee(s) and about any special instructions which should be issued to the Investigating Officer conducting the background enquiry (see paragraph 4, page 17, Chapter IV, M.P.S.M.). When referees are checked in this way, the Investigating Officer should be told that this has been done and of the results.

7. Departments may also ask the Security Service to check a referee if the Investigating Officer conducting an enquiry acquires and reports any information suggesting that the referee has or has had Communist associations or sympathies."

Yours sincerely,

(A. J. PLATT)

FRONT

CONFIDENTIAL

RETURN OF P.V. POSTS AS AT 30th JUNE 19

DEPARTMENT: .....

	Government Service	Industry
	<u>EXAMPLE</u>	
* A. Total number of posts	- [1,000]	
* B. Number of staff at present in post who have been cleared as follows:-		
(i) to Stage 4 -	- [ 900]	
(ii) to Stage 3 -	- [ 20]	
* C. Number of posts for which staff are in the process of being P.V'd and whose cases are:		
(i) in preparation for field enquiries -	[40] -	
(ii) with investigating authority -	[20] -	
(iii) awaiting final clearance certificate -	[ 8] -	
(iv) not yet cleared for any other reason -	[ 2] [ 70]	
* D. Number of unfilled posts for which no clearance action is at present in progress	- [ 10]	
	<u>[1,000]</u>	

A brief note should be given to explain appreciable changes in previous figures.

\* See explanatory notes overleaf.

REVERSE SIDE

CONFIDENTIAL

EXPLANATORY NOTES

- - The total number of posts the holders of which require to be positively vetted.
- - The number of holders of P.V. posts for whom a final clearance certificate has been issued after
  - (i) Stage 4 i.e. field investigation and
  - (ii) (exceptionally) Stage 3 i.e. paper enquiries
- - (i) The number of cases for which the paper work (Stage 3) is still in progress
  - (ii) The number of cases for which Stage 3 has been completed and which have been sent for field enquiries
  - (iii) Cases which have been completed to Stage 4 but have not yet been examined and assessed by the parent Department
  - (iv) All cases not completed for reasons other than those in (i) to (iii) above (e.g. those which have been examined but for various reasons cannot yet be cleared).
- - These refer to vacant P.V. posts for which no candidate is available.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

1620

Note for SF.50-24-4(120)

B. suggests that as much of our Positive Vetting procedure constitutes a Field Enquiry we should not use this expression in relation to the interview of a referee. I suggest that in future we should refer to this element of Stage IV as "Referee Interview".

21st May, 1962.  
CSW/JC

*C.S. Weldsmith*

REGIMITE  
(32)  
JC&SLtd  
Gp782/39  
Code 18-76

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12/90



It has been agreed by B. that when P.V. stages I - IV have been completed in regard to a candidate or newly joined member of the staff, a minute should be addressed to him on the Record of Service drawing attention to the satisfactory completion of the various steps necessary, and recommending that P.V. clearance be given.

2. The necessary P.V. steps are as follows:-

- (i) M.I.5. look-up
- (ii) S.B./C.R.O. look-up
- (iii) Two Positive Vetting references.
- (iv) Security Questionnaire.
- (v) Field Enquiry or interview of sponsor.

B. agrees that it is not necessary to enumerate these steps individually, but his attention should be called to the place in the file where a record of these steps is to be found. This will normally be in the B.M. at 1a of the Record of Service.

3. B.'s attention should be drawn to any point of security interest which has arisen at interview or in references.

4. I should like you to address your minutes to B. through B.2.

B.2.  
3 May, 1962.

*C.S. Kelly-Smith*

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*164  
3/5/62*

157a

B2 22/2

B.1

*M. Com. Pt. 50. 24. 4 (120) f. 18/1/62.*

I share Mr. Simkin's view that to apply a criminal record check to the spouse of any person having or about to have access is wrong. It is also in my view unnecessary.

2. I agree too that the spouse of a vetted person does not fall into a vettable category. The check of a spouse against security records is justified because its result may pose a doubt as to whether the partner should continue to enjoy access to classified matter. It is only the latter's security standing in which we are interested. In my view if the spouse has a criminal record or for that matter any other "character defect", the chance of consequential taint in the principal is so remote as to be discounted.

C.3  
27.2.62

*H.H. Potter*  
H.H. Potter

*B/alt  
5/3/62*

B.1, through C.3.

It can be argued that if a criminal record check is to be part of normal vetting for access to classified defence information it should be applied to the people covered by the extended record check.

2. But I don't think this is right. We did not propose that a criminal record check of spouses should be part of normal vetting, or positive vetting, and Ministers certainly never considered the point. They were extremely sensitive about the consequences of a criminal record check on the candidate, and would presumably be even more so about such a check on a spouse, or fiancé/e.

3. I think therefore that the proviso in para.3 of your minute of February 22nd is important.

*C.A.G. Simkins*

C.1.  
26.2.62

C.A.G. Simkins.

STAFF : PERSONAL

Reference...Loose Minute.....

B.1. through C.A.

I think what you propose is a desirable precaution and that if necessary the Treasury letters which you quote can be interpreted as sanctioning it.

2. I do not think we should go so far as to advocate that other Departments should follow suit, although I suspect some of them are already doing so.

3. If you would forgive a technical quibble I think we should prefer to describe the check of spouses in Security Service and Criminal Records as part of the process of vetting, normally or positively, ~~of~~ the other partner who has access to classified information.

4. As you probably realise the yellow form you employ asks for checks in certain other records as well as in Criminal Records. A C.R.O. check would normally be confined to a check in that office.

*B Russell Jones*

B. Russell Jones

C.1.  
23.2.62.

STAFF : PERSONAL

**STAFF PERSONAL**

Mr. Russell Jones  
C.1.

I enclose a copy of a minute which sets out the point about which I consulted you on the telephone yesterday.

2. The serials I quote are as follows:

120a - Treasury letter EG.160/011 of 3.5.60.


121a - Yellow form, sample attached.

127a - Treasury letter 2-EG.66/02 of 29.7.60.

3. I think my proposal is a desirable precaution where our own staff are concerned and I do not think it can be held to be objectionable provided anything turned up by Special Branch is not mishandled. You may care to look at the proposition from a wider point of view.

4. Will you please return these papers to me.

B.1.  
22.2.62.

  
C.J.H. Foulkes

Please return under cover to the <sup>Mr F.</sup> Lady Superintendent.

URGENT.

Box No. 500,  
Parliament Street B.O.,  
London, S.W. 1

Date.....

To THE COMMANDER,  
SPECIAL BRANCH.

The person whose particulars are given below is being considered for employment in this Office, and it would be greatly appreciated if any detrimental information concerning him/her which may be contained in C.R.O. or S.B. records, in the General Registry, or in Police Knowledge, could be furnished overleaf

Surname.....

Christian Names.....

Nationality .....

Date of Birth..... Place of Birth.....

Permanent address.....  
.....

Present address if different .....

Occupation.....  
.....

[P.T.O.]

Father :

Mother :

Husband/Wife :

M.I.5 Reference.....

---

To M.I.5.

No Trace in S.B. Records.

No Trace in C.R.O. Records.

No Trace in General Registry.

Date..... Signed.....

Summary of available information :

156.

B.2.

The matrimonial cases of RS.1718 and RS.4120 (on each of which I have minuted you) make me think that there is a lacuna in our fiancé/e vetting procedure.

2. A criminal record check is an integral part of P.V. (120a) and the yellow form (121a) is used for the purpose. It is in fact also an essential part of N.V. (127a) for certain classes of person. Such a check is made on all our staff.

3. By marrying a member of our staff in the P.V. category the spouse does not quite enter that category, but does in fact enter the N.V. category, though without necessarily having access to classified defence information.

4. If that does not seem sufficient cause for making the S.B. look-up on fiancé/es, in addition to local police enquiries where needed, I think the proposition may be looked at this way: when a candidate is looked up in S.B. particulars are also given of the spouse/...



Minute 156 (continued)

spouse (if there is one) as well as of the parents;  
when, therefore, a member of the staff acquires a spouse  
that person should be looked up in S.B. - in the fiancé/e  
stage.

B.1.


21.2.62.

C.J.H. FOULKES

C.J.H. Foulkes

Copied to 149H  
316-8-10NOTE

I have made an analysis attached of the vetting position of the 9 part time male translators who were on our books on 10.7.61 when we agreed that it should be examined. The date in the first column is the date at which we first got in touch with them. They were all introduced by reputable persons.



5. The remainder are all still currently used from time to time.

6. I have discussed the duties of these 9 men with [redacted]. He knew nothing of [redacted] with whom we had lost touch before [redacted] took control of the translators, and nothing of [redacted] except that he was accessible if needed. The other 7 confine their activities entirely to doing written translations.

None is known ever to have done [redacted] but [redacted] was once used for [redacted]

7. Looked at from a P.V. standpoint, the vetting position of these 9 men leaves a good deal to be desired and none can be said to have been P.V'd to Stage 4. However, I do not think that need worry us because it can hardly be said that they are employed in posts "in which the duties require regular and constant access to TOP SECRET information or material." The fact that letters are intercepted must be widely known, and provision is made for the process in the Post Office Act. The additional fact that they know they work for the Security Service hardly brings them within the scope of P.V. Many people in official employment who are not in a P.V. category know that we are the Security Service and where we work, and many more not in official employment must be presumed to know the same.

8. With your approval I shall leave these 9 cases undisturbed and I think we may regard all such occasional translators as outside the P.V. category. We ought, of course, to be careful in future to ensure that

we/...

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we can produce tangible evidence of having had personal particulars forms, O.S.A. declarations and Supplementary Security Questionnaires completed, and of having taken up two personal references and made a police enquiry as well as a check in R.2.

*C. J. H. Foulkes*

B.1.

C.J.H.Foulkes

29.8.61.

P.S. Occasional translators engaged to cover "constitutional conferences", such for example as the Luganda speaker I am now trying to find, will be in a different category and ought to be P.V'd in spite of the fact that they may only be used for a few weeks.

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147X

18/0/02.

B. h. 17/8

C.1 has shown me the enclosed copy of  
 Min B1 - your minute of 1.6.61 to the D.G. on the subject of  
 P.V. procedure operated by this Service (returned  
 herewith).

I am glad to have had the opportunity to  
 see this, and have these comments to make:-

Paragraph 3.

Is your statement that "Stage IV is not  
 obligatory in normal P.V." strictly accurate?  
 Chapter IV of the "Manual of Personnel Security  
 Measures" admittedly states in Annex 1, paragraph 2  
 (page 6), that it is difficult to lay down hard and  
 fast rules about the application of Stage IV. It  
 does however stress the importance of carrying out  
 full enquiries in all cases except those where there  
 is "real personal knowledge of the individual who is  
 being vetted", and it clearly regards such cases of  
 "real personal knowledge" as exceptional. We have  
 recently supported this view in the Personnel Security  
 Committee.

Paragraph 5.

I agree of course with the passage marked  
 X. Generally speaking, however, it cannot apply to  
 staff outside office hours, or during prolonged  
 periods of service abroad.

*J. C. Robertson*

J. C. Robertson.

C.  
 17.8.61.

145a

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✓ B.

We discussed your loose minute of 4th July. In my view the "field" element of Stage IV is fulfilled if we have a statement from a member of our staff, a trusted sponsor or some other person who is aware that we are the Security Service, that he knows the candidate and can make an informed judgement that his case meets the P.V. criteria. I accept your view at the end of your second paragraph that any statement by a member of this Service that a candidate is suitable implies all this, but I think nevertheless that it should be spelt out and that the precise question should be put when you are making an enquiry about a candidate.

2. If you cannot get such an assurance, then I agree with your suggestion that we should interview personally at least one referee or sponsor.

*Roger [unclear]*

D.G.

6.7.61.

STAFF PERSONAL

143a

D.G.

With reference to your draft minute attached to S.F.50-24-4(120), I attach the Records of Service of three recently joined officers and three recently joined girls and should be grateful for your instructions as to what additional action, if any, you envisage that compliance with your minute would have involved in each case.

In my submission we do already compile the equivalent of a field investigator's report in the shape of the first interview report on each candidate, male and female, supplemented by the recommendation of the sponsor, if there is one, and by the written replies from the referees, and since, unlike A.E.A. for example, all this information is always contained in one file I cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by placing on the same file yet another report setting out all the information which is already there. I am prepared to concede that in this context we are obliged to pay some regard to the form as well as to the substance and for this reason I think that such apprehensions as I know you feel about what outsiders might think about the way we do things would be better allayed by our making it a general rule to interview at least one referee or sponsor personally, unless, which in recent years has so often been the case with officers, there are already in the Service other officers who know him well and, although not quoted by him as referees, can be directly questioned about him, e.g. in the case of [redacted] whose respectability was vouched for by [redacted] and [redacted]. In this connection I think it proper to make the point that a statement by any member of this Service that a candidate is suitable for employment here would by any reasonable observer be taken to imply, without it being spelt out in so many words, that the sponsor is unaware of any respect in which the candidate offends against the P.V. criteria for suitability.

There may also be other cases where in my view any reasonable person would regard a personal interview with a referee as a complete waste of time, e.g. [redacted] who was initially recommended by A.C.A.S.(I) himself and was vouched for by, amongst others, a serving Air Chief Marshal in a reference which dealt categorically with the necessary points and which on its face the writer was clearly in a position to give with a proper understanding of what was involved.

Finally, on officers, you will see from the case of [redacted] that, when exceptionally a candidate comes from an unknown stable, we have not hesitated to interview a referee and of course would not so hesitate in future.

*11/11/61*

B.  
4.7.61.

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STAFF PERSONAL

B.

With reference to your minute 137, I think we must follow the following procedure. When a candidate, male or female, is approved for employment, B.Branch should compile the equivalent of a field investigator's report about the candidate and his family background. This can be done where possible by questioning trusted sponsors, members of the staff, or others whom we know and who know the candidate. In these cases enquiries may be made on the telephone.

2. If B.Branch is unable to compile an adequate report from such sources, a normal P.V. field investigation must be carried out.



136X

~~S. Sch 116~~  
~~B.~~  
~~B.1.~~

The attached papers show why I thought that our position with regard to Stage IV had been cleared with Sir Norman Brook. I should probably have realised that B.1's statement quoted in para.2 of minute 1022 ~~was~~ made for tactical reasons.

might have been

Simkins

C.1.  
1.6.61

C.A.G. Simkins.

Atts.

P.A. on S.F. 50/24/4(120)

300

Secretariat through C.1.

Please see 296a, in particular the passage side-lined on the second page. This requires us to make a return to G.C.H.Q. which I am afraid I have overlooked. However I discovered at today's meeting of the Committee that few departments have yet complied.

2. I shall be grateful if, in consultation with B. Branch, you would either let me have the information required or, if you prefer it, reply direct to G.C.H.Q. yourself.
3. Our return should probably be on a separate file in any event.
4. You will see from these papers that we have supported the suggestion that P.V. for access to Category III Comint should be mandatory. We have however opposed, and will continue to oppose, G.C.H.Q.'s suggestion that Stage IV of P.V. (field enquiries) should be mandatory.

C.1.  
31st March, 1960.

Signed R.C. Symonds

301

1022.

(Copy on SF 223-2-1) Original in SF 223-2 Supp.A.

C.1.

With reference to your minute at 1017b, the answers to the two questions posed by the Chairman in the extract at 985b are:

(a) nil.

(b) nil.

2. I have discussed this question with B.1. who tells me that by agreement between the Director General and Sir Norman Brook it was agreed that the enquiries made by this office about members of the staff, both men and women, before they are accepted for employment count as field enquiries and as P.V. clearance up to and including Stage IV.

3. I think it best if you yourself pass this information to the Secretary of the Security Committee.

Secretariat  
5.4.60

Signed H.I. Lee

Copy of para. 4 of Min. 308 in SF 223-2-1 <sup>136x</sup>

308.

C.

.....

4. I agree with Mr. Symonds' advice in Minute 306, viz: that we should encourage \_\_\_\_\_ to put up a case for making P.V. a requirement for any access to Category III Comint, but should advise him not to make a general issue about including Stage IV. In connection with the last point, I draw your attention to the note \_\_\_\_\_ in the appendix at 303a: \* no doubt they regard their recruiting procedure as equivalent to Stage IV, as we do ourselves (see minute 301).

C.1.  
10.5.60

Signed G.A.G. Simkins.

\* This reads \_\_\_\_\_ |..... (i) owing to nature of activities Stage 4 is not carried out.

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S30190 Wt.55449-7600 200M 3/58 Gp.789 F. & C. Ltd.

131x

S. Form 81/rev. 12.53

EXTRACT

Extract for File No. : ..... Name : .....

Original in File No. : \* SF 223-2-1 ..... Vol. : 4 Serial : 303a Receipt Date : 22.4.60

Original from : G.C.H.Q. ..... Under Ref. : R/0893/341/2 ..... Dated : 21.3.60

Extracted on : 31.5.61 ..... by : C.V.C. ..... Section : C.1.

Extract from Appendix to R/0893/341/2

\*If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner.

Depart.	A. Total No. of Cat. III Indoctrinees	C. No. P.Vd but not to Stage	D. P.Vd to Stage 4 (Balance of B & C over A)	Remarks
[Redacted]	677	677 (i)	NIL (i)	(i) Owing to nature of activities Stage 4 is not carried out.

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308.

C.

.....

4. I agree with Mr. Symonds' advice in Minute 306, viz: that we should encourage [redacted] to put up a case for making P.V. a requirement for any access to Category III Comint, but should advise him not to make a general issue about including Stage IV. In connection with the last point, I draw your attention to the note [redacted] in the appendix at 303a: no doubt they regard their recruiting procedure as equivalent to Stage IV, as we do ourselves (see minute 301).

C.1.  
10.5.60

Signed C.A.G. Simkins.

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301

1022.

(Copy on SF 223-2-1) Original in SF 223-2 Supp.A.

C.1.

With reference to your minute at 1017b, the answers to the two questions posed by the Chairman in the extract at 985b are:

(a) nil.

(b) nil.

2. I have discussed this question with B.1. who tells me that by agreement between the Director General and Sir Norman Brook it was agreed that the enquiries made by this office about members of the staff, both men and women, before they are accepted for employment count as field enquiries and as P.V. clearance up to and including Stage IV.

3. I think it best if you yourself pass this information to the Secretary of the Security Committee.

Secretariat  
5.4.60

Signed H.I. Lee

133a.

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B1 might  
wife free.

1280

B.1/Miss Deedes

You said you thought B. Branch  
would like two copies of this letter.  
A copy is also is in SF.53-12-89.(Security  
Education in Govt. Depts. etc).

C.1.  
3.11.60.



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128a  
Treasury Chambers  
Great George Street, London S.W.1  
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext.

Our reference: E.G.66/310/01

Your reference:

1st November, 1960

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Establishment Officer,

Security Education

The instructions on positive vetting - Annex I Chapter IV of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures - contain no reference to security education. The Security Service have drawn attention to this omission, and have pointed out that security education is of fundamental importance in protective security and that it is logical that personnel having regular and constant access to TOP SECRET defence information should be given an explanation of their security responsibilities. This requirement is already included in the instructions governing the vetting of personnel having access to classified Atomic information - paragraph 7 appendix to Chapter V of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures.

The Personnel Security Committee recently discussed this matter. Whilst agreeing that there was probably a need for the wider dissemination of security education to all positively vetted personnel, the Committee decided that this was not a matter on which it was appropriate to issue mandatory


/instructions,

The Establishment Officer

instructions, and that the extent and method used in providing security education could best be left to departmental discretion.

The Committee therefore invited the Treasury to remind Departments of the need to provide security education for positively vetted staff, and of the readiness of the Security Service to furnish Departments with a model for security notes, setting out the essentials of security behaviour within and outside the office.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'J.P. [unclear]', written in a cursive style. The signature is positioned below the typed text 'Yours sincerely,'.

**SECRET**

Reference... Loose Minute... 127a


Copy on SF.310-31

B.1. ✓  
1978

17 AUG 1960

SF.50/244(120)

I attach for your own file a copy of a Treasury letter to Establishment Officers which deals with the extended use of criminal record checks in normal vetting and also with the action to be taken where there is a risk that an individual, who is being dismissed or transferred, will discover that the reason is the existence of a criminal record against him.

  
J.A. Allen.

C.1.  
16.8.60.

**SECRET**



## TREASURY CHAMBERS

Great George Street, London S.W.1

Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext.

Our reference: 2-E.G.66/02

Your reference:

29th July, 1960

SECRET

Dear Establishment Officer,

Further to my SECRET letter of 3rd May, 1960, the Ministerial Committee on Security have now decided that a criminal record check should be made as part of normal vetting for all staff who have access to classified defence information.

2. A phased plan for the gradual extension of criminal record checks in normal vetting over the whole defence field is being worked out, but this will take some time and as a first step it is necessary (where it is not already being done) to include a criminal record check in normal vetting for the following limited categories:-

- (i) staff employed on signals intelligence work - including those already in post;
- (ii) cypher operators other than those employed solely in the use of tactical cryptosystems (a C.R.O. check on cypher operators already in post is left to departmental discretion);
- (iii) consultants who have access to SECRET or TOP SECRET information or material.

3. The Ministerial Committee has also ruled that for the time being the Official Committee on Security should consider all cases in which departments recommend dismissal, transfer to other work, or denial of employment to individuals on the grounds of criminal records discovered during normal vetting. This means that before overt action is taken the Treasury should be informed of any case where there is a serious risk of it becoming known to the individual concerned that the discovery of his criminal record was the reason for his dismissal or transfer.

4. Any reports made in accordance with paragraph 3 above and any enquiries should be addressed to Mr. W.G. Angle, Extension 174.

Yours sincerely,

J.J.S. Shaw

(J.J.S. SHAW)

The Establishment Officer

Tel. No.: Whitehall 1234, Ext.....



Your Reference .....

Treasury Reference E. G. 160/011.....



TREASURY CHAMBERS

GREAT GEORGE STREET

LONDON, S.W.1

120A  
2  
319A

3rd May, 1960

SECRET

Recd. 12. Jul. 1960

Dear Establishment Officer,

The security vetting of persons with access to Atomic information classified as Confidential or above for Civil Departments, and Secret and above for Defence Departments, has always included a criminal record check. Apart from this, criminal record checks have been made on a selective basis only - mainly at the discretion of Departments. Such checks are made widely, but not invariably, in positive vetting: in normal vetting they are made only in relation to a few small categories of personnel.

The Personnel Security Committee has now decided that a criminal record check should always be made as part of positive vetting. Would you please arrange for this to be done.

Future cases should not cause any particular difficulty. But past cases which have already been cleared can only be checked gradually as otherwise the Criminal Record Office would be overloaded. I should be grateful therefore if you would consult the Criminal Record Office as to how this backlog can best be cleared.

The Committee also decided that there might be good reasons for special security precautions in relation to certain posts abroad which are not already subject to positive vetting. Personnel posted abroad may be more likely to fall into bad habits when out of their normal environment; and they may be more easily approached by the agents of foreign powers with a view to subornation or blackmail. Departments may therefore, in future, having regard to the conditions in the country concerned, include in the positive vetting field staff employed or seconded abroad who would not otherwise be subject to positive vetting.

Yours sincerely,

J. J. S. Shaw

J. J. S. SHAW

The Establishment Officer.

# BRANCH MEMORANDA (B.M.) COVER

110a

UNREGISTERED

REFERENCE NUMBER OF ORIGINATING BRANCH <b>SF. 50-24-4(120)/B.1.</b>	SUBJECT HOME OFFICE CIRCULAR RE CRIMINAL RECORD CHECK.
<p style="color: red; font-size: small;">If this number is quoted in correspondence sent outside the War Office, "M.I.5" must not be appended nor any reference made to M.I.5.</p>	

The existence and movements of this B.M. are NOT recorded by Registry.

**IMPORTANT NOTICE.**

If this B.M. has to be minuted to another branch, it must be converted into a Registered File unless used as a B.M. Enclosure to an existing Registered File.

A telephone request to the nearest branch of 'R' will suffice immediately to produce a registered jacket.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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S. Form 288B

## FILE HELD BY

B

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File for P.A. and Transit Slips	} To be sent to the above Section
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Min. 5

M. Allen  
Col  
13.10.53

B.T  
PA. 50.24. 4(120)  
16.10.53

1.

2.10.59 Minute from C.1. re Criminal Record Check (Home Office) 1a

2.

2.10.59 To Home Office re 1a - returning forms. 2a

3.

Non.

From Dave 6.10.59. In view  
of the W.P. in m 14.10.59.  
He is to come in me to be kept.

*Stam*

B.1  
6.10.59

4.

6.10.59 Reply from Home Office re 2a 4a

5.

Thank you  
M: Ann JAA 13/10  
C.1.

At stake. Please return this to me.

*Stam*

B.1  
13.10.59





4a  
HOME OFFICE

Whitehall, London S.W.1

Telephone: Whitehall 8100 Ext. 73

Our reference: POL 421/1/30  
Your reference: SF.50-24-4(120)B1.

5th October, 1959.

*Fin.*  
*7/6/10*  
Dear Foulkes,

Thank you for your letter of 2nd October, enclosing the completed questionnaire about criminal record checks. I think this gives us all we need to know.

Yours sincerely,

*Erden Reed*

C.J.H. Foulkes, Esq.

Reference Loose Minute / A

*Hsa*

B.1/Mr. Foulkes *J 2/10.*

Reference our telephone conversation yesterday.

2. I attach a copy of the form which the Working Party is asking departments to complete together with the Chairman's explanatory letter. I should be grateful if you could complete the form, so far as it is possible to do so for this Service, and send it as soon as possible to G.Rudd at the Home Office.

*D. C. Driver*  
D.C. Driver.

C. 1.  
2.10.59.

SECRET

POL 421/1/30  
Whitehall 8100  
Ext. 73

HOME OFFICE,  
WHITEHALL,  
S.W.1.

26th August, 1959.

Dear

The Personnel Security Committee have appointed a Working Party, of which I am Chairman, to consider whether there should be a greater use of criminal record checks in personnel security enquiries. The Working Party are required to give priority to the positive vetting field; but we have also to consider the field of normal vetting, and to say whether there is scope for limited extensions of the criminal record check to areas in that field where risks, if character defects are overlooked, may be particularly serious. We are required to estimate the additional burden on the Criminal Record Office, and on the Establishment Divisions of Departments, that our recommendations would impose.

2 The first task of the Working Party is to find out to what extent the positive vetting field is not all ready covered; and what the burden of covering it would amount to. Would you please be good enough, therefore, to complete questions 1 and 2 in the attached form, and to say in a covering letter whether you think that criminal record checks should be carried out for some or all of the categories in the positive vetting field that are not all ready covered?

3 Our second task is to find out how far criminal record checks are all ready carried out in the normal vetting field. This is covered by questions 3 and 4 in the form.

4 We should also like your views on whether there should be an extension of the use of criminal record checks in the normal vetting field; and, if so, to what categories and to how many people. We would need to know the resultant burden, expressed in terms of the additional staff required. Questions 5 and 6 refer. If you think that there should be an extension, you may like to give reasons in your covering letter.

5 Finally, we should like your views on whether there is scope for cutting down the use of criminal record checks in the normal vetting field. While you may think that the check should be extended to certain categories, you may also think that it can be relinquished for other categories. Questions 7 and 8 refer. Again, you may wish to comment in the covering letter.

6 In your reply please cover not only the staff of the Department but also all others for whose security clearance you are responsible; for example, contractors' personnel and consultants.

7 Would you be good enough to try to let us have this information by 30th September? Approximate figures will be quite good enough, both for the numbers of checks and the numbers of staff.

8 We need only one copy of the return, and we should prefer a single consolidated return from each Department; but I enclose three spare copies of this letter and of the return.

Yours sincerely,

SECRET

