

POL F 316-8-1 / V3

SECURITY SERVICE STAFF - POLICY ON  
POSITIVE VETTING OF STAFF JOINING THE  
SECURITY SERVICE

FILE CLOSED

S Form 924

POL F 316-8-1 / V3

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date
KV4 / 486								

S. 960 Edn2

S Form 238D 10m 6/74

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81

POL F 316-8-1 / V3

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213.

*Trans to 316-8-4*

8.6.64.

~~Treasury D.E.O. letter : Reviews of Positive Vetting Cases. 213a~~

214.

*Trans to 316-8-3*

23.6.64.

~~Annual return of P.V. posts at 30.6.64.~~

214a

215.

*copied to 316-8-3*

D.G.

Please see at 214a a statement of our Positive Vetting position prepared in accordance with the attachment to Helsby's letter to you at 205a. A fair copy is attached to the file so that you may send it to Helsby, and a draft letter to the latter is at 216a.

In order that you may know how the return at 214a is made up there is filed immediately behind it an explanatory statement. The only point to which I think I need draw your attention is that I am continuing to treat the staff in A.4. as outside the formal P.V. category for the reason that I still do not have the staff required to carry through the whole P.V. process. Paragraph 4. of minute 200 and your minute 206 refer.

*Amarrill*

B.

24.6.64.

216.

24.6.64.

~~Draft letter to Treasury enc: annual P.V. return.~~  
replaced by 219a

246a

217

*copied to 316-8-3*

B.

With reference to the statement for Helsby at 214a and your Minute 215. You call my attention to the fact that you have treated the staff in A.4. as outside the normal P.V. category. As we have recorded in your Minute 200 paragraph 3 (in volume 2) and my Minute 206 that A.4. staff should be P.V.d to full current standards, I think it would be right that the 162 watchers should be added to A. Total Number of Posts, making a new total of 1,281. We can then have a footnote to say that the substantial increase in the total number of posts as compared with our return last year arises from my recent decision that a further group of our ancillary staff should come within the P.V. procedure.

Minute 217 continued

*copied to 316-8-3*

2. I see from your minute 200 referred to above that some of our A.4. staff have already been cleared to Stage 3. I imagine nevertheless that these should not be entered under B.(ii) but under one of the headings of C. as "in the process of being P.V.d" and that the balance of A.4. watchers who have only been cleared to Stage 2 should come under the same heading.

*Revised - Historic*

D.G.

29th June 1964

218.

*copied to 316-8-3*

D.G.

*Thank you.*

*Revised 30/6*

I have revised 214a in accordance with your instructions and a new fair copy is attached.

In view of the fact that we have throughout taken the view that our recruiting process is in part a field enquiry, since for example all recruits of whatever class are subject to a security interview, I think that the proper heading under which to put A.4. staff pending final clearance is paragraph C.(ii).

*Inuarrull*

B.  
30.6.64.

219

~~30.6.64~~

~~To Treasury~~

*Trans to 316-8-3*

219a

220.

1.7.64

D.E.O. letter from Treasury enc: List of Organisations of Security Interest.

220a

221.

7.64.

Summary of R.I. position.

Trans to 316-8-3

221a

222.

7.64.

From Treasury re distinction in Personnel Security procedures.

222a

7.64

Treasury letter on Reports of Arrests & Convictions.  
(Temp. transferred to Folder Reports of Arrest & Involvement  
223.

222b

in legal proceeding file to be made

Copied to 316-8-3

B.  
-

Reference minutes 208/209.

statistics for the second quarter of 1964 (the first quarter of his second year) are at 221a. This gives a total of 92 interviews in 70 man-days. The backlog, for what the figure is worth, remains more or less stationary.

*C.J.H. Foulkes*  
C.J.H. Foulkes

B.1.

7.7.64.

224.

Copied to 316-8-3

*9/7/64*  
*7/7*

We must wait and see his figures for next quarter when we shall <sup>have</sup> 2 offices for the whole period. The backlog is in fact much bigger than            shows and to believe that 2 interviewing officers may not be enough

*Tunnard*

B.  
7/7

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316-82

B. through ~~B.1~~ and B.2.

3079

B.289 I agree that only para 31 is made unnecessary but the new E93 I see no B2 diff. in procedure.

Reference minute 211 and serial 213a.

2. The revised version of Form E.93 has issued and a specimen has been placed behind serial 213a. Specimen copies of the Supplementary Security Questionnaire (S.S.Q.) and the two Personal Particulars forms are pinned behind the front cover.

3. The substance of the revised E.93 has the approval of C.Branch, which played a considerable part in securing its introduction. The questions set in Part 2 of the revised form include all, and in some instances go beyond or refine the questions in our S.S.Q. (e.g. question 13). The information required in Part 1 is already supplied by our candidates when they complete the Personal Particulars form.

4. The revised E.93 is a considerable advance on its predecessor, and Part 2 is better than our S.S.Q. I recommend that we should adopt it forthwith in place of the S.S.Q. (which in any event requires substantial amendment) for new entrants and for serving staff on P.V.Review in accordance with the D.G.'s note at serial 210a. On a point of detail, we do not use the privacy marking "In Confidence" and it will be necessary to grade the form "Confidential" for our own use.

to State Personnel  
with a witness  
Confidential.  
J.

5. I have considered the possibility of simplifying the Personal Particulars forms to save duplication when the revised E.93 is in use, and have concluded that any significant abridgement would be ill-advised. This is because the full personal particulars of candidates for appointment are required for preliminary look-ups and possible investigation at an early stage in the recruitment process before it would be appropriate to ask a candidate to complete the S.S.Q. In the case of male Officer and Class B.officer candidates, the Personal Particulars form is completed after the initial interview. In the case of women staff, the Personal Particulars form is usually, though not invariably, completed before the first interview takes place. The S.S.Q. is completed in the case of women staff after it has been decided at a second interview that the candidate should be offered an appointment but before an offer of employment is made orally. In the case of male Officers it is completed after it has been decided at a second interview that the candidate should appear before the Selection Board. In the case of Class B. officers, it has been the practice for an officer to complete the S.S.Q. when he joins for duty. In future he will complete the S.S.Q. at the second interview before an oral offer of appointment is made.

B.1.

25.9.64.

Stamp: ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS SECTION  
D.H. Payne  
316-82  
3079

Copied to 316-8-2

230.

B. 11/10/64  
B2 for 2/10  
B1/ΔHP.

I agree with the recommendation  
in min 229. Since the E93 will now  
leave to Branch on a day the wording of  
the privacy marking is surely immaterial.  
However the forms will now only printed  
for NARS.

I also accept that the PP forms  
will continue substantially unaltered. In this  
connection I see some advantage, particularly  
on the women's form, in retaining para 32  
since this will serve to prepare the candidates'  
memory for the same question - E93.

Vancouver

B. 1/10/64

	231	Trans to Security of Personnel	
8.10.64	Treasury letter: Discipline: Reports of Arrests or Convictions		231a
	232		
9.10.64	Summary of R.I. Position.		232a
	233	Trans to 316-8-2	
30.9.64	Note re P.V. position in B.2.		233a
	234		
23.10.64	Treasury Letter: Medical Aspects		234a
	235	Trans to 316-8-3 copied to 316-8-4	
23.11.64	Treasury letter: P.V. Reviews: Annual Returns		235a
	236	Trans to 316 - Security of Personnel	
2.12.64	Proposed amendment to Office Instructions		236a
2.12.64	Proposed D.G. circular		236b

*Copied to Security of Personnel*

237.

*4/14/64*  
B. through B.1. and L.A.

*I agree but have pencilled in on 236b an alternative last line for consideration*

*H. H. H. H. H.  
3/12/64*

I regret that the D.E.O. letter at serial 231a has been overlooked.

2. Although there is no written regulation or instruction, our staff are taught as part of their security education that they should inform B. Branch if they become involved in legal proceedings. This duty is underlined by Question 13 in the Security Questionnaire which requires candidates for P.V. to admit to certain offences against the law and by the certificate completed by the candidate at the end of the form which requires him/her to notify any material change in the information which has been supplied. Although to the best of my knowledge our present arrangements work well enough in practice, I think we should take the opportunity offered by the Treasury letter to issue a suitable instruction to the staff. This can, probably, best be done by an amendment to Part III of the Office Instructions.

3. The minimum requirements laid down in the Treasury circular are not sufficient for our purpose. We ought to know when any member of the staff is involved in any legal proceedings, whether as the accused, as a witness, as a plaintiff or as a respondent. An amendment to the Office Instructions might be made as suggested in the draft at serial 236a.

4. We ought to consider whether the amendment to the Office Instructions should be drafted to require members of the staff to tell us if any of their close relatives becomes involved in legal proceedings. Apart from the difficulty of defining "close relative", I think it would be going too far to lay an absolute duty on staff in this respect. I suggest that it would be sufficient to issue a D.G. circular announcing the amendment proposed in paragraph 3 above and adding a second paragraph about close relatives. A draft circular drawn on these lines is at serial 236b.

*Whye*  
D. H. Payne.

B.1.  
2.12.64

238.

*Copied to Security of Personnel*

D.G. *2/12*

The Treasury circular at 231a deals with the obligation of Civil Servants to report their arrest or conviction. I agree with the recommendation in minute 237 that we should have a written regulation and that it should be rather more tightly drawn than the minimum requirements set out at 231a. If you agree, I propose that a D.G. circular should issue in the terms of 236b as amended in pencil by L.A. I also support the proposed amendment to Office Instructions.

*W. W. W. W. W.*

B.  
7.12.64.

239.

*by [unclear]*  
The draft circular 236 b has been approved by [unclear] and is now with Secretariat for issue - which will be to Home & Overseas. Will you now please amend the amendment to their instructions

*P. [unclear]*

2.12.64  
14.12.64

copy of proposed redraft of <sup>15/12/64</sup> ~~Amick 3~~ <sup>240</sup> ~~Chiv~~ <sup>MPsm</sup> Field Enquiries: Guidance to Investigating Officers <sup>240z</sup>  
D.G. Circular: Staff Involved in Legal Proceedings  
*Trans to Security of*

15.12.64

L.M. to B.3/Colonel Franklin re amendment to the Office Instructions. 240a

18.12.64

L.M. to C.1/Mr. Russell Jones 241 *Trans to 316-8-2* 241a

21.12.64

L.M. from C.1. in reply to 241a 242 *Trans to 316-8-2* 242a

5.1.65

L.M. to B.3/Colonel Franklin re printing R.I. letters 243 *Trans to 316-8-2* 243a

6.1.65

Note of discussion with Investigating Officers 244 *Trans to 316-8-2* 244a

8.1.65

Note of Review of Possible Vetting Cases - position at 31.12.64 245 245a

7.1.65

~~Draft letter to Wyatt, Treasury~~ 245 245a

Replaced by 246a

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for as spoken. Reg.

246.

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~~B. through B.1.~~

Reference serials 225a and 235a.

2. We are required to provide a statement of the review of our P.V. cases during 1963 by the 31st January. As we are reviewing all cases annually, the form of return proposed by the Treasury, which is based on a quinquennial review, is not suitable, but we can conveniently follow the form of return for staff under twenty-one, where review is required annually (para 2 of Form A at serial 225a refers). A draft letter to Wyatt in the Treasury is submitted for approval at serial 245a.

3. There were 107 A.4. officers in post on December 1963, who were still serving on 31st December 1964. To these must be added a further 20 officers, who were recruited in 1964 and who have not been P.V'd. I hope that we shall be able to make a start with P.V. of the officers in A.4. in March.

*D. H. Payne*  
D. H. Payne.

B.1.  
7th January 1965

247

8.1.65 ~~Summary of R.I. position~~

for Trans to 316-8-3

~~247a~~

248

11.1.65 ~~To Wyatt, Treasury re P.V. Reviews - Annual Return~~

Trans to 316-8-3

~~248a~~

249

13.1.65 ~~Treasury Letter: Manual of Personnel Security Measures~~

copied to 316 Personnel Security

~~249a~~

250

15.1.65 ~~To Duke, Treasury, in reply to 249a~~

Trans to 316 Security of Personnel

~~250a~~

251

18.2.65 ~~Draft note for talk to A.4. officers with regard to P.V. review.~~

Removed - 26.2.65 JES.

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ACT 1958

252

*Copied to 316-8-2*

B.1.

We have discussed how best to undertake the P.V. of the A.4. officers. I have since consulted [redacted] who agrees that firstly an explanatory talk on the lines of the draft at serial 251a should be given to all the A.4. staff. He also agrees that it would be a very suitable arrangement if [redacted] were to be detached from his routine work to concentrate on completing P.V. in A.4., assisted, as convenient, by [redacted] with P.V. interviews and by [redacted] with the interviewing of referees. Essentially, we hope that [redacted] will be able to gain the confidence of A.4. and to demonstrate that we conduct P.V. enquiries thoroughly but considerately.

2. In para 4 of the draft at 251a it is stated that A.4. officers may nominate a colleague as one of their referees and that in exceptional cases both referees may be colleagues. We have not placed any similar restrictions on other members of the Service, some of whom, over the years, have nominated two colleagues as their P.V. referees. I think, however, that in the case of the A.4. officers there is good ground for requiring one of the referees, at the least, to be an outsider in that we know rather less about their home background than is normally the case with other members of the staff.

3. As soon as [redacted] has had the time to review the details of the job, we can ask him for an estimate of the time it will take to complete P.V. in A.4. This is likely to be, I should think, not less than six months and probably nearer nine.

4. May we now go ahead as proposed?

*D. H. Payne*  
D. H. Payne.

B.1.  
22nd February 1965

253. *Copied to 316-8-2*

Mr. Payne  
B.1.

Reference Minute 252. I think that in the note at 251a it should be brought out more clearly that the D.G. is applying to A.4 exactly the same standards as to the rest of the staff and that A.4 is only being treated as a bloc for administrative convenience. I think also that A.4 staff should be advised to consider, when naming referees outside the Service, whether such referees know or suspect that they are in fact in Government service. More detailed

consideration/...

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Minute 253 (continued)

consideration can then be given to the nomination of such referees at the P.V. interview. Subject to the foregoing and to A.1's concurrence, please go ahead.

*C.J.H. Foulkes*  
C.J.H. Foulkes

B.1.

23.2.65.

254

26.2.65 Note for Talk to A.4. Officers with regard to P.V. review

254a

255

~~1.3.65~~ L.M. to A.1./Mr. MacDonald Trans to 316-8-2

255a

256

22.3.65 Treasury letter - C.R.O. checks  
~~24.3.65~~ Treasury Letter re letters to referees. Trans to 316-8-2

256a

256a

257

7.4.65. Extract from Minute sheet, RS 1451  
L.M. to Interviewing Officers Trans to 316-8-2

257a

257b

258

~~24.4.65.~~ Summary of R.I. position Trans to 316-8-3

258a

258

~~20.4.65.~~ From Treasury re Criminal Record Office Checks Trans to 316-8-2

258a

4.5.65. Copy of Treasury letter re P.V.

258b

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259.

D.G. through F.O.Copied to 316-8-2  
Copied to 316-8-3  
87

Further to the discussion you had with Payne and me yesterday, when you directed that I should examine what additional staff and other facilities I should need in order to clear off by the end of this year the backlog of interviews with character referees, I have reached the following conclusions:-

- (i) The existing four Interviewing Officers, of whom one has only just joined, will be wholly occupied in the P.V. of new recruits and the staff of A.4 who have hitherto not been deemed to be in a P.V. category. You have accepted the arguments for not postponing the P.V. of A.4 now that this operation has been started;
- (ii) On the basis that one Officer can average five interviews per week and that the backlog of interviews is about 1,200 (not including A.4) it would take ten additional Interviewing Officers to clear the backlog by the end of this calendar year;
- (iii) The control of ten extra Interviewing Officers could remain under the general supervision of Payne if he had the assistance of another Officer, e.g. Broadbent, who returns to duty at the end of June. We should need additional clerical staff; I estimate this at six, but it may well be less in view of the fact that most police officers are able to type.

2. I have discussed with Tom Roberts the prospects of our being able to recruit retired police officers for this work and his estimate is that we should be able to do this without too great difficulty. I would propose that subject to the candidate being recommended by his Chief Constable we should accept candidates on the basis of an interview here and the provision of two satisfactory written references. These officers will not have access to Office files or to Records of Service, and in my view need not themselves be P.V'd.

3. As for finance, I think that we must offer a salary of £1,606 per annum, i.e. the bottom of the scale in which our existing Interviewing Officers are paid. Since many of these officers will have homes outside London and may have fairly expensive journeys to this Office for which, because they will spend so much time travelling in other directions, they will have to pay the full rate, I think that we must offer an

attractive/

attractive rate of pay for such short term employment without prospects. Finance Officer will perhaps be kind enough to make an estimate of what their travelling and other expenses are likely to be.

4. I cannot begin to undertake this extra commitment until the move to Marlborough Street is completed and we have the necessary extra accommodation, but since it is unlikely that we shall get the additional staff before that date this delay is perhaps acceptable to you.

5. The foregoing staff estimates are based upon what I think that we can cope with without distorting our present organisation and without relaxing our present standards both in the matter of the making of assessments and also in the equally important matter of exercising control over an activity which, if it is not properly controlled, can easily upset the staff and bring discredit on the Service. I do not need to tell you how important it is that the approach to and handling of referees should be conducted with great tact.

6. There is one further consequence of this programme, and that is the effect on me personally. As matters stand, and with the exception of Officers, the P.V. clearance certificate is given by me in all cases. This already takes up a great deal of my time and I think that while this backlog is being cleared off I must ask for your authority for <sup>some of</sup> this responsibility to be devolved on B.1, at any rate in respect of women Grade III and Grade II.

7. At the end of June next we shall need to make an annual return similar to that at 219a. I shall be grateful if you will let me know whether I may assume that this year's return is to be made on the same basis as before, namely, that Stage IV has been completed in respect of the great bulk of existing staff.

*Ammanwith*

B.  
13.5.65.

260. *Copied to 316-8-2*

*D.G.*

Reference Para.3 of minute 259. I estimate that the travelling and motoring expenses for 10 Officers for six months would be in the region of £1,000.  
The total cost therefore would be £9,030.

A.F.O.  
13.5.65

*D.R. Mearns*

*Copied to Pol. F. 50-24-4 (120) Supp. Vol.  
Copied to MP 316-8-2*

261.

*Copied to 316-8-2*

*Copied to 316-8-3 §6*

B. (through F.O.)

Thank you for your minute 259 which we have discussed briefly. I asked you to look again at the figure of 1,200 for the backlog of interviews as this is larger than I had expected.

2. If we can get sufficient interviewers of high quality to clear the backlog by the end of the year, this will be very satisfactory, but if we cannot recruit the full number you require we may have to go somewhat slower. It is important that we should have made substantial inroads into the backlog by the year's end.

3. I agree with the suggestions for payment you make in your paragraph 3, and I am not worried by the overall estimate of cost set out in minute 260.

4. I agree that you should use BROADBENT in support of PAYNE.

5. With regard to your paragraph 6, I have spoken to D.D.G. who is prepared to take a share in the examination of cases and the issue of P.V. clearance certificates. Will you therefore arrange to allocate categories of cases between the three of us?

6. With reference to your paragraph 7, I confirm that this year's return should be made on the same basis as before, viz. that Stage IV has been completed for the great bulk of existing staff. What we are doing now is to re-examine certain of the cases in the light of the new instructions which have just come out so as to ensure that our records are in line with current instructions. I am satisfied that we have always had on record more information about the security status of our staff than is strictly required.

D.G.

*Rose Johnston*

18.5.65.

*Copies to Pol.F.50.244 (130) Supp Vol*

262

*Trans to 316-8-2*

20.5.65.

~~Note re Investigating Officers making police enquiries.~~

262a

263

*Copied to 316-8-4 (301)  
Copied to 316-8-2  
Sections 1-2*

24.5.65.

Draft report of meeting between B. and C.

263a

24.5.65.


~~Copy of proposed redraft of Annex 3, Ch. IV, M.P.S.M., "Field Enquiries: Guidance to Investigating Officers."~~

*See 240y*

263b

B.1

I submit, at serial 263a, a <sup>note</sup> ~~report~~ in draft of the meeting between B. and C. on 20th ~~April~~, 1965.

*May*  
  
 D. H. Payne

B.1  
 24.5.65.

265.

26.5.65. Note from C. re P.V. problems.

265a

266.

26.5.65. ~~C.1. record of discussion about P.V.~~

*Trans 8, 10, 11, 12 to 3168-6*

266

267.

D.D.G.

Please see at 263a a record of the conclusions reached by C, B.1, Payne and myself about the way in which we have been conducting the P.V. of our own staff. Our discussion was, as you will see, in the main conducted by reference to the latest draft of Guidance to Investigating Officers filed at 263b.

2. Please also see at 265a and 266a two partially overlapping minutes from C. Branch on the same topic.

3. Now that you have an opportunity to see the various papers above referred to, you will, I hope, agree that the conclusions recorded at 263a are in line with the conclusions reached at the meeting you held on 26th May with C, Payne and myself.

4. To the extent that these conclusions are at variance with anything in 265a and 266a I have the following comments with which I hope you and the D.G. will agree:

(i) Even in its latest form the Guidance to Investigating Officers does not make it mandatory to interview school Principals. Accordingly, I propose not to interview school masters and school mistresses unless they are persons unknown to us or are not thought to have any sufficient understanding of our security requirements; or, of course, unless there is any special reason to do so.

(ii)

Minute 267 (continued)

(ii) I do not accept that there is any significant risk in confining, in a proper case, interviews to those with persons nominated by the candidate. Our interviewing officers, as you have had an opportunity to judge, are quite capable of deciding whether a referee is speaking from adequate and independent personal knowledge.

(iii) A requirement to complete the whole of P.V. before a recruit starts work would present us with an almost insuperable problem which certainly at the height of the recruiting season, viz: late summer and autumn, would involve us in the employment of investigating and officer staff on a scale quite out of proportion to the security advantage to be obtained. This of course particularly applies to the girls about whom, if they are not to be lost, a decision has to be taken very briskly. I am considering how we can step up investigations and at the same time increase their scope by using more staff, but I am in no doubt that sometimes, particularly in the height of the recruiting season, we shall be unable to complete P.V. within a reasonable time, and, if we are not to lose recruits, will have to grant provisional clearances, i.e. after Stage III has been completed. This will give me, personally, a lot of extra work, and I hope that you will agree that I can delegate authority to Payne to approve provisional clearances on my behalf. The standing arrangements for the granting of full P.V. clearance would not, of course, be affected.

4. To sum up, I propose that, subject to my obtaining the necessary staff:

(i) We should extend the P.V. enquiries we carry out at present in the case of recruits who do not come from a civil or military service by interviewing a former employer and, in the case of girls joining us straight from school, the principals of their schools, unless these are persons known to us and who are thought to have a sufficient understanding of our security requirements.

(ii) We will try to ensure that P.V. is completed to Stage IV before recruits join but in cases where any delay would mean that we would lose recruits, I (or Payne on my behalf) should be authorised to grant provisional P.V. clearances when Stage III has been completed.

B.  
31.5.65

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*Payne*



268

2.5.65

C. Branch note

*copied § 1 to 6 to 316-8-6*

268a

269

*[Signature]*  
D.D.G.

Further to my minute 267, please see at 268a another contribution from C. Branch. On this I refrain from commenting other than to say that there is a good deal in it with which I do not agree.

B.

*[Signature]* J.H. Marriott

2nd June 1965

271

B.

*B. and Mr. Payne to see their discovery*  
*22/6*

I have discussed Minute 267 and the related papers with D.G. Our system cannot be brought up to the required standard until there are sufficient investigators but the standard to be aimed at on the points to which you refer is:

*copied to 316-8-4*

- a) Since the rule about interviewing employers is to become mandatory we must conform; but the rule (paragraph 9 of 263b) allows of some flexibility and we should interpret it as follows:
  - i) On the topping up or review of P.V. of a member of the staff who has been with us for ten years, no previous employer need be interviewed;
  - ii) for all others at least one previous employer should be interviewed.
  - iii) For members of our staff who have come from official service in Commonwealth countries or from the Armed Forces, interviews with superior officers may often be impracticable or even impossible. In such cases interviews should be held with staff of the O.S.R.B. or appropriate officers in the Navy, Army or Air Depts.

/(b) .....

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Minute 271 continued

b) It is unnecessary to interview the school principals of girls joining us straight from school provided we are satisfied that the principals do have a sufficient understanding of our security requirements. There ought to be a record of a conversation with the principal when our security requirements are explained and the file of the girl ought to contain a cross-reference to this record.

*Carried to 316-8-b*

c) Staff ought not to be employed on TOP SECRET work in the Security Service before their P.V. has been completed. I have discussed with you various expedients for achieving this without running the risk of losing staff.

D.D.G.

*[Handwritten signature]*

17th June 1965

272.

~~17.6.65 Extract from L.183/3881~~

*Trans to 316-8-2*

272a

273.

~~22.6.65 Note re visit of Director of OSRB to B. and B.1.~~

*Trans to 316-8-2*

273a

274

236.65. Extract from [redacted] re age of referees.

274a

275

23.6.65. Note re discussion of possible changes in P.V. arrangements

*Trans 5-8 to 316-8-b*

275a

276

24.6.65. Note re length of acquaintanceship between subject and referee

276a

277

25.6.65. Draft Treasury return and covering letter.  
Replaced by 281a.

277a

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
~~B. through B.1~~

J25/6

The record of the discussion on 11th June has been entered at serial 275a.

2. The annual return of Positive Vetting posts for 1965 to follow the return made in 1964 at serial 219a is now due. A draft is at serial 277a. I have arrived at the figure of 163 in para. C (ii) of the return by adding the number of A.4 staff in post (136) to the number of <sup>the</sup> cases still under investigation and awaiting P.V. clearance. (28).

3. I do not know whether the DG might wish to add a paragraph to the covering letter to the effect that the strength of the P.V. investigating staff is being materially increased, in order that field enquiries for new recruits may be speeded up, and in order that P.V. review, by the higher standards likely to be imposed, may be completed as briskly as possible.?



D. H. Payne

B.1  
25.6.65.

Trans to 316-8-2

~~25.6.65.~~ Treasury D.E.O. letter: Positive Vetting

278a

279.

Copied to 316-8-3


~~D.D.G.~~  
D.G.

Please see at 277a a draft return of our P.V. position in the form prescribed at 205a. Last year's return for purposes of comparison is at 219a. With regard to the suggestion contained in para.3 of Minute 278, my view is that it is better to say nothing.

2. With regard to Minute 271, D.D.G. shewed this to me in draft and I subsequently had a discussion with my Officers on various points raised in it. A record of our discussion and our conclusions is at 275a.

3. You will see that compliance with the instructions in Minute 271 will have the following consequences:

(i)/



Minute 279 (continued)

(i) In addition to recruiting ten temporary Interviewing Officers to deal with the current backlog of review, we shall need to increase our permanent staff of Interviewing Officers from four to ten. May I have authority to attempt to recruit these?

(ii) In order to reduce the risk of losing recruits because of the delays inevitably attendant upon P.V., it is desirable, if possible, to declare parts of the Office eligible for the employment of staff who have not been P.V.'d. I have asked H.R. to consider whether R.3 can be in this category, and also whether anywhere elsewhere in the Registry could be. I think that nearly all junior secretarial posts in B.Branch could be treated in the same way, but I doubt whether this could be so in any other Branch.

*Copied to  
316-8-b*

4. You will see that we have considered other alternatives for getting round the difficulty created by para.(c) of Minute 271 but we do not think that any of them are feasible. We shall just have to face up to the fact that recruiting, which is already difficult, is going to become more so and that some suitable recruits simply will not come here.

5. Finally, with regard to instruction (b) in Minute 271 I should like you to see the second paragraph of the note at 24a in SF.50-36-3(798). Does this meet with your approval?

*Punnawalk*

B.

28.6.65

280

D.G.

You asked me to check that where you had delegated authority to issue P.V. clearance certificates this was in writing and to a named person. You delegated authority at paragraph 5 of Minute 261 to B. and to me by office.

2. B. has asked for guidance on priorities pending recruitment of sufficient field investigators to tackle the whole problem. It is my view that the main effort should be devoted to recruits and to interviews with character referees.

D.D.G.

1st July 1965

*A.2. Trinidad Jones*

281.  
6.7.65. Treasury D.E.O. letter: Mental Illness Criterion in P.V.  
6.7.65. Draft statement to headmistresses etc. Trans to 316-8-2  
7.7.65. To Treasury with annual return of P.V. posts. Trans to 316-8-3

281z  
281az  
281a

282

9.7.65. Loose Minute to E.3 and note re new standards of P.V. Trans to 316-8-2

282a

9.7.65. L.M. from C.1 with extracts from draft of Revised Manual of Personnel Security Measures. Copied 43 & 44 to 316-8-9  
Copied 53 to Security of Personnel  
Copied 54, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52 to 316-8-4 to 316-8-4  
Copied 41 to 316-8-6

283a

16.7.65. D.D.G. note.

283b

284

20.7.65. Draft Minute re P.V. field enquiries for submission to D.G. Trans to 316-8-2

285

Copied to 316-8-2

B. through B.1

I have entered at serial 284a a draft minute, setting our revised instructions for the conduct of P.V. field enquiries, for submission to the D.G. if you approve.

2. The draft is based on the extract from the draft Revised Manual of Personnel Security Measures at serial 283a, which has been supplied by C.1. I am assured by C.1 that, although some amendments of detail may be made before the Revised Manual is issued, the substance of Chapter III and its Annexes 8 and 24 will not be changed.

3. It remains to consider various other matters which arise from the revision of the old Chapter IV, now Chapter III, of the Manual of Personnel Security. In particular, we shall need to examine further the implications of ensuring that recruits are not posted to P.V. posts before P.V. clearance has been granted, and to consider the effect the revised standards of investigation will have on P.V. review cases.

*D. H. Payne*  
D. H. Payne

B.1  
20.7.65.

FILE CLOSED

286.

23.7.65. E. Branch note re staff P.V. position - E. Sections. Enclosure folder: Schedule of Posts for which P.V. Clearance is not essential.

286a

287.

27.7.65. Draft directive from D.G. to B. Replaced by 291a.

287

now in 161.4


CONFIDENTIAL Reference.....

283B

~~B.~~ ~~and Mr. Payne~~ <sup>to 20/7 I am ready.</sup>  
To see the attached to speak  
to me at your early convenience.  
19/7

D.G., to whom I have shown the attached papers, will be grateful if you will study them in relation to the note Denis Payne is preparing and speak to him.

D.D.G.



16th July 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference...Loose...Minute.

D.D.G.

C.I. and I have looked at this again. We agree that "former superior officers" are not "previous employers" and that it is highly desirable that the records of Service Department# should be taken into account. We have no doubt that it is not sufficient to rely on Service Department's certificate# and that interviews should be held with former superior officers, because people are sometimes prepared to say things they will not put on paper, and in aid of the process of obtaining a sufficient depth of information to enable a judgment of trustworthiness to be made.

2. In his minute to me of 13th July C.I. describes the practice of the Ministry of Aviation vis-a-vis Service Departments and former corporate employers.

3. I hope we are not at cross purposes?

*C.A.G. Simkins*

C.  
15.7.65.

C.A.G. Simkins.

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

Reference.....Loose Minute.....

C.

Reference D.D.G's attached loose minute.

2. If a candidate for Positive Vetting had previously been employed by I.C.I. the practice of the Ministry of Aviation Investigating Team, for example, would be for an Investigating Officer to call on the Personnel Officer of I.C.I. whom he would question about the candidate's conduct and reliability while in I.C.I.'s employment. He would seek to have sight of the candidate's employment file and is often successful in this. He would then ask to be allowed to interview one or more employees of the firm under whose supervision the candidate had worked.
3. The Ministry of Aviation make similar enquiries about a candidate who has formerly been in one of the Armed Services. They first of all obtain a statement in writing that Service records contain nothing adverse to the candidate. They then arrange to call on an officer in the Service Department, usually one dealing with personnel security, and jointly examine all the candidate's records which have been assembled for the purpose. The object of this exercise is twofold: it enables the investigator to detect any information which in his view might be relevant even though in the view of the Service Department that information is not relevant; and secondly it enables the Service Department to explain why, in its view, the information should not be regarded as having a bearing on the officer's reliability, i.e. to give the Service viewpoint. The Investigating Officer then arranges to interview a former Commanding or senior Officer under whom the candidate has served.
4. The procedure in paragraph 3 above is therefore the same in substance as the procedure for a person whose previous employment was in industry or commerce. It has been evolved by the M.O.A. because of the traditional reluctance of the Service Department to allow Departments or P.V. Investigating Officers to have access to Service records in any other way. Such is the experience of the M.O.A. that they would never rely solely upon a certificate from a Service Department. Only recently the M.O.A. discovered that one of their officers who was formerly in the Royal Air Force had been court martialled for drunkenness. This had not been disclosed by the Air Force Department presumably on the grounds that it was not relevant to consideration of the officer's security reliability. The M.O.A. feels strongly that there is no reason to treat a Service Officer differently from a person with a civilian background.
5. The procedure followed would be substantially the same in the case of a person who has been employed in a Government Department for some years and in respect of whom P.V. has only recently become a requirement. It would be for the Department first of all to examine his papers to see whether there is any prima facie reason why he should not be suitable to occupy a P.V. post. After completion of Stages 1 to 3 of P.V. the papers would be referred to the appropriate P.V. Investigating Team. An officer from the team would then visit the Department where, as a general rule, he would be allowed to examine the candidate's papers. He would also interview the Departmental Security Officer to discover whether any

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Reference.....

- 2 -

breaches of security were recorded against the candidate and he would then interview members of the Department under whom the candidate had served in the last ten years, or a sufficient number of such officers. I.O's reports which I have seen commonly include three to five such interviews.

6. I would expect the practice of other P.V. Teams to be substantially the same as that followed by the M.O.A.

*B Russell Jones*

B. Russell Jones.

C.1

13 July 1965

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C. through B. *12/7*

I shall be grateful if you will look at this again.

2. "Former superior officers" are not "previous employers" and while it may be desirable to interview one or more in a given case, this would not be in pursuance of the instruction you quote. On the other hand it would seem highly desirable that the records of the Service Department, as the only recognizable employer should be taken into account. I hope therefore that Appendix B will in some form figure in the revised M.P.S.M. I would see no advantage in an interview with someone in the Records Branch because only by chance would he have personal knowledge of the P.V. candidate but the records will cover his whole career.

3. Who is the employer of a chemist in I.C.I. Ltd ?



D.D.G.

9th July 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

D.D.G. *SP*

You referred me to Appendix B. Section II, paras 5 and 6 ~~of~~ Sir Edward Bridges' letter of 31st March 1954, in chapter IV of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures, and asked whether the certificate from the former Service Ministry can be taken in lieu of interviews with former superior officers. We think the answer is No if the certificate relates to time falling within the period of 10 years preceding the P.V. The revised instructions to investigating Officers require that "interviews should be held with a sufficient number of the subject's..... previous employers to cover adequately his career over at least the previous 10 years". A certificate covering only what is on record will not serve instead.

2. Appendix B. is not included in the revised M.P.S.M. (This ~~was~~ probably ~~an oversight.~~) *per instructions*)

3. You also queried para.11 of the E.93 which specifies 5 years, not 10. This is now para.8 in the revised version: it should be amended, and the Treasury's attention has been drawn to it.

C.  
8.7.65.

*C.A.G. Simkins*  
C.A.G. Simkins.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

283a

LOOSE MINUTE.

Reference.....

B.1./Mr. Payne.

As promised I enclose the following extracts from the draft version of the Revised Manual of Personnel Security Measures:-

- (a) Chapter III. Positive Vetting.
- (b) Annex on Field Enquiries.
- (c) Annex on Criteria for Assessing Trustworthiness.

258B  
278A

These are subject to amendment in the light of the Security Commission report and have already been modified by Sir Lawrence Helsby's letter of 30.4.65 and D.E.O. letter of 25.6.65.

C.1.  
9.7.65

Enclosures: 3

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REVISED MANUAL OF PERSONNEL SECURITY MEASURESDRAFTCHAPTER III: POSITIVE VETTINGPUBLIC STATEMENTS

1. The introduction of positive vetting was announced in a Press Statement released on 8th January, 1952, the terms of which are as follows:-

"His Majesty's Government have been considering the procedure for ensuring the reliability of Government staff employed on exceptionally secret work, especially work involving access to secret information about atomic energy.

They have decided that special enquiries should be made about those holding or applying for such posts. Further particulars will be sought from them and from other persons so that the Minister concerned may judge whether they are fit to be entrusted with such information. Any considered to be unfit, including members of the Communist Party or a Fascist organisation or those associated with such bodies in such a way as to raise legitimate doubts about their reliability, will be barred from such employment. The safeguards laid down by the previous Government for any person removed from secret work in the Civil Service on account of such associations will be maintained, the staff being transferred to other work in all cases possible.

Details of the proposed procedure are being discussed with the Staff interests concerned."

2. On 23rd November, 1955, the then Prime Minister set up a Conference of Privy Councillors to examine security procedures and a statement on their findings was issued as a White Paper in March, 1956 (Cmd. 9715-Annex 3). It included the following paragraphs:

"Some of the recommendations of the Conference deal with what may be called the relation between security risks and

defects of character and conduct. The Conference recognise that today great importance must be paid to character defects as factors tending to make a man unreliable or expose him to blackmail or influence by foreign agents. There is a duty upon Departments to inform themselves of serious failings such as drunkenness, addiction to drugs, homosexuality or any loose living that may seriously affect a man's reliability.

.....

While confining themselves to the security aspects of these defects of character and conduct, the Conference also record the view that in individual cases or in certain sections of the public service, a serious character defect may appropriately be the determining factor in a decision to dismiss a particular individual or to transfer him to other work."

In subsequent Parliamentary debate Ministers made it clear that the Government accepted these views.

3. In 1961 a Committee was appointed by the Government to examine security procedures in the public service ("The Radcliffe Committee") and included the Positive Vetting procedure within the field of examination. In their report published in April, 1962 (Cmnd. 1681, paragraphs 60 - 77) they commented at length upon the procedure. They found it, within its limits, an effective system, although they recognised that there may be difficulties in operating it and they made some related recommendations but they did not recommend any modifications of the procedure as such.
4. The nature of Positive Vetting was subsequently disclosed in some detail (though with only limited reference to certain confidential record checks and their scope) in the Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Vassall case (Cmnd. 2009).

PURPOSE OF POSITIVE VETTING

5. As indicated by the published statements, the purpose of Positive Vetting is to assemble sufficient information about an individual (his background, character, interests and associations) to enable the Minister concerned (or his nominee) to make a positive judgment that the individual is suitable to be entrusted with exceptionally secret information. The criteria for assessing whether a person can be so entrusted are set out in Annex 8.

SCOPE AND NATURE OF POSITIVE VETTING

6. Positive Vetting is to be applied to persons (including Civil Servants, both industrial and non-industrial; Diplomatic Service officers; members of the Armed Forces; Consultants; and Contractors' employees) who are being considered for employment on duties which require:

- (a) regular and constant access to TOP SECRET information;
- or (b) in Defence Departments<sup>c</sup> and their contractors - any access to TOP SECRET ATOMIC information, or to SECRET ATOMIC information bearing the codeword PRINCIPAL or CONIFER (see Chapter V paragraph 29).
- or (c) in Civil Departments and their contractors - any access to SECRET ATOMIC or TOP SECRET ATOMIC information (see Chapter V paragraph 29).
- or (d) any access to TOP SECRET COMINT information (but see paragraph 46 for exceptions), or to certain International Defence Organisation (I.D.O.) information (see Chapter V paragraphs 5, 6 and 36)

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<sup>c</sup> The Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Aviation.

7. Positive Vetting is also applied irrespective of their access, to all Under Secretaries and those under consideration for promotion to Under Secretary and, at the discretion of Permanent Secretaries, to senior scientific, professional and technical staff (Sir Laurence Helsby's letter of 3rd July 1964 to Permanent Secretaries). 299-17

8. It is also open to Departments to submit to Positive Vetting staff who are to be appointed to posts abroad involving a degree of access to classified information for which Positive Vetting would not normally be required under paragraphs 6 and 7 but, where the risk of subornation or attempted blackmail by foreign powers is higher than in the United Kingdom (see Annex 21).

9. The Positive Vetting of an individual consists of the following four stages, which are described in detail in later paragraphs:

Stage 1: Normal Vetting; comprising a check against the records of the Security Service and the Criminal Records Office, a check of the records of the employing Department, and (if an individual is a national of the Irish Republic or of Northern Ireland) a check with Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police.

Stage 2: Completion by the individual of a security questionnaire (Form E93<sup>or</sup> E93A or ~~E93B~~ - Annexes 22<sup>and</sup> 23 and 44).

Stage 3: Consultation in writing with character referees named by the individual in the questionnaire.

Stage 4: A field investigation.



10. All four stages of the procedure are now obligatory, subject to the following qualifications:

(a) Very exceptionally, if the Head of the Department is satisfied that he personally has sufficient real knowledge of the individual to make a field investigation unnecessary, he may dispense with it and grant a Positive Vetting clearance after the satisfactory completion of the first three stages only. However, such exceptions are not permissible when the individual is being positively vetted for access to ATOMIC information (paragraph 6(b) and (c)), I.D.O. information (paragraph 6(d)) and certain other foreign information (see Chapter V paragraphs 5, 6, 19 and 37).

(b) Provisional Positive Vetting clearances may in certain circumstances be granted in accordance with paragraph 41 before the field investigation is completed, provided it is completed and the clearance reviewed as soon as possible thereafter.

11. No person may be employed on duties to which Positive Vetting applies unless and until a properly-authorized Positive Vetting clearance or provisional clearance has been issued on his behalf.

12. It should be noted that, as a consequence of international agreements, access to ATOMIC and certain I.D.O. information specified in paragraph 6(b), (c) and (d) may only be granted if the Positive Vetting has conformed to certain minimum standards. The current national standards (see Annex 24) meet the international standards, but this is not true of all Positive Vetting undertaken in the past. Departments should therefore ensure, before access is authorized to information specified in paragraph 6(b), (c) and (d), that the Positive Vetting conforms to the standards currently required.

If it does not, the necessary supplementary enquiries should be made and the Positive Vetting clearance reconsidered in the light of those enquiries.

DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

13. The responsibility for:

- (a) determining which posts require Positive Vetting; and
- (b) conducting the associated vetting and deciding whether Positive Vetting clearances should be issued;

rests with the Department in which the posts occur, or (in the case of outside consultants and contractors) the Department on whose behalf the "exceptionally secret work" of the post is being undertaken. (But see paragraphs 42 and 43-44 about the Positive Vetting of Permanent Secretaries and of seconded staff)

14. Each Department is required:-

- (a) to identify and maintain an up-to-date record of all the Positive Vetting posts for which it is responsible;
- (b) to ensure that all current holders of these posts have valid Positive Vetting clearances;
- (c) to make arrangements so that persons being considered for recruitment or transfer to these posts undergo the Positive Vetting procedure (with satisfactory results) before they are appointed to and take up the full duties of the posts. Unless a provisional clearance is granted (see paragraph 41), a person should not be given grounds for supposing that he has been appointed to a Positive Vetting post until he has been fully cleared;
- (d) to maintain a record of the Positive Vetting clearances of staff;
- (e) to instruct staff with Positive Vetting clearances to report marriage or remarriage (see paragraph 46);
- (f) to review Positive Vetting clearances periodically (see paragraphs 47-52).

- (g) to ensure that any information available to the Department which may have a bearing on the security standing of an officer is recorded in a form in which it will be available if and when it becomes necessary for him to be positively vetted.

15. Departments should seek through establishment arrangements to ensure that, so far as practicable, persons in the following categories are not considered for posts which entail Positive Vetting:

- (a) Minors (i.e. persons under twenty-one years of age); their characters, interests and opinions are likely to be still developing rapidly and the Positive Vetting process is therefore of less value in assessing their reliability than is the case with more mature persons;
- (b) New recruits and persons who have only recently joined the public service; Departments can have less direct knowledge about the character, interests and opinions of such persons than they have of persons who have served for some time in the public service, and the Positive Vetting process in such cases is likely to be less valuable in assessing reliability.

POSITIVE VETTING PROCEDURE: THE FOUR STAGESStages 1 and 2: The Record Checks and Completion of the Questionnaire(A) For Staff already serving

16. The Department should first examine its records about the individual, including its security records, the individual's personal file, medical records and annual reports, to see whether:

- (a) a Security Service check has already been made and a valid 'N.R.A.' (i.e. 'Nothing Recorded Against') is held, (an N.R.A. is valid if it has been obtained since 1st January, 1949, and there has been no subsequent break in service); and
- (b) a check has recently been made with the Criminal Records Office;
- (c) there is any information from other sources indicating subversive tendencies or associations;
- (d) there is evidence of defects of character, conduct or circumstance\* of security significance.

17. If the departmental records reveal well-founded evidence of defect of character, conduct or circumstance of security significance, the Department should consider at this stage whether or not to proceed with Positive Vetting, account being taken of the action that would be required should the outcome of a Positive Vetting operation be unfavourable. The Security Service may be consulted on the assessment of the defect's significance. It should be borne in mind that in some cases of a reported defect, where the evidence is not established beyond doubt, the best way to arrive at a balanced account of it may be to proceed with Positive Vetting; and that in some circumstances (e.g. if the individual's career is likely to be prejudiced by lack of a Positive Vetting clearance), this may be the only fair course to follow.

---

\*See Annexes 6 and 7.

18. If the departmental records reveal any information indicating subversive tendencies or associations (including correspondence with the Security Service, even if it advised that the information did not provide security grounds for denying the individual access or, for example, that the individual presented "No Substantial Risk to Security"), the Security Service should be consulted.

19. If the departmental records reveal no adverse information of any kind, checks should be made with the Security Service (unless a valid "Nothing Recorded Against" (N.R.A.) is already held) and with the Criminal Record Office (unless a check was made recently). The submissions should be made as in

Chapter II paras. 15 and 19, except that the E.90 (Annex 11) sent to the Security Service should be marked "Positive Vetting". If the individual is a national of the Irish Republic or of Northern Ireland an I.R.A. check should be made with Special Branch if this has not previously or recently been done (see Chapter II, para. 23 and Annex 14).

20. If the checks with the Security Service or Special Branch (but not that with the Criminal Record Office - the results of which are for the Department to assess) disclose any adverse record, the Security Service should be consulted before proceeding to Stage 2 of Positive Vetting.

21. If a valid N.R.A. is held or has been obtained (para. 19 above) and the Criminal Record Office check and examination of departmental records reveal no information suggesting unsuitability for a Positive Vetting appointment, or, notwithstanding some adverse information, the Department decides, after any necessary consultation with the Security Service, to proceed with Positive Vetting, the individual should be asked to complete a security questionnaire (Stage 2) (E.93 (Annex 22)).

22. Extracts from the information so obtained should be entered on form E.81 (Annex 25) and sent to the Security Service for a further check. If this check discloses adverse security information, or if the individual has made some significant admission in the E.93 (Annex 22), the Department should consider, in conjunction with the Security Service, how to proceed.

(B) For Recruits

23. So far as practical recruits should be dealt with as in para. 19 (but see Chapter II paras. 29 and 30 about the vetting of staff recruited through the Civil Service Commission).

NOTE: Any form used for a vetting submission to the Security Service in the course of Positive Vetting, whether at the preliminary stage (para. 19) or after the E.93 has been completed, should be clearly marked "P.V." in bold letters at the top.7

Stage 3: Referees

24. The security questionnaire (E.93) includes a request for the names of two referees. Provided the subject of the Positive Vetting has no adverse security record and has made no significant admission in Form E.93, the next step is to consult these referees in writing (paras. 29-30).

25. For a referee to be accepted as satisfactory he must fulfil the following conditions:

- (a) be well-acquainted with the subject in his private life in recent years;
- (b) be a fit person to express an opinion on the subject's reliability;
- (c) not be related to the subject.

26. The letters sent to referees (para. 29) specifically seek to establish whether conditions (a) and (c) are met; and Investigating Officers conducting field investigations are required by their standing instructions (Annex 24) to

satisfy themselves on (a) and (b). If a referee does not satisfy these conditions, the subject should be asked to name an alternative. An official colleague of the subject may be accepted as referee provided he is well acquainted with the subject in private life.

27. If the Security Service check of the subject of the Positive Vetting, or departmental records, has revealed that he has, or has been suspected of having, Communist or other subversive associations or sympathies, but not otherwise, and the Department decides nevertheless to proceed with the case, the Security Service will check his referees and brief the Investigating Officer when appropriate. ~~The Department should use for this purpose only such personal details about the referees as are readily available and should not seek to obtain any additional details from the subject or the referees. [The Security Service should be informed of the reasons for the checks and, if the checks reveal information adverse to the referee(s), should be consulted about the acceptability of the referee(s) and about any special instructions which should be issued to the Investigating Officer conducting the field investigation (see para. 32). When referees are checked in this way the Investigating Officer should be told that this has been done and of the results.~~

28. Departments may also ask the Security Service to check a referee if the Investigating Officer conducting the field investigation acquires and reports any information suggesting that the referee has or has had Communist or other subversive associations or sympathies. (See Instructions to Investigating Officers, Annex 24).

29. Letters to be sent to referees should follow standard forms, depending on whether the subject is already in service or a candidate for employment. The two forms of standard

letter are at Annex 26 and 27. They may, exceptionally, be departed from when particular circumstances make them inappropriate e.g. when the referee is well-known to the Department a tailor-made letter may be more suitable.

30. In order to leave the referee in no doubt as to the purpose of the inquiry, a copy of the Press statement of the 8th January, 1952, should also be enclosed (see para. 1), together with an addressed envelope (for his reply) marked "Personal and Confidential", which will act as an added assurance that the reply will in fact be treated confidentially.

Stage 4: Field Investigation

31. Field investigations should normally be carried out by officers employed specifically for this purpose. The range of inquiries they should undertake is given in Annex 24. (The procedure may be varied in special cases requiring consultation with the Security Service - see paras. 18 and 20).

32. Unless, exceptionally, there are overriding reasons for not doing so, the Department must give the Investigating Officer access to all the available background information about the subject and should draw his attention to any aspects of the case which the Department particularly wants to be examined. On completion of his investigations the Investigating Officer will draw up a report recording the inquiries he has made and the information and opinions about the subject that he has obtained. If information has been withheld from the Investigating Officer, his report must be considered against the background that, by denying him a "lead" to a possible line of enquiry, the value of the report may have been diminished.

33. Field investigations on behalf of most Departments in the Home Civil Service are conducted by a team of Investigating Officers employed and managed by the Ministry of Aviation. Departments making use of this team are responsible for:



- (a) completing the first three Stages of the Positive Vetting procedure in each case and making available to the Investigating Officer all the background information etc. (para. 32);
- (b) indicating any special priority to be given to the case;
- (c) assessing each case, in the light of the Investigating Officer's report, and deciding whether Positive Vetting clearance should be granted or refused;
- (d) dealing with any "troubles" (e.g. Parliamentary Questions) arising out of the case.

#### ASSESSMENTS AND DECISIONS IN POSITIVE VETTING

34. No general rule can be laid down for the level at which decisions should be taken in Positive Vetting cases because of the wide variation in circumstances between Departments. But the delegated authority to decide Positive Vetting cases on behalf of the Minister should be clearly laid down in each Department.

35. The decision in each case should be clearly recorded; and if clearance is granted despite some query raised by the inquiry, or if clearance is refused, or information has been withheld from the Investigating Officer, the reasons for the decision should also be clearly recorded.

36. Although the decision in each case rests with the Department conducting the Positive Vetting inquiry, the Security Service are always ready to give assistance in assessing a case and to suggest or undertake, where necessary and possible, further investigations into it. This includes assistance in assessing a case where a character defect is thought to have security significance.

37. In the event of Positive Vetting clearance being refused, the Department will have to consider how the situation can best be handled. In the case of an applicant for employment in a Positive Vetting post there may be no difficulty; he should be refused employment without revealing that this is for security reasons. However, where a clearance is refused for a person already employed, difficulties may arise. The proposed appointment should not, of course, be made, but careful consideration will need to be given to -

- (a) the reason to be given to the person concerned for the change in posting;
- (b) the alternative to the proposed posting.

38. In certain circumstances the individual may or should be informed of the fact of refusal of Positive Vetting clearance, namely -

- (a) if the refusal is based on grounds of Communist or Fascist associations, or a combination of such grounds with character defect, AND the case falls within the scope of the Purge Procedure (see Chapter IV, paragraphs 5-7), he may be dealt with overtly under that procedure;
- (b) if the refusal is based on grounds of character defect alone and his career will be, or is reasonably likely to be, adversely affected thereby, he should as a general rule be informed of the fact and allowed to appeal to the Head of his Department if he wishes; however, if refusal is based on mental instability or if essential supporting evidence cannot be disclosed to him, it may be undesirable to tell him of the refusal of Positive Vetting clearance (see Annex 28);

- (c) if, in the course of Positive Vetting, an individual is found to have connections with a Communist country and, on this ground, it is decided either to refuse Positive Vetting clearance or additionally that he should be removed from a Normal Vetting post, AND his career would be prejudiced as a consequence, he should be informed of the decision and that he may appeal against it and have his case brought before the Three Advisers (see Chapter IV, paragraph 29 and Annex 6);
- (d) if disciplinary action in respect of a departmental offence as opposed to the use of the disciplinary procedure in paragraph 7 of Annex 28 is taken, e.g., in respect of false information provided in a Security Questionnaire (E.93), the individual can also be told quite frankly why his posting is changed, or indeed his services may be terminated by dismissal, discharge or resignation.

39. If an individual does not fall within one of the categories in paragraph 38 above, which permit or require him to be informed of the decision, the proposed appointment should not be proceeded with, ostensibly for non-security reasons. But there is no absolute rule against giving the true reason to the individual if it seems necessary to do so and if it is possible to disclose some supporting evidence for the decision. If the individual wishes to make representations to the Head of the Department, he may be permitted to do so.

40. A Department should normally expect if at all possible to continue in its employment a person from whom Positive Vetting clearance has been withheld or withdrawn. In a Department with a small proportion of classified work this should present little difficulty but in a Department where all or nearly all posts are vettable an awkward problem can arise. The question will have to be decided whether the reasons for the withholding of a Positive Vetting clearance are serious enough for the person to be denied any access to classified information. Where a Department feels that the security objections are such that they cannot continue to employ such a person, the Treasury can be asked under the procedure set out in Annex 29 to arrange for a transfer to a non-sensitive Department. However, if such a transfer is impossible, it may in the final analysis be necessary to consider whether discharge on security grounds is warranted.

#### PROVISIONAL CLEARANCES

41. Provided the Head of the Department is personally satisfied that such access is clearly consistent with the national interest, he may permit an individual to be afforded access to information requiring Positive Vetting (para. 6) before the procedure has been completed. Such cases should be kept to a minimum; at least the first three stages of Positive Vetting should have been satisfactorily completed before access is afforded, and the full Positive Vetting investigation should be completed as soon as possible. No mention is made of provisional clearances in the regulations of the International Defence Organisations but they are probably permissible except where NATO (including ATOMAL) information is involved (see Chapter V para. 8).

POSITIVE VETTING OF HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS

42. The Positive Vetting of Heads of Departments and subsequent reviews are the responsibility of the Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and will not be undertaken by their Departments.

STAFF TRANSFERRED OR LOANED FROM ONE DEPARTMENT TO ANOTHER

43. The responsibility for ensuring that an officer transferred or loaned to another Department has a security clearance appropriate to the work on which he is to be employed rests with the receiving Department, though naturally they will have to rely in the main on the evidence supplied by the officer's former Department. For transferred staff, the Officer's personal file including Positive Vetting papers (if any) should be handed over to the receiving Department. (The Security Service should be consulted before letters exchanged with it are transferred to another Department.) For loaned Staff, if the lending Department wishes to retain the Officer's personal file and Positive Vetting papers (if any), it should allow the receiving Department to have access to them.

44. If an officer is being seconded specifically to fill a Positive Vetting post in the receiving Department, that Department should inform the supplying Department in advance that it is a Positive Vetting post. The supplying Department (unless the two Departments should agree otherwise) is then responsible for:

- (a) completing Positive Vetting before the individual is appointed;
- (b) deciding whether Positive Vetting clearance should be issued. (Where the supplying Department decides that clearance should be issued despite some security doubt thrown up by the inquiry, the receiving Department should first be consulted);

(c) notifying the receiving Department when clearance has been issued and furnishing (if the receiving Department so requests) the individual's completed Positive Vetting file for perusal;

(d) conducting periodical reviews (see paragraph 47).

ACCESS TO TOP SECRET COMINT INFORMATION

45. As a general rule (see para. 6(d)) individuals who have any access to TOP SECRET COMINT material should first be positively vetted; and Departments should seek to positively vet in advance any individual who is likely, by virtue of his post, to have access to such material or information. Exceptions to this rule should only be made in exceptional circumstances and should be authorized at an appropriately high Departmental level. Positive Vetting should be carried out as soon as possible thereafter.

CHANGES IN MARITAL STATUS

46. Departments should instruct all positively vetted staff to report marriage or remarriage. When such reports are received, a Security Service check of the new spouse should then be made (see Annex 30). Submissions of the particulars of the new spouse, together with similar particulars of the individual, should be made on a form E.81 (Annex 25), inscribed at the top: "SUPPLEMENT TO POSITIVE VETTING OF (individual's name) PARTICULARS OF SPOUSE".

REVIEW OF POSITIVE VETTING CLEARANCES

47. Positive Vetting cases should be reviewed at least every five years or annually if the individual is under twenty-one until that age is reached. The purpose of a review is to check on the period which has elapsed since the original Positive Vetting enquiries (or review) were made and, where necessary, to bring a case up to current standards.

48. The review procedure\* (see Annex 31<sup>+</sup>) is as follows:
- (a) The subject should be asked (a convenient form of request is at Annex 31 (Appendix B)):-
    - (i) to complete the latest edition of the Security Questionnaire (form E.93);
    - (ii) to give the names of his immediate supervisors over the last five years;
  - (b) All the subject's personal papers should be examined, e.g. annual confidential reports, sick leave returns and his Positive Vetting folder, as well as his personal file.
  - (c) One or more of the subject's supervising officers, and the Security Officer if the subject has been employed in an outstation, should be asked for a report in writing on the subject's general reliability and character (a suitable form of request is at Annex 31 (Appendix C)). It is left to Departments' discretion to decide how many supervisors are consulted and whether their written reports should be supplemented by discussion.
  - (d) If the written evidence requires clarification or if the Department considers it desirable, the subject should be interviewed by an appropriate member of the departmental Establishment or Security staff.

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\*Reviews which have been undertaken on the basis of D.E.O. letter 2-E.M.354/01 of 26th July 1962, (Appendix D to Annex 31) need not be reopened until the time comes to review them again, i.e. after a five year or one year interval, as appropriate.

<sup>+</sup> Annex 31 consists of the contents of two D.E.O. letters - 2/EM/701/01 of 5th June, 1964, at serial 213a ; and 2/EM/354/01 of 26th July, 1962, at serial 107a.

49. This procedure may need some modification in the case of persons under twenty-one whose cases are reviewed annually and Departments have discretion to omit (a) as well as (d) in paragraph 49 if they think the completion of a further form unnecessary.

50. If the review discloses that any of the record checks listed at Annex 31 (Appendix A.) have not been made, these should be completed. If any interviews, e.g. with referees, are necessary to bring the case up to current standards or up-to-date, the assistance of the appropriate team of Positive Vetting Investigating Officers may be sought. Departments must indicate, however, precisely what interviews are required and why. Since a subject required to give referees will normally ask the latter for permission to use their names it is undesirable, on the occasion of a review, to seek referees, or up-to-date names and addresses of referees previously nominated unless the Department has reason to believe that interviews will be necessary. Departments have therefore discretion to tell officers on the occasion of a review that they need not complete the answer to question 12 of form E.93. An answer can be sought subsequently if this appears necessary or, of course, at the time if there is prima facie reason to think that interviews will be necessary.

51. If as a result of a review, or otherwise, doubt arises about the subject's reliability, the action to be taken depends upon the basis of the doubt. If it is based upon the discovery of subversive tendencies or associations, the Department should consult the Security Service. If it arises in connection with the subject's character or conduct, the Department should arrange for the case to be investigated by the appropriate team of Positive Vetting Investigating Officers. The Investigating Officer must be informed by the Department, in detail, of the points upon which their doubts are based.



52. If the results of a review, or of a re-investigation where this is necessary, are satisfactory, Positive Vetting clearance may be confirmed.

#### SECURITY INSTRUCTION

53. It is important that persons occupying Positive Vetting posts should be given an explanation of their security responsibilities. The form which this aspect of security education should take is left to the discretion of Departments, except where posts give access to classified information bearing a restrictive security marking (e.g. ATOMIC, COMINT, or some markings of International Defence Organisations (see Chapter V, paragraphs 9 and 10)): the holders of such posts must be given specific instruction in the relevant procedures for handling documents bearing that marking and in their special responsibilities for safeguarding the information.

#### APPLICATION OF POSITIVE VETTING TO THE ARMED FORCES AND IN INDUSTRY

54. The instructions in this chapter are stated mainly in terms of civilian employees of the public service. For contractors' employees the scope of positive vetting (paragraph 6), the nature of the field investigations to be undertaken, and the standards required for clearance are the same as for civil servants and are set out below. The procedures in the Armed Forces are under review.

#### CONTRACTORS' EMPLOYEES

55. The procedure in the initial stages of positive vetting of contractors' employees is slightly different from that set out in paragraphs 16-22. Departments which have classified contracts with industrial firms should identify

firms having access to information or material in the categories listed in paragraph 6, and then ask these firms to identify (in consultation with the Security Service) the posts which require access to such information. The procedure will then be:

- (a) the firm should submit to the Department a normal vetting form marked so as to show that the individual is being put forward for Positive Vetting;
- (b) on receipt of the form a Security Service check and a check with the Criminal Record Office should be made; and (if the individual is a national of the Irish Republic or Northern Ireland) a check with Special Branch to establish any I.R.A. sympathies or connections;
- (c) if either the Security Service or the Special Branch check shows an adverse record, the Department should consider with the Security Service what further action should be taken. The Department may also consult the Security Service about the security significance to be attached to any adverse information revealed by the Criminal Record Office check. If the checks do not show any adverse record (or if the Department decides to proceed with Positive Vetting despite some adverse record) the Department should send the contracting firm a security questionnaire, E.93<sup>A</sup> (Annex 23), together with a prepaid addressed envelope marked "Personal and Confidential" asking them to ensure that the form is completed by the

individual, sealed up by him in the envelope provided, and returned to the Department. The contracting firm should be informed that it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government that special inquiries must be made to establish the reliability of those who have access to exceptionally secret information.

The remainder of the procedure then follows that described in paras. 25-36, except that letters to referees should take the form given in Annex 32.

56. If Positive Vetting clearance cannot be granted the Department must inform the contractor and invite him to consult the Department if the decision is likely to be difficult to implement. In the case of applicants for employment there should be little difficulty. When the candidate is already in employment in a non-Positive Vetting post the contractor may be unable to prevent access to the classified information for which Positive Vetting was undertaken without detriment to the candidate's career or without arousing the candidate's suspicions that clearance has been refused. If the case falls within the scope of the Industrial Purge Procedure, it may be dealt with under it (see Chapter IV, paragraphs 20-26). Where the case does not fall within the scope of the purge procedure and the individual cannot be covertly excluded from access to classified information, the Department should consider with the Security Service and the contractor what action can be taken in the circumstances.

NOTIFICATIONS TO THE SECURITY SERVICE

57. In order to ensure that a character defect of security significance is not overlooked in subsequent vetting enquiries, the Security Service has undertaken to record the particulars of certain persons, namely:

- (a) any person outside the public service (whether he was a candidate for a Positive Vetting post in the public service or elsewhere) who is refused Positive Vetting clearance on account of a character defect; or,
- (b) any person in the public service who resigns as a result of being refused Positive Vetting clearance on account of a character defect.

58. Except where the sole evidence relied upon is a conviction recorded in the Criminal Record Office (which conviction would come to light in any subsequent vetting enquiry), Departments should therefore:

- (a) retain the papers which contain particulars of the character defect; and
- (b) notify the Security Service on a form inscribed at the top "REFUSED POSITIVE VETTING CLEARANCE ON GROUNDS OF CHARACTER DEFECT BY (NAME OF DEPARTMENT)" or "RESIGNED ON REFUSAL OF POSITIVE VETTING CLEARANCE ON GROUNDS OF CHARACTER DEFECT BY (NAME OF DEPARTMENT)", (as appropriate) giving the following particulars:

Surname

Full Christian Names

Date and Place of Birth

Private Address

Occupation

Brief Details of Character Defect.

FIELD ENQUIRIES: GUIDANCE TO INVESTIGATING OFFICERS  
(Annex 24 to Revised Manual of Personnel Security Measures)

The purpose of background investigations conducted under the Positive Vetting procedure is to supply the Head of the Department with information to help him to determine the fitness of persons to occupy posts covered by the procedure. The Investigating Officer should pursue his enquiries until he is satisfied that a sufficient depth of information has been obtained to enable such a judgment to be made.

2. Each Investigating Officer will be provided by his Department with a card of identity and authority which in the course of his official enquiries he will show to police officers and others when necessary. The fact that a background investigation is being made is not secret, but information about the methods used must not be divulged to any unauthorised person.

3. Before starting enquiries the Investigating Officer will be provided with all the available background information about the person to be investigated. The documents so made available should be listed at the beginning of each report. The Investigating Officer will be told to what extent the information already available about the person is inadequate for the purpose in hand and what should be the scope of his investigation.

4. Positive Vetting is sometimes undertaken when the candidate is already known to have some kind of security record. In such cases the Investigating Officer will normally be briefed by the Security Service before he commences the field enquiries and the interview with the candidate may sometimes be delayed until the results of other field enquiries are available and have been considered in consultation with the Security Service.

5. The Investigating Officer should be thoroughly familiar with the contents of the paper "Posts covered by the Positive Vetting Procedure: Criteria for assessing trustworthiness." He should be guided by the contents of this paper in deciding on the nature of his enquiries. He should not however use it as a catalogue of points to be raised at interviews.

6. The Investigating Officer should interview the person under investigation unless instructed to the contrary. The purposes of this interview are to establish identity, to obtain some knowledge of character, and to run through and if necessary seek amplification of the answers given in the Security Questionnaire. Inspection of a passport or other official document which the person may without pressure show to the Investigating Officer may also be useful. The Investigating Officer will include in his report a physical description of the person (unless he is known to the Department) and an estimate of his character.

7. The following information, not all of which is obtainable from the Security Questionnaire, should be an object of enquiry in all investigations:-

- (a) Details of residence and occupation for at least the last ten years.

- (b) All organisations, societies or associations to which the individual may belong.
- (c) Details of the individual's close relatives (including wife or husband, parents, brothers, sisters, and former wives or husbands) and their personal particulars. If information is obtained which shows that a close relative has subversive tendencies or is otherwise unreliable, the Permanent Head of the Department will need to know the degree of contact and the nature of the personal relationship between the individual and the relative whose reliability is in doubt.
- (d) Particulars of changes of name and of any pseudonyms, pen names or aliases which the individual may be using or have used.

8. The Investigating Officer should interview at least two character referees. He should be careful to discover whether they are well acquainted with the individual and are fit persons to express such an opinion, on his/her reliability. If the investigating officer is uncertain about the referee's fitness to express such an opinion, he may seek the assistance of the local police on this matter (see paragraph 13 below) and may make such other discreet local enquiries as may help to establish whether or not the referee is a person of good character and reliability. If, in the course of interviewing a character referee or of any limited enquiries about him that may be made, the Investigating Officer acquires information which suggests that the referee has or has had Communist associations or tendencies, he should report the facts to the Department forthwith.

9. Interviews should be held with a sufficient number of the subject's present and previous employers to cover adequately his career over at least the previous ten years. It may not always be either possible or profitable to interview every employer particularly in, for example, grades such as typing grades. In the case of a young person who has not been in employment for ten years, such enquiries should be made as may be necessary to obtain sufficient information about him to enable the Head of the Department to judge his fitness to occupy a Positive Vetting post.

10. Interviews may also be held with University dons, schoolmasters, police officers and such other persons as may be able to assist the investigation.

11. Investigating Officers should not conduct interviews by telephone.

12. If information is revealed showing past or present subversive tendencies as opposed to other undesirable tendencies on the part of the individual or his close relatives, the Investigating Officer should forthwith discontinue his investigation of the case, report the facts to his Department and await further instructions.

13. Investigating Officers will be able to seek assistance from Police Forces under arrangements authorised by the Home Office and the Scottish Home Department. These arrangements are as follows:-

- (a) Investigating Officers may refer to the police on the question whether the individual and his referees and any other persons to whom they may have occasion to refer in the course of their enquiries are persons of good character and reliability.
- (b) Opinions expressed by the police will be based on information in their possession. The police will neither make special enquiries themselves nor participate in the investigations of Investigating Officers.
- (c) Security intelligence in the possession of the police is normally passed direct to the Security Service or has been imparted to them by the Security Service. Any such intelligence should have been communicated to the Department at the start of the procedure, but the police have been informed that if they have reason to suppose that relevant information of a subversive nature is not in possession of the Investigating Officer, the latter should be referred back to his Department who will get in touch with the Security Service.
- (d) Investigating Officers will not disclose, except in their reports to their Department, that there has been consultation with the police in any particular case or attribute any responsibility to the police in the matter.
- (e) Investigating Officers, when approaching the police, will address themselves in each case to the Headquarters of the Police Force concerned and not to Divisional Headquarters or other subordinate offices. It is not intended that this should rule out reference to local police if the chief officer of police agrees that such reference may be made in particular cases.

14. As a general principle the sources of information given in reports should be quoted. When detailing, for example, the educational or occupational background of an individual the Investigating Officer should state in his report whether the information was obtained from the individual or from papers in possession of the Department or whether he had been able to check from other independent sources.

15. Investigating Officers should remember that the object of the Permanent Head of the Department is to establish whether the individual is wholly fit to be trusted. Throughout the investigation care should be taken to avoid giving any impression that the Department has a preference for employees holding any particular political views.

16. INVESTIGATING OFFICERS HAVE A SPECIAL DUTY TO EXERCISE TACT IN THEIR ENQUIRIES OF THE PERSON UNDER INVESTIGATION, OF HIS REFEREES AND OF ANYONE ELSE WHOM THEY APPROACH. ANY INFORMATION WHICH INVESTIGATING OFFICERS OBTAIN MUST OF COURSE BE TREATED AS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

POSTS COVERED BY THE POSITIVE VETTING PROCEDURE:  
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING TRUSTWORTHINESS

(Annex 8 to Revised Manual of Personnel Security Measures)

1. A Permanent Head of a Department will not appoint a person to or maintain a person in a post covered by Positive Vetting unless he is satisfied that he knows enough about the person concerned to feel justified in regarding him/her as wholly fit to be entrusted with the information to which the post gives access.

2. Evidence of the following will be regarded as raising a presumption of unfitness for a post covered by the Positive Vetting procedure:-

That the individual or a parent or guardian with whom he/she is or has recently been living or his/her spouse (lawful or unlawful) -

- (a) Has committed or has attempted to commit or has aided or abetted another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason or sedition, or any breach of the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts.
- (b) Is or has been (other than as a duty) an associate of spies or saboteurs or of persons reasonably suspected of being such or of representatives of foreign Powers whose interests may be inimical to those of the United Kingdom or Commonwealth.
- (c) Is or has been a member of the Communist Party or of a Fascist organisation in the United Kingdom or any other country, or of any other subversive organisation.
- (d) Is or has been a significant sympathiser with the Communist or Fascist or other subversive ideology, or is or has been a close associate of members of the Communist Party or a Fascist organisation or of any other subversive organisation.
- (e) Has advocated revolution by violence to alter the constitution of the realm.

That the individual:

- (f) Is or has recently been a close associate of persons who, though not members of the Communist Party or Fascist organisation or any other subversive organisation, are known sympathisers with such an organisation.
- (g) Does not conform to the Nationality Rule of the Department.



- (h) Has been held captive or interned for a substantial period in Communist hands (see Annex 7).
- (i) Has deliberately omitted significant information from, or falsified, an Application Form or a Security Questionnaire.
- (j) Has been certified insane or has been legally committed to a mental home or has been treated for serious mental disorder, unless there is evidence of cure. *is suffering or has suffered from any illness, including any mental condition, which may cause a significant defect in his judgement or reliability, unless there is evidence of cure.*
- (k) Has been convicted of a criminal offence, or offences, indicating habitual criminal tendencies or serious character deficiencies.
- (l) Has been addicted to the use of alcohol or drugs habitually and to excess, unless there is evidence of rehabilitation.
- (m) Has shown himself by act or speech to be unreliable, dishonest, untrustworthy, indiscreet or of extravagant habits.
- (n) Has grossly infringed security regulations.
- (o) Has been or is reasonably suspected of being a homosexual or has engaged in infamous, immoral or disgraceful conduct such as might expose him to a blackmail approach by a hostile intelligence service.

3. Other information may have a bearing on the individual's fitness for a post covered by the Positive Vetting procedure, such as residence on the part of the individual or of his close relatives in Russia or Russian Satellite country, or association with subversive groups on the part of the individual's close relatives or former spouse or friends or associates.

4. The Permanent Head of the Department, in reaching his decision, will take into account all the available information, favourable and unfavourable, which bears on the individual's fitness for a post covered by the Positive Vetting procedure. He will not decide in favour of an individual in whose case there is a presumption of unfitness for one or more of the reasons listed in paragraph 2 or for any other reason, unless he is satisfied by the weight of the favourable information about the individual that the presumption can be disregarded without prejudice to the national security.



Treasury Chambers  
Great George Street, London S.W.1  
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 473

Our reference: 2-E.M.701/380/01  
Your reference:

5th July, 1965

6 JUL 1965

Dear Establishment Officer,

Mental Illness Criterion in Positive Vetting

The Positive Vetting criterion on mental illness contained in the Manual of Personnel Security Measures, chapter IV, annex 2, sub-paragraph 2(i) provides that a presumption of unfitness to hold a P.V. post is raised if the individual has been certified insane or has been legally committed to a mental home or has been treated for serious mental disorder, unless there is evidence of cure.

2. This wording seems to exclude from consideration a range of mental conditions which, although not necessary severe, may be highly relevant to a person's suitability for employment on exceptionally secret work. In practice however, departments already take these into account. The present wording is also inaccurate in that no one is now "certified" as insane.

3. In order to bring the wording of the presumption of unfitness into line with current policy and practice, the Personnel Security Committee have agreed that it should be revised to read as follows:-

"Is suffering or has suffered from any illness, including any mental condition, which may cause a significant defect in his judgement or reliability, unless there is evidence of cure."

4. The revised Manual of Personnel Security Measures will be amended accordingly. Any enquiries should be addressed to Treasury EM-2 Division (Extension 382).

Yours sincerely,

(T.H. Caulcott)


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Reference.....POL.F.50-24-4(120)

Note

At B.'s request, I enquired today of C.1/ Mr. Russell Jones whether the requirement stated at para.12 of the revised security questionnaire (E.93) that a referee should have been "well acquainted with the candidate in private life during the past five years" was mandatory. Was a referee, otherwise well qualified but who had known the candidate for less than five years, acceptable?

2. Russell Jones said that the Revised Manual of Personnel Security Measures, which was yet to issue, provided, inter alia, that a referee should be well acquainted with the candidate "during recent years". There was no minimum period of five years prescribed, and he did not know why para.12 of the E.93 was so worded.



D. H. Payne

B.1  
24.6.65.

On 11th June, 1965, B. discussed with B.1, B.2, and officers of B.1 and B.2 likely changes in P.V. arrangements. He explained that the recommendations of the Security Commission on the lessons to be learned from the Bossard case would probably lead to stricter standards of P.V. investigation, and it was likely that the D.G. would require, in respect of the P.V.ing of recruits to the Service, that:

- (i) interviews should be carried out with previous employers;
- (ii) in the case of staff joining straight from or not long after leaving school, interviews should be carried out with the principals of the schools;
- (iii) P.V. should be completed in respect of all recruits before joining.

He would like to examine how this might best be done and what additional staff and accommodation would be required.

2. B. said that, as far as he understood, the interviewing of previous employers would be optional at the discretion of the investigating authority. He thought that, in the case of candidates from the Armed Forces or H.M.O.C.S., it would be neither necessary nor profitable to attempt to interview the "previous employer", but, where possible, one of the character referees should be qualified, e.g. as a former superior officer, to speak with authority about the candidates work and conduct in his previous career. In all other cases, we would have to accept that it would be normal practice to interview previous employers.

3. B. said he had proposed, and he hoped the D.G. would accept, that it would not be necessary to interview school principals who were known to us and who had been briefed about our security requirements. It would be necessary to keep a careful record of these schools, and to ensure that new Headmasters and Headmistresses were made aware of our security standards. In cases where the school principal was not interviewed in respect of a particular candidate, the D.G. would probably require it to be noted in the candidate's papers that the principal concerned had been "indoctrinated", quoting the serial in the relevant file recording the "indoctrination". It was agreed that B.2/Schools should be told what briefing was to be given to school principals about our security requirements.

4. B. said that it should not be difficult to P.V. male recruits before they joined, since they were relatively few in number, and the incidence of recruiting was fairly even throughout the year. Furthermore, there was not usually the same urgency to offer an appointment as was the case with the girls. He thought, however, that it might be necessary to stop the recruitment of males during the main recruiting season for the girls from July to October each year in order not to over-tax the resources of the P.V. staff.

5. The difficulties with the girls, particularly the secretaries, were that it was essential to offer them appointments quickly,

before/.....

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before other employers, and that the greater part of the recruitment programme took place in a short period between July and October each year. It was clearly impossible to P.V. all girls sufficiently briskly to avoid losing an undue number of recruits without major changes in the present practice. Several solutions to the problem had been suggested. First, that it would be possible to take suitable recruits on the payroll and then send them on paid leave until P.V. had been completed. Secondly, that a training section should be established to receive and hold recruits until their P.V. had been completed. These two possible solutions were discussed, and it was agreed, with regard to the first, that sooner or later there would be undesirable publicity, and it might then be difficult to defend the use of public funds for such a purpose. There were several possible objections to the second proposal. It would be difficult to organise a suitable and sensible course lasting more than two weeks. Furthermore, at the height of the recruiting season, we could not expect to complete P.V. in all cases within two weeks. Arrangements to hold girls whose P.V. was not complete at the conclusion of the training course would present great difficulty. There might also be difficulty in regulating the entry of recruits to the courses.

6. After further discussion, it was agreed that Directors should be asked to consider whether any sections of their Branches could be designated "non-P.V." sections. If R.3 could be so designated, and it was difficult to see any serious objection, all registry recruits, on joining, could be posted to R.3 where they would remain until P.V. clearance had been given. Priority could then be given to secretarial recruits.

7. B2 said that, during the recruiting season, as many as fourteen girls, of whom ten would be secretaries, might be expected to join each week. If we were not to lose most of them, P.V. must be completed within three weeks from the date of the second interview. To achieve this, and at the same time to P.V. the registry girls, it was considered, on the basis that an Investigating Officer could complete seven/eight cases a month, that the strength of the permanent Investigating Officers should be increased from four to ten officers.

8. B.2 went on to say that secretaries were usually offered appointments at the second interview, and, in some instances, if they accepted, they joined almost at once. She felt that, if we delayed making the offer of appointment until P.V. had been completed as much as three weeks after the interview, we should lose many recruits. She would like the present practice of making a firm offer at the second interview to continue, save only that the date of joining should be set some three weeks after the second interview. Even then, some recruits who needed work at once would be lost. It was pointed out that there might be difficulty if a girl who had been offered an appointment, either as a secretary who was to be P.V.d before joining or as a registry girl temporarily lodged in R.3, was found, after investigation, to be unfit for P.V. clearance. B. said that the risk of a girl being refused P.V. clearance was very small indeed, and was, in his view, acceptable. Another objection put forward was that, although it was agreed that a team of ten Investigating Officers would be working all-out during the height of the recruiting season, i.e. from July to October, some officers would be less than fully employed at other times in the year. B. said that he thought it would be possible to find other useful work for Investigating Officers at slack periods.

9. In conclusion, B. said that:

- (i) consideration should be given at once to defining the minimum knowledge of

our security requirements which the Headmaster or Headmistress of a known school should possess;

- (ii) a list should be prepared forthwith of schools of which the principals had been told of our requirements as defined; *in progress*
- (iii) he would ask the D.G. to approve that Directors should be invited to consider which sections of their Branches might be declared "non-P.V." sections, and that H.R. should be similarly invited;
- (iv) he would ask the D.G. to approve the recruitment of at least four, and probably six, new Investigating Officers on a permanent basis, in addition to the ten temporary Investigating Officers for whom recruitment arrangements were already in hand;
- (v) B.1, [redacted] should consider how accommodation for an additional six permanent officers and secretarial staff might be provided in Marlborough House; *done*
- (vi) B.2 should make arrangements to provide extra secretaries for the increased establishment of Investigating Officers, i.e. an additional ten temporary officers plus six permanent Investigating Officers; *in hand*
- (vii) B.3 should be asked to include provision for additional "self-drive" cars for the new permanent Investigating Officers in the 1966-67 estimates. *??*

*Whayne*  
D. H. Payne

B.1  
23.6.65.

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274 a

EXTRACT

Extract for File No.: POL. F. 50-24-4(120) Name: Application of P.V. to the Ser. Service.

Original in File No.: [redacted] Vol.: Serial: Min 40/41 Receipt Date:

Original from: B.1/DHP, B. Under Ref.: Dated:

Extracted on: 24.6.65. by: D.H.P. Section: B.1

.....

Minute 40

.....

2. The second referee, [redacted] made an entirely favourable impression on the interviewing officer. She will not, however, be twenty-one until July this year. There is no absolute bar to a P.V. referee being a minor, but, clearly, a referee should normally be over twenty-one. In this particular case, [redacted] is nearly twenty-one and is a mature young woman of discernment with common sense and good judgment. I think, in the circumstances, we can safely accept her as a qualified referee. C.1 know of no doctrinaire objection to this.

B.1/DHP  
17.6.65.

.....

\*If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner

Minute 41

I read this file before I read your minute and having been impressed with the interview recorded at serial 37a was relieved to learn that there is no doctrinaire objection to a referee under twenty-one - nor ought there to be. I have no hesitation in accepting [redacted] or in re-affirming P.V. clearance.

B.  
23.6.65.

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....Loose Minute

268<sup>A</sup>

B.

---

I know you are anxious that we should face up to all the problems involved in our recruiting and P.V. procedures. At my request Mr. Russell Jones comments further in the attached Minute on provisional clearances and the depth of field enquiries which has become customary.

*C.A.G. Simkins*

---

C.A.G. Simkins

C.

---

2 June 1965.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

*ADG/LS  
2-6-58*



e. 266A  
 You asked me to elaborate upon two points in my attached loose minute of 24 May.

### Provisional Clearances

2. In our discussion you asked whether, in fact, there are any short term risks in recruiting staff before Stage 4 field enquiries have been completed, and if so whether they can be defined.
3. The concept of P.V. is that a person should not be put into a P.V. post until a positive judgment as to his suitability has been made and that this judgment cannot be made until an adequate depth of information about his background, career and private life has been obtained. Experience has shown, and has led to formulation of the present rules which have been approved by the Official Committee on Security, that a sufficient depth of information about an individual's private life is rarely available without the benefit of a background investigation. Thus Field Enquiries have been made mandatory. Provisional clearances are permitted on condition that Field Enquiries are completed as soon as possible but it is implicit that there is an element of risk in this.
4. Although it is possible to generalise about Field Enquiries e.g. that they do not catch spies, seldom uncover formerly unsuspected subversive connections and often fail to detect homosexuality even though they are most effective in developing information about character, it is impossible to say that they will not do these things. Field enquiries have detected people with subversive connections and significant character defects. It may be that P.V. will one day lay the foundation for the catching of a spy.
5. The short term risks which seem probable are that we may recruit
  - (a) an unrecorded Communist
  - (b) an unrecorded Unilateralist e.g. a Committee of 100 sympathiser
  - (c) a person who is dangerously indiscreet.
6. The TOP SECRET sources which would be at risk, e.g. in R.3., would include IASCAR, STILL LIFE and Secretaries' access will vary widely but may, in some cases, include other delicate matters. But even without there being any unauthorised disclosure of TOP SECRET information the damage which could flow from e.g. a Spies for Peace type disclosure could be very serious and could have international as well as national repercussions. Field enquiries will not eliminate such risks but they will reduce them and our position would, I suggest, be indefensible if we had not made such enquiries in any case which went wrong.

### Depth of Enquiries

7. I said in my loose minute that a field enquiry

/which

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which relied solely upon interviews with nominated referees would now be regarded as inadequate. In as much as interviews with previous employers are about to be made mandatory this is indisputable. But I based my statement upon the "norm" which has evolved in the practice of P.V. Investigating Officers who are required to obtain a sufficient depth of information to enable a judgment to be made; and upon the fact that nominated referees are not, as a rule, disinterested witnesses (ignoring, for the moment, the risks of collusion). Against the background I think any inspector would form a poor impression of a department which consistently confined itself to doing the permissible minimum.

*B Russell Jones*B. Russell Jones.C.1

1 June 1965

266a

B - me spoke  
A.T.

26 MAY 1965

23/5

I undertook to let you have some information following our discussion about the application of personnel security procedures, particularly Positive Vetting, to our own staff.

The Historical development of the P.V. Procedure

2. 1952/54. Only stages 1 and 2 of P.V. were mandatory.
3. The Establishments Circular No. 21/52 dated 11 March 1952 promulgated the decision to introduce P.V. It stated (para. 3) that all posts giving access to ATOMIC information, and others which gave the holder secret information of exceptional importance (to be construed narrowly) should be categorised as P.V. posts; and (para. 4) that no-one should be appointed to such a post until the procedure had been completed. At that time, however, only Stage 1 (N.V) and 2 (Security Questionnaire) were mandatory.
4. 1954/62. Only stages 1 to 3 were mandatory.
5. The general instructions on P.V. issued by Sir Edward Bridges on 31 March 1954 extended the range of P.V. to holders of posts affording regular and constant access to TOP SECRET DEFENCE information or material, and stiffened the procedure by making Stage 3 (letters to referees) mandatory. The instructions, as subsequently revised in the light of the findings of the Conference of Privy Counsellors, stated (M.P.S.M. Chapter IV, Annex 1, para. 2) that "It is difficult to lay down hard and fast rules about the application of Stage 4 (Field Investigations) since much will depend upon the opportunity for real personal knowledge of the individual who is being vetted. But in the absence of such knowledge (which in large Departments is possible in only a small minority of cases) it is important that field enquiries should be carried out."
6. Except in the Armed Services, exemptions from Stage 4 Field Enquiries on the grounds of the existence of such real personal knowledge were whittled down to the point almost of disappearance (to the best of our knowledge) by the time the Radcliffe Committee was established. Certainly the Committee was led to believe this to be the position in the Civil Service and it recommended (Cmdnd 1681 para. 97(c)) that "All three Services should follow current Civil Service practice in their field investigations" (i.e. should do Stage 4). The right to exempt from Stage 4 in certain circumstances was not specifically cancelled. Thus the draft of the Revised M.P.S.M., as approved by the Official Committee on Security, stated (Chapter III, para. 10(a)) "Very exceptionally, if the Head of the Department is satisfied that he personally has sufficient real knowledge of the individual to make a field investigation unnecessary, he may dispense with it and grant a Positive Vetting clearance after the satisfactory completion of the first three stages only. However, such exceptions are not permissible when the individual is being positively vetted for access to ATOMIC information (paragraph 6(b) and (c)), I.D.O. information (paragraph 6(d)) and certain other foreign information (see Chapter V paragraphs 5, 6, 19 and 37)." The right to exempt from Stage 4 was subsequently cancelled however by Helsby's letter of 13(?) May 1965.

/Extent of Field Investigation

Extent of Field Investigation

7. The instructions issued in March 1964 (M.P.S.M. Chapter IV, Annex 3) stated (para. 4) that "Whenever it is possible the I.O., unless instructed to the contrary, will interview the subject;" and (para. 6) that "Interviews may also be held with present or previous employer(s), character referees, university dons, police officers and such other persons as may be able to assist the investigation." Subsequently (I am trying to establish the precise date)\* para. 6 was amended (inter alia) to read: "The I.O. should interview character referees...". This reflected current practice rather than changed it.

8. In accordance with recommendations of the P.V. Working Party (1964) the instructions to Field Investigating Officers which will appear (as Annex 24) in the Revised M.P.S.M. require (para. 8) that "At least two referees should be interviewed" and (para. 9) that "Interviews should be held with a sufficient number of the subject's present (i.e. supervising officers - my interpolation) and previous employers to cover adequately his career over at least the previous ten years."

/recruitment

Why

9. The current average number of interviews in a P.V. investigation conducted by the M.O.A. is, in my experience, about four or five (i.e. subject, two referees, two previous employers or previous supervising officers). These are of course generally additional to the enquiries made as to character and general suitability by a Department or the Civil Service Commission, as the case may be. In the case of school leavers or under 21s living at home, it is usual for the I.O. to attempt to interview the candidate at home, preferably in the presence of the parents.

Provisional Clearances

10. The (old) M.P.S.M. stated (Chapter V, Appendix, para. 5) that "Provided the head of a Department is personally satisfied that such a case is clearly consistent with the national interest he may permit an individual to be afforded access to ATOMIC information before the appropriate investigation has been completed. Such cases should be kept to the minimum and their investigation should be completed as soon as possible." Although this rule applied in an ATOMIC context it was interpreted as applying a fortiori to P.V. generally. The revised M.P.S.M. states (Chapter III, para. 41) that "Provided the Head of the Department is personally satisfied that such access is clearly consistent with the national interest, he may permit an individual to be afforded access to information requiring Positive Vetting (para. 6) before the procedure has been completed. Such cases should be kept to a minimum; at least the first three stages of Positive Vetting should have been satisfactorily completed before access is afforded, and the full Positive Vetting investigation should be completed as soon as possible. No mention is made of provisional clearances in the regulations of the International Defence Organisations but they are probably permissible except where NATO (including ATOMAL) information is involved (see Chapter V, para. 8)."

11. Provisional clearances are rightly designed to take account of the unavoidable administrative facts of life but the qualification "unavoidable" should be strictly

\* 3. 1st August 1962.

/construed

- 3 -

construed. We shall probably criticise the Treasury for abusing provisional clearances by allowing as many as fifty people to take up P.V. posts before their P.V. had been completed. (I say probably because it is not at present clear over what period of time this happened).

12. When the G.C.H.Q. practice of allowing recruits to start work before completion of Stage 4 was disclosed to the Radcliffe Committee the Committee said that it "would not do", and intended to say so in their report unless G.C.H.Q. did something about it. G.C.H.Q. consulted us about streamlining their procedure and since then has operated a rule that no-one starts work in a P.V. post (all but a handful of their posts are P.V. posts) until Stage 4 has been completed. The only exceptions are those made in favour of certain classes of recruit who are very hard to come by. These constitute approximately 14% of the annual intake and of this percentage a proportion do not normally have access to TOP SECRET information e.g. Security Officers and Messengers in London. (Between August and October 1961 G.C.H.Q. lost 286 out of 500 potential recruits because they were not prepared to wait the six weeks which the P.V. enquiries then took to complete. To deal with the problem they had to increase considerably their P.V. investigating and assessing staff.

What is an acceptable standard?

13. For a Positive Vetting to be, by current standards, sufficiently thorough:

- (a) the candidate must be interviewed and taken through his curriculum vitae in detail. Evidence should be seen of his birth and of his previous service in the public service or the Armed Forces;
- (b) two referees should be interviewed who know the candidate well in his/her private life, i.e. know the home circumstances over a period of at least five years;
- (c) if the candidate is a recruit, the previous employer or, if he/she has just left school or come down from university, the school principal or university tutor, should be interviewed. If the candidate has been in the public service, some of his supervising officers over the last ten years should be interviewed.

14. I think experience has shown that written references, although useful in themselves, are not an adequate substitute for interviews with referees. I think also that an investigation would not now be regarded as adequate if the only persons interviewed were persons nominated by the candidate. Collusion between candidates and their referees can and has occurred. Indeed I have just seen a case in which there was evidence of collusion between a Treasury P.V. candidate and both of his referees, one of whom is now a Cabinet Minister.

*B Russell Jones*

B. Russell Jones.

C.1

24 May 1965

265a

Reference.....

*By XHP*

26 JUN 1965

B.

Following our discussion, I have been thinking about your problems and there are some points to which I should draw your attention.

(i) Russell Jones, who ~~was~~ is on the Personnel Security Committee's Working party which revised P.V. procedure last year, says that the Working Party thought the effect of ~~the~~ Revised Guidance to I.O.s on Field Enquiries (you have a copy) would be to raise the minimum number of interviews to be held (excluding that with the candidate himself) from two to three. Paragraph 8 says that the Investigating Officer should interview at least two character referees, and paragraph 10 that interviews should be held with a sufficient number of employers to cover adequately the subject's career for at least ten years. Prima facie it is not sufficient to have written references covering either the man's career or his private life, since people will say things viva voce which they will not put on paper. I appreciate that ~~the~~ in the case, e.g., of an officer from the overseas service one referee may be able to cover both the man's career and his private life.

(ii) The purpose of a P.V. interview is to bring a case up to present day standards as well as to check on the period which has elapsed since the original enquiries. (D.E.O. letter of 5th June 1964) Where the original clearance was not based on what would now be regarded as sufficient depth of information, the enquiries should be carried further back than five years. You will note that there is a requirement (para.2(c) ) to consult at least one supervising officer on the subject's general reliability and character. Looking at Annex C. I think that, at least in the case of officers, this is sufficiently met by our confidential reports.

*Same women as*

(iii) As ~~Stage~~ Stage IV is not completed until after staff join, I have asked C.I. for a note about the doctrine on provisional clearances. I have an uneasy recollection that the Radcliffe Committee told G.C.H.Q. that they must complete Stage IV before people join in virtually all cases.

*C.A.G. Simkins*

C.  
21.5.65.

C.A.G. Simkins.

263A

NOTE

On 20th May 1965 Director B. discussed with Director C. the theory and practice of P.V. as applied to Security Service staff. B.1 and B.1/DHP were present. The object was to seek C.'s opinion of the standards of P.V. investigation in the Service in relation to those prescribed for P.V. investigations in government departments. It was agreed that, although our P.V. investigations had been designed to satisfy the requirements set out in Chapter IV of the current Manual of Personnel Security Measures, it would be prudent to ensure that we were complying with the latest doctrine, and to base the discussion on the proposed redraft of Annexe 3 to Chapter IV which was prepared by C.1 in December 1964 and which incorporated points made by the working party of the Personnel Security Committee. (A copy of the redraft is at 263b.) The standards for the review of P.V. had followed those set down in the Treasury D.E.O. letter 2-E.M. 701/01 of 5th June 1964. (Serial 213 refers).

2. B. then commented on the various paragraphs of the revised Schedule 3, "Field Enquiries: Guidance to Investigating Officers", first with regard to the P.V. of new staff on recruitment, and secondly with regard to the review of P.V. of staff in post. At the conclusion, C. said that, in his opinion, the steps taken to P.V. new staff satisfied in full the prescribed standards laid down for investigation and constituted clearance to Stage IV. The following points of detail were made:

(i) Para.6. B. said that the B.Branch Investigating Officers who were engaged in the interviewing of referees did not themselves normally interview a candidate for P.V. All recruits, however, were subject to a minimum of two interviews by other officers of B.1 or B.2. during the selection process. In the case of girls, the second interview was, in part, a formal P.V. interview because the B.2 interviewing officer took the candidate through the revised security questionnaire (E.93) which she completed, taking the opportunity to clear up any points of P.V. interest which might not have been clarified during the first interview, or which had arisen in the course of routine enquiries. Arrangements for male officers followed a similar pattern, with the additional safeguard that Officer candidates also appeared before a Selection Board, where the candidate's security fitness was considered specifically by the Board. It could reasonably be said that these arrangements ensured that all the information required of a candidate at a formal P.V. interview, and much more, was invariably obtained about any recruit for any post in the Security Service. C. said that, in his opinion, these arrangements amply satisfied the requirement that there should be an interview with a P.V.candidate.

(ii)/

- 2 -

(ii) Para.8. B. said that it was the invariable practice to interview two character referees. There was no doubt that the quality of the reports of these interviews was such as to satisfy the highest standards. He would, however, be grateful for C.'s opinion of the long-standing arrangement whereby, if the character referee were a responsible member of the staff of the Security Service, with a sufficient knowledge of the theory and practice of P.V., a full length report of the interview was not made. He thought it was sufficient if a covering note was attached to the completed P.V. questionnaire to the effect that the interviewing officer had satisfied himself that the referee was fully conversant with P.V. and was qualified, by personal knowledge of the candidate, to express an opinion of his fitness for P.V. clearance. If a member of the staff nominated a referee who was not fully conversant with P.V., a detailed report in the standard style was completed and entered. C. said that, in his opinion, P.V. interviews with members of the staff conducted on these lines were entirely acceptable in form and content. In response to a further question, he confirmed that there was no bar against a P.V. candidate nominating a colleague as a character referee.

(iii) Para.9. B. explained that it was not the normal practice to interview previous employers when examining recruits for P.V. fitness. There were practical reasons for this. In the case of girls, most came to us straight from school or from secretarial college, with most of which we had long established relations. Where they had had previous employment, we invariably asked the last employer for a character reference in writing, setting out the points on which we would like the employer to comment. The majority of Officers and of officers Class B. recruited during the past ten years had come to us from the Overseas Civil Service or from the Armed Forces. In such cases we always obtained a written confidential report from the Resettlement Bureau in the case of HMOCS officers and, in the case of officers joining us from the Armed Services we drew either the man's papers or obtained from the appropriate security department an assurance that there was nothing on record to suggest that the officer might be considered unfit for employment with us. In all other cases a written reference was obtained from the last employer. In addition, it was often the case that a character referee nominated by a candidate was able to cover his service career as well as his private life. If the response to any request for a reference from

a/



- 3 -

a previous employer or from a school was equivocal, or if a reference was refused, it was the invariable practice to follow up the letter by further enquiries including if necessary a visit by a B.Branch officer. C. said that, in his opinion, the arrangements made had satisfied the requirements laid down, but in the light of the higher standards likely to be introduced, consideration should be given to interviewing former employers in cases where the recruit had not come from a civil or military service.

(iv) Para.13. B. explained that in the case of recruits resident in the provinces and in addition to the SB/CRO check applied to all recruits, we always asked the local police to make an enquiry about his/her fitness for employment. Any adverse report, or any report which was not entirely favourable, was invariably followed up, or the candidate was denied employment without further ado. C. said that he considered these arrangements to be satisfactory.

3. B. then described the arrangements for P.V. review prescribed by the Treasury instructions (serial 213a). He said that, in the case of many older members of the staff, interviews had not always been carried out with two character referees. Arrangements were being made to remedy this as quickly as possible, and it was hoped that the task would largely be completed by the end of the year. P.V. clearance was reviewed annually for each member of the staff in a P.V. post. All had completed, or would complete during the coming few months, the latest edition of the security questionnaire. In the case of subordinate staff, the questionnaire was completed in the presence of and with the help of a B. Branch officer. Officers and Assistant Officers and staff of similar status completed the questionnaire without direct supervision, although each was told individually that B.Branch was very ready to answer any query which might arise. The reviewing officer examined each Record of Service in detail and noted any defect, e.g. a Personal Particulars form not having been completed. Unless the officer concerned was overseas, every effort was made to correct defects, other than the interviewing of character referees, on the occasion of the review. Supervising officers were not interviewed. First, all supervisors in the Security Service were educated in security matters to a degree unknown in any other government department and would undoubtedly have reported anything of security interest. Secondly, each supervisor has to answer the following question when completing the annual report for a subordinate: "Have you any reason to doubt his/her continued fitness to be entrusted with TOP SECRET information?". C. said that, in the special circumstances of the Security Service, he thought an interview with a supervising officer was unnecessary.

4/.

- 4 -

4. B. said that he would like guidance on another matter. He said he had heard that the Security Commission might well recommend that when an officer was seconded the receiving department should be given his P.V. file. We did not keep P.V. files as such. The Record of Service of every member of the staff was comprehensive in that it included all the written information about him or her which was available. This included reports of P.V. field enquiries, and other P.V. documents, such as the security questionnaire. He would like to know whether it was likely to become mandatory to maintain separate P.V. files for staff in P.V. posts and, if not, whether in the case of Security Service staff seconded to other government departments it would be sufficient to supply copies of papers in the Record of Service relevant to P.V. C. said that he thought it likely that the Security Commission would recommend that a man's P.V. papers should follow him on secondment to another department. There was no requirement laid on departments to maintain separate P.V. files although clearly in the larger departments where there was a security department separate from the personnel department, P.V. files had to be maintained apart from the records held in the latter. He thought that B.'s proposal to supply copies of P.V. papers, suitably annotated where necessary, in respect of any member of the staff who was seconded was sensible and would be acceptable. B. said that he had long held the view that our arrangement of using the Record of Service as a P.V. file had much to commend it in that it ensured that the D.G. or any other officer reviewing P.V. clearance had on hand every available scrap of information on record. C. said that he endorsed B.'s opinion.

B.1.  
24.5.65.

Copied to. WH06/1924

COPY. (Original on Pol.F.310/4,  
vol.6, 420b).

Treasury Chambers,  
Great George St.,  
London, S.W.1.

258B

CONFIDENTIAL.

30th April 1965.  
(Rec'd 4.5.65).

B

B1

RA

Dear Hollis,

Positive Vetting.

I am writing about three aspects of positive vetting procedure which have recently been considered by the Official Committee on Security.

1. Field Enquiries - Stage 4.

Under the instructions of 31st March 1954 on positive vetting, Departments had discretion to dispense with Stage 4 where there was real personal knowledge of the individual who was being vetted. Subsequently, the procedure was tightened up, and in practice most Departments now carry out the Stage 4 enquiries in all cases. There has never been any formal instruction on this point however (save in relation to Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries) and the Official Committee decided that it would now be appropriate to introduce the rule that Stage 4 is not to be dispensed with in any circumstances.

From now on therefore the carrying out of Stage 4 is to be mandatory for all those subjected to positive vetting.

The Manual of Personnel Security Measures will be amended accordingly.

2. Criminal Record Office Reports.

It has come to notice that the information about a previous conviction furnished by the Criminal Record Office may be inadequate for a decision to be taken whether P.V. clearance should be given. The Official Committee decided that where a Criminal Record Office check disclosed a conviction, but where it was desirable to ascertain whether the police had any additional information before a final decision was taken.

The necessary procedure is now being worked out, in consultation with the Home Office, and Departments will be told as soon as this has been done.

In the meantime, I should be grateful if you would hold up the decision in any P.V. case where the Criminal Record Office check has disclosed a conviction but it is nevertheless considered that the case may be one in which clearance could be given.

3. Suppression or Falsification of Information.

Among the criteria for assessing trustworthiness (Manual of Personnel Security Measures, Chapter IV, Annex 2) one of the points to be regarded as raising a presumption of unfitness for P.V. clearance is stated as follows: "Has deliberately omitted significant information from, or falsified, an Application Form or a Security Questionnaire".

/Dishonesty...

Sir Roger H. Hollis, C.B., O.B.E.

Dishonesty in completing an application form or a security questionnaire may well be more significant as an indication of unreliability than the information which has been suppressed, and the presumption of unfitness that it raises should be treated very seriously. I am taking this opportunity of emphasising the point, and asking you to see that it is given full weight in deciding P.V. cases.

Yours sincerely,

Sgd. L.M.Helsby.

257a

Reference Copy on POLR 50-24-4(120)

Extract from Minute Sheet,

With reference to minutes 60 and 61, I have read through the relevant papers about subject of RS 1451 which are perfectly satisfactory as far as they go. I note however that there is no specific reference in either of the interview reports at 50a and 55a to the question of homosexuality. I should like to know whether specific questions were put to the two referees on this subject, and I think you should see that the field enquirers do this in each case and record the answer in the report.

D.G.  
31.3.65.

Code 18-76

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DHP

Wlee.

PLEASE NOTE IN FOLDER WHERE THIS CIRCULAR IS FILED

SECRET

2562



Treasury Chambers  
Great George Street, London S.W.1  
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 473

Our reference: 2-E.M.700/874/01

Your reference:

18th March, 1965

Dear Establishment Officer,

22 MAR 1965

Criminal Record Office Checks

? in Ref 310/11

Arrangements already exist (see D.E.O. letters of 29th July, 1960, 13th May, 1964 and 2nd July, 1964) for checks with the Criminal Record Office as part of the normal vetting process. Thus all vetted staff with access to classified information are now checked with the Criminal Record Office as a "once for all" operation. Positive vetting cases are, of course, reviewed every five years (annually if under 21) but under present rules, if a Criminal Record Office check has already been made, this check is not repeated at review.

2. All staff are now required (see our D.E.O. letter of 7th October, 1964) to report to their Department if they are convicted of any criminal offence apart from certain traffic offences; and if an officer fails to do so it is both an offence against departmental rules and may be of security interest. Arrangements have therefore been made with the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the Criminal Record Office to report to Departments with positively vetted staff any conviction which recorded in future against an individual who is known to be a member of that Department. In the case of a convicted person known to be a civil servant but whose Department is in doubt, the Criminal Record Office will contact the Treasury.

3. Our D.E.O. letters of 29th July, 1960 and 13th May, 1964 said that the Treasury should be consulted before any overt action was taken with an individual which might lead to the discovery of the Criminal Record check and perhaps the normal vetting process. It has been necessary to decide whether a similar requirement exists in connection with the new "after care" arrangements and the opportunity has been taken to review the necessity for consultation with the Treasury at the time of the initial check also.

4. The matter is a complicated one. In the first place the circumstances of the individual concerned may differ greatly: for instance he may be in or a candidate for a N.V. post, or he may be in or a candidate for a P.V. post. Secondly, the Department may or may not be able to obtain a press report of the conviction. And thirdly, the Department may or may not be able to deal with the matter by unobtrusive means e.g. an administrative transfer from sensitive to non-sensitive work. All these factors have a bearing on how the matter should be handled. We feel therefore it would be virtually

/impossible

The Establishment Officer

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impossible to produce sufficiently comprehensive guidance for us to be able to delegate to all Departments discretion to handle cases arising as a result of information from the Criminal Record Office. We are however satisfied that the Departments represented on the Personnel Security Committee - which are also the Departments with the biggest vetting problems - can handle these cases in a way which would protect both the confidentiality of the C.R.O. check and of normal vetting.

5. Accordingly, Departments not represented on the Personnel Security Committee should continue to consult the Treasury before taking any overt action which might be attributed to the discovery of a criminal record (whether on initial check with the Criminal Record Office or as a result of the after care arrangements).

6. Departments represented on the Personnel Security Committee have discretion to deal with cases where a previous conviction is revealed and further action appears necessary without consulting the Treasury, provided they handle the matter on the lines suggested in the next paragraph.

7. These Departments should note the following points:-

- (i) It is most important to ensure that there is no question of mistaken identity. All the previous papers on the person concerned should be carefully scrutinised and where there is any doubt departments have found the C.R.O. willing to supply a description of the person concerned.
- (ii) The individual may be taken through his answers on Form E 93 or through his application to join the Department where one is used. He may be asked more generally whether anybody else is likely to be in a position to question his fitness for employment.
- (iii) Staff responsible for conducting interviews in these cases should be instructed not to press the interview too far. Should there be any difficulties there is always the real possibility of an error in identification to justify bringing the interview to an end.

/(iv)

SECRET

SECRET

- (iv) It is useful to have on hand a Press Report of the conviction where this is possible, but there may be cases where it would be inadvisable even to produce a Press Report; for instance where the conviction was some years old. Departments should accordingly aim at eliciting an admission before producing any evidence to collaborate the charge. A Certificate of Conviction obtainable on request from the Court where the conviction took place will not of itself serve to explain how the Department came to know of the conviction, and should be used with discretion.
- (v) Where the individual admits the conviction in the course of interview it may be helpful for him to have advice on the reason he may give if he is questioned by his colleagues or immediate superiors as to why he was called for interview at the security/establishment branch.
- (vi) It may be appropriate in some cases to ask whether there has been any attempt at blackmail and to advise on the action which the individual should take if anybody attempts to bring pressure to bear on him in the future.
- (vii) Departments should ensure that where the conviction comes first to notice of the Establishments Branch the Security Branch is consulted before any action is taken.
- (viii) In any case where they are in doubt as to the advisability of further action, or where an interview has proved abortive and the conviction was for a serious offence, they should consult the Treasury.

8. Any enquiries should be addressed to Mr. A. Duke, extension 609.

Yours sincerely,

(T. H. CAULCOTT)



CONFIDENTIAL

254a

NOTE FOR TALK TO A.4. OFFICERS WITH REGARD TO  
POSITIVE VETTING REVIEW

As you may know, the Government accepted all the recommendations in the report of the Radcliffe Committee on security procedures in the public service. One of these recommendations was that the clearance of officers currently in posts subject to Positive Vetting should be reviewed at regular intervals. As you may know, Positive Vetting clearance is required if an officer has constant and regular access to Top Secret information. It follows that almost all members of the Security Service are in P.V. posts. Instructions have since issued from the Treasury about the ways and means of carrying out the review and in common with other Government Departments, we are in the process of reviewing the fitness for P.V. clearance of those members of our staff who are in P.V. posts. This means that in common with staff serving in other sections, all A.4. officers will be subjected to P.V. review proceedings which the D.G. has directed should be applied throughout the Security Service. Usually the P.V. status of our staff is examined annually on the occasion of their annual reports, but for administrative convenience we shall be treating A.4. as a bloc and will aim to complete your P.V. review within a matter of months.

2. The immediate purpose of Positive Vetting review is to bring each case up to current standards which have been laid down by the Treasury. This means, firstly, that we shall be asking each of you to complete the new Security Questionnaire. Secondly, we shall arrange for each of you to have a P.V. interview. Thirdly, we shall be undertaking full field enquiries in respect of almost every one of you. These enquiries must include two interviews with suitable referees, who know you well and you will be asked to nominate them.

3. This sounds to be, and is, a formidable task and in conjunction with B. Branch I have arranged that a B. Branch officer, one of the P.V. Investigating Officers, should be assigned to the task of conducting P.V. interviews and the field enquiries for the whole of A.4. In view of the amount of work involved and the need to complete it as speedily as possible, [redacted] will be giving a hand with the P.V. interviews and the other Investigating Officers in B. Branch will help [redacted] with the heavy task of interviewing referees. I know that you will find [redacted] and [redacted] ready and willing to give you all possible help in completing the somewhat complex Security Questionnaire and in selecting suitable referees.

4. I should like to say a word about the selection and qualifications of the referees. We appreciate that because of the nature of the work in A.4. you may find it difficult to nominate two referees who have known you well enough over the last five years to answer to our satisfaction the searching questions about you that the P.V. procedure requires should be put to them. To help meet these difficulties, we are ready to accept as one of your referees a colleague in the Service who knows you well in and out of the office. For the second, we would prefer an outsider, but if you are quite unable to produce one, we will be prepared to consider accepting another colleague as a second referee. The second point about the referees is that because you work irregular hours, you have all had to give some satisfactory "cover" story about your employment to satisfy the curiosity of friends and neighbours. In some cases, your friends and acquaintances may not know or suspect that you are, in fact, in Government Service. The "cover" stories will have infinite variations and [redacted] will be particularly careful to ensure that the approach to your referees is made in a way that fits with your "cover" story.

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ACT 1958 July 2022

5./...

Copied to

316-8-10

5. I have called you together to describe in some detail the arrangements we have made for the Positive Vetting review of A.4., because we know from experience that it can be irritating for a member of the staff of some years standing to be subjected to the formalities of examination, or re-examination, for fitness for P.V. clearance. It remains, however, as you will appreciate, that we must reach a standard of P.V. review in this Service which is at least as good as the best which can be attained in any other Government Department. I know that [redacted] and I can count on you to be as helpful as possible to [redacted] who will be starting work in A.4. early in March.

D. H. Payne.

B.1.  
26th February 1965

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ACT 1958 July 2022

249b.

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THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958.

P67-50-24-4(120)

~~Bi/DHP~~

I imagine C.I. have their own copy, don't you?



Yes to  
13/1

Treasury Chambers  
Great George Street, London S.W.1  
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 609

13/1

249a

Our reference: 2-E.M. 700/316/02

Your reference:

12th January, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

13 JAN 1965

Dear Establishment Officer,

MANUAL OF PERSONNEL SECURITY MEASURES

The printing of a revised version of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures is now in hand. The revision was undertaken by a Working Party of the Departments mainly concerned with security matters and the Manual has been completely re-written in narrative form. The main instructions now form a set of annexes at the end.

2. It is important that the Manual should be available for regular use by those responsible in Departments for personnel security matters, but normally circulation should be limited to those who need to have access to the original instructions. The matters with which the Manual deals will be of concern to all Departments with vetted staff, not only to those with positively vetted staff.

3. I should be grateful if you would let me know how many copies you will require for Departmental use. When the revised Manual is issued we shall be asking for the return of all copies of the existing Manual.

Yours sincerely,

(A. DUKE)

The Establishment Officer

2426

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THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958.

R Ksee h 23/10

P.A. or SP. 50/24/4(120).

B1/24/10

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234a



Treasury Chambers  
Great George Street, London S.W.1  
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 473

2-E.M. 701/01

Our reference: 2-E.M. 704/06

Your reference:

22nd October, 1964

23 OCT 1964

Dear Establishment Officer,

Positive Vetting: Medical Aspects

During the course of field enquiries it sometimes comes to light that an individual has suffered, or is suffering, from some form of mental disorder. The sort of thing we have in mind is not a serious illness of the kind which might lead to premature retirement. Nor is it the discovery of a medical circumstance (e.g. addiction to the use of alcohol or drugs habitually and to excess) which is in itself a character defect and which if known might be exploited. It is rather the discovery of some neurosis or abnormality (past or present) which does not prevent a man from doing his normal work satisfactorily, but which might make it unwise to give him a positive vetting clearance because the burden of consciously and continuously having to protect much highly classified information might in certain circumstances prove too much for him.

2. In some such cases (e.g. where the man himself volunteers the name of a reputable psychiatrist as a referee) the matter may easily be resolved. But in other cases the department may have difficulty in obtaining expert medical advice either because of lack of knowledge as to whom to approach or because of fear of impinging on confidentiality between doctor and patient. Or, having obtained medical advice, the Department may find it difficult to interpret it or to assess its relevance to security.

3. The purpose of this letter is to let Departments know that if they cannot obtain the advice they want from their own resources they may consult the Treasury Medical Adviser (Sir Walter Chiesman). Some Departments already do this but others may not be aware that he is conversant with the way in which positive vetting cases are handled.

4. Approaches to Sir Walter Chiesman can be made to him direct at Tilbury House, Petty France, London, S.W.1., but it would be helpful if Departments would note two points:-


- (a) Unless there are good reasons to the contrary Sir Walter Chiesman should be shown the full positive vetting report and not just a particular medical reference.

/(b)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- (b) Having seen the papers, Sir Walter Chiesman will not make any formal report on paper but will discuss with the Department the significance of the point referred to him.



(J. J. B. Hunt)

CONFIDENTIAL



*D. 10 see para in our B Branch Pr file.  
I don't think this affils our own procedures.*

Treasury Chambers  
Great George Street, London S.W.1  
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 473

*6/7  
222A*

Our reference: 2-E.M.701/05  
Your reference:

2nd July, 1964

SECRET

3 - JUL 1964

Restricted Circulation

Dear Establishment Officer,

Personnel Security

It has been decided that the distinction in personnel security procedures between the access given to defence and other classified information should be removed. The background to this decision is contained in the paper (S(O)(64)11) by the Chairman of the Official Committee on Security, a copy of which was sent on 13th April to all Departments receiving this letter. Departments are accordingly asked to revise their procedures as follows.

Normal vetting

2. Reference should be made to the Criminal Record Office in all normal vetting cases, and not only, as hitherto, in those cases where the individual will have access to classified defence information. As the consequent increase in the number of references to the Criminal Record Office will involve some additional risk to the confidentiality of the normal vetting procedure, Departments should bear in mind that the Treasury must be consulted before overt action, which might lead to the existence of the Criminal Record Office check becoming known, is taken in such cases, (paragraph 3 of D.E.O. letter of 29th July, 1960)

Purge procedure

3. The scope of the purge procedure will extend to the exclusion of untrustworthy persons from economic and political secrets as well as from defence secrets.

Positive vetting

4. Departments should, in future, subject to positive vetting all candidates for, or occupants of, posts in which the duties require regular and constant access to Top Secret information of any kind.

5. Any enquiries should be addressed to Mr. F.H.C. Wyatt, Extension 382.

Yours sincerely,

(J. J. B. HUNT)



SECRET

220a



Seen by B.

P.A. SF 50/24/a(120)

Treasury Chambers  
Great George Street, London S.W.1  
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext.

Our reference: 2-E.M. 700/197/04  
Your reference:

29th June, 1964

Dear Establishment Officer,

1 - JUL 1964

List of Organisations of Security Interest

Our D.E.O. letter 2-E.M.701/01 of 5th June, 1964<sup>-213a</sup> about reviews of positive vetting cases referred (Annex A, paragraph 6) to a list of subversive organisations.

2. This list, which is better described as a "List of Organisations of Security Interest", has hitherto been given only a limited distribution by the Security Service. It has been decided, however, that all Departments which have to take decisions in P.V. cases might find it useful and that it should be distributed accordingly.

3. Departments are asked to acknowledge receipt of the attached copy on the tear-off slip below and to restrict access to the list to central Establishment and Security staff who have personnel security responsibilities.

4. The list will be revised and reissued from time to time. Departments will then be asked to return their copies of the previous edition. Departments which possess copies of the 1961 edition are asked to return them to the Security Service.

Yours sincerely,

(A. Duke)

List  
destroyed (4710073)  
12.11.76  
gm  
B2.

The Establishment Officer

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

P.V. Number .....

Name .....

Grade .....

Present branch/establishment .....

1. Do you confirm that he served under your control  
from ..... to .....

Yes/No

2. What is your assessment of his character and conduct during the  
time you were acquainted with him. A brief pen-picture would  
be helpful.

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

3. Are you aware of any circumstances concerning his character or  
conduct which might cast doubt on his reliability for employment  
by the Government on work of a secret nature? If the answer is  
"yes" please give details.

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

Date .....

Signature .....

.....  
(branch or establishment)



~~Bil DHP~~ — To note.  
to  
Treasury Chambers  
Great George Street, London S.W.1  
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 1025/9.

Our reference: 2-E.M. 701/269/01  
Your reference:

24th September, 1964

Dear Establishment Officer,

25 SEP 1964

Positive Vetting : Form E.93

Our 'D.E.O. letter' of 28th July, 1964, announced that a revised version of form E.93 was available.

I am sorry to have to ask you to correct a printer's omission in line 3 of Question 13(b):-

after "the Army Act,"  
insert "or the Air Force Act,"

This amendment will only be necessary on stocks of the form at present in your department; new supplies from H.M.S.O. will be a corrected reprint.

Yours sincerely,

(A. DUKE)

The Establishment Officer

## SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE

Your (prospective) employment puts you in touch with information of outstanding importance from the point of view of security and the Government have decided that special enquiries must be made about the reliability of those in such employment. In order that these enquiries may be made you are asked to complete this questionnaire in ink or typescript. The enquiries which will be made will not necessarily be confined to the former or present employers and character referees named in your answers to questions 8 and 12. If for any reason you are unable to give all the particulars precisely please give as much information as you can, using if necessary the additional space on Page 4.

## Part I: PLEASE COMPLETE THIS PART IN BLOCK CAPITALS

Particulars	Self	Wife/Husband*	Father†	Mother‡
<b>1. SURNAME</b>				
(a) Now				
(b) At birth if different and any other surname(s) used—including maiden name and any former married name(s)				
<b>2. FULL CHRISTIAN/FORE NAMES</b>				
<b>3. ADDRESSES</b>		‡	‡	‡
(a) Full permanent home address and telephone No.				
(b) Temporary address—if any—and telephone No.				
(c) Other addresses in the United Kingdom during the last 5 years with dates				
(d) Other addresses outside the United Kingdom AT ANY TIME for more than 6 months WITH DATES IN EACH CASE				
	<b>PRESENT MARRIAGE</b>		<p><b>NOTES ON COMPLETION</b></p> <p>* Please give corresponding details on Page 4 of any former wife or husband.</p> <p>† If you were brought up by step-parent(s), guardian, parent-by-adoption or anyone acting as a parent please give corresponding details on Page 4.</p> <p>‡ If deceased state year of death.</p> <p><b>DETAILS OF ANY CHANGE OF ADDRESS AND NOTIFICATION OF ANY FUTURE MARRIAGE OR REMARRIAGE SHOULD BE SENT TO YOUR ESTABLISHMENT OFFICER IMMEDIATELY.</b></p>	
	Date :	Place :		
<b>4. NATIONALITY</b>				
(a) Now				
(b) At birth, if different. If naturalized state Number and Date of Certificate				
(c) If not of British nationality is it intended to apply for naturalization ?				
<b>5. DATE OF BIRTH</b>				
<b>6. PLACE OF BIRTH</b> including County, State and Country				
<b>7. PRESENT OCCUPATION</b>				

**THIS DOCUMENT IS GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND WILL BE TREATED IN CONFIDENCE AT ALL STAGES**

**8. EMPLOYMENT**

Give full particulars WITH DATES of your employment, including service in Government Departments, during the last 5 years.

<i>Name and Address of Employer</i>	<i>Nature of Employment</i>	<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>

**9. H.M. FORCES**

If you have served in the Armed Forces please state :

Service..... Rank..... Official No.....

**10. RELATIVES LIVING ABROAD**

Have you any relative by blood or marriage who is living in or has lived in a country having, at the time of residence, a Communist or Fascist Government ? If so, please give such particulars as you can, including name, age, relationship, nationality and address (with dates).

**11. FOREIGN TRAVEL**

If you have AT ANY TIME visited a country having, at the time of the visit, a Communist or Fascist Government give FULL details below.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Reason for Visit</i>	<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>

**12. CHARACTER REFEREES**

Give particulars of two British Subjects (NOT relatives) resident in the United Kingdom\* who have been well acquainted with you in private life during the past 5 years. It is not sufficient to nominate someone you know in an official or professional capacity, such as your doctor, unless you know him socially as well.

Full Name : ..... Full Name : .....

Occupation : ..... Occupation : .....

Full Address : ..... Full Address : .....

Telephone No. : ..... Telephone No. : .....

\* If resident overseas in the past 5 years, give particulars of two British Subjects who have known you abroad.

Part 2: QUESTIONS 13 TO 16 WHICH COMPRISE THIS PART SHOULD ALL BE ANSWERED 'YES' OR 'NO' IF THE ANSWER TO ANY QUESTION IS 'YES', FULL PARTICULARS MUST BE GIVEN. YOU MAY CONTINUE THE ANSWER ON PAGE 4 IF NECESSARY.

13. OFFENCES AGAINST THE LAW

Answer 'Yes' or 'No'

(a) Have you ever been charged before any Court with an offence of which you have not been acquitted, even though you may only have been absolutely or conditionally discharged or placed on probation or bound over ?

.....

(b) Have you ever been convicted by a Court Martial or Service Disciplinary Court, or sentenced summarily to detention and/or dismissed under the Naval Discipline Act, the Army Act, or while serving in any Commonwealth or Foreign Armed Forces ?

.....

see  
ref

NOTE : In answering Questions 14 and 15 you should take into account not merely your own belief but also the sort of opinion which is generally held of the organisation or person in question, even if you do not endorse that opinion. The word " Communists " embraces Trotskyists for the purposes of this form. An affirmative answer will not necessarily disqualify you from appointment, but since it is Government policy that no one may be employed on Secret work if he is judged unreliable, it must be taken in consideration.

14. (a) Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party in the United Kingdom or elsewhere ?

.....

(b) Have you ever been a member of any organisation associated with the Communist movement or in sympathy with it ?

.....

(c) Have you ever had any connection with a Communist Party anywhere ?

.....

(d) Have you ever had any connection with any organisation associated with a Communist Party or in sympathy with its aims ?

.....

(e) Have you ever been a close associate of a person who to your knowledge is, or has been, a Communist or Communist sympathiser ?

.....

15. (a) Have you ever been a member of a Fascist organisation in the United Kingdom or elsewhere ?

.....

(b) Have you ever been a member of any organisation associated with the Fascist movement or in sympathy with it ?

.....

(c) Have you ever had any connection with a Fascist organisation anywhere ?

.....

(d) Have you ever had any connection with any organisation associated with the Fascist movement or in sympathy with its aims ?

.....

(e) Have you ever been a close associate of a person who to your knowledge is, or has been, a Fascist or Fascist sympathiser ?

.....

16. Are you aware of any circumstances not covered by your answers to the questions in Parts 1 and 2 above which might cause your fitness for employment on Secret work to be questioned ?

.....

Part 3: CERTIFICATE

I CERTIFY THAT the information given on this form is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief and that I shall notify any material changes in this information. I understand that any false statement or omission may disqualify me for employment, or make me liable for disciplinary action, which may include dismissal.

Date.....

Signature .....

In Confidence

SPACE FOR FURTHER INFORMATION—If you need to amplify your reply to any question please do so on this page noting against your entry the number of the relevant question.

CABINET OFFICE,  
WHITEHALL,  
S.W.1

20 OCT 1964

*With the*  
*Secretary's Compliments*  
Sir Roger Hollis,  
C. B., O. B. E.



3

