

POL F 316-8-1 / V4

File 316-8-1 / V4

SECURITY SERVICE STAFF - POLICY ON
POSITIVE VETTING OF STAFF JOINING
THE SECURITY SERVICE

FILE CLOSED

S Form 924

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date	Serial No	Star Designation	Date
<p>KV4 / 487</p>								

S. 960 Edn2

S Form 238D 10m 5/74

FILE HELD BY

BR

POL F 316-8-1 FILE CLOSED / V4

288.

D.G. through D.D.G.

1. Please see Minute 285 and the draft there referred to at 284a. I have redrafted the Appendix to the latter and my redraft is at 287a. In drafting paragraph 3 of the latter I have considered, as instructed, the papers at 283b. With all due respect to the M.O.A. and the procedure which they feel it necessary to adopt, I think that their experience is irrelevant to our position. In our experience the Security Branches of the Service Departments have no inhibitions about revealing derogatory information of any kind to this Service and this is particularly the case when the individual concerned is a candidate for employment. It is inconceivable, for example, that the Air Force Department should fail to disclose to us that an officer had been court martialled for drunkenness or any similar offence.

Copied to 316-8-6
2. Please also see at 286a a minute from E. in which he deals with the possibility of receiving staff into his Branch before P.V. has been completed. It seems to me that except in the Training Section all staff in E.Branch should have been P.V. cleared before they go there. I assume that other Directors and H.R. will have addressed you direct on this topic. So far as B.Branch is concerned, I think that all the junior secretarial and clerical posts could be thrown open to staff whose P.V. has not been completed.

In answer

B.

27.7.65

289

D.G.

Copied to 316-8-6

I have somewhat amended the draft at 284a, in part to take account of the fact that the new Manual has now been issued. I have added to it a paragraph about provisional clearances. In my view P.V. ought to have been completed up to Stage III before we take on staff and if we adjust our recruiting procedure we could achieve this without running the risk of losing staff but if we insist on the completion of P.V. including Stage IV before anyone joins I believe we shall find it extremely difficult to recruit secretaries.

2. When one considers the number of young girls we recruit each year and subject to Positive Vetting, paragraph 15 of Chapter III of the Manual must strike us as somewhat unreal. Provisional clearances are dealt with in paragraph 41.

/3.

Minute 289 continued

3. I also draw your attention to paragraph 3 of Annex 24. I have asked B to prepare a note on our briefing of Investigating Officers, distinguishing between recruits and staff in post, between officers and others, and between permanent and temporary Investigators. When, as I expect you wish to discuss the drafts with B, he will be ready to justify paragraph 3 of the draft at 287a in relation to the Armed Forces.

D.D.G.

A. F. ...

30th July 1965

290

30.7.65

Draft minute - Replaced by min.292.

290a

~~2.8.65.~~

~~Treasury D.E.O. letter further to 256z. Trans to 316-8-2~~

290b

~~4.8.65.~~

~~Draft reply to 290b~~

290c

291.

Trans to 316-8-2

9.8.65.

Directive from D.G. to B re P.V.

291a

292.

E.

I have reviewed our arrangements for P.V. and am satisfied that the investigations we have been making during field enquiries have, at the minimum, reached the standards formerly prescribed in the Manual of Personnel Security measures.

2. The revised Manual sets higher standards for field enquiries, and we shall have to make corresponding changes in our own arrangements. Instructions to this effect, which I have approved, are set out in the Directive at 291a, which should be implemented as soon as the additional staff you will need is available. The briefing of schoolteachers, referred to in paragraph 2 of the Directive, should be done on the lines of the note at 281az.

3. I confirm that the D.D.G. and you are authorised to issue P.V. clearance certificates on my behalf, but I wish to approve personally the P.V. clearance of Officers and Junior Officers on first appointment.

4. You or B.1 may grant provisional clearances to all grades other than Officers, but staff so cleared may be employed only in such posts as I may from time to time designate.

D.G.

Roger ...

9.8.65.

293.

D.G.

With reference to para.3 of Minute 289 I propose to meet D.D.G.'s point in the following way. All investigators whether permanent or temporary who conduct any sort of P.V. interview will study all the papers relating to the candidate and will record that they have done so either in the relevant report or in a minute on the file as may be appropriate. The allocation of cases to particular investigators will have regard to the rank of the candidate and to the degree of difficulty involved.

Munnick

B.

10.8.65

294.

B. 12/8

Thank you for your minute 293 stating the procedure which you intend to follow. I agree with this.

D.G.

Roman Istaitia

11.8.65.

295.

B.1.

Please see from Minute 292 and in particular the D.G.'s Directive to me at 291a. Will you please bring the latter to the attention of all Officers in B.1 and B.2 who are concerned with P.V. or with recruitment, and I think that it would be well for each of them to be supplied with a copy.

Munnick

B.

12.8.65

- | | | | |
|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| 16.8.65. | 296 | Trans 316-8-2 | 296a |
| 16.8.65. | Extract from RS.1372 re P.V. enquiries for H.M.O.C.S. recruits | | 296b |
| 16.8.65 | Loose Minute further to 296a | Trans no 316-8-2 | |
| | Courses for Security Service P.V. Officers | | 296c |
| | | Trans no 316-8-2 | |

297.

B.1. ~~STP~~ *Right. 1/19/65*

If you agree, I propose to reply to the Treasury D.E.O. letter at serial 290b in the terms of the draft at serial 290c.

Whizpe
D. H. Payne

B.1
19.8.65.

298

1.9.65. Copy of Annexe 27 of Manual of Personnel Security Measures.

298a

299

Trans to 316-8-2

1.9.65. ~~Copy of Annex 26 to Manual of Personnel Security Measures.~~

299a

300

Trans to 316-8-2

1.9.65. ~~Draft standard letter to P.V. referees for recruits~~

300a

301

Trans to 316-8-2

1.9.65. ~~Draft standard letter to P.V. referees for serving staff~~

301a

2.9.65. Minute re motoring offences.

301b

302

copied to 316-8-2

B.1. ~~STP~~ *Agreed. I should like to see the proofs. JDP/165.*

As you know, we are changing our arrangements for P.V. to follow the four stages described in paragraph 9 of Chapter III of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures. Principally, this will mean that we shall have to complete Stage III (the obtaining of written references) before starting on Stage IV (field enquiries). Changes will, accordingly, be required in the printed letters we send to referees. We shall need a standard first letter calling for written references, and a second letter to the referees seeking their agreement to receive one of the I.O.s for an interview. For the purpose of comparison, copies of the forms we use at present are enclosed loosely behind the front cover.

2. With regard to the first letter calling for written references, I think that, except for one small amendment, we should follow exactly the form of the

/standard

Minute 302 continued

Copied to 316-8-2

standard letters at Annexes 26 and 27 of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures (copies are at serials 299a and 298a respectively) for candidates for employment and for existing staff respectively. The small amendment would be the substitution of the words "Government Service" for "Civil Service" in line 4 of each letter.

3. The second letter, proposing an interview, should I suggest, be in the terms of the draft at serial 300a for candidates for employment and ~~the~~ draft at serial 301a for serving staff.

4. As you know, I am considering separately amendments which will be necessary to the wording of standard letters used in the recruiting procedure when we make the change, probably in October, to the new P.V. procedure.

D. H. Payne
D. H. Payne

B.1.

3.9.65.

303.

1.9.65.

2.9.65.

~~Treasury circular re Positive vetting.~~

Trans to 316-8-2

303a

~~Note re note to Air Ministry.~~

304.

Trans to 316-8-2

303b

7.10.65.

Note on new procedure for recruitment of girls *Copied to 304b*

Copied to 316-8-2

316-8-6

305.

8.10.65

Copy of B. minute relating to 304a.

Trans 316-8-2

305a

8.10.65.

Treasury Circular - Vetting of Recruits to the Civil Service.

305b

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ACT 1958 *July 2022*

W. 19/10.
to 11/10 Ref B 15w of r
306.
J 11/10.

B.1/DHP through B.1.

With reference to the last two serials, I have had a discussion with the D.G. about the wider definition which he has given to the words "independent testimony". What it amounts to is that in the absence of any other type of independent testimony we can accept as such a satisfactory interview with a third referee nominated by the candidate and who is especially well qualified, e.g. by reason of present or former Crown service, to understand and appreciate the significance of the State's interest in P.V.

Although he gave no ruling about it, the D.G. might be prepared to accept an interview with a third referee who was not qualified as above, but such a case would obviously have to be considered, as indeed all cases must, on its merits.

V. denver with

B.
8.10.65

307

JSW
B. through B.2. J 4/11

Copied to
316-8-b

Reference paragraph 4 of Minute 292.

2. We have now had notes from all the Directors (save D. Branch) and H.R.A. about the secretarial and registrar posts which might be filled by girls who have been granted provisional P.V. clearance and who are awaiting full P.V. clearance. (Serial 286a refers).

3. I understand from B.2 that Director D. has already told her orally of his proposals, and that these are satisfactory. We await written confirmation.

4. The proposals of H.R.A. are unsatisfactory in that there will be an entirely inadequate number of posts in R.3 to which B.2 can post girls with provisional P.V. clearance. We might, possibly, hold the girls as registrars in other branches until full P.V. clearance has been granted, but I understand that a girl who has been a registrar is very unlikely to take kindly to work in R.3. It is thus in H.R.'s interest, as well as in ours, that he should reconsider the position. I am not competent to offer any suggestions in detail, but H.R. might, I think, consider

making/....

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ACT 1958

Minute 307 Continued*Copied to 316-8-6*

making the whole of R.3 open to girls with provisional P.V. clearance. After all, B. will grant provisional clearance only if he is satisfied, on the evidence, that there is no reason to fear that the girl will be found unsuitable for full clearance after the field enquiries have been completed.

Whitney
D. H. Payne

B.1
14.10.65.

308.

Copied to 316-8-4

D.D.G.

On 13th October, Payne and I discussed with you how we might obtain the independent testimony necessary to bring the P.V. clearance of staff in post to current standards; namely to the standards set in the D.G's directive at 291a. There should be no great difficulty in finding independent testimony for newly joined members of the staff with less than five years' service, but, in the cases of those of longer service, we shall have to exercise our ingenuity. First, we may find it necessary to ask the local police to make enquiries about staff who live outside the Metropolitan area. Secondly, we may wish to interview a colleague who has good and recent knowledge of the candidate, but who is not, perhaps, so well informed about his/her home life. Last, there may be cases of staff who live in London and for whom no colleague is qualified to speak. In these cases, we shall have to try to find a referee outside the office.

2. It is our considered view that, in all cases where independent testimony is required on P.V. review, we should tell the person concerned, and discuss with him/her how best to obtain the necessary information. I think, too, that we should say outright ~~that we should say outright~~ that we may decide to ask the local police to make enquiries. To take staff into our confidence in this way may tend to make the testimony less "independent", but, if we just go ahead and make enquiries without telling staff that we are doing so, there will, I think, be a real risk that morale will be undermined, and that some of the staff will come to feel that we distrust them. Furthermore, in some instances, I do not think we shall be able to obtain independent testimony without the active co-operation of the member of the staff concerned. I hope you will agree that we may work on these lines.

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/3...

Minute 308 continued.

Copied to 316-8-4

3. Paragraph 2(2) of the D.G.'s directive steps us interviewing the candidate's superior officer to obtain independent testimony. We understand from C. Branch that the recommendation made in the Winn Report (summarised at paragraph 125(xii) of the Report (clipped inside file cover)) that a man's superior officer in the public service should not normally be acceptable as a referee, is being considered by the Official Committee on 19th October. The S.P.M. and P.M.C. Committees are, apparently, proposing that the bar to a superior's acting as a referee should be lifted if there is no other qualified referee to be found. If that is accepted, I trust that we may be authorised to interpret the D.G.'s instruction in the same way.

OTJ
C. J. H. Foulkes

Ag.B.
18.10.65

22.10.65.

Copy of B. Minute to D.G. through D.D.G. [redacted]

308b

309

Acting B.

W.D. (10/12) through REFS. W.D. 28/10.

See his discussion with [redacted]

I agree that you not only may but should work on the lines described in paragraph 2 of Minute 308.

2. What the Personnel Security Committee has said, and the Official Committee has not dissented, is that because it is the practice always to interview a superior officer as part of the P.V. procedure, he should not normally be accepted as a character referee. But the Committee recognises that there may be occasions, e.g. at posts abroad, when there will be no alternative to accepting a person's superior as a referee and, indeed, in some cases he would be a more suitable referee than anyone else. So far as we are concerned, superior officers sign what amounts to a P.V. certificate annually and any superior officer in the Security Service worth his salt could be expected to bring to your notice any character defect which he observed in a member of the staff. It was no doubt on grounds of this kind that the D.G. ruled that "the immediate present superior officer" should not be interviewed to provide independent testimony, the purpose being to cover as wide a field as was practicable. The limitation is very narrowly worded and should remain the policy. If the immediate present superior officer is a well qualified referee and there is no other qualified referee, the case should be referred to D.G. to consider whether an exception may be made to the rule.

D.D.G.

[Handwritten signature]

26th October 1965

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310

Copied to 316-8-2

B. *JSH*

Following the meeting recorded at 275a, B issued oral instructions to B.2/Schools concerning what they should say when indoctrinating Head Mistresses and Principals. This was similar to the draft at 281az.

2. A number (ten or more) of Head Mistresses were indoctrinated as above and thus have not been given S Form 559 dated September 1965, a copy of which is pinned inside cover.

3. We do not want to revisit these schools, partly for pressure of work reasons, but more because we would not be welcome. Do you consider we should send S Form 559 with a covering letter referring to "our conversation at the time of my visit on (give date)".

B.2
4.11.65

[Handwritten signature]

311

B. *JSH*

Copied to 316-8-6

Reference Minute 307. In my view it is very necessary for us to have more posts in Registry open to girls for whom Provisional P.V. clearance has been obtained. This need is not likely to arise before next summer, but unless we are able to proceed on Provisional clearance of a large number of Registry candidates, we shall lose them.

B.2
4.11.65

[Handwritten signature]

312.

B.1.DHP. through B.2. *JSH*

*Copied to 316-8-2
Copied to 316-8-6*

1. Reference minute 310. I consider that the head-mistress in question should be sent S.Form 559. Will you please draft a covering letter?

2. Reference minute 311. Will you please negotiate with H.R? Your argument in para 4 of minute 307 is very telling.

[Handwritten signature]

C. J. H. Foulkes

Ag.B.
5.11.65

313

~~15.11.65. Draft letter to headmistresses~~

Trans to 316-8-2

343a

~~15.11.65. DEO Letter - P.V. Review: Annual Returns~~

Trans to 316-8-3

343b

B. D. D.

314

Ex. film

Ag. B. through P.2. 16/11 No comments.

Reference para.1, Minute 312.

2. I submit a draft at serial 313a.
3. I will speak to H.R. about the point raised in para.2 when the file returns.

D. H. Payne

D. H. Payne

B.1
15.11.65.

315

Acting B. *J. D. M.*

We discussed the requirement endorsed by the Official Committee on Security that papers relating to the security status of staff should be readily available. We agreed that the most convenient way of meeting this requirement would be to have in each R of S an index to the relevant papers on the lines of the form you now use for checking that all the necessary steps in the recruitment process have been taken. The implementation of this proposal can be spread over a period and might be associated with the periodic reviews of P.V. It should, however, be applied to all staff whether or not they are in the P.V. category.

D. D. G.

D. D. G.

16th November 1965

316.

B.1.DHP.

Reference minute 315. When I discussed this matter with D.D.G. on 16.11.65 we agreed that we should continue to keep our Records of Service in the same form as at present.

2. The re-drafting of the index sheet will require careful attention and in addition to listing basic recruiting, security and P.V. papers must make provision for other matters relevant to the security standing of the owner of the file. There should also be spaces for noting the serials of original P.V. clearance and reaffirmation.

3. The implementation of this requirement will not present any serious problems in the case of modern Rs of S. But the old B.2 Rs of S with numbered serials will call for some ingenuity and possibly more work.

4. Please let me have a sample of the current index sheet and a rough draft of a revision and then discuss.

C. J. H. Foulkes
C. J. H. Foulkes

Ag.B.
17.11.65

317

1.12.65.

~~Copy of L.M. re Treasury returns for P.V.~~

Trans to 316-8-3

317a

318

2.12.65.

~~Situation of P.V. interviews at 30th November~~

Trans to 316-8-3

318a

319.

2.12.65.

~~P.V. statistics at 2.12.65.~~

Trans to 316-8-3

319a

320

10.12.65.

~~Draft revised vetting sheet for Rs of S.~~

Trans to 316-8-2

320a

321

~~B.1~~ ~~SHP~~ Wharua 4m ltr. Surtain
Common Proposal inside file cover.

File

Reference Minute 316.

2. I enclose at serial 320a a sample of the current index sheet and a first draft of a revised index sheet. I am ready to discuss.

D. H. Payne
D. H. Payne

B.1
10.12.65.

322

10.12.65. Note re registry posts for girls with provisional P.V. clearance

*Personal
322a
Folder
286 A*

323

21.12.65. From Treasury

29.12.65. BM re application of PV (E.93) to staff involved in legal proceedings.
(Decision not to issue a circular to warn staff to report convictions)

323a

323b

324

Trans to 316-8-6

~~25.1.66. Note - Posts to which Staff with Provisional P.V. Clearance may be posted.~~

324a

325

copied to 316-8-b

B.

At paragraph 4 of Minute 292 the then D.G. authorised you to grant provisional P.V. clearances on the understanding that staff so cleared should be employed only in posts he would designate. I now submit at serial 324a, for the D.G.'s approval, a list of such posts as proposed by the Directors at serial 286a. I think you will agree that the response from the Branches has been very satisfactory.

2. Before Officer recruits appear before the Selection Board P.V. is always brought to Stage III, but field enquiries have not, usually, been carried out. There is a reasonable implication that if the D.G. authorises an appointment he is also pronouncing provisional P.V. clearance and to this extent the existing arrangements are satisfactory. We have found in practice, however, that it takes not less than four weeks or so to complete the field enquiries, thus, if an officer recruit joins shortly after selection he is likely to have provisional clearance only for the initial part of his service in F.l.C. To put the matter straight I should be grateful if you would consider inviting the D.G. to designate the Officer (training) posts in F.l.C. as posts in which Officers with provisional P.V. clearance may be employed. I have discussed this with F.l. who is ready to accept the arrangement. He thinks that it would cause him no difficulty and he has undertaken to advise F. accordingly.

Whayne
D.H. Payne

B.1.

25 January 1966

326.

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Chel 26/11
D.G.
D.G.

Please see Minute 325.

2. The response of Directors to the request that they should consider what posts under their command could properly be filled by staff with provisional P.V. clearance, i.e. cleared only to Stage 3, is in a sense very satisfactory, but it confirms my belief that we have all along made things unnecessarily difficult for ourselves by declaring so many P.V. posts.

3. With regard to paragraph 2 of the above Minute, I support the request that the F.l.C. training posts should be declared open to Officers with provisional P.V. clearance.

B.

26.1.66

Extract from Minute by B. to Bl/DHP in

Trans to 316-8-3

326ab

26.1.66
CODE 11-75

27.1.66.

To Barrows, Treasury re P.V. Reviews: Annual Returns

326b

327.

copied to
316-8-6

B.

I believe we were right, as other departments have been, in requiring that substantially all our staff should be P.V'd. While I do not doubt that Directors have been sound in accepting that staff with provisional P.V. clearance may work in the posts they have designated - and I confirm that they may - the nature of our work is such that almost anywhere in the office a person could obtain access to information which, if it leaked, could do irreparable damage to the Security Service.

2. I would like to discuss paragraph 3 of minute 326 with you and F. The answer seems to turn on the delicacy of the information to which an F.I.C officer under training normally has access in the first 4 - 6 weeks of his career.

D.G.

A.2. Finlay Jones

31.1.66.

328.

~~B. 1/2~~ to 1/2

To see min. 327. I will discuss para 2 thereof with JG when F is back from leave.

Annawell

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1/2

1.2.66. Extract from Police Act Regulations 1964

328

329.

copied to
316-8-6

D.G.

You wished to give a direction on our discussion this afternoon with F. on paragraph 2 of your Minute 327.

Annawell

B.

1.2.66

~~B.~~ ~~ΔHP~~ ~~to 3/2~~ ~~in Rev~~ ~~in 3/2~~ 330.

copied to 316-8-6

In our discussion with F yesterday it became apparent that although a new officer under training in F.I.C was likely to see intelligence which had been obtained by very delicate operations, the nature of these delicate operations would not be explained to them during their training. On this understanding I agree that F.I.C training posts should be open to officers with provisional P.V. clearance.

D.G.

2.2.66.

~~B.~~ ~~through B.I/RE~~ ~~under~~ ~~4/2~~ 331

Reference paragraph 1 of Minute 92 in RS.902 (NORRIS), attached, which is extracted at serial 326ab.

2. I have consulted Tom Roberts. A regulation contained in paragraph 7(f) of the Regulations made ~~in~~^{under} the Police Act of 1964 forbids policemen to give character references for persons seeking jobs without the permission of their Chief Constables (an extract of this particular regulation is at serial 328b). Tom Roberts thinks that there should be no difficulty in arranging for a police officer to act as a P.V. referee if we should consider this to be necessary and A.S.C. will negotiate with the police forces concerned on our behalf.

B.1.

D.H. Payne

3 February 1966

332

~~B.2.~~ ~~is 8/2~~ ~~I am taking a copy of 324a for B2 posting purposes.~~

Please see paragraph 1 of Minute 327.

2. You wished to inform the B.2. officers concerned.

B.1.

D.H. Payne

7 February 1966

333

§4 copied to Security of Personnel
§9 copied to 316-8-4

18.2.66. D.E.O. letter from the Treasury 333a

18.2.66. L.M. from C.I. enclosing copy of letter re Security Commission's recommendations 333b

334

~~23.2.66. D.E.O. letter from the Treasury~~ Trans to 316-8-2 334a

~~7.3.66. Example of Security Index Sheet~~ Trans to 316-8-2 335a

336

§1 + 2
copied to
Security of
Personnel

~~B. (through B.I.)~~ JB

It is hard to receive data at 333 & this is interesting. Note about looking up papers using temporary album from this.

Please see serials 333a and 333b. Note...

§2
copied to
316-8-6

2. In view of the importance of this D.E.O. letter it should be said for the record that we are conforming with the various requirements as far as is practicable. In particular:

Paragraph 4: We already repeat some of the D.G. circulars which bear on personnel security. I will check that we are repeating all the important circulars each year.

Paragraph 5: I have put a copy of the Security Index Sheet, which is being placed in the front of each Record of Service, at serial 335a in this file.
See mins 315 & 316.

Paragraph 9: We are, of course, continuing to review the files of all members of the staff in P.V. posts annually.

Paragraph 11: The D.G. has formally authorised the D.D.G. and you to issue P.V. certificates on his behalf (paragraph 3 of Minute 292 refers).

3. Paragraph 3 of the Treasury letter at serial 333b is welcome.

D.H. Payne
D.H. Payne

B.I.

7 March 1966

459
54
Cred 9/3. 337.

You may care to see min 336 which shows that we are complying with the exhortations contained in 333a.

B. 9/3
D.H. Payne

338.

D.G.

I agree that our procedures meet the requirements of 333a. You may care to reaffirm paragraphs 3 and 4 of Minute 292.

2. I don't think there is any need to brief our staff about "the general background against which the introduction of new security measures is considered" (333b). B.1's manuscript note to Minute 336 refers to a new requirement, not yet met in our Office Instructions, that classified papers must be locked up when a room is left vacant for more than ten minutes.

C.A.G. Simkins

C.A.G. Simkins

D.D.G.

9th March 1966

339

D.D.G. *Pol. 11/3*
B.

STO to 11/3
to see 11/3

I note that we are conforming with the requirements of 333a.

2. I confirm that you are both authorised to issue P.V. clearance certificates on my behalf for all staff other than Officers and Junior Officers on first appointment. Both of you and B.1. may grant provisional clearances to staff to be employed in the posts designated at 324a.

Copied & 316-8-2

D.G.

10th March 1966

R.2. Simkins

340

341

9.5.66. Copy of Minute to B.1.

341a

342.

10.5.66 Copy of B.1 minute re employment of 16 year olds.

342a

343.

11.5.66 Copy of B.'s minute referring to 342a.

343a

344.

~~13.5.66 From Treasury re 1966 P.V. return.~~

Trans to 316-8-3

344

345

By JWP to 16/5

ask you please prepare a draft in accordance with 344

A. 13/5

Minis. mt.

346.

~~3.6.66 Exchange of minutes B. - A. re A.4. staff's awareness of Office Instructions.~~

~~346a~~

*Trans to 316-8-
Secretary of
Personnel*

347

~~1.7.66. Copy of L.M. to B1/REGB~~

Trans to 316-8-4

~~347a~~

348

4.7.66.

Draft letter to Sir Laurence Helsby replaced by 351a

348a

B. (through B.I.) ³⁴⁹ JSY.

copied to 316-8-3

Reference serial 344a.

2. I submit at serial 348a a P.V. return in the form required for the D.G. to send to Sir Laurence Helsby. The return for 1965 is at serial 281a.

3. The figure of 8 shown in paragraph C of the return represents the number of girls with provisional P.V. clearance who are working in designated posts and who are awaiting full clearance.

4. The figure of 50 in paragraph E(ii) is the number of A.4. staff already in post who are awaiting P.V. clearance. The field investigations for 44 of these are already well ahead. The field investigations in respect of 6 static watchers have not yet been started.

5. Although the return does not include information about the P.V.ing of candidates for employment you may wish to know that 62 candidates were in the process of being P.V.d on 30 June 1966.

D.H. Payne

D.H. Payne

B.I.

4.7.66.

350

copied to 316-8-3

~~JSY~~ JSY

Please see mem 349. The draft @ 348a is in my view in order.

B.

5/7

D.H. Payne

351

~~6.7.66~~

To Treasury enclosing Positive Vetting Return for 1966

Trans to 316-8-3

351a

352.

~~14.7.66.~~

Note re secretaries and registrars in F. Branch.

Trans to 316-8-b

352a

353

B. 20/7.

Copied to 316-8-b

Reference serial 352a.

2. At Minute 327 the D.G. approved a list of designated posts (at serial 324a) in which staff with provisional P.V. clearance may be employed. F. has now proposed that six posts of registrar in F.1.C. and F.2. should be added to the list. May the D.G. please be asked to approve this addition.

D. H. Payne

B.1.

D. H. Payne

19.7.66.

Copied to 316-8-b

354.

D.G. Agreed 18/20/7

to B2 to Mr W. Payne to see 21/7

Please see min 353. Will you please approve the addition asked for?

Dunaville

B. 20/7

355

4.8.66

Copy of minute in [redacted]

Trans to 316-8-2

355a

356

4.8.66

Note re delegation of authority to give P.V. clearance

copied to 316-8-2

356a

4.8.66.

Copy of Minute on Pol. F. 53-12-117

copied to Security of Personnel

356b

357.

D.D.G.

copied to 316-8-2

Reference 356a. This is the file. I draw your attention to para 6 of minute 259 and para 5 of minute 261. The rule to which we are now working is set out in paras 3 and 4 of minute 292.

2. During B.'s sick leave from 11.10.65 to 5.12.65 I was orally empowered by the then D.G. to assume B.'s clearance functions as acting Director.

C. J. H. Foulkes

B.1.
5.8.66

358.

copied to 316-8-2

B.1

whid s/s RECS and DTP (1/2)

J.D.

Thank you for Minute 357. In the light of 356a, I could not recommend D.G. to delegate authority to grant PV clearance further than he has done already in Minute 339. But I am glad to be reminded that you yourself are authorised to grant provisional clearance to staff in the posts designated at 324a.

2. Paragraph 2(3) of the D.G.'s directive at 291a requires independent testimony from at least one source about the candidate's character and prescribes how this can be obtained for a girl coming direct from school or training college. In all other cases such testimony must be obtained by interviewing an appropriately qualified person or persons. Such a person may well be another member of staff of the Security Service if he knows the candidate personally." We must be careful to

/maintain...

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July 2022

Minute 358 continued

maintain a strict view of what constitutes adequate independent testimony. In my opinion it should show knowledge of the subject's private life as well as his/her office life.

W. H. Williams

D.D.G.

8th August 1966

B.1 RECOR *was 9/8* 359.

I have noted D.D.G.'s Minute 358 and shall make sure in obtaining independent testimony that it is adequate in the sense that he requires.

*Not in B's
a Green.
C. Jones*

2. I am, however, not entirely clear as to the meaning of his paragraph 1. Should I now submit provisional clearance cases to you? The position at present is that when provisional clearance is sought no decision has been taken as to the posting of the individual when he or she joins. In many cases it is hoped that Stage IV will have been completed; and full clearance affirmed, before the candidate actually joins. In a much smaller number of cases it is recognised from the start that it will be impossible to complete Stage IV before the candidate joins, and on joining he or she is posted to one of the posts designated at 342a.

R.E.C. Broadbent

B.1

R.E.C. Broadbent.

8.8.66.

9.8.66.

Copy of Minute from Pol. F. 53-12-117

360

Trans to Security of Personnel

359b

10.8.66.

D.E.O. letter - Central Recording of Individuals Refused N.V. clearance on character grounds.

360a

361

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11.8.66.

~~D.E.O. letter - The employment of Au Pair girls and domestics from communist countries~~

361a

Trans to Security of Personnel

362

Hand
B.1. *3018*

copied to Security of Personnel

Reference serial 361a.

2. Paragraph 1(f) of Part III, Administration, of Office Instructions provides that members of the staff should notify B. Branch of any intention to share accommodation with anyone not employed in the Security Service. It will not, therefore, be necessary to issue an instruction as is required by paragraph 3 of the D.E.O. letter.

B.1.

[Signature]
D. H. Payne

30.8.66.

363

2.9.66. ~~Note for file re 351a~~

Trans to 316-8-3

~~363a~~

364

~~9.9.66. Note re visit to Air Secretary~~ *filed in cuor - see 303 b.*
~~21.9.66 D.E.O. Letter: Psychiatric Treatment of Civil Servants Engaged on Secret Work~~

~~364a~~

3641

Trans to 316-8-

365.

Security of Personnel

Copy in BI BM.

D.G.

As a result of the recent case of [redacted] I have been trying to track down the foundation for the belief that in October of last year your predecessor instructed Directors to speak to their Senior Officers and supervisors about the obligation of staff to report all criminal convictions including in particular those for bilking the railways.

2. The only papers in any way bearing on this are those contained in the BM at 323b, and since they relate to the desirability or otherwise of issuing a D.G. circular on the subject, they suggest to me that the belief above referred to must be unfounded. However that may be, I find that neither A. nor D. have any recollection of having been asked to address their supervisors, and have certainly not done so. In point of fact, D. was on leave throughout October of last year, and I was myself in hospital.

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SECTION
1958

F./

Minute 365 (continued)

F., on the other hand, thinks that some instruction was given and that he acted upon it to the extent that he spoke to his Senior Officers and his Branch Supervisor, but he does not know how much further down ~~it~~ went, and after my talk with the Branch Supervisor concerned I am doubtful whether ~~it~~ did at all; it is certain that ~~it~~ did not in the case of [redacted] E., as you know, is not available, nor is D.D.G. who was then Director C.

3. My personal view is that we had better leave things as they are since, as a result of our P.V. activities alone, I doubt if there is anybody in the Service who is not fully aware of what their obligations are.

4. There is, however, another aspect of the [redacted] case about which I think that Directors should be informed and asked to speak to all members of their staff, who have the responsibility for writing confidential reports, and in particular for answering the question whether they have any reason to doubt continued fitness to be entrusted with TOP SECRET information. I think that it would be useful to remind reporting staff that answering this question is no mere formality and that if they have possibly adverse information but decide after due consideration that it is not in the context significant, they should realise that they are taking on a heavy responsibility which they would probably be much better advised to transfer to B. Branch. They should also be told that if they have information which they consider is significant, they must not answer the question in the negative unless they are absolutely certain that the same information is in fact in the possession of B. Branch.

Munnawell

B.

14.10.66

366

10.11.66

Copy of D.G. Minute re independent testimony

366a

367

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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 *July 2022*

11.11.66

Copy of B.I. minute re 366a

367a

368

Cpys - B1 B.M.

Encl. 17/11
 D.D.G.
 SECRETARIAT
 B.

We discussed this morning various points arising out of the folder at 323b and B's minute 365. Our conclusions were:-

- (a) We should not issue any circular to staff, e.g. on the lines of enclosure 6a to 323b, enjoining them not to break the law.
- (b) We should issue a circular, either drawing the attention of staff to Part III, paragraph 1, of Office Instructions, or generally to Office Instructions and in particular to Part III paragraph 1, or setting out the paragraph in full. B. and Secretariat would prepare a draft together. Such a circular might be re-issued periodically.
- (c) Secretariat would consider whether the printed conditions of employment for women staff required any amendment, with particular reference to paragraphs 8 and 9, and would also consider whether a sentence about summary dismissal should be included in letters of appointment to other staff.
- (d) I would ask Directors to draw the attention of Supervisors to the importance I attach to the question on Confidential Reports about continued fitness to be entrusted with TOP SECRET information and to the need to consult B. Branch if they had any doubt. I would draw the attention of new Senior Officers to this on appointment and B. Branch would do the same for other Supervisors.

*Copy to
 316-8-8*

2. We would look at these questions again after two years. Perhaps B. will arrange to have the file brought forward.

S. J. ...

D.G.

16th November 1966

B.

I am ready to discuss at your convenience how we should set about (b) and (c) of Minute 368a.

Secretariat

J.A. Allen
J.A. Allen

18th November 1966

370.
For J.A. Allen
By Cand Mr Payne.

Please see mins 368 & 369.
which I want to discuss with you.

B.
18/11

Amaworth

371

24.11.66 D.E.O. letter: List of Organisations of Security Interest

371a

372

Trans to 316-8-6

9.12.66 ~~Note of D.G.'s mtg with Directors re question of fitness to be entrusted with TOP SECRET information~~

372a

373.

Trans to 316-8-3

20.1.67 ~~Draft letter to Treasury Annual P.V. review return~~

373a

374.

copied to 316-8-3

Please see draft letter and set of statistics at 373a. Last year's return is at 326b, and the return is requested as a result of the Treasury letter at 225a as amended by the letter at 313b. If you approve I will arrange despatch.

H.I. Lee
H.I. Lee

B.I.
20.1.67

375.

Trans to 316-8-3

~~23.1.67 To Treasury with annual statistics of P.V. review 375a~~

376.

2.1.67. Copy of draft letter to Treasury re recruiting of minors and juveniles. 376a

377.

9.2.67 Copy of C1 minute re 376a. 377a

14.2.67 ~~Instructions to staff on security matters (DG Circ.) 377b~~
Trans to Security of Personnel

16.2.67 Loose minute re 376a and 377a. *82 copied to 316-8-4* 378a

16.2.67 ~~Copy/minute re Sudan papers unobtainable 379.~~ *Trans to 316-8-2* 378b

20.2.67 Copy of minute to C.1. 379a

380

1.3.67. To Treasury re employment of minor and juveniles. 380a

381.

11.4.67 Loose Minute re retirement of [redacted] *Trans to 316-8-2 (HMCOS papers)* 381a

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ACT 1958
NOVEMBER 2022

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B.

In order to complete P.V. Stage III you have instructed that an applicant should have four satisfactory sponsors, two of which must have completed P.V. written references. As I understand your instructions these can be made up by:-

- Two P.V. written references
- One personal friend
- One known stable school reference (sometimes additionally there are employment and university references)

2. If I am correct in paragraph 1 above, will you accept an applicant for provisional P.V. clearance with the above specified references even though I have asked for a second personal reference which has not yet been received?

3. One such case is attached

B.2.

5 June 1967

London

B.2.

7/6 BIRD to Co

8/6/67


The position with regard to provisional P.V. clearance is that I am prepared to consider a case whenever B.1/P.V. are able to recommend that I should do so. It follows that, although I ~~can~~ continue to require a candidate to nominate four personal referees, and that all four should be approached, I may be willing to grant provisional clearance before all have replied, provided that all the information about the candidate is wholly favourable.

2. In the particular case of I will grant provisional clearance.

London

B.

6th June, 1967.



384

Trans to 316-8-2

12.6.67 ~~From Commonwealth Office re provision for obtaining P.F. of ex-C.S. officers~~ 384a

385

Trans to 316-8-2

14.6.67 ~~To Commonwealth Office in reply to 384a~~ 385a

386. *Copied to 316-8-2*

19.6.67 Copy/instruction to I.Os re Finance Officer's certificate of clearance for P.V. purposes 386a

387. *Trans to 316-8-2*

28.6.67 ~~Papers concerning SB/CRO l.us on spouses etc.~~ 387a

388. *Trans to 316-8-2*

30.6.67 ~~To Harrison, ODM re Colonial Office papers~~ 388a

389. *Trans to 316-8-3*

3.7.67 ~~P.V. return for the Treasury as at 30.6.67~~ 389a

Del 316-8-3

D.G. through D.D.G. (B. on return) *L 10/7* *Copied to 316-8-3*

In B.'s absence on leave I submit at 389a (in duplicate) a P.V. return in the form required for you to send to Sir Laurence Helsby in the light of his letter of 12 May 1966 at 344a. Last year's return is at 351a.

The figure of 8 shown in paragraph C of the return represents the number of girls with provisional clearance who have not yet been fully cleared. The figure of one in paragraph E.(iii) represents the case of [redacted] at present employed in the garage, who is to be moved shortly to A.4 as a driving instructor. His case is only lacking a reference from the Police.

B.1
3.7.67

H.I. Lee

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ACT 1958 *July 2022*

391

Trans to 316-8-3

5.7.67 To ~~Treasury~~ Positive Vetting Return 30.6.67 391a

392.

Trans to 316-8-2

5.7.67 From ~~Harrison, Min. of Overseas Development re~~
~~HMOCS files~~ 392a

393.

Trans to 316-8-2

5.7.67 To Harrison ackn. and accepting procedure in 392a 393a

8.8.67. Copy of A.2. Loose Minute ref. ~~vetting of A2A staff.~~ 393b

394
10/8

*Copied to Security of Personnel
I recall re J. G. Collins*

B. through B.1. HIL. and B.1. DHP. to 10/8

I was under the impression that there had been some discussion, written or oral, about 364b, but if there was I can now find no record of it. I was also under the impression that we had come to the conclusion that there was nothing we need do on the basis of the Treasury letter. If indeed we did so decide, I see no reason to alter that decision in the light of the [redacted] case. Events have demonstrated that we can catch up with such a fact.

[Handwritten signature]

B.1.
9 August 1967

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ACT 1958

395

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Security of Personnel

~~B.~~

I have a recollection of discussion on this subject but I believe it to have been in my Secretariat capacity when the draft paper was under discussion in the Official Committee. I have no recollection of a discussion since I joined B Branch at the end of September 1966.

I have spoken to L.A. who tells me that no D.G. Circular has been issued on the subject and a recent search by R.7. shows no mention of any such discussion in any obvious file.

H. I. Lee
H. I. Lee.

B. I.
10.8.67.

~~B.~~ ³⁹⁶ ^{11/8} ^{11/8} ^{11/8} ^{11/8} ^{11/8} ^{11/8}
I have absolutely no
recollection of this or even of having
seen 3646 but I quite agree
with you that a decision not to take
any action but to rely on the
instinct, habit & discipline of the
staff would have been and still is
right.

J. Mansfield

B. 11/8

21.8.67.

~~B1/HIL Loose Minute ref. B's instruction to route R of S through B.L./PV (instruction attached), dated 24.7.67.~~

Trans to 316-8-4

5.9.67.

~~Copy of Draft for inclusion in Office Instructions~~

det. 11/176

*398
11/9/67 JK 7/9*

HW 11/9

B. through B.1. KBM./JR. and B.1. P.V.

Copied to 316-8-4

Reference 397a. I find in practice that this procedure tends to retard annual confidential reports on their way to you, and onwards. It also put the P.V. Officers under at least psychological pressure to rush their revisions.

2. All that could be obviated if the P.V. Officers had advance warning of when a report was coming in. That could be very easily arranged if when we sent for reports we put on the minute sheet a rubber stamp saying: "B.1./PV. - To Note. Report requested, due at the end of this month - date ..."

3. Would such a system have your approval?

B.1.

6 September 1967

[Signature]

399

Copied to 316-8-4

B. through B.1.

HW 11/9

Reference min. 398. I think the only way to ensure that reports are not held up is for B.1/P.V. to review the files the month before reports are sent out by us. This would be possible by reorganising slightly an index kept by B.1/P.V.

B.1.
7.9.67

KBH

400.

Copied to 316-8-4

B. through B.l. *J2079* It is all me to me

I do not think that either suggestion made in Minutes 398 and 399 will work satisfactorily because it is clearly essential for the annual report to be on the file before the case is reviewed for P.V. For one thing the annual report includes the P.V. certificate of fitness to be entrusted with TOP SECRET information and for another the report itself may contain information which, taken in context, has a bearing on P.V. B.l./P.V. clearly cannot say P.V. is complete to current standards without having seen the certificate and should not express an opinion without all the relevant information being available.

I am sympathetic to the view expressed in Minute 398 that delays occur and I am quite certain that P.V. review should not be undertaken by I.O.s under pressure - it should be a reasonably leisurely process which gives the officer time to examine the whole file and not simply to skim through the serials since last P.V. was reaffirmed.

If delay is unacceptable - and I think it probably is - I suggest we should revert to the system whereby files are sent to B.l./P.V. for review after they have been seen by B. (and D.G. and D.D.G. where appropriate). If the review then brings forward anything to cast doubt about a member of staff's P.V. status the file will ~~then~~ be referred to B. or B.l. Equally any such point arising during the year between annual reports will presumably be referred to B.l./P.V. automatically.

It should be perfectly possible to ensure that all files seen by B. on annual report are marked as a matter of course to B.l./P.V. Instead of the case officer marking the file on the minute sheet 'B through B.l. and B.l./P.V.' - it should be marked : 'B.l., B. B.l./P.V.' or 'B., D.D.G., D.G., B.l./P.V.'.

B.l.
20.9.67.

insert officer
who is to see content of
the report
ls. 3/10/67.
H. I. Lee.

2079 401

Copied to 316-8-4

~~B.l.~~ through ~~B.l.~~ *J2079*
I agree that the present arrangements have proved unsatisfactory

Copied to
316-8-4

and that we must revert to the
old ones.

B. 25/9

Amarnath

402.

Trans to 316-8-4

26.9.67. ~~Bl/HIL Loose Minute ref. routing of files for P.V. review.~~

403

Trans to 316-8-6

8.11.67. ~~Minute re standard Letter of Appointment~~

404

13.11.67. Copy of Loose Minute to C.1. re analysis of women
recruits

404z

14.11.67. ~~Minute referring to Serial 403a~~

Trans to 316-8-6

404a

405

Copied to 316-8-2

22.11.67. Loose minute re secretarial college reference not
adequate for I.T.

405a

406

~~30.11.67.~~

~~Note re analysis of candidate cases dealt with
by B.1/P.V.~~

Trans to 316-8-3

406a

407

B.1/12

Copied to 316-8-3

You may care to see the note at 406a.

H. T. Lee
H.T. Lee

B.1
30.11.67.

18/12
~~Both~~ *to see*

408.

Copied to 316-8-3

~~D.G.~~ *Both points are well taken incl. 8/12*
D.G. *Thank you 8/12*

You may care to see 406a which analyses the P.V. position of all women recruits to Grade III and Grade II in the twelve months ended 31st October last.

The most significant figures which seem to me to emerge from the analysis are, first, that, contrary to what I think most people would guess to be the case, as many as 85 of the total of 192 recruits in these two Grades were over twenty-one when they joined; and, secondly, that in spite of all the difficulties we managed to complete P.V. clearance to Stage IV for no less than 83 out of a total of 192 before they joined.

Dunbar

B.
1.12.67

8.12.67.

Copy of Minute 15 from Pol. F. 316-9

408b

2.1.68.

To Barrows (H.M. Treasury) enclosing annual return
re P.V. Review

Trans to 316-8-3

409a

410

Copied to 316-8-3 Secretary of State

Yes
11/11

~~DDG~~ If you agree will re-issue 377b. This is
Secretariat to be done annually.

Samuel
9/1/68

The time has come to re-issue the D.G. Circular on Instructions to Staff on Security Matters, issued originally on 14 February 1967 as No. 4/Gen(67) (377b) and I should be grateful if you would arrange this. I have confirmed with C.1. that there is no change in Appendix A and, so far as I am aware, there is no change in Appendixes B to E inclusive.

Next year, i.e. in January 1969, we should include mention of the amendments shortly to be included in Office Instructions dealing with the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Acts (5a in Pol. F. 316 - 9).

H.I. Lee

B.1
8.1.68.

411

removed a send as Printing - 2.2.68. (see 415a)

24.1.68.

Copy of draft letter to referees for candidates 411a

*

DDG at 411a
11/11/68

412

Copied to 316-8-2

B.3. O & M (through B.1)

OK. I should like to see a proof. 26/1/68.

The Personnel Security Committee has decided to include in the standard letter to referees for candidates for employment, a paragraph asking referees to agree, in due course, to be seen by the official responsible for conducting enquiries about the candidate. As matters at present stand, we despatch S. Form 478 and S. Form 478A (pinned to the inside cover of the file and marked A and B) together

/and follow ...

Minute 412 contd.

Copied to 316-8-2

** adapted 15
our needs.
J.*

and follow this up with S. Form 478D (attached to the inside cover of the file and marked C). The P.S.C. has now decided that a single letter will do, i.e. a combination of A and C. A copy* of this is filed at Serial 411a. This is a great improvement from our point of view and subject to your approval, I should be grateful if a proof of Serial 411a could be obtained from B.3. Printing. The lay-out of the letter should be on the same lines as in the existing S. Forms 478 and 478D.

B.1 approved the draft of S. Form 478D in September 1965 at Minute 302 in Volume 4.

H.I. Lee
H.I. Lee

B.1

24.1.68.

5/2

413

*Copied to
Security of Personnel*

B.1

*B.1
1 Apr. 1968*

The D.E.O. letter at 361a in Volume 4 of this file dealt with the employment of Au Pair girls and Domestic workers from communist countries. As you will see from Minute 362 it was our view at that time that it was unnecessary to issue any specific instruction on this subject.

The latest additions to the Manual of Personnel Security Measures includes, at Annex 53, a copy of the D.E.O. letter and I think it is now incumbent upon us to take note of this and to issue a specific warning to members of the staff. I am doubtful as to whether para 1(f) of Part III of Office Instructions can really be said to cover this subject and I think a short extra paragraph should be included either in Part III or in Part II. I do not consider it necessary to issue a D.G. Circular and I think this amendment to Office Instructions can await the issue of any others which may be on the way. If you agree with this proposal, I will discuss what should be included and where in Office Instructions with B.3.

H.I. Lee
H.I. Lee

B.1

25.1.68.

Copied to Security of Personnel

B.1

Ar
1 Apr. 1968

has been discussed

JHL 1/16/68

The D.E.O. letter at 364b in Volume 4 of this file, which deals with psychiatric treatment of Civil Servants engaged on secret work, has been included in the latest edition of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures as Annex 54.

You, yourself, were consulted about this D.E.O. letter when it was in draft and I refer you to Minutes 142 and 144 in Volume 2 of Pol. F. 53-12-117. The wording of the D.E.O. is such that it may be difficult to avoid drawing the attention of members of staff to the contents of the letter (vide para 5, line 1). On the other hand, I cannot help feeling that we should be likely to do more harm than good by issuing any such instruction as that attached to the D.E.O. letter at 364b as an Annex. Perhaps we could discuss this in due course.

H.I. Lee
H.I. Lee

B.1

25.1.68.

26.1.68

Trans to Security of Personnel
~~D.G. Circular re Instructions to Staff on Security~~
Matters.

414b

415

2.2.68

~~Minute to B.3. Printing~~

Trans to 316-8-2

415a

416

B.1

JHL

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Please refer to Minute 413 which we discussed on 5 February.

I suggest that we include the following as para 1(f)(iii) on page 77 of Office Instructions:

"intention to employ a domestic ^{*servant (at)*} or au pair girl from a communist country."

I have discussed this proposal with L.A. Mr. Sheldon who considers it to fit the bill.

H.I. Lee
H.I. Lee

B.1

5.2.68.

417

B.1 *John*

copied to Security of Personnel

Please refer to Minute 414 which we discussed on 5 February.

We agreed that the following might be included as para 1(g) on page 77 of Office Instructions, necessitating the redesignation of the present para 1(g) to 1(h).

"Members of the Staff requiring, or recommended by their General Practitioner to have specialist medical treatment which may involve discussion of their official duties are advised to consult B branch who, in consultation with the office doctor, if necessary, will be able to give appropriate guidance. This applies particularly in cases where psychiatric treatment has been recommended."

Pol. F. 53-12-117 to which reference is made in Minute 414 is attached. I think you may wish to discuss this with B before reaching a decision.

H.I. Lee

B.1
5.2.68.

6.2.68.

Extract from RS.5763 418

Trans to 316-8-2

417b

B.1/2

copied to Security of Personnel

/share accommodation it will mean that I am going to /

"Au pair girls". Minutes 413 and 416 recommend an addition to Office Instructions which I endorse. Part III 1(f)(ii) at present requires staff to notify B. Branch of "intention to share accommodation with anyone not employed in the Service", but if ever I am going to / invite some one to live with me (as a paying guest, of course) or that I am going to take a joint lease on a flat with some one else or that I am going to turn my home into a chummary; I should not consider that I was "sharing" my home if I engaged a servant to live in it. The proposed insertion removes doubt.

2. "Psychiatrists". Here again I agree that in the changed circumstances an addition is needed to our Office Instructions (minutes 414 and 417 refer). The position suggested is the least unsuitable and the form of words recommended is least likely to cause offence. If I appear to have changed my ground since I wrote minute 144 in Pol.F.53-12-117, so I believe have the Official Committee and the Treasury.

B.1.

7 February 1968

St James

12/2
419
By [Signature]

Copied to Security of Personnel

! agree the proposals made

mins 416-418. Will whether please
to ahead accordingly

B. 9/2

[Signature]

420

Copied to Security of Personnel

B.3 Noted on P.F. 50-24-4(103) Supp A for action
B/14/2.

Please see Minutes 416 to 419.

May the amendments to Office Instructions
for the Security Service mentioned in Minutes 416
and 417 be issued, please.

[Signature]
H.I. Lee

B.1
12.2.68.

421

22.2.68.

D.E.O. letter re 'Employment on Classified Work
of Staff and Service Personnel not of U.K. origin etc.' 421-

422

Trans to 316-8-6

7.3.68.

Note for file re ruling that candidates under 17 should
have full Stage 4 clearance before joining

42

423

14.3.68

~~Extract from M.P.S.M.~~*Trans to 316-8-4*

423a

424

27.3.68

From Treasury, DEO (Security) 5/68.

424a

425

B. 23/4.
Through B.1. *J 18/4**Copied to 316-8-4*

Chapter III (paragraph 47) of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures, which is itself based on paragraph 78 (f) of the Report of the (Radcliffe) Committee on Security Procedures in the Public Service, places upon us an obligation to review quinquennially all P.V. cases, except for those members of the staff under the age of 21 years which must be reviewed annually.

2. We already review all cases annually upon report and, in the case of those under the age of 21, these are submitted to you, D.G. or D.D.G. for reaffirmation of P.V. clearance. Where members of the staff are over 21 years of age formal review of the case is carried out by a P.V. I.O. and is submitted to me for approval. Unless there has been a change in status or some doubt cast upon the subject's reliability, these cases are not submitted to you for formal reaffirmation but are approved by me as being complete to current standards. It is only five years after original affirmation or reaffirmation that such cases must be reaffirmed by you, D.G. or D.D.G.

3. I foresee that if we do not take steps to stagger these cases we may well find ourselves in a year or two's time having to submit a large number of cases in a short space of time for reaffirmation and this may place an unacceptable burden upon you or your successor as B. I suggest, therefore, that we should give consideration to staggering these submissions by submitting for reaffirmation those cases which have not been reaffirmed for at least four years. For the next eighteen months or so these are likely to amount to only a few for most cases were reaffirmed after the introduction of independent testimony as a result of D.G.'s directive of 9 August 1965.

Send to

/4. ...

4. We should also consider how to implement the review as laid down in the M.P.S.M. Filed at 423a is an extract from Annex 31 as well as a copy of Appendix A setting out what is to be done to complete the review. So far as Appendix A is concerned it can be said that, with the possible exception of point 11 dealing with P.V. interviews, we already cover the thirteen points listed when we undertake our annual reviews. We have always held - and I am sure correctly - that B. Branch interviews with candidates cover all the points which a specific P.V. interview should be expected to cover and are carried out by members of the staff who are themselves experienced Security Service officers having in the forefront of their mind the P.V. criteria. In the case of those members of the staff who joined the office before current P.V. procedures came into force, subsequent interviews have, in most cases, been conducted by B. Branch officers and in those few cases where this has not already been done, it is being done upon review.

5. An examination of Annex 31 raises one or two points:

- (a) Paragraph 2 (a) (i) says that the subject should be asked to complete the latest edition of the Security Questionnaire, although the last sentence of paragraph 2 allows discretion to omit this for persons under 21. I suggest, and C.1 agrees, that we shall comply with this instruction if we arrange for all members of the staff to be shown the Security Questionnaire which they had earlier signed and be asked whether they have anything to add or any amendments to make. If they have none, then the fact will be recorded on the file and they will be asked to initial and date the existing Security Questionnaire. If there is anything to add other than changes of addresses already notified to B.1, then a new form should be completed, but only in respect of those paragraphs where fresh information is provided. At the same time they should be asked if they have anything to mention which they think might be of interest in a P.V. context.

Agree.

So far as A.Os, clerical and secretarial staff are concerned, it should become normal procedure for the B.1 officer seeing them upon annual report to note whether four or more years have elapsed since P.V. was last revalidated, and if so to go through the procedure set out above. In the case of Staff Officers, Officers Class B and Interpreters, similar action should be taken by Barker and Hooper. In the case of Officers this can be dealt with by whoever sees them upon annual report, or by me.

/(b) ...

Minute 425 (cont'd)

Copied to
316-8-4

5. (b) Paragraph 2 (a) (i) specifically refers to the "latest edition of the Security Questionnaire". We first started to use this form in the Autumn of 1964 and the only differences between the form used then and the present edition are:
- (i) The "marriage box" on page 1 of the form has been moved from the left hand side to the right hand side.
 - (ii) The third "note on completion" in the box on page 1 now reads "If deceased state year of death and nationality and occupation at time of death as appropriate". The words underlined have been added in later editions.
 - (iii) Paragraphs 3 (c) and 8 now read "10 years" rather than "5 years" - although for a considerable time these have been amended in ink from 5 to 10.

Page. I do not consider that these amendments are sufficiently important to warrant our asking each member of the staff to complete a fresh form when his case comes up for revalidation. Of course, if at a future date material changes are made in the form, we shall clearly have to ask staff to complete new forms.

- (c) Paragraph 2 (b) suggests, among other things, that sick leave returns should be examined when a case is reviewed. Under the new system which came into effect on 1 April, sick leave records are held in a card index in B.1 Registry, each card covering a period of two years. When the card is filled at the end of the two year period it will be placed in the R. of S. In theory, therefore, a sick leave record of any member of the staff appearing in the R. of S. may be anything up to two years in arrear. While it would be perfectly possible for the I.O. reviewing a case to consult the appropriate index in B.1 Registry, I doubt whether this is necessary. In all cases where illness plays a significant part in anyone's working life, reference to this invariably appears in the R. of S.
- Surely.*

/(d) ...


Copied to
316-8-4

5. (d) Paragraph 2 (c) deals with reports on reliability and character. Generally speaking, reports on members of the staff, as well as the P.V. certificate of fitness to be entrusted with TOP SECRET information, are written by one and the same person, although in the case of officers the Director adds his comment to that of the Assistant Director, and in the case of most women a Branch Supervisor or the Head of Registry normally endorses a report written by an immediate supervisor. I do not believe in an office of this size and with our present reporting system that we have any need to change our arrangements.

/agree.

6. In every other respect, I believe we conform to the requirements laid down. I have shown a copy of this minute in draft to Cradock of C.1, who considers that the suggestions made above do not run counter to policy laid down in the M.P.S.M.

B.1.
18.4.68.


H. I. Lee.

Copied to
316-8-7

426
~~As. 28/4~~
~~Bill~~ 28/4

Minute 425 is admirably lucid & seems to me to cover all possible points. My only comment is that on behalf of myself & my successor I want to disclaim any responsibility @ x in para 5(a). Perhaps this could be assumed by Lee himself.

unusually

B.
23/4

~~25.4.68~~ 427 *Trans to 316-8-4*
~~Min. to B.I Officers and I.O.'s re quinquennial~~
~~review~~ 427a

~~10.5.68~~ 428 *Trans to 316-8-2*
~~Min. to B.I. I.O.'s ment. final interview~~
~~of candidates~~ 428a

~~23.5.68~~ 429 *Trans to 316-8-Security of Personnel*
~~Copy of Min. from Pol.F.258-15~~ 429a

~~27.5.68~~ 430 *Trans to Security of Personnel*
~~Copy of Min. from Pol.F.258-15~~ 430a

~~27.5.68~~ 431 *copied to 316-8-5 Trans to 316-8-2*
~~Copy of Min. re not employing 16 year olds~~
~~if there is any doubt about them~~ 431a

~~27.5.68~~ 432 *Trans to 316-8-5*
~~Copy of Min. agreeing with 431a~~ 432a

~~30.6.68~~ 433 *Trans to 316-8-3*
~~P.V. position as at 30.6.68~~ 433a


~~B. 317~~
~~B.~~
~~D.D.G. 317~~
~~D.G.~~

I submit at 433a a P.V. return in the form required for you to send to Sir William Armstrong in the light of Sir Laurence Helsby's letter of 12 May 1966 at 344a. Last year's return is at 389a.

2. The figure of 1 shown in paragraph C of the return represents a girl with provisional clearance who has not yet been fully cleared.

3. Although the return does not include information about the P.V.-ing of candidates for employment, you may wish to know that 22 candidates were in the process of being P.V.d on 30th June 1968.

B.1.
 1st July, 1968.



 H. I. Lee.

Copied to 316-8-3

D.G.

You queried the figure 1 in paragraph C at 433a. I now confirm what I told you this morning that as at 30 June this was the only case on our books of a member of staff who had been granted provisional P.V. clearance and had not at that date been fully cleared to Stage IV.

The heading E does not refer to applicants for employment but only to existing staff; thus if it was decided that garage mechanics, receptionists and porters already in our employ should be P.V., their numbers would be included under E. It is for this reason that in 1966 (see 351a) 50 members of A.4., who previously had not been considered as in a P.V. category, were included under this heading. X in Helsby's covering letter at 344a and paragraph 5 of minute 349 confirm this.


 H. I. Lee

B.1
 4 July 1968.

436

Copied to 316-8-3

4
B.

I have discussed this return with Harry Lee. I see that it follows the precedents of the two past years but I am not sure that it correctly interprets the form at 344a in two respects.

- (a) I believe that the 22 candidates now in the process of being p.v.'d ought to be included under Section E. I base this on the words "is included in E below" in Explanatory Note D and the opening words of Explanatory Note E.
- (b) I believe staff included under Section C (in the present instance one girl with provisional clearance) ought also to be included under E. I base this on the opening words of Explanatory Note E.

2. I think too much has been read into Helsby's covering letter at 344a.

D.G.

5th July 1968

437.

Copied to
316-8-34
H.L.

Please see the D.G.'s Minute 346 and in accordance therewith redraft the return at 433a.

I think, with respect, that the correct interpretation of the instructions at 344a can only be arrived at if one ~~can~~ be absolutely certain what is the purpose of the return which we are asked to make: I must confess that this is something which has not been revealed to me.

B.


5.7.68

438

Copied to
316-8-3

D.G. through B.

With reference to minute 436 the P.V. return has been redrawn to take account of the 22 candidates in process of being P.V. on 30 June 1968. I cannot be absolutely sure at this distance of time that all 22 fell into E (ii) at the material time; there may have been a few candidates in sub paras (i) and (iii), but this has no material effect upon the return.



H.I. Lee

B.1

8.7.68.

439

~~9.7.68~~

~~To Treasury enclosing P.V. Return~~

Trans to 316-8-3
439a

440

15.7.68

~~From Treasury - D.E.O.(Security) 6/68 -
The Cost of Protective Security.~~

Trans to 316-8-3

440a

441

15.7.68

~~From Treasury - D.E.O.(Security) 7/68 -
Employment on classified work of staff
and Service personnel not of UK origin.~~

copied to 316-8-2

441a

442

23.7.68

~~Note of statistics referred to at 440a,
paragraph 5.~~

Trans to 316-8-3


442a

443.

B.1.

I understand from C.1 that you are already concerned in the operation discussed in paragraph 1 of the D.E.O. letter at 440a, and you will certainly wish to see the circular.

2. So far as paragraph 5 is concerned I have had the figures placed at 442a.



H.I.Lee.

B.1.

25 July 1968

444.

B.1/Mr.Lee

26/7
With reference to Minute 443, I am indeed involved in the operation arising from 440a, but primarily as F.O. in costing the relevant part of the Service effort. It is not intended that we should seek to estimate separately the cost of our domestic security procedures, these being counted in as part of the overheads relating to the effort, e.g. of C.Branch, in direct support of protective security procedures in other Government Departments.

I doubt if we need to make a Departmental return of the statistics set out at 442a, but will take advice from the D.G. on this when the time comes for us to submit to the Treasury our main costings.

B.1.

26 July 1968



(The above minute has been copied to Pol.F.53-8-289/FO)

12.8.68.

From Treasury re United States Top Secret Information . 444b.

445.

Agreed ^{15/8}

Copied to 316-8-2

D.G. through D.D.G.

^{15/8}

I should like to propose that during my absence on leave you should authorise John Harrison to give provisional P.V. clearance for women clerical candidates. There are likely to be a number of these in connection with the staffing of the new Registry outpost at Acton, and this type of candidate will have to be dealt with very quickly. It would, I think, be an unnecessary intrusion into your other ^{pre-}occupations.

Munnarwalli

B.

15.8.68

446.

Copied to 316-8-2

^{19/8}
H/O

Please see mem 445 AG's

authority for you to give provisional P.V. clearances in my absence.

B. ^{16/8}

Munnarwalli

447.

Copied to 316-8-2

Note.

Ref mem 444 pae 2. On D.G.'s instructions the P.V. notices at 442a were cancelled & the Treasury in our letter POL.F.5318/289 of 30.8.68

J.

448

Trans to 316-8-2

~~3.10.68~~

~~Letter to A.L.O. Scotland re referee interviews in Scotland.~~

448a

449

Trans to 316-8-2

~~9.10.68~~

~~Letter from A.L.O. Scotland re referee interviews in Scotland.~~

449a

450

~~18.10.68~~

~~Letter from Treasury Chambers, D.R.J. Stephen re transfer of staff between departments~~

450

Trans to 316-8-9

451.

Item I, III & IV copied to 316-8-4

~~20.11.68.~~

~~Note of Informal Meeting held at the Cabinet Office on 6 November, 1968 to Discuss P.V. Problems.~~

451a.

452

Trans to 316-8-2

~~30.12.68~~

~~Instruction to B.1/P.V. I.Os re alteration in mode of work of Section.~~

452a

453

Trans to 316-8-3

~~4.1.69~~

~~To Gillings, Civil Service Dept., enclosing annual return of Positive Vetting Review.~~

453a

*Copied to
Security of
Personnel*


Secretariat.

The time has come round once again to re-issue the D.G. circular on Instructions to Staff on Security Matters, issued originally on 14.2.67 as No. 4/Gen(67) at 377b. It was issued last year as D.G. circular No. 2/Gen(68) on 26.1.68 (414b). I have confirmed with C.1 that there is no change to Appendices A to E.

2. I see that in Minute 410 I suggested that on this occasion we should include mention of the amendments now included at paragraph 1 (h) in Part III of Office Instructions (page 77) dealing with the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Acts. As you will see from 1a in Pol.F.316-9, the Treasury asked us to ensure that the attention of staff was drawn to the existence of this instruction annually. It could therefore probably be best included in this year's circular as Appendix F.

B.1
1.1.69.

H. I. Lee.



Copied to Pol.F.316-9.

~~2.1.69~~

~~Draft Appendix F. to reissue of 414b joined at 454b~~
456a

455


D.D.G.

*Approved
incl 2/11*

Reference minute 454, if you agree I will reissue 414b with the addition of an Appendix F as drafted at 454b.

Secretariat

C.P.C. de Wesselow.



2.1.69

456

~~7.1.69~~

~~DG Circular No.2/Gen(69) - Instructions to Staff
on Security Matters~~

*Trans to 216 Security of
Personnel*

456a

457

9.1.69

From Civil Service Dept. re Notification by the Civil Police of Convictions of Civil Servants. (DEO (Security)1/69). 457a

Copied to 316-8-13 Copied to 316-8-2 Copied to 316 Security Personnel Trans to 316-8-4

458

13.1.69

To Civil Service Dept., replying to 457a. 458a

Copied to Security of Personnel

17.3.69

SM(O)(PS)(69)3 - Personnel Security Committee paper on "Proof of Identity" - Note by the Civil Service Department. 458b

21.3.69

Extract from SM(O)(PS)(69) - Minutes of the Personnel Security Committee Meeting - Item 1: P.V. Criminal Record Check during Reviews. 458c

Trans to 316-8-4

27.3.69

Copy of Minute by B.1/HIL, referring to 458c. 458d

Trans to 316-8-4

31.3.69

Note by B.1/HIL, referring to 458d. 458e

Trans to 316-8-2

459

2.4.69

Loose Minute re [redacted] Iron Curtain contacts. 459a

14.4.69

From Civil Service Dept. re P.V. Reviews: Criminal Record Check. (DEO (Security)3/69) 459b

Trans to 316-8-4

460

16.4.69

L.M. to interviewers re getting details of Iron Curtain contacts of interviewees. 460a

Trans to 316-8-2

461

30.4.69

Note by B.1/HIL referring to 459b. 461a

Trans to 316-8-4

462

30.4.69

Note by B.1/PV/Sec. - numbe of staff who would come within the range of new CRO check. 462a

Trans to 316-8-4

463

30.4.69

To Home Office, referring to Civil Service Dept. letter at 459b. 463a

Trans to 316-8-4

THIS IS A COPY ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 July 2022

464

Trans to 316-8-4

9.6.69 ~~Note by B.1/HIL re C.R.O. backlog cases.~~

464a

465

Copied to 316-8-6

9.6.69 Loose Minute to B.1/AMT re provisional clearances for candidates between the ages of 16 and 17.

465a

466

30.6.69 ~~P.V. position as at 30.6.69~~ *Trans to 316-8-3* 466a

467

Copied to 316-8-3

~~B.1. GMD~~ 47
~~B. Seen~~
D.D.G.
D.G.

I submit at 466a a P.V. return in the form required for D.G. to send to Sir William Armstrong in accordance with Sir Laurence Helsby's letter of 12 May 1966 at 344a. Last year's return is at 433a.

This year's return takes into account the point made by D.G. in minute 436 and the figure of 36 under para E.(ii) therefore represents the number of candidates being processed by B.1./P.V. on 30 June.

It may be wondered why we have invariably made a nil return in respect of para E.(i). The reason is that we take the view that these returns relate to existing members of the staff and not to applicants (for whom, of course, we could if we wished give a figure). Open Departments with a limited number of P.V. posts would make returns under E.(i) for those members of the staff it was decided should transfer within the Department from a non P.V. post to a P.V. post.

H.I. Lee

B.1.

1.7.69

468

3.7.69 From Civil Service Dept., reminder about P.V. Annual Return.

468a

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
10 OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958

Copied to 316-8-3

8/9/67
469.
D.G. through D.D.G. *and 7/7*

Reference Minute 467, the P.V. return pinned inside the cover has been drawn up on the lines which you directed last year though, with respect, I am not convinced we are wholly logical in completing it in this way, in the sense that if it is right to show against E. (ii) the number of candidates still not in employment whose papers are being progressed to Stage 4, by extension we ought to show against E. (i) the number of candidates who, having been considered acceptable following the first interview, are being progressed to Stage 3. On the best retrospective estimate we can make this would have been 25 on 30 June.


2. I have sought C.1's advice on the purpose of this return. After consultation he tells me that it was originally conceived as a basis of making a central check on:

- (a) the number of P.V. posts in a Department (in case the number was unreasonably large), and
- (b) the arrears in completing P.V. to Stage 4 in respect of staff already employed in such posts.

C.1's C.S.D. contact simply did not know whether candidates should be included or not, but voiced the view that rather than attract comment we should complete the form in the same way as we had done in the past (not knowing that we changed it last year).

3. In view of this comment you might decide that we should stick to what we did last year and accordingly submit the return as prepared. The alternatives will be either to confine the return to staff, i.e. those already in our employment, or to complete it both for staff and all candidates in respect of whom we have launched P.V. proceedings in the expectation that they will join the Service.

B.
3.7.69


J. A. Harrison.

470

Trans to 316-8-3

8.7.69

To C.S.D. enclosing annual P.V. return

470a

B. Sullivan
117

471

Copied to 316-8-3

I suggest that we continue on the pattern of the returns for this year and last. I don't suppose anybody in the C.S.D. pays much attention to our return, one of the principal objects being to discover whether departments are falling seriously into arrears and to keep them up to the mark.

D.G.

A. F. ...

8th July 1969

472

Trans to 316-8-4

10.7.69

~~Loose Minute to P.V. I.O.s re Criminal Records checks~~

472a

473

Trans to 316-8-4

22.7.69

~~Loose minute to I.O.s further to above~~

473a

474

3.10.69

Copy of minute from B.5. re provisional PV clearance

474z

10.10.69

~~Ext. from R.S.5851 re security training given to staff~~

Trans to 316-8-4
Copied to 316-8-12

474a

15.10.69

~~DEO letter re reporting of convictions by Civil~~

Servants

474b

475

Trans to 316-8-4

22.10.69

~~Ext. from R.S.5851 further to~~

Trans to 316-8-4

475a

476

22.10.69

~~L.M. to B.1 from B promulation of Office Instructions to younger members of staff~~

476a

Trans to Security of Personnel

477

Copied to 316-8-2

B.

-

§ 2 copied to
316-8-6§ 3 + 4 Copied to
316-8-4

1. You asked me to let you know the authority upon which our arrangements for granting P.V. clearance are based:

The Manual of Personnel Security Measures (Chapter III, para 34) reads as follows:

"No general rule can be laid down for the level at which decisions should be taken in Positive Vetting cases because of the wide variation in circumstances between Departments. But the delegated authority to decide Positive Vetting cases on behalf of the Minister should be clearly laid down in each Department and the delegation made in writing."

Minute 339 in Volume 4 of this file provides this authority in the form of a minute to D.D.G. and B from D.G. It reads:

X | "I confirm that you are both authorised to issue P.V. clearance certificates on my behalf for all staff other than Officers and Junior Officers on first appointment."

2. You also asked about provisional P.V. clearances. Chapter III - para 41 - of the Manual reads as follows:

"Provided the Head of the Department is personally satisfied that such access is clearly consistent with the national interest, he may permit an individual to be afforded access to information requiring Positive Vetting before the procedure has been completed. Such cases should be kept to a minimum; at least the first three stages of Positive Vetting should have been satisfactorily completed before access is afforded, and the full P.V. investigation should be completed as soon as possible."

Minute 339 in Volume 4 of this file provides D.D.G., B and B.1. with D.G.'s authority to grant provisional P.V. clearances in the following terms:

/"Both ...

"Both of you and B.1. may grant provisional clearances to staff to be employed in the posts designated at 324a." (This list was later extended by the list at 352a, D.G.'s authority being obtained in minute 354.)

The fact that provisional clearances have been granted by B and, in his absence by D.D.G. and only in the absence of either by B.1., seems to be based on no specific instruction, but simply upon interpretation of D.G.'s ruling mentioned above.

3. So far as the review procedure is concerned the authority stems from the Manual ~~concerned~~ Chapter III - para 47. This reads in part:

"Positive Vetting cases should be reviewed at least every five years or annually if the individual is under 21 until that age is reached. The purpose of the review is to check on the period which has elapsed since the original Positive Vetting enquiries (or review) were made and, where necessary, to bring the case up to standard."

Para 52 of the chapter on review adds:

"If the results of a review, or of a re-investigation where this is necessary, are satisfactory, Positive Vetting clearance may be confirmed."

It is therefore necessary in the case of the under 21s annually, and in the case of the rest of the staff, quinquennially, that ~~D.G., D.D.G.~~ or B should specifically "confirm" (we call it "reaffirm") P.V. clearance upon review.

*Reaffirmations
are delegated
to B - see XI
overleaf*

4. Our decision to subject all staff over 21 annually to review is based on B's minute 180 in Volume 2. This reads in part:

"In my personal view I think that it will in practice be found to be more convenient to review all our P.V. cases annually rather than, in the case of the over 21's, five-yearly, but on this I am open to argument." (B.1., in a manuscript note, added: "insofar as men are concerned, I agree."). Minute 182 then records the agreement of B, B.1. and the then B.2. that all P.V. cases would be reviewed annually.

/If it ...

Minute 477 contd.

Copied to 316-8-2

If it was thought advisable, therefore, we could clearly reverse this latter decision but I doubt if this would be sound policy. A year seldom passes without some fresh hurdle being placed on the P.V. course and it is only by means of regular reviews that we are able to ensure that all members of the staff jump each one.



H.I. Lee

B.1.

27.10.69

478

Trans to 316-8-2

28.10.69

~~Copy of L.M. sent to A.3.C. re Police enquiries concerning applicants~~

-478a

479

30.10.69

~~L.M. from A.3.C. re 478a~~

Trans to 316-8-2

479a

480

10.11.69

~~Note - the addressing of envelopes when writing to SB for full enquiries~~

Trans to 316-8-2

480a

481

27.11.69

~~L/M from A.3.C. further to 479a~~

Trans to 316-8-2

481a

482

1.1.70

~~To C.S.D. (Gillings) enclosing annual return of PV cases~~

Trans to 316-8-2

482a

483


Secretariat through C.1.

No amendments necessary.
2/11 *7.15-*

Forwarded to
Secretary of
Personnel

You will wish to re-issue the D.G. circular on Instructions to Staff on Security Matters which was last issued on 7 January 1969 as D.G. Circular No. 2/Gen(69), (456a).

I am passing this file through C.1. to confirm that no amendments are necessary to the various Appendices. I have one amendment myself to suggest and that is that in Appendix A we add the words, "before making arrangements to undertake any journey to the Communist countries ..." in lines 7 and 8. In the past twelve months we have had several cases of girls making arrangements to visit Yugoslavia and then telling us of their intention only a short time before they are due to leave and after they have already paid their costs to travel agencies.


H.I. Lee

B.1.

1.1.70

13.1.70

From Civil Service Department re PROOF OF IDENTITY 483b.

484.

16.1.70

Draft Circular on Instructions to Staff on Security Matters. *-sent out at 486A.* 484a.

485.

Copied to Security of Personnel

D.D.G.

*Approved -
MEL 16/1*

The draft re-issue of the D.G. Circular on Instructions to Staff is now ready for your approval (484A). I have made the alteration suggested by B.1. and have added an additional appendix reproducing the Circular on the danger of identification by hostile I.S. D.G. asked that it be brought to notice at regular intervals. This Circular was originally graded CONFIDENTIAL but I see no reason why it should not now issue as RESTRICTED. I have made a small amendment to the only sensitive sentence.

Secretariat

T. P. Aubrey
T. P. Aubrey

16 January, 1970

486.

23.1.70

~~D.G. Circular No. 2/GEN(70) - Instructions to Staff on Security Matters~~

Trans to Security of Personnel

486a.

487

8.1.70

~~From Civil Service Dept. re proof of identity of applicants filed in error. See 483b. Held B2/EAM.~~

487a

488

12.2.70

From CSD re List of Organisations of Security Interest

489

488a

4.3.70

Copy of MP/12/58/01 from Civil Service Re: Convictions of Civil Servants

489a

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490 Copied to 316-8-2

20.3.70 Extract from L.436/6955 re revealing identity of office to unusually young candidates 490a

491

Copied to 316-8-4
Trans to 316-8-5

19.5.70 Form C.S.D. re Amendment to the Manual of Personnel Security Measures 491a

492

Trans to 316-8-3

~~3.6.70 From C.S.D. re Annual return of P.V. Reviews 492~~

493

~~25.6.70 From CSD re staff 1~~

493

Trans to 316-8-3

15.6.70 To C.S.D. re p.v. reviews 493

494

~~25.6.70 From CSD re staff loans~~

Trans to 316-8-9

494a

496

Trans to 316-8-7

~~30.6.70 To B.1. re process of P.V.ing ICL employees 496a~~

497

~~1.7.70 To B.1. re proposal to transfer P.V. of I.C.L. empl. to Min.Tech. 497a~~

Trans to 316-8-7

498

~~1.7.70 To Min. Tech. proposing that they should P.V. Min. Tech. I.C.L. employees 498a~~

Trans to 316-8-7

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499

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D.D.G. *Ind 217*

D.G. *29 37*

B. (o/r)

-71

I attach the P.V. return in the form required for D.G. to send to Sir William Armstrong in accordance with Sir Laurence Helsby's letter of 12 May 1966 at 344a. Last year's return is at 470a.

2. The difference of thirty between the number of total P.V. posts this year and last year has been caused mainly by an increase in the establishment of A.O.s, Mobiles and Statics.

3. As instructed by D.G. in minute 471, our returns have been made this year on the same lines as they were in the past two years. You may also wish to refer to minute 467.

H. I. Lee

B. 1.

2 July 1970

500

2.7.70

Draft covering letter for sending P.V. returns to replaced by 501a C.S.D.

500a

501

Trans to 316-8-3

~~3.7.70~~

~~To C.S.D. enclosing annual P.V. return~~

501a

	502.	
13.7.70	Circular from B.1 - Recruitment/P.V. Procedure (References).	502a
	<i>Trans to 316-8-2</i>	
15.7.70	BM re Children and Young Persons Act 1969 - affect on PV procedure	502b
	<i>Trans to 316-8-2</i>	
	503	
16.7.70	From Min. Tech. re P.V. of computer engineers	503a
	<i>Trans to 316-8-7</i>	
	504	
23.7.70	L.M. to C.2. re vetting of I.C.L. employers	504a
	<i>Trans to 316-8-7</i>	
	505	
30.7.70	From C.S.D. re annual returns of P.V.	505a
	<i>Trans to 316-8-3</i>	
30.7.70	Reporting of Social Relations with Officials of Communist and other Countries	505b
	<i>Trans to Security of Personnel</i>	
	506	
17.8.70	From C.S.D. re Access to Civil Service Commission Records in P.V. Cases	506a
	<i>Trans to 316-8-2</i>	
25.8.70	B.1. circular re Welsh Nationalism	506b
	<i>Trans to 316-8-2</i>	

Copied to 316-8-2

21/9

507

~~B1/BFW of~~

To see s.506a. My reflex action to this is that from our point of view it will not materially change things in that presumably you will continue to use your present contact with [redacted] and will handle affairs in your usual discreet way.

W.D. Hooper

W.D. Hooper

B.1.

25th August 1970

508

Copied to 316-8-2 & 316-8-6

D.G.

Minute 477 sets out against the background of the M.P.S.M. existing rules governing the level within this Service at which full or provisional P.V. clearance and reaffirmation of P.V. clearance may be certified. I wish to seek your authority for some modification of these rules, but to put my proposals in their context should first cover the extent to which authority to make a conditional offer of employment is already or will shortly be delegated.

2. Before a conditional offer of employment can be made to any candidate the papers must be complete to Stage III and have been examined by the Officer on the P.V. desk. If the papers are fully satisfactory and disclose no likelihood of a defect in a P.V. sense they will be endorsed by the P.V. desk that there is no objection to a conditional offer subject to satisfactory final interview. If the papers are not fully satisfactory,

/other ...

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S Form 587 30m 3/70 2022

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+ 316-8-6

Minute 508 (cont'd)

other procedures apply which are not immediately relevant. A conditional offer involves also revealing the identity of the Service (except to girls still at school at the time of the final interview) and some more precise description of the intended duties than will have been given in earlier interviews.

3. Conditional offers to Registry and secretarial staff are made by the A.O. conducting the final interview. B.1 chairs the final boards for Static Watchers, who are recruited to the unestablished staff, and for drivers, messengers and porters. Hitherto B. has chaired the final board of all other categories of staff except Officers. I intend that in future B.1 should chair the final boards for all Class "B" and Interpreters, and make a conditional offer when appropriate.

4. P.V. clearance is required before recipients of conditional offers can start work, except for a particular range of posts which you or your predecessor have approved where an individual may start work in advance of completion to Stage IV given that provisional P.V. clearance has been formally affirmed. I think it right that the P.V. clearance certificate or provisional P.V. clearance enabling the commencement of work should remain the responsibility of B., except in the case of candidates for the Junior Officer and Officer grade, where I assume you would wish yourself to continue to certify P.V. clearance. (There are no Officer posts in which the incumbent may start work before full P.V. clearance has been affirmed.)

5. I now seek, however, your permission to delegate to B.1 or, in his absence, to B.2, authority:

- (a) to reaffirm P.V. clearance (annually) for members of the staff under 21;
- (b) to reaffirm P.V. clearance on quinquennial review for
 - (i) secretarial, clerical and A.2.A. staff up to and including the new grade of Assistant Supervisor (or S.F. Supervisor);
 - (ii) Officers Class "B" and Accounts Officers;
 - (iii) British-born Interpreters.

/It would ...

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
Minute 508 (cont'd)

*Copied to
316-8-2,
316-8-6*

It would be understood that cases within these categories in which there was an element of doubt would be referred to B.

B.

2.9.70



J. A. Harrison.

509


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316-8-2
Copied to 316-8-6*

B. *Seen*

I agree that authority to reaffirm P.V. clearance should be delegated as proposed in paragraph 5 of Minute 508.

It would be wise, I think, to ask Directors to have a fresh look at the numbers of posts in which they can accept staff who have been provisionally cleared (324a and 352a).

D.G.



3rd September 1970

510

4.9.70

~~To Directors and H/T.S., etc. re posts to which staff with Prov. P.V. clearance can be posted.~~

Trans to 316-8-6

510a

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511

B.1 through B.2

To see, please, D.G.'s approval at Minute 509 of the delegation of authority to reaffirm P.V. clearance specified in paragraph 5 of Minute 508, which we will bring into effect forthwith.

2. The delegation of the chairmanship of Final Boards for Class "B" and Interpreters referred to in paragraph 3 of that Minute is also with immediate effect.

B.

4.9.70

J. A. Harrison.

512

B.1/RJW

WDH 9/8.

ABW

2/9.

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316-8-6

Please pass URGENTLY

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To see minutes 508 and 509.

2. Additionally I wish to arrange that in those cases where it becomes necessary at a Final Board to disclose certain sophisticated techniques of the Service (e.g. in the cases of Interpreters or A.4. Mobile and Static candidates), such cases should be passed to me by the I.O. through B.1./Mr. Hooper with a recommendation that a conditional offer of employment can be made at the same time as a disclosure of the nature of the duties expected of the candidate. This will make it unnecessary to obtain provisional P.V. clearance in such cases.

B.1.

H. I. Lee

8 September, 1970

24.11.70
3.12.70

513.
Ext. from record of DG's meetings with RCMP
Copy of B's Minute on L.436/7351, re
case of [redacted]

513z
513a

514

B.1.
1) has a 'his' been omitted from your note. 11(a)(ii) end line 1. ? NO
2) The paper Annex A para 2(o) needs amending i line 6th MP/ST
Annex 2(o). otherwise no consent. LR/CI 14/12/70.

Please see ~~171a~~^{513z} Bill Hooper showed you
an earlier draft of our note. I have made sub-
stantial alterations to this and I should be grateful
if you would examine the final draft and let me know
if you see any objection to it as it stands.


H.I. Lee


B.1.

11th December, 1970.

515

D.G. through B.

Attached to the inside cover of this file
are papers to forward to the Director of Security
and Intelligence of the R.C.M.P. in accordance with
your undertaking at ~~171a~~^{513z}. A draft letter for your
signature is attached.


H.I. Lee

B.1.

15th December, 1970.

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516

17.12.70

Note for file re annual F.V. Returns

Trans to 316-8-3 516a

517


~~D.G.~~ through D.D.G. ^{inc.} 111

513₂

With reference to ~~171a~~, B.1 and I have been in some doubt as to precisely what is required, but I have now placed in the folder inside the cover a draft letter with two intended enclosures which I think may be that much more helpful to Parent than a simple statement of our stage by stage drill of bringing P.V. to completion.

B.

30.12.70


J. A. Harrison.

518.


~~D.G.~~

Following your query yesterday, I have confirmed with C.1/Mr. Ruxton that the note on P.V. procedures in U.K. Government Departments which it is intended to send to the R.C.M.P. is a "liaison version" of Chapter III of the M.P.S.M., the release of which was authorised in writing/originally for India. Reference is made to this in Minute 86 and the same version was used to send to Canada (and other old Commonwealth Security Organisations) in 1965. The version it is now proposed to send to the Canadians has been amended in only minor details, for which C.1 take the view it is unnecessary to obtain special clearance.

by the
Treasury

B.

5.1.71


J. A. Harrison.

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6.1.71

Reference.....

519

copied to 316-8-2

To R.C.M.P. re PV REVIEW Procedures

519a

520

copied to 316-8-3

~~B.1.~~

Attached to the inside cover of this file is a draft letter to Gillings of C.S.D. covering our Annual P.V. Stats. Return - as at 31.12.70.

2. I am quite sure that we need to spell out the situation in rather more detail than heretofore; the more so as some differing phraseology is creeping into correspondence, e.g. serial 492a entitled "Annual Return of Positive Vetting Reviews" really refers to Quinquennial Reviews and Under 21 Reviews - whereas, for our own purposes, we have in the past included in these Returns to C.S.D. our own Annual Reviews as well. Again, as serials 246a/247a in Pol. F. 310-11 make clear our Return is being interpreted only in the context of Quinquennial and Under 21 Reviews when it comes to the Consolidated Departmental Return which is considered by the Personnel Security Committee. At serial 516a I have made a historical note which outlines the development of events in respect of these Annual Returns to date.

3. As you are aware, we have made a considerable effort to reduce our backlog of Quinquennial Reviews (the vast majority of the 370 outstanding cases at the end of 1969 fall into that category) but the success we have achieved has been, I am afraid, at the expense of our own Annual Reviews. The P.V. T.O.s have been anything but idle. Unfortunately, Quinquennial Reviews for obvious reasons are infinitely more time-consuming than Annual Reviews and the up-shot is that we shall show under the heading of "Outstanding Cases" a marked increase as at 31.12.70 over the previous year.

4. I believe that we should submit once more our Return in the same format as previous years and, in the covering letter, suggest that the time has come to change our format next year and submit the Return along the lines of Annex attached to Duke's D.E.O. letter of 12.11.65. (It is not really feasible to change the format this year as we cannot accurately interpret datum point figures, but provided we take action now we can establish a basis for the 1971 Return.)

5. I am sorry for this rather lengthy minute, which you may wish to discuss.

W.D. Hooper
W.D. Hooper

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~~B.1.~~

7.1.71

521

destroyed - see 523a

Draft letter to Gillings/C.S.D.

521a

~~D. Damard~~ to discuss ⁵²² of the work
B.1. *Jan 11/11*

We discussed minute 520 and the draft letter which I brought to our discussion. I now re-submit a simplified draft letter filed at serial 521a for further consideration.

W.D. Hooper
W.D. Hooper.

B.1.

8.1.71

523

Trans to 316-8-3

To CSD re Annual Return

523a

524

Trans to Security of Personnel

1.71

26.1.71

Note re re-issue of D.G. Circular on Instructions to Staff

524a

525

Trans to 205/CANADA

2.2.71.

From RCMP re positive vetting procedures

525a

526

17.2.71

From CSD re Organizations of security interest

~~526~~ 526a

527

25.2.71

To CSD re 526a

527a

528

26.2.71

From R.C.M.P. re visit of [redacted] to London.

528a

Trans to Prof 205/CANADA

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529

Trans to 205/ CANADA

1.3.71

Note by B. re talk with Canadian High Commission re visit of Spooner.

529a

*we discussed
5/3*
~~B.1 (on return)~~

530

With reference to 528a/529a, I should like to discuss with you how this visit should be handled.

B.
1.3.71

J. A. Harrison.

531

B.1/W.D.H. *W.D.H.*

Please see 528a and 529a.

2. I shall spend an hour and a half or so talking to [redacted] along the lines of the papers at 519a and I shall then hand him over to you to have a short talk before lunch. I suggest you take him out to lunch and I will join you if I can.

3. I have arranged with C.3 that he should spend the afternoon of 15 March with C.3 and Bill RUXTON discussing the significance of character defects in positive vetting.

4. On Tuesday morning, 16 March, I suggest he comes to see you and [redacted] and you spend whatever time is necessary answering the practical questions which he will no doubt wish to put.

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Minute 531 continued

At the same time I suggest you explain to him our own nationality rule and show him copies of the personal particulars forms for men and women staff, the Security Questionnaire and the various pro formae which we use when communicating with referees. If he wishes it, I see no reason why you should not provide him with copies of these documents and to this end three copies of most of them are enclosed in the attached folder. You had better check whether they are all there or whether there is anything else which you think he should have.

Done

5. I have spoken to Inspector FRIEND on the telephone and have arranged that he will bring [redacted] over to see me at 10 a.m. on Monday, 15 March.

Answered ✓

6. Sometime during his visit [redacted] should be introduced to B.

7. Please return these papers to me by Friday, 12 March.

H.I. Lee
H.I. Lee

B.1

9 March 1971

15.3.71

532
Trans to Perf 205/CANADA
~~Note for file - B.1's meeting with [redacted]~~ 532a

18.3.71

533
Trans to Perf 205/CANADA
~~To [redacted] RCMP re P.V. forms and letters~~ 533a

26.3.71

534
Trans to 316-8-3
~~Note for file re 1970 Review of PV Cases return~~ 534a

1.4.71

535
Trans to 316-8-3
~~To Grice CSD re stats~~ 535a

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536

14.4.71
14.4.71

From [redacted] RCMP re his visit } trans to 205-0047 536a
From [redacted] RCMP to B.1. 536b

537

Trans to 316-8-3

20.4.71

From Miss Sparrow/CSD re annual return 537a

538

Trans to 316-8-2

28.4.71

Note for file re S. Form 478 538a

539

30.4.71

DEO letter re reporting of convictions by Civil Servants 539a

540

Trans to 316-8-4

5.5.71


LM from B.1. re Quinquennial Reviews 540a

541

Trans to 316-8-2

13.5.71

To B5 re re-printing of S. Form 478 541a



544

~~B.P.~~ 7/7
~~D.D.G.~~ note 2/7
~~D.G.~~
B. o/r jgn

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I submit the annual P.V. return in the form required for D.G. to send to Sir William Armstrong as required by Sir Lawrence Helsby's letter of 12 May 1966. Last year's return is at 501a.

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/2. ...

Minute 544 contd.

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2. The increase in the total of P.V. posts is attributable mainly to general staff increases among Officers/A.O.s (18), Secretarial grades (22) and A.4. mobiles (14).

3. The 45 cases shown at B(ii) are almost all candidates for employment.

[Signature]
A.D. Waugh

B.1.

6.7.71

545

9.7.71

To C.S.D. - Annual P.V. Return

Trans to 316-8-3

545a

546

~~21.7.71~~

~~Branch Memorandum folder dealing with Reprinting of
finance(e) forms~~

filed - error

~~546a~~

547

~~9. 10.71~~

~~Revised Army paper request forms~~

filed - error

~~547a~~

548

15.12.71

~~From OSD re PV REVIEWS: ANNUAL RETURNS~~

Trans to 316-8-3

548a

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549

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B.1.

Attached to the inside cover of this file is a draft letter to C.S.D. covering our annual return of P.V. statistics for 1971.

523a

2. The figure of 234 under "Number of new cases" includes about 140 Quinquennial Review cases which had in fact been begun before the end of 1970 but were omitted from last year's statistics on the grounds that they had been begun prematurely, i.e. before five years had elapsed from the date of the signing of the E.93.

3. The number of cases under Quinquennial Review is now in fact 16 with three Under 21 annual reviews also in hand. This much more satisfactory state of affairs is a credit to the industry of P.V. I.O.s and their staff.

A.D. Waugh
A.D. Waugh

B.1/4.

7.1.72

550

Trans to Security of Personnel

~~7.1.72~~

~~B.M. re re-issue of Instructions to Staff on Security Matters~~

550a

A.D. Waugh
12/21
81
02/21

551.

To see the draft letter and set of statistics pinned to the inside cover of this file. The return for this year is in a different form from that for last year (523a). This is as a result of the CSD letter at 548a.

H.E. Lee
H.E. Lee

B.1

11th January 1972

552

13.1.72

~~To CSD re 1971 statistics~~

Trans to 316-8-3

552a

553

28.1.72

~~Defence council instructions - Army~~

Trans to Security of Personnel 553a

554

17.2.72

~~DEO letter re security significance of membership of GND~~

Trans to 316-8-2 554a

555

14.3.72

~~E.M. and S.B. re fiances as amended at 14.3.72. ^{Examples} of letters sent to Police Forces &~~ 555a

Trans to 316-8-2

556

~~B.1. 18/7
B.1. 18/7
D.D.G. 23/11/7
D.G. 18/11/7~~

copied to 316-8-3

I submit the annual P.V. return in the form required for D.G. to send to Sir William Armstrong as required by Sir Lawrence Helsby's letter of 12 May 1966. Last year's return is at 545a.

2. The salient increases in P.V. posts since last year are:

Officers/A.O.s	22
A.4. field staff	26
Secretarial/Registry	41

3. The 59 cases under investigation are almost all candidates for employment.

A.D. Waugh
A.D. Waugh

B.1/4.

7.7.72

557.

Copied to 316-8-3

003 11/7
D.D.G.

D.G. *Matthew*

The words "almost all" at paragraph 3 above cover the single case of an existing employee who is a doorkeeper under consideration as a Static Watcher.

B.

11.7.72

Matthew

M. T. E. Clayton.

558

Trans to 316-8-3

~~12.7.72~~

~~To C.S.D. enclosing annual review~~

558a

559

Copied to 316-8-6

B.T.

16 year olds & P.V. clearance

Please see 422a, 431a, 432a and 465a.

At that time it enabled us to make an offer of Emplt.

2. 465a seems a contradiction in terms unless by Provisional Clearance we mean Conditional Offer, since there is not much point in Provisional Clearance, if we have to complete Stage IV before the girl joins.

3. A.M.T. argues that as we only accept mature 16 year olds, our rather fine distinction has little meaning and indeed I can see no logical reason for full P.V. of them more than 17 year olds; neither has reached the age of majority.

4. The only significant change since the ruling was made has been the statutory lowering of the age of majority from 21 to 18 in 1970, but this does not seem directly relevant.

A.D. Waugh

A.D. Waugh

B.1/4.

2.8.72

B. *Seen*

As the monthly statistics show, we have not been successful in recruiting as many Grade II/III Registry candidates as we would wish and I am uncertain of whether we shall ever achieve our establishment figures this autumn, let alone exceed them as I should like to do.

2. We should almost certainly be able to make up our numbers with 16 year old candidates of whom the Agencies have a number, but those we have seen, and who seem to be suitably mature for our purposes, simply will not wait around the four to six weeks which full PV enquiries generally take.

3. The current position is that we can bring in candidates of 17 years of age and over on provisional PV clearance (ensuring, of course, that they are in non-sensitive posts until fully cleared), but we cannot do the same for the sixteen year old candidates.

4. We are exceptionally careful now to consider only mature 16 year old candidates and I hope very much you will agree that we should now be permitted to bring in such girls on provisional clearance, thus enabling them to start work before they are fully cleared.


H.I. Lee

B.1/0

3rd August 1972

561

*Copied to 316-8-6**108 7/8/72*
D.D.G.

Minute 560 proposes a change in our existing policy toward the recruitment of 16 year old girls in the Registry.

2. Whether we should do so or not depends not so much in my view on the age of the candidate but on our assessment of her maturity. A young 16 year old, still at school, may well be more mature than a girl of 17½ who has drifted from one temporary job to another while making up her mind after leaving school. Much of course depends on the candidate's home and scholastic background, the latter we will be able readily to establish before granting provisional P.V. clearance, and we may also be able to obtain some knowledge of her home environment; but we will only be able to develop this knowledge in any depth when we proceed to Stage IV. The risk is that these enquiries will disclose a history of sufficient security significance to cause us to reject the candidate, but this risk is already accepted for the 17 year olds who are granted provisional P.V. clearance and I do not believe that we would be putting ourselves at any greater risk by allowing 16 year olds to join the Registry on provisional clearance.

3. I therefore support Mr. Lee's recommendation and should be grateful for your endorsement.

B.

4.8.72

M. T. E. Clayton

M. T. E. Clayton.

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^{seen}
B. through C.

This confirms our discussion of Minute 561. While I understand the recruiting difficulty, I am reluctant to agree to the proposal in question, at any rate before alternatives have been thoroughly explored.

2. The M.P.S.M. enjoins us to keep provisional clearances to the minimum. It is true that we already employ girls of 17 with a provisional P.V. clearance and, as you say, a girl of 16 may be as mature as a girl of 17. But generally speaking the older girl will be more mature and our present practice can be defended on the grounds that it has operated for a number of years without any harmful consequences. I understand that there has only been one case anybody can recall where provisional P.V. clearance could not be confirmed after Stage 4, and that in this case it was possible to terminate the girl's employment without giving security reasons and without any embarrassment to the Service.

3. On the other hand, if we now lower the age for admitting people into P.V. posts with only provisional P.V. clearance and something goes wrong, we shall be very vulnerable unless we have a cast iron case for having lowered the age. We should be particularly vulnerable if it emerged that our standards were lower than those, for example, of G.C.H.Q. If you can discover what is their practice, this might be useful.

4. Before referring to possible alternatives to your proposal, there are two further points on which I should like to

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*Copied to 316-8-6*Minute 562 continued

comment. The first relates to the value of Stage 4 as compared with Stage 3. I accept that a good deal of useful information can be obtained from Stage 3. But I have been very impressed by the quality of the reports I have seen by our P.V. Investigating Officers on Stage 4 interviews and by the depth of information about the home background of some of these girls revealed in these reports. Secondly, I do not believe there are really any non-sensitive posts in Registry. Some posts are more sensitive than others but knowledge that a PF exists in certain circumstances be as sensitive as its contents.

5. As to alternatives, perhaps you would see what could be done to speed up Stage 4 in urgent cases. I do not know what is the volume of urgent cases of 16 year olds. Perhaps something could be done by rearranging priorities. If an extra P.V. Investigating Officer were needed, this is an alternative we would have to consider.

6. Another possibility that occurs to me is a conditional offer of employment to begin on a stated date subject to satisfactory completion of outstanding enquiries.

7. I am minuting this through C since it would be helpful to have his comments on this matter against the background of general personnel security policy.

*R.C. Symonds*D.D.G.

7 August 1972

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F.

Reference minutes 561 and 562.

2. It is laid down in M.P.S.M. that provisional clearances should be kept to a minimum. There is no specific reference to young persons in this context, but since it is also prescribed in M.P.S.M. that as far as possible persons under 21 should not be employed in P.V. posts, a fortiori provisional clearances for such persons should be kept to a minimum. Owing to the nature of our Office it may well be considered impracticable for us to follow this advice. One can of course always argue against any yardstick which has been arbitrarily adopted, such as a lower age limit of 17 for provisional clearance.

3. I am not aware of the general practice in other Departments, and since I understand you want an urgent comment I have not made any enquiries.

D.H. Whyte
D. H. Whyte

C.

10th August 1972.

Copied to 316-8-6

15/8
[Signature]

14/8
564
[Signature]

Discussed
15/8

B.1.

12 SW through D.M.T. Mrs. we please discuss

11/8

From D.D.G.'s minute it is evident that we cannot lower our sights and admit 16 year olds on provisional clearance. Consequently we must, if we are going to pursue our intention to accept girls of even less maturity than the 17 year olds, be sure that we have enough information about their home background. D.D.G. makes some suggestions in paragraph 5 and 6 of his minute which I would be grateful if you would explore in conjunction with Mrs. Orr.

2. I believe you have recently obtained some information recruitment practice; would it be possible for you to enquire - in appropriately reserved terms - from G.C.H.?

B.

11.8.72

Interchange
M. T. B. Clayton.

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565

15.8.72

Note re PVIOs

565a

11.9.72

Minutes of Cabinet P.S.C. meeting

565b

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Mr H P Goodwyn 5
11 SEP 1972

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PSC(72) 1st Meeting

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568B

CABINET

*Original in POL F51-30-168 S/A.
copied Pol.F. 316-8-1 by P/PS 4/10/72*

PERSONNEL SECURITY COMMITTEE

To see: DG

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Conference
Room B, Cabinet Office on
FRIDAY 8 SEPTEMBER 1972 at 10.00 am

*DDG
S
AB .. 25/10
B
Kx
KY
F*

PRESENT

Mr J E Herbecq
Civil Service Department
(In the Chair)

Mr A Duke
Civil Service Department

Mr K R C Pridham
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr E A Sedgley
Home Office

Mr S D Wilks
Department of Trade and Industry

Mr J D Simmonds
Government Communications
Headquarters

Mr H P Goodwyn
Security Service

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Mr H L Emmett
Ministry of Defence

Mr H E Davies
Ministry of Defence

Mr R L Thomas
Ministry of Defence

Mr J W T Pritchard
Department of the Environment

Mr P I M Irwin
United Kingdom Atomic
Energy Authority

Mr R A Browne
Post Office

SECRETARIAT

Mr J M Moss
Mr P A Evans

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2	POSITIVE VETTING REVIEW: SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE	4

9-1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

565b

Item 1 extracted to Pol. R. 310-24

CONFIDENTIAL

1. POSITIVE VETTING: SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE (FORM E93)

Previous References: S.(P.S.)(62) 6th Meeting, Minute 1;
S.(O)(64) 1st Meeting, Minute 1

The Committee considered memoranda by the Civil Service Department (PSC(71) 10 and PSC(72) 3) and by the Security Service (PSC(71) 11) about the revision of Form E93, the Positive Vetting Security Questionnaire.

MR DUKE (Civil Service Department) said that the main points for resolution were:

- i. whether the Questionnaire should aim to refer to all subversive organisations and, if so, in what terms;
- ii. whether to adopt the revised version of Questions 8-16 at Annex A to PSC(72) 3, and in particular Questions 11a, 11b and 14 which reflected the Security Service's wish to establish whether PV candidates had put themselves into a position where a hostile Intelligence Service might be cultivating them or might apply pressure to them in the future;
- iii. the choice between the formats at Annex A and Annex B to PSC(71) 10.

In discussion the following points were made -

- a. the format and preamble of Annex B to PSC(71) 10 were to be preferred to those of Annex A to PSC(71) 10, although it might be possible to incorporate further improvements in the layout;
- b. the third line of the preamble to Annex B to PSC(71) 10 should, however, be amended to refer to "information of special importance";
- c. to the first Note on page 2 of Annex B to PSC(71) 10 should be added "or any person who is regarded or lives as your wife/husband";
- d. Question 7 of Annex B to PSC(71) 10 should be amended to omit the requirement to give the names and addresses of parents' employers;

e. the Questions in paragraphs 11a, 11b and 14 of Annex A to PSC(72) 3 were best omitted; information of the kind they were designed to elicit should be left to be pursued in interviews, and this requirement should be drawn to the attention of Investigating Officers.

f. otherwise, the revised version of Questions 8-16 in Annex A to PSC(72) 3 should be adopted in preference to Questions 8-14 and 16 of Annex B to PSC(71) 10, subject to the amendment of

(1) Question 8 to embrace service with the Post Office, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and the Civil Aviation Authority, and to confine its application to the last 10 years;

(2) Question 9 to refer to "Occupation in last 10 years"; this would be consistent with the amendment to Question 7 proposed in Annex B to PSC(72) 3;

(3) Question 13 to read

"Have you ever been a member of, or in sympathy with, any organisation not covered in your reply to Question [12] which advocates or practises illegal activities in pursuit of its political objectives?"

g. in particular -

(1) it was desirable to retain the references to Fascists in Question 12 of Annex A to PSC(72) 3; it was, however, undesirable to mention countries having Fascist governments in Questions 10 and 11 of that Annex because the magnitude of tourist traffic to Spain and the widespread ignorance of the Fascist nature of its Government had often led staff to answer questions about visits to such countries incorrectly in the past;

- (2) adequate Character Referees resident in the United Kingdom were not always available, but it was desirable to retain this residence qualification in the Questionnaire and to confine any relaxation of it to particular cases;
- h. the final Certificate should make clear to whom material changes in the information recorded should be reported;
- i. in the positive vetting of a former member of HM Forces, it was essential to consult the appropriate Service security authorities.

The Committee -

1. Took note that the Chairman would seek the approval of the Chairman of the Official Committee on Security for the incorporation in the revised Form E93 of the Question -

"Have you ever been a member of, or in sympathy with, any organisation not covered in your reply to Question [12] which advocates or practises illegal activities in pursuit of its political objectives?"

2. Subject to conclusion 1 above, invited the Civil Service Department -

- i. to prepare a revised Form E93, taking into account the points made in discussion and in Annex B to PSC(72) 3;
- ii. to show it to the National Staff Side;
- iii. to arrange for its introduction into use; and
- iv. to arrange for all Investigating Officers to be reminded of the importance of eliciting, at interviews with candidates for Positive Vetting, relevant information on contacts with officials of a country having a Communist government.

Item 2 extracted to Pol. F. 310-11.

RESTRICTED

2. POSITIVE VETTING REVIEW: SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE
Previous Reference: S.(0)(64) 1st Meeting, Minute 1

The Committee considered a memorandum by the Civil Service Department (PSC(72)4) covering the draft of a Security Questionnaire that it recommended should be completed by the subject of any PV review.

MR DUKE (Civil Service Department) said that the form had been prepared in the light of discussion with Departments, to meet a widespread view that a questionnaire separate from the Form E93 was needed to avoid asking for review purposes some of the questions to which answers could not possibly have changed since the last Security Questionnaire was completed.

The following points were made in discussion of the draft:

- a. The covering letter should not be printed on the form as Departments would sometimes wish to use an individually tailored letter; it would however be important for that letter to include the date when the subject completed his last questionnaire.
- b. Each page of the form should carry the marking "In Confidence".
- c. It would be preferable to leave the subject to write "Yes" or "No" rather than ask him to delete a word from a printed choice of answers.
- d. Question 2 should be amended to read "Has your nationality or that of your spouse changed since you completed your last questionnaire?"
- e. Question 3(c) should be amended to refer to "Any other addresses ...".
- f. The heading "Supervising Officer" in Question 4 should be amended to read "Senior Officer".

g. Despite the desirability of minimising the effort involved in completing the Questionnaire, the application of Question 10 should not be restricted to the period since the completion of the last questionnaire, in particular because this might lead to undesirable pressure for the application of Question 9 to be similarly restricted.

h. The final Certificate should make clear to whom material changes in the information recorded should be reported.

The Committee --

1. Invited the Civil Service Department, in consultation with the Security Service, and taking account of the points made in discussion and of the final text of the revised Form E93 discussed earlier in the meeting, to prepare for the Committee's consideration a revised draft Security Questionnaire for use in PV reviews.

2. Took note that the Ministry of Defence wished to remain free to use the revised Form E93 for review purposes, making clear in a covering letter that the subject was free to answer particular questions by saying only that there had been no change from the information he had given on a previous questionnaire.

Cabinet Office

8 September 1972

565a

Pol F 316-8-1 Vol 6

NOTE FOR FILE

I discussed Minute 564 with B.1. on 15th August. We considered the various alternatives open to us, and concluded that in the short term there was no action which could be taken which would provide a solution to this problem. In the long term there seems no doubt that the presence of one more PVIO would make a substantial difference. One extra such post has been included in the advance proposals for 1973-1974. Hopefully, this post will be filled by [redacted] on his return from the Persian Gulf.

[redacted]

B.1

15th August 1972

4/10 8-10
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PA please
PFI 316-8-1526a
(marked WDH)

NOTE

The list circulated with DEO(Security)3/70 - 11 February 1970 replaced the list circulated under DEO(Security)10/66 - 23 November 1966.

A request to forward destruction certificates for the copies of the 1966 list you hold was included in DEO 3/70. A destruction certificate has not yet been received.

Would you please forward destruction certificates for the 1966 list as soon as possible. According to our records Department hold copy Nos 59 Box 500

526a



Civil Service Department
Whitehall London SW1

Telephone 01-839 7733 ext

Your reference

Our reference DEO (Security) 2/71
MP 12/25/02

Date 17 February 1971

PQF 316-8-1.

Dear Establishment Officer

LIST OF ORGANISATIONS OF SECURITY INTEREST

A revised list of organisations of security interest was issued under the reference DEO (Security) 3/70 MP 12/25/02 of 11 February 1970. The Security Service have now prepared an addendum covering some organisations, mainly those active amongst students which were of security interest in the past or which are now defunct.

2. The list is divided into the same categories as defined in DEO (Security) 3/70. The two lists should be used in conjunction and only for the purpose and in the manner specified in paragraph 3 of that letter. Most of the organisations ceased to be active or of security interest by 1955 and many only flourished in the 1930s. Nevertheless departments should, if in doubt, consult the Security Service if a P V enquiry throws up a post 1955 reference.

3. Will you please acknowledge receipt of the attached copy on the slip provided below and restrict access to the list to central establishment and security staff who have personnel security responsibilities.

Yours sincerely

A DUKE

ENCS

AS
22.3.71
B1/Plan
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COPY NO.: 62

S26a

ADDITIONAL LIST OF ORGANISATIONS OF SECURITY INTEREST

The attached list should be used in conjunction with the list of Organisations of Security Interest dated January 1970. The numerical symbols carry the same meaning as in that list. It consists mainly of organisations, active amongst students, that were of security interest before 1955 or which are now defunct. Some University organisations are already named in the earlier list.

2. The list is for use solely as a reference document at central checking points when P.V. investigators are briefed and where their reports are received for review.

Security Service

187 FEB 1971

SECRET

ADDITIONAL LIST OF ORGANISATIONS OF SECURITY INTERESTGeneral

Anti-War Committee	1
Association of Scientific Workers (A. Sc. W.)	1
British Universities League of Nations Society	1
Friends of the Soviet Union	1
International Alliance of Students for Socialism	1
International Peace Campaign	1
International Student Service	1
Left Book Club Groups	1
League of Nations Society	1
Peoples' Vigilance Committee	1
Student Federation for International Co-operation	1

Universities

Aberdeen University Marxist Science Group	1
Aberdeen University Plan for Progress Movement	1
Birmingham University Russian Club	1
Dundee (University College) Students Progressive Society	1
Edinburgh University - The Cosmopolitan Club	1
Liverpool University Labour Club	1
Reading University Labour Club	1
Sheffield Federation Society's Group	1
The Cosmopolitan Club (Edinburgh University)	1
University College of North Wales (Bangor) Labour Club	1

S26a

Cambridge University

Cambridge Anti-War Council	1
Cambridge Students Anti-War Group	1
Cambridge University Democratic Front	1
Cambridge University Labour Society	1
Cambridge University Majlis (Indian)	1
Cambridge University Peace Council	1
Cambridge University Undergraduate Council	1
The Fascist Society	II

London University

Gower Socialist Society (University College)	1
Inter-Hospitals Socialist Society (London)	1

Oxford University

Karl Marx History Society	1
October Group/League	III
Oxford Council for Peace and Civil Liberties	1
Oxford University Anti-War Committee	1
Oxford University Co-ordinating Committee	1
Oxford University Democratic Socialist Club	1
Oxford University Fascist Association	II
Oxford University Peace Group	1
Oxford University Representative Council	1

SECRET

511
511

Copy:

POL.F.310-70

✓POL.F.316-8-1/DG

6th January 1970

When I was in Ottawa in November you asked if I could let you have information about the Positive Vetting periodical review procedures which we apply to our own staff.

2. By way of background I enclose an up-to-date note on U.K. Government Positive Vetting procedures, of which an earlier version was sent to you under cover of our letter POL.F.310/70/C dated 23 November 1965. This details the essential steps in applying Positive Vetting in a U.K. Government Department. In addition I enclose a note on our own arrangements for Positive Vetting and review, which is designed to show how we adapt the procedures to our own particular requirements.

3. If these two notes do not give you all you need, please return to the charge.

E. M. FURNIVAL JONES

Assistant Commissioner
L.R. Parent,
Director, Security and
Intelligence,
R.C.M.P. Headquarters,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Enclosures: 2

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22

SECRET

-1-

Positive Vetting Procedures
applied by the Security Service
to its own staff.

Arrangements for Positive Vetting

Unlike many Government Departments nearly all posts in the Security Service require P.V. clearance; Positive Vetting thus forms an integral part of the recruitment procedure. This is reflected organisationally by locating full-time P.V. staff alongside the recruiters and giving them access to all recruitment papers at the appropriate stages. The P.V. Section consists of a team of Investigating Officers specially recruited for the work, working under the direction of an experienced Security Service Officer.

2. The fact that most posts require P.V. clearance has the disadvantage that the time which must elapse between first contact with a candidate and the date on which he/she can start work is governed by the time taken to bring P.V. enquiries to an acceptable standard. The delay factor involved can on occasion mean that a potential recruit is lost.

3. On the other hand, there are significant advantages. In particular:

- (a) the application form completed by all candidates is designed to collect information which will be relevant to security enquiries, including details of close relatives, foreign relatives, periods of residence in the U.K. and abroad, educational establishments attended, past employment and the names of four character referees, two of whom may later be selected as P.V. referees;
- (b) recruitment interviews (at least two for all categories of staff) are conducted by experienced Security Service staff and handled in such a way as to serve the purpose of a P.V. interview. As a result, only in exceptional cases is a separate P.V. interview required;

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- 2 -

- (c) the papers which thus accumulate in the form of employment and character references, interview reports, etc., provide valuable background for Investigating Officers when they start their field enquiries in the course of completing Stage IV of the P.V. procedure.

4. Given these procedural variations, the standards of enquiry and clearance are as strict as those applied in U.K. Government Departments generally, but in two particulars stricter. Firstly, in addition to interviewing two nominated P.V. referees, independent testimony is sought and obtained from a referee not nominated by the candidate. Secondly, while it is within the limits applying to U.K. Government Departments generally, the Service has a slightly stricter nationality rule which may be waived only on the authority of the Director General. If at any stage in the recruitment process information is received which requires special interpretation for its possible significance in an espionage or subversive context, the papers are referred to the Branch concerned.

5. P.V. clearance for Officer recruits is affirmed by the Director General and for other grades, on delegated authority, by the Director of Establishments.

Review Procedures

6. The special situation of the Security Service calls for constant and close attention to personnel security, and review procedures should be seen against this requirement. To be alert for incidents or aspects of behaviour of subordinate staff which may affect security status is part of the responsibilities of a supervisor at any level in the Service, any cause for doubt being brought to the attention of those responsible for personnel security in the Establishments Branch. More particularly, however:

- (a) the occupants of supervisory posts are educated in personnel security requirements and the annual report form which a supervisor completes in respect of subordinate staff requires the reporting officer to certify that he/she knows of no reason why the individual should not continue to have access to TOP SECRET information;

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SECRET

- 3 -

- (b) all staff below the rank of Assistant Director are seen on annual report by the Establishments Branch, the interview, though primarily for staff management purposes, being so conducted as to bring into account factors in the individual's personal life which might affect security status.

7. When a record of the annual interview on report has been completed, the Record of Service (which now contains all facets of the individual's record including the original recruitment and P.V. papers) is passed to the P.V. Section for review, which checks:

- (a) that the degree of enquiry supporting the latest P.V. Certificate is in accordance with standards currently being applied; and
- (b) that no new information has reached the Record of Service raising a presumption of doubt.

If the papers are unsatisfactory in either particular they are referred for instructions. Whenever formal reaffirmation is required, the case is summarised and specially submitted by the P.V. Section.

8. P.V. clearance is formally reaffirmed:
- (a) annually for staff under 21;
 - (b) quinquennially for staff over 21;
 - (c) at any intervening stage when doubts have been raised and resolved.

30 December 1970

SECRET

POSITIVE VETTING

PUBLIC STATEMENTS

1. The introduction of positive vetting was announced in a Press Statement released on 8th January, 1952 the terms of which are as follows:-

"His Majesty's Government have been considering the procedure for ensuring the reliability of Government staff employed on exceptionally secret work, especially work involving access to secret information about atomic energy.

They have decided that special enquiries should be made about those holding or applying for such posts. Further particulars will be sought from them and from other persons so that the Minister concerned may judge whether they are fit to be entrusted with such information. Any considered to be unfit, including members of the Communist Party or a Fascist organisation or those associated with such bodies in such a way as to raise legitimate doubts about their reliability, will be barred from such employment. The safeguards laid down by the previous Government for any person removed from secret work in the Civil Service on account of such associations will be maintained, the staff being transferred to other work in all cases possible.

Details of the proposed procedure are being discussed with the Staff interests concerned."

2. On 23rd November, 1955, the then Prime Minister set up a Conference of Privy Councillors to examine security procedures and a statement on their findings was issued as a White Paper in March, 1956 (Cmnd. 9715). It included the following paragraphs:

"Some of the recommendations of the Conference deal with what may be called the relation between security risks and defects of character and conduct. The Conference recognise that today great importance must be paid to character defects as factors tending to make a man unreliable or expose him to blackmail or influence by foreign agents. There is a duty upon Departments to inform themselves of serious failings such as drunkenness, addiction to drugs, homosexuality or any loose living that may seriously affect a man's reliability.

.....

While confining themselves to the security aspects of these defects of character and conduct, the Conference also record the view that in individual cases or in certain sections of the public service, a serious character defect may appropriately be the determining factor in a decision to dismiss a particular individual or to transfer him to other work."

In subsequent Parliamentary debate Ministers made it clear that the Government accepted these views.

3. In 1961 a Committee was appointed by the Government to examine security procedures in the public service ("The Radcliffe Committee") and included the Positive Vetting

procedure within the field of examination. In their report published in April, 1962 (Cmnd. 1681, paragraphs 60-77) they commented at length upon the procedure. They found it, within its limits, an effective system, although they recognised that there may be difficulties in operating it and they made some related recommendations but they did not recommend any modifications of the procedure as such.

4. The nature of Positive Vetting was subsequently disclosed in some detail in the Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Vassall case (Cmnd. 2009).

PURPOSE OF POSITIVE VETTING

5. As indicated by the published statements, the purpose of Positive Vetting is to assemble sufficient information about an individual (his background, character, interests and associations) to enable the Minister concerned (or his nominee) to make a positive judgment that the individual is suitable to be entrusted with exceptionally secret information. The criteria for assessing whether a person can be so entrusted are set out in Annex A.

SCOPE AND NATURE OF POSITIVE VETTING

6. Positive Vetting is to be applied to persons (including Civil Servants, both industrial and non-industrial; Foreign Service Officers; members of the Armed Forces; Consultants; and Contractors' employees) who are being considered for employment on duties which require regular and constant access to TOP SECRET information and for any access to certain categories of specially sensitive information.

7. Positive Vetting is also applied, irrespective of their access, to all Under Secretaries and those under consideration for promotion to Under Secretary and, at the discretion of Permanent Secretaries, to senior scientific, professional and technical staff.

8. It is also open to Departments to submit to Positive Vetting staff who are to be appointed to posts abroad involving a degree of access to classified information for which Positive Vetting would not normally be required under paragraphs 6 and 7 but where the risk of subornation or attempted blackmail by foreign powers is higher than in the United Kingdom.

9. The Positive Vetting of an individual consists of the following four stages, which are described in detail in later paragraphs:

Stage 1: Record Checks; comprising a check against the records of the Security Service and the Criminal Records Office and a check of the records of the employing Department.

Stage 2: Completion by the individual of a security questionnaire, Form E.93, Annex B.

Stage 3: Consultation in writing with character referees named by the individual in the questionnaire.

Stage 4: A field investigation.

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10. All four stages of the procedure are now obligatory, subject to the qualification (see para. 35) that provisional Positive Vetting clearances may in certain circumstances be granted before the field investigation is completed, provided it is completed and the clearance reviewed as soon as possible thereafter.

11. No person may be employed on duties to which Positive Vetting applies unless and until a properly-authorized Positive Vetting clearance or provisional clearance has been issued on his behalf.

DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

12. The responsibility for:

- (a) determining which posts require Positive Vetting; and
- (b) conducting the associated vetting and deciding whether Positive Vetting clearances should be issued;

rests with the Department in which the posts occur, or (in the case of outside consultants and contractors) the Department on whose behalf the "exceptionally secret work" of the post is being undertaken. (But see paragraphs 36 and 37-38 about the Positive Vetting of Permanent Secretaries and of seconded staff.)

13. Each Department is required:-

- (a) to identify and maintain an up-to-date record of all the Positive Vetting posts for which it is responsible.
- (b) to ensure that all current holders of these posts have valid Positive Vetting clearances.
- (c) to make arrangements so that persons being considered for recruitment or transfer to these posts undergo the Positive Vetting procedure (with satisfactory results) before they are appointed to and take up the duties of the posts. No person should be given grounds for supposing that he has been appointed to a Positive Vetting post until he has been fully cleared.
- (d) to maintain a record of the Positive Vetting clearances of staff.
- (e) to instruct staff with Positive Vetting clearances to report marriage or remarriage (see paragraph 39).
- (f) to review Positive Vetting clearances periodically (see paragraphs 40-45).
- (g) to ensure that any information available to the Department which may have a bearing on the security standing of an officer is recorded in a form in which it will be available if and when it becomes necessary for him to be positively vetted.

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14. Departments should seek through establishment arrangements to ensure that, so far as practicable, persons in the following categories are not considered for posts which entail Positive Vetting:

- (a) ~~Minors~~ (i.e. persons under twenty-one years of age); their characters, interests and opinions are likely to be still developing rapidly and the Positive Vetting process is therefore of less value in assessing their reliability than is the case with more mature persons;
- (b) New recruits and persons who have only recently joined the public service; Departments can have less direct knowledge about the character, interests and opinions of such persons than they have of persons who have served for some time in the public service, and the Positive Vetting process in such cases is likely to be less valuable in assessing reliability.

POSITIVE VETTING PROCEDURE: THE FOUR STAGES

Stages 1 and 2: The Record Checks and Completion of the Questionnaire

15. The Department should first examine its records about the individual, including its security records, the individual's personal file and annual reports, to see whether:

- (a) a Security Service check has already been made and a valid 'N.R.A' (i.e. 'Nothing Recorded Against') is held, (an N.R.A. is valid if it has been obtained since 1st January, 1949, and there has been no subsequent break in service); and
- (b) a check has recently been made with the Criminal Records Office;
- (c) there is any information from other sources indicating subversive tendencies or associations;
- (d) there is evidence of defects of character, conduct or circumstance of security significance.

16. If the departmental records reveal well-founded evidence of defect of character, conduct or circumstance of security significance, the Department should consider at this stage whether or not to proceed with Positive Vetting. The Security Service may be consulted on the assessment of the defect's significance. It should be borne in mind that in some cases of a reported defect, where the evidence is not established beyond doubt, the best way to arrive at a balanced account of it may be to proceed with Positive Vetting; and that in some circumstances (e.g. if the individual's career is likely to be prejudiced by lack of a Positive Vetting clearance), this may be the only fair course to follow.

17. If the departmental records reveal any information indicating subversive tendencies or associations the Security Service should be consulted.

18. If the departmental records reveal no adverse information of any kind, checks should be made with the Security Service

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(unless a valid "Nothing Recorded Against" (N.R.A) is already held), and with the Criminal Records Office (unless a check was made recently). If the Criminal Records Office have recorded a conviction of such a nature that it might lead a Department to withhold Positive Vetting clearance, but where it was possible that nevertheless clearance might be given, further enquiries should be made locally to obtain any additional details of the conviction that might be available.

19. If the check with the Security Service discloses any adverse record, the Security Service should be consulted before proceeding to Stage 2 of Positive Vetting.

20. If a valid N.R.A. is held or has been obtained (para. 18 above) and the Criminal Records Office check and examination of departmental records reveal no information suggesting unsuitability for a Positive Vetting appointment, or, notwithstanding some adverse information, the Department decides, after any necessary consultation with the Security Service, to proceed with Positive Vetting, the individual should be asked to complete a security questionnaire (Stage 2) (E.93 (Annex B)).

21. Extracts from the information so obtained should be entered on form E.81 (Annex C) and sent to the Security Service for a further check. If this check discloses adverse security information, or if the individual has made some significant admission in the E.93 (Annex B), the Department should consider, in conjunction with the Security Service, how to proceed.

Stage 3: Referees

22. The security questionnaire (E.93 - Annex B.) includes a request for the names of two referees. Provided the subject of the Positive Vetting has no adverse security record (see para. 25), the next step is to consult these referees in writing (Paras. 27-28).

23. For a referee to be accepted as satisfactory he must fulfil the following conditions:

- (a) must be well acquainted with the subject in his private life in recent years;
- (b) must be a fit person to express an opinion on the subject's reliability;
- (c) must not be related to the subject.

24. The letters sent to referees (para. 27) specifically seek to establish whether conditions (a) and (c) are met; and Investigating Officers conducting field investigations are required by their standing instructions (Annex D) to satisfy themselves on (a) and (b). If a referee does not satisfy these conditions, the subject should be asked to name an alternative. An official colleague of the subject may be accepted as referee provided he is well acquainted with the subject in private life.

25. If the Security Service check of the subject of the Positive Vetting, or departmental records, has revealed that he has, or has been suspected of having, Communist or other subversive associations or sympathies, and the Department decides nevertheless to proceed with the case, the Department should also check his referees with the Security Service. The Department should use for this purpose only such personal

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details about the referees as are readily available and should not seek to obtain any additional details from the subject or the referees. The Security Service should be informed of the reasons for the checks and, if the checks reveal information adverse to the referee(s), should be consulted about the acceptability of the referee(s) and about any special instructions which should be issued to the Investigating Officer conducting the field investigation (see para. 30). When referees are checked in this way the Investigating Officer should be told that this has been done and of the results.

26. Departments may also ask the Security Service to check a referee if the Investigating Officer conducting the field investigation acquires and reports any information suggesting that the referee has or has had Communist or other subversive associations or sympathies.

27. Letters to be sent to referees should follow standard forms, depending on whether the subject is already in service or a candidate for employment. The two forms of standard letter are at Annex E and F. They may, exceptionally, be departed from when particular circumstances make them inappropriate e.g. when the referee is well known to the Department a tailor-made letter may be more suitable.

28. In order to leave the referee in no doubt as to the purpose of the inquiry, a copy of the Press statement of the 8th January, 1952, should also be enclosed (see para. 1), together with an addressed envelope (for his reply) marked "Personal and in Confidence", which will act as an added assurance that the reply will in fact be treated confidentially.

Stage 4: Field Investigation

29. Field investigations should normally be carried out by officers employed specifically for this purpose. The range of inquiries they should undertake is given in Annex D.

30. Unless, exceptionally, there are overriding reasons for not doing so, the Department must give the Investigating Officer access to all the available background information about the subject and should draw his attention to any aspects of the case which the Department particularly wants to be examined. On completion of his investigations the Investigating Officer will draw up a report recording the inquiries he has made and the information and opinions about the subject that he has obtained. If information has been withheld from the Investigating Officer, his report must be considered against the background that, by denying him a "lead" to a possible line of inquiry, the value of the report may have been diminished.

31. Field investigations on behalf of most Departments in the Home Civil Service are conducted by a team of Investigating Officers employed and managed by the Ministry of Aviation. Departments making use of this team are responsible for:

- (a) completing the first three Stages of the Positive Vetting procedure in each case and making available to the Investigating Officer all the background information etc. (para. 30);

- (b) indicating any special priority to be given to the case;
- (c) assessing each case, in the light of the Investigating Officer's report, and deciding whether Positive Vetting clearance should be granted or refused;
- (d) dealing with any "troubles" (e.g. Parliamentary Questions) arising out of the case.

ASSESSMENTS AND DECISIONS IN POSITIVE VETTING

32. No general rule can be laid down for the level at which decisions should be taken in Positive Vetting cases because of the wide variation in circumstances between Departments. But the delegated authority to decide Positive Vetting cases on behalf of the Minister should be clearly laid down in each Department.

33. The decision in each case should be clearly recorded; and if clearance is granted despite some query raised by the inquiry, or if clearance is refused, or information has been withheld from the Investigating Officer, the reasons for the decision should also be clearly recorded.

34. Although the decision in each case rests with the Department conducting the Positive Vetting inquiry, the Security Service are always ready to give assistance in assessing a case and to suggest or undertake, where necessary and possible, further investigations into it. This includes assistance in assessing a case where a character defect is thought to have security significance.

PROVISIONAL CLEARANCES

35. Provided the Head of the Department is personally satisfied that such access is clearly consistent with the national interest, he may (except where the U.K's international obligations provide otherwise) permit an individual to be afforded access to information requiring Positive Vetting before the procedure has been completed. Such cases should be kept to a minimum; at least the first three stages of Positive Vetting should have been satisfactorily completed before access is afforded, and the full Positive Vetting investigation should be completed as soon as possible.

POSITIVE VETTING OF HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS

36. The Positive Vetting of Heads of Departments and subsequent reviews are the responsibility of the Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and will not be undertaken by their Departments.

STAFF TRANSFERRED OR LOANED FROM ONE DEPARTMENT TO ANOTHER

37. The responsibility for ensuring that an officer transferred or loaned to another Department has a security clearance appropriate to the work on which he is to be employed rests with the receiving Department, though naturally they will have to rely in the main on the evidence supplied by the officer's former Department. For transferred staff, the Officer's personal file including Positive Vetting papers.

STAFF TRANSFERRED OR LOANED FROM ONE DEPARTMENT TO ANOTHER

37. (a) The responsibility for ensuring that an officer transferred or loaned to another Department has a security clearance appropriate to the work on which he is to be employed rests with the receiving Department. That Department should ensure that the officer's personal, Normal Vetting and/or Positive Vetting papers are examined before accepting him on transfer or loan. The examination may disclose or give rise to security doubts, or show deficiency in depth of documentation, against current vetting standards, contemporary criteria, or the particular requirements of the post. It is for the receiving Department in these circumstances to decide whether to seek more information from the parent Department or reject the candidate. Where an officer has been the subject of correspondence with the Security Service, the Security Service should be consulted before any information supplied by it is made available to the receiving Department.
- (b) If an officer who is to be transferred or loaned to another Department does not have an appropriate clearance the supplying Department is responsible (unless the two Departments agree otherwise) for:
- (i) completing Normal Vetting or Positive Vetting enquiries before the officer is appointed;
 - (ii) deciding in consultation with the receiving Department whether Normal Vetting or Positive Vetting clearance should be issued. Where the receiving Department is not satisfied that a clearance should be granted, the appointment will not take place.
- (c) Once a transfer has been agreed the officer's personal file, Normal Vetting and/or Positive Vetting papers should be handed over to the receiving Department who will be responsible for conducting periodical Positive Vetting reviews. For loaned staff an officer's personal file, Normal Vetting and/or Positive Vetting papers will be retained by the supplying Department who will be responsible for conducting Positive Vetting reviews.

~~(if any) should be handed over to the receiving Department. For loaned Staff, if the lending Department wishes to retain the Officer's personal file and Positive Vetting papers (if any), it should allow the receiving Department to have access to them.~~

38. If an officer is being seconded specifically to fill a Positive Vetting post in the receiving Department, that Department should inform the supplying Department in advance that it is a Positive Vetting post. The supplying Department (unless the two Departments should agree otherwise) is then responsible for:

- (a) completing Positive Vetting before the individual is appointed;
- (b) deciding whether Positive Vetting clearance should be issued. (Where the supplying Department decides that clearance should be issued despite some security doubt thrown up by the inquiry, the receiving Department should first be consulted);
- (c) notifying the receiving Department when clearance has been issued and furnishing (if the receiving Department so requests) the individual's completed Positive Vetting file for perusal.

CHANGES IN MARITAL STATUS

39. Departments should instruct all positively vetted staff to report marriage or remarriage. When such reports are received, a Security Service check of the new spouse should then be made. Submissions of the particulars of the new spouse, together with similar particulars of the individual, should be made on a form E.81 (Annex C), inscribed at the top: "SUPPLEMENT TO POSITIVE VETTING OF (individual's name) PARTICULARS OF SPOUSE".

REVIEW OF POSITIVE VETTING CLEARANCES

40. Positive Vetting cases should be reviewed every five years or annually if the individual is under twenty-one until that age is reached. The purpose of a review is to bring a case up to current standards and to check on the period which has elapsed since the original Positive Vetting enquiries (or review) were made.

41. The review procedure is as follows:

- (a) The subject should be asked
 - (i) to complete the latest edition of the Security Questionnaire (form E.93);
 - (ii) to give the names of his immediate supervisors over the last five years;
- (b) All the subject's personal papers should be examined, e.g. annual confidential reports, sick leave returns and his Positive Vetting folder, as well as his personal file.

/(c)

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- (c) One or more of the subject's supervising officers, and the Security Officer if the subject has been employed in an outstation, should be asked for a report in writing on the subject's general reliability and character. It is left to Departments' discretion to decide how many supervisors are consulted and whether their written reports should be supplemented by discussion.
- (d) If the written evidence requires clarification or if the Department considers it desirable, the subject should be interviewed by an appropriate member of the departmental Establishment or Security staff.

42. This procedure may need some modification in the case of persons under twenty-one whose cases are reviewed annually and Departments have discretion to omit (a) as well as (d) in paragraph 41 if they think the completion of a further form unnecessary.

43. If the review discloses that any record check has not been made, this should be completed. If any interviews, e.g. with referees, are necessary to bring the case up to current standards or up-to-date, the assistance of the appropriate team of Positive Vetting Investigating Officers may be sought. Departments must indicate, however, precisely what interviews are required and why. Since a subject required to give referees will normally ask the latter for permission to use their names it is undesirable, on the occasion of a review, to seek referees, or up-to-date names and addresses of referees previously nominated unless the Department has reason to believe that interviews will be necessary. Departments have therefore discretion to tell officers on the occasion of a review that they need not complete the answer to question 12 of form E.93. An answer can be sought subsequently if this appears necessary or, of course, at the time if there is prima facie reason to think that interviews will be necessary.

44. If as a result of a review, or otherwise, doubt arises about the subject's reliability, the action to be taken depends upon the basis of the doubt. If it is based upon the discovery of subversive tendencies or associations, the Department should consult the Security Service. If it arises in connection with the subject's character or conduct, the Department should arrange for the case to be investigated by the appropriate team of Positive Vetting Investigating Officers. The Investigating Officer must be informed by the Department, in detail, of the points upon which their doubts are based.

45. If the results of a review, or of a re-investigation where this is necessary, are satisfactory, Positive Vetting clearance may be confirmed.

SECURITY EDUCATION

46. It is important that persons occupying Positive Vetting posts should be given an explanation of their security responsibilities. The form which this aspect of security education should take is left to the discretion of Departments, except where posts give access to classified information bearing a restrictive security marking: the holders of such

posts must be given specific instruction in the relevant procedures for handling documents bearing that marking and in their special responsibility for safeguarding the information.

APPLICATION OF POSITIVE VETTING TO THE ARMED FORCES AND IN INDUSTRY

47. These instructions are stated mainly in terms of civilian employees of the public service. In the Armed Forces and for contractors' employees the scope of positive vetting, the nature of the field investigations to be undertaken, and the standards required for clearance are the same as for civil servants, but the procedures to be followed may differ.

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POSTS COVERED BY THE POSITIVE VETTING PROCEDURE:
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING TRUSTWORTHINESS

1. A Permanent Head of a Department will not appoint a person to or maintain a person in a post covered by Positive Vetting unless he is satisfied that he knows enough about the person concerned to feel justified in regarding him/her as wholly fit to be entrusted with the information to which the post gives access.

2. Evidence of the following will be regarded as raising a presumption of unfitness for a post covered by the Positive Vetting procedure:-

That the individual or a parent or guardian with whom he/she is or has recently been living or his/her spouse (lawful or unlawful) -

- (a) Has committed or has attempted to commit or has aided or abetted another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason or sedition, or any breach of the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts.
- (b) Is or has been (other than as a duty) an associate of spies or saboteurs or of persons reasonably suspected of being such or of representatives of foreign Powers whose interests may be inimical to those of the United Kingdom or Commonwealth.
- (c) Is or has been a member of the Communist Party or of a Fascist organisation in the United Kingdom or any other country, or of any other subversive organisation.
- (d) Is or has been a significant sympathiser with the Communist or Fascist or other subversive ideology, or is or has been a close associate of members of the Communist Party or a Fascist organisation or of any other subversive organisation.
- (e) Has advocated revolution by violence to alter the constitution of the realm.

That the individual:

- (f) Is or has recently been a close associate of persons who, though not members of the Communist Party or Fascist organisation or any other subversive organisation, are known sympathisers with such an organisation.
- (g) Does not conform to the Nationality Rule of the Department.
- (h) Has been held captive or interned for a substantial period in Communist hands.
- (i) Has deliberately omitted significant information from, or falsified, an Application Form or a Security Questionnaire.

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- (j) Is suffering or has suffered from any illness, including any mental condition, which may cause a significant defect in his judgment or reliability, unless there is evidence of cure.
- (k) Has been convicted of a criminal offence, or offences, indicating habitual criminal tendencies or serious character deficiencies.
- (l) Has been addicted to the use of alcohol or drugs habitually and to excess, unless there is evidence of rehabilitation.
- (m) Has shown himself by act or speech to be unreliable, dishonest, untrustworthy, indiscreet or of extravagant habits.
- (n) Has grossly infringed security regulations.
- (o) Has been or is reasonably suspected of being a homosexual and therefore vulnerable to a blackmail approach or to pressure by a hostile intelligence service, or has engaged in infamous, immoral or disgraceful conduct which might similarly expose him to such an approach or to such pressure.

3. Other information may have a bearing on the individual's fitness for a post covered by the Positive Vetting procedure, such as residence on the part of the individual or of his close relatives in Russia or Russian Satellite country, or association with subversive groups on the part of the individual's close relatives or former spouse or friends or associates.

4. The Permanent Head of the Department, in reaching his decision, will take into account all the available information, favourable and unfavourable, which bears on the individual's fitness for a post covered by the Positive Vetting procedure. He will not decide in favour of an individual in whose case there is a presumption of unfitness for one or more of the reasons listed in paragraph 2 or for any other reason, unless he is satisfied by the weight of the favourable information about the individual that the presumption can be disregarded without prejudice to the national security.

In Confidence

SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE

Your (prospective) employment puts you in touch with information of outstanding importance from the point of view of security and the Government has decided that special enquiries must be made about the reliability of those in such employment. In order that these enquiries may be made you are asked to complete this questionnaire in ink or typescript. The enquiries which will be made will not necessarily be confined to the former or present employers and character referees named in your answers to questions 8 and 12. If for any reason you are unable to give all the particulars precisely please give as much information as you can, using if necessary the additional space on Page 4.

Part I: PLEASE COMPLETE THIS PART IN BLOCK CAPITALS

Particulars	Self	Wife/Husband*	Father†	Mother†
1. SURNAME (a) Now				
(b) At birth if different and any other surname(s) used—including maiden name and any former married name(s)				
2. FULL CHRISTIAN/ FORE NAMES				
3. ADDRESSES (a) Full permanent home address and telephone No.		‡	‡	‡
(b) Temporary address — if any — and telephone No.			<p>NOTES ON COMPLETION</p> <p>* Please give corresponding details on Page 4 of any former wife or husband.</p> <p>† If you were brought up by step-parent(s), guardian, parent-by-adoption or anyone acting as a parent please give corresponding details on Page 4.</p> <p>‡ If deceased state year of death and nationality and occupation at time of death as appropriate</p> <p>DETAILS OF ANY CHANGE OF ADDRESS AND NOTIFICATION OF ANY FUTURE MARRIAGE OR RE-MARRIAGE SHOULD BE SENT TO YOUR ESTABLISHMENT OFFICER IMMEDIATELY.</p> <p>YOUR PRESENT MARRIAGE Date : Place :</p>	
(c) Other addresses in the United Kingdom during the last 5 years with dates				
(d) Other addresses outside the United Kingdom AT ANY TIME for more than 6 months WITH DATES IN EACH CASE				
4. NATIONALITY (a) Now		‡	Father† ‡	Mother† ‡
(b) At birth, if different. If naturalized state Number and Date of Certificate				
(c) If not of British nationality is it intended to apply for naturalization ?				
5. DATE OF BIRTH				
6. PLACE OF BIRTH including County, State and Country				
7. PRESENT OCCUPATION		‡	‡	‡

THIS DOCUMENT IS GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND WILL BE TREATED IN CONFIDENCE AT ALL STAGES

8. EMPLOYMENT

Give full particulars WITH DATES of your employment, including service in Government Departments, during the last 5 years.

<i>Name and Address of Employer</i>	<i>Nature of Employment</i>	<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>

9. H.M. FORCES

If you have served in the Armed Forces please state :

Service..... Rank..... Official No.....

10. RELATIVES LIVING ABROAD

Have you any relative by blood or marriage who is living in or has lived in a country having, at the time of residence, a Communist or Fascist Government ? If so, please give such particulars as you can, including name, age, relationship, nationality and address (with dates).

11. FOREIGN TRAVEL

If you have AT ANY TIME visited a country having, at the time of the visit, a Communist or Fascist Government give FULL details below.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Reason for Visit</i>	<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>

12. CHARACTER REFEREES

Give particulars of two British Subjects (NOT relatives) resident in the United Kingdom* who have been well acquainted with you in private life during the past 5 years. It is not sufficient to nominate someone you know in an official or professional capacity, such as your doctor, unless you know him socially as well.

Full Name : Full Name :

Occupation : Occupation :

Full Address : Full Address :

.....

Telephone No. : Telephone No :

* If resident overseas in the past 5 years, give particulars of two British Subjects who have known you abroad.

Part 2: QUESTIONS 13 TO 16 WHICH COMPRISE THIS PART SHOULD ALL BE ANSWERED 'YES' OR 'NO'. IF THE ANSWER TO ANY QUESTION IS 'YES', FULL PARTICULARS MUST BE GIVEN. YOU MAY CONTINUE THE ANSWER ON PAGE 4 IF NECESSARY.

13. OFFENCES AGAINST THE LAW

Answer 'Yes' or 'No'

- (a) Have you ever been charged before any Court with an offence of which you have not been acquitted, even though you may only have been absolutely or conditionally discharged or placed on probation or bound over ?
- (b) Have you ever been convicted by a Court Martial or Service Disciplinary Court, or sentenced summarily to detention and/or dismissed under the Naval Discipline Act, the Army Act, or the Air Force Act, or while serving in any Commonwealth or Foreign Armed Forces ?

NOTE : In answering Questions 14 and 15 you should take into account not merely your own belief but also the sort of opinion which is generally held of the organisation or person in question, even if you do not endorse that opinion. The word " Communists " embraces Trotskyists for the purposes of this form. An affirmative answer will not necessarily disqualify you from appointment, but since it is Government policy that no one may be employed on Secret work if he is judged unreliable, it must be taken into consideration.

- 14. (a) Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party in the United Kingdom or elsewhere ?
- (b) Have you ever been a member of any organisation associated with the Communist movement or in sympathy with it ?
- (c) Have you ever had any connection with a Communist Party anywhere ?
- (d) Have you ever had any connection with any organisation associated with a Communist Party or in sympathy with its aims ?
- (e) Have you ever been a close associate of a person who to your knowledge is, or has been, a Communist or Communist sympathiser ?

- 15. (a) Have you ever been a member of a Fascist organisation in the United Kingdom or elsewhere ?
- (b) Have you ever been a member of any organisation associated with the Fascist movement or in sympathy with it ?
- (c) Have you ever had any connection with a Fascist organisation anywhere ?
- (d) Have you ever had any connection with any organisation associated with the Fascist movement or in sympathy with its aims ?
- (e) Have you ever been a close associate of a person who to your knowledge is, or has been, a Fascist or Fascist sympathiser ?

- 16. Are you aware of any circumstances not covered by your answers to the questions in Parts 1 and 2 above which might cause your fitness for employment on Secret work to be questioned ?

Part 3 : CERTIFICATE

I CERTIFY THAT the information given on this form is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief and that I shall notify any material changes in this information. I understand that any false statement or omission may disqualify me for employment, or make me liable for disciplinary action, which may include dismissal.

Date.....

Signature

In Confidence

SPACE FOR FURTHER INFORMATION—If you need to amplify your reply to any question please do so on this page noting against your entry the number of the relevant question.

CONFIDENTIAL

Code No. 5-31-0..

TO BE COMPLETED IN BLOCK LETTERS OR TYPED

FORM E.81 ESTASUP.

Department _____

All available information should be included. If information is not available this should be stated	A. SUBJECT	B. SPOUSE. Date of marriage	C. FATHER	D. MOTHER	P V
1. SURNAME (a) Now					
(b) At birth if different and any other surname(s) used					
2. ALL FORENAMES					
3. ADDRESSES† (a) In the U.K. during the last 5 years with dates		*	*	*	
(b) Outside U.K. at any time (excluding military or government service and short visits) with dates <u>NOTE</u> : See question 11 which refers to subject only					
4. NATIONALITY‡ (a) Now					
(b) At birth if different					
5. DATE OF BIRTH					
6. PLACE OF BIRTH					
7. OCCUPATION (See overleaf for previous occupation)					FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DATE OF INFORMATION					

† It is appreciated that Departments may not be able to supply previous addresses for B, C and D.
* If deceased state year of death.
‡ If naturalised give certificate number. If applicable, Aliens Registration Number.

8. PARTICULARS OF SUBJECT'S EMPLOYMENT DURING LAST FIVE YEARS (WITH DATES)			
9. ANY RELEVANT INFORMATION UNDER QUESTIONS 14/15 OF THE FORM E.93 ..			
10. ANY RELEVANT INFORMATION UNDER QUESTION 16 OF THE FORM E.93.. ..			
11. FOREIGN TRAVEL Countries (outside the U.K.) visited since 1945 (excluding military and government service and visits of less than 6 months duration.)	COUNTRY	REASON FOR VISIT	APPROXIMATE DATES
12. CHARACTER REFEREES (i) (ii)	FULL NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION

FIELD ENQUIRIES: GUIDANCE TO INVESTIGATING OFFICERS

The purpose of background investigations conducted under the Positive Vetting procedure is to supply the Head of the Department with information to help him to determine the fitness of persons to occupy posts covered by the procedure. The Investigating Officer should pursue his enquiries until he is satisfied that a sufficient depth of information has been obtained to enable such a judgment to be made.

2. Each Investigating Officer will be provided by his Department with a card of identity and authority which in the course of his official enquiries he will show to police officers and others when necessary. The fact that a background investigation is being made is not secret, but information about the methods used must not be divulged to any unauthorised person.

3. Before starting enquiries the Investigating Officer will be provided with all the available background information about the person to be investigated. The documents so made available should be listed at the beginning of each report. The Investigating Officer will be told to what extent the information already available about the person is inadequate for the purpose in hand and what should be the scope of his investigation.

4. Positive Vetting is sometimes undertaken when the candidate is already known to have some kind of security record. In such cases the Investigating Officer will normally be briefed by the Security Service before he commences the field enquiries and the interview with the candidate may sometimes be delayed until the results of other field enquiries are available and have been considered in consultation with the Security Service.

5. The Investigating Officer should be thoroughly familiar with the contents of the paper "Posts covered by the Positive Vetting Procedure: Criteria for assessing trustworthiness." He should be guided by the contents of this paper in deciding on the nature of his enquiries. He should not however use it as a catalogue of points to be raised at interviews.

6. The Investigating Officer should interview the person under investigation unless instructed to the contrary. The purposes of this interview are to establish identity, to obtain some knowledge of character, and to run through and if necessary seek amplification of the answers given in the Security Questionnaire. Inspection of a passport or other official document which the person may without pressure show to the Investigating Officer may also be useful. The Investigating Officer will include in his report a physical description of the person (unless he is known to the Department) and an estimate of his character.

7. The following information, not all of which is obtainable from the Security Questionnaire, should be an object of enquiry in all investigations:-

- (a) details of residence and occupation for at least the last ten years.

/(b)

- 2 -

- (b) All organisation, societies or associations to which the individual may belong.
- (c) Details of the individual's close relatives (including wife or husband, parents, brothers, sisters, and former wives or husbands) and their personal particulars. If information is obtained which shows that a close relative has subversive tendencies or is otherwise unreliable, the Permanent Head of the Department will need to know the degree of contact and the nature of the personal relationship between the individual and the relative whose reliability is in doubt.
- (d) Particulars of changes of name and of any pseudonyms, pen names or aliases which the individual may be using or have used.

8. The Investigating Officer should interview at least two character referees. He should be careful to discover whether they are well acquainted with the individual and are fit persons to express such an opinion, on his/her reliability. If the investigating officer is uncertain about the referee's fitness to express such an opinion, he may seek the assistance of the local police on this matter and may make such other discreet local enquiries as may help to establish whether or not the referee is a person of good character and reliability. If, in the course of interviewing a character referee or of any limited enquiries about him that may be made, the Investigating Officer acquires information which suggests that the referee has or has had Communist associations or tendencies, he should report the facts to the Department forthwith.

9. Interviews should be held with a sufficient number of the subject's present and previous employers to cover adequately his career over at least the previous ten years. It may not always be either possible or profitable to interview every employer particularly in, for example, grades such as typing grades. In the case of a young person who has not been in employment for ten years, such enquiries should be made as may be necessary to obtain sufficient information about him to enable the Head of the Department to judge his fitness to occupy a Positive Vetting post.

10. Interviews may also be held with University dons, schoolmasters, police officers and such other persons as may be able to assist the investigation.

11. Investigating Officers should not conduct interviews by telephone.

12. If information is revealed showing past or present subversive tendencies as opposed to other undesirable tendencies on the part of the individual or his close relatives, the Investigating Officer should forthwith discontinue his investigation of the case, report the facts to his Department and await further instructions.

13. As a general principle the sources of information given in reports should be quoted. When detailing, for example, the educational or occupational background of an individual the Investigating Officer should state in his report whether the information was obtained from the individual or from papers in possession of the Department or whether he had been able to check from other independent sources.

14. Investigating Officers should remember that the object of the Permanent Head of the Department is to establish whether the individual is wholly fit to be trusted. Throughout the investigation care should be taken to avoid giving any impression that the Department has a preference for employees holding any particular political views.

15. INVESTIGATING OFFICERS HAVE A SPECIAL DUTY TO EXERCISE TACT IN THEIR ENQUIRIES OF THE PERSON UNDER INVESTIGATION, OF HIS REFEREES AND OF ANYONE ELSE WHOM THEY APPROACH. ANY INFORMATION WHICH INVESTIGATING OFFICERS OBTAIN MUST OF COURSE BE TREATED AS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

INTAKE

DRAFT

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

Dear Sir,

You may be aware that in 1952 the Government introduced a special procedure for checking the reliability of their staff who may have access to exceptionally secret information. This procedure is being applied to officers irrespective of rank and without regard to the posts in the Civil Service which they may have previously held.

M..... comes within the terms of the new procedure and has given your name as a character referee. I am therefore writing to ask if you would be good enough to let us have any information concerning him/her which you think would be of assistance to the Head of the Department in determining whether he/she is a person who could properly be entrusted with exceptionally secret information. For this purpose I should be grateful if you would complete the enclosed report form to the best of your knowledge and belief and return it to me at your earliest convenience. The report form has been compiled with a view to assisting referees to provide the Department with the type of information which they require in assessing reliability. Your reply will be treated as strictly confidential.

Yours faithfully,

.....

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

- 1. Are you well acquainted with the candidate? 1.
- 2. Over what period have you been well acquainted with the candidate? 2.
- 3. Has the candidate ever been in your employ or subject to your authority? if so- 3.
 - (a) during what period? (a)
 - (b) why did he/she leave your employment? (b)
- 4. If not employed under you, in what capacity have you known the candidate? 4.
- 5. Do you know the candidate to be strictly- 5.
 - (a) honest? (a)
 - (b) sober? (b)
 - (c) conscientious? (c)
 - (d) of good character? (d)
 - (e) discreet? (e)
- 6. Is the candidate to the best of your knowledge free from pecuniary embarrassment? 6.

- *7. Have you reason to believe that the candidate is, or has been, a member of, or associated with, wither the Communist Party of a Fascist organisation (see footnote)? 7.
- 8. Are you aware of any further circumstances which would tend to disqualify the candidate from Government employment of a secret nature? 8.
- 9. Are you related to the candidate? If so, what is the relationship? 9.

To the best of my belief, the above answers are correct.

Signature of Referee
.....
Date

* The Government have decided that no one may be employed in Government Service in connection with work the nature of which is vital to the security of the State if he is or has recently been a member of the British Communist Party or in such a way as to raise reasonable doubts about his reliability, is or has recently been sympathetic to Communism, associated with Communists or Communist sympathisers, or is susceptible to Communist pressure. (For convenience and brevity the term "Communist" is used to cover Communist and Fascist alike).

OCCUPANTS

DRAFT

PERSONAL AND IN CONFIDENCE

Dear Sir,

You may be aware that in 1952 the Government introduced a special procedure for checking the reliability of staff who may have access to exceptionally secret information. This procedure is being applied to officers irrespective of rank and without regard to the posts in the Civil Service which they may have previously held.

M..... comes within the terms of the new procedure and has given your name as a character referee. I shall be grateful, therefore, if you would be good enough to let us have any information concerning him/her which you think would be of assistance to the Head of the Department in determining whether he/she is a person who could properly be entrusted with exceptionally secret information.

We have, of course, a complete record of his/her official history but we do not know so much about those aspects of his/her life outside the office which might have a bearing on his/her reliability. It is here we hope you will be able to help us. I should be obliged, therefore, if you would assist the Department by completing the enclosed report form and returning it to me at your earliest convenience. Your reply will be treated as strictly confidential.

Yours faithfully,

.....

M.....

1. Are you well acquainted with M.....?
2. Over what period have you been well acquainted with him/her?
3. In what capacity have you known him/her?
4. What is your assessment of his/her character?
- *5. Have you reason to believe that he/she is, or has been, a member of, or associated with either the Communist Party or a Fascist organisation (see footnote)?
6. Are you aware of any circumstances which would tend to disqualify him/her from employment by the Government on work of a secret nature?

(Signature).....
(Date).....

* The Government have decided that no one may be employed in Government Service in connection with work the nature of which is vital to the security of the State if he is or has recently been a member of the British Communist Party or in such a way as to raise reasonable doubts about his reliability, is or has recently been sympathetic to Communism, associated with Communists or Communist sympathisers, or is susceptible to Communist pressure. (For convenience and brevity the term "Communist" is used to cover Communist and Fascist alike.)

RESTRICTED

19 MAY 1970
49/a

PA PdF 81615/1



Civil Service Department

Whitehall London SW1
Telephone 01-839 7733 ext.

Your reference

Our reference DEO (Security) 6/70
MP 1/016

Date 18 May 1970

Dear Establishment Officer

Annex 28 of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures sets out the procedure to be followed when Positive Vetting clearance has to be refused or withdrawn on character defect grounds.

2. Paragraph 11 asks Departments to inform us when they refuse or withdraw a Positive Vetting clearance solely because of character defect and decide to tell the officer concerned. This was intended to enable us to build up a selection of case histories and if necessary to issue central guidance on the broad criteria to be employed. A number of cases have been reported since the procedures were introduced in 1962 but these have not indicated any need for central guidance. We have accordingly decided that Departments need no longer notify such cases to us as a general rule. We will however, be ready to advise Departments on the handling of difficult cases if they wish, and we should therefore be glad to receive a note of any case which is thought to present exceptional features.

3. The necessary amendment to the Manual of Personnel Security Measures will be made in due course. Any enquiries arising from this letter should be addressed to Miss P E Sparrow, extension 1071.

Yours sincerely

A DUKE

RESTRICTED

AS 26.5.70
V.M.
26/5/70

Original at Min 26 in
L. 436/6955

Reference L. 436/6955 (CRITCHETT)

Copied to: Pol. F. 316-8-1

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~~B.1~~ 23/13


I am prepared to grant provisional P.V. clearance on these papers and agree that, subject to a satisfactory second interview, a conditional offer of employment may be made.

2. We agreed in discussion, however, that it was not essential in this case, or in other cases of this kind with an unusually young candidate, to reveal our precise identity if and when the conditional offer is made. In such cases we can at that stage stand on the ground that we are an independent intelligence department of the Ministry of Defence and that the work is necessarily secret, and on these grounds counsel discretion. The precise identity can be revealed when full P.V. clearance has been given and the offer of employment becomes unconditional.

3. The question of timing of the revelation of our precise identity will need to be catered for in the new procedures which are being shaped.

B.

20.3.70



J. A. Harrison.

MS
21.4.70
JSB1
24.70

13 JAN 1970

HIL to see

483a

PA 10 316-8-1

PA 10 105 to see

we already full with all these requirements

- F.2.
- H/TS
- K.7.
- C.3.
- C.4. Inspection Desk
- C.2. Staff Officer
- C.1./P.S.
- C.1./S.J.F.
- D.E.O. Folder

RESTRICTED

Civil Service Department

Whitehall London SW1

Telephone 01-839 7733 ext. 904



Your reference

✓ Pol.F.310-1
✓ Pol.F.316-8-1

Our reference

DEO(Security)1/70

Date

8 January 1970

BNCL

12 JAN 1970

TO: *Pol. 316-8-1*

REF: *Pol. 316-8-1*

Copy to [unclear] via this folder

Dear Establishment Officer

PROOF OF IDENTITY

You should know of a case which has highlighted a possible loop-hole in our vetting arrangements.

2. A man obtained employment under a false name with a firm engaged on classified work. The usual security checks produced no adverse record. The deception later came to light but, for a while, the man had access to classified information. The case, which concerned Michael Allen Pells, attracted some public attention following his trial on charges of theft and bigamy at the Old Bailey in February 1969.
3. This case has emphasised the importance of proper identity checks at the outset of security enquiries. It is most convenient to make these checks at the time of recruitment of both industrials and non-industrials. Routine steps to establish an applicant's identity would not frustrate a spy such as Lonsdale, who will have taken care to establish an apparently genuine background. But routine checks which are conscientiously applied as part of a recruitment process should normally deter (or reveal) anyone masquerading under a false identity. I should be grateful, therefore, if you would ensure that those of your staff who are responsible for recruitment take all reasonable steps to check the identity of any applicant for employment who is to be taken on.
4. The main means of establishing identity are birth certificates (except for married women), British passports, and references covering at least three years. A satisfactory check of any one of these should be sufficient to remove any doubt about a person's identity, but where possible two should be covered as a cross check, eg a birth certificate and references. Employers' references are generally of more value in establishing identity than social references eg from friends. Other documents which can be of help in particular cases are the P.45 tax form and DHSS number and to a lesser extent driving licences, but these cannot always be relied on. Craftsmen's apprenticeship papers or union cards, in the case of industrials, can help to establish that a person has for some time used the name he has given.

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MS 4220
51 MC 27-11-70

4742

B.1.

We spoke. I explained that the preliminary fact finding stage of my examination of B.1 recruiting methods was now almost complete but that before I could study the facts and put up some tentative proposals for discussion, I needed the answer to three questions. These are :-

- (a) Is provisional PV clearance necessary before a candidate can be offered a PV post in this Service, provided that the offer is made "subject to the satisfactory completion of outstanding enquiries?" (It is clearly understood that provisional clearance, if not full clearance, would have to be obtained before any such candidate actually began to work here).
- (b) If the answer to (a) is no, is it acceptable that, in certain grades, a qualified offer can be made (as at present) by the B.1 interviewing officer, or should a more senior officer see the papers before the offer is made?

(c) /

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4861
127/10/69

- (c) whatever the answer to (a), is it necessary that provincial police enquiries should be completed before provisional PV clearance is sought, or would a provincial police record check suffice for Stage III PV purposes?

2. Is provisional PV clearance necessary before a candidate can be offered a PV post in this Service, provided that the offer is made "subject to the satisfactory completion of outstanding enquiries?" The Manual of Personnel Security Measures, lays down that provisional PV clearance permits an individual "to be afforded access to information requiring Positive Vetting before the (PV) procedure has been completed. Such cases should be kept to a minimum; at least the first three stages of PV should have been satisfactorily completed before access is afforded....." (MPSM Chap. III para 41).

3. MPSM therefore regards provisional clearance as a step to be taken before a candidate may begin to work in a PV post. However, since October 1965 we have made it an essential preliminary to an offer of appointment. 304b in POL.F. #16-3-1 (all subsequent references are to this file) reads "no offer of appointment, no matter how tentative, may be made to any candidate before PV clearance or provisional PV clearance" (my underlining) "has been given". (It should be remembered that in 1965, offers of appointment to candidates for secretarial and clerical posts were made at the second interview and were not then qualified by the words "subject to the satisfactory completion of outstanding enquiries", this qualification being introduced in November 1967 (403a)).

4. Although in December 1968 it was laid down (452a) that provisional clearance should not be requested unless we would be in danger of losing the candidate or unless to delay until Stage IV would cause hardship, this ruling has been interpreted not in terms of a candidate's starting work, but in terms of an offer (qualified) of appointment. Only in the officer grade has there been any (de facto rather than de jure) relaxation - because in this grade it is rare for a recruit to start work without a full clearance. Oral - and qualified - offers have been made without prior provisional clearance but only by Director B.

5. If we have regard only to the requirements of Positive Vetting (and there are other considerations set out in para. 7 below) it seems to me that it is not necessary to seek provisional clearance before making an offer of appointment provided:-

- (a) that the offer is made subject to "the satisfactory completion of outstanding enquiries"
- (b) that provisional clearance is sought if the candidate is to begin work before a full PV clearance has been obtained.

6. The decision to seek provisional clearance or not is one that could be made at a very early stage of the recruitment. In practice, the abolition of the present blanket ruling on provisional clearance will mean that such clearance will not be sought for the mass of school and college leavers whom we interview in the period April - July but who will not start work until September or later. The effect in these cases will not be to reduce the length of the period between their first coming to our notice and their joining us (because in these cases the length of the period is dictated not by our recruiting processes but by their availability). However, the fact that SI/PV will have to handle substantially fewer applications for provisional clearance should mean that this part of SI will be better placed to deal rapidly with those requests for provisional and full clearance which have to be met before recruits who are available and who want to start work immediately, can start. (I have in mind secretaries in between jobs, and A4 candidates particularly). It is in these latter cases that one would hope for a significant reduction in the length of the recruitment period.

7. If it is agreed that provisional clearance is not necessary in certain cases described above, is it acceptable that, in certain cases, offers of appointment can be made (as at present) by the SI interviewing officers? The provisional PV clearance arrangements at present in use serve a secondary purpose - they ensure that the papers for candidates who would not otherwise be seen on interview by Director B or even (in the secretarial and clerical grades) by SI, are read by one or other of these officers (since only they may grant provisional PV clearance in grades below that of Officer).

8. It seems to me that there would be advantage in the recruitment papers being "vetted" before the second interview takes place and the (qualified) offer is made. While I have great faith in the judgment of the SI interviewing officers, I think that the responsibility of deciding whether to make even a qualified offer of appointment is not one which they should have to bear alone. At present they offer in the knowledge that the papers have been scrutinised by a Senior Officer and a Director. If you agree, I will consider how this "vetting" might be done - the obvious suggestion that the papers should be seen by the officer responsible to SI for recruitment generally (at present Mr. Hooper) presents one difficulty in that the work load on his desk is already extremely heavy.

9. Whatever the decision on question (a) above, is it necessary for police enquiries to be completed before provisional clearance is sought? I have it in mind to draw a distinction between police enquiries and police record checks - the former being "field enquiries" and so properly a part of Stage IV of PV.

10. The argument that police enquiries are part of Stage III of PV and must therefore be complete before provisional clearance is sought, is not valid. NPSM makes it clear (Annex 24) that enquiries of the police are part of Stage IV (Field Enquiries) and that even then they will be limited to the obtaining of information already in the possession of the police, who will not make special enquiries themselves.

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 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
 ACT 1958 July 2022

minute 4 continued.....

11. It is only we who ask provincial police forces (not the Metropolitan SB - except in special cases) to make enquiries about candidates on our behalf and only we currently regard these enquiries as part of our Stage III. (The question whether we should make police enquiries at all and, if so, what sort of enquiries, is outside my terms of reference).

12. It seems to me that when, writing to provincial police forces about candidates, we might ask two things for a comprehensive record check (the result to be returned immediately, perhaps by means of a perforated tear-off section of the form on which we make the request), and for enquiries to be made. We would require the result of the record check before stage III was regarded as complete. The result of the police enquiries need not be received until we were in a position to request full IV clearance.

13. These provincial police enquiries take by far the longest to complete of all the enquiries we make in our recruiting process (an average time of 21.5 days, ranging from 6 days - when a record check only was sought - to 49 days). By not insisting that we have the result before Stage III can be regarded as complete, we would make it possible to seek provisional clearance (in those cases in which provisional clearance is required) several days earlier on average.

14. Although it might be argued that by not having the result of the enquiries available before the decision to grant provisional clearance is taken, we deprive ourselves of information that might be relevant to that decision, I would ask in how many cases provincial police enquiries have by themselves revealed information which could not have been thrown up by a record check in the same police area and which was so significant as to cause us to reject the candidate before IV was complete. In any case, no offer of employment is ever confirmed until full IV clearance has been obtained - before which time the police enquiries would have been completed.

15. As I told you, I cannot proceed much further with my assignment without the answers to these three questions. I will be on an O. & M. course from 15 to 31 October. If you could reply by the end of the month I would be grateful.

B.S.

1st October, 1969.

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B.1/Miss Tufnell

I have to-day discussed with B. whether, to help in the recruiting problem, he would agree to grant provisional P.V. clearance for candidates between the ages of 16 and 17. He has agreed that this may be done provided there is no question of the candidate joining the Service before Stage IV is complete, and that the offer of employment is made conditional upon the satisfactory completion of outstanding enquiries.

2. It will now be all the more important that we have the assurance of the B.1 interviewer that the candidate is a sufficiently mature 16-year-old to merit serious consideration.

H. I. LEE

B.1

9 June, 1969

H. I. Lee

Copies to: B.
B.1
B.1/KCT
B.1/P.V./I.Os.

~~2~~
= conditional offer?
A conditional offer
and only introduced
after his date.

16.6.69
Bill
a.6.69.

3/4

B.1/HIL.

Arising out of the particular case of the potential recruit [redacted] we concluded in discussion that we should re-examine the existing drill for securing during the recruitment process all relevant information in sufficient detail where a recruit had contacts - in the broadest sense - with Iron Curtain countries:

2. The first opportunity to obtain such information is in the recruitment interviews and we should re-examine whether the interviewers are sufficiently briefed on the kind of detail they should seek gently to extract during those interviews. Where such information becomes available on the first interview report, it might be right to arrange for the recruiters to refer the papers to you for guidance as to points to be covered in subsequent interviews.

3. Depending on what emerges it might then be right in special cases to stage a P.V. interview on the particular areas of doubt or obscurity, and, exceptionally, to secure a K.Branch comment on the information, and perhaps the assistance of a K.Branch officer when it is decided that a P.V. interview should take place.

4. I should be grateful if you would consider this in collaboration with Mr. Thomas on the appropriate policy file, and let me have your views.



B.1.

2nd April 1969

~~1447~~ ^{KST} to see + for discussion of re-consultance ^{bt}

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ACT 1958 July 2022

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✓ Copy to Pl. f. 316-e-1.

Mr D. H. Whyte 4586
POL F 57-30-168
17 MAR 1969
Supp A

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

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COPY NO. 2

14th March, 1969

CABINET

PERSONNEL SECURITY COMMITTEE

PROOF OF IDENTITY

Note by the Civil Service Department

Michael Allen Pells managed to secure an appointment with Decca Navigator Company under an alias; and was subsequently moved on to classified work with Decca Radar Ltd. As he gave a false name, the usual vetting checks naturally produced no trace of a previous record. This case attracted some public attention following Pells' trial on charges of theft and bigamy at the Old Bailey on Tuesday 25th February.

2. We have been considering the weakness in the security procedures which this case has disclosed. The main lesson to be learned is the major importance of establishing identity at the outset of any security enquiries. Without proof of identity, the usual negative record checks with the Security Service and the Criminal Record Office will be worthless. It seems desirable, therefore, to emphasise in our security instructions the importance of proper identity checks. We accordingly propose that guidance should be given to departments as in the attached draft D.E.O. letter; and that the Manual of Personnel Security Measures should be amended as indicated.

3. In paragraph 3(d) and (e) of the draft D.E.O. letter the period of years to be covered has been left blank. We think that any instructions /should

CONFIDENTIAL

[Handwritten signature]
30.4.69

should allow departments a considerable degree of discretion; a period which seemed sufficient in one case might be inadequate in another. But departments will expect some guidance on the period which should be regarded as normal. The Ministry of Technology have suggested five years as being the period required if Security Service and other record checks are to have any value. The Security Service, on the other hand, consider that three years might be sufficient because a dishonest man is unlikely to be able to sustain a false identity for any longer period. In the Pells case and in another similar case, the false identity was maintained for significantly less than three years.

4. We suggest that similar guidance should be given to List X firms; and that this should be worked out by the Security Service in consultation with the departments concerned.

5. The Committee are invited

- (i) to approve the proposals in paragraphs 2 and 4 above;
- (ii) to decide what period of years should be included in paragraph 3(d) and (e) of the draft D.E.O. letter annexed.

Cabinet Office,
London, S.W.1

14th March, 1969

DRAFT D.E.O. (SECURITY) LETTER

Dear Establishment Officer,

Proof of Identity

You should know of a recent case which has highlighted a possible loophole in our vetting arrangements.

2. A man obtained employment under a false name with a firm engaged on classified work. The usual normal vetting checks produced no security or criminal record. The deception later came to light but, for a while, the man had access to classified information. The case, which involved Michael Allen Pells, attracted some public attention following his trial on charges of theft and bigamy at the Old Bailey on Tuesday, 25th February.

3. This case has emphasised the major importance of proper identity checks at the outset of security enquiries. It is most convenient to make these checks at the time of recruitment of both industrials and non-industrials. Routine steps to establish an applicant's identity would not frustrate a spy such as Lonsdale, who will have taken care to establish a virtually foolproof background. But routine checks which are conscientiously applied as part of a recruitment process should normally deter (or reveal) anyone masquerading under a false identity. I should be grateful, therefore, if you would ensure that those

/of

of your staff who are responsible for recruitment take steps to establish with reasonable certainty the identity of any applicant for employment who is to be taken on. You might find it helpful to have the following comments on various methods of checking identity:-

(a) Birth certificate or copy

Short of a risky and elaborate plot to use someone else's birth certificate and identity, this is very reliable.

(b) Passports

These are acceptable as an alternative to birth certificates, since a birth certificate is required in order to obtain a passport.

(c) Driving Licences, Motor Vehicle Registration Books

The value of these is limited since there is considerable traffic in forged documents of this kind.

(d) The P.45 and MSS No.

The production of a P.45 giving the PAYE tax and MSS number is not by itself a reliable indication of identity, unless there is additional evidence that this MSS number has been used for [] years or more.

(e) References

The value of a reference in providing identity (as opposed to providing evidence of good character) /depends

depends chiefly on the period of time covered by the reference. A reference showing that the identity claim has been in use for [] years or more can normally be considered reliable.

4. We shall be amending the Manual of Personnel Security Measures, chapter II, paragraph 14, by the addition of a new second sentence reading as follows:-

"The validity of this assessment must clearly rest upon the department's satisfaction that proof of identity has been established."

5. Similar guidance will be issued to List X firms. The precise form of this guidance is under discussion between the Security Service and the main departments concerned.

6. Any questions on this letter should be addressed to Mr. R. G. Gillings, Civil Service Department, extension 1071.

Yours sincerely,

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE OF INFORMAL MEETING HELD AT THE
CABINET OFFICE ON 6 NOVEMBER 1968 TO
DISCUSS P.V. PROBLEMS

ITEM I - P.V. REVIEW

The meeting considered whether there would be advantage in introducing a special P.V. review form instead of asking the person concerned to complete again an ordinary P.V. questionnaire (E.93).

2. From the ensuing discussion it appeared that comparatively few people complained about having to complete again a detailed P.V. questionnaire; and that these complaints could usually be overcome by departments either deleting those sections of the questionnaire to which a further reply was not required or by attaching a slip specifying the questions requiring completion.

3. The meeting did not generally favour a suggestion that a photo-copy of the original E.93 might be used accompanied by a slip asking whether all the details remained valid; nor did it feel a case had been made out for the introduction of a special P.V. review form.

4. The meeting also heard that it was proposed to introduce a C.R.O. check as an automatic part of P.V. review. But the staffing position of the Criminal Record Office (C.R.O.) had so far prevented the elimination of the back-log of C.R.O. checks in N.V. cases; about 49,000 such checks remained. The question arose whether it was more important to clear the N.V. "back-log" or to introduce immediately a C.R.O. check in P.V. review cases, which was expected to result in approximately 15,000 more checks per annum.

5. The meeting thought that the clearance of the N.V. back-log would be likely to bring to light proportionately more convictions than would arise in a C.R.O. recheck in a P.V. review; but that any convictions that came to light during a P.V. review would be potentially of greater security significance and might well provide grounds for thinking that the person concerned had knowingly suppressed information about a past conviction. This question would be further discussed in the Personnel Security Committee (P.S.C.).

ITEM II - THE IMPLICATIONS FOR P.V. OF THE 10 YEAR
MINIMUM RESIDENCE RULES AND THE RACE RELATIONS BILL

6. Points emerging from the discussion of this item included:

- (a) it was impossible for the Security Service to provide regular guidance on the extent and value of the checks that could be made in overseas territories as the conditions in those territories and the state of their relationship with the U.K. varied considerably from time to time. The Security Service reply to a record check involving overseas residence provided, therefore, not only.

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any information that had been obtained but, by implication, an indication of the Security Service view on the extent to which such a check was necessary and reliable at that time;

- (b) difficulties could easily arise in denying to someone with P.V. clearance access to information "politically sensitive in relation to his country of origin"; this particularly applied in the case of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Service Departments and G.C.H.Q.;
- (c) departments felt an urgent need for better arrangements for checking the reliability of nationals of Eire; it was noted that attempts to improve these arrangements were still in train;
- (d) it was not possible, and indeed it would be undesirable, to attempt to define, with any degree of precision, criteria which might justify an extension or reduction of the period of ten years residence qualification. Nor would it be possible to lay down criteria which could govern a judgement whether or not assimilation had taken place, although there were obviously factors (e.g. the degree of integration achieved, part played in local affairs, settled employment etc.) which would assist in arriving at a judgement.

ITEM III - THE DESIRABILITY OF INSTITUTING ANNUAL SECURITY REPORTS FOR HOLDERS OF P.V. POSTS

7. The Army Department suggested that the institution of a system of annual reports dealing specifically with the security fitness of staff occupying P.V. posts would get over the difficulty encountered by the Services of obtaining reports from superior officers who, even if they could be traced, often could not clearly recall the person being reported on.

8. It was clear from the ensuing discussion that the representatives of the Civilian Departments felt that this was mainly a Service problem and that they experienced little difficulty in their interviews with senior officers in the course of P.V. review; they were not in favour of introducing a system such as that advocated by the Army Department.

ITEM IV - THE PROCEDURE FOR REPORTING ON THE RELIABILITY OF P.V. HOLDERS SERVING IN OUT-STATIONS

9. The meeting discussed the P.V. review requirement in para. 2(c) Annex 31, M.P.S.M., and its Appendix C. that the Security Officer, if the subject had been employed in an out-station, should be asked for a report in writing on the subject's general reliability and character. In

the Army Department security duties at out-stations were invariably on a part-time basis and those entrusted with them were often junior to the officers being reported on. Moreover, Commanding Officers were best placed to report on the reliability of those serving under them and Security Officers generally had no personnel security functions.

10. In discussion it emerged that the status, employment and responsibilities of Security Officers at out-stations differed widely in the various departments and that some departments would not welcome any change in the role of Security Officers in P.V. review cases as prescribed in the M.P.S.M.

ITEM V - IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY OF THE SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 1967

11. The meeting noted that since it had last met a D.E.O. letter - D.E.O. (Security)5/68 - had been issued dealing with the security implications of the Sexual Offences Act 1967; the general view was that this letter had not materially affected the way departments handled homosexual cases or the considerable problems involved in investigating cases of suspected homosexuality. But the change in the law had led some departments to wonder in what circumstances an admitted homosexual could be given P.V. clearance. It was generally felt that no firm guidance on this issue was possible and that the decision was one for the individual department to take.

ITEM VI - THE STANDARD LETTER TO P.V. REFEREES

12. The meeting noted that a recommendation made at its last meeting that the standard letter to P.V. referees in Annexes 26 and 27 of the M.P.S.M. should be amended in order to ask referees in a more direct manner whether character defects existed, had been approved by the P.S.C. It was expected that the necessary amendment to the M.P.S.M. will be issued, among others, early next year.

ITEM VII - ANY OTHER BUSINESS

13. It was noted that some departments, and particularly the Department of Economic Affairs (D.E.A.), were in the habit of P.V.ing Agency staff. This practice, although not expressly forbidden, is strongly discouraged by a letter D.E.O.(Security)5/67 and it was suggested that it might be necessary to invite attention of the D.E.A. to this D.E.O.; (action would be taken by the Security Service).

14. It was also noted that the P.S.C. was likely shortly to be asked to consider the implications of the Latey Committee recommendation that the age of majority should be reduced from 21 to 18. It was agreed that it would be undesirable, and largely impracticable, to change the present P.V. rules regarding minors; and that the requirements to limit the P.V. of those under 21 and to subject those P.V.'d to annual review should be maintained.

20 November 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

*For PA in 316-8-1
Mr. [unclear] to be
informed
444 b*

B/TAC.



C1/JAC has come. Treasury Chambers
Great George Street, London, S.W.1
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext.

Our reference: D.E.O.(Security) 8/68
Your reference: 2-EM 700/212/03

9th August, 1968

12 AUG 1968

Dear Establishment Officer,

United States Top Secret Information

The United States authorities have asked Her Majesty's Government that all persons having any access whatsoever to United States TOP SECRET information should be positively vetted. The Personnel Security Committee have agreed to meet this request.

Departments are accordingly asked to ensure that any person who requires to have access to United States TOP SECRET information is positively vetted. The necessary amendment to paragraph 6 of Chapter III, M.P.S.M. will be made in due course.

Any enquiries should be addressed to Mr. R. G. Gillings (Extension 1071).

Yours sincerely,

DRJ Stephen

(D. R. J. Stephen)

J 20/8.

CONFIDENTIAL

*B1/LH
20.8.68*

CONFIDENTIAL

4240



PA Pol.F. 316 / 8/1

Copied to Pol.F. 53/8/165
Treasury Chambers
Great George Street, London S.W.1
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 473

DEO (Security) 5/68

Our reference: 2-EM.6/254/03

Your reference:

26th March, 1968

Dear Establishment Officer,

Sexual Offences Act, 1967;
Implications for Security

27 MAR 1968

Existing security policy regards homosexuality as raising a prima facie presumption that an individual is unfit for employment in a post requiring positive or normal vetting (Manual of Personnel Security Measures, Annex 8 and Chapter 1, paragraph 8). It is based on the premise that a homosexual is vulnerable to blackmail or pressure.

2. The principle provision of the Sexual Offences Act, which has implications for security, is that homosexual acts between consenting male adults in private is no longer a criminal offence. Nevertheless certain homosexual acts, e.g. offences against minors or importuning in public remain criminal offences; there can be no certainty that an individual with homosexual tendencies will not resort to such illegal practices and thus render himself liable to blackmail on this score. Perhaps more important is the fact that the threat of exposure to family, friends or employer is in no way reduced by the Act. Moreover homosexuality in itself still carries some social stigma.

3. The threat of prosecution abroad under local law also remains a relevant factor. The law in communist countries is almost invariably more restrictive than our own, and in some allied countries, including Canada and some States of the United States of America, the legal position is much the same as it previously was in the United Kingdom. Thus staff at Missions in or on visits to such countries are no less liable to pressure or blackmail than before; indeed they may be more liable, since they may no longer be on their guard to conceal this aspect of their behaviour.

4. It is clear therefore that, despite the change in the law, the risk of blackmail or pressure in homosexual cases remains substantial. On the other hand, the threat of exposure to the police in this country will be less effective as a ground for blackmail.

5. The Official Committee on Security have decided, therefore, that there should be no change in the general policy, but that, in considering particular cases involving suspicion of homosexuality, departments should take into account the lessened threat of exposure to the police in the United Kingdom. As a result they may sometimes find it possible to come down in favour of the individual where previously they would not have done so.

/6.

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6. In the course of consideration of this matter, some ambiguity in the Manual of Personnel Security Measures, Annex 8, paragraph 2(o) became apparent. This will be amended in due course to read as follows:-

"Has been or is reasonably suspected of being a homosexual and therefore vulnerable to a blackmail approach or pressure by a hostile intelligence service, or has engaged in infamous, immoral or disgraceful conduct which might similarly expose him to blackmail."

7. Any enquiries should be addressed to Mr. R. G. Gillings, extension 1071.

Yours sincerely,

A. W. Wyatt

(A. W. WYATT)

B/AH 28/2

PA in POF 316/8/1

421A



CONFIDENTIAL

Treasury Chambers
Great George Street, London S.W.1
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 639

21st February, 1968

Our reference: 2-EM 700/431/01
Your reference: DEO(Security)3/68

22 FEB 1968

Dear Establishment Officer,

Employment on Classified Work of Staff and
Service Personnel not of United Kingdom origin other than
aliens or British subjects by
naturalisation or marriage

Consideration has recently been given to the criteria to be applied in vetting staff and Service personnel not of United Kingdom origin, other than aliens or British subjects by naturalisation or marriage.

2. This letter does not of itself alter the guidance on the security precautions in connection with aliens, etc., in the Manual of Personnel Security Measures, Annex 6. But there will be consequential changes to this section (particularly paragraph 12) and other parts of the Manual, yet to be worked out (see paragraph 8 below).
3. An important factor to be taken into account is that individuals not of United Kingdom origin in general cannot be assumed to have an inherent loyalty to this country. If in particular they are coloured, they may also become disaffected through real or imagined acts of racial discrimination; consequently they may be vulnerable to inducements offered by hostile intelligence services, or to the influence of subversive organisations. The risk to security which arises from the employment of staff as defined in paragraph 1 on classified work may however be accepted if there is satisfactory evidence of their assimilation into this country and of their trustworthiness in handling its affairs.
4. There are obvious difficulties in completing either the positive or normal vetting processes satisfactorily when the subject has lived in this country for only a few years.
5. The P.V. process requires (Manual of Personnel Security Measures, Annex 24, paragraph 9) interviews in P.V. cases to be held with a sufficient number of the subject's present and previous employers to cover adequately his career over at least the previous ten years. It has therefore been decided that a minimum of ten years' residence in this country should be required as a condition of positive vetting, except where suitable background inquiries can be made in the subject's

/country

The Establishment Officer

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country of origin. Where satisfactory background inquiries of this kind can be made, or sufficient other evidence of trustworthiness covering this period can be provided, it may be possible to grant P.V. clearance to a man who, after less than ten years' residence, has clearly assimilated himself into this country. Conversely, P.V. clearance may have to be withheld from a man who, despite having lived here for ten years, has still put down no firm roots.


6. The N.V. process relies on record checks, and residence in this country must therefore be long enough for the absence of an adverse record to have significance. Less than five years would deprive the Security Service record check of any real value. On the other hand, five years' residence is now regarded as sufficient to enable a Commonwealth citizen to obtain a United Kingdom passport. It has therefore been decided that a minimum of five years residence should be required as a condition of normal vetting, except where satisfactory enquiries can be made in a man's country of origin or other evidence of trustworthiness can be provided. In line with what is said in paragraph 5 about P.V. cases, however, it may be possible exceptionally to grant N.V. clearance to a man who, after less than five years residence, has clearly assimilated himself into this country, and conversely N.V. clearance may have to be withheld from a man who has lived here for five years but has still not put down roots or shown evidence of assimilation.

7. In granting clearance to those covered by the definition in paragraph 1 Departments should be guided by paragraphs 5 and 6 above.

8. Amendments to the Manual of Personnel Security Measures will be issued as soon as we have considered all the implications of the new residence criteria in relation to the guidance in Annex 6.

9. Any enquiries should be addressed to Mr. R. G. Gillings (Extension 1071).

Yours sincerely,



(N. G. Morrison)

KL

Copies to C1/JAC

PLF 816-8-1

441A

B.1/H.L. to ~~see~~



Treasury Chambers
Great George Street, London S.W.1
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext.

2-EM 700/431/01

Our reference: D.E.O.(SECURITY)7/68

Your reference:

12th July, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

15 JUL 1968

Dear Establishment Officer,

Employment on classified work of staff
and Service personnel not of United Kingdom origin

421A

Morrison's letter of 21st February 1968 - D.E.O.(Security)3/68 - set out the criteria to be applied in vetting staff and Service personnel not of United Kingdom origin, other than aliens or British subjects by naturalisation or marriage.

2. The five and ten year residence rules were publicly announced by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury in a written reply to a Parliamentary Question on 28th June 1968 (Hansard, Col. 148). It is now open to Departments to refer to this public statement in cases where a refusal to accept an applicant for a particular post can be explained only by reference to the residence rules.

Yours sincerely,

DRJ Stephen

(D. R. J. Stephen)

The Establishment Officer

29/7
Bill
23.7.68

ENCLOSURE FOLDER

Enclos. File No. <u>440a</u> to <u>POL.F. 316-8-1 Vol. 4</u> (Parent File No.)	SUBJECT PROCEDURE FOR P.V. BRIEFING OF SCHOOLS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
EBP Min 5					
MW " 5					
EA " 5	30/87				
JTB " 7	3/17				
JTB } Min 8	9-9-68				
JTB }	11-9-68				
JTB	12/5				

1

15.7.68.

Note re Procedure for Briefing of Schools

1a

2

23.7.68.

Draft of possible letter to replace S. Form 559

2a

3

J.F.H.B. *EBP*

Serials 275a and 281az and Minutes 310 and 312 in POL.F. 318-8-1 Vols. 3 and 4 set out the requirement for the P.V. Briefing of Schools. Minute 310 states that B.1. Schools officers were orally briefed by B. concerning the action to be taken. In order to clarify the position a statement of the action they take is filed at 1a.

2. This procedure works well and B.1. Schools Officers have all received remarks of appreciation that return visits will not be necessary. It is, however, felt that we could with advantage revise and bring up to date S. Form 559 and a suggested draft is at 2a for your consideration.

E. B. Partridge
Miss E. B. Partridge.

B.1.

23.7.68.

4

26.7.68

Draft letter to replace S. Form 559

4a

5

EBP *EBP*

Reference Min 3.

Please consider an alternative draft (at 4a) with EBUTA, MW and then speak

Pn. 26.7.68

J.F.H.B.

31.7.68.

Draft letter to replace S. Form 559.

6a

7

Mr Benker

As spoken, I have slightly re-drafted the final paragraph (6a).

MW agrees but EA has not seen 6a, though she saw 4a & agreed

J. F. H. Baker

B1
31/7/68

J.F.H.B. approved 16/10/68
~~B. through H.C.~~

A nit-pickers redraft is at 6a
the 10/9

When p.v. briefing schools we presently use the letter at 1a. (Min Partridge has set out at 1a what p.v. briefing involves)

2. We have been considering a revised version of the p.v. briefing letter and a draft is at 6a for your consideration

for. 5.9.68

J. F. H. Baker



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
ROOM 055,
OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

Personal

This is a department of the Ministry of Defence engaged on highly secret work and girls take part in this work on joining. We therefore need to be sure that the girls are trustworthy.

2. We do not expect you to guarantee the reliability of a girl but we are sure you will only recommend girls whom you believe to be of good character, honest, sober and above all discreet. We cannot employ girls who hold, or whose families hold, extreme political views—communist or fascist— or who associate with such people.

Director of Establishments

September, 1965

Draft.

AC

This is a department of the Ministry of Defence which is engaged on highly secret work. From the beginning of their careers here all girls are required to take part in this work.

2. You will readily understand, therefore, that we cannot employ here any girl who holds, or whose family holds, extreme political views whether of the Right or of the Left or who associate with such people. Furthermore, we wish to assure ourselves that no-one is considered for work here whose character, temperament or habits in any way cast doubt on her trustworthiness, integrity, reliability or discretion.

3. Naturally, I do not expect you to guarantee the trustworthiness of any girl you recommend to us. ~~But I should like to feel that in the act of putting her forward you are indicating that as far as you know there is no impediment to her employment here.~~

26.7.68

BIB/JJ
26.7.68

2a

OK

Dear

This is a department of the Ministry of Defence engaged on highly secret work and girls take part in this work on joining. We therefore need to be sure that they are trustworthy, of good character, honest, sober and discreet.

2. Naturally, we do not expect you to guarantee the reliability of the girls you recommend to us, but you will understand we cannot employ anyone who holds, or whose family holds, extreme political views - Communist or Fascist - or who associate with such people.

3. Should there be any difficulty over the reference perhaps you would be good enough to get in touch with me.

Yours sincerely,

B1/RVT
23.7.68

1a

Procedure for P.V. Briefing of Schools


When visiting a school for purposes of P.V. Briefing, B.1. Schools Officers tell the Head that we are an entirely secret department, and from the moment a candidate joins she has access to secret information. Because of this it is essential for us to be satisfied about a candidate's reliability, suitability for secret work, and mental stability. We then go on to say we are interested in such things as drug taking, undesirable company, political activity or anything else which might render a candidate unsuitable for such work.

2. The Head is then asked whether, in the light of this, he/she wishes to change the written reference, or amplify it in any way.

3. In order to save further visits to the Head in connection with references we ask if we may leave a copy of S. Form 559 to act as an aide memoire (copy attached).

4. A copy of the report is filed in the school file. Where no school file exists and the Head shows interest in a subsequent recruiting visit, Registry is asked to make one. If no interest is shown, a copy of the report is filed in SF. 50-36-3(1) Supp.A. and Registry is asked to card the school in the Central Index.

5. In all cases cards are made for B1/PV index of indoctrinated schools.


Miss E. B. Partridge.

B.1.

15.7.68.

B1/PV T
15.7.68


~~PHS~~ to Pae
Wes
8/3

4220

Reference Pol.F.316-8-1
c.c. Pol.F.316-1-3


NOTE FOR FILE

My attention has been drawn to the fact that I omitted to record in this file the result of a discussion held some months ago at which B ruled that no candidate under the age of 17 years should be considered for provisional P.V. clearance and that full Stage 4 clearance should be obtained before joining. I have confirmed in the past day or so that B's recollection of this ruling coincides with my own.


H.I. Lee

B.1

7.3.68.


Wes
8/3/68


P.V. Pong He
405A

Reference.....

- Copies to: B.2
- B.2/E.A.A.
- B.2/J.E.
- B.2/E.B.P.
- B.2/A.M.T.
- B.2/J.M.W.
- B.2/M.W.

B.1/P.V. - All I.O.s.

B. has expressed the view that a favourable report from a Secretarial College which has been P.V. briefed e.g. St. James's, is normally insufficient by itself for independent testimony. In such cases we should support this by an interview with a School Headmistress.



H.I. Lee

B.1
22.11.67.

J.
98 B1/P
29-11-67

CONFIDENTIALC.1.

Between 1 January and 31 December 1966 we recruited 191 women into Grade III posts, including part-timers (who accounted for 41 out of the total), but excluding members of A.4., Interpreters and staff employed locally overseas. An analysis by age of women employed full-time is at Appendix A, and a similar analysis for part-timers is at Appendix B.

Of the 191 recruits 98, or about 51% were Minors, i.e. under the age of 21 when recruited. If the part-timers are excluded then the percentage of women recruited under the age of 21 is about 66%.

Appendix A shows that the greatest number of women in any one group was recruited between the ages of 18 and 19, followed fairly closely by the age group 17 to 18 and further behind by the 19 to 20s. These three groups combined account for 87 of those recruited for full-time employment, or 57%.

I am not sure what conclusions should be drawn from these figures other than the fact that paragraph 15 of chapter 3 of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures appears to be unrealistic. The paragraph in question reads: "Departments should seek through establishment arrangements to ensure that so far as practicable persons in the following categories are not considered for posts which entail positive vetting :-

- (a) Minors (i.e. persons under 21 years of age); their characters, interests and opinions are likely to be still developing rapidly and the positive vetting process is therefore of less value in assessing their reliability than is the case with more mature persons

I suspect that while [redacted] and G.C.H.Q. must find themselves in the same sort of difficulties when recruiting for P.V. posts as we do, the problem is not so acute in other Whitehall departments where Minors can be placed initially in non-P.V. ^{posts} and only moved into posts requiring full P.V. clearance when they reach 21 (although it is worth recording that Helen KEENAN was 20 years of age when she joined the Cabinet Office typing pool).

We should perhaps consider whether there would be any advantage in stimulating the Personnel Security Committee to review the age below which persons should not be employed on duties entailing positive vetting.

In the Security Service we recruit from the age of 17 although, if a candidate is thought to be exceptionally mature for her age, we lower the limit to 16. (During 1966, as you will see, we recruited only 5 16-year-olds). In doing this we are of course covered in the Manual by the words in paragraph 15 of chapter 3: "So far as is practicable". Nevertheless, as mentioned above, out of

/a total

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958

July 2022

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J
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13-12-67

CONFIDENTIALC.1.

Between 1 January and 31 December 1966 we recruited 191 women into Grade III posts including part-timers (who accounted for 41 out of the total), but excluding members of A.4., Interpreters and staff employed locally overseas. An analysis by age of women employed full-time is at Appendix A, and a similar analysis for part-timers is at Appendix B.

Of the 191 recruits 98, or about 51% were Minors, i.e. under the age of 21 when recruited. If the part-timers are excluded then the percentage of women recruited under the age of 21 is about 66%.

Appendix A shows that the greatest number of women in any one group was recruited between the ages of 18 and 19, followed fairly closely by the age group 17 to 18 and further behind by the 19 to 20s. These three groups combined account for 87 of those recruited for full-time employment, or 57%.

I am not sure what conclusions should be drawn from these figures other than the fact that paragraph 15 of chapter 3 of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures appears to be unrealistic. The paragraph in question reads: "Departments should seek through establishment arrangements to ensure that so far as practicable persons in the following categories are not considered for posts which entail positive vetting :-

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I suspect that while [redacted] and G. C. M. Q. must find themselves in the same sort of difficulties when recruiting for P.V. posts as we do, the problem is not so acute in other Whitehall departments where Minors can be placed initially in non-P.V. [redacted] and only moved into posts requiring full P.V. clearance when they reach 21 (although it is worth recording that [redacted] was 20 years of age when she joined the Cabinet Office typing pool).

We should perhaps consider whether there would be any advantage in stimulating the Personnel Security Committee to review the age below which persons should not be employed on duties entailing positive vetting.

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/a total

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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 July 2022

CONFIDENTIAL

a total of 150 women recruited 98, or 66%, were Minors.

It may very well be that it is best to leave well alone rather than to suggest that the age limit should be dropped to - say - 18. If this were done the reaction of the P.S.C. or the Official Committee might be to say that in view of this concession 18 should be the absolute lower limit and that no exceptions should be allowed.

I should welcome an opportunity to discuss this subject with you at your leisure.

H. I. LEE

B. I.
13.11.67.

H. I. Lee.

Attachments: Appendices A and B.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANALYSIS BY AGE OF GRADE III WOMEN
RECRUITED DURING 1966 - EXCLUDING PART-TIMERS

<u>Age</u>		<u>Numbers</u>
16	:	5
17	:	31
18	:	37
19	:	20
20	:	5
21	:	2
22	:	6
23	:	3
24	:	2
25	:	1
26	:	5
27	:	2
33	:	1
35	:	1
36	:	1
41	:	1
42	:	2
44	:	1
47	:	4
48	:	2
49	:	1
50	:	1
51	:	3
52	:	3
54	:	1
56	:	2
57	:	1
		<hr/>
		150
		<hr/>

B.1.

13.11.67.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANALYSIS BY AGE OF PART-TIMERS
RECRUITED DURING 1966

<u>Age</u>		<u>Numbers</u>
23	:	1
24	:	1
28	:	1
31	:	1
38	:	2
40	:	1
41	:	1
42	:	3
43	:	5
44	:	3
45	:	1
46	:	3
47	:	3
48	:	1
49	:	1
50	:	3
52	:	3
53	:	3
55	:	2
56	:	1
59	:	1
		<hr/>
		41
		<hr/>

B. 1.

13.11.67.**CONFIDENTIAL**

P.V. POSITION AS AT 30TH JUNE 1967DEPARTMENT : SECURITY SERVICE

GOVERNMENT SERVICE

A.	Total number of P.V. posts	1,366
B.	Number of staff at present in posts included in A who have been cleared to Stage 4	1,220
C.	Number of staff in posts included in A who have not yet been cleared through Stage 4	8
D.	Number of vacant posts	138
E.	Number of staff in the process of being P.V.'d and whose cases are :-	
	i) in preparation for field enquiries	nil
	ii) with investigating authority	nil
	iii) awaiting final clearance certificate or not yet cleared for any other reason	1

STAFF PERSONAL

LOOSE MINUTE

Reference.....

393
B

B.1./Mr. Lee

We spoke about the P.V. status of [redacted] Irrespective of what may have been said when this lady joined, we now require to use her Afrikaans on CINNAMON and possibly operations. This will mean that she will have to be fully P.V.d. I would be grateful if this could be done as soon as possible as the operation on which she will be employed has already been completed.

2. As a matter of policy, I should have thought that all members of A.2.A. should have been P.V.d before joining, with the possible exception of half time translators, and even these I should have thought it prudent to P.V. if only because one does not know the content of the translation until after they have done it.

A.2.
8.8.67.

[Handwritten signature]
F.H. Winterborn

[Handwritten initials]
15/8/67
B
15/8/67

CODE 18-76

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958
November 2022

386A

To: All Investigating Officers


Certificates from Finance Officer

I spoke to F.O. on 20 June about the arrangement which was made in July of last year to obtain from him certificates to the effect that there was nothing on his files for members of staff which might raise a presumption of doubt about fitness for the reaffirmation of P.V. clearance (247a in POL.F.50-24-4(120) refers).

As this arrangement came into effect at the beginning of July 1966 it can be assumed that by the same date in 1967 most R's of S's, apart from those for candidates who have joined since that date, will contain a certificate.

As from 7 July it will be unnecessary therefore to request certificates from F.O., except for those members of the staff who joined before 7 July 1966 and whose files still contain no certificate. F.O. has agreed to inform me without prompting of any information coming to his notice which might cause the P.V. of a member of staff to be called into question. In practice this is likely to be confined almost entirely to requests by members of staff for loans, although F.O. will of course also draw to our attention anything else which he considers may be of interest from a P.V. point of view, e.g. lax handling of office funds, extravagance in entertaining etc.

B.1
19.6.67

H.I. Lee 

Copies: B
B.1
B.1/DHP, B.1/JFHB, B.1/HLM
B.2, B.2/JBE, B.2/JMW, B.2/MW, B.2/EAA, B.2/EBP, B.2/AM
F.O.
File

2081
Am/B1
22.6.67

CONFIDENTIAL

Boa

Copy to POL.F.50-24-4(120) ✓

held B1

967

POL.F.53-8-234/G1/JAG

1st March 1967.

Dear

We think that it might be worth while at present having another look at the policy on the employment on classified work of those under twenty-one years of age. But since definitions tend to cause trouble in any discussion on this subject, I should perhaps say at the outset that throughout this letter I shall use the term 'minor' to mean anyone under 21 and the term 'juvenile' to mean anyone under 17.

2. The existing instructions on this subject are to be found in the Manual of Personnel Security Measures (M.P.S.M.) where all references are indexed under the heading 'Minors'. In brief the Manual says that minors should not be employed on highly classified work unless this is unavoidable; further, Departmental Supervising Officers are instructed to restrict the access of minors who must be used on highly classified work until they have reached a considered judgment on their character and discretion (paragraph 8, Chapter VIII, M.P.S.M.); these restrictions clearly apply with particular force to P.V. posts and it is made clear that P.V. is of less value in the case of minors than with others (paragraph 15(a) Chapter III, M.P.S.M.).

3. Bearing in mind the difficulties of recruiting and retaining clerical and secretarial staff it is unavoidable that many minors will continue to be employed in posts affording them access to classified information and in the circumstances we do not consider that it would be practicable or realistic to strengthen these regulations. The further requirement (paragraph 47, Chapter III, M.P.S.M.) that the P.V. of minors should be reviewed annually provides for a considered judgment to be reached at regular intervals of their fitness to be retained in P.V. posts; and in this way the requirement of paragraph 8, Chapter VIII, M.P.S.M. is likely to be brought regularly to the notice of supervising officers in respect of these posts. But this paragraph is not restricted in its application to minors serving in P.V. posts; it refers to those employed on "highly classified work". So extensive however is the employment of minors in the N.V. field that we do not think that it would be reasonable or practicable to require Departments to record by written judgment at prescribed intervals their considered decision to retain a minor in any N.V. post. But we do think it would give Departments a clearer indication of what is intended by the reference to "highly classified work" to indicate to them that the special precautions prescribed in paragraph 8, Chapter VIII of the M.P.S.M. are not applicable only in the P.V. field but to any post involving regular and constant access to SECRET information or occasional access to TOP SECRET information.

A. Duke Esq.,
Treasury Chambers.

/4. We also suggest

[Handwritten signature]


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

4. We also suggest that the time has come to give Departments clearer guidance on the employment of juveniles on classified work. It seems to us that to entrust to a juvenile classified information, the unauthorised disclosure of which would prejudice the national interest, would generally be regarded as inadvisable. Moreover it must be remembered that someone of sixteen years of age is not regarded in law as having full criminal responsibility and if such a person did make an unauthorised disclosure of classified information, any case against that juvenile would have to be taken before a juvenile court. It is perhaps unlikely that the Attorney General would give a fiat to allow such proceedings to be instituted but in any event an incident of this kind would be likely to bring ridicule and contempt on the Department concerned and on Government security regulations in general.
5. In fact we already advise Departments against employing juveniles on classified work in any vetting case where the person being vetted is under seventeen years of age; a copy of our standard letter is attached. But in the circumstances we think that it would be wise to amend the Manual to bring this point out more clearly. Indeed it might be desirable to go further and to stipulate that no juvenile should be employed on classified work without either the express consent of the Principal Establishment Officer of the Department concerned, or of any other responsible officer to whom this authority has been delegated in writing. Such an instruction could be promulgated by a D.E.O. letter which could also include the point mentioned in paragraph 3 above.
6. We should be grateful for your reactions; if you agree with our views the next step might either be a discussion in the P.S.C. or a D.E.O. letter; in either event we would gladly prepare a draft paper.

Yours sincerely,



J. A. Cradock

A. Duke Esq.,
Treasury Chambers.

Enc.: 1.

JAC/CMK

CONFIDENTIAL

379A

POL.F.53-8-234

c.c. Pol.F.50-24-4(120) ✓

196.

C.1.

I certainly do not think that the regulations about the employment of minors on classified work should be strengthened, partly because, like you, I think that to do so would be to disregard the realities of the present employment situation, and partly, I am bound to say, because I personally doubt whether, whatever the theory may be, minors as such do in practice represent any substantially greater security risk than do adults; certainly this is true so far as our own extensive experience as employers of female minors goes. I do not, however, know about male minors, and I of course accept that public opinion supports the official doctrine.

2. With regard to juveniles, our basic policy is not to employ anybody under the age of seventeen. Without, however, giving any publicity to it, we have since May of last year accepted that we might in exceptional circumstances recruit girls of sixteen provided that we consider them to be reasonably mature. In fact, we have only recruited three sixteen year olds and two of them became seventeen shortly after joining. The problem is therefore not a significant one in our case. For what my opinion is worth, I think that since C.3 does already advise Departments against employing juveniles on classified work, there would be something to be said for going rather further, as proposed in paragraph 5 of your draft. I should have thought, however, that authority so to employ a juvenile might be vested in the Principal Establishment Officer or anybody authorised by him.

J. H. Martlett

B.

20.2.67

h
20 267

noted
47

RESTRICTED

APPENDIX E.

PEN-FRIENDSHIPS AND CORRESPONDENCE
WITH PERSONS RESIDENT IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

There is considerable evidence that pen-friendships are deliberately fostered by the Communist intelligence services; indeed, the fact that Communist countries, particularly the Soviet and Satellite countries, permit private correspondence with foreigners suggests that it yields an intelligence or political dividend.

2. It must, therefore, be assumed that private correspondence with persons resident in Communist countries is liable to be censored at the other end even if it is not conducted, so far as the foreign correspondent is concerned, under official control.

3. Members of the staff may not correspond with any person resident in any of the Communist countries without the prior agreement of B.Branch. They should report immediately to B.Branch any approach that might be made to them suggesting that they should conduct any such correspondence.

RESTRICTED

Reference.....
(Attached: POL.F.53-8-234)

378a

B

see 377a

see 376a

Please see Minute 195 and the draft letter to the Treasury at 194a.

Our own policy on the employment of minors is to recruit from age seventeen upwards and to employ as an exceptional measure only girls of sixteen years of age who meet our educational requirements, who are of acknowledged maturity and who provide satisfactory references. In May 1966 you commented:-

"In point of fact our practice is only to employ persons whom we consider to be reasonably mature, irrespective of age, but clearly the presumption of immaturity is greater in respect of very young persons and the latter must therefore make a very favourable impression on our recruiters before we take them on.

"I think we ought not to advertise an interest in sixteen-year olds or we shall be flooded with unsuitable applicants."

In supporting the employment of sixteen year old girls, B.1 suggested that special supervision should be given to them after joining (see 341a to 343a in POL.F.50-24-4(120)).

So far as the draft letter at 194a is concerned, I have the following comments:

(1) Paragraph 2

Paragraph 8 of Chapter VIII of the M.P.S.M. contains the following:

"Minors present a security problem because they are still at an impressionable age and may be more easily swayed than adults by subversive influences and because the value to be derived from vetting young people is extremely limited. So far as possible, therefore, they should not be employed on highly classified work. Where this is unavoidable, arrangements should be made for their close supervision and, so far as practicable, to restrict their access until they have been employed long enough for a considered judgment as to character and discretion to be formed by their supervising officers."

(2) Paragraph 2

Paragraph 47 of Chapter III of the M.P.S.M. reads as follows:

"Positive Vetting cases should be reviewed at least every five years or annually if the individual is under 21 until that age is reached. The purpose of a review is to check on the period which has elapsed since the original Positive Vetting enquiries (or review) were made and, where necessary, to bring a case up to current standards."

/As

Handwritten signature and notes: 20 267, B/As/mmt, 20-267


2.

As you are aware we review all our cases (not only those of minors) annually on report.

- (3) Paragraph 3. None of our girls is employed in N.V. posts.
- (4) Paragraph 5. Since it was agreed in May 1966 that sixteen year old girls might in exceptional circumstances be employed we have recruited only three - two of whom attained the age of seventeen shortly after joining and one of whom was just over sixteen on joining; there is one further sixteen year old in the pipe-line. So far as this Service is concerned therefore this is not a big problem.

On the assumption that ^{the} Director General has already delegated to you the necessary authority to recruit and employ all members of the staff including juveniles, the proposal at X of paragraph 5 should cause no problems. It might, however, be wise to obtain Director General's written approval of the arrangements if the D.E.O. letter referred to in the last sentence of paragraph 5 is issued.

B.1
16.2.67


H.I. Lee

371a

Copy of Minute in POL.F.53-8-234.

c.c. for POL.F.50-24-4(120)

195

see
376a

~~B.1/DHP~~ *Hm/15/2*

Please see Minute 193 and the draft at 194a. The points made in paragraph 4 of this draft are quite sound from a pure doctrinal point of view. I have no doubt that Departments which have areas of non-classified work can avoid giving juveniles access without much difficulty, but I wonder whether in wholly secret Departments the harsh realities of life do not render it inevitable that juveniles should be given access more or less on recruitment. I imagine that we find it necessary to recruit school leavers for Registry work. These presumably are

some times

~~often~~ juveniles. I think the same may apply to Defence Departments. In the Evening Standard of 8 February I noticed an advertisement for "Clerical Officers required for interesting and worthwhile work in the Ministry of Defence (Navy Department) Offices in Whitehall pay £411 at 15." I have no doubt these Navy Department recruits fall into a vetting category. I am in some doubt therefore whether we should pursue the question of juveniles and should be very grateful for any observations you may have on this problem. Equally you may have some comments on the subject of "minors".

C.1

D.H. Whyte
D.H. Whyte.

9 February 1967

Blk/mtt
Co.2.67
no 267

Draft Letter/Minute to A. Duke Esq.,
Treasury Chambers.

Grading

Date 2.1.67.

Copies to
Copy for POL.F.50-24-4(120)

Our Ref. POL.F.53-8-234/C1/
JAC

Their Ref.

For Signature by JAC

Approved by

144
376a

We think that it might be worth while at present having another look at the policy on the employment on classified work of those under twenty-one years of age. But since definitions tend to cause trouble in any discussion on this subject, I should perhaps say at the outset that throughout this letter I shall use the term 'minor' to mean anyone under 21 and the term 'juvenile' to mean anyone under 17.

2. The existing instructions on this subject are to be found in the Manual of Personnel Security Measures (M.P.S.M.) where all references are indexed under the heading 'Minors'. In brief the Manual says that minors should not be employed on highly classified work unless this is unavoidable; further, Departmental Supervising Officers are instructed to restrict the access of minors who must be used on highly classified work until they have reached a considered judgement on their character and discretion (paragraph 8, Chapter VIII, M.P.S.M.); these restrictions clearly apply with particular force to P.V. posts and it is made clear that P.V. is of less value in the case of minors than with others (paragraph 15(a) Chapter III, M.P.S.M.).

3. Bearing in mind the difficulties of recruiting and retaining clerical and secretarial staff it is unavoidable that many minors will continue to be employed in posts affording them access to classified information and in the circumstances we do not consider that it would be practicable or realistic to strengthen these regulations. The further requirement (paragraph 47, Chapter III, M.P.S.M.) that the P.V. of minors should be reviewed annually provides for a considered judgement

AP 257
Bleed
20 20

Draft Letter/Minute to

Grading

Copies to

Date

Our Ref.

For Signature by

Their Ref.

Approved by

- 2 -

to be reached at regular intervals on the fitness of minors to be retained in P.V. posts; and in this way the requirement of paragraph 8, Chapter VIII, M.P.S.M. is likely to be brought regularly to the notice of supervising officers in respect of these posts. But this paragraph is not restricted in its application to minors serving in P.V. posts; it refers to those employed on "highly classified work". So extensive however is the employment of minors in the N.V. field that we do not think that it would be reasonable or practicable to require Departments to record by written judgment at prescribed intervals their considered decision to retain a minor in any N.V. posts. But we do think it would give Departments a clearer indication of what is intended by the reference to "highly classified work" by indicating to them that the special precautions prescribed in paragraph 8, Chapter VIII of the M.P.S.M. are not applicable only in the P.V. field but to any post-involving regular and constant access to SECRET information or occasional access to TOP SECRET information.

4. We also suggest that the time has come to give Departments clearer guidance on the employment of juveniles on classified work. It seems to us that to entrust to a juvenile classified information, the unauthorised disclosure of which would prejudice the national interest, would generally be regarded as inadvisable. Moreover it must be remembered that someone of sixteen years of age is not regarded in law as having full criminal responsibility and if such a person did make an unauthorised disclosure of classified information, any case against

98a

Continue overleaf if necessary.

Draft Letter/Minute to

Grading

Copies to

Date

Our Ref.

For Signature by

Their Ref.

Approved by

- 3 -

that juvenile would have to be taken before a juvenile court. It is perhaps unlikely that the Attorney General would give a fiat to allow such proceedings to be instituted but in any event an incident of this kind would be likely to bring ridicule and contempt on the Department concerned and on Government security regulations in general.

5. In fact we already advise Departments against employing juveniles on classified work in any vetting case where the person being vetted is under seventeen years of age; a copy of our standard letter is attached. But in the circumstances we think that it would be wise to amend the Manual to bring this point out more clearly. Indeed it might be desirable to go further and to stipulate that no juvenile should be employed on classified work without either the express consent of the Permanent Head of the Department concerned, or of any other responsible officer to whom this authority has been delegated in writing. Such an instruction could be promulgated by a D.E.O. letter which could also include the point mentioned in paragraph 3 above.

6. We should be grateful for your reactions and to know whether you consider that this subject might in the first instance be discussed in the P.S.C. If so, we would gladly prepare a draft paper.

189z

X

Pol. F. 50-24-4 (120.)

SECRET

I O's to see
371A



By [unclear] to see

Treasury Chambers
Great George Street, London S.W.1
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext.

Our reference: D.E.O. (Security) 10/66
Your reference:

3230

23rd November, 1966

24 NOV 1966

Dear Establishment Officer,

List of Organisations of Security Interest.

In Caulcott's letter of 20th December 1965, Departments were told that the list of organisations of security interest was being revised. This revision has now been completed and a copy of the revised version is attached.

2. I would like to emphasise again that the purpose of this list is solely to assist in Positive Vetting enquiries and it should be used as a reference document only in those enquiries. Although many of the organisations named are still of security interest, the list should not be regarded as a reliable up-to-date guide. Membership of any of the organisations listed may not necessarily be significant by itself; it is often nothing more than a warning that further enquiries need to be made and departments should consult the Security Service on the significance of membership of any of these organisations. As the list is not exhaustive, Departments should also consult the Security Service about any organisation which is not listed and about which they have doubts.

done
3. Departments are asked to acknowledge receipt of the attached copy on the tear-off slip below and to restrict access to the list to central establishment and security staff who have personnel security responsibilities.

4. Departments who have copies of the 1964 Edition of the list which was circulated with my letter of 29th June 1964, are asked to return them to the Security Service or else provide a certificate of destruction.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
(A. DUKE)

*Attachment (No. 59)
destroyed 25.2.71
Serial 526 a / 527 a
refer. [unclear] 2/71*

[Signature]
Bi/65
30.11.66

The Establishment Officer,

SECRET

Copy for: POL.F.50-24-4(120)

Original in RS.1421

90.

367a

B.

-

366a

May I assume from paragraph 1 of Minute 88 that P.V. clearance in this case has been reaffirmed by the D.G?

Arrangements are being made to reproduce Minute 88, copies going to all I.O's, to B.2 staff concerned and to Messrs. I will also see that the appropriate extract is made for POL.F.50-24-4(120).

The main problem which is likely to arise from the directive in Minute 88 is that we shall in very few cases be able to use interviews with employers to provide independent testimony. In the case of candidates living in London this will inevitably mean an increase in the number of enquiries which we shall have to make from Special Branch and this in its turn will, I fear, cause delays in clearance.

B.1
11.11.66

H.I. Lee

Handwritten initials and date: H.I. Lee 11/11/66

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ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 July 2022

366a

Extract from RS.1421 Minute 88

Subject: Independent Testimony

88.

B.

I accept that in this case 85a constitutes adequate independent testimony.

2. On the general issue my views are these:

- (a) Ideally any referee should have known the subject over a longer period than 15 months.
- (b) Colleagues are acceptable to provide independent testimony and may be very useful because their knowledge is current or very recent and because they should be professionally well qualified to judge what is significant.
- (c) What really counts is intimacy.

3. You say in your minute that you are not asking me to commit myself to any very precise ruling. This is not a subject which lends itself to precise ruling since each case has to be looked at as a whole and what may be sufficient testimony in one case may be totally insufficient in another. The aim should be that from one source or another adequate light is thrown on the subject's private life.

D.G.

(Sgd.) E.M. FURNIVAL JONES.

10th November 1966.

DE/NJW
16/4/66

B1/DHP to see [unclear]

Copy to: C.I.

CONFIDENTIAL



Treasury Chambers
Great George Street, London S.W.1
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 609

30A

Our reference: DEO (Security) 5/66
Your reference:

9th August, 1966

10 AUG 1966

Dear Establishment Officer,

CENTRAL RECORDING OF INDIVIDUALS REFUSED
N.V. CLEARANCE ON CHARACTER GROUNDS

Paragraphs 57 and 58 of Chapter III of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures (M.P.S.M.) provide for the recording by the Security Service of the particulars of anyone outside the public service who is refused Positive Vetting (P.V.) clearance on account of a character defect, and also anyone in the public service who resigns as a result of being refused P.V. clearance on the same grounds, except where the sole evidence relied upon is a conviction recorded in the Criminal Record Office (C.R.O.).

2. The Personnel Security Committee has now decided that details of persons who resign or are removed from the public service as a result of, or subsequent to, denial or withdrawal of Normal Vetting (N.V.) clearance on grounds of character defect (except where the sole evidence relied upon is a conviction recorded in the C.R.O.) should similarly be recorded by the Security Service. This requirement is designed to obviate the risk that individuals who have been excluded or removed from N.V. posts on character grounds, and have left the public service, may subsequently obtain employment in N.V. posts notwithstanding that character information bearing upon their security reliability exists within the Government machine and should have been taken into account.

3. Departments should therefore in future send to the Security Service particulars of individuals who leave the public service below the age of 65 years, about whom Departments have adverse character information (except where the sole evidence is a conviction recorded in the C.R.O.) which has led to their exclusion or removal from any vettable post. This instruction should be interpreted to include those persons who, although their clearance has been withdrawn, are nevertheless kept on in the public service in a post not requiring access to information classified CONFIDENTIAL or above and then subsequently leave the service before they reach the age of 65 years. The particulars required by the Security Service are those set out in paragraph 58(b) of Chapter III of the M.P.S.M. and in addition the date on which N.V. clearance was refused or withdrawn and the date of termination of employment. The form of notification should be headed:

/"TERMINATION


CONFIDENTIAL

B1/DHP
22/8/66

"TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT IN (NAME OF DEPT.)
OF PERSON PREVIOUSLY REFUSED NORMAL VETTING
CLEARANCE ON CHARACTER DEFECT GROUNDS".

4. The Security Service will record only the particulars supplied by the Department and will make no further investigation. Any Agency subsequently submitting a vetting enquiry about an individual so recorded will be advised to consult the Department supplying the information. If the enquiry comes from a List X firm, the contracting Department will be so informed. Departments should not, therefore, without prior consultation with the Security Service, destroy the relevant records relating to anyone who had been the subject of a report in accordance with the terms of this instruction.
5. The necessary amendment to the M.P.S.M. will follow in due course.
6. Any enquiries should be addressed to Mr. D. K. Barrows (Treasury, extension 1071).

Yours sincerely,



(A. DUKE)

3596

EXTRACT

Extract for File No. : Pol. F. 316-8-1 Name: S.S. Staff - Application of P.V.
 Original in File No. : Pol. F. 53-12-117 Vol.: 2 Serial: - Receipt Date: -
 Original from : Minute to C. Under Ref.: - Dated: 9.8.66
 Extracted on : 25.1.68 by: J.S. Section: B.1/P

Extract from Minute 144 in Pol. F. 53-12-117 to C. from B.1. referring to Serial 364b in Pol. F. 316-8-1-Vol. 4 (letter from D.E.O.)

Minute 144

C. (Minute seen and signed off by C on 15.8.66.)

Reference Minute 143. It is difficult for me to offer any comment of general value because in such matters we are, in my opinion, so exceptionally favourably placed. First, we are comparatively speaking a very small and well knit service. Secondly, though unobtrusive (I hope) our internal welfare services are very extensive. And thirdly, having had one and the same medical adviser for some sixteen years he is unusually well informed of our problems.

2. I think the line taken in 140a is quite correct and that the draft D.E.O. letter at Appendix A is unexceptionable. I should however want to take further thought and possibly seek the advice of higher authority before issuing the Annex as a notice in our own Service; I believe the same effect can be achieved in so small a service as ours other than by sending out a circular.

(signed) C.J.H. Foulkes

B.1
9.8.66.

* If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner

AS B1/PV
25.1.68

P.a. in Statistics Pol F

D.D.R.

B.1

For int: as relevant to
your current thinking on P.V. clearance.

5/8/66

You asked me to give you the figures of cases which went to D.G., D.D.G. or B. for first clearance or reaffirmation during the first six months of this year. The total figures cleared and reviewed during this period are as follows:-

Candidate and Joiners:	164
Annual Review:	455
A.4:	<u>45</u>
<u>Total:</u>	<u>664</u>

2. It can be taken as certain that all the candidate and joiner cases and the A.4 cases went to Director level or above for clearance. The review cases for the rest of this Service are a little more complicated because if the P.V. of a member of staff over 21 years of age was complete when seen by me including independent testimony, I would merely note the file to that effect and would not submit it to higher authority in the absence of special circumstances. We have no accurate figures of the number of cases where this was done, but it can be reckoned with a high degree of probability that the number of such cases would be a third or a little less of the total. Out of the 455 cases reviewed therefore, it is probable that up to 150 but not more did not reach B., leaving a balance of 300 or slightly more which did. If we take 310 cases as the number of reviews which went to Director level or above, the total number of cases reaching that level during the first half of this year would be 519.

44+ cases
to working day
5 days a week

3. The cases of candidates who obtain both provisional and full clearance have to go to Director level twice. Our records for this only run from 1st April. In the three months April to June there were 31 cases so up to 10 a month would appear to be a good average. Since the end of June provisional clearances have greatly increased because B. agreed to give provisional clearance to "Autumn Candidates" so that we could offer them employment. It was understood that full clearance should be obtained before these Autumn Candidates joined. The result was that the provisional clearance figures for July was 24. A very few cases were put up to B. for provisional clearance and refused.

R.E.C. Broadbent

R.E.C. Broadbent.

B.1
5.8.66.

356b

EXTRACT

Extract for File No. Pol. F. 316-8-1 Name: S.S. Staff- Application of P.V.
 Original in File No.: Pol. F. 53-12-117 Vol.: 2 Serial: - Receipt Date: -
 Original from: Minute to C Under Ref.: - Dated: 4.8.66.
 Extracted on: 25.1.68. by: JS Section: B.1/P

Extract from Minute to C from C.1 on Pol. F. 53-12-117 referring to
 Serial 364b in Pol. F. 316-8-1 Volume 4, (a letter from the D.E.O.)

.....
 Minute 142

C. (Minute signed off by C on 9.8.66)

The Official Committee Paper at 140a arises out of a recent discussion in the P.S.C. (137a, 139z refer). Although the P.S.C. paper at 137a largely followed our draft, the initiative on this subject was taken by the Treasury in which the case referred to in para 2 of 140a occurred; I understand that it had no direct security implications.

2. Our position which was endorsed by you in reply to Minute 135, is that we can produce no evidence that the country's secrets have been compromised because officials have failed to tell their Departments of their intention to visit psychiatrists; we do not therefore consider that regulations requiring Civil Servants to consult their Departments before visiting psychiatrists can at present be justified on security grounds.

3. The course of action now proposed in 140a does not conflict with this position and is in line with the recent P.S.C. discussion. In view of paragraph 7 of 140a I do not think that we need offer any comments on either this Official Committee Paper or the draft D.E.O. attached to it; and in the circumstances you may not consider it necessary to consult the D.G.

(signed) J.A. Cradock

C.1
 4th August 1966.

*If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner

.....
 JS 81/PV
 25-1-68

CONFIDENTIAL

356a.

Reference...Loose minute.....

B.I. 5/19/66

I asked for this note in order to consider whether authority to give P.V. clearance could be delegated lower down the Security Service than is the case at present. This seems very doubtful, but I should be grateful if you would join the appropriate file which you hold.

William

D.D.G.

4.8.66.

CONFIDENTIAL

5/19/66

B/125
5.8.66

3/8
D.D.G. through C.

You have asked for information about the delegation of authority to give P.V. clearances.

2. The general position is stated in paragraph 34 of Chapter III of the M.P.S.M. as follows:

"No general rule can be laid down for the level at which decisions should be taken in Positive Vetting cases because of the wide variation in circumstances between Departments. But the delegated authority to decide Positive Vetting cases on behalf of the Minister should be clearly laid down in each Department."

3. The Standing Security Committee looked at the position in its review of the BOSSARD and Allen cases and paragraph 92 of its report reads:

"It is evident to us that there is, or has been in the past, some variation as between Departments in the practice of certifying positive vetting clearance. In some Departments a formal certificate has been given by the Head of Department; in others, the decision has been conveyed merely by initials on a minute sheet in the file. It is important - as was recognised by Sir Laurence Helsby's letter to Heads of Departments in May 1963 - that the decision to give a man positive vetting clearance should always be formally certified. Furthermore, we think it desirable that, when the Head of Department delegates responsibility for giving positive vetting clearance, he should do so in writing to a named officer or officers."

This recommendation, which has already gone out as a D.E.O. letter, will shortly be incorporated in the M.P.S.M.

4. We have no precise information on the level at which decisions on P.V. clearance are taken in Departments. But there is no doubt that Permanent Secretaries realise that the responsibility is theirs; Annex 8 of the M.P.S.M., which lists the "Criteria for Assessing Trustworthiness", makes this clear. Moreover we have sufficient experience of difficult cases to know that these always go up to Permanent Secretaries.

5. In straight forward cases the level of decision seems to depend on:

- (a) the rank of the officer;
- (b) the amount of work involved in handling P.V. cases.

Taking these considerations into account I would expect to find that decisions on P.V. clearance are rarely, if ever, taken below the level of the Establishment Officer who is usually an Under Secretary and that for Administrative and equivalent higher grades of staff, they are always taken by the Permanent Secretaries. In general Permanent Secretaries will probably sign all P.V. certificates unless too much work is involved. These conclusions are borne out by our findings in our recent security inspections of Departments in that:


CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

- 2 -

(a) In the Treasury clearances are given by the Establishment Officer (a Deputy Secretary) except for Administrative and equivalent grades where the Joint Permanent Secretary signs the certificate.

(b) In the Home Office and Ministry of Housing and Local Government the Permanent Secretary signs all P.V. certificates acting on the written advice of his Establishment Officer.


C. A. Cradock

C.1.

2nd August 1966.

CONFIDENTIAL

14.

B.2 through B.1 and B.1/DHP.

I entirely agree with what is said in Minutes 12 and 13. I do not know what is the origin of our present practice but my recollection is that when I first became B. the practice was in fact not to employ girls under the age of eighteen, and that the relaxation in favour of seventeen year olds crept in more or less for the same reasons as are now compelling us to think of sixteen year olds. In point of fact, our practice is only to employ persons whom we consider to be reasonably mature irrespective of age, but clearly the presumption of immaturity is greater in respect of very young persons and the latter must therefore make a very favourable impression on our recruiters before we take them on.

I think that we ought not to advertise an interest in sixteen year olds or we shall be flooded with unsuitable applicants.

B.

J. H. Marriott

11.5.66

(The above Minute has been copied to POL.F.50-24-4(120))

(noted on Al 50-36-3)

[Handwritten signature]
12-5-66

B. J. J. J. J.
11/5/66

342A

Reference POL. F. 50-24-4(120)

Copy of Minute 13 in L.436/5182 to
B. from B.1. dated 10.5.66.


B.

I strongly support the recommendation made in para.6 of Minute 12 that we should not close the door to girls under 17 if our experienced recruiting officers deem them to be suitable, and provided our combined recruiting and P.V. procedures throw up no obstacles. We should acknowledge that after recruitment they be given (though they may not require) extra special supervision.

B.1.
10.5.66

(Signed) C.J.H.Foulkes

(noted on Pol 50-36-3)


12-5-66
B.1. / wmt
11/5/66

341A

B.1.

Reference serial 10a.

2. I asked B.2. to put this test case. Because of our staffing arrangements and the requirements of the Service we have no choice but to put recruits into P.V. posts when they join. This practice is not in line with Treasury advice as set out in the Manual of Personnel Security Measures (an extract is at serial 11a).

3. In practice, we do not employ girls who are under the age of 17. As far as I can discover our reasons for setting the age of 17 as the minimum age have not been set down in writing (serial 249b in POL.F.50-24-4(120)) but are presumably:

- (a) girls usually take their O levels at the age of 16 plus and come into the labour market about their 17th birthday;
- (b) as a rough compromise it can be claimed that girls (unlike boys) are sufficiently mature at about the age of 17 to be entrusted with TOP SECRET information. (It should, of course, be added that this has been well proven in practice.)

4. Some girls take their O levels earlier than most and seek employment when they are only 16 and well below the age of 17. This is such a case and placed to satisfy our modest educational standard for entry as a G.III. More important, she has impressed Miss Partridge, who has much experience in these matters, as being "remarkably mature" for her age.


5. It seems to me that there is no substantial objection to offering a post this year after she has completed her O levels although she will then be only just over 16 years of age. She is clearly as mature as many 17 year olds and we may well lose her if we make her wait until she is 17.

6. I recommend that, as an exceptional measure, B.2. should be authorised to offer an appointment in the autumn subject to the usual recruitment procedures being satisfied. If this is accepted the cases of the other two candidates mentioned by B.2. can be considered on their merits. I would not advocate the lowering of the minimum age from 17 to 16 as a matter of general practice.

B.1.

9.5.66.

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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 July 2022


D.H. Payne

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....Loose Minute....

3330

~~B.1./Mr. Farnie~~ A17

As spoken I enclose for Director B. a copy of a letter about the Security Commission's recommendations which Osmond has sent to all Principal Establishment Officers. The top copy is filed in POL.F.51-30-186 Supp.A.

Copied to POL.F. 50-24-28(24.)

A. G. Lake

A. G. Lake

C.1.

18th February 1966.

[Handwritten signature]
15366
2/12/66
2/15/66

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies to POL.F.
50-24-28(24).

Distribution: POL.F.51-30-186 Supp.A.
C.1, D.E.O. Folder.
R.1./Mr. Payne. ✓



FOR INFORMATION

Treasury Chambers,
Great George Street,
London, S.W.1

333b

Whitehall 1234, ext. 598

CONFIDENTIAL

9th February, 1966

10 FEB 1966

I attach a copy of a reply which the Prime Minister has given to a Parliamentary Question about the Report of the Security Commission.

Some of the suggestions made by the Commission about improving our security procedures have already been dealt with; and on others detailed instructions are being issued in the 'Dear Establishment Officer' or 'Dear Security Officer' series as appropriate.

There is, however, one general point I have been asked to make. In considering the Report of the Security Commission, Ministers have had very much in mind the possible effect on the attitude of members of the Public Service towards security which might result from too wholesale an increase in the scope and complexity of security regulations. Good security must be founded on the willing and intelligent co-operation of each member of the staff. It follows that each security measure must be a well-conceived response to a genuine security requirement and must be seen to be such. Ministers have therefore sought to avoid imposing additional and more burdensome measures which do not clearly contribute in an effective way to the main objective - the safe-guarding of the nation's secrets - and which might involve a real risk that the present co-operative attitude of the staff built up over the years by security education and training might be transformed into one of resentment and cynicism.

Because of the proposals of the Security Commission, and because departments will be reviewing the application of certain existing procedures which have not always been strictly followed in the past, the impression may be given of a general tightening up of security procedures. We think it is important, therefore, that staff should know of the considerations outlined in the preceding paragraph, and should be grateful if you would bring them to the notice of all your staff who have to handle classified information so that they may be aware of the general background against which the introduction of new security measures is considered.

We have had fruitful discussions with the National Staff Side; and, whilst recognising that when security instructions are issued they are mandatory and not subject to negotiation, it would undoubtedly be helpful if you can keep your departmental Staff Side in the picture.

E. P. OSMOND

Copied
to HST/S

EXTRACT FROM HANSARD (VOLUME 723, No. 33, Column 23)

dated 25th January, 1966

SECURITY COMMISSION (REPORT)

Mr.E.L.Mallalieu asked the Prime Minister if he will now make a statement on the Report of the Security Commission of June, 1965.

The Prime Minister: The Government have carefully considered the various recommendations and suggestions made by the Security Commission about future procedure, as summarised in paragraph 125 of its Report. They have taken note of public comments on these recommendations, and have consulted the staff associations concerned. As a result, the Government have accepted in whole or in part all the specific recommendations for action made by the Commission. The House will not expect me to go into the details of the various procedures involving questions of security practice.

Apart from its specific recommendations the Commission suggested also that further thought should be given to the desirability of making staff with access to highly classified information liable to spot searches on leaving the buildings in which they work. As the Commission recognised, any such arrangement would give rise to practical difficulties. Ways and means could no doubt be found of surmounting these if it were clear that spot searches of the kind suggested would constitute a really effective counter-espionage measure. But the Government are not satisfied that this is so; and have decided not to pursue further this particular suggestion. They believe that the steps which have now been taken for the safeguarding of highly classified documents are the best way of meeting the problem to which the report of the Commission draws attention.

LW

B1/DHP.

CONFIDENTIAL

BF on Pol F 50-24-4 (120)



Treasury Chambers
Great George Street, London S.W.1
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 473

333A

Our reference: DEO(Security) 3/66
Your reference:

14 February, 1966

18 FEB 1966

Dear Establishment Officer,

333b

Osmond wrote to Principal Establishment Officers on 9th February 1966 explaining the background against which the suggestions of the Security Commission had been examined and saying that instructions would follow in the form of a D.E.O. or D.S.O. letter as appropriate.

2. This letter therefore sets out the changes in personnel security procedures which Ministers have decided should be introduced and also draws attention to certain matters which are of importance to security. The Manual of Personnel Security Measures will be suitably amended in due course.

Staffing of Departmental Security Branches

3. The Commission discussed in paragraph 74 of their Report the importance of good departmental security staff. They were conscious of the inevitable conflict between, on the one hand, the need for more professionalism and continuity in security branches and, on the other, the need for the Security Branch to achieve proper status and offer prospects for men of the highest calibre, but they suggested that this was a matter which deserved further attention. We do not consider it appropriate to issue specific instructions because circumstances vary so much between departments, but departments are asked to bear in mind the Commission's views when considering the appointment of staff to Security Branches. It is essential to provide some continuity and if for career reasons this cannot be provided at the level of the Head of the Security Branch, it must be provided at lower level.

Instruction in Security Responsibilities

4. Departments are reminded of the importance of ensuring that staff appointed to or occupying posts involving security responsibilities are made fully aware of these responsibilities. We have not so much in mind the staff of security branches as staff such as the heads of operational branches to whom the need for instruction particularly applies. It is not a matter requiring rigid procedures, but departments may find the following suggested measures for the instruction of staff helpful: a talk on joining by the unit or branch security officer or the branch security liaison officer; the wide distribution of departmental security instructions; periodic or annual reminders to staff: more detailed security education; and (in departments with relatively little classified material) specific instruction by the departmental security officer or one of his staff on posting to a job which handles classified material.

/Availability

The Establishment Officer,

h
15-366
B1/DHP
21/2/66

Availability of Information for Security Assessments

5. Departments are reminded that the current instructions on normal and positive vetting are designed to ensure that the annual reports on the individual, and anything on record in any of the papers about him, should automatically be scrutinised in the course of a security assessment. Departments should also ensure that effective arrangements are made whereby all the security information on an individual is kept together in a readily accessible form. Departments may however use their discretion as to how this is achieved: for instance, a card index may be convenient in some cases; the security papers can be put together in a special folder or envelope within the personal file; or a security index sheet can be kept at the front of the file. In some departments a complete separate security file for each individual may be practicable.

Positive Vetting Enquiries

6. Departments responsible for teams of Investigating Officers should ensure that these officers are reminded of the need to quote the sources of information given in their reports, and where necessary the standard form used in making these reports should be amended to make this clear.

7. It would be quite impracticable to check the basic facts of an individual's career, perhaps going back to his schooldays, in all P.V. cases. Nevertheless, such basic information cannot always be taken on trust. Departments should not, therefore, hesitate to check any facts of a man's career, such as the school he claimed to have attended, if they feel that the information might be relevant to security. In order to avoid increasing the time taken over field enquiries, it will be for the department, and not the Investigating Officer, to make these enquiries and to decide how far to take them in the circumstances of each case. A single false answer to any of the questions of the security questionnaire would, for instance, constitute a strong case for making a thorough check.

P.V. Referees

8. Under the P.V. procedure, the subject is required to provide the names of two referees. Consideration has been given to whether the subject's superior in the public service can be accepted as one of those referees. The superior officer would in any case be interviewed as part of the P.V. procedure, so that there would be no question of losing the benefit of his knowledge if the subject nominated another referee, and there is considerable advantage in having two referees in addition to the superior. It has been concluded, therefore, that as a general rule a man's superior in the public service should not normally be acceptable as a referee.

Quinquennial P.V. Reviews

9. The quinquennial review procedure at present applies only to a person occupying a P.V. post at the time when the review falls due. We see no case for altering the general rule, but departments who find it practicable should arrange that an officer's P.V. file is brought forward for perusal every five years whether or not he still

/occupies

occupies a P.V. post. If he is not in such a post, the department would not be bound to carry out any of the further stages of the review procedure if this would cause delay in dealing with current cases.

Aftercare of staff returning from overseas

10. The Commission drew attention in paragraph 103 of their Report to the particular difficulties which may be faced by staff returning from an overseas posting and suffering a drop in income. They suggested that further thought should be given to the aftercare of officers returning from overseas, particularly those returning from Communist countries and countries (such as West Germany) where they are exposed to special hazards. Arrangements already exist for a considerable degree of aftercare for both civilian staff and servicemen returning from overseas, but the form of this varies according to the different circumstances of departments and services. We do not think that any new positive general guidance on this subject can usefully be given, but departments should bear in mind that this problem is important.

Recording of Positive Vetting Clearances and the delegation of authority to make Positive Vetting decisions

11. In paragraph 92 of their Report, the Security Commission referred to variation between departments in the practice of certifying positive vetting clearance. Existing instructions already provide that the decision to give or withhold clearance on a positive vetting case should be recorded with some formality; and that any delegation of authority to decide these cases should be clearly laid down in each department. Delegation of authority in this way should be made in writing and departments should introduce arrangements, if they do not have them already, under which clearances are recorded by means of a formal certificate.

12. Any enquiries should be addressed to Mr. A. Duke (extension 609).

Yours sincerely,

T. H. Caulcott

(T. H. Caulcott)

EXTRACT

326AB

Extract for File No.: POL.F.50-24-4(120) Name :

Original in File No. : * [redacted] Vol. : 1 Serial Min.92 Receipt Date : 26.1.66.

Original from : B. Under Ref. : - Dated : 26.1.66.

Extracted on : 3.2.66. by : RJP Section : B.1.

Extract of paragraph 1 of Minute from B. to B.1./DHP

In this A.4. case you will see that one of the first choice referees was a Metropolitan policeman and (79a) therefore precluded by the regulations from giving a reference. Is there anything we can do to get round this ? It is after all only a regulation which the Commissioner can - and in P.V. should - waive. It is very difficult for many of us to produce referees and it is vexatious not to be able to use what may be the best of all. Could you have a word with Evan Jones about this.

.....

*If the original is in the file of an individual include the name of the file owner.

31/2/66
3/2/66

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B. / D.H.P. 21/12
PA Pol F 50-24-4(120)

CONFIDENTIAL

Treasury Chambers
Great George Street, London S.W.1
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 473

323A

Our reference: 2-EM.700/197/04
Your reference:

20th December, 1965

21 DEC 1965

Dear Establishment Officer,

Our D.E.O. letter of 29th June, 1964, sent to departments a list of organisations of security interest. The list is being revised, and a revised version will be sent to departments as soon as possible. But there has been some misunderstanding of the purpose and meaning of the list and we are therefore sending round this further letter about it now.

The purpose of the list is to assist in the Positive Vetting procedure. As part of that procedure departments will want to check whether an officer has ever been associated with any of these organisations. But the inclusion of an organisation in the list does not mean that there is necessarily any doubt about that organisation at the present time in a security context. There is no suggestion therefore, that departments have to be on their guard in any dealings they may have with such organisations in the course of their day to day business, although obviously there are variations between one organisation and another. If, however, a department wishes to deal with an organisation in circumstances which give rise to security considerations, it should consult the Security Service whether or not the organisation is on the List.

Any enquiries on this letter should be addressed to Mr. D. K. Barrows (extension 1071).

Yours sincerely,

T. H. Caulcott

(T. H. Caulcott)

The Establishment Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

32124P
6/11/66

REVIEWS OF POSITIVE VETTING CASES

ANNUAL RETURN OF CASES COMPLETED IN RESPECT OF STAFF CURRENTLY IN P.V. POSTS

Department: _____

YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1965

QUINQUENNIAL REVIEWS

Number of cases outstanding at 31/12/64	338	(none)	370
Number of reductions (i.e. resignations retirements etc.)	<u>35</u>	(193)	<u>211</u>
	303		581
Number of new cases arising during 1965	<u>100</u>	(269)	<u>235</u>
	403	- 76	<u>816</u>

STAFF UNDER 21

Number in current P.V. posts 111 +
75

NUMBER OF CASES CLEARED DURING THE YEAR

		<u>QUINQUENNIAL</u>	<u>STAFF UNDER 21</u>
By review	240	710 530	60 111
By re-investigation	6	none	5
Clearance denied as a result of review or re-investigation	<u>2</u>	248 530	<u>1</u> 66 111

NUMBER OUTSTANDING AT
31/12/1965

In course of review or re-investigation	45	169	699	7	7	111	
<u>Not yet started</u>	<u>110</u>	-	<u>155</u>	<u>403</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>75</u>

323A

Pol. F. 50-24-14 (120)

CONFIDENTIAL

3058



RT/DH 11/10
to see
CJHF - for information
JWID/65

Treasury Chambers
Great George Street, London S.W.1
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 473

Our reference: 2-EM 700/73/010
Your reference:

7th October, 1965

8 OCT 1965

Dear Establishment Officer,

Vetting of Recruits to the Civil Service

A recent case has shown the difficulties which can arise where a Department decides that a recruit cannot be granted clearance under the normal vetting procedure, but the evidence for such a decision does not come to light until after the recruit has been offered a post. Departments are reminded of the importance of following the procedure in Chapter II, paragraphs 29 and 30, of the Manual of Personnel Security Measures. In particular, Departments are reminded of the importance of early vetting where there would be difficulty in placing a candidate in the event of an adverse report. For grades where all posts are subject to vetting, it is important that an offer of employment should not be made before vetting has been completed. Departments are also reminded that they should not say that an applicant is being rejected for security reasons. In cases of difficulty, departments should consult the Treasury and the Security Service at as early a stage as possible.

Another recent case has pointed to the importance of ensuring that adequate character enquiries, including the taking up of proper references (Estacode B a 140) are made when recruiting temporary staff where there is a prospect of eventual establishment and where establishment may involve assignment to a post for which vetting is necessary. Departments are asked to bear this in mind.

Any enquiries should be addressed to Mr. D. K. Barrows (extension 1071).

Yours sincerely,

T. H. Caulcott

(T. H. Caulcott)

CONFIDENTIAL

Handwritten initials and date: JAS 18/10/65

Bi. / 10/65
~~RDF~~
KR 304/5

POL.F.50-24-4(120)

COPY TO POL.F. 316/1/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

Now that the Director General has authorised the granting of provisional P.V. clearance in cases where speed is essential, we shall have to ensure, by obtaining P.V. written references, that Stage III of P.V. has been completed before a provisional clearance is sought. This will require some changes in the existing arrangements for recruitment. Attached is a note setting out a new procedure for the recruitment of girls to G.III posts. A similar procedure is to be followed for the recruitment of all other staff for P.V. posts, except that:

- (i) it is most unlikely that it will be possible to recommend provisional P.V. clearance in the case of recruits of alien origin (e.g. linguists);
- (ii) Officer candidates will not be given a P.P. form until after the first interview, as is the arrangement at present. They will continue to complete the E.93 at the end of the second interview, but P.V. written references must be obtained and Stage III completed before they appear before the Appointments Board.

2. It should be noted that the essential feature of the new procedure is that no offer of appointment, no matter how tentative, may be made to any candidate before P.V. clearance or provisional P.V. clearance has been given.

3. The new arrangements will be introduced with effect from 11th October, 1965, but cases which are already in the process of P.V. investigation on that day may be completed in accordance with the existing practice.

4. A separate but related matter is the conduct of P.V. Review. With effect from 11th October, Stage III must be completed by obtaining written character references before Stage IV (Field Enquiries) begins. For administrative convenience, review cases in which field investigations have already started may be completed in accordance with the existing practice.

5. Revised letters to character referees nominated by recruits and by members of staff on P.V. Review are being printed and will be available on 11th October.

C. J. H. FOULKES

C. J. H. Foulkes

7/10/65

To:

All Officers and A.O.s
B.1 and B.2, and B.1/RDF

Bi/KR
8.12.65

Procedure for the Recruitment of girls to G.III posts

1. The girl writes enquiring about a job.
She will sometimes enclose a completed Personal Particulars (PP) form. If not, she should be sent a copy of the P.P. form and be asked to complete it, provided, of course, that she is "No Trace" in R.2. and is apparently suitable for employment.
2. On receipt of the P.P. form, the B.2 officer checks that the girl is not disqualified by the nationality rule, and that she does not belong to a questionable organisation, such as the Exclusive Brethren. If she passes this preliminary test, the girl, her parents, her husband or fiance and her brothers and sisters over the age of fourteen (the minimum age of entry to the Y.C.L.) should then be looked-up in R.2. Further look-ups should be done in R.2. in respect of other relatives as is judged to be necessary.
3. If none of the look-ups produces a significant adverse trace, the girl should be invited to a first interview. If the B.2 interviewing officer considers the girl suitable for employment and the girl herself is interested, she should be asked at the end of the interview to complete the E.93. She should then be told that her references are being taken up and that she will hear from us again in due course. A full record should be made of the interview, with particular reference to the girl's personal history and background.
4. The B.2 officer should send the standard requests for written references, after look-up in R.2., to the girl's school, to all her previous employers (including part-time employers) during at least the last ten years, to the referees nominated at paragraph 45 of the PP form, and to the two P.V. referees. (Some girls may nominate as P.V. referees one or two of the four referees named at paragraph 45 of the PP form. Such referees should be asked to complete only the P.V. reference.) Service papers should be obtained where appropriate. The standard enquiry form should be sent to SB/CRO and, if the girl's home is outside the Metropolitan Police Area, the local police should be asked to make discreet enquiries about her family and background. Enquiries should also be sent to [redacted] and to S.L.O.s as is judged to be necessary.
5. When favourable answers to all these enquiries have been received, B.2. will decide whether there is sufficient urgency to justify an application for provisional P.V. clearance. If there is, B.2. should minute the file to Mr. Broadbent, asking him to seek provisional P.V. clearance from B. Otherwise, B.2. will minute the file to Mr. Broadbent asking him to obtain full P.V. clearance.
6. If provisional clearance is required, Mr. Broadbent will minute the file to B. or, in his absence, B.1, demonstrating that Stage III has been completed to the required standard. Otherwise, Mr. Broadbent will decide what field enquiries are necessary and will minute the file to [redacted] with his instructions.
7. When full P.V. clearance or provisional clearance has been given, the girl may be summoned to a second interview. If the B.2 interviewing officer considers her suitable, she may be offered an appointment on the spot. The offer should then be confirmed in writing without delay. A record of the interview should be made.

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8. When a girl who has been given provisional clearance has accepted a written offer of employment, the file should be minuted once again to Mr. Broadbent, who will arrange for Stage IV (field enquiries) to be carried out.

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DIRECTIVE FROM DIRECTOR GENERAL TO B

You should be guided by the instructions given in Annex 24 to the revised Manual of Personnel Security Measures - "Field Enquiries, guidance to Investigating Officers".

2. In deciding how the instructions are to be applied in detail to the Security Service, I take into account first that the process of recruitment is inseparable from that of P.V. and that all staff engaged in recruitment are experienced members of the Security Service who at all times have in the forefront of their minds the security status of any candidate for employment; and secondly that the Security Service has exceptional relations with the Police and access to Police records. Accordingly the instructions will be interpreted as follows:-

- (1) The recruiting procedures currently in force in the Service involve a candidate being seen by Officers of B. Branch at at least two interviews during or prior to which all the requirements and information prescribed by paragraphs 6 and 7 of the instructions are observed or obtained and a record made in the candidate's file. Provided this procedure is followed, you have complied with the instructions.
- (2) The general purpose and extent of investigations is set out in paragraph 1 of the instructions. The requirements of paragraphs 8 and 10 will be met by satisfactory interviews with at least two character referees, whether nominated by the candidate or not, conducted by officers of B. Branch who have been properly briefed about the candidate's background in accordance with paragraph 3, and by obtaining, in addition, from at least one other source independent testimony about the candidate's character. Such testimony may consist of a police report which shows that specific enquiries were made about the candidate's background or, in the case of a girl coming to us direct from school or training college, of a written report by her school-teacher, who has first been briefed about the character and security requirements of our work. In

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all other cases such testimony must be obtained by interviewing an appropriately qualified person or persons. Such a person may well be another member of the staff of the Security Service if he knows the candidate personally. In such a case however the immediate present superior officer of the candidate should not be interviewed.

- (3) In fulfilment of the requirements of paragraph 9 of the instructions you should, in the case of candidates from the Overseas Civil Service, regard the Overseas Services Resettlement Bureau as the former employer, and the Armed Service concerned in the case of Servicemen. It will not be obligatory to interview a member of the Resettlement Board or of the Armed Service concerned in each individual case provided that written references are obtained from appropriately qualified officers who are aware of our security and character requirements, have examined the candidate's personal papers, and state that there is no information on record which might cause his fitness for P.V. clearance to be called in question.

In the case of Army officers and of other ranks in all three Services, you are able to have direct access to personal papers and you will therefore arrange for B. Branch officers to obtain these.

I.T.

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Employment

Reg. Historic.

D.G.

9th August 1965

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