CAB 164/1987

SECRET

CABINET OFFICE

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CLOSED 1991

127/5 PT 14

PRIVATE OFFICE ONLY

FILE TI

IRAQ / KUWAIT CRISIS

FILE BEGINS 29-1-91 ENDS 14-2-91 FILE No. 127/5 Pt 14

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REFERRED TO	DATE	REFERRED TO	DATE	REFERRED TO	DATE
MLSS Boundary	25/3/91				

CLOSED

1991

CAB 164/1987

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OS90 (6/89)D

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43	4/2/91	A1281	50	4/2/91	A1332	57	5/2/91	A1345
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OS90 (6/89)D

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23	31/1/91	A1253	30	1/2/91	A 1548	37	3/2/91	A1278
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						42m	4/2/91	—
						42N	4/2/91	A1365
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OS90 (6/89)D

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FOLIO	DATE	CODE REF.	FOLIO	DATE	CODE REF.	FOLIO	DATE	CODE REF.
1	29/1/91	A1119	8	30/1/91	A091/249	15	30/1/91	A1123
2	29/1/91	A1091	9	30/1/91	A1118	16	30/1/91	A091/248
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4	29/1/91	A1184	11	30/1/91	A1157	18	31/1/91	A1195
						18M	31/1/91	—
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						19M	31/1/91	—
6	29/1/91	—	13	30/1/91	A1156	20	31/1/91	A1192
7	30/1/91	—	14	30/1/91	A1154	21	31/1/91	A1191
7M	30/1/91	A091/249						
7N	30.1.91	A1123						

CABINET OFFICE
A 1709
14 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS

FOL 102

CONFIDENTIAL

SIR ROBIN BUTLER
MR APPLEYARD

cc Mr Reeves
Mr Gowan
Mr Ball
Col Wilson
Mr Mathewson
Mr Gibbons

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS: 13/14 FEBRUARY

Military

1. Again a quiet night on the military front. Tornado GR1As flew recce sorties overnight identifying vehicle scrapes and providing other good imagery, Tornado GR1's have flown their 1000th offensive sortie since hostilities began. A surface combat air patrol (SUCAP) identified and destroyed an Iraqi patrol boat 2 miles east of Bubiyan Island. No SCUD attacks.

Political

2. The UN Security Council have decided to meet in private later today. The motion was passed by nine votes to two with four abstentions. As expected Cuba and the Yemen voted against with China, Ecuador, India and Zimbabwe abstaining.

3. Yevgeny Primakov has returned to Moscow following his meeting with Saddam Hussain yesterday. Reports from Baghdad appear optimistic but the FCO reports indications from Moscow that no substantive progress has been made. Tariq Aziz is due to fly to the Soviet Union on 17 February and meet President Gorbachev on the 18th.

CONFIDENTIAL

Terrorism

4. The Red Army Faction have claimed responsibility for a small arms attack on the US Embassy in Bonn. Over 60 shots are reported fired from the opposite bank of the Rhine but there were no injuries.

Media

5. The media is still dominated by the reports of the bombing of a bunker in Baghdad. The US have reported that the shelter has been an active C2 facility and on their target list for 2 weeks, having recently been re-camouflaged. Iraq claims the shelter contained only women and children of whom some 400 were killed.

J A J BUDD

0600
14 February 1991

CABINET OFFICE
A 1708
14 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTION
FOLIO 101

SECRET - UK EYES A

B.0731

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 14 February: Overnight Action Points

Item 3: Current International Situation

The Security Council agreed, at UK initiative, to convene in closed session. The proposal received the necessary nine votes, including the Soviet Union, with only the hard core of Yemen and Cuba voting against and with four abstentions (China, India, Zimbabwe and Ecuador). The meeting will begin today and the list of speakers suggests that the balance of the debate should be reasonably acceptable. Sir David Hannay will speak early, almost certainly today. The proceedings were accompanied by denunciations of the allied air attack on the Baghdad bunker by Iraq's supporters. Altogether, as good an outcome as could have been expected.

2. Soviet diplomacy continues to focus on high profile peacemaking. Despite some upbeat Soviet briefing it does not look as though Primakov's mission indicated any change in Iraqi attitudes. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister is in Moscow now and will be followed by Tariq Aziz who arrives on Sunday. Deputy Foreign Minister Belonogov told the US Ambassador that his visit to Ankara and Tehran had been designed to dissuade the Iranians and Turks from any territorial ambitions against Iraq and to secure assurances that they opposed any widening of the conflict. All this diffuse activity contrasts with Vorontsov's robust line at the UN.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard
Cabinet Office
14 February 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A

Hidden copies: Mr Appleyard
Miss Phippard
Mr Reeves
Mr Gowen
Mr Ball
Col Wilson

Sir Robin Butler
RAB

SLP 14/2

FOLIO 100

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 071 270 0050

SECRET

T01395

14 February 1991

A H Turney Esq CB
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
London SW1



Dear Alan

EMERGENCY LEGISLATION

I spoke to you this morning about the outcome of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers which considered emergency legislation. You will be seeing the minutes shortly, but the upshot in brief was that Ministers decided not to proceed with the legislation now, but to keep the position under review. Two points made by the Lord Privy Seal were accepted by the meeting. The first was that, since a number of the powers provided for in the draft Regulations were most unlikely to be needed, there would be advantage in reducing the scope of the Bill to relate it more closely to those powers which might be required, thereby making it more palatable to Parliament. The second point was that the difficulties of recalling Parliament would be somewhat greater during the Easter Recess (though rapid recall would still be possible), and it would therefore be timely for a similar meeting of Ministers to review the position two or three weeks before the start of the Recess, the aim being to leave a fortnight for passage of the Bill (if needed) before Parliament rises.

2. Making a working assumption (no more than that at this stage) that Parliament might rise around 27 March, this would require decisions to be taken by 13 March, which argues for a meeting of Ministers round about 7 March, three weeks from today. We therefore need to meet fairly quickly; I suggest next Monday. David Gowan will be in touch to fix a time.

Yours ever
Bill

W D REEVES

SECRET

Copied to:	D J Bentley Esq,	Home Office
	A Burnside Esq,	Scottish Home and Health Department, Edinburgh
	R J Meadway Esq,	DTI
	N Bevan Esq,	MOD
	D J Rowlands Esq,	DTp
	Mrs S Brown,	HM Treasury
	P Atkinson Esq,	DEn
	P J Walsh Esq,	Emergency Planning Unit, DEm
	G F Meekings Esq,	Head of Emergencies and Food Protection Divison, MAFF
	P Nixon Esq,	Emergency Unit, FCO
	J R Perrett Esq,	DOE
	Miss J Wheldon,	LOD
	Dr L J Martin,	DH
	A J Merifield Esq,	DH
	M MacLean Esq,	Government Chief Whip's Office
	A M Russell Esq,	Cabinet Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1740
14 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.
FOLIO 99

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

c - Mr Appleyard

14 February 1991

Dear Simon,

THE GULF

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister at lunch time today about the Gulf conflict.

The President began by enquiring about public reaction in the United Kingdom to the destruction of the bunker in Baghdad yesterday in which a number of civilians had been killed. The Prime Minister said that the press had been very even-handed in their treatment of the incident. Television coverage had initially leaned heavily towards accepting Iraqi propaganda at face value. But, following large numbers of telephone calls from furious listeners, the later bulletins had been more balanced. The Prime Minister continued that the worry was the propaganda which Saddam Hussein would make of the incident. But Ministers here were taking a very robust line, pointing out that the responsibility lay with Saddam Hussein for deliberately exposing his people to danger. We were reiterating that it was not our policy to attack civilians, but only legitimate military targets.

The President said that public opinion in the United States was very similar: it was holding well. He thought that the briefers in Riyadh had done a good job. Statements from elsewhere in the Alliance, including Egypt, had been pretty good. He was confident that the United States was on firm ground in its assessment of the use to which the bunker was being put. He was still worried by the disposition of television to swallow Iraqi propaganda, with reporters failing to show the barbed wire and camouflage and making no effort to enquire about the use to which the lower storey of the bunker was being put. The President added that he was very pleased with the United Kingdom's response. The role of the UK at home and in the field was terribly important to public opinion in the United States.

The Prime Minister said that it would be very important to try to avoid any similar incidents in future, even at the risk of holding back from attacking one or two potential targets. It would be difficult for public opinion to take a similar event in the run-up to the ground campaign. The President said this was a fair point. He understood that no attacks were planned in Baghdad for tonight. The emphasis would be increasingly on Iraqi forces in and around Kuwait. The New York Times were running a

story that the Al Rashid Hotel was being used as a communications centre for the Iraqi military: this was quite helpful because it demonstrated that the United States was exercising restraint in attacking military targets where there was a probability of causing civilian casualties. He would talk again to Secretary Cheney and General Powell. But his understanding was that their approach was to avoid any repetition of an attack of the sort which had taken place yesterday and which had given Saddam Hussein a propaganda advantage.

The President continued that he had received a letter from Gorbachev overnight, talking about the forthcoming visit to Moscow of Tariq Aziz, and urging that the United States should not initiate a ground campaign while he was there. He was a bit worried that the Soviet Union or some other Government might issue a last-minute appeal for a ceasefire or a halt to hostilities to give negotiations another chance. We would have to resist that very firmly. The Prime Minister said he very much agreed that there could be no stepping back now, unless Saddam Hussein actually withdrew from Kuwait.

The Prime Minister thanked the President for receiving the Defence Secretary and CDS. They had found their discussions very worthwhile. The President said that the Defence Secretary had spoken in very helpful terms to representatives from the Oval Office.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

CABINET OFFICE
A 1741
14 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS

14 February 1991

c- Mr Appleyard

Dear Simon,

THE GULF

I spoke to General Scowcroft after OPD(G) this morning to confirm arrangements for the President to talk to the Prime Minister at lunchtime. I took the opportunity to say that I hope the Americans would deploy publicly as much as possible of the evidence they had for military use of the bunker in Baghdad. General Scowcroft said that he was not sure that it was the sort of evidence which could be made public: the Americans observed strict constraints on this. But they were "very comfortable" with the evidence and were going to stand very firmly by it.

I also mentioned that we seemed to be having some difficulty in fixing a date for the next round of talks between officials and were being steered towards the end of the month. If at all possible, we would like to have further discussions before that. General Scowcroft, who seemed only just aware that there were to be further talks, said he knew of no reason for delay. He would look into it and come back to me.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL





10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

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c - Mr Appleyard

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I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

Rt Robin Butler RERB

2 MARSHAM STREET
LONDON SW1P 3EB
071-276 3000

FOLIO 97

My ref

Your ref

c- Mr Appleyard
This is not a silly idea. It seems absurd to argue over ½ million when we are paying (and receiving) many times that each day. Worth considering in the burden-sharing committee?
FERB
15.2.

The Rt Hon David Mellor QC MP
Chief Secretary to the Treasury
Parliament Street
London
SW1P 3AG

cc- Mr Appleyard
Mr Reeves
Prof Stewart

CABINET OFFICE
A 1779
15 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.

14 FEB 1991

ENVIRONMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE GULF

I was encouraged by your helpful response to my intervention in Cabinet this morning about our policy towards providing environmental aid to the Gulf.

The aid that we have so far given was set out in my "Dear Colleagues" letter of 6 February. So far it has consisted mainly of expert advice, and such costs as there have been to the UK have been slight.

The pollution is now entering a new phase where the immediate need is less for expertise and more for urgent supplies of booms and other capital equipment for fighting the slick. Japan, Canada, France, the US and the Netherlands have already made substantial support available to the Gulf states free of charge.

Bahrain has now asked the UK urgently for booms, which it says that it is not well placed to finance for itself. Bahrain is not of course a poor country, but it does face special challenges because it is an island with a correspondingly long coastline to defend, and because of the range and value of its threatened wildlife habitats.

DTp has 3km of booms which it could make available. The costs would be; first, about £½m; and, secondly, a period during which contingent protection for our own coasts was reduced while replacements were procured. However, our present policy dictates that we are able to make the offer only on condition that the full costs of the booms and their transport are recovered from the Bahrainis. And whether or not the Treasury make this a special case, there would as things stand be no obvious source for the PES cover, and we should in effect have to pass the hat round Whitehall.

recycled paper

I believe that this situation is unacceptable for a number of reasons.

First, it precludes fast decisions and action on requests from the Gulf states. It was the speed and promptness of our responses to requests for experts that put us in an international lead in the early days of the response to the crisis.

Secondly, it risks giving us the worst possible public profile in relation to environmental considerations in the Gulf. Our present policy, which must become widely known as time goes on, would be seen with some justice by both home and international opinion as miserly and lacking in due concern. There will be no convincing public response to those who contrast our preparedness to find billions for military action while refusing comparatively minute sums for combatting environmental damage of international significance.

Thirdly, and more immediately, our policy gives us a poor profile, especially in relation to the Gulf states, which threatens damage to future political relations. A policy of requiring the pound of flesh will, again with justification, appear callous behaviour on the part of an ally, particularly when the Gulf states and others are already committed to contributing a far larger sum to our war costs.

Fourthly, our current policy is not in the UK's long-term commercial interests in the region. The countries which have provided equipment free will no doubt expect to get a degree of long-term commercial preference in return.

I therefore propose that we set aside from the resources earmarked for the war a relatively minor sum - perhaps £5 million initially up to the end of next financial year - for responding to requests from the Gulf states for short and medium-term aid with the oil pollution and its environmental consequences; and that the Bahraini booms should be agreed as the first call on it. We would then consider - on merits, but sympathetically - further requests from the Gulf states for

- oil pollution control equipment;

- further expert advice both on oil pollution control and on assessing and countering immediate impact on wildlife; and

- scientific and other help in assessing the longer-term impact on the ecology of the Gulf and in developing strategies for dealing with it.

Clear criteria would of course need to be agreed between officials, and I emphasise that I am not proposing that we should forgo reimbursement where it would be practical and politic. But establishing a modest fund of this kind would give us the same ability to respond flexibly and positively to developing needs as the Know-How Fund has given us in relation to Eastern Europe.

recycled paper

I should be grateful for a very early response to these proposals. We need to act quickly as the Bahraini request is urgent and we need if at all possible to respond to it very early next week.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and to Norman Lamont, Douglas Hurd, John Wakeham, Chris Patten, Malcolm Rifkind, Peter Lilley, Tom King and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever

MICHAEL HESELTINE

recycled paper

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1691
13 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

FOLIO 96

R

c- Mr Appleyard.

PRIME MINISTER

We are to deal tomorrow with the question of the supply of "humanitarian" food to Iraq. It may be worth at this stage setting out the following thoughts.

Article 23 of the fourth Geneva Convention imposes an obligation upon the parties to permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases. The full text is attached.

Under Security Council Resolution 666, if the Sanctions Committee should, after receiving reports from the Secretary General, determine that circumstances have arisen in which there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering, it should report promptly to the Security Council its decision as to how such need should be met. In formulating its decision, the Committee is directed to bear in mind that foodstuffs should be provided through the United Nations in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their supervision in order to ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries.

We should avoid suggesting to the Committee that the fulfilment of obligations under Article 23 should be made conditional upon Iraq's compliance with its own Convention obligations regarding prisoners of war or any other category. Whereas Saddam Hussein

has already linked providing access to prisoners of war with the cessation of the bombing of civilians, our own position - and the coalition's - is that we fulfil our obligations under humanitarian law in any event.

Moreover, we can exert the leverage we need without resorting to linkage or reciprocity. Whether there is any obligation under Article 23 in this regard depends upon the country concerned being satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing:

(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination;

(b) that the control may not be effective; or

(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy through substitution.

Since the ICRC has lacked the clout in Iraq over a period of three weeks to secure access to POWs, we may well have serious reason to fear that the ICRC will be brushed aside in its efforts to get the food to its destination and to control its distribution there, including seeing that none gets to the military.

I am copying this minute to the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Energy Secretary, the Chief of Defence Staff and Sir Robin Butler.

P M.

13 February 1991

ARTICLE 23 OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION

ARTICLE 23

Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.

The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the free passage of the consignments indicated in the preceding paragraph is subject to the condition that this Party is satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing:

(*a*) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination,

(*b*) that the control may not be effective, or

(*c*) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or through the release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be required for the production of such goods.

The Power which allows the passage of the consignments indicated in the first paragraph of this Article may make such permission conditional on the distribution to the persons benefited thereby being made under the local supervision of the Protecting Powers.

Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible, and the Power which permits their free passage shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements under which such passage is allowed.

FOLIO 95

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1660
13 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

SIR ROBIN BUTLER
MR APPLEYARD

cc Mr Reeves
Mr Ball
Mr Gowan
Col Wilson
Mr Mathewson

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS : 12/13 FEBRUARY

Military

1. A very quiet night. Only 2 Tornado sorties overnight: the first by a GR1A from Dhahran providing good imagery; and the second an attack on an Iraqi FPB.

2. A large scale probing operation (involving combined land sea and air forces) was carried out yesterday on the Kuwaiti/Saudi border to test Iraqi reactions. Coalition forces did not venture across the border and drew no fire. UK elements were not involved.

Political

3. The media are making over much of the Iraqi statement, broadcast over Baghdad radio yesterday evening, that Iraq is willing to join the Soviet Union to seek a peaceful solution to the region's problems. The FCO have advised that there has in fact been no shift in the respective positions.

4. The Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Belgrade yesterday broke up without substantive agreement, though ministerial visits to both Baghdad and Coalition Capitals were approved.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. As yet no decision has been reached on whether the meeting later today of the United Nations Security Council will be closed or open.

N F J GIBBONS

0600
13 February 1991

FOLIO 94

Ref. A091/352

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 14 February

Item 1: Release of POWs in the context of a ceasefire

You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce the paper which is relevant to the ceasefire terms which we have been discussing in the UK/US talks.

2. You might then invite the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff for their views on the staged approach recommended in the paper to be negotiated through a third party: preferably the ICRC but possibly the UN or an acceptable neutral country. This involves the ICRC being notified of the names of POWs, being given access and the POWs being concentrated at specific locations before a ceasefire comes into operation; with the POWs being handed over between 24 hours and 4 days from the ceasefire. Parallel action would be taken with Iraqi POWs on the basis that the ICRC would look after those who did not want to return. The advantage would be that the Iraqis would have to take verifiable steps before a ceasefire came into operation. If the Iraqis did not comply with an agreement on that basis there would be two possible sanctions: hostilities could be resumed (although it is questionable how realistic this would be) and/or the repatriation of Iraqi POWs could be suspended (although this might not be much of a lever).

3. You might ask the Attorney General for his comments on the legal aspects and the Foreign Secretary for his assessment of

whether the ICRC would be prepared to act as intermediary, and if not, whom he had in mind. I understand that he has in mind Algeria or the Soviet Union, as the most effective mediators still with a presence in Baghdad.

4. You might conclude the discussion by approving the paper, subject to points made in discussion, and asking the FCO to pass the paper to the US Government as part of the follow-up to the UK/US talks.

Item 2: Current Military Situation

5. You will want to invite the Defence Secretary to report on his visit to Washington. The Defence Secretary will want to cover US thinking on the timing of the land campaign, where I understand that the indications were similar to those which President Bush gave you in his telephone call on Monday evening. The Defence Secretary may put some of this into writing beforehand. He will want to mention burdensharing which he discussed in Washington and possibly a number of more detailed military points.

6. You might then invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to report on allied and Iraqi operations and any further work which has been done on damage assessment, which the CDS discussed in Washington, and his conclusions from the operational briefing which he was given at the Pentagon.

7. You might conclude the discussion by agreeing on the line to take on the timing of the land campaign at Cabinet afterwards and at Prime Minister's Questions.

Item 3: Current International Situation

8. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to report on developments. The Security Council is meeting this evening. It is still not clear whether this will be in open or private

session: we can update on this tomorrow morning. You may wish to mention your telephone call to the UN Secretary General which included discussion of this issue. Further inconclusive diplomatic activity has continued at the non-aligned meeting in Belgrade and through Primakov's mission to Baghdad and Deputy Foreign Minister Belonogov's visit to Tehran and Ankara.

9. At OPD(G) on Tuesday the Foreign Secretary was asked to come back on humanitarian food supplies to Iraq when the US attitude had been clarified. The US Government apparently considers that the ICRC should first conduct a needs assessment covering Kuwait as well as Iraq. If the Iraqis refused to allow the ICRC to visit Kuwait the US Government might oppose the shipment, though there is some reluctance to take action which might cut across the signs of a more open policy on the part of the Iranians. The US seems content to allow the Sanctions Committee to discuss this issue on that basis. The Attorney General has sent you a minute on the legal aspects.

Item 4: Media handling

10. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report first. You might ask whether there are any current issues which could come up at Prime Minister's Questions in the afternoon which might not be covered by the normal briefing.

11. You might then ask Mr O'Donnell to cover day-to-day press questions. A story which may be continuing to run is the reported civilian casualties through a raid on a Baghdad bunker last night: the MOD put out a robust line on this today - copy attached. The Foreign Secretary also dealt with this firmly in the House today.

R.L.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

13 February 1991

REPORTS THAT ALLIED FORCES HAVE HIT A CIVILIAN SHELTER IN BAGHDAD

ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE **13 Feb 1991**

- We are aware of reports from Iraq that a civilian shelter in Baghdad has been hit by allied forces, causing many casualties.

- Present information from US military in Riyadh is that it was a military command and control facility in contact with Iraqi forces in the Kuwait area. A US military spokesman has said it had been on the allied target list for some time, but had become more active over the past couple of weeks. He said it was a legitimate military target hit with precision-guided munitions.

- The US spokesman added that, although it had been an airraid shelter in 1985, it was subsequently upgraded to a hardened structure and its roof had recently been camouflaged. Military personnel had been continuously in and around the bunker and there was nothing to indicate that any civilians were associated with the facility.

- We have always made clear that allies are only attacking military or strategic targets. Any civilian casualties are very much regretted and great care is taken to minimise the risk of causing civilian casualties.

CONFIDENTIAL

Li Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
A 1665
13 FEB 1991
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FILE No.
FOLIO 93

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

c - Mr. Appleyard

13 February 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF: TALKS WITH PRINCE BANDAR

Prince Bandar telephoned me at the princely hour of 0045 last night from Washington to report on reactions in Saudi Arabia to recent high-level contacts. The King had been very pleased indeed with the Prime Minister's telephone call: and had exerted himself to make a success of the meeting with the Foreign Secretary, whom he also held in high esteem. Any problems and misunderstandings over the Foreign Secretary's Blaby speech had been laid to rest. We could be confident that substantial financial help would be forthcoming from the Kingdom although it might take a little while to settle the details. There was enormous admiration and gratitude in Saudi Arabia for Britain's contribution to the war effort. Prince Bandar added that the visit of Secretary Cheney and General Powell had also been a success.

Prince Bandar said that he thought that a further message from the Prime Minister to the King in the fairly near future would be useful. It might deal in particular with the second phase of Al Yamamah, and look beyond that to subsequent phases, which would underline the continuity of our co-operation with Saudi Arabia. He would like to call on the Prime Minister when he next passed through London, and might receive such a message from him then to take on to the King.

I said that I was sure the Prime Minister would be happy to see him: I did not envisage any problem over a message. We must ensure that the flow of funds under Al Yamamah was synchronised with the progress of the various projects.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Jeremy Heywood (Chief Secretary's Office), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1729
14 FEB 1991
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SECRET

cc Flook
To Sir Robin Butler
Mr Appleyard

British Embassy
Washington

3100 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington D.C. 20008-3600

Telephone: (202) 898-4292
Facsimile: (202) 898-4255

From The Ambassador

13 February 1991

By Fax

Sir Patrick Wright GCMG
PUS
FCO

Dear Patrick,

THE DEFENCE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT: 12 FEBRUARY

1. Since only David Craig and I accompanied the Defence Secretary on his call on the President, you might like an account of what was said. Present on the American side were the President, the Vice President, Cheney, Scowcroft, Sununu, Gates and Gompert.

2. The President began by asking the Defence Secretary to pass a very warm message to the Prime Minister, with whom he had talked recently. He was delighted with the cooperation with Britain and thought that the United Kingdom military briefings (he referred to Air Chief Marshal Craig as one of the stars) were very helpful to the US side. They showed that the United States was not alone. The President said that he felt very good about the relationship. Britain was doing a disproportionate amount and deserved very warm thanks. The command and control arrangements were going very well, as they were with the Saudis. Mr King added "and hopefully with the French too". The President said that he had no gripes of any kind as far as the British were concerned. He was, however, worried about the propaganda campaign. The British ITN correspondent (comment: Brent Sadler, I think) was better than Arnett; and the journalists who had come out through Jordan had been helpful in making clear that the Iraqis censored everything shown from Baghdad. It was very important not to lose the propaganda battle. Mr King said that journalists were short of material. As to what they wrote, he thought that "censored" was the wrong word. It was not foreign correspondents' material which was censored, but what was seen was Iraqi material which was fed to them and which they had to send. This should be made clearer. The President seemed interested in this comment.

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3. The President said that he had told the Prime Minister that he had made a number of telephone calls recently to Perez de Cuellar (who was upset about reports of his representations to Iraq), to the President of Venezuela (who liked to be kept in the picture), and to the Indian Prime Minister (to try to keep him on board about re-fuelling). He was somewhat worried about the Soviets. A lot of churning was going on about cease-fire moves, but he saw no sign of any pull-out from the coalition.

4. Mr King said that the Scud attacks on civilian centres were helpful to the coalition in propaganda terms. They showed that Saddam Hussein was utterly unscrupulous about targetting centres of civilian population indiscriminately. On the timing of the ground battle, there were clearly military considerations at one end of the spectrum and political pressures at the other. Politico-military considerations were in the middle. Militarily, our forces were approaching their peak and it was a question of how long they could be held there. He thought that it was necessary to do a bit more to tip the balance in the coalition's favour. But it was important to maintain the credibility of the air campaign. He thought that the peace pressures were at the bottom of the list. As an illustration of the problem of keeping the military in the theatre for very long, and the impact on families at home, Mr King said that 14 tons of service mail ("Blueys") had been received last week.

5. The President asked how long a ground war might last. Secretary Cheney said that he had briefed Mr King and Air Chief Marshal Craig on the campaign plans. He had hoped that it might go fairly quickly. Air Chief Marshal Craig commented that much depended on the fighting will of the Iraqi soldiers. The President asked about rations and supplies. Secretary Cheney said that the Iraqis were in difficulties now, but that they must have some emergency reserves. The President asked about the performance of equipment. He had the impression that it had been good. Air Chief Marshal Craig said that there had been a remarkably good rate of striking and the aircraft were being pushed very hard. He would have expected a slight fall off in performance, but this had not happened.

6. The President reverted to his worries about propaganda and civilian casualites. People were saying that with 64,000 sorties, an average of one civilian must have been killed in each, making 64,000 casualties. Mr King and others commented that this was a false picture, since a lot of the attacks had been in unpopulated areas of Iraq.

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7. Mr King ended by saying that Britain would back the President's military judgement over starting the ground battle. We had great confidence in General Schwarzkopf and the military leadership.

8. I was struck first by the very genuine warmth of the President's comments about the British contribution and performance. He spoke with great sincerity and feeling. I was also struck by the emphasis which he put on the dangers of Iraqi propaganda and the effect which this could have on coalition cohesion and public opinion in America. He is, of course, an avid television watcher himself, and tends to react to what he sees on the screen. He certainly has a point, however, which needs watching. I thought that, in appearance and manner, the President seemed well and robust and also relaxed. Mr King was asked in his television and radio interviews how he had found the President, and he responded very positively.

9. We then went on to see Brent Scowcroft briefly in his office. Bob Gates and David Gompert were also present.

10. Mr King mentioned the problem of financial contributions from Japan. Scowcroft said immediately that the UK and the US were not, and should not, be competing with each other. The United States would work to get contributions for both of us, although the Japanese were playing funny games. Mr King asked whether all the $9 billion was for non-combative expenses. Gates confirmed that Prime Minister Kaifu had made that commitment in the Japanese Parliament.

11. Mr King asked what Brent Scowcroft's views were about the war and what he had said to the President. Scowcroft commented that it was "right on". Mr King said that it was very important to maintain credibility. If the Iraqis thought that they could actually survive an air war, there could be a morale problem. Scowcroft commented that the Iraqis were digging their tanks in too deep and were turning them into fixed pillboxes. On the political front, he thought that there was a danger of being seen to "beat them down and make the rubble bounce", at least in propaganda terms. Later on, after the ground war had been joined, there could be a real problem over Prisoners of War but, in general, the cooperation within the ungainly coalition had been remarkable.

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12. Mr King said that European opinion in support of the Gulf war was coming round quickly. Prime Minister Martens in Belgium had said that he had made an initial mistake, and the French Defence Minister Joxe had been very positive. Scowcroft commented that Joxe had been very refreshing in comparison with his predecessor. Mr King said that Chevenement had been very difficult, but had been greatly influenced by his own experience in Algeria. It was indeed remarkable that the French had come under full US tactical command. It was important for NATO that the French should enjoy their experience within the coalition.

13. The meeting ended with some brief comment on the Soviet Union, which Scowcroft said was in a terrible mess. The situation was very depressing, with Gorbachev facing two revolutions - political and economic - at the same time. He was now being attacked for the first time over his handling of foreign policy. Even so, Scowcroft did not see the military taking over.

14. I am sending a copy of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

Antony

Antony Acland

cst.ps/let/24dm11.2

SECRET

Sir Robin Butler

001449

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street SW1P 3AG
071-270 3000
Fax 071-270 5456

The Rt Hon Peter Lilley MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
Department of Trade and Industry
1 - 19 Victoria Street
London
SW1H OET

13 February 1991

CABINET OFFICE
A 1688
13 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

cc - Mr Appleyard
Mr Reeves

Dear Peter,

INSURANCE AGAINST DAMAGE BY IRAQI TERRORISTS

Thank you for your letter of 23 January. I have also seen Kenneth Baker's letter of 31 January. The risk of Iraqi terrorism in the UK is for others to assess, but I would hope that the risk of major damage is remote. It is not in the Government's interest to excite alarm on this score by preparing a general compensation scheme for terrorist damage which as a general proposition the industry is normally prepared to cover, so I was disappointed to see that the insurance industry are apparently taking such a rigid attitude.

2. It is already regrettably the case that there are risks of terrorism in the UK, yet the insurance companies do not seek to use war risk exclusion clauses when claims arise in this way. Although it may be that war risk exclusion clauses will bear the interpretation that Iraqi terrorism now would be an act of war and not an act of terrorism, it does not in my view follow that isolated acts of terrorism associated with the present hostilities would automatically bring the exclusion clause into operation. I think it is essential that we explore the legal issues here fully before we decide on action, and so I would like to see an early reference of the question to the Law Officers. This is particularly so given the risk, as Kenneth Baker points out, that any concession in this area could have an unwelcome read-across to the status of other terrorist activity. From the expenditure point of view, I am greatly concerned as you can imagine with the proposition that the costs of any compensation scheme would not only lie wholly at the door of the Government but would also be unquantifible.

SECRET

3. So far as a public line to take is concerned, I think we are entitled to look for industry's cooperation in the public handling of this issue; and so at least until we have had a view from the Law Officers I suggest that if we are pressed we simply say in public that the Government is aware of the issue, that we are in touch with the industry and are monitoring developments. I also support Kenneth Baker's point that we could make something of the fact that the insurers have not hitherto tried to disown responsibility for terrorists damage.

4. I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Douglas Hurd, James Mackay, Kenneth Baker, Tom King, Michael Heseltine, John Wakeham, John Gummer, Ian Lang, David Hunt, Peter Brooke, Patrick Mayhew and Sir Robin Butler.

DAVID MELLOR

Sir Robin Butler 90

FOLIO
CABINET OFFICE
A 1707
13FEB1991
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FILE No.

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/17/15/1D

c - M. Appleyard

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO WASHINGTON

CDS and I were very warmly received both by Dick Cheney and Colin Powell and then by the President and his team. Anthony Acland is reporting separately on our conversations with the President, and subsequently with Brent Scrowcroft.

2. Cheney and Powell briefed us on the outcome of their discussions with Schwarzkopf over the weekend. Their collective view was that the air campaign was going well. Substantial damage had been done to the leadership's overall command capability. The Iraqi Air Force no longer posed any serious threat. Their small Navy was written off as was to a major extent their nuclear, biological and chemical production and storage. The threat from SCUD missiles continued, but at a low level. The US believe that CW weapons already filled and deployed before hostilities may be approaching the end of their shelf lives, so the Iraqis could be facing the dilemma of "using it or losing it". (Our experts do not share this assessment of shelf life). However, in military terms the CW threat did not worry them because the Iraqi could probably not achieve the necessary concentration of agents in a given area. We were adequately prepared to cope with what they could do.

3. Production and storage facilities for petrol, oil and (especially) lubricants were also severely damaged as was much of the electrical generation capacity. The disruption to the road and rail networks caused by destroying bridges and interdicting road

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traffic (the Baghdad/Basra railway is cut and not in use) means that the remaining capacity of the transportation system was probably no longer able to sustain fully the Iraqi forces in the KTO at present levels of activity. With the RGFC and other reserve forces in the north of Kuwait syphoning off their requirements, the flow of supplies to the units on the Iraqi front line was probably very inadequate. It would certainly be insufficient once operations increased the level of use.

4. Against this broad analysis, with which we agree, Schwarzkopf was switching more and more of the increasing offensive effort to targets in the KTO. They had concluded that the area bombing (eg by B52s) of the RGFC and other heavy divisions was not producing the best destruction of materiel. For the past couple of days they had been targeting tanks and artillery one by one with Maverick and other precision anti-armour weapons. On Monday night 40 aircraft had accounted for 79 tanks, so last night 65 aircraft were tasked. Schwarzkopf believes that this campaign should show real dividends in depleting the main battle fighting elements of the heavy Iraqi divisions. In their dug-in positions they were seen as no better than pillboxes and lacking fighting mobility. Nevertheless Cheney, Powell (and Schwarzkopf) believe that the coalition must mount a ground offensive to build on the destruction being achieved so far from the air, which will of course continue. They briefed us in outline about the way the ground offensive would start ('G' DAY); Powell thought that it would be a matter of days but acknowledged that much would depend on the Iraqis' (and Saddam's) determination to fight, regardless of odds, to achieve casualties on our side. They stressed that there would be a continuing need to try and get into the deep command bunkers in Baghdad (using F117As with Precision Guided Munitions) and to sustain the interdiction of supply routes and closure of airfields. But the weight of effort on these (and SCUD hunting) would now be very much reduced.

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SECRETARY OF STATE

5. Cheney made it clear that he was now awaiting Schwarzkopf's recommendation about the date for G day, and implied that they did not expect to have to wait very long for this. I indicated our confidence in General Schwarzkopf and readiness to support a ground offensive. I will report to colleagues orally on the discussion of the possible timing of offensive operations.

7. The French Defence Minister, M Joxe, was also in Washington yesterday. We avoided a trilateral meeting in case this gave an impression to Arab partners of the Western Allies settling issues without them.

8. I am sending a copy of this minute to OPD(G) colleagues and Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence
13th February 1991

(T K)

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FOLIO 89

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CDS 2066/2/4

13 Feb 91

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A 1696
13 FEB 1991
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Ext Jt Cdr
SIR ROBIN BUTLER
SIR PERCY CRADDOCK

PENTAGON OPS/INT BRIEF 12 FEB 91

1. During his visit to the Pentagon CDS was briefed by Lt Gen Carns, Director of the Joint Staffs, assisted by Maj Gen Sewall in the Pentagon Crisis Management Group. The brief was an updated version of that given to Gen Powell earlier in the day. The Crisis Management Cell appeared to be an amalgam of sorts of the JOC and the DIC; the brief was slick, polished and was notable in that it treated the coalition forces as a whole rather than being US orientated. Gen Carns made it clear at the outset that the Pentagon was not attempting to parallel the detailed operational information which would be available to Gen Schwarzkopf in theatre; indeed, he was under instructions from Gen Powell not to do so. A script for this quickfire brief was not available and thus I have noted only the main points of interest, some of which may require a follow-up.

2. In order of presentation:-

a. On 11 Feb, the USS Missouri had been subject to counter battery fire when engaged in NGS against Iraqi forces in South East Kuwait. With the exception of the incident involving the USS Nicholas a few days earlier (as yet unresolved) this was the first recorded attempt to counter attack US naval forces.

b. There are now 94 Patriot launchers in Israel. There are a total of 60 around Tel Aviv, 36 of which are controlled by the US and 24 by the Israelis, and a further 34 protecting Haifa. To date 50 missiles have been launched in Israel.

c. On 11 Feb there had been 40 F111 sorties against Iraqi armour in the KTO using precision guided 500lb bombs. The US Air Force is employing a new tactic with apparent success

(they claimed 79 tank kills on 11 Feb) attacking just after sunset when the infra-red signature of tanks against that of the desert makes them more conspicuous. As a result they intended to launch 65 F111 sorties on the evening of 12 February.

d. The loss of the AV8B over the KTO recently was being credited to a possible SA-16 firing and although a parachute was seen and a SAR option was still open there had been no evidence that the pilot had survived.

e. Although overall recent SAM firings were fewer than had been seen recently (9 on 11 Feb against a maximum of 28 firings in 1 day recorded previously) there had been considerable evidence of the use of SA-16 in Kuwait. Interestingly, Gen Carns assessed that the Iraqis still had more than 7,000 SAMs and that less than 10% of the orbat had been fired to date. This appears to be at variance with a recent DIS assessment.

f. US sources estimate that there are now 142 Iraqi military aircraft in Iran of which 116 are fighters or fighter-bombers. They have confirmed more than 50% of these aircraft by imagery and have noticed a recent deployment of some of these aircraft from airfields in the south of Iran to the north.

g. The USS America battlegroup will transit the Straits of Hormuz on 14 Feb and the amphibious task force is currently off Dubai. Embargo enforcement operations continue in the northern Red Sea where 2 CVBGs remain.

h. There are now 513,641 US military personnel in theatre. 2,414 reinforcements mostly for ARCENT had arrived in the previous 24 hours. There have been 946 US casualties to date of which 29 are dead and 12 officially notified as killed in action.

i. Logistic targets have been set as follows:

1. Water 60 days.

2. Food 60 days.

3. Aviation fuel 30 days.

4. Medical supplies 60 days.

5. Ammunition 60 days.

All have been achieved with the exception of food for which there are currently 54 days supplies in theatre.

j. Pentagon officials have a tally of 74 confirmed mines in the northern Persian Gulf to date, most of which appear to have been free-floating with no indication that they have

ever been moored. When CDS queried the impact of mining on maritime operations the staff appeared to be quite dismissive and gave the impression that amphibious operations were very much on the back burner.

k. The DIA assessed that 90% of Iraqi NBC production and storage facilities were now inoperable. They reiterated their views that, because Iraq did not have a binary weapon capability, existing stocks were subject to a shelf-life (they mentioned between 30 and 60 days). CDS noted that the UK experts had a different view; the briefing staff claimed that all CW/BW refrigeration storage facilities had been destroyed. Clearly this debate is going to run on. Gen Carns discounted a recent press story, thought to have emanated from the Soviet Union, that there had been some evidence of outbreaks of anthrax near BW facilities in Baghdad, Basra and Takrit. His view was echoed by BDS staff later in the day.

l. Only 2 of the 15,000lb area clearance bombs have so far been dropped on front line troops in Kuwait. It appeared that bombs had detonated too soon and there was little indication that they had caused much damage on the ground. Further drops have been delayed by insufficient stocks of special to-type parachutes in theatre.

3. The thrust and weight of the air campaign was discussed in some detail and it was clear that, certainly on 12 Feb, the predominant effort was against targets in the KTO (648 sorties out of a total of 1,022 combat missions). This was very clear from a 'measles' map of targets for the 24 hour period. For instance, 140 A-10 missions were being mounted in daylight against divisions in the Wadi Batin, 65 F111 anti-tank sorties as mentioned previously, and 34 F117 strikes against C3 and MOD facilities in Baghdad of which 7 would be attempting to penetrate one Presidential bunker. It was interesting to note the complete absence of B-52 activity against front-line troops in Kuwait. B-52 targets for the day included Mawsul nuclear facilities in northern Iraq (from Fairford overflying Turkey en-route), Al Taqqadum airfield, Al Qaim in western Iraq and the Hamurabi RGFC division). This division was clearly the target for the day for many other air strikes.

4. Discussion then turned to BDA and, following probing by CDS, Gen Carns was adamant that the Pentagon was not attempting to devise effectiveness figures for Iraqi ground forces. The staff was content to note figures for equipments destroyed ie tanks, artillery, radar sites and soft-skinned vehicles using BDA available to them, but were equally clear in their view that Gen Schwarzkopf had a far better feel for the impact of the air campaign from all-source intelligence. Following the recent visit of Mr Cheney and Gen Powell the Joint Staff were not in the business of trying to second guess CINCCENTCOM. Earlier indications that a target of 50% effectiveness was being aimed at had clearly been shelved. We were shown some interesting F117,

F111 and F15E videos of precision bombing, sent to the Pentagon via commercial satellite with a delay time of about 24 hours. During this showing staff claimed that they had destroyed almost 50% of HAS's in Iraq.

5. Gen Carns outlined the current strategy for attacking bridges on logistic supply routes; staff had identified 9 choke points on river crossings between Baghdad and Kuwait. The railway bridges had been destroyed as had the main highway bridges but there remained 2 "levee" bridges which were still in operation and which were difficult to destroy; these were at Hawr Al Hammar and Shatt Al Barsa canal route 31. It was estimated that the routes into Kuwait before the war started could handle 215 kilo-tonnes per day which was now reduced through bombing to 85 kilo-tonnes per day. Iraqi forces in the KTO currently required 15 kilo-tonnes per day which would increase to a minimum of 45 kilo-tonnes per day during a land campaign. Although efforts to date had not reduced supply capability sufficiently Iraqis were experiencing extreme difficulty in distributing stores once they reached northern Kuwait as a result of air strikes against convoys and because the RGFC were creaming off the best supplies en-route. Consequently, front line troops were not being well supplied at all.

D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
MB6173 83353MB

SECRET AND PERSONAL



FOLIO 88

MARKET OFFICE
A 1710
14 FEB 1991
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 February 1991

Dear Simon,

THE GULF

I had a short round up with General Scowcroft this evening on a number of points.

I briefed him on the Prime Minister's conversation with the UN Secretary General. General Scowcroft said the President would be very grateful to the Prime Minister for following up on this.

General Scowcroft said the Americans were not worried about the Security Council discussion. They believe they have 9 votes to hold it in private, and that the Chairman intended to close off discussions by 6pm New York time.

We talked about the attack on the bunker/shelter in Baghdad. General Scowcroft said that all the evidence he had seen indicated that the building was being used as a military command and control centre. He believed the Administration's evidence was really very strong and was making an impact on public opinion in the United States. They were not getting too much trouble on this.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

General Scowcroft spoke warmly of the visit of the Defence Secretary and CDS, which had been very successful.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CAB 164/1987

Letter dated
13/02/1991

POLIC 87
CABINET OFFICE
A 1659
13 FEB 1991
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FILE No.

SECRET

T0391

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

AD HOC MEETING OF MINISTERS: 14 FEBRUARY AT 8.45

The following Ministers are expected to be present: Lord Privy Seal, Home Secretary, Environment Secretary, Lord President, Chancellor of the Duchy, Attorney General, Chief Whip, Mr Hamilton, Mr Lennox-Boyd and Mr Dorrell. The Scottish Office are also considering whether to send a Minister. Mr Barrass of the Assessments Staff will be present to speak about the threat.

Item 1 - Emergency legislation

2. The papers are my letter of 25 January to the Home Secretary's Private Secretary and his reply of 31 January; the Health Secretary's Private Secretary's letter of 28 January; and the Environment Secretary's letter of 4 February to the Home Secretary.

BACKGROUND

3. With the Prime Minister's approval the Home Secretary has prepared a contingency draft Bill and Regulations to give the Government emergency powers to help it deal with the Gulf crisis. I attach the latest available drafts, which the Home Office tell me are not quite up to date. A similar emergency Bill and Regulations were prepared during the Falklands crisis but never enacted. A short summary of the Regulations is attached to my letter of 25 January.

4. The Home Secretary has consistently taken the view that, while it is right to have the powers ready in draft, they should not be enacted until they are needed, and that there is as yet no pressing need to do so. He has commented that they would probably cause some alarm because they are so wide-ranging. He has suggested that the Regulations be divided into first and second priorities, the latter being kept in reserve.

5. The Environment Secretary on the other hand argues that the powers in his area, which are concerned with responding to an act of chemical or biological (CB) terrorism, could be needed at very short notice, for example on a Friday evening, and that failure to have them in place would be indefensible. He therefore favours enacting the Bill now.

HANDLING

6. You may wish to begin by inviting the Home Secretary to put his case, and then the Environment Secretary to reply. You might then invite:

- Other Ministers present to say whether they wish to argue in favour of early enactment from the standpoint of their Departments. This may enable you to establish that the CB terrorist threat is the only factor which tells in favour of this. My own enquiries suggest that the Department of Health are the only other Department who might press for early enactment. There is however a point about coroner's inquests, succinctly explained in the attached minute by the Attorney General, which tells the same way; you could invite the Attorney General and Mr Hamilton to speak to this.

- The Lord President, Lord Privy Seal and Chief Whip to give their assessment of the speed of which the Bill could be enacted. Could it be done in 24 hours? Are there any problems over making the Regulations? (In an emergency they would be made by the Queen in Council but would have to be approved by both Houses within 7 days). Also, what about the Easter Recess? Could Parliament be recalled if necessary to enact the Bill?

- Mr Barrass to give the intelligence assessment of the CB terrorist threat. How acute is the danger?

- The Environment Secretary to explain what powers he is asking for. Is there any possibility that his existing powers would carry him through, at any rate for a few days? (MAFF at official level say that their own powers are sufficient to meet their needs in the event of a CB emergency). If not, could he expect voluntary co-operation from those concerned in what he needed to do? Would it be legally acceptable to act first and seek legislative cover afterwards? (The Attorney General will have a view). The same questions could be put to Mr Dorrell if DH support early enactment.

7. You may then wish to invite discussion of the Parliamentary and publicity aspects. How would the Government justify to Parliament the need for these powers? Would the risk of CB terrorism be cited as the main reason, or a supporting reason? Would this create public alarm? (There has already been press speculation that such a danger exists, but Government confirmation would be a significant step). Would we risk putting ideas into Saddam Hussain's head? Against this, is there an argument for

telling the British public about the risk? Would the Government be criticised afterwards if it had not done so?

8. If the meeting is convinced by the Environment Secretary's arguments, there are a number of handling issues to consider:

- Should the initial package of Regulations be the CB-related ones only, or should there be others as well? The Cabinet Office could be tasked to examine this with Departments.

- Should the co-operation of the Opposition be sought? Should the other party leaders be briefed on Privy Counsellor terms?

CONCLUSION

9. The argument seems likely to turn on how great is the risk of CB terrorism and whether it is indeed essential to have emergency powers in place in order to deal successfully with an attack. The intelligence assessment may lead to the conclusion that the threat is not all that acute.

10. If the Environment Secretary is persuaded that early enactment is unnecessary, it can be left at that (except that the Cabinet Office, in consultation with the Home Office and others, could be tasked with putting the Regulations in order of priority for enactment in case they are needed).

11. If the Home Secretary and the Environment Secretary stick to their respective views, OPD(G) will need to resolve the issue, with both Ministers present. The Cabinet Office could be tasked with preparing a paper as a basis for discussion.

12. If the Environment Secretary persuades his colleagues that early enactment is desirable, the Home Secretary should be invited to put proposals to OPD(G) accordingly.

ITEM 2: Unconventional terrorism - media handling aspects

13. The item links naturally with the previous one. Although there is some public awareness of the risk of a CB terrorist attack, official planning and briefing has been held within the relatively small circle described in paragraph 6 of the Home Secretary's paper. The fire and ambulance services, and local government, have not been briefed; but to do so would be tantamount to making a public announcement.

HANDLING

14. After inviting the Home Secretary to introduce his paper, you might lead discussion as follows:

(a) Fire and ambulance services

The choice appears to lie between a relatively full (and in effect public) briefing of personnel, along the lines of Annex A to the paper, and confidential briefing of chief officers. Given the threat assessment, is the latter sufficient? In the event of a terrorist incident, would the Government be fairly criticised for not having done more? Are the police themselves adequately briefed? (Home Secretary, Mr Dorrell)

(b) Medical and nursing staff in the NHS

Are they being adequately briefed on injuries/illnesses and their treatment, and on protection of those who treat them? (Mr Dorrell)

(c) Local authorities

Some have been pressing for information. Is there any operational need or political justification for going beyond the bland and uninformative formula at Annex B to the paper?

(d) Government buildings

Should Government Departments check air intakes and water supplies in their buildings as a prudent precaution? As the paper points out, this could smack of special protection unless the general public were advised to do the same (cf Lockerbie and the subsequent criticisms of the US Government). (Environment Secretary)

15. Two presentational points remain:

(a) Before an incident

Is the press line in paragraph 10 adequate? Plainly more would be needed if the emergency services were briefed in detail. (Home Secretary)

(b) After an incident

Does the Home Office contingency plan contain clear advice be given to the public in the danger area -recognising tha different advice might have to be given depending on the nature of the CB agent and the environment in which it was released? Press and public would plainly expect the Government to be able to give clear advice on safety measu in such an emergency.

(Home Secretary)

CONCLUSIONS

16. Subject to satisfactory answers being given to these questions, the meeting might be guided to endorse the recommendations in paragr 14 of the paper.

W D REEVES

Cabinet Office
12 February 1991

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR BAKER, 1 FEBRUARY

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED BAKER ON 1 FEBRUARY. THEY TALKED FOR JUST OVER 30 MINUTES ABOUT:

- ARAB REACTION TO THE GULF CONFLICT
- COALITION AIMS
- GULF SECURITY AFTER THE CONFLICT
- SHIA SHRINES
- BURDENSHARING
- ARAB/ISRAEL

GULF CONFLICT: ARAB REACTION

2. BAKER SAID HE DID NOT DETECT ANY SUBSTANTIAL WEAKNESSES IN THE COALITION. OPPOSITION TO THE COALITION IN SOME ARAB COUNTRIES WAS GROWING, BUT STILL LESS THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED. HE HAD BEEN UNHAPPY ABOUT THE RECENT JORDANIAN COMPLAINT FOLLOWING AN ATTACK ON THEIR NATIONALS. BAKER WAS SYMPATHETIC. IT WAS NECESSARY TO TRY TO AVOID A REPETITION.

COALITION AIMS OF THE GULF CONFLICT

3. BAKER REMAINED CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER OF FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF BROADENING THE WAR AIMS, ALTHOUGH NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR THE UK HAD DONE SO YET. BUT WHEN THE IRAQIS DISPLAYED PRISONERS OF WAR, OR IF THEY USED CW, THE EMOTIONAL REACTION COULD PUSH GOVERNMENTS IN THE WRONG DIRECTION. MANY PEOPLE IN THE US THOUGHT THAT THE COALITION SHOULD AIM TO KILL SADDAM HUSSEIN OR TO PROMISE TO TRY HIM FOR WAR CRIMES. AN EXTENSION OF THE WAR AIMS IN THIS WAY COULD MEAN SNATCHING DEFEAT FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY. IT COULD ALSO INVOLVE THE COALITION IN TAKING WIDE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR IRAQ SUCH AS PROTECTING IRAQ FROM POSSIBLE SYRIAN OR TURKISH ATTEMPTS TO POACH IRAQI TERRITORY. CONTINUED VIGILANCE WAS NEEDED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRONGLY AGREED. IT WAS A LONG WAY TO BAGHDAD AND EVEN FURTHER TO GET HOME AGAIN. THE TWO GOVERNMENT HAD TO KEEP THEIR OPTIONS OPEN ALTHOUGH THIS WAS DIFFICULT,

ESPECIALLY WHEN THEIR OWN SUPPORTERS WERE PRESSING THEM TO BROADEN THE AIMS.

GULF SECURITY POST-CONFLICT

4. BAKER SAID THAT IN HIS RECENT MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON WITH POOS, VAN DEN BROEK, SAMARAS AND BESSMERTNYKH, ALL HAD WANTED TO TALK ABOUT POST-CONFLICT ARRANGEMENTS. THIS WAS TIMELY, ESPECIALLY AS HE WOULD BE TESTIFYING TO CONGRESS THE FOLLOWING WEEK WHEN QUESTIONS ABOUT POST-CONFLICT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE ASKED.

5. IN ANSWER TO BAKER'S QUESTION THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONFIRMED THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD BE DISCUSSING GULF SECURITY, AMONG THE TWELVE, ON 19 FEBRUARY. BUT THE SUBJECT WAS ARISING ALL THE TIME, IN BILATERAL AND OTHER CONTACTS. UK OFFICIALS WERE TRAVELLING TO WASHINGTON ON 3 FEBRUARY TO TALK TO THEIR AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD TALKED AT UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO DO AFTER THE WAR.

6. BAKER DID NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY DISINCLINATION TO DO WHAT WAS REQUIRED, ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT WAS SERIOUS WHEN HE SAID HE WANTED THE UNITED STATES' TROOPS HOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BAKER CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTINUED TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AND AIR FORCE/NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS. THE AMERICANS MIGHT HAVE TO THINK UP SOME NEW ARRANGEMENTS COVERING, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRE-POSITIONING OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

SHIA SHRINES

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE WORRIED ABOUT IRAQI PROPAGANDA WHICH CLAIMED THAT THE COALITION HAD ATTACKED SHIA SHRINES. BAKER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN SOME DEFENSIVE MEASURES. THERE WAS NOT A GREAT DEAL MORE THEY COULD DO. THEY TOO WERE WORRIED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF IRAQI PROPAGANDA, ESPECIALLY IN IRAN.

BURDENSHARING

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE UNDER MUCH PRESSURE ON BURDENSHARING, ESPECIALLY NOW THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BLAZED THE TRAIL. AT THE SAME TIME WE REALISED THAT THE UK WAS THE JUNIOR PARTNER. HE WANTED TO COORDINATE WITH THE US.

9. BAKER READILY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS A DIFFICULTY OVER CONTRIBUTIONS FROM JAPAN. HE SAID, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT THE JAPANESE HAD IN THEIR USUAL WAY SAID ONE THING, BY PROMISING THE UNITED STATES THE FULL DOLLARS 9 BILLION, BUT THEN STARTED TO SAY SOMETHING DIFFERENT, BY SUGGESTING THAT THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION MIGHT BE FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AS A WHOLE. IT WAS NOT THE RELATIVELY SMALL PERCENTAGE WHICH WOULD BE DIVERTED TO THE UK,

FRANCE AND MAYBE OTHERS WHICH BOTHERED BAKER (IN THE UK'S CASE JUST DOLLARS 720 MILLION). BUT FOR THE SAKE OF THIS SMALL SUM THE AMERICANS RAN THE RISK OF A MAJOR FUSS IN CONGRESS BECAUSE THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION HAD BECOME A PUBLIC FIGURE, AND IF ANY LESS WENT TO THE UNITED STATES THERE WOULD BE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CHANCES OF SQUEEZING ANY FURTHER MONEY OUT OF THE JAPANESE WERE SLIGHT. WE WOULD BE TALKING OF ONLY 8 PERCENT OF THE MONEY GIVEN TO THE UNITED STATES, AS BAKER HAD ACKNOWLEDGED, ALTHOUGH HE COULD SEE THE AMERICANS' POLITICAL DIFFICULTY.

11. BAKER WONDERED IF THE JAPANESE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE UK EFFORT ON A SIX-MONTHLY BASIS RATHER THAN THE THREE-MONTHLY BASIS ON WHICH THEY WERE HELPING THE AMERICANS. IN OTHER WORDS COULD THE JAPANESE NOT SAY THAT THEY WOULD GIVE THE UK 8 PERCENT OF WHAT THEY GAVE THE UNITED STATES OVER THE FIRST HALF OF 1991 (RATHER THAN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR). THEY COULD LOOK AT A FIGURE IN, SAY, APRIL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THIS WOULD NOT WORK BECAUSE IT WOULD MEAN THE JAPANESE FINDING FRESH MONEY, WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. BAKER SAID THAT THE JAPANESE MIGHT NEED TO FIND SUCH FRESH MONEY IN ANY CASE BECAUSE THE AMERICANS WOULD BE GOING BACK TO THEM FOR THE SECOND QUARTER OF THE YEAR. EVEN IF THE CONFLICT WERE OVER, THERE WOULD STILL BE SOME DEPLOYMENTS OF US FORCES TO BE PAID FOR.

12. BAKER THOUGHT THAT HE AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE MIGHT HAVE TO TALK AGAIN ABOUT THIS ISSUE. HE SUGGESTED RATHER VAGUELY THAT FOR THE SAKE OF JUST DOLLARS 720 MILLION PERHAPS THE AMERICANS COULD IN SOME WAY POSTPONE RECEIPT OF PART OF THEIR MONEY FROM THE JAPANESE. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS TO HOLD THE JAPANESE TO THEIR INITIAL COMMITMENT TO LEAD THE PACK IN PROVIDING CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED STATES' EFFORT. HE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK ON THE PROBLEM.

ARAB/ISRAEL

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO DO WELL BY SHOWING RESTRAINT. BAKER SAID THE AMERICANS WOULD SUPPORT ANY EFFORT TO TREAT THEM AS A FRONT-LINE STATE. THEY HAD SUFFERED WAR DAMAGE AND INCURRED EXPENSE AS A RESULT.

14. BAKER SAID THAT ARAB/ISRAEL WOULD BE ONE OF THE FIVE. THE ISSUE NEEDED TO BE TACKLED PRAGMATICALLY. HE WANTED TO FLAG THIS POINT WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE KNEW THAT DUMAS WOULD PROBABLY PRESS FOR EARLY INTERNATIONAL ACTION. BESSMERTNYKH CERTAINLY WOULD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED. THE FRENCH WERE THINKING OF A HUGE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THIS WOULD NOT WORK (BAKER AGREED). BUT THE PROBLEM NEEDED ATTENTION AND MAY HAVE BEEN MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY THE GULF

CONFLICT. BAKER DOUBTED THIS. HE SAW A LITTLE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN THE ARABS' POSITION.

15. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HOW, IF ACTION BY THE PERMANENT FIVE OR AN EARLY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WAS NOT FAVOURED, WORK SHOULD BE GOT UNDERWAY. PRESUMABLY BAKER WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO SAY THAT HE WAS GOING TO PICK UP AGAIN ON THE 'BAKER PLAN'.

16. BAKER THOUGHT THAT ALL PARTIES COULD SAY THEY WERE GOING TO DO MORE TO MOVE THE ARAB/ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS FORWARD: EACH WOULD WORK ON THE PROBLEM TO THE EXTENT THAT HE COULD CONTRIBUTE. BAKER ADDED THAT THERE WERE SOME POTENTIALLY HELPFUL NEW ELEMENTS. THE SYRIANS, FOR EXAMPLE, NO LONGER LOOKED TO THE SOVIET UNION AS THEIR PROTECTOR. THEY WANTED TO GET ALONGSIDE THE UNITED STATES. BUT THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY, NOT SOME HIGHLY PUBLICISED CONFERENCE.

17. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT AFTER THE CONFLICT THERE WOULD BE GREAT EXPECTATIONS OF ACTIVITY ON ARAB/ISRAEL. CRITICISM WOULD BE GREAT IF THE FORCES WENT HOME AND NOTHING WAS SEEN TO BE HAPPENING. BAKER SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY SCHEME HAD A CHANCE OF WORKING UNLESS IT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE WITH THE KEY PLAYERS. ISRAEL HAD TO BE BROUGHT ALONG. THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT CONSIDER SITTING DOWN WITH ONLY THE PALESTINIANS. THEY WOULD WANT TO GO BACK TO ONE OF THE ORIGINAL ELEMENTS OF THE LEVY PLAN, WHICH REFERRED TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS SAID THAT IF TOO MANY PEOPLE WERE 'DOODLING ABOUT' WITH THE PROBLEM, THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS. THE ISRAELIS WERE VERY SUSPICIOUS OF THE EUROPEANS, SEEING THE FRENCH AND SOME OTHERS AS TOTALLY ARABIST. THE ISRAELIS' SUSPICION OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAS TOTAL.

18. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPEATED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO LEAVE THE ISSUE TO QUIET DIPLOMACY ALONE. A FORMULA WOULD BE NEEDED, PERHAPS ALONG THE LINES OF THAT TO WHICH BAKER HAD REFERRED (PARA 16 ABOVE).

19. THE TALK FINISHED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND BAKER AGREEING THAT THEY SHOULD GET TOGETHER BEFORE TOO LONG, PERHAPS IN BERMUDA. BAKER SUGGESTED LATE FEBRUARY/EARLY MARCH.

20. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO SAID THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF RAY SEITZ WAS VERY GOOD NEWS AND WARMLY WELCOMED IN LONDON.

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Sir Robin Butler

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 February 1991

c- Mr Appleyard

THE GULF: FRENCH VIEWS

Pierre Morel, President Mitterrand's new diplomatic adviser, came to see me this morning to talk about the Gulf. I think he was also intending to make some calls in the Foreign Office later. I will therefore report our conversation only briefly.

Morel said that he was going with Admiral Lanxade to the United States tomorrow to discuss the post-conflict situation in the Gulf. President Mitterrand had been very insistent that he should come to London first to compare notes. In that context, the President would be replying very soon now to the Prime Minister's recent message about contacts between the Elysée and Whitehall, accepting our proposals.

We then went through possible scenarios for how the conflict would end and how to win the peace. I spoke on the lines of the various papers we have discussed with the Americans (although not quite so frankly). I also mentioned the need to impose stiff terms for any ceasefire. French thinking as described by Morel appeared to be very similar on most of these points. They are exercised about what would happen if Iraqi forces left Kuwait but continued to pose a threat to its security. They favour the concept of a security zone of indeterminate size, although it was not clear whether they envisage allied forces actually trying to hold or police such a zone. They are clearly worried that the Americans are moving towards more ambitious objectives and might march on Baghdad. I said we had no reason to think this was the case.

The main difference, predictably enough, came on the subject of a grand international conference following the end of the conflict, to deal with the whole gamut of regional problems. Morel went through the reasons why the French believe that it will not be enough just to slip back into quiet diplomacy on the Arab/Israel situation. The United Nations had provided the legal authority for the present conflict and must be fully involved in resolving the consequences of it. It would not be enough for the United Nations Secretary General to have a personal, mediating role as in the case of the Iran/Iraq war. I took him through the reasons why we did not think an early international conference was likely to be a practical way to proceed, while acknowledging that there had to be a process

which would give moderate Arab governments grounds for faith that progress would be made. Like an expedition setting out to conquer Everest, we might chart some camps along the way. This led Morel to mention a proposal, which he said he had put to President Mitterrand, for a broad declaration of principles which would guide a post-war settlement. These might be general in nature, such as confirming existing borders, as well as embracing some of the CSCE principles. He was unclear in which forum such a declaration might be made, although thankfully did not appear to envisage the Twelve as the appropriate place. I imagine that we may hear more of this.

Two other points which are worth mentioning:

- Morel claimed the French were not opposed to a meeting of the Security Council this week being private, just rather sceptical as to whether that was possible.

- He was emphatic about the need to subject Israel to any constraints agreed on arms and NBC capabilities in the region. Without that, there was no prospect of making progress. But he had little idea how this could be achieved if the Israelis just dug in their heels (as would be the case). I said that we had to distinguish clearly between restrictions on Iraq as the country responsible for the present Gulf war, and wider and probably looser arrangements which might apply to the region as a whole.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FOLIO 84

SECRET

CABINET OFFICE
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12 FEB 1991
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SIR ROBIN BUTLER
MR APPLEYARD

cc Mr Reeves
Mr Gowan
Mr Ball
Mr Mathewson
Mr Gibbons

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS : 11/12 FEBRUARY

Military

1. There were three separate Scud attacks during the night, two at Israel and one on Riyadh. The first attack on Israel at 1700 yesterday afternoon was intercepted and landed injuring no-one. The second attack at 2324 landed on Tel Aviv injuring 6 people. The attack on Riyadh was intercepted by a patriot, debris fell to the ground and hit a swimming complex injuring two people.

2. Allied air operations continue with no reports of any losses. Target priorities remain Republican guard positions, Scud sites, airfields, chemical weapons and petroleum production and storage facilities.

Political

3. Secretary Cheney and General Powell had a short meeting with President Bush after which the President said that the Alliance was in no hurry to begin a ground war.

4. The Non-Aligned Movement is meeting today in Belgrade. The Foreign Office think that it is unlikely that they will achieve an agreed line and even if they do the Iraqis are likely to

reject it.

5. The Soviet envoy Primakov hopes to meet Saddam today. The Foreign Office say that the Soviets expect that he will be as intransigent as ever and that Primakov's mission is for domestic reasons.

6. The Foreign Office are still pushing for a closed session of the Security Council to be held tomorrow, which they expect to get. A decision will be made today.

H R G WILSON

12 February 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

c- Mr Appleyard

12 February 1991

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CALL TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

The Prime Minister spoke on the telephone this evening to the United Nations Secretary-General about the situation in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister regretted that it was some time since he and the Secretary-General had last spoken. He had talked the previous evening to President Bush: they both shared a concern at Iraq's efforts to make propaganda by claiming extensive civilian casualties as a result of Allied bombing. This seemed to be affecting opinion in the non-aligned countries, which in turn was creating pressure on the Secretary-General to intervene in some way. The Prime Minister continued that we could well understand the anguish which developments in the Gulf caused the Secretary- General. He had done everything humanly possible to avert the conflict there: and it was obnoxious of the Iraqis to accuse him of complicity in what they called crimes against Iraq. Responsibility for the present conflict rested simply and solely with Iraq.

The Secretary-General said that he very much agreed with this. But we must be careful not to provide the Iraqis with material to bolster their arguments that the Allies were indiscriminately killing civilians. They were beginning to gain ground with this line of argument internationally. The Prime Minister assured the Secretary-General that all Allied pilots were under strict instructions to minimise civilian casualties and avoid sites of religious and cultural significance. There was no policy to attack anything other than military targets, and we believed that the guidelines had been rigorously followed. He understood that the President would be letting the Secretary-General have some photographic evidence to sustain this. The Secretary-General said that he entirely accepted this and knew that the President and the Prime Minister were doing everything possible to avoid civilian casualties. Unfortunately he was a victim of Iraqi attempts to distort the truth.

The Prime Minister assured the Secretary-General that our aims remained those set out in the Security Council resolutions and we had no intention of widening them to include the destruction of Iraq or the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Nor was

there any question of changing Iraq's borders. The Secretary-General said that he had dealt with the United States and the United Kingdom for many years and trusted them absolutely. He would not allow himself to be used by the Iraqis.

The Prime Minister said that we understood that pressure for a Security Council meeting could not be contained indefinitely. But we thought it better for any meeting to be held in private rather than open session. There were plenty of precedents for this. The key factor was that the meeting should not be exploited to blur the clear message that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait. Public airing of proposals for a ceasefire or a pause in hostilities might give the Iraqis the false impression that they could even now get away without implementing the Security Council's resolutions fully.

The Secretary-General said that full compliance with the Security Council resolutions was the essential premise for a solution. Unfortunately there was no indication that the Iraqis were prepared to accept that. Suggestions of flexibility would be misleading and should be avoided. The Prime Minister said that it would be a tragic error if the unity and consistency of the Security Council, maintained over many months, were now to be put in jeopardy. The Secretary-General entirely agreed.

The Prime Minister spoke of our strong support for the Secretary-General and urged Sr. Perez de Cuellar to telephone him at any time if there were matters which he wished to discuss.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Chalmers (Attorney General's Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FOLIO 93 R

Ref. AO91/329

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 12 February

Item 1: Winning the peace

You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce the paper and to add to it by summarising his conclusions from his discussions in Taif, Riyadh, Cairo and Rome. You may wish to mention any discussion of this subject during your Bonn visit.

2. On the Foreign Secretary's visit, his talks revealed that the Gulf States and the Egyptians are finally buckling down to the task of looking seriously at future Gulf Security. President Mubarak is convening a Cairo Foreign Ministers' meeting on Thursday involving Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, Syria and Morocco (though the Moroccans may decide not to attend) to address this question. The Egyptians, Saudis and Syrians are already drafting papers and the Egyptians evidently envisage the process leading to a Summit. A GCC Committee has also been formed for the same purpose. Inevitably perhaps, the Gulf states still harbour suspicions of the Saudis, Egyptians, Iranians and Syrians and are inclined to hark back to traditional bilateral arrangements with Western powers. The UK/US talks showed that the US approach to Gulf Security is close to ours.

3. Moving on to the FCO paper, you might ask the Foreign Secretary whether his meetings reflected local enthusiasm for the ideas in the paper of a Gulf defensive alliance, which might include an integrated command, Egyptian deployment and Western underpinning. Turning to UK deployments you might confirm, as

the Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary agree, that this should be limited to aircraft rotation and a naval presence (Mr Hamilton is not expected to raise his personal, dissenting view in favour of a ground presence). The issue is also relevant to the Foreign Secretary's meeting with General de la Billiere and the latter's earlier remarks about retaining a brigade in Kuwait. The FCO, Treasury and other Departments have begun to prepare work on economic support which will need to take account of Mr Baker's proposals on economic reconstruction, including a Middle East Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Saudi sensitivities. The paper discusses arms control and non-proliferation on standard lines, noting that further work is being done on tightening supplier controls, and you may wish to endorse these ideas.

4. The most difficult issue is of course an Arab/Israel settlement on which the Foreign Secretary may have further thoughts. It seems clear the Americans will want to make progress by quiet diplomacy looking to us to put a brake on European pressure for a Conference. You might ask the Foreign Secretary for his assessment in the light of his visit of the settlement prospects, the future of Jordan, the role of the PLO with Arafat badly discredited and the influence of Iran. The latter seem poised to play a more important post-conflict role, with indications that they would like to re-open direct links with the US. The latest indications on the state of mind of King --- Hussein (Amman telegram number 002 to Riyadh: copy attached) are not reassuring. The resumption of PLO crossborder operations from Jordan is another unwelcome development. The US is reviewing economic and military aid to Jordan in response to King Hussein's speech. Our policy still is that the King is a better bet than any likely replacement.

5. You might conclude the discussion by endorsing the broad thrust of the paper, as amended in discussion in the light of the

Foreign Secretary's visit, which could be used as the basis for further discussion with the Americans when they send their team here. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to bring to OPD(G) the further work on tightening supplier controls and economic support for the region when it is ready.

Item 2: Current international situation

6. It might be more convenient this time to move straight on from the earlier paper to invite the Foreign Secretary to report on other aspects of his visit and the international scene. You may wish to congratulate the Foreign Secretary (again) on the success of his burdensharing discussion in Kuwait (on which you propose to send the Amir a message of thanks) and ask how we stand on a Saudi contribution. King Fahd left this to be discussed with Prince Saud. The FCO Political Director, Mr Weston, is travelling to South Korea and Japan to pursue the battle there. The Omanis have pledged the princely sum of $5m., while the UAE, in the wake of the Chief Secretary's visit, have offered $500m. now and a possible further $300m. later. The Foreign Secretary might also say a word about his meetings and those of his accompanying business mission in Taif about the reconstruction of Kuwait.

7. The Security Council will be holding a formal debate on Wednesday though it is not yet clear whether this will be an open or a private session. There are bound to be allegations, following President Gorbachev's recent statement, that the allies have widened the war aims. President Gorbachev's envoy, Mr Primakov, is off again to Iraq and the Iranians are continuing to play the peacemakers. There is a non-aligned meeting in Belgrade tomorrow (Tuesday) where more countries will make speeches for the record. However, Saddam Hussain's bellicose statement of 10 February, and the uncompromising line taken by the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Hammadi with President Rafsanjani (who described the Iraqi response as inadequate but not entirely

unsatisfactory), will make it hard for Iraq's supporters to claim that there is any real sign of willingness on Iraq's part to fulfil UN Resolutions.

8. The Iraqi Embassy in London continues to cause problems even though relations have now been broken. The Foreign Secretary is looking at recommendations that the Embassy should be inspected after the departure of the Iraqi diplomats to see whether, as the Metropolitan police suspect, it contains an arms/explosives cache. The FCO is also examining the question of which country should be the UK's protecting power in Baghdad (important for POWs). The Iraqis want the Zambians to act here. The US Government is conducting a similar review, as are a number of EC countries.

9. You may want to have a word about Iranian plans to send humanitarian food to Iraq on which there has been an exchange of Private Secretary letters with the FCO. The FCO are inclined to agree with the proposals in the Sanctions Committee if ICRC control of distribution can be effectively organised. You have reservations and would prefer to link the idea to an Iraqi commitment to grant ICRC access to POWs or at least to notify the ICRC of details about them. Unless the issue has been completely resolved by then, you might want to check the state of play on the Royal Jordanian Airlines Airbus contract.

Item 3: Current military situation

10. In the absence of the Defence Secretary and the CDS, who will be in Washington, you might invite the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Richard (Dick) Vincent, to report on the military situation. You might note that the first B52 raids on Iraq have taken place from Fairford without exciting an enormous press or public response.

11. The FCO paper on POWs, which was due to be taken at this meeting, has been postponed until Thursday so that the Defence Secretary can be present.

Item 4: Media handling

12. The Energy Secretary can report on broader issues. These might include countering Iraqi and other claims that the allies are widening the war: the focus of in-theatre briefing appears to place the main emphasis still on the more exciting operations inside Iraq. Making action in the Kuwait theatre of operations the lead item could pay dividends internationally.

13. Mr O'Donnell can report on day-to-day issues and any recurring themes from the weekend.

R.F.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

11 February 1991

GRS 850

CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIP
FM AMMAN
TO DESKBY 091730Z RIYADH
TELNO 002
OF 091450Z FEBRUARY 91
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

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RIYADH FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

FCO FOR FAIRWEATHER

CAIRO TELNO 6: MESSAGE TO PRINCE HASSAN

SUMMARY

1. YOUR MESSAGE HANDED OVER. PRINCE HASSAN DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO DEFEND THE KING'S SPEECH. DESCRIBES HIS DIFFICULTIES IN GETTING HIS ADVICE ACROSS. DENIES THAT ANY CHANGE OF POLICY IS INTENDED.

DETAIL

2. I SAW PRINCE HASSAN TODAY (9 FEBRUARY) AND HANDED OVER YOUR MESSAGE, WHICH HE READ CAREFULLY. WHAT FOLLOWED WAS, AT HIS REQUEST, A PERSONAL CONVERSATION WHICH HE ASKED ME TO TREAT AS FOR YOUR EARS ONLY.

3. HASSAN DID NOT TRY TO DEFEND THE KING'S MESSAGE EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THE KING HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO APPEAL TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THEM, RATHER THAN FOR SADDAM: HENCE THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE LATTER. HE SAID THAT THE SPEECH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY WORSE HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR HIS OWN INTERVENTIONS. BUT IT WAS BECOMING DIFFICULT TO GET HIS VIEWS ACROSS BECAUSE THERE WAS INCREASINGLY AN ATTITUDE OF QUOTE ARE YOU FOR US OR AGAINST US? UNQUOTE (HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY SAY THAT THIS WAS THE KING'S OWN ATTITUDE BUT HE IMPLIED IT). EVEN BADRAN HAD SAID TO THE KING QUOTE IF YOU REALLY NEED TO MAKE THE SPEECH, PLEASE GIVE US ANOTHER 72 HOURS UNQUOTE, WHICH, SAID HASSAN, WAS TO ALLOW TIME FOR THE AID MONEY TO COME IN.

4.
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE WHOLE EQUATION WAS MUBARAK, ABOUT WHOM THE KING FELT FAR MORE BITTER THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, KING FAHD OR THE OTHER GULF RULERS. WITH EGYPT THE WELL HAD BEEN SO POISONED THAT RELATIONS WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO PUT BACK ON A SOUND FOOTING, THOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT MUBARAK HAD SENT ONE OR TWO QUOTE POLITE ENQUIRIES UNQUOTE IN RECENT WEEKS. HASSAN SAID IT WAS USELESS TO TRY TO DISCUSS THE NATIONAL INTEREST. THE KING CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT PRINCIPLES WERE MORE IMPORTANT. THERE WAS ALSO AN ELEMENT OF EMOTIONAL BLACKMAIL, EG THE KING WAS WONT TO SAY QUOTE IF YOU DON'T WANT ME ANY LONGER I'LL PACK MY BAGS UNQUOTE. HE AGREED WITH MY OBSERVATION THAT THE KING SEEMED TO HAVE A STRONG EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT TO SADDAM AND SAID THAT HE SOMETIMES SUSPECTED THAT BOTH OF THEM HAD A DEATH WISH. HIS OWN CONTACTS WITH EG MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT SUGGESTED THAT MANY JORDANIANS WERE MORE WORRIED ABOUT HOW JORDAN WOULD PULL THROUGH THE CRISIS THAN THE KING SOMETIMES APPEARED TO BE.

5. I SAID THAT WE WERE DISMAYED, NOT ONLY OVER THE KING'S QUESTIONING OF OUR MOTIVES BUT BECAUSE MANY OF THE POINTS IN HIS SPEECH WERE SIMPLY NOT TRUE. IT SEEMED THAT HE HAD TAKEN IRAQI PROPAGANDA AT FACE VALUE. ALSO I FOUND IT ASTONISHING THAT THE KING COULD REFER TO THE QUOTE NEED TO PROTECT THE LESS POWERFUL AGAINST THE MORE POWERFUL WHO SEEK TO SUBJUGATE THEM UNQUOTE WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THIS ALSO APPLIED IN THE CASE OF IRAQ/KUWAIT. HASSAN AGREED.

6. I EXPLAINED TO HASSAN THAT WHAT CONCERNED US MOST WAS WHETHER WE WERE SEEING A SHIFT OF POLICY WHICH WOULD INVOLVE JORDAN GIVING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO IRAQ. HASSAN SAID THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THIS. AS HE HAD TOLD ME BEFORE, HE HAD LITTLE TIME FOR BADRAN AND SOMETIMES WONDERED WHERE HIS LOYALTIES REALLY LAY. BUT HE REALLY DID NOT THINK THAT THE KING WAS INTENDING TO MAKE ANY SUCH MOVE, AND HE (HASSAN) WOULD STRONGLY RESIST ANY SUCH SWITCH OF POLICY. I SAID THAT THERE WERE VARIOUS INDICATORS, FOR EXAMPLE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS AND ANY SIGNS OF CO-OPERATION WITH IRAQ, EITHER MILITARY OR CIVIL, WHICH WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE LOOKING AT KEENLY. HASSAN REPLIED THAT HE REALISED THAT. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE THE SAME POINT.

COMMENT

7. THIS CONVERSATION WENT CONSIDERABLY FURTHER THAN PREVIOUS EXCHANGES IN REVEALING THE EXTENT OF HASSAN'S DIFFERENCES WITH HIS BROTHER. HE IS CLEARLY A DEEPLY WORRIED MAN. AT ONE POINT HE SAID THAT HE FELT THAT HE WAS ON A ROLLER-COASTER - HE NEVER KNEW WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN NEXT OR HOW THE KING MIGHT REACT. FOR THIS REASON I DO NOT THINK WE CAN TAKE AS READ HIS ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE OF POLICY, THOUGH PERSONALLY I THINK HE IS RIGHT. I FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT, HOWEVER MUCH HE AGREES WITH YOUR MESSAGE, HE MAY JIB AT SHOWING IT TO THE KING, AT LEAST RIGHT AWAY. OVER LUNCH, I TRIED TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO KEEP TRYING TO GET HIS ADVICE ACROSS ON THE GROUNDS THAT NO-ONE ELSE WOULD OR COULD SPEAK SO FRANKLY TO THE KING. YOUR OWN MESSAGES, I KNOW, ARE GREATLY APPRECIATED SINCE HE REALLY FEELS BELEAGUERED. THE KING LOOKS INCREASINGLY A LOST CAUSE, THOUGH I WILL OF COURSE KEEP AT HIM. A MESSAGE TO HIM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT STILL BE WORTHWHILE, THOUGH I SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD ALLOW AN INTERVAL TO GET REACTIONS TO THE SPEECH OUT OF THE WAY FIRST.

REEVE

NO DISTRIBUTION

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Mr Appleyard - Cabinet Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

FOLIO 82 R

CABINET OFFICE
A 1585 (Revised copy)
12 FEB 1991
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FILE No.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

copy D. 15.5.91
K. [illegible]

11 February 1991

c- Mr Appleyard

THE GULF

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister this evening, shortly after his return from Germany, to report on the visit by Secretary Cheney and General Powell to Saudi Arabia.

The President said that Cheney and Powell had so far reported to him only in general terms. They had told him that the Allies would have to use ground forces. But they were not yet recommending a firm time for action to start. They found that the Commanders in the Gulf were quite comfortable with the concept of a land battle. They also thought that the air campaign had gone better than official briefing from the Pentagon had suggested. They believed that the Iraqi forces were immobile pill-boxes. There had been quite a number of additional defectors in the last day or so, who painted a gloomy picture of morale in Iraqi forces in the Kuwait theatre of operations. Cheney and Powell had also reported greater confidence than in the past about the casualty levels which would be incurred in a ground operation. They still needed to make a few final adjustments to the US forces. But they would be coming to him very soon, probably within a week, with a clear recommendation for the timing of action on the ground. All in all, their report had been very upbeat and very positive. They would fill in the Defence Secretary and CDS when they visited Washington the next day.

The President continued that he had Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft with him and they were talking about the other side of the equation, in particular the pounding which the US was receiving on the propaganda front. He had himself talked to the UN Secretary General that day and found him wringing his hands and lamenting over the difficulty of resisting a further meeting of the Security Council. He had urged the Secretary General not to believe the propaganda coming out of Baghdad. The Indian Prime Minister had told him that the Indian Parliament was in a state of rebellion over the permission granted to US aircraft to refuel in India, and he would have to withdraw the facility. President Perez of Venezuela was concerned about the forthcoming NAM meeting. The President continued that he himself had been a bit worried about Gorbachev's comments, although in fact they seemed to have come out reasonably well. Nonetheless, he was concerned that Saddam Hussain might come forward with a statement to the effect that Iraq would withdraw, provided certain conditions could be met. In these circumstances, we should stay on course and refuse to blink. But it would undoubtedly

SECRET AND PERSONAL

complicate our task. The fact was that Saddam Hussain was making some progress in stirring up Arab and Third World opinion based on skilful propaganda.

The Prime Minister said that we would be happy to reinforce the President's efforts with the UN Secretary General. He would telephone him on 12 February. The President said that would be extremely helpful. The Americans were going to send him some briefing material and some aerial photographs. He wondered what the Prime Minister made of King Hussein's recent remarks. The Prime Minister said that the King was a menace and doing himself a lot of harm. The Foreign Secretary had sent Crown Prince Hassan a message, urging him to tell the King that his allegations were simply untrue. He would be ready to follow this up with a message direct to the King if the response was unsatisfactory. The President said that the United States had decided to give up on the King for now and just hoped there would be no destabilisation of Jordan. He took some comfort from the fact that the King had not attacked him personally. Much of the problem seemed to lie with his American wife, who was a complete pain in the you-know-where.

The President continued that he had seen the Israeli Defence Minister that afternoon and found him quite demanding. He had taken the line that the latest SCUD attack had caused extensive damage and it was now very difficult to resist retaliation. Just as he was leaving, a message had come in about yet another SCUD attack, but fortunately it appeared to have landed in the sea. The Prime Minister asked whether the Israelis were serious about threatening retaliation or just trying to turn the screw to secure the funds. The President said that to be fair, Arens had not come up with any specific price tag. But there was no doubt that the Israelis were after substantial extra funds from the United States.

The President said he had just wanted to give the Prime Minister a quick fill in on the Cheney/Powell visit. The Defence Secretary and CDS would get a fuller account tomorrow. The Prime Minister asked how much notice the President and he would get of a request for permission to launch a ground campaign. The President said that Cheney and Powell would come forward with a recommendation for a definitive date and time, but would ask for two or three days leeway to take account of weather and other factors. He hoped the recommendation would come forward within a week. He could assure the Prime Minister as soon as he received a recommendation, he would let him know. He and the Prime Minister would get exactly the same amount of notice.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sir Robin Butler.

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

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c- Mr Appleyard







10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 February 1991

Dear Richard,

BURDEN-SHARING: KUWAIT

The Prime Minister was very pleased to learn of the Foreign Secretary's success in securing a substantial financial contribution from the Kuwaiti Government. He thinks it would now be right for him to send a letter of gratitude to the Amir. I should be grateful for a draft as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter to Jeremy Heywood (Office of the Chief Secretary, HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth office.

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Sir Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
A 1534
11 FEB 1991
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FILE No. .....

FOLIO 80

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

c - Mr. Appleyard

10 February 1991

R.B.F. for OPD/G (O) this evening

Dear Christopher,

HUMANITARIAN FOOD FOR IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 8 February about the proposal before the UN Sanctions Committee that a consignment of food from Iran should be sent to Iraq.

The Prime Minister has considerable reservations about this. He is doubtful whether the ICRC would be able to exercise effective control over the distribution of the food. If their influence and standing in Iraq is sufficient to secure that, they should surely be in a position to insist on access to POWs. Furthermore, if one such operation is allowed, the ICRC are likely to be swamped with further offers of food, and the risks of leakage to the military will consequently increase. The Prime Minister's inclination is to try to tie agreement by the Sanctions Committee to the food consignment to an Iraqi commitment to honour its obligations under the Geneva Convention to grant the ICRC access to POWs, or at least to notify the ICRC of details about them.

Depending on the view taken by other OPD(G) collleagues, this is something which might be discussed in the Committee at a meeting next week.

I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

C.D. POWELL

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DEPARTMENT/SERIES CAB 164 PIECE/ITEM 1987/2 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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CABINET OFFICE
A 1536
11 FEB 1991
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FILE NO.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Sir Robin Butler

9 February 1991

C - Mr Appleyard

FOREIGN SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION WITH BFCME IN RIYADH

The Prime Minister has seen Riyadh telegram No.394 about the subjects which General de la Billiere plans to raise with the Foreign Secretary in Riyadh. He has noticed in particular the reference to current planning involving a phased back-lift of British troops from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia over several months: and the possibility of retaining a brigade in Kuwait for a longer period. He does not think this is consistent with his often repeated statement that British forces in the area will be brought back home as soon as possible after the conflict is ended. He believes that our aim should be to bring out all those involved in fighting or the re-entry into Kuwait very rapidly indeed, even if this means rotating others from Germany and the UK for temporary duty. He hopes the Foreign Secretary will make this point to General de la Billiere during their discussions, and that MOD will take it into account in their planning.

I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C.D. POWELL

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Sir Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
A 1532
11 FEB 1991
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 February 1991

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THE GULF

I had a talk this afternoon on the secure line with General Scowcroft in the White House. There is really very little to report.

General Scowcroft confirmed that the Scud fired at Israel last night had been destroyed by a Patriot missile and that the damage in Tel Aviv had been caused by falling debris.

General Scowcroft said the President had made half a dozen 'phone calls to various members of the multi-national coalition. Generally it was holding together pretty well. Those to whom he had spoken included the Amir of Bahrain, the Netherlands Prime Minister, the Spanish Prime Minister, the President of Venezuela and the Indian Prime Minister. Only the last had given any trouble, indicating that India would have to suspend the permission given to US aircraft to refuel in India. Chandra Shekhar had said that personally he was in favour of continuing the arrangement, but pressure in Parliament against it was too great to withstand. For my part, I briefed General Scowcroft on the Prime Minister's talk with King Fahd.

Finally, we wondered whether there was significance in the fact that Saddam Hussein seemed to have made no public appearance or speech or broadcast (I think) for over a week. We noted that the Deputy Prime Minister, Hamadi, was today taking what was described as Saddam's reply to the recent Iranian peace initiative to Tehran, but that was not necessarily conclusive.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CAB 164/1987

Letter dated
09/02/1991

I am sending copies of this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

C.D. POWELL

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CABINET OFFICE
A 1487
8 FEB 1991
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FILE No.
FOLIO 76

CONFIDENTIAL

SIR ROBIN BUTLER
MR APPLEYARD

cc Mr Reeves
Mr Ball
Col Wilson
Mr Mathewson

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS : 7/8 FEBRUARY

1. This has been another quiet night. The main events have been as follows.

Military

2. A single SCUD was fired at Riyadh at 2300 hours, but was destroyed by one of two PATRIOT missiles which were directed against it. Some debris fell on a parking lot, causing no casualties.

3. There were only two TORNADO sorties. Both were reconnaissance missions against Iraqi positions in Kuwait. (Bombing missions are now concentrated in daylight hours.)

4. We have no detailed information about US air missions overnight. There are however reports that one US F-18 aircraft may have crashed after a raid, and a US helicopter was destroyed (not in combat) in Saudi Arabia.

5. A total of 2600 sorties have been flown during the last 24 hours.

6. Northerly winds are reported to be pushing the oil slicks in the Gulf towards the Saudi coast.

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Political

7. Under pressure from Congress, the State Department has announced that it is reviewing all military and economic assistance to Jordan in the light of King Hussein's speech of 6 February.

8. Mr Cheney and General Powell are on their way to Saudi Arabia.

9. President Mitterrand has expressed the opinion that the ground offensive will begin before the end of February.

David Gowan

D J GOWAN

0600
8 February 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

c - Mr Appleyard



CABINET OFFICE
A 1527
11 FEB 1991
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REF No. .....

8 FOLIO 75

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 February 1991

Dear Simon

DEFENCE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister this morning to commiserate about the PIRA attack on No. 10. In the course of their conversation, the Prime Minister mentioned that the Defence Secretary and CDS would be visiting Washington next week to see Secretary Cheney and General Powell. The President said that he would himself like to see them while they were there. You will no doubt wish to follow this up.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

HOUSE OF ~~COMMONS~~/LORDS

For answer on WED 13 FEBRUARY 1991 by US OF S (AF) PQ No. 2246F

Draft reply required by FRI 8 FEBRUARY 1991

74M

ACTION DIVISION:

Draft approved by	Signature or Initials	Contact Tel No
~~Deputy~~ Head of GFI	MJP	82739
Secretary of State		
Minister(AF)		
Minister(DP)		
US of S(AF)		
US of S(DP)		

Question copied by Action Division to

Cabinet Office
HM Treasury
FCO Pol/Mil
PS/SofS
PS/Min(AF)
DUS(F)
AUS(GF)
CPR
A/Head of Sec(O)(C)
Head of RP(P+B)
Head of GFI
Head of GFG

Answer copied to:- As above plus:

127

Type of Question:- First Order Oral (~~No .....~~); ~~Non Priority Written~~; Supplementary Questions are ~~not~~ required.

Please type Member's name, party, constituency and Question here

Lord Borthwick (Conservative): To ask Her Majesty's Government what is their policy for financing military operations in the Gulf.

DRAFT ANSWER

A substantial part of the costs have come from the Reserve through Winter and Spring Supplementary Estimates. In addition, some of the costs have been met from the original Defence Budget, and from contributions from other nations both in kind and in cash.

PQ 2246F

SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS

Cost of the Gulf Conflict

Q1. **Are there limitations on funding?**

A1. Whatever is necessary to enable our forces in the Gulf to fulfil their obligations will be forthcoming.

Q2. **Costs to be funded from taxation or borrowing?**

A2. That is something my rt hon Friend the Chancellor will have to consider in framing his Budget.

[if pressed] There is a £3½bn Reserve next year available for extra spending not contained within existing departmental plans.

Q3. **How much is the crisis costing?**

A3. The full operating costs are estimated to be £1.25bn in 1990/91.

Q4. **What are the costs additional to original defence provision for 1990/91?**

A4. Supplementary provision for £480M has already been granted; and a further £300M has been sought.

Q5. **What about the costs of hostilities?**

A5. The value of aircraft lost and weapons and ammunition consumed to date is approaching £200M. The equipment concerned is already bought and paid for and becomes a cost to the Defence budget only when it is replaced. It is not possible to forecast the costs of future losses and consumption. This will depend upon the intensity and duration of the war and the timing of replacement.

Q6. **What costs are to be funded from the original Defence Budget?**

A6. £40M of the additional costs.

Sharing the Cost of the Conflict

Q7. **What is the nature of the assistance we are receiving from Saudi Arabia?**

A7. We concluded an agreement with Saudi Arabia on 15 January 1991 which provides for free food, water, fuel, accommodation/facilities and transport for our forces.

Q8. **What is the value of Saudi Arabian assistance?**

A8. The value in cash and kind up to the end of March could be as much as £200M depending on the future conduct and intensity of operations. Where costs incurred by the UK are to be reimbursed, the payment may not be received until after the end of March and will therefore come in the next financial year.

Q9. **What is the MOD doing to seek financial contributions from the rest of the international community?**

A9. In the immediate area of operations, assistance is being received from Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE. We have also received help, both financial and in kind, from a number of other countries, including Germany and Japan, for which we are duly grateful. With hostilities now in progress, we are seeking further contributions from allies and other nations who are considering our request.

The Gulf Conflict and Options for Change

Q10. **What is the likely impact of the Gulf crisis on Options for Change?**

A10. Options will take account of any lessons from the Gulf. These are unlikely to change the requirement to restructure forces in response to the changed security situation in Europe, and to provide a robust military capability to respond to a wide range of future challenges. Much of our thinking has been validated by recent events, for example the need to retain a capability to deal with emergencies arising outside the NATO area.

Q11. **What about the effect of the Gulf crisis on the proposed changes in the Army front line?**

A11. We intend to proceed with the implementation of rationalisation proposals and other support changes in areas which do not affect our efforts in the Gulf.

Sir Robin Butler PERB c - Mr Appleyard

SEP

For OPD(G) 1st evening

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

74

8 February 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1544
11 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. .....

Dear Charles,

Humanitarian Food for Iraq

The Foreign Secretary wishes to consult OPD(G) colleagues about a proposal before the UN Sanctions Committee that a consignment of food from Iran should be sent to Iraq. The proposal could fit within the terms of Security Council Resolutions 661 and 666 in that the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) are seeking to make an independent assessment of the need for the food and we are discussing with them control of the distribution of the consignment so that it goes, as far as possible, only to civilians who are casualties, or the sick and needy.

We could seek to block the proposal on the grounds that we were worried that the food would find its way into military rather than civilian mouths. If we do so, Iran is virtually certain to act unilaterally for domestic reasons (to satisfy the constituency which is more anti-American than anti-Iraq). Other requests to send food to Iraq have come before the Sanctions Committee and so far the requirement for prior Sanctions Committee authorisation of food consignments to Iraq has been met. This is the first request from Iran. If the Iranians go ahead unilaterally, this could represent a major breach of the food embargo and encourage some other Arab nations to follow suit. If we obtain effective ICRC control, however, the food consignment would also make clear the allied point that we are not waging war on Iraqi civilians, but on Saddam Hussein and his armies. The Foreign Secretary believes that the balance of advantage would lie in authorising UKMis New York to agree to the proposal if, but only if, the ICRC conduct a prior assessment that satisfies their own strict criteria and if they control the operation.

/The key

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The key to our attitude would seem to be effective ICRC control of distribution. If that can be achieved, we could agree in the Sanctions Committee; if not, we should block. The Foreign Secretary would be grateful for colleagues' views.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Neilson (Energy), John Gieve (Treasury), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DEPARTMENT/SERIES CAB 164 PIECE/ITEM 1987/2 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
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or Number not used.

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SECRET

Sir Robin Butler

c - Mr Appleyard

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
071-270 3000

CABINET OFFICE
A 1538
11FEB1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

PRIME MINISTER

GULF CONFLICT: FINANCIAL POSITION OF SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT

In response to my minute of 1 February, you asked me to keep you in touch with developments. Since then, Treasury officials have worked with the Bank of England, the Cabinet Office and the Foreign Office to assess the ability of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to meet their financial commitments without disrupting the markets. I conclude that they should be able to do so in the short term; but that if the conflict is prolonged, both Governments may find it much more difficult to raise the funds. They might therefore become more reluctant to contribute; or their attempts to raise funds might affect confidence in the financial markets.

Analysis

There is inevitably tremendous uncertainty over the numbers, in part because both countries release little information on their

spending or net financial assets. But our best current estimate is shown below.

Assets and expenditure of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

	Saudi Arabia	$billion Kuwait
Usable assets at end 1990 Q2	65	75
(of which liquid assets)	35	10
Drawdown over 1990 H2	6	4
(of which crisis expenditure)	13	7
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Assets at end 1991 Q1	39	53

Note (a): this assumes that commitments attributed to 1991 Q1, mainly to the US are fully disbursed then. In practice, disbursement is likely to be slower.

Market Implications

The Saudis might be able to call upon assets of $59 billion at the end of 1990. They can meet their commitments in 1991 Q1 by running down their holdings of foreign debt, their time and call deposits and by domestic borrowing. The debt markets have sufficient depth that in normal circumstances, they would be able to cope with transactions of this scale even over a short period.

The Kuwaitis also face large outlays in the first quarter of perhaps $18 billion. They can draw on their Future Generations Fund, which has liquid assets of about $10 billion, bond holdings of $20 billion and equity holdings of $40 billion. Therefore they could meet commitments in the near future from liquid assets and bond sales and avoid major recourse to borrowing or sales in the equity markets.

In short, the main risk lies not so much in the ability of either Government to fund its short term commitments but in a misinterpretation of this activity by the markets or an overreaction to any heavy-handed efforts to raise the funds. It is clearly in those Governments' own interests to avoid this.

Secondly, the position could deteriorate markedly if hostilities continued well beyond the end of March. Then their ability to pay might be doubted and the markets would in any case become more nervous.

We will keep this position under close review but I see no case for immediate action. It should certainly not make any difference to Douglas' efforts to obtain assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait this weekend. And obviously we should take great care not to let our concerns filter out into the markets.

I am copying this minute to Douglas Hurd, Robin Leigh-Pemberton and Sir Robin Butler.

[N.L.]
7 February 1991

SECRET

Sir Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
A 1462
7 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. .....
FOLIO 71

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 February 1991

c - Mr. Appleyard.

Dear Simon,

DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL DESIGNATION AIRCRAFT TO THE GULF

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute of 6 February about the proposed deployment of six Buccaneers equipped with the Pavespike laser target designator system to the Gulf, which was discussed in OPD(G) on 6 February. He is content with what is proposed.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G), to the Chief Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir Robin Butler KCB

BLP

CABINET OFFICE
A 1475
8 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. .....

POLIO
£70

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

cc - Mr. Appleyard
Mr Reeves

7 February 1991

Dear Robert,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE
PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

The Prime Minister had a talk this afternoon with Dr. Sommaruga, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Dr. Sommaruga was accompanied by two members of his staff.

Dr. Sommaruga began by expressing his sympathy for those who were suffering as a result of the Gulf conflict and his feeling of frustration that the ICRC was prevented from doing as much as he would like to help our prisoners of war. The Prime Minister said that we were indeed very concerned about the POWs. There had been a huge weight of public revulsion at the treatment and parading of the POWs. We were disappointed at the ICRC's lack of success so far in securing access to the prisoners. He would like to hear more from Dr. Sommaruga about what the ICRC had actually done so far and intended to do in future.

Dr. Sommaruga said he would first express his appreciation of the way in which the United Kingdom had treated the Iraqis who were here. We had behaved in perfect conformity with the Geneva Conventions. He wished that all members of the international coalition were as diligent in fulfilling their obligations. In response to a question from the Prime Minister, he cited the example of Italy as a country which was not. Dr. Sommaruga continued that on 17 January the ICRC had reminded all parties to the conflict of their obligations under the Geneva Convention. As soon as they heard that prisoners had been taken, they had requested notification of the details in writing. They had subsequently reminded the Iraqis that public display of POWs was not allowed. They had also sent an additional communication of protest. The Prime Minister asked whether these representations had been public or private. Dr. Sommaruga said they had been private but very firm. Public protest was not the ICRC style. They could only act with the co-operation of the parties and had to keep channels open. Britain could help by showing that it had confidence in the ICRC, and by asking other parties to the Convention to make representations to the Iraqis. He had in mind Jordan, Iran, even the PLO.

Dr. Sommaruga continued that he was optimistic about the prospects and thought the ICRC would eventually be able to secure access to our POWs, although not immediately. The ICRC had been dealing with the Iraqis for 10 years. They were using a number of different channels, in particular through Amman. He had also written personally to Saddam Hussein (a fact which he would not want to be made public). The Prime Minister asked whether it was the case that despite all this, the ICRC had no evidence of how many POWs there were, where they were and what their condition was. Dr. Sommaruga confirmed there had been no response on these points. The Prime Minister asked whether all of these representations had been followed up. Dr Sommaruga said they had been. The Prime Minister asked what channel of communication had been used when it came to sending an ICRC medical mission to Iraq. Dr Sommaruga said that had been the ICRC's own decision. All they needed was visas, which they had obtained through the Embassy in Tehran. The mission had not been sent in response to an Iraqi request.

The Prime Minister said he assumed that the ICRC had faced similar problems before. Dr Sommaruga confirmed this, saying the only way to deal with this sort of situation was by discreet pressure and not too much noise or public condemnation. The Prime Minister questioned whether it would not be better to go in for some condemnation. If the ICRC got nowhere by being courteous and polite, they might have to try other methods. Dr Sommaruga said it was very important they should not be seen as an instrument of the coalition. That would be counter-productive for our PoWs. The over-riding aim must be to get access to them. He could assure the Prime Minister that the ICRC were very firm in private, so firm that the Iraqi Ambassador in Geneva refused to see him any more. He could well understand the feelings of dissatisfaction in the United Kingdom about lack of progress and the desire to see results. But he urged the Prime Minister not to lose confidence in the ICRC.

The Prime Minister said we would certainly not lose confidence. At the same time there was some irritation at the ICRC's tendency to equate the Allies' behaviour with that of Iraq. But he did not want to dwell on that. The question which interested him was what more could be done to get access to our prisoners. Surely as a minimum the ICRC could say openly that the Iraqis had refused access while the Allies had granted it? Dr Sommaruga said he would certainly acknowledge publicly that Iraq was acting in contravention of the Geneva Conventions. But to return to the point about equating Iraqis and the Allies: if he officially and publicly condemned one side, circumstances might arise in which he would have to do the same to the other, for instance over civilian casualties. The Prime Minister said that there was a clear distinction between civilian casualties caused unwittingly while attacking military targets, and the Iraqi practice of firing missiles at population centres. But he did not want to labour the point. His main concern was with access to the PoWs. He would ask Dr Sommaruga to keep him up to date regularly on his efforts. Dr Sommaruga said that he would do this.

Dr Sommaruga added that he was most appreciative of the additional financial contribution to the ICRC which the United

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Kingdom had just announced. He expressed the hope that we would also soon be able to ratify the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Prime Minister had written to him about this as Foreign Secretary 1989. The Prime Minister said that they were on hold for now, but we had not forgotten them. Dr Sommaruga said he also wanted to thank the United Kingdom for the practical support which the ICRC received for its operations around the world. The Prime Minister said this would be maintained.

Finally, Dr Sommaruga mentioned briefly the problems faced by the ICRC in the Occupied Territories.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Suma Chakrabarti (Overseas Development Administration) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

CHARLES POWELL

R H T Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1476
8 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

c- Mr Appleyard

7 February 1991

Dear Richard,

PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA

The Prime Minister had a talk on the telephone with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia this evening, lasting some fifty minutes. The Prime Minister spoke to the note enclosed with this letter. I will, therefore, record only the King's part of the conversation (except where the Prime Minister added one or two additional points).

The King thanked the Prime Minister for telephoning. He agreed that their talks in Saudi Arabia had been extremely constructive and useful. They had made clear to both sides what had to be done. It was essential to strike with the utmost force at military targets in Iraq and Kuwait, particularly NBC sites ('illegal weapons'). He was grateful for the Prime Minister's kind words about the performance of the Saudi armed forces. He wanted to underline the importance of striking only at military targets and not at civilian areas. We must make clear that we were not waging war against the Iraqi people: to do so, would cause great difficulties throughout the Middle East. The scale of Iraq's military machine had been a considerable surprise. We had to continue the air action until it was substantially destroyed. In particular, the communications systems had to be knocked out as well as roads, bridges and logistics. As to the land battle, it was essential not to start too soon. We should wait until the main military targets had been neutralised. We should cut off the supplies to Iraqi forces in Kuwait and isolate them from Basra and Baghdad. That would have a devastating effect on the morale of Iraqi forces. It was most important, also, to continue to destroy Iraq's fixed and mobile SCUD missile sites.

Taking up the further points in the Prime Minister's speaking note, the King said that he was very pleased to hear of our contacts with Egypt and Syria, and agreed that both countries remained resolute. It was very regrettable that King Hussein continued to take the line he did: it would not bring him any benefit from Saddam Hussein. He believed that Iran would remain neutral, although one heard different views from different Iranian leaders. But he thought that Rafsanjani was in the ascendant. Turning back to Iraq, he would be most interested in the Prime Minister's assessment of Iraq's CW and BW capacity and

how many SCUD launchers Iraq still had available. The Prime Minister said that we did not believe that Iraq had a nuclear capacity. We were dubious whether it had delivery systems for BW. But the position on CW was less happy: we simply did not know whether they could deliver it over a long distance. If they had the capacity, it was a bit surprising that they had not used it. But there was no doubt they could deliver it over shorter distances, and we must bargain with the likelihood that they would use it as part of a land battle. But our forces were well prepared and we would retaliate very severely indeed.

After the Prime Minister had deployed the remainder of his speaking note, the King replied that he wished to say to his dear friend the Prime Minister that Saudi Arabia would always stand side by side with the United Kingdom, because it regarded Britain as a friendly country in all areas. He would be delighted to see Mr Hurd the following weekend. He was very pleased that the Al Yamamah project was going so well, and Saudi Arabia wanted to develop relations in this field on a large scale in future, in order to meet its requirement for armaments. He would stress that such armaments would only ever be used defensively: Saudi Arabia threatened no one.

The King expressed his horror at the terrorist attack on No 10 earlier in the day and his relief that no one had been injured. The Prime Minister suggested that the King should keep in close touch in the immediate future. He could assure the King that Great Britain and Saudi Arabia would stand shoulder to shoulder until they had finished the task of evicting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The King spoke of the great personal pleasure which his talk with the Prime Minister had given him. He would not hesitate to get in touch in the weeks ahead. He looked forward to continuing their talks at greater leisure, perhaps in the United Kingdom.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,

CHARLES POWELL

R H T Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TELEPHONE CALL TO KING FAHD

- Like to thank the King once more for his hospitality during your visit there. You found your conversation with him extremely useful and illuminating on the background to the present Gulf crisis and Iraq's role in it. You look forward to an opportunity for a further discussion before too long.

- You also wanted to express your congratulations to Saudi armed forces for their success at Kahfji, as well as to the Royal Saudi Air Force on their performance in combat.

- Your view that the campaign is going very well and that great damage is being done to military and strategic targets in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. You see no hurry to embark on the ground campaign, although it may be necessary eventually. The important thing is to inflict the most extensive possible damage on his forces in Kuwait, particularly on the Republican Guard, so that an eventual land battle is neither too long nor too expensive in terms of casualties. Our own forces are ready for the land battle when it comes.

- At the same time, the international coalition is holding together remarkably well and you are grateful for Saudi Arabia's key role in that. You spoke recently to President Mubarak and found him very confident and determined: and we had the Syrian Foreign Minister here yesterday who was equally robust.

- There are some fainter-hearts both in the Arab world and the non-aligned movement. You disagree profoundly with King Hussein's speech last night. And there are signs that some non-aligned countries will try to come forward with premature and unfocussed peace initiatives. There is also some pressure in New York for a meeting of the Security Council next week. But

we are confident that these trends can be kept under control.

- You would be interested to hear the King's view about Iran and its intentions. It seems to you that Iran has every incentive to remain neutral and to hold on to the Iraqi aircraft. Their main concern seems to be to stake a claim to an important role once the conflict is over.

- We are beginning to give thought to how the conflict will end and what should follow it and are consulting very closely with the United States about that. You are sorry that the King was taken by surprise at some elements in the Foreign Secretary's recent speech. You hope that a fuller examination of the text and the Foreign Secretary's subsequent remarks will have made clear our view that it is for the Arab Governments themselves to decide what sort of long term security arrangements they want in the Gulf. You also acknowledge how extremely generous Saudi Arabia has been in its financial assistance to other countries in the region.

- You are most grateful to the King for seeing the Foreign Secretary during his forthcoming visit and it will be most helpful for you to have an account of the King's most recent thinking.

- You hope that your message about costs of our military effort will have been received in the spirit of friendship in which it was sent. Obviously we would be most grateful for any assistance Saudi Arabia felt able to provide.

- Meanwhile, you are delighted with the progress of the Al-Yamamah project and hope that we can continue to build on it.

c:\foreign\fahd (kk)

Cabinet Secretary

FOLIO 69



CABINET OFFICE
A 1513
8 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

MO 6/17/15/1

SECRETARY OF STATE

PRIME MINISTER

c - Mr Appleyard

Copy D. 6.3.91
C. Terrey
A. Park

BW COUNTERMEASURES

At the end of last year we agreed, following OPD(G) discussion, that we should proceed with a voluntary anthrax vaccination programme for our forces in the Gulf. We also identified the need to consider countermeasures against plague and botulinum toxin (BTx). It may be useful if I briefly update colleagues on progress made with our BW countermeasures programme.

2. On anthrax, the first 2 of the 3 doses in the vaccination programme have now been administered to the great majority of our forces in the Gulf (the exceptions are recent deployments, such as the Buccaneer force, who have received only one dose). We have been getting adequate supplies from the Public Health Laboratory Service to meet the UK forces' requirements and we have also provided, or will provide, doses to Saudi MOD, the WHO and British Aerospace. There should also be sufficient extra production over the coming weeks to satisfy the remaining 45,000 doses of an order from the Saudi MOD by early March and to start addressing other orders, including up to 500,000 more for the Saudis.

3. On plague, we have started a vaccination programme. The first of two doses has now been administered. In this case we acquired the vaccine from the US. Although licensed by the Federal Drug Agency it has not been granted a Medicines Act product licence in the UK. Both the National Institute of Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC) and the Department of Health have, however, cleared the vaccine for use. As in the case of the anthrax vaccine, the vaccination programme is voluntary, with the informed consent of



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SECRETARY OF STATE

each individual being obtained prior to immunisation. The US do not acknowledge a threat from plague and do not intend to vaccinate their forces.

4. On BTx, our assessments suggest that the Iraqis are likely to possess toxin in as many as four different strains. CDS Porton Down has been producing BTx antitoxin from goat and human plasma. Between them, the goat and human antitoxins cover all strains of BTx which we believe the Iraqis may have. For their part, the US have (relatively limited) supplies of BTx vaccine which they have used to immunise some of their servicemen in the Gulf. They have also been developing antitoxin for use as post-attack treatment. We have not produced BTx vaccine, since it was estimated that it would have taken several months to produce vaccines covering all the relevant BTx strains.

5. As with the plague vaccine, the BTx antitoxin does not have a Medicines Act product licence. It has, however, been tested by NIBSC; and NIBSC, the Department of Health and Porton Down have concluded that the antitoxin is of acceptable quality for use as post-attack treatment. It is not recommended that the antitoxin be used prophylactically.

6. Our intention is to administer the antitoxin once a BW attack involving BTx had been confirmed; and limit its administration to those assessed to have been in the area likely to have been affected by the attack. We are currently holding some 20,000 doses in theatre. (There is also a small stockpile in the UK). As in the case of the two vaccination programmes, administration would need to be voluntary.

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SECRETARY OF STATE

7. I am copying this minute to other OPD(G) colleagues, and to Sir Robin Butler.

(T K)

Ministry of Defence
7 February 1991

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PT. 1A
C91

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

CABINET OFFICE
A 1462
7 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. .....

FOL 69M

From the Private Secretary

7 February 1991

c - Mr Appleyard.

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Yours ever,

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

chex.jp/ttl/9

SECRET

FCO 69N

c - Mr Appleyard

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
071-270 3000

127/5
P7-14

CABINET OFFICE
A 1538
11 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

PRIME MINISTER

GULF CONFLICT: FINANCIAL POSITION OF SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT

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I am copying this minute to Douglas Hurd, Robin Leigh-Pemberton and Sir Robin Butler.

[N.L.]
7 February 1991

Sir Robin Butler

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 14/7D

6th February 1991

c- Mr Appleyard

CABINET OFFICE
A 1461
7 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

Dear Christopher,

VISIT OF ITALIAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Sr Rognoni came to London today for a short visit (arranged following an earlier suggestion by us for a telephone call to the Defence Secretary). He was accompanied by General Corcione, the Italian Chief of Defence Staff, and their Ambassador.

During a short téte â téte, Sr Rognoni said that Italians had difficulties finding out enough information about what was happening in the Gulf. It was difficult to present the Italian contribution effectively to the public. He had sent General Corcione (the CDS) to Paris, Washington and London two weeks ago, and very much welcomed the chance of a talk with Mr King. Apart from the political difficulties, the Italians needed to understand the over-all plan of campaign so that they could be comfortable about the role of the Italian Tornado aircraft under US tactical command. The Defence Secretary said that the UK faced similar problems, though on a smaller scale since our land forces contribution gave us access to a good deal of US planning. It was important for all of us that the Americans did not appear to be in complete control of the situation and that we could influence their thinking. Despite these difficulties he thought that public presentation was going quite well; and he was pleased that the WEU was playing a useful role. This week for example, two British warships would be operating under Italian tactical control.

Sr Rognoni raised the two countries mutual interests in the work of the ICRC. He said that both De Michelis and Andreotti had visited Switzerland to make representation about the Italian pilots in Iraqi hands. The Defence Secretary explained that he was meeting Dr Sommaruga later that afternoon and, at Sr Rognoni's request undertook to raise the Italians concern along with those of the UK.

Christopher Prentice
Private Secretary to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Over a working lunch at which Mr Mottram and General Incisa di Camerana were also present, the Italians engaged in an extended question time about what was going on in the Gulf. The UK team's response, was as follows:

Do the Arabs have staying power?

The Defence Secretary said that the Saudi's and Quataris had fought well at Khafji; and the casualties sustained would probably strengthen their resolve. They were keen to get into Kuwait though we must understand that many of them (eg Syrians and Egyptians) would not want to go into Iraq itself. CDS commented that most Arab countries had sent their best forces forward to Saudi Arabia and he thought they would fight well. There were some difficulties about co-ordination but, by putting most Arabs under Prince Khalid, these were not likely to be significant in practice.

Bombing: Is it really damaging the Iraqis?

The Defence Secretary said that we did not really know how far the Republican Guards had been impaired. Our Commander in the Gulf had reported to him intelligence of Kuwaiti hospitals being full of RGFC casualties; and there had been similar reports from PoW's of the poor conditions of Iraqi troops in Kuwait. This was all anecdotal and hard evidence was difficult to come by. CDS commented that we knew quite accurately how many bridges had been knocked out; the percentage of Petroleum and refinery and their related capacity that had been destroyed; and the number of individual tanks and ammunition stores that had been damaged. The problem was translating this into an overall assessment of capability of Iraqi forces and in particular their sustainability.

Israel

The Defence Secretary said a good deal of effort had been devoted to hunting Scuds. We had not got them all but were reasonably confident that the Iraqis could no longer launch a multiple, say 20 strong, missile attack. The US had done a good job in persuading the Israelis that they were better leaving the military task to the multi-national force rather than joining in themselves and risking the cohesion of the coalition.

Turkey and Kurds

The Defence Secretary said that we were probably less good at answering questions here than the Italians themselves, particularly about the Turks. We were concerned that if the Iraqis ended up very weakened by the conflict, the Kurdish problem would re-emerge. The Americans had made it very clear to the Turks that none of the NATO partners would have any sympathy for Turkey taking any opportunity to nibble a piece of Iraqi territory.

Iraqi aircraft in Iran

General Corcione said that he thought that the evidence was consistent with Iraqi moving the aircraft to Iran in the hope of preserving them for the long term. The UK team agreed that this was the most probable answer, referring to Rafsanjani's complaint about the movements and reluctance to accept any more. The Iraqis might well be calculating that, after the present conflict, they would have difficulties getting anyone (including the Russians) to sell them sophisticated aircraft again.

Soviet Attitudes

The UK team said that they thought that the Soviets would continue to be helpful over the Gulf situation, if only because they needed western money. Sr Rognoni said that he had cancelled a visit to Marshall Yazov using the Gulf as an excuse, but really because the Italian Government was concerned about the situation in the Baltic States. He revealed in confidence that the Italians had induced the Holy See to influence the Lithuanian Catholics to be more conciliatory towards Gorbachev.

Concluding the visit, the Ministers agreed that it was helpful to keep in touch given our close mutual interests in the Gulf. The UK team handed to the Italians the attached list of ammunition that they might be able to help provide and referred to possible assistance with bombs and other air delivered weapons too. The visit concluded with a photocall for the UK and Italian press.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Charles Powell (No 10) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office), and (by secure fax) to the Defence Attaché in Rome.

Yours sincerely

Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS FROM ITALY

UK requires the following ammunition types and quantities from Italy:

a. 155mm HE L15 plus charges and primers	-	31,500 rounds
b. 155mm Smoke plus charges and primers	-	12,600 rounds
c. 155mm Illum. plus charges	-	6,300 rounds
d. 8" HE plus charges and primers	-	10,080 rounds
e. 155mm Bomblet M483	-	12,600 rounds
f. MLRS rockets	-	3640 rounds
g. 165mm HE (Demolition round)	-	630 rounds

Further ammunition may be required.

UK would be grateful if Italy could ship the ammunition to the Gulf as soon as possible.

CABINET OFFICE
A 1454
7 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO. 67

Sir Robin Butler

MO 6/17/15/1J

SECRETARY OF STATE

c- M. Appleyard
Copy D.6.391
C. Terry
A. Parr

PRIME MINISTER

DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL DESIGNATION AIRCRAFT TO THE GULF

At OPD(G) this morning, we discussed the deployment of a further 6 Buccaneers equipped with the Pavespike laser target designator system to the Gulf. In the light of that discussion, I am minuting colleagues on what is envisaged and the costs involved.

2. On 24th January I announced the deployment of 6 Buccaneers to the Gulf. At that time, we decided to modify 12 Buccaneers for operations in the Gulf, to provide for long term unserviceability and losses in action.

3. The Buccaneers had, by midday today, flown some 18 operational sorties, each in support of Tornado GR1s equipped with laser guided bombs (LGBs). These missions have achieved a very high success rate - colleagues will have seen the television footage of successful LGB attacks on bridges.

4. The Joint Commander has now requested the deployment to the Gulf of the remaining six modified Buccaneers. These will allow Tornado GR1s and Jaguars to conduct missions using LGBs simultaneously from Muharraq and Dhahran at an increased rate. Our total stocks of LGBs should be adequate to support missions by 12 Buccaneers for some 2 to 3 weeks. Thereafter, operations would depend on the supply of additional LGBs from Allies.

5. 56 personnel would support deployment of a further six Buccaneers (in addition to the 125 already deployed to support the

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SECRETARY OF STATE

current six aircraft). The first three modified aircraft and their crews will be ready for deployment by 7th February and the second three on 10th February. This additional deployment would incur only small additional costs (perhaps £200K a week for personnel allowances and fuel) compared with being based in Scotland. I also propose that two further Buccaneers are modified, to be available as replacements for losses in action, at a cost of £400K.

6. Missions using LGBs can use fewer aircraft with fewer bombs and achieve a considerably higher success rate. For example, a Tornado GR1 mission against a target such as a bridge using standard 1000lb bombs might involve 10 aircraft with 8 bombs each (weapons cost £1.04 million); based on recent experience, the likelihood of success would be considerably lower than for a Buccaneer-accompanied mission involving 4 Tornado GR1s with 3 LGBs each (weapons cost £0.26 million). Since only six aircraft would be involved rather than ten, fuel and other operating costs would be less too. Increased use of LGBs would also have the useful effect of slowing the usage rate of 1000lb bombs, where we are already having to replenish in-theatre stocks (a laser guided bomb is a standard 1000lb bomb to which a laser guidance system is fixed in theatre). LGB also reduces collateral damage.

7. The further Buccaneers should be based with those already at Muharraq, to achieve the most efficient use of support facilities. We are consulting the Bahraini authorities. Since the doubling of the number of Buccaneers in theatre is unlikely to go unnoticed, I propose to announce the deployment of further aircraft at a press conference on Friday (without giving precise numbers). I would put this in the context of a wider briefing on the advantages of precision guided munitions but the difficulty of assessing damage on deployed Army targets (as opposed to bridges etc).

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SECRETARY OF STATE

8. Separately I am planning to deploy 4 Tornado aircraft fitted with a newly developed thermal imaging and laser designator (TIALD). This will provide a capability for laser designation at night and in poor visibility to complement the daytime capability of the Buccaneers. A decision was taken some months ago to accelerate development of this equipment. I will not, however, publicise its deployment initially since it is unproven and a potential surprise to the Iraqis.

9. I am sending a copy of this minute to other OPD(G) colleagues and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and to Sir Robin Butler.

Tom King

Ministry of Defence
6th February 1991

100% Recycled Paper

CABINET OFFICE
A 1452.
7 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS

FOLIO 66

SECRET - UK EYES A

B.0728

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 7 February

Item 1: Reconstruction of Kuwait: Opportunities for British Industry

The Trade and Industry Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Chief Secretary, Treasury have been invited for this item. A Note by the Department of Trade and Industry has been circulated (OPD(G)(91)10).

2. You might invite the Trade and Industry Secretary to introduce the paper. In discussion you might ask him why British companies previously had such a modest share of business in Kuwait (6.4% compared with Japan 11.4%); whether there is not more the British companies can do to get alongside the Kuwaitis in exile (e.g. a small trade mission before the restoration); and how companies from other countries can live with the conditions imposed by the Kuwaitis while ours apparently cannot. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to say how he proposes to approach the issue in his discussions with the Amir. The Defence Secretary may wish to cover the (separate) arms sales angle. The Chief Secretary can comment on the part that securing reconstruction work may play in the context of burdensharing more generally.

3. You may wish to conclude the discussion by underlining the importance of doing all we can to stimulate and help

British industry to secure a decent share of the Kuwait reconstruction market. You might invite the Trade and Industry Secretary to report to colleagues on further progress in about four weeks' time.

Item 2: Burdensharing

4. You might ask the Chief Secretary to introduce his note (OPD(G)(91)11). You might note his success in obtaining a general commitment from Shaikh Zayed and asking for his personal view on when this was likely in practice to be translated into money, and how much. You might then invite the Chancellor of the Exchequer to comment on the wider public expenditure background to this exercise.

5. The most important current problem is Japan, on which the Foreign Secretary may wish to add his comments. The Japanese Foreign Minister has written to Mr Baker to inform him that the $9bn. will be shared among the coalition allies through the Gulf Co-operation Council and that some will go to the United Kingdom. The current proposal is that a senior FCO official (Mr Weston or Mr Gillmore) should travel to Tokyo to follow up Mr Nakayama's letter. Mr Mellor may also suggest that further contacts should be made with the US Administration to secure a co-operative approach (Sir Charles Powell to General Scowcroft and/or a visit to Washington by Mr Mellor). The MoD meanwhile have prepared a list of costs on the lines proposed by the Japanese.

6. Mr Mellor may also want to discuss approaches to second echelon countries. You might ask the Foreign Secretary to report on his contacts with the Belgians, Dutch and Danes after the earlier discussion in OPD(G). Mr Mellor is likely

to suggest that you should approach the Norwegian Prime Minister, Mrs Brundtland, when she visits here next week. The Foreign Secretary may argue that other Europeans should be approached (e.g. Italy and Luxembourg) on European solidarity grounds and because the Americans are likely to be less successful there.

7. You might conclude the discussion by endorsing the Chief Secretary's line with the UAE; by agreeing that a senior FCO official should travel to Japan as proposed, adding that a Ministerial visit might well be needed as well; that the Foreign Secretary should report back to OPD(G) on the results of his visit to Saudi Arabia; and that further action with major potential donor countries and any suitable second echelon countries should be reviewed in the light of the Foreign Secretary's visit. Depending on the current stage reached in the exercise, you might consider having another word with President Bush at that point.

Item 3: US/UK Talks - Ceasefire Terms

8. If you wish, I would be ready to introduce the Note by Officials (OPD(G)(91)12) on ceasefire terms which was commissioned at OPD(G) earlier today.

9. The terms take account of US views and the OPD(G) discussion. They are deliberately pitched high and their acceptability will depend on the situation at the time. The first two sections are intended as the basis for a document to be presented to the Iraqis. The third section on modalities is for discussion with the Americans only at this stage. You might invite the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary to comment on the sections dealing with POWs and

on the timescales set for withdrawal (48 hours from Kuwait City and 15 days from Kuwait). On POWs the Foreign Secretary may suggest that the precise timing figures in paragraph 2 might be omitted for the Americans, pending further discussion of the whole POW problem in OPD(G) on Tuesday. The section on equipment would mean that the Iraqis would leave Kuwait pretty well empty-handed and would give Saddam Hussain no grounds for claiming victory.

10. You might invite the Attorney General to comment on the legal aspects. (His Department was represented on the small drafting group but the Attorney General will only have seen the paper this evening.)

11. You might conclude the discussion by approving the text, subject to points made in discussion, for transmission to the US Government through our Embassy in Washington, making clear that this did not represent a final position taken by Ministers. You might ask the Embassy to keep in close touch with US thinking to ensure that UK views continue to be fed into the US drafting process well before the US team sets out for London and other capitals. You might ask the Cabinet Office to keep OPD(G) informed on progress.

Item 4: Current Military Situation
Item 5: Current International Situation

12. You might wish to take these two items quickly together. The Defence Secretary may wish to mention his meeting with his Italian opposite number. The Foreign Secretary will be meeting M. Dumas in London at the latter's request tomorrow.

Item 6: Media Handling

13. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report briefly on his continuing discussions with ITN and the BBC and the action taken over encouraging Gulf support groups to look after elderly people with relatives in the Gulf during the present cold spell. Mr O'Donnell will be able to cover day-to-day media issues.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
6 February 1991

R.

CABINET OFFICE
A 1387
6 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.
FOLIO 65

SECRET - UK EYES A

B.0726

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 6 February: Overnight Action Points

Item 2: Current military situation

The Defence Secretary may wish to comment on President Bush's announcement yesterday that Mr Cheney and General Powell will visit Saudi Arabia later in the week to be given a first-hand report on the military situation. Their intention is presumably to be in a position to brief the President on the progress of the air campaign and the timing of the ground offensive. It is not clear whether they will be in Saudi Arabia at the same time as the Foreign Secretary.

Item 3: Current international situation

2. The Foreign Secretary may mention the visit today of the Syrian Foreign Minister, Mr Faruq Shar'a at his request. The Ministers will confirm plans for an exchange of Ambassadors shortly. There will doubtless be discussion about the allied military campaign and the role of the Iranians in promoting talk of mediation.

3. Sir Percy Cradock is expected to report on terrorism. According to media reports, two time bombs were placed overnight in Athens, one at the offices of Citibank.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
6 February 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A

SECRET UK/US EYES A
GRANBY SPECIAL HANDLING CHANNELS ONLY

Sir Robin Butler

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

6th February 1991

CABINET OFFICE
A 1453
7 FEB 1991
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FILE No.

Dear Charles,

VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

I attach a copy of the "View From Washington" following a call from the Chief of Defence Staff to General Powell this afternoon. We have subsequently been in touch with Secretary Cheney's office and plans are now shaping up for a short visit by the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff to see their US counterparts early next week.

We will be in touch separately to seek the Prime Minister's formal approval.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever

Simon Webb.

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

GRANBY SPECIAL HANDLING CHANNELS ONLY
SECRET UK/US EYES ONLY

CDS 2066/2/1

6 Feb 91

PS/Secretary of State

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON - 061530Z FEB 91

1. CDS spoke briefly to Gen Powell this afternoon on the general state of progress of the war in the Gulf. The General has briefed President Bush that weather has been a major factor in causing a delay in the air campaign of about a week to date. As he always does Gen Powell emphasised that there is no serious pressure on him or on Gen Schwarzkopf to commit ground forces before they are ready to do so. As Powell sees it, the President will not go for the ground campaign until recommended to do so by Schwarzkopf and him. The imminent visit of Cheney and Powell to the theatre in no way presages the start of a land campaign; they are going simply to get first hand reports from Gen Schwarzkopf whom they have not seen for over 6 weeks.

2. In agreeing with CDS that we need to keep the air campaign going to really soften up Iraqi ground forces, Gen Powell made the point that when the land campaign starts the air effort will intensify rather than stop. Gen Schwarzkopf does not intend to pit ground forces against strong well dug-in Iraqi resistance; he plans to make them move thereby exposing themselves to air effort. He does not believe that ipso facto the ground campaign will lead to a large number of casualties. [In an aside he said that US forces would open up Iraqi minefields by rolling a 15,000lb bomb out of the back of a C130! Two will be dropped on Iraqi forward defences tonight.]

3. CDS professed satisfaction with the conduct of the war to date, was pleased with the extent of the air effort against the Iraqi Army together with continued attacks on Iraqi infrastructure. Gen Powell concurred that we need to agree our conditions for ceasefire to ensure that Saddam Hussein will be unable to stage a repeat in a few years time.

4. CDS floated the idea that he and the Secretary of State should fly to Washington for a meeting with Mr Cheney and Gen Powell on their return from the Gulf. Gen Powell agreed that this would be a good idea and suggested that this should now be taken forward by Mr King and Mr Cheney. He also recommended that the visit should not take place immediately on their return, Sunday 10 February, but that we should wait a few days so as not to send any wrong messages to the media. CDS and Gen Powell agreed that they would speak again by telephone on Monday 11 February.

D G LITTLEJOHNS
Cdre
PSO/CDS
MB6173 83353MB

Good idea.
Pl. keep me in touch.
RCRB
6.2.

Sir Robin Butler

SECRET

CABINET OFFICE
A 1430
6 FEB 1991
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Mr Reeves
c-FERB

FOLIO 63

Confidentially the Home and Environment Secretaries have been invited to a meeting of OPD(G)(MH) (date still to be fixed) to talk about the publicity aspects of CB terrorism (see attached letter). The Lord Privy Seal, Lord President and Chief Whip also attend MH. I have suggested to the Home Office that we take advantage of this gathering to discuss Ms Heseltine's suggestion in the margins (ie get rid of the MH officials for that part of the meeting). There is no point in pursuing it at official level since the proposal is Ms Heseltine's own. It has a certain logic but involves a sledgehammer approach.

[illegible]
6/2

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1393
6 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. .....

FOLIO 62

SIR ROBIN BUTLER
MR APPLEYARD

cc Mr Reeves
Mr Gowan
Mr Ball
Mr Mathewson

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS : 5/6 FEBRUARY

The main developments during a night of little activity have been:

Military - The vast majority of RAF sorties are now being conducted in daylight. Two GR1A's from Dhahran last night carried out "Line Search Missions", identifying a convoy of vehicles and confirming strikes on Iraq's 48th Infantry Brigade and damage to an airfield in Kuwait.

- There were no reported major incursions, artillery duels or SCUD attacks during the night. There was a news report of a small skirmish involving Syrian troops overnight. Details are still sketchy and unconfirmed.

Terrorism - Two time-bombs went off in Athens overnight. The first was at the offices of the US based Citibank and the other destroying a car belonging to either a French diplomat or academic. No casualties have been reported.

H R G WILSON

0600
6 February 1991

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MESSAGE TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR PETER DE LA BILLIERE

The British Forces have earned the admiration of all of us here at home. As Commander-in-Chief, I congratulate those under your command on their conduct throughout the Conflict so far. My thoughts and prayers go with each and every one of you for the days ahead.

ELIZABETH R.

As a nation we are rightly proud of our Armed Forces. Never has that pride been more justified than by their conduct in the war in the Gulf so far. As they face a fresh and yet sterner challenge, I hope that we can unite in praying that their success will be as swift as it is certain, and that it may be achieved at as small a cost in terms of human life and suffering as possible. Then may the true reward of their courage be granted, a just and lasting peace.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1450
6 FEB 1991
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FILE No. 127/5

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 February 1991

Dear Robin

THE GULF

General Scowcroft telephoned me this afternoon without any particular reason. He said he was grateful for my reply to the message he had sent at the weekend assessing the state of the campaign. The comments were very useful and he was discussing them with the various agencies. The President had also been appreciative of the Prime Minister's telephone call to Mitterrand and the full account we had provided of it.

General Scowcroft went on to say that the visit of Secretary Cheney and General Powell to the Gulf had now been announced. They would be back on Sunday and be able to give the President the view from the field. Obviously one of the main considerations would be the timing of a ground campaign. He would give me a full account as soon as they had been debriefed. I said the Prime Minister would be grateful for that. General Scowcroft said the President would certainly want to telephone the Prime Minister to discuss the conclusions he drew from the visit.

I said that the Prime Minister would need at some stage to have a word with the President about burden-sharing. We had had a helpful response from the Germans: and the Foreign Secretary was on his way to Saudi Arabia shortly, to discuss the prospects of Saudi and Kuwaiti contributions. But there seemed to be a problem over the Japanese, with the Americans claiming that the full $9 billion was for them and the Japanese saying that it had to cover contributions to others as well. General Scowcroft said disgustedly that it was a typical Japanese performance. They made big announcements and when it came to the small print they tried to chisel you. He was sure the President would want to help the United Kingdom's efforts to obtain fair contributions from others, and would be ready to discuss this with the Prime Minister at the right moment. We agreed that it was probably best to wait until after the Foreign Secretary's return from the Gulf.

I said to General Scowcroft that we had been very grateful for the clear account of American thinking on retaliation in the event the Iraqis were to use chemical weapons. There was

SECRET AND PERSONAL

still some speculation in the press about possible use of nuclear weapons. But of course we discounted this heavily in the light of his remarks to me, and were confident that the established consultation procedures would be used if ever the need arose. General Scowcroft said that, at the present juncture, he could not conceive of circumstances where a nuclear response would be necessary or appropriate. If the idea ever crossed the Americans minds, they would consult immediately. I think that is rather a satisfactory response.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of DefencE) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

FOLIO 60

Ref. A091/291

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
L V Appleyard

OPD(G): 6 February

Item 1: UK/US Talks

You might invite Mr Appleyard to introduce the note by officials (OPD(G)(91)9) reporting the UK/US talks in Washington on Monday. The talks were important and timely. The Americans accept the need for the US and UK to come to a joint view on the main action points for a ceasefire and the immediate aftermath which they would then settle in general terms with key coalition members in advance. The exchanges on longer term issues may be helpful background for the Foreign Secretary's discussions in Riyadh and Taif.

2. On the principal action points, ceasefire procedures and concrete steps (criteria for Iraqi withdrawal) there is a broad measure of agreement. The Americans have a rolling list of high priority targets for the 24-48 hour period before a ceasefire is put in place. POWs are a very sensitive matter for the US. They share our view that rapid exchange takes precedence over screening. They took on board our concerns about TV footage of Iraqi POWs being interviewed blindfold and said that media access to POWs would be denied. You and the Secretary of State for Defence have meetings with the President of the ICRC later in the day: this is an important opportunity to put our view on POWs generally and you may like to review with the Secretary of State the main points to stress.

3. The Americans evidently believe that the ceasefire proposals can be reported, but not debated, in the Security Council. They accept the advantages a UN monitoring force would provide once a ceasefire had been implemented but are sceptical about a long-term UN peacekeeping force.

4. We turned out to be very much on track over advice to the Kuwaiti Government, Gulf security, policy towards Iraq after the conflict and Iraq/Kuwait negotiations. However, US officials are harbouring some grandiose ideas about regional groupings from the Maghreb to the Western borders of Afghanistan which our side found unconvincing.

5. The US propose to send a team to London in the next two weeks to reach broad agreement on outstanding points so that they can be concerted with other key coalition countries. In preparation for that, you might invite the official team to put to OPD(G) on Thursday our ideas about the concrete steps for an Iraqi withdrawal and OPD(G) next Tuesday our proposals on other issues including treatment of POWs: we would then send these to Washington so as to influence US preparations for the next round of talks.

Item 2: Current Military Situation

6. The Chief of the Defence Staff proposes to report very briefly on developments. There has been little further Iraqi activity. The CDS will mention the present situation on the oil spillage.

Item 3: Current International Situation

7. You may wish to say a word about your recent discussions with President Mitterrand, President Mubarak and Mr Hawke. The Foreign Secretary might wish to look ahead to his visit to Saudi Arabia and Egypt on 8-10 February. The Saudis took offence at press reports of a couple of extracts from his Blaby speech

concerning Britain's contribution to Gulf security arrangements and economic assistance from Gulf States to poorer Muslim countries. This seems to have blown over after the Foreign Secretary telephoned Prince Saud. You might ask what the impact on the visit may be of EC Foreign Ministers' agreement to extend assistance to Israel.

8. On burdensharing more widely, the Chief Secretary's group is also meeting on Wednesday morning, following his return from the UAE, and he is expected to put proposals to the Committee on Thursday. You may therefore wish to postpone substantive discussion of this subject until then.

9. The Foreign Secretary may mention Iran's continuing efforts to keep a high diplomatic profile. President Rafsanjani's statement on Monday that he would not oppose talking to the Americans in certain circumstances has been widely misreported as an offer of mediation. According to Moscow Radio, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister is to visit Teheran shortly. Manoeuvres continue in New York for a formal Security Council meeting. The general assessment seems to be that this diplomatic activity is directed towards striking a posture for the future rather than serious pressure for a ceasefire.

10. You might invite Sir Percy Cradock to say a word about the terrorist threat in the light of the discovery of bombs at a methanol plant in Norfolk, Virginia; and the cryptic messages on Baghdad Radio to all revolutionary cells to strike against Iraq's enemies. Except for the Virginia incident, no major terrorist activity still seems to be taking place. The position on Iraq's Embassy in London has been reported to you separately.

Item 4: Media Handling

11. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture. The Energy Secretary has spoken to ITN at a

senior level about their reporting from Baghdad, and they appear to have taken the concerns on board. A letter from Tariq Aziz to the UN Secretary General indicates that civilian casualties have been surprisingly low. Once the UN publish this letter, it would be advantageous for us to draw attention to it.

12. You might invite Mr O'Donnell to report on day-to-day issues of interest, which will include your meeting with the President of the ICRC.

R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

5 February 1991

CABINET OFFICE
A 1331.
5 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO. .....
FOLIO 55

SECRET

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

cc Mr Appleyard o.r.
Mr Reeves
Col Wilson
Mr Ball
Mr Mathewson
Mr Gibbons

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS: 4/5 FEBRUARY

1. The main overnight developments are as follows.

Military

2. During the past 24 hours the air offensive has been maintained at a high level. There have been 2700 sorties, of which 1540 were offensive. The attacks have covered a wide range of targets. A US spokesman has reported the destruction of 25 Iraqi tanks in Kuwait, and B52 attacks on Republican Guard positions.

3. The USS Missouri has shelled targets in southern Kuwait, the first operation of this sort.

4. Iraqi military activity in the Kuwait Theatre of Operations has been at a relatively low level.

5. There have been no SCUD firings.

Political

6. The UN Secretary General has condemned Allied action against Jordanian trucks on the Baghdad-Amman highway.

7. The Iranian President Rafsanjani has made an offer to mediate, but has also criticised the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for lack of flexibility during his weekend visit to Tehran.

SECRET

8. The Soviet media have announced that a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister will shortly be visiting Iran. The focus of this visit may be more on bilateral relations than on the Gulf conflict.

9. The Israeli Prime Minister has said in the Knesset that Israel will not take part in an international conference after the conflict.

Terrorism

10. An arson attack on the British Airways office in East Jerusalem yesterday evening caused extensive damage, but no casualties.

11. The US authorities are investigating an unsuccesful attempt to cause an explosion at a methanol plant at Norfolk, West Virginia. It is not yet clear whether this was the work of pro Iraqi terrorists.

12. Yesterday evening, Baghdad radio broadcast a number of cryptic messages which could possibly contain instructions for terrorists overseas.

David Gowan

D J GOWAN

5 February 1991

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FOLIO 57 R

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T01373

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A 1345
5 FEB 1991
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SIR ROBIN BUTLER

cc Colonel Wilson

GULF CRISIS CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Further to my minute of earlier this morning, you will wish to be aware before your meeting of the attached official letter from DOE to the water companies in England (similar letters would go to the companies in Wales and perhaps Scotland) about contingency plans to deal with the CB threat. Mr Wakeham handed it to me at OPD(G)(MH) this morning, and I told him I would raise it at your meeting.

2. It seems sensible to write in this way. The letter will no doubt leak and simulate media interest, though there have already been press reports of the CB threat.

W D REEVES

5 February 1991

Att

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FOLIO 56
CABINET OFFICE
A 1343
5 FEB 1991
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FILE NO. .....

SECRET

T01372

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

cc Mr Appleyard
Colonel Wilson

GULF CRISIS - CONTINGENCY PLANNING

I have seen Colonel Wilson's brief for your meeting at 11.30 this morning, which I look forward to attending.

2. One aspect you may care to raise is that of emergency legislation. DOE are drafting a Defence Regulation which would give their Secretary of State a wide range of powers for dealing with contamination by CB agents as a result of a terrorist incident. The question of requisitioning labour to mop up has also been raised, though this sounds like a non-starter. Such powers would be needed in a hurry if at all. However, the Home Secretary has just confirmed his (understandable) view that there is no pressing need to enact the Emergency Bill, though he accepts that it is right to have the draft Bill and Regulations available and kept up to date.

3. You may also wish to raise the subject of terrorism more generally in the light of two developments yesterday:

- Baghdad radio's cryptic messages which could be coded instructions to terrorists in the field
- the discovery of pipe bombs at a methanol plant in Norfolk, Virginia.

You may wish to ask the Home Office and Department of Energy to confirm that their contingency plans for protection against terrorist are fully in place.

W D REEVES

5 February 1991

SECRET

FOLIO SS

CABINET OFFICE
A 1347
5 FEB 1991
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

c - Mr Appleyard.

From the Private Secretary

5 February 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister telephoned Mr. Hawke this morning to discuss the Gulf and South Africa.

Mr. Hawke began by saying he had made a good resolution not to talk about cricket. The Prime Minister said that he had been intending to explain that all our best cricketers were in the Gulf. He congratulated Mr. Hawke on Australia's success.

The Gulf

Turning to the Gulf, the Prime Minister said that we were content with the progress of the campaign. We were in no hurry to get into a land battle. The air campaign was wreaking heavy damage on strategic targets and on logistics and supplies. The focus was increasingly on attacks against the Republican Guards. Mr. Hawke said that it was not inconceivable that the air campaign alone would be sufficient. The Prime Minister said that a land battle would probably still be required. But in any event, the air campaign would go on for some time yet. Meanwhile, we must fend off undesirable peace initiatives.

Mr. Hawke said that the Foreign Secretary's recent speech had been a useful contribution to discussion of the post-conflict situation. The Australian Government was basically in agreement with it, particularly the point that there should be no dismemberment of Iraq. Iraq had some greedy neighbours with territorial aspirations. The Prime Minister said that we were defending Kuwait's territorial integrity, and the same principle must apply to Iraq. We were giving a great deal of thought to the post-conflict situation. At the moment it was difficult to see how it would actually end: it might not be clear cut at all.

The Prime Minister noted that the Israelis were already saying that they would not attend a peace conference, although this was no more than their traditional position. Mr. Hawke said that Israel's refusal to deal with the PLO had been given credibility by the PLO's support for Iraq. But he hoped that the experience of war in the Middle East might persuade people to look more favourably on peace negotiations.

South Africa

Turning to South Africa, the Prime Minister asked what Mr. Hawke made of President de Klerk's recent speech. Mr. Hawke said it would be churlish to do anything other than welcome it. De Klerk had shown a lot of courage, and obviously still faced difficulties from some very antediluvian opponents. Australia had taken the lead in the Commonwealth in seeking to impose sanctions against South Africa. He now felt under a personal obligation to take a lead in dismantling them. The Australian Foreign Minister would be attending the meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers on South Africa shortly, and would be putting a proposal for the phased easing of sanctions. The Australian idea was to take 'people-oriented' sanctions first, including sport, provided it was integrated in South Africa: then move on to trade sanctions: and finally to arms sales and financial sanctions. It was not unreasonable to think in terms of all these measures being unravelled in the course of the current year.

The Prime Minister said he very much agreed that President de Klerk had done enough to enable us to lift sanctions. He very much hoped there could be rapid progress in the Commonwealth, so that the CHOGM in October would not be burdened with the issue. There could then be a forward looking meeting in Harare concentrating on the future CHOGM. He had made this point strongly to the Commonwealth Secretary General. Mr. Hawke agreed that we ought to be able to get a long way with lifting sanctions before October. Privately, the ANC were expressing understanding of the need to move. The Prime Minister thought the Secretary General already understood the danger of the Commonwealth being left behind and looking silly. Mr. Hawke repeated that he felt a sense of personal obligation and of urgency about this. We must not let the Front Line States dictate our position, but try to carry them along.

Future of the Commonwealth

Mr. Hawke said that he hoped very much that the dates of 10-12 June could be agreed for the meeting of CHOGM on the future of the Commonwealth. His Parliament was sitting until 6 June, and his Biennial Party conference was on 24-28 June, and he would want to be back in Australia well before that. The Prime Minister said he did not think the dates of 10-12 June posed great problems for us: rather, it was the Malaysians who had difficulties.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C.D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLIO 54

CABINET OFFICE
A 1346
5 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. .....

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

c- Mr Appleyard

5 February 1991

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

The Prime Minister had a talk on the telephone this morning with President Mubarak of Egypt about the situation in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister said that we were all tremendously impressed with President Mubarak's resolve, and his clear-cut and outspoken lead on Gulf issues. This commanded great admiration in Britain. President Mubarak said that the conflict with Iraq was a matter of principle for Egypt, which would not weaken. The Prime Minister continued that we were well content with the progress of the campaign. Considerable damage was being done by the bombing. President Mubarak said it was quite possible that the vigorous air campaign would on its own bring a quick end to the war. It could be over by the end of February. The Prime Minister said there was evidence that the air campaign was beginning to hurt the Republican Guard. President Mubarak said that he had sent a message to General Schwarzkopf urging him to put the main pressure on Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The Prime Minister agreed that the right way was to weaken the Iraqi forces before any land battle.

The Prime Minister asked whether President Mubarak saw any possibility that Saddam Hussain could suddenly withdraw, saying that he had stood up to the Americans and prevailed and had therefore achieved a victory. We very much wanted to avoid this situation: Saddam Hussain had to be defeated and humiliated. It was important to make sure that Saddam Hussain's military might was destroyed. President Mubarak said that once Saddam Hussain was defeated he would soon be seen off by his generals. That was why it was so important to put maximum pressure on the Republican Guard. Even if Saddam Hussain withdrew now, so much of his military machine had been destroyed that he would not survive. The Prime Minister said that he and President Mubarak were agreed that the right way was to go on with the air campaign for the time being. President Mubarak said this would then make it easier to put in ground forces. He continued to believe that the Iraqis might be forced to surrender on the basis of the air campaign alone. He repeated that he had no doubt that, once Iraq was defeated militarily, the regime would fall.

The Prime Minister asked President Mubarak about the state of opinion in other Arab countries. President Mubarak advised the Prime Minister not to pay too much attention to it. All was well in Egypt where he had the support of the whole people, including the People's Assembly and popular institutions throughout the land.

The Prime Minister asked what assessment President Mubarak made of Iran's intentions. President Mubarak said that the Iranians and Iraqis hated each other. Whatever impression they might be trying to give publicly, they would go to great lengths to do each other down. He did not think it at all likely that Iran would let Iraq have its aircraft back, either during the conflict or indeed afterwards. They might send food and medicine but not provide any serious help.

The Prime Minister asked what President Mubarak expected Saddam Hussain to do next. He was getting steadily more boxed in. President Mubarak said that he would probably use CW on his artillery, once he saw no way out. Our forces should all take the necessary precautions.

The Prime Minister asked whether President Mubarak thought the various rather dubious peace initiatives now being floated were likely to make ground. The President said there was no need to worry about them, it was just a case of countries fishing for a role in the post-war settlement.

The Prime Minister said he was grateful to find that he and the President saw matters very similarly. They should keep in touch. The President thanked the Prime Minister very much for telephoning: he had found it most helpful.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1348
5 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.
FOLIO 53

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

c- Mr Appleyard. 5 February 1991

Dear Richard,

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

The Prime Minister had a talk on the telephone this morning with President Mitterrand about the situation in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister said that he was just making a casual call: it was a week or so since they had last spoken and he would find it useful to know how the President thought things were going in the Gulf, and where they would go in the future.

President Mitterrand said that he thought the campaign was going ahead satisfactorily. France was now ready to move to the next stage of committing ground forces. He thought that would be necessary in order to break's Iraq's war machine. We would have to prepare public opinion for a difficult battle. It remained to be seen whether a great land battle would cause a total collapse of Iraq. As far as he was concerned, a ground campaign should be limited to Kuwait itself and the immediately adjoining areas of Iraq: he did not really see any point in waging war to the far corners of Iraq or of occupying any part of its territory. The Prime Minister said that he agreed with this assessment. He thought the air campaign should continue for some time yet. It was proving effective and inexpensive in terms of human life. Most importantly, it was weakening Iraq's capacity to wage war. The objective must be to make a land battle as short as possible, with casualties kept to a minimum.

The Prime Minister continued that we were nonetheless worried that Saddam Hussein might yet score a propaganda victory of the sort that he had enjoyed at Khafji. He might withdraw from Kuwait and boast that he had stood up to the United States, France and the United Kingdom, making himself a hero among the Arabs. President Mitterrand agreed this was a problem against which we must guard. It must be clear that Saddam Hussein had lost the war. Equally the peace must be very demanding on Iraq, particularly in terms of future constraints on the supply of weapons. The Prime Minister said that we certainly took the view that Iraq's boundaries should not be changed in any way. But more thought was needed on what should follow the conflict in terms of a wider Middle East settlement. President Mitterrand agreed that boundary changes must at all costs be avoided, otherwise there would be a chain reaction right throughout the region. It was not exactly a restful part of the world at the best of times.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Prime Minister asked whether President Mitterrand had any insight into Iran's intentions, in the light of M. Scheer's visit. Could we rely on them not to give back the Iraqi aircraft for use in the conflict? President Mitterrand said that M. Scheer had come back with the impression that the Iranians were sincere about remaining neutral in the conflict. It was anyway not in their interest to take one side or the other. They would probably try to use the aircraft to influence decisions on both sides. They were great hagglers and they would use the aircraft as bargaining counters to extract concessions from the Iraqis once the conflict was over. He could see them being very active when peace negotiations began. The Prime Minister commented that this was an interesting insight.

The Prime Minister said that he had seen the new French Ambassador the previous day and had enjoyed their discussion. He would try to see him again in future. President Mitterrand commented that the Ambassador was a man with an original cast of mind. There were two sorts of diplomats, the conformists and those who were alive: it was difficult to find many of the latter but M. Dorin was one. The Prime Minister added that we had also been very pleased to see the new French Defence Minister so soon after he took office. President Mitterrand said that he had come to the United Kingdom virtually on his first day as Defence Minister. He would be seeing him later in the day on his return from Saudi Arabia. He was confident that M. Joxe would do a good job.

President Mitterrand said he was very pleased that the Prime Minister had called and they should have another talk soon.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

CHARLES D POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET
UK EYES A



CABINET OFFICE
A 1349
5 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO. .....
FOLIO 52

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 February 1991

c- Mr Appleyard.

LOSSES OF AIRCRAFT OVER IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 4 February about losses of aircraft over Iraq, which I have shown to the Prime Minister. He has commented that it seems a bit hard on the families to tell them that the loss of the last Tornado may have been an own goal, when we shall never know for certain. But if there are legal considerations, they must of course be given full weight.

The Prime Minister may raise this with the Defence Secretary in the margins of OPD(G) tomorrow.

I am copying this letter to Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers Department) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET
UK EYES A

SECRET AND PERSONAL



CABINET OFFICE
1395
A
6 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.
FOLIO
51

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 February 1991

Dear Richard,

THE GULF

Since General Scowcroft was testifying up on the Hill this evening, I had a brief word with Bob Gates. The main purpose was to brief him on the Prime Minister's telephone call with President Mitterrand, which I did on the basis of my letter to you earlier today. I added that President Mitterrand had not given any hint of an impending French peace initiative: but in the light of the experience of the Prime Minister's visit to Paris in January, that was not necessarily definitive. M. Dumas was coming over to London to see the Foreign Secretary on Thursday: we were not quite sure why. I also mentioned the Prime Minister's conversations with President Mubarak and Mr. Hawke.

Bob Gates said that he would pass this on to the President and to General Scowcroft. The President would be grateful to the Prime Minister for contacting Mitterrand as they had agreed.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MoD) and to Sir Robin Butler.

yours ever,

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1332.
5 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.
FOLIO 50

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 February 1991

Pl. bring XI forward for OPDS(O)

Dear Simon,

THE GULF

General Scowcroft and I had our customary brief chat this evening on the secure line.

I recalled that the President had told the Prime Minister last night that he was returning to Washington for a meeting with Baker, Cheney, Powell and Scowcroft himself, at which they would be considering among other things when to start the land battle. I was curious to know how the meeting had gone. General Scowcroft said that it had been a bit of a non-event. He had set aside an hour for the meeting but in fact they had only needed 25 minutes. Most of the time was spent ploughing familiar ground. The only concrete result was a decision that Cheney would go out to Saudi Arabia, probably at the end of this week to gather impressions from the field commanders and talk to General Schwarzkopf. Scowcroft added that the general feeling at the meeting was of no great hurry about starting the land battle. Personally, he was getting increasingly nervous about waiting too long. More and more people were busying themselves with devising ceasefire initiatives, and the risk was there that Saddam Hussain might accept one of them. That would enable him to withdraw, saying that he had taken the most that the Americans could throw at him and survived, making himself a hero in the Arab world. That would be a bad outcome: and the land battle still provided the best means of destroying or at least reducing his remaining forces. I recalled that I told him yesterday that our assessment of the damage inflicted on the Republican Guards was considerably less optimistic than the American calculation. Our view remained that we should only start the land battle when Iraqi forces in Kuwait had been degraded by 50 per cent or so, in order to minimise our own casualties. General Scowcroft said this was one of the factors Cheney would have to assess. But he repeated that he remained uneasy about waiting too long.

I told General Scowcroft that we were getting to see more pictures on television of damage to civilian areas in Iraq, put out by Iraqi TV. I thought this was going to cause us increasing trouble as the days went by. General Scowcroft said that he had been talking to the UN Secretary General that morning, and Perez de Cuellar had told him that he was getting an increasing number of complaints from UN members about civilian damage and casualties. The fact was there were practically none:

the numbers were insignificant measured against the amount of bombing which had taken place. We had to find a way to get this into better perspective. I said that General Schwarzkopf was saying that quite a lot of the damage was probably caused by Iraqi SAM missiles falling back to earth. General Scowcroft thought this probably was a factor.

I referred to reports that President Rafsanjani was now offering to mediate between the US and Iraq. Had the Administration heard from the Iranians? General Scowcroft said there had been a few feelers but nothing they could focus on. Quite a lot of the peace initiatives going the rounds were self-promotion. The Iranians probably thought the war would not last long and wanted to be sure they were in on the peace negotiations.

General Scowcroft said the President had instructed yesterday that someone should come over from Washington to show the Prime Minister more of the satellite photography, but Colin Powell had said that we had all the photographs already. I said that arrangements were being made for the Prime Minister to receive a full photographic briefing on Wednesday. I would let him know if there seemed to be any particular gaps in our coverage.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

FOLIO 49 R

CABINET OFFICE
A 1326
4 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

SECRET

UO 4719

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

cc Mr L V Appleyard
Mr W D Reeves

GULF CRISIS CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. You are chairing the meeting in Conference Room B at 11.30am on Tuesday 5 February to discuss the United Kingdom response to calls for assistance following any use of unconventional, particularly CB, weapons by Iraq. Your bidding letter (FLAG A) went to a wide selection of Departments and the attendance list is at FLAG B.

Background
Briefing - expert spokesmen
Advice
Assistance

2. **OPENING STATEMENT**

You may wish to mention -

- Following the oil pollution experience, a clear need to anticipate further requests arising from Gulf War, be they CB, radiological or oil-related.

- Useful for individual Departments to review their own capabilities and plans but also be aware of others'.

- Build up a network of key people in each Department to speed up our reaction to any incident/request.

- Tackle the meeting in three parts;

One - The JIC Assessment (Sir Percy Cradock)
Two - Existing UK Contingency plans (Home Office)
Three - The UK response - Discussion.

Purpose
① By acquainting Depts with threat encourage you to consider what your Dept could contribute
a) by way of advice & briefing
b) resources
② Not warn.
② Get Whitehall network
③ Minutes of this meeting plus further contributions

SECRET

Unclassified note
Presentation

ITEM ONE - THE JIC ASSESSMENT

3. Sir Percy Cradock will speak on the assessment of Environmental Effects of Hostilities in the Gulf (J180/5 of 1 February - FLAG C). While there could certainly be more oil related incidents, you may wish to focus attention on CB aspects.

- Expert CB Advice. Dr Graham Pearson, Director CDE Porton is well qualified to answer queries of a technical nature on CB, as is Dr Mike Abrams (DCMO at DH). However the Assessment does however contain the following useful annexes:

Annex A - Characteristics of Chemical Agents
Annex B - Characteristics of Biological Agents
Annex C - Counter Measures
Annex D - Medical Response to the Use of CB Agents

From this Assessment, what are the most likely situations requiring UK response?

- Chemical more likely than biological? Radiological threat not discounted but of limited effectiveness.

- Spillover from use of CB as battlefield weapons? Casualties etc among own, allied and Iraqi troops. Post-war decontamination.

- Non-battlefield use. Attacks on Israel, Saudi Arabia Gulf States and Turkey by missile (?), aircraft etc.

- Some, albeit remote, possibility of CB terrorism elsewhere.

Interest or contribution

ITEM 2 - EXISTING CONTINGENCY PLANS

4. CB. Mr Stephen Boys-Smith, Home Office, will outline the UK response to an internal CB threat (OP ABSOLUTION) which has been drawn up on an accelerated time-table. The assets of the MOD and CDE Porton are crucial to this. You should note that the Department of Environment take over the lead for the long term clean up.

5. Nuclear Incidents. There is a well practiced UK contingency plan (OP SCARAB) for dealing with the terrorist use of, or threat to use, improvised nuclear devices. However the equipment of the organisation, known as CINDER, held at AWE Aldermaston is not readily transportable. Furthermore we would be reluctant to reveal widely our capability in this area.

6. Oil Incidents. Although the DOE are coordinating the UK response to the Gulf slicks, the Department of Transport - Marine Pollution Control Unit - lead for such UK incidents. The Department of Energy lead on oilfield fires.

ITEM 3 - UK RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE

7. Before dealing with the CB/radiological response, you might wish to confirm the current arrangements for oil slicks and plans for dealing with oilfield fires.

8. Oil Slicks. The DOE (Mr Derek Osborne) are coordinating this response. What is the latest position? Are more resources required from the UK? Are they available?

9. Oilfield Fires. Have DEn (Mr Bob Priddle) been approached yet in anticipation of assistance? What are DEn's and the UK oil industry's capabilities?

10. CB Incidents

- You may wish to stress that it is understood that specialist CB resources are scarce and largely committed to GRANBY and ABSOLUTION. Important not to dilute these too far.

- Impossible to be precise as to the requirement but helpful to have a feel for capabilities.

- You may wish to go round the table inviting Departmental contributions: Possible areas include:

a. FCO (Mr John Goulden) and ODA (Mr John Kerby)

- Lead Department? Coordination of press line? Requirement for expert spokesmen (CDE Porton)

b. MoD (Mr Richard Hatfield)

People
Environment
Forensic
Deterrence & response

- Availability of service protective and detection equipment; instructors; medical teams; drugs?

- Special Forces in event of terrorism?

- CDE Porton laboratories? Specialist Teams? (Very limited)

- RAF Transport for samples/evacuation assistance?

c. Home Office (Mr Stephen Boys Smith/Alan Turney)

- Draw on UK plans. Co-ordination within UK?

- Availability of laboratories?

d. Department of Health (Mr Mike Abrams)

- Medical teams/drugs. Sufficiency?

- Availability of NHS hospital beds?

e. Department of Transport (Mr Russell Sunderland)

- Charter/requisition of aircraft.

f. DOE (Mr Derek Osborne)

- Longer term decontamination.

- Advice on water issues.

g. MAFF (Mr Pat Murphy and Grant Meekings)

- Analysis of soil/foodstuffs.

- Food aid/remedial measures.

- Advice on importation of food from area.

h. Department of Employment (HSE) (Mr J Remington)

- Advice/ assistance/laboratories.

i. Any other contributions?

11. Radiological Incidents

- As for above. Any special features. Role of AWE Aldermaston (MOD).

- Extent of possible UK contribution?

- Security implications?

CONCLUSION

12. Depending on the outcome of the discussion you may wish to include in your summing up

- The expectation of further requests for assistance particularly for the effect of CB and oil related incidents.

- The need to keep Departments informed of any change to the threat (JIC)

- The appointment of lead Department(s) for dealing with requests. Any action required now? Press lines? Nomination of spokesmen?

- The continuous review of Departmental capabilities

- Importance of retaining a viable CB capacity for both GRANBY and ABSOLUTION

- The circulation of contact lists (by the Cabinet Office)

H R G WILSON

4 February 1991

Gulf Crisis: Contingency Planning

Tuesday 5 February

11.30 am Conference Room B

Sir Percy Cradock	-	JIC
Mr Gordon Barrass	-	Assessments Staff
Mrs Gloria Craig	-	Assessments Staff
Prof Bill Stewart	-	S&T, Cabinet Office
Mr John Goulden	-	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr Alan Turney	-	Home Office
Mr Stephen Boys Smith	-	Home Office
Mr John Warne	-	Home Office
Miss Alison Rutherford	-	Home Office
Mr Richard Hatfield	-	MOD
Cdr Chilton	-	MOD
Mr Derek Osborne	-	Department of Environment
Mr David Bellfall	-	Scottish Office
Mr Bob Priddle	-	Department of Energy
Mr J Remington	-	Health and Safety Executive
Dr Mike Abrams	-	Department of Health
Mr Andrew Merrifield	-	Department of Health
Dr Graham Pearson	-	CDE Porton
Mr John Kerby	-	ODA
Mr Russell Sunderland	-	Department of Transport
Mr Pat Murphy	-	MAFF
Mr Grant Meekings	-	MAFF
Mr Derek Hill	-	NIO
Brig Tony Budd	-	Cabinet Office
D Perrett		DoE
Sandra Brown		HMT

R

Department of the Environment
2 Marsham Street London SW1P 3EB
Tel: 071 276 3600
Fax: 071 276 5995

Permanent Secretary
Sir Terence Heiser KCB

FO 48

CABINET OFFICE
A 1307
4 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

SECRET

Sir Robin Butler KCB CVO
Permanent Secretary
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London
SW1A 2AS

c- Mr Appleyard.
cc- Col Wilson
Sir P Cradock

Copy D
6.3.91
C. Lerry
A. Part

4 February 1991

Dear Sir Robin,

GULF CRISIS - CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Thank you for your letter of 30 January. My office have already been in touch with yours to confirm that Derek Osborn will represent DOE at the meeting tomorrow.

It may be helpful to list in advance the kind of area in which we believe DOE might have a contribution to make in the event of environmental damage in the Middle East. This could include the following:-

i. Air pollution. We have already been involved in the work to assess the risks of serious damage to the global atmosphere from large scale fires at oil wells. This work could be refined and include more detailed assessments on regional or local effects of major fires at oil wells or other installations in the area.

ii. Marine pollution. Further releases of oil and their effects are the major threat here. We are all now well aware of the arrangements that have been put in place and are still being developed to contribute to an assessment and response on this.

iii. Fresh water pollution. There are a variety of obvious risks to fresh water either by interference with desalination plans or aquifers or other stores. The UK has strong expertise in water engineering and water pollution matters which could no doubt be tapped into in emergency.

iv. Contamination of land. Again it seems to us there are obvious risks with certain types of weapon, or the destruction of certain types of installation could lead to releases of toxic pollutants which could contaminate surrounding areas. We could offer some assistance with identifying relevant professionals and engineers to help with such incidents.

v. Radioactive releases. These might arise from damage to nuclear installations or from bombs. We have some expertise in the Nuclear Waste Inspectorate in this Department, but it may be that other Departments and their professionals would be better placed to take the co-ordinating role.

vi. Damage to natural habitats and wild life. We would be well placed to offer whatever types of expertise in ecological matters would be needed in such circumstances. The work we have done on the consequences of the oil slick are a good example in practice.

I have dealt with arrangements for dealing with an incident in the Middle East, which is the point I particularly raised with you. We are of course already playing our full part in establishing appropriate links and contingency arrangements for any incident arising in the UK. I have at this stage nothing to add to earlier exchanges on this subject.

Yours Sincerely

John Bailey

SIR TERRY HEISER
(Agreed by the Permanent Secretary
and signed on his behalf)

SECRET

13 OF 14

2 MARSHAM STREET
LONDON SW1P 3EB
071-276 3000

c- Mr. Reeves, Sir Robin Butler

How are we proposing to resolve this?

6.2.

My ref:

Your ref:

FOL/O 47

CABINET OFFICE
A 1340
5 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.

The Rt Hon Kenneth Baker MP
Home Office
Queen Anne's Gate
LONDON
SW1

4 February 1991

c- Mr. Appleyard
- copy D.6.3.91
C. Terry
A. Par

Dear Home Secretary

GULF CRISIS: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR LEGISLATION

I have seen the letter of 25 January from Reeves in the Cabinet Office to your Private Secretary, Mr Waters, on the above subject.

Despite the sweeping nature of the draft legislation I believe it is prudent to be making contingent provision for the sort of powers that would be required should there be an act of terrorism in the UK resulting in a release of CB agents.

Should the powers we are drafting be needed, they could be required at short notice. Although it is helpful to have your officials' assurance that the Bill could, if absolutely necessary, be rushed through within as short a period as 24 hours. I do not see how we could defend any inability to act in an emergency whilst waiting for legislation. This could happen for example if such an emergency arose on a Friday evening.

I believe it would be better to enact the Bill now, so that regulations such as ours could be made virtually immediately there is a need, and scarce resources would not have to be diverted in a crisis. Perhaps Ministers should make an early approach to the Opposition to seek their co-operation both in the enactment of the Bill and the minimisation of public alarm.

On reflection my Department is not pressing for a general power to direct labour. We think our requirements will be better met by including in our own regulation a provision to direct the provision of services.

I am copying this to Ministers of the departments on Reeves' circulation list.

Richard Shaw

MICHAEL HESELTINE

Approved by the Secretary of State and signed in his absence

recycled paper

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

FOLIO 46

2 MARSHAM STREET
LONDON SW1P 3EB
071-276 3000

My ref:

Your ref:

RECEIVED
- 4 FEB 1991
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ENERGY OFFICE

The Rt Hon John Wakeham MP
Department of Energy
1 Palace Street
LONDON
SW1E 5HE

4 February 1991

Dear Secretary of State

You and OPD(G)(MH) Ministers will wish to know that Kenneth Baker and I have agreed to the issue of the attached official letter from my Department to the water companies in England. A similar letter will go to the companies in Wales and consideration is being given to sending one to water service bodies in Scotland.

The main purpose of the letter is to outline Government contingency arrangements for the analysis of water samples for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. Although a claim that water has been contaminated by CBW agents is much more likely to be a hoax than genuine, it may be necessary to analyse samples if only to provide public reassurance. The letter also offers advice on handling media speculation and enquiries, of which there have been several already. Water companies have been seeking urgent advice on these questions.

We propose therefore to issue the letter immediately to security-cleared staff in the water companies. Since news of its contents might leak, Ministers will wish to be forewarned. Nevertheless, we believe that if news of the contingency arrangements became public knowledge, it would be reassuring rather than the reverse and could be represented as a sensible precautionary measure which we do not expect to have to use.

CES Bush

pp MICHAEL HESELTINE

(approved by the Secretary of State & signed in his absence)

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

To: Chief Executives, Managing Directors
or Directors of Operations,
all Water Companies in England

FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT POSSIBLE THREATS TO WATER SUPPLIES

Further to my letter of 15 January 1991, you might find the following additional information helpful.

There has been a good deal of speculation in the media, particularly since the outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf, about the possibility that Iraqi operatives or terrorists acting on their behalf might attempt to contaminate the water supply with chemical or biological warfare agents.

PUTTING THE THREAT IN PERSPECTIVE

As I mentioned in my earlier letter, the possibility that terrorists might attempt to interfere with water supplies in any way is assessed to be low. In particular, it would be difficult for them to utilise chemical or biological warfare agents effectively as a means of contaminating water supplies. The actual quantities of water drunk in an unboiled state are small in relation to the quantity supplied per person daily, so contamination of domestic water supplies would be a singularly ineffective use of these agents. This is also partly for practical reasons, with some of which you will be familiar, and partly because chemical agents tend to decompose in water and react with chlorine so that they are unlikely to endanger water supplies, unless introduced close to the point

CONFIDENTIAL

of consumption. Biological agents too are affected by chlorine and can often be destroyed by boiling. But it is impossible to discount all risk. Contingency arrangements are therefore in hand to deal with any suspected genuine incident. Further information about these arrangements is being given to members of the Department's National Security Working Group.

Nothing in this letter supersedes the advice in my letter of 15 January, which sets out the reporting arrangements for a terrorist incident.

ANALYSIS OF WATER SAMPLES

We believe that a hoax claim that water has been contaminated is much more likely than a genuine threat or incident. In such a case there would clearly be a need to reassure the public about the continuing safety of the supply. Recognising that few, if any, water companies would have the laboratory facilities and expertise to analyse water samples alleged to contain chemical or biological warfare agents, should this become necessary in order to provide this public reassurance, the Department is arranging for 24-hour facilities to be available for water companies at the Laboratory of the Government Chemist (LGC) at Teddington, with assistance if necessary from the Public Health Laboratory Services (PHLS) at their laboratories in Hereford, Newcastle or Chelmsford. Charges would be by arrangement between the parties concerned in the normal way.

Of course, water companies would be able to continue to analyse samples for those substances with which they are familiar, if necessary with help from the Toxicity Advice Service of the Water Research Centre or the National Chemical Emergency Centre at Abingdon.

RESPONDING TO THE MEDIA

If you are approached by the media about arrangements to deal with contamination of the water supply by chemical or biological warfare agents, we suggest that you take the following line: you have instructed your staff to be vigilant and that contingency arrangements are in place, although the likelihood of contamination of the water supply by chemical or biological warfare agents is low; it would clearly not be in the public interest to go into any of the details.

Copies of this letter go to Mr M G Healey (Drinking Water Inspectorate), Mr H Pearce (National Rivers Authority), Mr P Roderick (Welsh Office), Mr P H Taylor (Scottish Development Department).

bcc: Mr A Williams (Chief Executive (LGC); and
Dr J W G Smith (Director, PHLS)

PS/Cabinet Secretary

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

FOLIO 45

MO 6/17/15/1D

4th February 1991

cc - Mr Appleyard
Mr Reeves

CABINET OFFICE
A 1344.
5 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

Dear Charles,

REPORTS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES/DAMAGE

I said that I would let you have some analysis of the reporting of claims of civilian casualties and damage as a result of Allied bombing. We have not been able to carry out a comprehensive review of media reports but the very clear impression from even a cursory study is that the number of primary sources for these is very limited but that they are being heavily "recycled", partly as a result of conscious 'pooling' arrangements and also precisely because the amount of material available is so limited. The impression has perhaps been heightened because the return of a group of Western media to Baghdad has coincided with a lack of competing major news stories from the conflict. There appear to be three routes by which these stories are emerging:

a. Official Iraqi Sources. Judging by 'claims/allegations' generally - reported on Western media, official Iraqi sources contain much invective and few specific details. Indeed, such casualty figures as have been given by Iraqi sources have been low - presumably supposed to demonstrate how ineffective the campaign has been.

b. Western Media in Iraq. The limited number of Western media in Baghdad include CNN and ITN and two UK nationals, the Independent and the Sunday Times. Some papers are running stories filed by other Western journalists who have managed to remain - eg the Guardian is running pieces from a Spanish correspondent.

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
No 10 Downing Street

c. Reports from Neighbouring Countries. Some reports are emerging via travellers and refugees reaching neighbouring countries. The claims of attacks on Jordanian civil traffic came out this way, as did the weekend stories about damage in Basra.

The number of separate specific stories which can be clearly traced is small but each tends to be used to provide the basis of an apparently more substantial piece on casualties in general. For example, the Independent in Sunday's article about collateral damage and TV pictures of collapsed (presumably civilian) buildings around an apparently undamaged communications tower apparently came from the same Iraqi organised media trip to Diwaniya. Similarly several TV stations have shown (repeatedly) the same footage of damage in the 'outskirts of Baghdad'. By contrast, however, a few days ago we were seeing footage of how life in Baghdad is continuing 'normally'. Several recent reports have also included earlier stores in an attempt to produce an overall picture. The Iraqis have been taking the returned correspondents to the "milk factory" (or BW facility) attacked early in the campaign.

In fact, given that the Iraqis have been choosing sites for TV crews to visit, reports from within Iraq are notable for what they do not show. There have not so far been pictures of widespread destruction or of damage to religious sites. Reporters stress that they are being shown only what the Iraqis choose to show them and, despite censorship, their doubts about Iraqi claims come through (eg references to the camouflage on the 'milk factory'). This might be best illustrated by quoting Pat Arrowsmith (part of the "Gulf Peace Team" who have just left Baghdad): 'The Iraqis had to hunt about a bit to find things to show us'.

I attach a collection of press cuttings on this subject from recent days, which generally are built from the same small groups of incidents/stories - often in identical words.

We shall now be discussing further with the US the damage assessments for these areas to check that our current public line (based on instructions to try to avoid civilian casualties) is still sustainable.

I am sending copies of this letter to Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and its Media Handling Group, and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Civilian deaths rise around the missed targets

From **Patrick Cockburn** in Diwaniya, Iraq

"THIS last night was the first time they did not hit the area," said a man in Diwaniya, a city on the Euphrates, 125 miles south of Baghdad, as he surveyed the ruins of a small hotel for Egyptian workers. Allied bombers have been trying since 17 January to hit a tall pylon, which rises 150 feet over Diwaniya. In four raids they had blown the top storey off two hotels, the Yarmuk and the al-Khayam, and wrecked about 60 small shops in the neighbouring *soukh* (market), but without demolishing the target.

Just how many people have been killed is unclear. One officer said 35 dead, but the owner of the al-Khayam, loading surviving beds and mirrors on to a lorry, would confirm only four dead in his hotel and three dead or wounded in the street outside.

Elsewhere in Diwaniya, a depressing Iraqi provincial city sprawling across the Mesopotamian plain, Iraqi officials showed two areas which had been attacked in the first days of the war. By now green slime had formed on the surface of the water in the deep craters in a street of small houses wrecked by a bomb which, in one case, had killed a family of seven. A few hundred yards away a flour factory had been squarely hit, torn apart by the blast.

The Iraqi purpose in organising the visit to Diwaniya was to show that, contrary to allied claims, the attack on Iraq



with bombs and missiles has been inaccurate and has caused heavy civilian casualties. At the second and third sites I saw in the city it was impossible to get a clear view of potential military targets, but at the first it was evident the two hotels and 60 shops had been destroyed by a series of near-misses.

The picture, going by the evidence of Baghdad and Diwaniya, is that Iraqi civilians are not facing carpet bombing of residential areas, but that the allied planes and missiles are not as accurate as they claim, and frequently hit non-military targets. Further evidence of this was a salvo of five Tomahawk cruise missiles fired on Friday which roared over Baghdad, two landing in unquestionably civilian areas.

The initial shock effect on Iraqis of the bombardment – traumatic in the first few days – has worn off, leaving people apprehensive, but better able to estimate the risks they take. Iraqis traditionally store a lot of food, but absence of electricity means that food in freezers and fridges has to be thrown out. Petrol is rationed to 6½ gallons every 15 days and there are long queues at every filling-station. With the refineries destroyed, it is not clear where any more will come from. The dark grey cloud of smoke from Dohra refinery on the outskirts of Baghdad, first hit a week ago, can be seen more than 60 miles to the south of the capital, rising above the palm trees on the Mesopotamian plain.

It is probably in Baghdad and Basra, Iraq's second city close to the front, that the effects of the bombing are felt worst by civilians, partly because they had a higher standard of living. There were few cars or vehicles on the main expressway, indicating that people in the cities of the south have not tried to leave. The main movement of refugees has been from the richer neighbourhoods of Baghdad to the north.

Iraq yesterday made little comment on the war. However, the speaker of the national assembly, Saudeh Mehdi Saleh, told a delegation of Palestinians that the attack on Khafji had been a tactical manoeuvre, because the army wanted action, but no general offensive had been contemplated.

Dilemn



Palestinians gather in Amman to

Slicks threaten to overwhelm Saudi defences

TWO giant oil slicks in the Gulf

From Tim Kelsey

Gulf War Briefing

Military casualties

The allies say 30 of their troops have been killed and a further 34 wounded. Eighteen of the dead are Saudi

S
E

IRAQ claimed yesterday that 18 Allied bombing raids had hit residential areas and the people would use everything from kitchen knives to chemical weapons to force the enemy to defeat.

At least six Tomahawk cruise missiles struck Baghdad on Friday and two crashed in residential areas, narrowly missing the abandoned U.S. Embassy. Government officials said several people were killed or wounded in those attacks. There were no air strikes on the city yesterday.

The army newspaper Al-Qaddisiya said President George Bush was deluded if he imagined the bombardment would cause Iraq to capitulate.

From Bob Graham on the Iraqi-Jordan border

"The Iraqi leadership will use whatever power and weapons are at our disposal, starting from kitchen knives to weapons of mass destruction," it said.

Reality

The people meanwhile pick through the propaganda and come up with a reality far different.

I don't blame the pilots, I blame those who tell us lies," said Abdul Fateh Mohammed, who watched Allied bombers flatten his dry cleaning shop near Saddam's palace on Tuesday. "They were aiming for the Electric City because it was a proper target. Or maybe it was Saddam Hussein's house they were aiming for.

"One time they said a plane was shot down near my home. I went to see it, but there was nothing, they were lying. And again when I heard another plane was down, I went to look. And again, they lied. So I decided to leave."

Abdul reached the border early on Friday but even there he was not free. Iraqi soldiers stripped him of his savings of £42,000 — and all valuables.

Mohammed Sayed Ali carried the body of his best friend out of the rubble of their home. The 34-year-old Egyptian blames no one. They lived close to electrical power plants and a post office. The Americans just missed.

Trainee doctor Taha Abed, from Yemen tended injured in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul which has a large military base. "It is strange everyone still believes that Iraq will win the war," he said. Taha has now left.

Doubt

Reporters were taken to the wrecked factory the Iraqis claim was making baby milk, but the Pentagon insists was producing chemical and biological weapons.

ITN's Brent Sadler said: "It looked and smelled like a factory plant. But the watch-tower and partly-camouflaged buildings left me with a nagging doubt."



PROPAGANDA: bombed factory which the Iraqis say made baby milk and the allies insist made weapons

3 FEB 1991

The Guardian



The Guardian

Angry eyes of a woman, sad eyes of a child, all accusing

Eyewitness

Alfonso Rojo in Baghdad

"Is this what you call Western civilisation?" From a terrace, a woman shouts down to us; she is enraged, her eyes smouldering.

"Mea culpa! Mea culpa! Westerners are guilty, including you lot."

She grinds her teeth and jabs her finger at the foreign journalists with their cameras, microphones and notebooks, standing around the enormous crater the missile has just created.

"You are all guilty of killing people for oil."

She isn't one of the Shi'ites of Kadmiya; permanently swathed in a chador.

There are foreign embassies in the Carrada quarter and many Christians live there.

The inhabitants used to have a lot of money. The Iraqi woman is wearing a white tracksuit with the insignia of the United Nations. She speaks good English.

"We are human beings." The hate burning her up inside makes her eyes shine like two burning coals. She stretches her throat with each shout. "This isn't a game, these are human lives".

As she is dragged back into the house, she has enough strength and hate to turn: "Remember my eyes."

We had gone out in the morning for one of the trips organised by the Ministry of Information.

The first stop is a milk factory which, according to the Pentagon, was a camouflaged chemical factory. The second, a hospital where casualties from the bombings were being treated, and the third stop is a block of flats hit six days ago by a missile which went off-course.

In the twisted ruins of the factory we asked twenty times why the building had been covered in camouflage paint, and we taste some of the packets to see if they are really milk powder.

At about 11 o'clock, we hear several bangs and a missile whistles past, 150 yards above the ground. The group is still scattered when another missile passes, lower in the sky, also coming from the East, and heading for the heart of Baghdad.

Another passes, then another and another, six in all. Each is followed by the staccato of anti-aircraft fire positioned along the missile's route.

If the Iraqi artillery don't hit the missile, the projectile unswervingly finds the programmed target. What often happens if they hit the missile, is that it loses direction and crashes just anywhere with all its cargo of death.

When we arrive at Arbuk hospital, they tell us that around 11 o'clock a missile fell on the Saidia quarter and another in Karrara.

They bring a child, naked from the waist down and whimpering.

"What's your name?" The kid opens his huge eyes and wriggles like an animal caught by its leg in a trap. He has little bits of shrapnel in his left leg, a cut in his side and his feet are covered in blood.

"Ahmet Abdelada," he says in a barely audible voice.

"What happened?"

"I was with my family, opposite my house, and things began to fall on us, things from the sky."

The child, frightened by the cameras and the television lights, looks at the doctor and whispers something to him.

"He says that he doesn't know where his father and mother are," explains Dr Bogosian, who used to work in Britain. The doctor says the worst problem is that there is no electricity. He explains that since the outbreak of war, more than 200 civilians have been admitted to hospital with wounds caused by the bombs or missiles. Roughly 30 have died. He adds, without changing his tone of voice or his sad smile faltering: "War is an atrocious thing."

● *Alfonso Rojo is a correspondent of the Spanish newspaper* [illegible]

THE TIMES

Cruise missiles fray weary Baghdad nerves

From RICHARD BEESTON
IN BAGHDAD

THE first cruise missile came in low and fast, hugging the highway like a speeding white sports car travelling east into Baghdad, before disappearing above the rooftops and landing beyond the skyline with a dull thud and a puff of smoke about 10 miles away.

It was followed in the next 15 minutes by five more Tomahawks each cruising about 100 yards from the ground, their tiny fins visible for an instant as they shot past on a route mapped out by their on-board computers to guide them through the streets of Baghdad to a target south of the city.

But the high-tech war is so hard on Baghdad's nerves that the official radio is now threatening to put captured allied pilots on trial as "war criminals". Scores of anti-aircraft batteries, whose gunners have grown accustomed to the daily cruise missile shoot, opened fire with a barrage of flack intended to clip the projectiles and throw them off course or destroy them in the air.

Yesterday, either the gunners were successful or the missile's accuracy failed, as the people of Karrada and Masbah, two prosperous residential areas in Baghdad, discovered to their cost. "Is this the civilisation of the West?" screamed a housewife in a tracksuit as foreign journalists inspected the decapitated trees and a large crater 10ft deep and three times as wide near the American embassay in Masbah.

"*Mea culpa*, all of you are responsible for attacking people for the sake of oil. We are human beings. This is not a game, these are human lives."

The outburst, was one of the clearest signals that Baghdad's residents are beginning to foster a real hatred of the Western forces. Baghdad radio reported that 77 allied raids were carried out overnight and a commentary described the killing of civilians as "cold-blooded", recommending that allied pilots captured should be treated as war criminals not prisoners of war.

"You are equally responsible," said the woman to visiting Western journalists. "I suppose you are happy because you have a story now, but I say enough, enough civilian casualties."

After a fortnight of continuous air raids the civilian toll is beginning to mount and although the city is returning to some form of normality the shortages of fuel and food and the absence of water and electricity is putting great pressure on those trying to survive from day to day.

At the second civilian bomb site in Karrada, next door to the Abdel Maguid Hussein hospital, an entire two-storey house was reduced to a heap of bricks. No one was at home at the time the missile struck and an inspection of the debris revealed that the only casualty was the family cat.

Visits to two nearby hospitals, oganised by the Iraqi authorities, revealed that at least nine people were injured in the morning's raid and one woman killed.

Other suspected casualties, from the billowing smoke rising nearby from a strategic target censors will not allow us to reveal, were not released.

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FINANCIAL TIMES

Iraq radio says allied pilots machine-gunned civilians

By Mark Nicholson in Cairo and Reuter in Baghdad

IRAQI radio yesterday accused coalition air forces of killing "very large numbers" of civilians in the continued bombardment of Iraq and charged some pilots with machine-gunning pedestrians to death in the streets.

Iraq also repeated its call yesterday on Arabs everywhere to strike against the coalition of forces ranged against Iraq, saying: "All you have to do is take the first step."

The broadcast accused US, British, French and Italian air forces of deliberately bombing residential districts and civilian targets, and said coalition pilots should be treated as war criminals.

"In other words, they should be treated as the killers of defenceless women, children and old people, not as soldiers waging a war against other soldiers," the broadcast said.

Iraqi radio described the coalition pilots of being the "spiritual inheritors of colonialism."

The broadcast echoed the recent assurance of President Saddam Hussein by saying that Iraq was "sure of the eventual victory which God had destined for him."

It singled out King Fahd of Saudi Arabia for particular contempt, saying that Iraqis would uproot his family.

Two weeks of allied air attacks have turned life in Baghdad into a nightmare.

Every day has become a battle for life's most basic necessities. Every day brings fear of being killed or wounded by missiles or bombs.

There is no power. There is little water. There is very little petrol, so little that some motorists spend the night in front of filling stations, wrapped in blankets against the bitter cold, to gain a place in the queue.

By the time filling stations open at 8 am, up to 400 cars are waiting their turn to buy the newly-introduced ration of 30 litres for 15 days. Petrol sales resumed this week after a nationwide halt.

"The most simple things, all the things one took for granted no longer exist," one Baghdad resident said.

Iraqi authorities this week introduced a system which provides for the two halves of the capital, bisected by the Tigris river, to take turns in getting three days supply of water.

The next three days are waterless and few Baghdadis have the containers to store enough water to last them through the week.

Perhaps the worst aspect of life under the allied bombs is fear and uncertainty. Fear of dying or being maimed, fear of losing one's child, husband or parent.

After the opening attack of the war on January 17, a few local telephones still functioned. Wave after wave of strikes have ended all that. Now, not even ministries can communicate with each other.

US statements that the air war is being waged exclusively against military targets look different from Baghdad.

On Friday, five cruise missiles crossed Baghdad from west to east and smashed into the city.

Correspondents visited what Iraqi officials say was a baby milk factory before a missile reduced it to a tangle of twisted steel girders and flattened walls.

According to Washington, the plant was in fact producing chemical weapons. Inside the building however, spilt milk powder, containers, signs such as as "pasteurising line" and stationery appeared to indicate the plant was everything the Iraqis said it was.

Correspondents were taken to two residential areas which had been hit and two hospitals where the wounded had been taken.

One building destroyed in the attack was near the American Embassy. There was no indication of anything of military significance in the vicinity – or near the other destroyed houses correspondents were taken to see.

There were 11 wounded treated at two different hospitals. They included six children. One of them, aged 12, was hit by shrapnel that pierced his back and came to rest in his abdomen, according to a physician.

His young patient, he said, was on the verge of death.

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Daily Telegraph

IN IRAQ

Back to basics for civilians in Baghdad

By Bernd Debusmann of Reuters in Baghdad

TWO WEEKS of allied air attacks have turned life in Baghdad into living hell. Every day has become a battle for life's most basic necessities. Every day brings fear of being killed or wounded by missiles or bombs.

There is no power. There is little water. There is very little petrol, so little that some motorists spend the night in front of filling stations, wrapped in blankets against the cold, to gain a place in the queue.

By the time filling stations open at 8 am, up to 400 cars are waiting their turn to buy the newly-introduced ration of 6½ gallons for 15 days. Petrol sales resumed this week after a blanket nationwide halt.

"The most simple things, all the things one took for granted no longer exist," one Baghdad resident said. "Even shaving in the morning is almost impossible. Where do you get the water?"

Authorities this week introduced a system which provides for the two halves of the capital, bisected by the Tigris river, to take turns getting three days supply of water.

The next three days are waterless and few Baghdadis have the containers to store enough water to last them through the week.

"Old habits die hard," said another resident. "I still automatically flip the light switch when I get home. Nothing happens of course. I still turn the tap and expect water. Nothing."

But perhaps the worst aspect of life under allied bombs is fear and uncertainty. Fear of dying or being maimed, or of losing one's child, husband or parent.

After the opening attack of the war, a few local telephones still functioned and some people could exchange views.

Wave after wave of strikes have ended all that. Now not even ministries can communicate with each other.

"Bush said he had no dispute with the Iraqi people," a Baghdadi said. "It certainly looks different from Baghdad."

So do American statements that the air war is being waged exclusively against military targets.

Yesterday, five cruise missiles — flying at an almost sedate speed and plainly visible — crossed Baghdad from west to east and smashed into the city.

The air strike began at 11 am (0800 GMT) as a group of foreign correspondents visited what Iraqi officials say was a baby milk factory before a missile reduced it to rubble.

According to Washington, the plant was producing chemical weapons. Inside the building however, spilt milk powder, containers, signs such as "pasteurising line" and stationery appeared to indicate the plant was everything the Iraqis said it was.

After the cruise missiles swished overhead, correspondents were taken to two residential areas which had been hit and two hospitals where the wounded had been taken.

One destroyed building was near the American Embassy. There was no indication of anything of military significance in the area, nor near other destroyed houses correspondents were taken to see.

There were 11 wounded treated at two hospitals. They included six children. One aged 12 was hit by shrapnel that pierced his back and came to rest in his abdomen, according Dr Zaku Ghazi. He said the boy was on the verge of death.

Dr Paul Bogossian said he had treated several hundred wounded since the start of the war. About 50 had died.

● Christopher Lockwood in Amman writes: Damage to civilian areas of Baghdad does not appear to be heavy, Pat Arrowsmith, the British peace campaigner, said yesterday after being evacuated to Amman from a "peace camp" on the Saudi-Iraqi border.

Mrs Arrowsmith and other members of the "Gulf Peace Team" saw a small number of civilian casualties and limited bomb damage to residential areas. "The Iraqis had to hunt about a bit to find things to show us," she said. "It didn't look like Portsmouth when I lived there in the Second World War."

Reports from countries in the war zone are subject to censorship by the relevant authorities

Daily Telegraph

Allied raids wreck refugees' lifeline

By Jane Arraf of Reuters in Ruweished

THE main Gulf war escape route from Iraq has been almost cut off by allied air raids, refugees who trickled across the border into Jordan said yesterday.

Nightly bombing has badly damaged the main Amman-Baghdad highway, they said. This, and Iraqi exit restrictions, is preventing people fleeing the war from reaching Iraq's western border.

Relief officials said Baghdad was still insisting that anyone trying to leave Iraq, including those already at the frontier, must obtain exit visas in the capital. They said that up to 1,000 people, mostly Egyptians, were stranded at the Iraqi border post of Treibeel.

"We went back to Baghdad twice under the bombing," said Mr Mohammad al-Bedoui, an Egyptian teacher. "The first time we went back for visas to Baghdad they told us there we didn't need them, and when we came back they sent us there again."

Mr Bedoui, 40, said his wife and three children spent 10 days at Treibeel, wrapped in blankets, with no shelter from freezing rain and snow.

He and about 200 other Egyptians, crowded into the backs of lorries, arrived at the Ruweished transit camp after waiting for days at the Iraqi border post.

The Geneva-based International Organisation for Migration said nearly 9,000 foreigners who have fled Iraq since the start of the war will have left for their home countries by today.

But few people are now crossing at the Jordanian checkpoint.

Hundreds streamed across every day before allied bombs blew craters in the road and killed at least five civilians. Some Western diplomats say the planes may be aiming at Iraqi Scud missile sites, but Jordan maintains the attacks are deliberate.

Many drivers say they are too frightened to run the gauntlet of bombs on the road to Baghdad. But a 52-seat bus packed with Jordanians, most of them hoping to bring relatives home, waited to head for the Iraqi capital yesterday.

Mrs Fatma Naser said she had left her three grown children in Kuwait in December after 25 years there. Now she was going to bring them back.

Mr Fuad Rashid, 22, wearing Italian shoes and a Palestinian scarf, said he was going to fetch his fiancee from the Iraqi-occupied emirate.

But a veteran lorry driver, who had crossed the border the day before after dodging air raids and 20ft deep craters in the road, said: "This was my last trip."

One refugee said: "We were so afraid. They didn't care about civilians — they hit everybody."

Travellers said they switched off headlights and drove by moonlight on Thursday, hoping attacking planes would not see them.

2 FEB 1991

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

Saddam 'offensive now broken up'

By Will Bennett in London

THE scale of the Iraqi offensive along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border this week seems to have been larger than revealed so far.

Sources in London said last night that Iraqi movements other than those already known about at Khafji and elsewhere had been broken up by allied artillery fire and aircraft.

No further details were given but it does seem that a substantial number of Iraqi troops and armoured vehicles were standing by to exploit any successes by their troops along the front.

It now seems probable that the Iraqi offensive was more than a series of raids. It may have been intended to seize and hold a slice of north-eastern Saudi Arabia. One source said: "Clearly something big has gone on over the past few days."

Khafji has now been cleared by allied forces apart from some snipers and isolated pockets of resistance north of the town. The operation was described as "a clear military disaster" for Iraq by Lieutenant-General Sir Peter de la Billière, the Commander of British Forces in the Gulf.

The scale of Iraqi casualties at Khafji was drastically revised down yesterday, when the British military spokesman in Riyadh said 30 had died. An earlier figure of 300 was a "typing error," he said. Between 400 and 500 Iraqi prisoners were taken.

The Iraqi troops who carried out the raid on Khafji are thought to have been a mechanised infantry battalion from the 3rd Corps based to the west of Kuwait City.

This unit, which worked closely with the Republican Guard during the invasion of Kuwait, is among the best units in the army.

An Iraqi column was said to be moving south yesterday, but there was uncertainty in London last night about what it was doing. A considerable reorganisation is going on among the occupying forces in Kuwait after their attacks into Saudi Arabia. One source said: "They are getting themselves sorted out."

Cruise missiles killing civilians in Iraqi capital

Patrick Cockburn reports from Baghdad on casualties of the allied air assault

THE TOMAHAWK missile that landed on a house in the Karada district of Baghdad yesterday morning seriously wounded only one person, a 12-year-old boy called Mohammed Hussein. At the Al-Khindi hospital an hour later doctors said pieces of shrapnel had hit him in the back, entering his stomach from behind. They pulled up the blanket covering him to show the dark blood stain under the bandages, saying they would not know what organs had been destroyed until they operated. In the next bed lay an older man, his skin punctured in an earlier blast.

In Karada, a district of shops and small businesses on the other side of the Tigris, a crowd had gathered outside a house next to which the missile had landed. Picking his way through the broken glass and smashed furniture Fuad Saleh looked surprised that his wife and six children were alive. A little further down the street Hashem Jassem, an electrical engineer, showed the ruins of his kitchen, saying: "This is just bombing. There are no government buildings around here." He added that his brother, drafted into the army, had been killed on 23 January in south Kuwait. "I am proud of him."

The missile which hit Karada, was one of five Tomahawks which, looking like black aerial torpedos, had roared over Baghdad at 1,000 feet yesterday morning. A second had struck close to the American Embassy, causing a deep crater in the road close to Baghdad's largest open-air swimming pool, and decapitating a palm tree. I saw no obvious military targets in the area.

In the hour after the missiles struck casualties trickled into the hospital. The explosion near the embassy injured a man who arrived at the Yarmuk teaching hospital with one arm roughly bandaged by first aid workers and a line of blood from a scalp wound down his forehead. A girl called Suad Ibrahim, admitted to the hospital with skull injuries, said: "I was walking in the street. All of a sudden I lost consciousness and fell down." An elderly Iraqi who brought her to the hospital, said: "I just heard the sound of thunder."

At the two sites I visited there was no sign of military facilities nearby, indicating that the Tomahawks are considerably less accurate than claimed by the allies. Casualties were limited but it appears only a matter of time before one lands beside a bread queue on or one of the petrol stations where up to 500 people gather to pick up their petrol and paraffin ration.

There was no question of the explosions being caused by anything other than Tomahawks. I saw the missiles go over, was at the sites where they exploded an hour later and, at Karada, handled a piece of a missile.

The extent of civilian casualties in Iraq is still unclear. At the Yarmuk hospital, Dr Paul Bogossian, the Edinburgh-trained chief surgeon, said between 30 and 40 had died in his hospital and another 200 were wounded.

Despite the missile attacks people in Baghdad, while still apprehensive, are less frightened than in the first days of the war. Electricity is no longer supplied but water is available in each side of the city for half the week. Food is still plentiful, with fruit and vegetables on sale in the shops that have opened. But food in deep freezes is spoiling. Petrol is rationed to 30 litres a fortnight.

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2 FEB 1991

HANNAH LIMITED MEDIASCAN
841 Worship Street, London EC2A 2BC Tel. 377 1742 / 247 3511 Fax: 377 6101
1 FEB 1991

THE TIMES

Iraqi incursions may have caused surprise, some of the allied commanders, including Lieutenant-General Sir Peter de la Billière, the British forces commander, have given warnings in recent weeks that an Iraqi preemptive strike into Saudi Arabia could not be ruled out.

It should be remembered that the original reason for deploying so many allied troops to Saudi Arabia was to defend the kingdom against an Iraqi invasion, not to mount an offensive. Six weeks ago General Schwarzkopf's mission was still only a defensive one. So the allied forces, now adequately reinforced to launch an offensive, should be fully capable of repelling any Iraqi sorties across the border even if, as in the case of Khafji, it takes nearly three days.

If Saddam's orders to his troops, delivered in person to the operational headquarters last Saturday at Basra, were to follow a strategy of constant harassment by battalion or even divisional strength units, General Scwharzopf's plan surely will be to draw them as far as he can into the Saudi desert before engaging them, cutting them off from their supply line and making retreat more hazardous. The Iraqis can ill afford to use up too much ammunition during this stage of the conflict, unless their purpose is to occupy Saudi territory permanently. Yesterday, Baghdad claimed that this was not the objective.

Because of increasingly successful allied raids on ammunition dumps, the Iraqis could face serious resupply difficulties if they mount too many border raids which become bogged down in heavy crossfire. General Schwarzkopf reported on Wednesday that B52 bombers had set off a huge explosion at an Iraqi ammunition depot. About 125 storage facilities at the largest ammunition site in the theatre of operations were destroyed. General Schwarzkopf said allied aircraft would be back.

DAMAGE REPORT

Kurds tell of allies' precision bombing

By HAZHIR TELMOURIAN

A DETAILED account of the damage inflicted by allied bombers on the Kurdish region of northern Iraq was published yesterday in Europe by spokesmen of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of the two largest guerrilla organisations fighting the Iraqi army there.

It said that although there had been instances when civilian targets had been mistaken for government establishments, the allied bombing had been executed with precision and care, leaving almost no site of military significance intact.

The account could not be independently verified, but the union has proved reliable in the past. It was responsible for disclosing the news of the explosion at Iraq's rocket research establishment south of Baghdad, in August 1989, which claimed 700 lives. Its members relay news abroad by radio and telephone.

Ahmed Barmani, spokesman for the union, said about 129,000 deserters from the Iraqi army and 150,000 civilians had fled from Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq, to seek refuge in cities throughout the Kurdistan region. He also said that there were hundreds of civilian casualties of allied air raids, and that a captured allied pilot had been executed.

Mr Barmani said he received information every two or three days from Kurdish sources in Iraq. There was no immediate means of confirming his detailed report. The union is one of five main Kurdish political parties forming the Kurdistan Front, which says it is preparing armed resistance against President Saddam Hussein.

Mr Barmani said 300 Iraqi soldiers in military convoys were killed on January 23 by allied bombing. Kirkuk, a major oil-producing city near the Iranian border, had been under allied bombing almost daily, he said, and hundreds of civilians were killed by bombs that missed their targets. But he said military bases, munitions depots, air bases and oil wells were hit by allied bombing.

Baserma, a town built in northern Iraq after the 1988 chemical weapon attacks on Kurdistan, was heavily bombed on January 25, and at least 40 civilians died, he said. Mr Barmani said the pilot of an allied plane shot down over Mossul, near the Turkish border, had been executed by Iraqi secret police.

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The Guardian

1 FEB 1991

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Muzak sounds the all-clear as foreign hackpack returns

Alfonso Rojo listens as the rules of the reporting game are laid down to Westerners returning to a miraculously restored Baghdad hotel

IT'S 11.05 in the morning and there's a light drizzle over Baghdad. A tremendous buzzing can be heard and a cruise missile can be seen 150 yards from the al-Rashid Hotel, slowly crossing the sky.

The sirens haven't sounded and not until several seconds after the projectile hits its target and grey smoke mushroomed into the sky, can the deafening rattle of the anti-aircraft batteries be heard.

I've always thought that missiles travel at the speed of a flash of lightning, but no. The cruise is a light green colour and it moves slowly and quietly from east to west, watched by the 20 foreign journalists who have just arrived from Jordan.

The people start running like rabbits towards the hotel's underground shelter, abandoning luggage, bags, boxes of food, and dozens of bottles of mineral water.

Soon afterwards, another cruise comes by, also from the east, over the bank of the Tigris.

"Today is an ideal day for bombing and they are taking advantage of it," comments the senior official leaning against the marble wall of the hotel foyer. "Today we can't see the planes."

He explains that there is fighting in the south around the Saudi town of Khafji. The Iraqis are proud of it.

Last night, in the half-light of the hotel hall, I came across Naji Hadizi, the general manager, and I asked him why he was so relaxed.

"Bush said that he was going to finish us off in three days," he said very proudly. "We have come to the end of the second week of the war, and we have just occupied part of Saudi Arabia."

A communique says an allied counter-offensive over Kafji has been crushed: "Innumerable corpses lie abandoned on the battlefield ... prisoners have been captured, as many men as women, and they will soon be transferred to Iraqi territory."

Apart from the cruise incident and the occasional wailing of some siren in the distance, Baghdad is eerily quiet.

Yesterday, for the first time since dawn on January 17, the night passed without aerial attacks. The allied fighter-bombers must have too much work in the south.

The 67 foreign "pacifists" who had set up a "peace camp" at Arar on the Saudi frontier left Baghdad in two buses for Jordan. Four days ago they were evacuated from Arar. On the front of one of their vehicles a placard read: "Let this peace shine." They wore Palestinian scarves and they had tears in their eyes.

Sadun al-Janabi, the head of protocol from the Ministry of Information, gathers us at 2pm in the Sherezade Bar, which has become a "campaign press office".

He orders an interpreter to translate the headlines of al-Jumuriyah, one of the three newspapers still being printed in Baghdad, and he explains the "rules of the game".

"The more you co-operate with us the easier it will be for you," declares the indefatigable Mr Janabi. "Point number one, no information on damage inflicted on strategic installations can be given. Point number two, no important logistic data can be included. Point number three, you must show us your stories before sending them."

Smiling and friendly as usual, he makes clear that he has staff who speak English, French, Spanish, even Polynesian.

Afterwards he announces that each journalist will have 15 minutes on one of the three satellite telephone links which the big televison teams have brought and he announces that there will be a journey outside Baghdad in the morning.

The destination is 140 miles south of the capital, to a place where several houses have been destroyed and civilians have died.

Until three days ago, the al-Rashid Hotel had no running water, no electricity and there was a strong stench of rubbish.

Now it is impeccable. Employees worked round the clock for 48 hours. They have stuck tape on the windows and picked up all the broken fragments of glass as if they were diamonds, tidying everything to give the arriving journalists a good impression.

They have put back at the door of the hotel — the door through which a cruise missile went — the former doorman: a six-footer dressed like Harun al-Rashid, the caliph of One Thousand and One Nights.

The food is still rationed in the restaurant, and the lights are so weak that they look like wisps of fire, but music is being played.

While the Indian and Moroccan waiters criss-cross the room in the half-light, elegantly carrying the sparse portions on trays, you can hear the type of music piped into dentists' waiting rooms.

● *Alfonso Rojo is a correspondent of the Spanish newspaper El Mundo.*

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- 1 FEB 1991

DAILY EXPRESS

Baghdad

CRUISE missiles are continuing to pound Baghdad with pinpoint accuracy, TV newsman Brent Sadler revealed yesterday as he returned to the city.

But despite the daily bombardment life there is returning to normal and the people are still confident of victory.

The ITN reporter is the first British journalist allowed back into the Iraqi capital after being thrown out at the start of the war. He told how he watched two Tomahawk cruise missiles skim past his hotel and home in on their targets.

"We arrived here a couple of hours ago and were welcomed by the sight of two Allied cruise missiles whistling over the top of our heads at the front of our hotel and going off to some target we know not where," said Sadler.

Treacherous

"There's smoke spiralling away from me. But people around here seem pretty calm," he said in a live broadcast subject to Iraqi censorship.

Sadler said he and his crew faced a difficult 20-hour journey across the desert from the Jordanian capital Amman.

They travelled at night on roads which only hours earlier had been attacked by Allied planes.

He said protests from the Jordanian Government that several civilians has been killed in the air strikes appeared to be true.

"These protests from what I could see seem to be pretty well founded," said Sadler. "I saw four blazing fuel tankers.

"I saw huge bomb craters made by low-altitude bombing runs on those roads. There was a minibus that had nosedived into one of the road cavities and one saloon car also there.

"Inside the minibus one of the passengers was actually still asleep. I don't know how he survived it.

"It was quite an incredible sight."

Sadler, who had only been in Baghdad a matter of hours when he made his live broadcast to ITN, said the mood of the people had not changed despite the continual bombardment.



BRENT SADLER reports from Baghdad

Normal

Describing the mood, he said: "People are talking about victory, people I've spoken to in the street.

"People are very relaxed. They are going about their business as normal. They are very happy."

The Iraqi authorities have allowed a small number of journalists to return to Baghdad.

Until now reporter Peter Arnett from the American cable network CNN was the only newsman allowed to broadcast from the capital.

Sadler said: "The very small group of journalists that came here across the desert last night is just assembling, so it's very difficult to say what I can see around here."

DAILY EXPRESS

School ban on pupils' battle games

By GERARD GREAVES

CHILDREN have been banned from playing war games in a school playground because of the Gulf conflict.

Toy guns and mock fights are also barred in a move which parents have branded an insult.

But yesterday headmistress Christine Barry defended the ban at the 370-pupil Moreland Primary School in Islington, North London.

"We do not feel war toys or games should be allowed," she said. "War is not a good thing and the children should know."

Ms Barry, who has been backed by Labour-run Islington Council, told parents of the move in a newsletter.

Racial

"Several of our families have relatives in the war zone.

"It is important we make clear to all our children that this war is not a game or an excuse to express prejudice against racial or religious groups."

But Brenda Quinn, 41, whose 10-year-old son Dean attends the school, said yesterday: "It's ridiculous. War games are war games and kids will always play them.

"It's an insult to our boys in the Gulf."

● Labour-run Lambeth Council in London yesterday called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Gulf. It condemned "all attempts to whip up patriotic and pro-war hysteria".

DAILY EXPRESS

BAGHDAD REAPS THE WHIRLWIND



This picture, said to show bomb damage in Baghdad, was released by Iraq's official news agency yesterday — with no information on when it was taken

Late

dti
the department for Enterprise

FOLIO 44

SECRET

Sir Peter Gregson KCB
Permanent Secretary

Sir Robin Butler KCB CVO
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
LONDON SW1

CABINET OFFICE
A 1365
5 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

Department of Trade and Industry
1-19 Victoria Street
London SW1H 0ET
Enquiries
071-215 5000
Telex 8811074/5 DTHQ G
Fax 071-222 2629

Direct line 215 4439
Our ref
Your ref
Date 4 February 1991

c- Mr Appleyard

c- Col Wilson

Dear Robin

GULF CRISIS: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 30 January to Terry Heiser.

The Department of Trade and Industry does not need to be added to the list of those attending the meeting on Tuesday 5 February.

In drawing up the network however your people will want to bear in mind that there may be instances when there will be a need to export goods to the Gulf region at short notice. The Department's Export Control Organisation has procedures in place to deal with such emergencies. Our duty officer has access to certain officers on a 24 hour basis to expedite various export control matters.

I am sending copies of this letter to Terry Heiser, Michael Quinlan, Patrick Wright, Clive Whitmore, Alan Bailey, Geoffrey Chipperfield, Chris France, Derek Andrews, Geoffrey Holland and Tim Lankester.

Yours ever

Peter

SECRET

Recycled Paper

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CABINET OFFICE
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4FEB 1991
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FILE No. .....

FOLIO 43

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

cc Mr Reeves
Mr Gowan
Col Wilson
Mr Mathewson
Mr Gibbons

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS: 3/4 FEBRUARY

1. The main developments are as follows:-

- The loss of the B52 near Diego Garcia (three crew missing) has been announced by the US authorities. It is not thought to have been brought down by enemy action.

- Allied air raids have been continuing. Over 2500 sorties in the last 24 hours, concentrating on lines of communication and Scud locations.

- 4 US marines have died in a second helicopter crash over the Saudi desert. US have confirmed that 7 marines had earlier been killed by allied fire in the battle for Khafji.

- Occasional artillery exchanges overnight between Iraqis and US marines, but no significant Iraqi troop movements.

- The allies have claimed naval supremacy in the Northern Gulf.

- There is at least one new oil slick, emanating from Mina al-Bakr, and possibly a third.

2. On the wider diplomatic front, the Saudis have asked us to help lobby non-aligned countries (whose Foreign Ministers meet on 11-12 February) to head off ceasefire proposals. The UN has a new Presidency (Zimbabwe) that will not be able to hold off pressure for a formal Security Council meeting

SECRET

indefinitely. The President of the ICRC visits London this week. The recent Iraqi, Algerian, Yemen and French contacts with Iran do not appear to have amounted to any sort of diplomatic initiative. The FCO are inclined to believe French assurances that Scheer's presence was a coincidence.

3. The Saudis (in characteristic form) have complained about some innocuous remarks in the Foreign Secretary's speech on Saturday on longer-term security arrangements. The Ambassador has asked the FCO for some soothing words.

D C J BALL

4 February 1991
0630

FOLIO 41

Ref.A091/269

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G) : 4 February

Item 1: Current Military Situation

1. You might invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to report on recent developments. He proposes to give a brief overview, as last Monday, on the state of the sea, land and air campaigns and the progress they are making in achieving the objectives. He is also going to survey Saddam Hussein's present options. Sir Percy Cradock might comment on our assessment of Iraqi intentions behind the battle for Khafji, and whether it was intended to be part of a larger scale invasion. You may also like to mention the assessment sent by General Scowcroft yesterday evening, which will have been circulated to participants. If anything, it is a bit more upbeat than our own but this may be because it is a version of a general briefing circulated to all allies. You will also want to report on the conversation which I understand that you will be having later this evening with President Bush.

2. Officials are currently in Washington discussing policy on the ending and longer-term aftermath of hostilities. A paper on the talks will be tabled for discussion on Wednesday.

Item 2: Current International Situation

3. You might open by saying a word about your own meeting with Vice President Quayle. The Vice President shed little new

light on US thinking, but noted the pressure for an early ground attack, and in the longer term for an international conference. You might invite Mr Hogg to give an account of the Foreign Secretary's telephone conversation with Mr Baker on Friday.

4. You might invite Mr Hogg to report briefly on the United Nations, where we have bought more time, although the new Presidency (Zimbabwe) will not be able to hold off pressure for a formal Security Council meeting indefinitely. He might also cover the recent Iraqi, Algerian, Yemeni and French contacts with Iran. These do not seem to have amounted to any sort of initiative, and the Iranians are reported to have given a firm response to Saddam's message. The French deny that Scheer met the Iraqis in Tehran and the Foreign Office are inclined to believe that their presence was coincidental. The Foreign Minister of the non-aligned movement (NAM) will meet in Belgrade on 11-12 February. Prince Saud has asked for our help in lobbying to see off possible NAM ceasefire proposals. Mr Hogg may mention under this heading briefings given to Commonwealth Governments and attempts to stiffen the Yugoslavs. The Syrian Foreign Minister has asked to come to London to see the Foreign Secretary before 10 February, but his purpose is so far unclear.

5. Apart from a brief report on progress, further discussion of brudensharing might await the Chief Secretary's return from the Gulf and the next meeting of his Sub-Committee on Wednesday, after which he will be reporting back to OPD(G). The Foreign Secretary's visit to Cairo and Saudi Arabia is now becoming firmer for 8 - 10 February.

6. On ICRC, the President of the International Committee (Mr Sommaruga) visits London this week. He made a statement on 1 February which tended to equate Iraq and the allies without highlighting Iraqi violations. You might invite Mr Hogg and the

Defence Secretary to give their preliminary views on the line that should be taken with him.

7. Mr Hogg will also report on the oil slicks. The first slick seems to have settled north of Manifah, 5-10 miles from the coast. The British equipment has arrived and is being installed. The EC has made a formal offer of help. The Saudis are concerned about a second slick heading south from Mina al Bakr. You might invite the Defence Secretary to check that the prevention of the flow by military means is receiving a sufficiently high priority.

8. It would again be premature to discuss closure of the Iraqi Embassy, especially in the absence of the Foreign Secretary, since Mr Hogg is not aware of the all considerations. If anyone raises the issue, I suggest you head it off until a later meeting.

Item 3: Media Handling

9. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture and Mr O'Donnell to cover matters of day-to-day media handling. Now that journalists have returned to Baghdad we may need to counter reports of the effect of the campaign on civilian life in Baghdad, especially when there may not be much new about the allies' operations in the next week or so. It is worth noting, however that the BBC are stopping their continuous television coverage, allegedly on grounds of cost, until the war moves into a new phase. Backbenchers have been provided with material on the US/Soviet statement, POWs and Iran as well as general updates on the international effort. Current media attention is focusing increasingly on war aims, ceasefires and longer-term security arrangements.

R.E.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

3 February 1991

SECRET UK EYES A
MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE

PCRS FOLIO 42

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

4th February 1991

c- McAppleyard

CABINET OFFICE
A 1320
4FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.

Dear Charles,

LOSSES OF AIRCRAFT OVER IRAQ

The Prime Minister should be aware of circumstantial evidence emerging that the possible cause of the loss of one of the five aircraft over Iraq was premature detonation of one of its bombs.

The loss of an RAF aircraft is always of concern and normally the subject of a detailed Board of Inquiry. Every effort is being made to investigate the losses of Tornados in combat, although in the absence of recoverable wreckage and crew interviews, it is unlikely that the cause of individual losses will ever be known for certain. Since most of the missions were at night, little evidence is available from other members of the formations concerned.

That said, each of the losses to date has been examined. From the information available, enemy action is assessed as the most likely cause for the loss of three Tornado aircraft carrying out sorties using 1000 lb bombs. A fourth aircraft was seen to crash shortly after delivering JP 233 at low level over a heavily defended airfield.

The last Tornado lost on 24th January had, however, delivered 1000 lb bombs from level flight at medium altitude (about 20,000 ft). Very heavy surface to air missile (SAM) and Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA) activity was experienced before weapon delivery. The bombs were fuzed to burst in the air at a pre-set height above the ground. This is achieved by arming after a pre-set period of time and detonating when proximity to ground is detected. Analysis suggests that the fuze arming time set was such that they armed while close enough to the aircraft to inflict damage if detonated. Such premature detonation could have been caused by another bomb or the presence of AAA, SAMs or chaff near the weapons. The spacing selected for this attack could have put the bombs close enough to cause bomb-to-bomb interference. Thus, while the aircraft could

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

SECRETARY OF STATE

have been lost to enemy action, another technically possible cause is that it was hit by debris from its own weapons prematurely detonating. This analysis is further supported by damage to the second aircraft in the attack consistent with premature detonation of its own weapons, but which was able to return to base.

There is no reason to suspect that technical failure was a factor in other losses. A variety of weapon delivery types, heights and profiles were being flown. In the case of the last loss it now seems quite possible that premature detonation was the cause, but we will never know for sure. Whilst some risk of premature detonation with high explosive weapons cannot be eliminated entirely, changes are being made to both weapon settings and delivery profiles to minimise the chances of this occurring in future attacks.

Given the lack of hard facts, the Defence Secretary does not believe that it would be helpful to make a statement about the possibility that premature detonation had occurred. In response to media enquiries (and some interest has already been shown), we have discouraged publication under the current "Guidance to Editors" and we intend to continue to do this. If pressed, we would stress that these aircraft were lost over enemy territory in attacks on heavily defended targets, explaining that it was not possible to ascertain the cause of any individual loss with certainty and that we were not prepared to speculate on the range of possibilities in the absence of hard facts.

Finally, the Defence Secretary has also considered the position of the families concerned. While not going into detail, he believes that it would be sensible to inform those concerned in the last case of the range of possibilities, against the chance of speculation in the media, and this is being done. Questions of legal liability may be involved.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Juliet Wheldon (Attorney General's Office), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
Simon Webb.

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

Did you wish to see the text of the Blaby speech? PS Thanks

Embargoed until 8.30 pm
2 February 1991

FOLIO 42m

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
VITAL FOR ALL

SPEECH BY THE RT HON DOUGLAS HURD CBE MP, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, TO THE BLABY CONSERVATIVE ASSOCIATION ANNUAL DINNER, SATURDAY, 2 FEBRUARY 1991

In 1938 Britain's Prime Minister, reflecting public opinion, found it 'incredible' that we should become militarily involved in a 'quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing'. The country concerned was Czechoslovakia. Appeasement led to the aggressor growing ever stronger. It postponed the day of reckoning and made it more bitter.

The conflict in the Gulf is not of our seeking. We face it as a nation which knows out of painful experience what must be done in the face of aggression. The conflict is entirely of Saddam Hussain's choosing. He has had half a year in which to recant his aggression and to withdraw from Kuwait. He has refused to budge. Whilst we sought to remove him peacefully, he prepared for war.

The liberation of Kuwait is a just cause. The people of that little country have suffered grievously from Iraq's aggression. But the coming battle is about more even than this. It is about the sort of world in which we wish to live. In the late twentieth century nations must be able to conduct affairs by a code more worthy of rational human beings than the law of the jungle - under which large nations may consume weaker neighbours at will. The reduction in tension between East and West presents an opportunity to strengthen collective security as the foundation for the conduct of international relations.

/The

The prospects for collective security looked brighter on 1 August 1990 than at any time since 1945. The events of 2 August put them to the test. If we had confined our response to the invasion of Kuwait to a ritual denunciation and sanctions, the opportunity of establishing a more stable and secure world would have disappeared. The so-called 'peace movement' should remember this. The unity of the coalition against Iraq is a fine demonstration of how collective security should work.

The objectives of the coalition are set out in twelve resolutions of the United Nations Security Council - each passed either unanimously or by an overwhelming margin. They are, first, to eject Iraqi forces entirely from Kuwait; secondly, to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait; and thirdly, to restore "international peace and security" to the region.

The parameters of the third objective cannot sensibly be defined at this stage. Much will depend upon the way in which the conflict evolves and upon Iraq's posture once her troops have been pushed out of Kuwait. We will need to consider the views of our partners in the coalition. But if Iraq continues actively to menace Kuwait with her tanks, aircraft and rockets, the third objective will not have been achieved.

Now we are seeing the very considerable might of the Iraqi war machine reduced. Iraq is being disarmed day by day, night by night, as a result of Saddam Hussain's choice. By choosing to fight, he has ensured that Iraq's military capabilities will be radically reduced. That is good news for us all. But let me make clear what Resolution 678 does not mean:

- it does not mean dismembering Iraq - indeed Iraq's borders must not be called into question;

- it does not mean a vendetta against the Iraqi people - indeed we have sought in the conduct of the war to minimise civilian casualties; and the resolution

/does

- does not mean imposing a particular government or type of government on Iraq.

Victory is still some time away. We have won air supremacy. Iraq has one of the world's largest armies and the task of our forces is not to be under-estimated. The campaign to date gives us cause for confidence - although in war we must always be braced for setbacks. Day after day the nation has admired the courage, professionalism and quiet determination of our forces and those of our allies. Our first and all-important task is to ensure that they succeed. For the moment Foreign Offices and diplomacy are rightly in second place.

But it is important when Kuwait is free again that the peace is used constructively. This requires hard thinking on three topics by all those with something to contribute.

Gulf Security

The first task will be the reconstruction of Kuwait - in which I believe Britain will have a significant part to play. But in parallel with this, the countries of the Gulf, helped as necessary by their allies, will need to devise new structures to bolster their security. Their wealth and small populations make them attractive targets for greedy aggressors. Their control over a large proportion of the oil supplies upon which the developed and developing world depend makes their stability a legitimate cause for concern beyond the region.

For some years the countries of the Gulf have worked together in the GCC. But the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait highlighted the need for a stronger association. The Gulf States will want to look at how they can live in a secure peace with their neighbours in Iran and Iraq and at whether there is a role for other Islamic countries

/slightly

slightly further afield - Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Pakistan. The Gulf States may, in turn, have a role in helping to promote the economic stability of these Muslim States who have no large income from the sale of oil. Greater equity between the countries of the Middle East will help those who give and those who receive.

As the Prime Minister has made clear, we stand ready where necessary to play our part. It is unrealistic and undesirable to try and put the clock back. We do not want to revive a permanent military presence East of Suez. But with our allies we are naturally prepared to respond to suggestions about how best we can help to underpin the peace. This might include maintaining pre-positioned equipment, aircraft or a naval presence. But this should be a contribution to, rather than the cornerstone of, a coherent security structure in the area.

Arab/Israel

There is no linkage between the Arab-Israel issue and Kuwait. Saddam Hussain's attempt to justify his invasion of Kuwait by reference to the plight of the Palestinians was cynical and transparent. It was some ten days after the invasion before he happened upon the pretext. It has been dismissed for what it is by other Arab and Islamic countries in the region.

Saddam Hussain has made a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute more difficult. Israel has been subject to outrageous provocations by Iraq. She has reacted with restraint and dignity to the unprovoked attacks upon her people. These attacks will have made Israeli opinion more chary of a peace settlement with peoples whom they perceive to will their country's destruction. For its part, the PLO has undermined its credibility in acting as an apologist for Iraq and showing no concern for the right to self-determination of the Kuwaiti people. The invasion has also badly damaged the position of many Palestinians in the Gulf and cut their remittances to the West Bank.

/But

But despite the uncertain prospects there can be no doubt of the need to return to the Arab-Israel question with urgency and vigour. It is wrong to see the problem as immobile; progress has been made. In recent years we have seen the PLO and leading Arab nations come to accept Israel's right to exist within secure borders. Before the Gulf conflict pressure had been mounting on Israel to take part in a dialogue with the Palestinians. The Soviet Union is prepared too, to play a constructive role in seeking peace. This progress must not be lost. The continuing Israeli occupation of the Occupied Territories, the lack of assured security for Israel and the injustice suffered by the Palestinians will continue to be main causes of instability in the Middle East.

The basis for a settlement is not hard to identify. It is set out in Resolution 242 - passed over 20 years ago by the United Nations - and expressed in diplomatic shorthand as 'land for peace'. Israel has a right to expect security and acceptance of her right to exist. It is understandable that a people who endured the unspeakable terrors of the Holocaust should require absolute confidence about their security. But they above all should understand the position of a people - the Palestinians - who see themselves as dispossessed.

Arms Control

Tom King has spoken recently of the dangers posed by the massive arsenal which Iraq has amassed. Countries must, of course, be able to defend themselves. But the Middle East is in danger of descending into a terrible arms race including the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It is profoundly dangerous for world peace for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons to proliferate.

Whilst enabling the Gulf States to defend themselves the West must exercise restraint in the supply of armaments to the region. Above all we must put a choke on components which can be used to

/manufacture

manufacture weapons of mass destruction. These restraints will have to be effectively and vigorously policed. But supply restraints will not prevent the development of such weapons systems - it merely delays them. We must seek to remove the motivation for their possession.

Improved security structures in the Gulf and progress on the Arab-Israel conundrum may create conditions in which a regional arms control initiative could succeed. Indeed, progress on arms control, involving all the countries of the region, is likely to be necessarily an integral part of durable settlements of these larger conflicts. An arms race may be a symptom of other problems, but it is a symptom which can vastly increase the dangers of the underlying condition.

As the midnight oil is burned in Ministeries and Chancellories around the world and as we grapple with this awesome agenda, I would offer one word of caution. We must not become obsessed with means and mechanics. There is no point in great over-arching conferences, for example, if there is not the will to reach settlements. We have long supported the idea of an international conference, but if it is to succeed it needs careful preparation. Who is willing to attend? How for example are the Palestinians to be represented? How is the new found authority of the United Nations to be brought to bear? These and other questions have to be tackled before a conference begins if it is to have a chance of success.

The peace of the Middle East is of vital interest to us all. The region has persistently been the crucible for conflicts which threaten to ignite an ever-wider area. Once the fighting is done we must use the peace well. Britain is a main contributor to the effort in the Gulf, a Permanent Member of the Security Council, one of the European Twelve, a close ally of the United States and a traditional friend of many Arab States. We shall not be laggard in our effort to make sense of the peace.

dti
the department for Enterprise

127/5
PT. 14
C91

FOLIO 42N

SECRET

Sir Peter Gregson KCB
Permanent Secretary

Sir Robin Butler KCB CVO
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
LONDON SW1

CABINET OFFICE
A 1365
5 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

Department of
Trade and Industry

1-19 Victoria Street
London SW1H 0ET

Enquiries
071-215 5000

Telex 8811074/5 DTHQ G
Fax 071-222 2629

Direct line 215 4439
Our ref
Your ref
Date 4 February 1991

c- ~~Mr Appleyard~~

c- Col Wilson

Dear Robin

GULF CRISIS: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 30 January to Terry Heiser.

The Department of Trade and Industry does not need to be added to the list of those attending the meeting on Tuesday 5 February.

In drawing up the network however your people will want to bear in mind that there may be instances when there will be a need to export goods to the Gulf region at short notice. The Department's Export Control Organisation has procedures in place to deal with such emergencies. Our duty officer has access to certain officers on a 24 hour basis to expedite various export control matters.

I am sending copies of this letter to Terry Heiser, Michael Quinlan, Patrick Wright, Clive Whitmore, Alan Bailey, Geoffrey Chipperfield, Chris France, Derek Andrews, Geoffrey Holland and Tim Lankester.

Yours ever

Peter

SECRET

Recycled Paper

Department of the Environment
2 Marsham Street London SW1P 3EB
Tel: 071 276 3600
Fax: 071 276 5995

Permanent Secretary
Sir Terence Heiser KCB

FOLIO 42P

CABINET OFFICE
A 1307
4 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No 127/5
PT. 14

SECRET

Sir Robin Butler KCB CVO
Permanent Secretary
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London
SW1A 2AS

c- Mr Appleyard.
cc- Col Wilson
Sir P Cradock

4 February 1991

Dear Sir Robin,

GULF CRISIS - CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Thank you for your letter of 30 January. My office have already been in touch with yours to confirm that Derek Osborn will represent DOE at the meeting tomorrow.

It may be helpful to list in advance the kind of area in which we believe DOE might have a contribution to make in the event of environmental damage in the Middle East. This could include the following:-

i. Air pollution. We have already been involved in the work to assess the risks of serious damage to the global atmosphere from large scale fires at oil wells. This work could be refined and include more detailed assessments on regional or local effects of major fires at oil wells or other installations in the area.

ii. Marine pollution. Further releases of oil and their effects are the major threat here. We are all now well aware of the arrangements that have been put in place and are still being developed to contribute to an assessment and response on this.

iii. Fresh water pollution. There are a variety of obvious risks to fresh water either by interference with desalination plans or aquifers or other stores. The UK has strong expertise in water engineering and water pollution matters which could no doubt be tapped into in emergency.

iv. Contamination of land. Again it seems to us there are obvious risks with certain types of weapon, or the destruction of certain types of installation could lead to releases of toxic pollutants which could contaminate surrounding areas. We could offer some assistance with identifying relevant professionals and engineers to help with such incidents.

v. Radioactive releases. These might arise from damage to nuclear installations or from bombs. We have some expertise in the Nuclear Waste Inspectorate in this Department, but it may be that other Departments and their professionals would be better placed to take the co-ordinating role.

vi. Damage to natural habitats and wild life. We would be well placed to offer whatever types of expertise in ecological matters would be needed in such circumstances. The work we have done on the consequences of the oil slick are a good example in practice.

I have dealt with arrangements for dealing with an incident in the Middle East, which is the point I particularly raised with you. We are of course already playing our full part in establishing appropriate links and contingency arrangements for any incident arising in the UK. I have at this stage nothing to add to earlier exchanges on this subject.

Yours Sincerely

John Bailey

SIR TERRY HEISER
(Agreed by the Permanent Secretary
and signed on his behalf)

FOLIO 40 R

SECRET

CABINET OFFICE
A 1277
3 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.

SIR ROBIN BUTLER
MR APPLEYARD

cc Mr Reeves
Mr Gowan
Col Wilson
Mr Ball
Mr Mathewson

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS : 2/3 FEBRUARY

1. The main developments are as follows:

- Three SCUD missiles were launched last night. Patriot missiles intercepted one aimed at Riyadh - 29 people were reported to be injured by the falling debris. Two were aimed at Israel, but both fell harmlessly to earth. The first appears to have landed just across the Green Line north-east of Tel Aviv, and the second also on the West Bank but farther east. [This means that the last 4 attacks on Israel have all hit the West Bank.] All three had conventional warheads.

- A US B52 crashed into the sea last night 15 miles north of Diego Garcia. 3 of the crew were rescued; a search is in progress for another 3. It is not clear whether the cause of the accident was battle damage or simply a malfunction. News of the crash has not yet broken.

- There have been terrorist attacks against Western interests in Larnaca, Beirut and Lima (no further details).

2. Latest intelligence reports suggest that a further Iraqi incursion could be planned astride the Wadi Batin. Elements of 6th Armoured Division are moving south west towards the border. (See paragraph 4 of today's Immediate Assessment).

nfj.

3 February 1991 (0930) N F J GIBBONS

SECRET

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Sir Robin Butler



CABINET OFFICE
A 1286
4 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.

FOLIO 39

RJB

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

copy D.15.5.91

3 February 1991

cc - M. Appleyard
M. Reeves

GULF BURDEN SHARING: SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT

Thank you for your letter of 1 February about endeavours by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to raise funds to cover their burden sharing commitments. The Prime Minister has commented that this could be difficult and might mean that we get a dusty response from Kuwait. He would like to be kept informed.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Paul Tucker (Bank of England) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

John Gieve Esq
HM Treasury

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Sir Robin Butler



CABINET OFFICE
A 1282
4FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

R 38

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 February 1991

Dear Richard,

c - Mr Reeves.

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister this evening for a general round-up on the Gulf.

The President said that he had no specific agenda. He thought things were going reasonably well. He was just on his way back to Washington for a meeting with Cheney, Baker, Powell and Scowcroft to review progress. He had spoken yesterday to King Fahd, President Mubarak and the Amir of Qatar: they had all seemed reasonably relaxed and not fussing about a premature ceasefire. He had been a bit worried that the joint statement agreed by Baker and Bessmertnykh might have started a few hares.

The Prime Minister said that we too were quite content with the way things were going. We had succeeded in damping down speculation about the Baker/Bessmertnykh statement quickly, and it was not an issue. Public opinion in the United Kingdom was resolute and prepared for the conflict to last longer than some had initially thought. The case for completing the air campaign before starting ground action was well taken. The effects of the massive bombing were clearly building up and that was becoming increasingly clear to public opinion. Beyond that, we were turning our minds to how the conflict might end and to post-conflict security arrangements.

The President said that the American military experts were now telling him that the land battle would not be particularly bloody or prolonged. If we needed a land assault at all, it would be relatively quick. They reached this view after assessing the damage done by bombing to the Republican Guards and other forces and from the evidence of prisoner interviews. He agreed with the Prime Minister there was no need to rush into a land battle. He would be discussing the timing of it with his principal advisors this evening and would let the Prime Minister know any conclusion they reached. He was not sure that the American ground forces were yet fully ready, although they should be very soon. More generally, public opinion in the United States was resolute and he did not sense any restlessness or desire to hurry things up.

The President continued that he had talked to the Pakistani Prime Minister yesterday and had found him concerned about what

the American reaction would be if Saddam Hussein offered to withdraw from Kuwait on condition that all foreign forces withdrew from the area. He had replied that Saddam Hussein was in no position to set conditions. The Prime Minister said that we had some concern about a scenario under which Saddam Hussein decided to withdraw with some of his forces still intact and declare a victory. He would say that he had stood up to the United States, bloodied its nose and was now preparing for the battle with Israel. It was important that he should be seen to lose and be humiliated, so that he had no credibility left. It would be most unfortunate if he emerged from the conflict with any sort of prestige. We must do everything to keep up pressure on his forces and destroy them as comprehensively as possible before the conflict ended. The President said that General Scowcroft and I had discussed this scenario, very much on the lines described by the Prime Minister, and he himself had no difficulty with it. President Mubarak took the view that it was impossible for Saddam Hussein to withdraw. One of the advantages of a land battle would be that it would destroy an even higher proportion of Saddam Hussein's forces. We needed to think through the end-game. We did not want Saddam Hussein to be another Nasser. It would be much simpler all round if his own people took him out. The President concluded that he and the Prime Minister would need to discuss these matters further in a few days' time.

The President said that he had not recently talked to President Mitterrand. There was some concern in Washington about the fact that the French had sent an envoy to Iran. The Prime Minister said that the French had assured us that he was not engaged in talks with the Iraqis. It might be easier if he were to ring President Mitterrand. The President said that he would welcome this.

The Prime Minister said that he had been sorry to hear about the loss of a B52 in the Indian Ocean. The President said that he wanted to thank the Prime Minister for the very quick and helpful response to his request to accept the stationing of some B52s in the United Kingdom. All in all things were going pretty well and he was glad that Britain and the United States were in there together.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary



CABINET OFFICE
A 1278
3 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.

FOLIO 37

Copy D. 15.5.91
C- Lerrey
K- Sowter

3 February 1991

THE GULF

I enclose a copy of a message which I have received from Brent Scowcroft about the progress of the military campaign in the Gulf. You will note that he says that he would welcome comments and I should be grateful if recipients of this letter would let me know any points they would like to see made in reply. He also offers a visit from a military briefing team to brief the Prime Minister, and I propose to accept this.

The arrangements for discussing "war termination" and post-war arrangements, mentioned in the last paragraph of the letter are of course already in hand. You will note that the Americans remain strongly opposed to the quick convening of an international conference.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

3/1718Z G.

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TO CABINET OFFICE
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S E C R E T VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQQ
.
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT AT OPENING OF BUSINESS.
.
.
DEAR CHARLES:
.
AS WE GO THROUGH THE THIRD WEEK OF WAR, I THOUGHT I MIGHT STEP BACK
AND OFFER YOU A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE GULF. I WOULD
WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS. WE ARE THINKING ABOUT PUTTING TOGETHER A
MILITARY BRIEFING TEAM THAT MIGHT COME BY LONDON IN THE NEAR FUTURE
AND SHARE AN EVEN MORE DETAILED PICTURE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER,
SUPPLEMENTING THE INFORMATION WE ARE ALREADY SHARING DAY BY DAY.
.
THE MILITARY PICTURE IS QUITE PROMISING. THE FIRST PHASE OF OUR AIR
CAMPAIGN IS ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE AND AIR
DEFENSE SYSTEM IS NOW POWERLESS TO INTERFERE WITH OUR OPERATIONS.
WE BELIEVE THE FLIGHT OF SOME OF THEIR AIRCRAFT TO IRAN IS SYMPTOMATI
C
OF A DESPERATE JUDGMENT THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO HAVE EVEN
A CHANCE OF PRESERVING SOME OF THEIR BETTER AIRCRAFT FOR THE FUTURE.
WE HAVE NOTED THE ASSURANCES FROM TEHRAN ABOUT THESE AIRCRAFT.
WE DOUBT THEY WILL BE REEMPLOYED IN THE WAR AGAINST US. WE HAVE
SEEN NO SIGNS OF PREPARATION FOR SUCH USE AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
TO PREPARE AND MAINTAIN THE AIRCRAFT FOR SUCH OPERATIONS WHILE THEY
REMAIN IN IRAN. THE IRANIANS WILL DISPOSE OF THESE AIRCRAFT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH IRANS INTERESTS. IF THEY ARE USED AGAINST US,
WE WILL BE READY TO DEAL WITH THAT.
.
OTHER OBJECTIVES IN THE INITIAL PORTION OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN INCLUDED
THE DISRUPTION OF IRAQS NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
CAPABILITY AND DEGRADATION OF ITS NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
SYSTEM. THOSE OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. WHERE PARTICULAR
FACILITIES SUFFERED ONLY PARTIAL DAMAGE, WE ARE NOW FOLLOWING UP TO
FINISH THE JOB. NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL, ALONG WITH COMMAND
AND CONTROL IN KUWAIT, CONTINUES TO BE HIT (19 OF 20 NATIONAL COMMAND
FACILITIES HAVE BEEN ATTACKED) AND CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.
.
IRAQ RETAINS SUBSTANTIAL STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ALTHOUGH SOME,
SUCH AS MUSTARD GAS, MAY POSE A THREAT FOR SOME TIME TO COME, THE
NERVE AGENTS WILL DETERIORATE IN WEEKS AND BAGHDAD WILL HAVE
DIFFICULTY PRODUCING MORE OR FILLING THEM INTO MUNITIONS. IRAQS
DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, AND PETROCHEMICAL
PLANTS HAVE ALL SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE AS WELL.

.

WE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN: THE ISOLATION AND DESTRUCTION OF IRAQS FORCES IN KUWAIT. I SHOULD NOTE HERE THAT, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO GIVE ATTENTION TO THE SCUD THREAT (PERHAPS 150-200 SORTIES A DAY), THIS EFFORT HAS ALREADY PAID OFF IN REDUCED NUMBERS OF MISSILE ATTACKS AND IS NOT AN UNDUE BURDEN ON THE OVERALL CAMPAIGN. THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE DISRUPTED IRAQS ABILITY TO SUPPLY ITS FORCES IN KUWAIT AND THAT THE BOMBING IS TAKING AN INCREASING TOLL ON THE FORCES THEMSELVES. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT OVER 75

OF THE IRAQI NAVY HAS BEEN SUNK OR DISABLED, AND SURVIVING CRAFT ARE INTERESTED ONLY IN THEIR OWN SURVIVAL. AS YOU KNOW, YOUR FORCES HAVE MADE AN ESPECIALLY LARGE CONTRIBUTION TO THIS NAVAL EFFORT.

.

RECENT IRAQI OFFENSIVE PROBES INTO SAUDI ARABIA, ALONG WITH ATTEMPTS TO REPOSITION THEIR FORCES -- POSSIBLY FOR FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTION -- HAVE OFFERED NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUR AIRPOWER. WE BELIEVE OUR STRIKES MAY ALREADY HAVE BROKEN UP AT LEAST ONE ATTACK BY III CORPS AND HAVE CAUSED HEAVY LOSSES TO IRAQI UNITS. THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS ARE BEING HIT DAY AND NIGHT. ALTHOUGH THERE IS SADNESS HERE ABOUT ANY LOSS OF OUR SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN, IRAQS APPARENT EFFORT TO EMBROIL US IN COSTLY GROUND BATTLES IS PROVING COSTLY ONLY FOR BAGHDAD. THERE ARE SIGNS OF MORALE PROBLEMS IN THE IRAQI UNITS -- ONE INFANTRH DIVISION IS REPORTING THAT THOUSANDS OF ITS TROOPS HAVE DISAPPEARED FROM THE RANKS.

.

WE CERTAINLY DO NOT FEEL COMPLACENT. THERE MAY WELL BE ADDITIONAL MISSILE ATTACKS OR OFFENSIVE SALLIES. THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IS QUITE HIGH, ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET IT. THE AIR CAMPAIGN WILL CONTINUE. WE WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO LAUNCHING ANY GROUND CAMPAIGN BEFORE WE ARE READY, OR BEFORE SUCH ACTION IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS. RECENT AIR ATTACKS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IRAQS ABILITY TO LAUNCH ATTACKS THAT WOULD REQUIRE A SUBSTANTIAL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE BY THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES.

.

POLITICALLY THE COALITION REMAINS SOLID. OUR POSITION ON WHAT SADDAM MUST DO TO END THE WAR IS UNCHANGED. ALTHOUGH WE ARE ALREADY WORKING ON THE RANGE OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN WAR TERMINATION AND POSTWAR ARRANGEMENTS, AND WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS IN GREATER DETAIL WITH YOU SOON, THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT QUICK CONVENING OF A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO ADDRESS ALL OF THE POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS YOU MIGHT GUESS, WE THINK SUCH PLANS ARE PREMATURE.

.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING AGAIN WITH YOU SOON.

.

.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT
BT
£0129

NNNN

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1280
3 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO. .....

R
36

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 February 1991

THE GULF

General Scowcroft rang me this evening, more for a general chat than anything else.

I thanked him for his message (a copy of which I have sent you separately) and said that personally I agreed pretty much with the assessment in it. Our experts were rather less upbeat about the amount of damage inflicted on the Republican Guard. And I was a bit concerned about growing diplomatic activity among the Non-Aligned, which might lead to unhelpful action in the United Nations. General Scowcroft said that he would talk further to Pentagon experts about the damage to the Republican Guard. He agreed about the risks of activity by the NAM and OIC. The President had telephoned the Prime Minister of Pakistan yesterday, to stiffen him up. He had in fact been quite resilient and said he could handle the pressure he was getting.

I reminded General Scowcroft that we were sending a team of officials over for talks in Washington tomorrow about the ending of the conflict and post-conflict security arrangements. There had been some suggestions that a gap was opening up between us and the Americans, with the United Kingdom taking a rather harder line on war aims. I did not think that was really the case, but we certainly took the view that physical withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait would not necessarily be the end of the story, if they continued to pose an active threat to Kuwait. In some circumstances, it might be necessary to go on attacking them to reduce their military capability. General Scowcroft said that he very much agreed with this and had been jotting down some thoughts for the President. He himself took the view that, when the Iraqis left Kuwait, they must be required to leave all their weapons and equipment behind, thus further diminishing Iraq's military strength. I said that I rather doubted there would be a clear cut end to the conflict, with a formal ceasefire agreement: it was more likely to be a rather messy situation without there necessarily being any formal contact between the Iraqis and the Allies. General Scowcroft agreed this might well be the case: but even then it would remain important to do everything possible to reduce the Iraqi armed forces before the conflict ended.

General Scowcroft added there was still some discussion in Washington of changing the war aims to include the downfall of Saddam Hussein but he did not think this was really feasible. We would have to rely on a lucky hit, or on the Iraqis themselves removing him.

We agreed that it would be useful for the Prime Minister and the President to have a talk later this evening.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Robin Butler.

CHARLES POWELL

Richard Gozney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

R

FOLIO 35

CONFIDENTIAL

SIR ROBIN BUTLER
MR APPLEYARD

cc Mr Reeves
Mr Gowan
Col Wilson
Mr Ball
Mr Gibbons

CABINET OFF
A 1276
3 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

PROGRESS REPORT : 1900 2 FEBRUARY

The main developments are as follows:

Military No further incursions across the Saudi. Intensive allied air activity continues; the RAF Buccaneers have been in action for the first time. Television reports the "recapture" of the small Kuwaiti island of Um Al Maradin, which Iraqi troops seem to have abandoned after writing "SOS" in the sand. It is reported that some of the ammunition cases found had Jordanian markings. A further TNC-45 patrol vessel was reported destroyed today. This is the seventh of this class reported to have been destroyed; at the start of the conflict Iraq had five in its fleet!

SCUDS A SCUD attack on Israel was reported at 1830. It appears to be one missile, landing in the central region of the country. Further details, including warhead type, awaited.

Burdensharing Brief reports of Mr Mellor's visit to the UAE and of a call by the Japanese Anbassador on the Prime Minister.

Diplomatic The Iranian Government is reported to have criticised Iraq for sending planes to Iran, but said that it will enter the war if Israel retaliates against Iraq.

Protest First reports are that 20,000 people have attended today's "Stop the War" march in London compared with fewer than 5,000 last week.

A MATHEWSON

CONFIDENTIAL


OIL SLICKS
KEY
DESALINATION PLANT (OPEN)
DESALINATION PLANT (CLOSED)
OIL SLICK
MAIN OIL SLICKS
A.100nm X 20nm
B.50nm X 10nm (COMPOSITE)
C.5nm X 1nm
ALL DIMENSIONS APPROX
Direction of Slicks
SURFACE (WINDSPEED 15 Kts)
NOTE:
SEVERAL SMALL SLICKS IN N.P.G
AHMADI
B
C
KHAFJI
A
BOOM
AL JUBAYL
AL KHUBAR
0
200KM
200NM

Sir Robin Butler

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

FOLIO 34

MO 14/4S

February 1991

CABINET OFFICE
1296
A
4FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.

c- M. Appleyard

Dear Christopher,

VISIT BY FRENCH DEFENCE MINISTER

M Joxe paid a initial visit to the Defence Secretary today. This was curtailed to an hour by a summons to return to Paris to discuss a US request for overflying rights for B52s and basing of supporting tankers.

M Joxe arrived after visiting a French Airforce Jaguar base this morning where he made positive remarks to the press about co-operation between Britain and French airforces (our Defence Attache was in his party). During a photo call on arrival M Joxe spoke warmly about Anglo-French relations and common interests in the Gulf - dodging questions about what French diplomatists were doing in Iran.

During a tete-a-tete with the Defence Secretary, which occupied most of the available time, discussion centred on the Gulf. Mr Joxe, though obviously new to military affairs, showed a distinctly more supportive outlook than his predecessor.

The Defence Secretary said that the recent engagement in Khafji had been a useful introduction for the Saudis and Qataris. It looked as though the Allies had had much the best of the engagement with casualties of 20 compared to 350/400 Iraqi casualties or prisoners taken. The problem was getting the press to take a sensible view of Saddam Hussein's claims that this was some great victory for Iraq.

M Joxe referred in positive terms to the air campaign and the involvement of Jaguars. He found it difficult to discern how far the Allies were making an impact on Iraqi ground forces. The Defence Secretary commented that imagery of battle damage had been hard to get during recent periods of bad weather, but the air campaign did seem to be having a steadily mounting effect on Iraqi capability. There had been some spectacular successes (which prompted M Joxe to recall that 2,000 tons of munitions exploded in one recent raid). Nonetheless, the Iraqis probably still had over

Christopher Prentice Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

90% of ammunition and other logistic depots for their ground forces intact and the air campaign would have to continue for some time.

M Joxe wondered whether it would be helpful or not for Saddam Hussein now to have returned to television. The Defence Secretary said that on the whole coverage had not been damaging. In particular, the precision of Allied bombing of Baghdad had been underscored by the press reporting (though this might have the side-effect of relieving pressure upon the civilian population).

In response to questions from M. Joxe, the Defence Secretary said that we were worried by CW attack by Iraq which might come on Scuds but more likely from artillery. We had vaccinated our forces against Anthrax and Plague but only had post-attack treatment available for Botulinum. There was a worry about whether such agents could be used by terrorists as well as normal forces.

At this point the conversation was interrupted by news of the early meeting of the French War Cabinet to discuss B52s. The Defence Secretary explained the UK had accepted the basing of 8 aircraft and 5 tankers. It would certainly shorten the mission time to targets in Iraq and Kuwait if the French could find their way to help.

The two Ministers agreed to meet again soon (M Joxe is visiting French forces in Saudi from 3rd to 5th February). The Defence Secretary said that although there had been difficulties from time to time, in defence relations between France and Britain, interests were generally very close. M Joxe said, pointedly, that he had always thought that was the case. The Defence Secretary mentioned specifically the close relations between Sir Peter Levene and M. Sillard on equipment.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Charles Powell (No 10), and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Steve Webb.

(S WEBB)
PS/S of S

R SLP

FILIO 33

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CABINET OFFICE
A 1262
1 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

B.0724

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

Mr. Appleyard
Many thanks. Pl. see also my comment on the Chief Secretary's letter on Al Yamamah written before I had seen this minute.
RRB 2.2.

c - FERB

Saudi and Kuwaiti Liquidity

You ought to be aware of some possible doubts, which are being very closely held, about the state of Saudi and Kuwaiti liquidity.

2. Nigel Wicks held a meeting in the Treasury this morning with Malcolm Gill and Tim Smith from the Bank, Nicholas Bayne from the FCO and myself plus two or three Treasury officials to discuss this question. The Bank of England had been told that the Saudis were planning to raise $7bn. through a private arrangement with the G5 and Swiss banks. $3.5bn. was to be raised very quickly through an unsecured loan and the remaining $3.5bn. to be raised (I think in about ten days' time) as a secured loan. Apparently UK banks declined to participate. Partly on the technical grounds that Saudi Arabia is classified as an OECD country, therefore they need to make capital provision for such a loan. Partly, because they were reluctant to take on so much Saudi exposure.

3. The Treasury have heard from a good source that the Kuwaitis are likely to liquidate a significant part of their assets in the KIO: the figure of $12bn. was quoted. This is perhaps less surprising since the Kuwaitis have no ongoing income apart from interest and dividends on assets.

4. All of this is of immediate relevance in the context of burdensharing. Nigel Wicks will be doing a note for the

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and yourself (he will not inform the MoD at this stage). The Treasury has also formed a small working group to do a note as quickly as possible on the Saudi and Kuwaiti liquidity position. They will also look at the UAE in slightly slower time. The aim is to put forward a fuller note to the Foreign Secretary before he leaves for Saudi Arabia at the end of next week. These rumblings about Saudi liquidity and the attitude of the British banks will not help him in his task.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

1 February 1991

SECRET AND PERSONAL

chex.kf/tt/24

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Pse Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
A 1294
4 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.
FOLIO 32

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
071-270 3000

cc- Mr Appleyard, Mr Reeves } Copies destroyed 4/2/91

1. Mr Gowan
2. Sir R Butler

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
PS/Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

1 February 1991

Dear Charles

GULF BURDEN SHARING: SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT

You and copy recipients will want to be aware of certain developments which appear to relate to Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti endeavours to raise funds to cover their commitments towards allied military and other expenditure.

The Saudis have already committed some $13½ billion to the US in relation to their military expenditure. Kuwait has made similar commitments of some $16 billion. Each country has also made considerable commitments to the front-line states: $4.5 billion in the case of Saudi Arabia, and $3.3 billion in the case of Kuwait. We are of course seeking further contributions towards our own expenditure, and the two countries have almost certainly made further commitments.

Against this background, you will want to be aware that we have learnt that the Saudis have approached the US bank Morgan Guaranty to raise a loan of some $7 billion to meet commitments to the United States. These are probably (but not certainly) commitments arising from the pledge to some of the military costs of the US arising from the crisis. Morgan Guaranty have in turn approached ten banks, in the United States, Germany, Japan, France and the UK. The loan being sought would be in two parts, with $3.6 billion sought immediately. The first part is unsecured; the second will be secured. Each bank's initial participation has been set at around $350 million. The UK banks concerned are

Barclays, NatWest, and Midland. The banks are expected to respond to Morgan Guaranty today; we understand that the UK banks will decline the offer to participate, on commercial grounds, while the other banks will accept the offer.

We have less firm information about Kuwait. We understand, however, that the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) may be instructed to liquidate up to $12 billion of assets to meet Kuwait's expenditure. If this were carried out too quickly or clumsily it could have adverse effects on the markets. It is obviously important that we do everything to maintain orderly financial markets during the war.

The Treasury - in cooperation with the Bank, FCO, and Cabinet Office - will be as a matter of urgency undertaking further work on the extent and distribution of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait's assets. It seems clear, however, that both countries are facing a cash squeeze arising from their commitments. We see no reason to reconsider our strategy towards burden sharing, or more particularly alter our claims under the exercise. But we shall need to continue to monitor the position carefully, and will report any further developments.

I need not emphasise how important it is that none of this information should get into the markets. I should be grateful, therefore, if knowledge could be restricted to the recipients of this minute and your principals.

I am copying this minute to Richard Gozney, and to Paul Tucker and Sir Robin Butler.

JGl.

JOHN GIEVE

SECRET

SIR ROBIN BUTLER
R APPLEYARD

cc Mr Reeves
Mr Ball
Col Wilson
Mr Mathewson
Mr Gibbons

CABINET OFFICE
A 1229.
1 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS : 31 JANUARY/1 FEBRUARY

1. The main developments overnight are as follows.

Military Situation

2. The Iraqi incursion at Khafji has now been pushed back with relatively heavy Iraqi losses (according to media reports).

3. There appear to be sizeable troop movements in border areas. The overall picture is, however, unclear. (Some units are moving back, while others are coming forward.) The media have reported alliance attacks on troop and logistic convoys, but the MOD have been unable to confirm this.

4. British Tornadoes have conducted sorties against a petroleum production plant at Ar Ramadi in central Iraq (apparently causing a major explosion) and against an electronic warfare site. All the aircraft returned safely.

5. There have been no SCUD attacks overnight. (A SCUD was fired at Israel at 1553 GMT yesterday afternoon. This landed on the West Bank without causing any casualties.)

Political

6. Iran radio reported yesterday that delegations from Iraq,

Algeria, Yemen and France had "come together" in Tehran with the aim of trying to bring about the end of the war. In a seperate report, the Iranian Foreign Minister is said to have given a blunt message to the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister (who is heading the Iraqi delegation) condemning the movement of Iraqi aircraft to Iran, and repeating that the aircraft and pilots would be detained until the end of hostilities.

7. The Quai (in a telephone conversation with Mr Gore-Booth) have said that their Secretary General is indeed in Tehran as part of a visit to the Middle East. They maintain that his purpose is solely to hold bilateral talks with the Iranians, and that the presence of the Iraqi and other delegations is no more than coincidence.

8. Zimbabwe takes over the Presidency of the Security Council today. There are continuing reports of pressure from the Cubans and others for a public debate on the Gulf.

David Gowan

D J GOWAN

1 February 1991

SECRET

Sir Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
A 15488
11 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. ...
FOLIO 30

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/17/15/1D

C - Mr Appleyard
Copy D. 6.3.91
C. Jeffery

PRIME MINISTER

DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES IN THE UK

In my minute to you of 31st January I set out the United States proposals for the future deployment of US nuclear forces in the UK. In addition to these proposals the United States have now requested a change in the basing of those of their Special Operations Squadrons, presently stationed at RAF Woodbridge in Suffolk, to RAF Alconbury.

2. The Squadrons presently based at RAF Woodbridge which would relocate to RAF Alconbury consist of the 67th Special Operations Squadron who operate 6 HC-130 Hercules aircraft, and the 21st Special Operations Squadron who operate 5 MH-53 helicopters. The role of the Special Operations squadrons necessitates both night time and bad weather operation at low levels, which will clearly cause some disturbance in the local area.

3. We understood that the US had two further plans for Alconbury:

a) Withdrawal of the A10 squadron, but there have recently been indications that this might be revised.

b) redeployment of other Special Operations forces presently based at Rhein-Maine, in Germany.

No firm proposals have as yet been received from the US on these. Much will depend on developments in the Gulf and budget factors.

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SECRETARY OF STATE

4. The US is looking to start the relocation process in July '92, with a target date of September '93 for Woodbridge becoming a standby operating base.

5. If colleagues are content, then I will be writing to the MP's concerned about these plans in the next few days.

6. A copy of this minute goes to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

(T K)

Ministry of Defence
1st February 1991

rec'd
11.2

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SLP

FOLIO 30m

CABINET OFFICE
A 1262
1 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

B.0724

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

c - FERB

Mr. Appleyard
Many thanks. Pl. see also my comment on the Chief Secretary's letter on Al Yamamah, written before I had seen this minute.
RRB 2.2.

127/5
Pt. 14

Saudi and Kuwaiti Liquidity

You ought to be aware of some possible doubts, which are being very closely held, about the state of Saudi and Kuwaiti liquidity.

2. Nigel Wicks held a meeting in the Treasury this morning with Malcolm Gill and Tim Smith from the Bank, Nicholas Bayne from the FCO and myself plus two or three Treasury officials to discuss this question. The Bank of England had been told that the Saudis were planning to raise $7bn. through a private arrangement with the G5 and Swiss banks. $3.5bn. was to be raised very quickly through an unsecured loan and the remaining $3.5bn. to be raised (I think in about ten days' time) as a secured loan. Apparently UK banks declined to participate. Partly on the technical grounds that Saudi Arabia is classified as an OECD country, therefore they need to make capital provision for such a loan. Partly, because they were reluctant to take on so much Saudi exposure.

3. The Treasury have heard from a good source that the Kuwaitis are likely to liquidate a significant part of their assets in the KIO: the figure of $12bn. was quoted. This is perhaps less surprising since the Kuwaitis have no ongoing income apart from interest and dividends on assets.

4. All of this is of immediate relevance in the context of burdensharing. Nigel Wicks will be doing a note for the

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and yourself (he will not inform the MoD at this stage). The Treasury has also formed a small working group to do a note as quickly as possible on the Saudi and Kuwaiti liquidity position. They will also look at the UAE in slightly slower time. The aim is to put forward a fuller note to the Foreign Secretary before he leaves for Saudi Arabia at the end of next week. These rumblings about Saudi liquidity and the attitude of the British banks will not help him in his task.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

1 February 1991

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET

c – Mr. Appleyard – copy D 6.3.91
This robust response
looks v. sensible
PSRB 2.2

Sir Robin Butler
A. Parker

29

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

CABINET OFFICE
A 1257
1 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

31 January 1991

c- Mr Appleyard

c- Mr Reeves

Dear Peter

INSURANCE AGAINST DAMAGE BY IRAQI TERRORISTS

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 23 January.

My general reaction is that we should not rush into state compensation arrangements based on a concept of "war damage" which suits the insurance industry, but not us, and which does not fit present circumstances. My concern is that your proposals could draw us into an enduring commitment, possibly not confined to Iraqi-inspired terrorism. I agree that we must be ready to respond to developments, but not without regard to the long-term implications of any commitments we give now.

I have a particular concern that we should not give too alarming a view of the threat short-term, or too sanguine a view of it long-term. I should therefore be grateful if your officials would liaise closely with mine over how we present our assessment of the threat in any discussions which are, or which are likely to become, public.

Our assessment is that the **overall** risk of terrorist damage to property is not - certainly not yet - substantially heightened by events in the Gulf, given the subsisting risk of Irish terrorism. The threat from Irish terrorism remains more real. If Gulf-related terrorism does occur in the United Kingdom, there is no indication that any damage caused would be on anything like the scale that justified the special arrangements to deal with damage caused by enemy action in 1939/45. There are also likely to be serious practical difficulties in ring-fencing any scheme for Government support - while it may be relatively simple to identify terrorist acts that have a Middle East element, it would probably be very difficult to isolate, certainly for public identification, those incidents cause by Iraqi Government-inspired terrorists, as opposed to those caused by, say opportunist Palestinian groups.

And "The end of hostilities", however that is to be defined, is unlikely to see the end of any terrorist campaign that the Iraqis do succeed in mounting: the prospect must be that we shall remain vulnerable for many years to terrorist actions which may be claimed as a response to our military action in the Gulf. If insurance companies do disclaim responsibility while hostilities continue I see no reason why they should refrain from disclaiming it for any later incident plausibly attributable to the Gulf conflict.

The Rt Hon Peter Lilley, MP.
Secretary of State for Trade & Industry
Department of Trade & Industry
1-19 Victoria Street
LONDON, S.W.1.

/cont...

SECRET

And I see political difficulties in denying compensation to an uninsured person for an apparently Gulf-related incident occurring after some deadline; or for an act of, for instance, Irish terrorism, while Iraqi terrorism is covered. These political difficulties will be compounded because in practical terms it may be difficult to establish terrorist motives convincingly. It is also conceivable that different terrorist groups might collaborate.

Terrorism in this country alas seems likely to be with us for some years. The conflict in Iraq does not create a radically new situation as regards terrorism here. If we respond by expanding Government's responsibilities for the consequences of terrorism, any such commitment could have implications beyond that conflict and terrorism associated with it.

The issue is really whether Government should get further into the insurance business as regards terrorism. If there were terrorist outrages here connected with the Gulf the Government would have to pick up a bill as regards injuries under the criminal injuries compensation scheme. Whether that could be absorbed under existing provision would depend on the scale of the claims. There is no special financial provision. It would not be feasible for the Government to opt out of its general commitment to cover injuries from crime by way of an exception as regards either terrorist crime or terrorist crime associated with armed conflict. But to add to the uncertain implications of that commitment a further dimension of commitment as regards property seems very questionable.

My Department's experience of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board suggests that the political attractions of appearing helpful and sympathetic can lead to costs which are difficult to predict and impossible to control. Targeting a Government scheme so that those who benefit in practice are only or predominantly those sufferers whom the Government wants to help, and not those who find opportunities to manipulate the rules of the system, is more difficult for Government than for insurance companies. Peter Brooke may wish to comment in the light of his experience of the wider compensation arrangements in Northern Ireland.

On present information it is difficult to see that the risks of terrorism in the UK are so different from the risks of other kinds of major tragedy which are difficult to predict that the insurance industry is incapable of dealing with the problem if it wishes to do so. To the extent that it cannot, any major tragedy caused by terrorism is likely in practice to call for a charitable response with a fund to assist the victim being established. It would then be open to Government to make a contribution to such a fund.

If the taxpayer is to bear losses, I see no case for confining compensation to those who thought they were privately insured. On the other hand there might be a case for meeting claims which are excluded as "war damage", but offsetting the cost by a percentage levy on the classes of insurance covered -straightforward enough to administer, I should have thought. Either way, benefits and costs should fall on the same group of people.

But I should prefer, if we can - while the extent and duration of any Iraqi-inspired terrorism here is so uncertain -to take the position that insurers have not hitherto tried to disown responsibility for terrorist damage - rightly, because terrorism is crime. This position would maintain pressure upon the insurance industry, and would avoid giving the impression that we expected something comparable with "war damage" as generally understood. (I accept that we cannot exclude the possibility of occasional high-value losses).

If you do proceed on your original lines, I see much advantage in <u>private</u> delivery of state compensation, building on present insurance arrangements. Experience of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board makes me doubt whether a public board is likely to be effective or economical in administering a scheme.

I agree that we should make no change to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, for which I am jointly responsible with Ian Lang. It will cover injuries and death which arise from a crime of violence. You have noted the possible awkwardness of Government's paying large sums for damage to property, while bereaved families would receive only the statutory sum for fatal accidents - presently £3500, which James Mackay is raising to £7500 for deaths from 1 April.

I am sending copies of this letter to those who received yours, and to James Mackay.



FOLIO 28
CABINET OFFICE
A 1152
31 JAN 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS

SECRET

SIR ROBIN BUTLER
MR APPLEYARD

cc Mr Reeves
Mr Gowan
Mr Gibbons
Mr Mathewson
Col Wilson

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS : 30/31 JANUARY

The main overnight developments are as follows:

- fighting in and around the town of Khafji continues. Few hard facts have emerged from the area, though the MOD have a US report that Saudi forces re-entered the town at 0350z and have so far encountered little opposition from the Iraqi forces. The media continue to report that the town is surrounded but that the Iraqis are proving hard to dislodge. Much speculation on Saddam's intentions.

- No further reports of allied casualties. They currently stand at 12 US dead and 2 missing.

- The Jordanians yesterday called in Ambassadors of the Five to complain of attacks on Jordanian vehicles travelling from Iraq to Jordan.

- There are media reports that the number of Iraqi aircraft in Iran now stands at 200. It has also been suggested that some transport aircraft are shuttling between the two countries, but there is no collateral for this.

- Allied air operations are continuing. RAF Tornados have been targeting SAM sites, and have suffered no losses.

SECRET

SECRET

- Burdensharing. Media coverage of German pledge of 275 million to offset UK Gulf costs.

- The Iraqi representative in Geneva has continued to try to justify maltreatment of POWs by reference to British detentions in the UK.

- The oil slick has now reached about 50 miles north of Jubail. Gulf states are still confident that with Western help they can protect their water supplies.

- Terrorism. Various attacks in Turkey. Bomb threat to British Council in Turkey on Tuesday. Channel 4 "Dispatches" last evening gave prominence to alleged training of Iraqis in CW and BW terrorism by East Germans, and role of Exeter University as a centre for Iraqi "student" terrorist planning.

D C J BALL

0600
31 January 1991

FOLIO 27

SECRET - UK EYES A

CABINET OFFICE
A 1153
31 JAN 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS

B.0721

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 31 January: Overnight Action Points

Item 3: Current international situation

The Foreign Secretary will report on his discussions in Bonn. He obtained a pledge of £275m. (DM.800m.) which, subject to confirmation, appears to be around 10% of the additional contribution of $5.5bn. to the US Government recently announced by the German Government.

2. There are renewed signs of pressure for a UN Security Council debate. The Maghreb countries are complaining about breaches of procedure in not having a debate, the French expect to receive instructions to accept an open session provided it is immediately suspended sine die, and the Iraqi Ambassador has called publicly for a debate though he has not made a formal application. On the other hand, the Iraqi cross-border incursions into Saudi Arabia may inhibit the Maghreb countries from pressing for an early debate.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
31 January 1991

SECRET - UK EYES A

26

SECRET

CABINET OFFICE
A 1158
31 JAN 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 January

Dear Simon,

B52s at Fairford

I attach the formal request from the White House to station 8 B52s at Fairford. This will need to be discussed at this morning's OPD(E).

I am copying this note & enclosure to Richard Gozney (FCO), John Neilson (Energy), & Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely, Charles Powell

R311

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FM WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE
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S E C R E T VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQQ
-
PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
-
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE
-
TO: CHARLES POWELL
£10 DOWNING STREET
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-

JANUARY 30, 1991

-
DEAR CHARLES:
-

WE HAVE EXHAUSTED AVAILABLE RAMP SPACE TO LOCATE B-52S IN SAUDI ARABIA AND NOW NEED ADDITIONAL BASING AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT ON-GOING DESERT STORM OPERATIONS. SPAIN HAS QUIETLY AGREED TO OUR USE OF MORON AB BUT WE ARE NOW AT CAPACITY THERE AS WELL. AS A RESULT, WE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR PERMISSION TO DEPLOY EIGHT B-52S AT RAF FAIRFORD.

-

SINCE WE HAVE ALREADY DEPLOYED OUR ENTIRE INVENTORY OF CONVENTIONAL-ONLY B-52S TO SUPPORT DESERT STORM, THE EIGHT IDENTIFIED FOR RAF FAIRFORD ARE NUCLEAR ALCM CAPABLE. HOWEVER, WE PROVIDE ASSURANCES TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT THESE EIGHT B-52S WILL BE USED ONLY TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS WHILE AT RAF FAIRFORD. FURTHER, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF DEPLOYING ANY ALCM WEAPONS= ALCM ROTARY LAUNCHERS, ALCM PYLONS OR ALCM SUPPORT EQUIPMENT WITH THESE AIRCRAFT.

-

WE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ENDORSEMENT OF THIS REQUEST.

-

WARM REGARDS,

-

BRENT

-
END TEXT
-
DECL: OADR
£0115

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE FOI
A 1190
31 JAN 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1991

cc - Mr Appleyard
Mr Reeves

GULF CRISIS: FINANCIAL BURDEN SHARING

Thank you for your letter of 30 January enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Bush about burden sharing. I enclose a revised version which I have sent on the direct line to the White House.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (HM Treasury) and Sonia Phippard).

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

KW

c/foreign/bush

FOLLOWING FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM CHARLES POWELL:

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER:

Dear George,

There are some points which I would like to make to you about the cost of the Gulf conflict.

The United States is bearing the brunt of the military burden in the Gulf. It is right that the Gulf States, and other wealthy countries which have not made a substantial military contribution, should help you financially. I welcome the success you have had in obtaining pledges of assistance. It is very good news.

The cost to Britain is also great and a matter of concern to the people here. There is a growing feeling both in Parliament and the press, that we are not receiving enough support from wealthy potential donors. The announcements of the large pledges to the United States from Kuwait, Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia have not surprisingly strengthened that view. Your role is pre-eminent, but ours is substantial too.

We are making our own approaches: and like you, we are seeking contributions principally from Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, but possibly from some others too Helmut Kohl last night announced some very welcome assistance of DM 800 million. I have spoken to him today, to convey our thanks. We are in touch with the others.

Some coordination of our efforts would be beneficial. It would be particularly helpful if the United States was seen to

endorse our efforts. The Japanese in particular need reassurance that our respective bids for help from them are coordinated.

Our military forces in the Gulf represent about 8 per cent of yours in manpower terms. In our search for financial contributions we are therefore aiming for a figure about 8 per cent of your own. The German contribution just announced meets that target.

Perhaps we could have a word about this when we next speak on the telephone.

Warm regards

John

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Sir Robin Butler



CABINET OFFICE
1222
A
1 FEB 1991
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FILE

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1991

THE GULF

I had a further, very brief, conversation with General Scowcroft tonight. We both agreed there was not very much to report.

We talked about the reports of the massing of Iraqi forces just over the Saudi border. General Scowcroft said he did not really know what to make of these. It was hard to understand why Saddam Hussein should be so dumb: once his forces came out of their defensive positions onto the highways and open spaces, they were bound to get decimated. I said that it struck me as slightly odd that we had not yet received reports of allied air strikes against the Iraqi forces reported to be massing. General Scowcroft wondered whether they really were doing so: a lot of the information came from PoW reports. But either way, he was at a loss to explain it.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET AND PERSONAL

cst.ps/let/18dm30.1

UNCLASSIFIED

Sir Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
A 1253
1 FEB 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

FOLIO 23

CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY





Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

cc - Mr Appleyard
Mr Reeves

The Hon Timothy Sainsbury MP
Minister of State
Department of Trade and Industry
1 - 19 Victoria Street
London
SW1

31 January 1991

Dear Tim,

IRAQ: PREMIUM REFUNDS

Thank you for your letter of 27 December.

2. I understand the legal position is clearly that exporters have no entitlement to refund of premium. From the moment an exporter signed a contract under a line of credit ECGD was on risk and the exporter certain of being paid for goods shipped - and a premium of 10 per cent was a most modest charge for ECGD carrying such a risk on Iraq. It is quite clear that it was the exporter who was at risk if shipment was thwarted. Exporters who did not wish to take this risk had the option of taking our separate cover with ECGD against pre-shipment risks. Exporters who took out such cover - paying the appropriate premium - have been fully protected against recent events.

3. Like Norman Lamont I am prepared to agree that ECGD should offer ex-gratia premium refunds of 75 per cent to exporters who have made no loan drawings. This is consistent with past ECGD practice. However, the arguments are firmly against giving policy holders on Iraq further special treatment. As Norman Lamont pointed out earlier, these include the enormous loses which ECGD faces on Iraq, the breach of normal insurance principles, the likely knock-on effects elsewhere on ECGD's business, and the undermining of our policy of not paying compensation for losses arising out of sanctions.

4. We have taken legal advice about the risk of judicial review and are not confident that this should not alter our approach. These issues are questions of commercial relations between the various parties on a contractual matter and do not appear to raise questions of public law. Even if they did the risk of a legal challenge to current policy seems remote as the legal, position is clear and no policy holder can have had a legitimate expectation that ECGD's approach to ex gratia payments for Iraq would have been more generous than normal arrangements.

5. I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Douglas Hurd, Tom King and to Sir Robin Butler.

DAVID MELLOR

SECRET

Sir Robin Butler

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

31 January 1991

CABINET OFFICE
A 1186
31 JAN 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS

cc - Mr Appleyard
Mr Reeves

copy D. 15.591
C Tenney
K. Smith

Dear Michael,

(1) TERRORIST CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL THREAT IN THE UK
(2) PUBLIC PRESENTATION TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND OTHERS

Thank you for your letter of 14 January.

I was very pleased to learn that our officials have been able to resolve the issue of the involvement of your Department and of local authorities in our planning to counter the terrorist CB threat.

On your final paragraph, I understand that, following discussion at official level, OPD(G)(MH) will shortly be invited to approve draft DOE guidance to water companies on the current Iraqi CBW threat to water supplies.

Finally, I understand that the briefing pack to which you refer was circulated to all relevant Departments on 21 January, and that it will be continuously revised and updated in the light of developments over the next few weeks.

I am copying this letter to members of OPD(T), and to William Waldegrave, John Gummer and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,

The Rt Hon Michael Heseltine, MP.
Secretary of State for the Environment
Department of the Environment
2 Marsham Street
LONDON, S.W.1.

SECRET

RESTRICTED

FOLIO 21

SP R

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1S

31st January 1991

CABINET OFFICE
A 1191
31 JAN 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS

c- Mr Appleyard

Dear Richard,

GULF STATEMENT

I attach a copy of the text which the Defence Secretary proposes to use for his Statement in the House this afternoon.

I am sending a copy of this to Sir Charles Powell (No 10), John Neilson (Energy), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers) as well as to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office)

Yours

(S WEBB)
PS/S of S

Richard Gozney Esq
PS/Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

1500

STATEMENT BY THE RT HON TOM KING MP
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
31ST JANUARY 1991

With permission Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement on the Gulf and various matters arising.

The allied campaign to liberate Kuwait was launched two weeks ago. The initial aim has been to establish air supremacy and then sufficiently to reduce the military capability of the Iraqis armed forces so that the liberation of Kuwait would be successfully achieved with the minimum of casualties to our forces.

During this first period over 30,000 allied sorties have been flown against what was initially substantial air defences. From these 30,000 sorties 19 aircraft have not returned of which 5 were British. The House knows of these most regrettable losses in the first week, but will be pleased to note that none have been lost in the past week. That pleasure is combined with the deepest admiration for the skill and courage of our aircrews and of all the allies at the way they have sustained this vital air campaign. The initial denial to the Iraqis of the use of their airfields, in which the Tornadoes played such a critical part, the progressive suppression of their ground air defences, the shooting down of their aircraft seeking combat, have enabled air supremacy to be achieved so that hardened aircraft shelters and other military and strategic targets can be progressively attacked. This supremacy has been underlined by the sudden departure of some 100 Iraqi aircraft to Iran.

The achievements of the air campaign so far include the destruction of all nuclear reactor capacity, about half of their Biological and Chemical production, military fuel and ammunition stores, a number of airfields out of action, major damage to Command and Control facilities, loss of centralised control of air defences, progressive reduction of Scud launch capability, and 22 bridges hit to inhibit re-supply of Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

However substantial as these achievements are, I must warn the House that so vast is the Iraqi military capacity that it is likely to be some time yet before it will be sufficiently reduced to proceed with the liberation of Kuwait.

In this connection, we have received a request from the US Government for a limited number of B52s to be temporarily based at RAF Fairford to undertake missions with conventional munitions against Iraqi military or strategic targets which are supporting the continuing Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. RAF Fairford is an established forward operating base for B52s and the Government has readily agreed to their request.

At sea, while the allied navies have been much involved since August in enforcing the embargo, it is only in the last few days that there has been any significant action against Iraqi Navy. In these engagements in which RN Lynx helicopters and RAF Jaguars have played an important role, 10 Iraqi patrol boats and minesweepers has been sunk and up to a further 25 damaged. A number of these vessels had an Exocet capability. These naval encounters have frustrated what may have been an amphibious attack designed to coincide with this land attack at Khafji, which occurred yesterday.

In respect of the 1st Armoured Division the continuing delivery of

supplies is further enhancing its battle ready capability.

The House will be aware that we are now starting to hold a number of Iraqi POWs. I wish to affirm again that they will be held in strict conformity with the requirements of the Geneva Convention. That is our absolute commitment, and we insist on those requirements being observed by the Government of Iraq as well. To parade captured aircrew on television is in total breach of the Convention as would be any detention of them at strategic sites. I regret to inform the House that the ICRC has still not even been informed of the names of any prisoners, let alone being granted the access to which they are entitled. This inhuman treatment of the prisoners is causing great distress, and the thoughts of us all are with their families as is our admiration for their courage and steadfastness as such a difficult time. I confirm that we are making the strongest representations to the ICRC and the Iraqi authorities for these our concerns to be met.

- I turn now to our strengths in the Gulf. At the start of operations we had committed some 35,000 men to the Gulf. We have been strengthening units already deployed. three additional battalions are being deployed to fulfill our obligations to Prisoners of War. With the extra half squadron of Buccaneers I announced on 25th January, the total of UK personnel now committed will rise to about 42,000.

- The full operating costs in 1990/91 now over £1.25 billion, excluding the cost of any replacement of loss of equipment and of munitions used. The daily operating cost has risen to over £4 million which so far would total nearly £200 million.

- In connection with these costs, I very much welcome the announcement by the German Government of further DM800M contribution to our costs. We are very hopeful of other contributions from our friends and allies in support of our efforts in support of the United Nations.

- Turning now to matters of particular interest to our forces and their families, there have been complaints over difficulties in the availability at Post Offices of the very popular airletter, the bluey, and steps have been taken which I hope have dealt with this problem.

- Some hon Members have told me of Service families being charged normal interantional airmail rates for sending parcels to the Gulf. From tomorrow, I am pleased to announce that the Post Office are suspending the use of normal airmail rates for any parcels sent to BFPO addresses. All will be charged at the UK inland parcel rate. This clear instruction should end any confusion about our policy at Post Office counters.

- The telephone service we installed with the help of British Telecom and Mercury has been very popular but it is obviously somewhat expensive. We are therefore proposing to subsidise calls for all service personnel from the Gulf on a basis similar to that for forces in Northern Ireland. The value of this will be up to £10 a month affecting for example, 3 minute calls at half price. I have to say to the House that many of our forces are not actually in early reach of a telephone kiosk at present, but their entitlements under this scheme will be accumulated for later use.

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Sir Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
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31 JAN 1991
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FOLIO 20

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

c- Mr Appleyard

31 January 1991

Copy D-6.3.91
C-Tenney
A. Part

Dear Richard,

THE GULF: PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

The Prime Minister spoke on the telephone this morning to Chancellor Kohl.

Chancellor Kohl said that he and the Foreign Secretary had talked at length yesterday. They had come up with a good result on burden sharing. The Prime Minister said that his first task was to thank Chancellor Kohl most warmly for the German government's most generous contribution to the costs of our forces. He would be making our gratitude clear in the House of Commons in this afternoon. The Foreign Secretary had given him an account of his talk with the Chancellor. There were a number of points which he would like to follow through personally. Perhaps they could find a date in the near future when he could come over to Bonn for a private talk. Chancellor Kohl thought this an excellent idea: the meeting should take place as soon as possible. The Prime Minister might come over one morning for a talk followed by lunch. The smaller the delegation the better. The Prime Minister said that he intended to come just with me. We would be in touch to discuss dates.

Chancellor Kohl said that he had a couple of points to ask the Prime Minister about the situation in the Gulf. He wondered first how the Prime Minister assessed the transfer of Iraqi war planes to Iran. The Prime Minister said we did not believe they were defectors, but had gone according to a pre-determined plan. Saddam Hussain's purpose appeared to be to husband his resources, so that he still had a substantial airforce after the conflict was over. He had done something similar in the early stages of the Iran/Iraq war. Chancellor Kohl commented that this meant Saddam Hussain assumed he would survive, which did not quite fit with his statements about all-out war to the finish.

Chancellor Kohl asked whether the Prime Minister had reliable information on the real extent of the damage being done to Iraq by the Allied bombardment. The Prime Minister said we were confident that substantial damage had been done to Iraq's air defences, communications, NBC establishments and other strategic targets. The weight of the attack was now against the enemy's supply lines and logistics. But Iraq's war machine was so enormous that there was still quite a long way to go. We did not believe we had yet succeeded in inflicting major damage on

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the Republican Guards. Chancellor Kohl observed that this would have consequences for the ground campaign. The Prime Minister said that the present ground fighting was largely a side show. But there were some indications that a larger battle was in the offing. The indications were that Iraq was likely to use CW quite soon. Chancellor Kohl commented that this would be a very bad development.

The conversation ended with the Chancellor promising to ring again soon.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

FOLIO 19m

The Gulf

3.30 pm

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Tom King): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the Gulf conflict and various matters arising therefrom.

The allied campaign to liberate Kuwait was launched two weeks ago. The initial aim was to establish air supremacy and then sufficiently to reduce the military capability of the Iraqis' armed forces, so that the liberation of Kuwait will be successfully achieved with the minimum of casualties to our forces.

During this first period more than 30,000 allied sorties have been flown against what were initially substantial air defences. From those 30,000 sorties, 19 aircraft have not returned—of which five were British. The House knows of those most regrettable losses in the first week, but will be pleased to note that no British aircraft have been lost in the past week. That pleasure is combined with the deepest admiration for the skill and courage of our aircrews and of all the allies at the way in which they have sustained the vital air campaign. The initial denial to the Iraqis of the use of their airfields, in which the Tornadoes played such a critical part, the progressive suppression of their ground air defences, in which the Jaguars have been very active, and the shooting down of their aircraft seeking combat, have enabled air supremacy to be achieved, so that hardened aircraft shelters and other military and strategic targets can be progressively attacked. That supremacy has been underlined by the sudden departure of about 100 Iraqi aircraft to Iran.

The achievements of the air campaign so far include the destruction of all nuclear reactor capacity and of about half Iraq's biological and chemical production; substantial damage to military fuel and ammunition stores; the putting out of action of a number of airfields; major damage to command and control facilities; the loss of centralised control of air defences; the progressive reduction of Scud launch capability; and the hitting of 22 bridges to inhibit the resupply of Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

However, substantial as those achievements are, I must warn the House that so vast is the Iraqi military capacity that it is likely to be some time yet before it will be sufficiently reduced for the allies to proceed with the liberation of Kuwait.

In that connection, we have received a request from the United States Government for a limited number of B52s to be temporarily based at RAF Fairford, to undertake missions with conventional munitions against Iraqi military or strategic targets that are supporting the continuing Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. RAF Fairford is an established forward-operating base for B52s, and the Government have readily agreed to the request.

At sea, while the allied navies have been much involved since August in enforcing the embargo, it is only in the last few days that there has been any significant action against the Iraqi navy. In those engagements, in which Royal Navy Lynx helicopters and RAF Jaguars played an important role, 10 Iraqi patrol boats and minesweepers were sunk, and up to a further 25 damaged. A number of those vessels had an Exocet capability. Those naval encounters frustrated what may have been an amphibious attack designed to coincide with the land attack at Khafji that occurred yesterday.

In respect of the 1st Armoured Division, the continuing delivery of supplies is further enhancing its battle-ready capability.

The House will be aware that we are now starting to hold a number of Iraqi prisoners of war. I reaffirm that they will be held in strict conformity with the requirements of the Geneva convention. That is our absolute commitment and we insist on those requirements being observed by the Government of Iraq as well. The parade of captured aircrew on television is in total breach of the convention—as would be any detention of them at strategic sites. I regret to inform the House that the International Committee of the Red Cross has still not even been informed of the names of any prisoners, let alone been granted the access to which it is entitled. That inhuman treatment of the prisoners is causing great distress and the thoughts of us all are with their families—as is our admiration for their courage and steadfastness at such a difficult time. I confirm that we are making the strongest representations to the Red Cross and the Iraqi authorities for our concerns to be met.

I refer next to our strengths in the Gulf. At the start of operations, we committed some 35,000 service men and women. We have since strengthened some units already deployed. Three additional battalions are being deployed to fulfil our obligations to any prisoners of war. With the extra Buccaneers that I announced on 25 January, total United Kingdom personnel now committed will rise to about 42,000.

The full operating costs in 1990-91 now total more than £1·25 billion, excluding the cost of any replacement of lost equipment and of munitions used, which so far totals nearly £200 million. The daily operating cost has risen to more than £4 million.

In connection with those costs, I very much welcome the announcement by the German Government of a contribution of a further 800 million deutschmarks to our costs. We are very hopeful of other contributions from our friends and allies in support of our efforts in support of the United Nations.

As to matters of particular interest to our forces and their families, there have been complaints over difficulties in the availability at post offices of the very popular air letter—the bluey—and steps have been taken that I hope have dealt with their problem.

Some hon. Members told me of service families being charged normal international airmail rates for sending parcels to the Gulf. I am pleased to announce that, from tomorrow, the Post Office is suspending the use of normal airmail rates for any parcels sent to BFPO addresses in the Gulf. All will be charged at the normal United Kingdom inland parcel rate. That clear instruction should end any confusion at post office counters.

The telephone service that we installed with the help of British Telecom and Mercury has been very popular, but it is obviously somewhat expensive. We therefore propose to subsidise calls for all service personnel from the Gulf, on a basis similar to that for forces in Northern Ireland. The value of that subsidy will be up to £10 a month—affecting, for example, five three-minute calls at half price. Many of our forces are not in early reach of a telephone kiosk at the moment, but their entitlement under that scheme will be accumulated for later use.

The House can be proud of the way in which the armed forces are contributing to the multinational effort. They have made an excellent start and, thankfully, losses have

been few. However, there is some way to go yet, and there will be setbacks and at times unwelcome news. None the less I have no doubt of the determination of the House and the country to give our forces the support that they need to bring their task to a successful conclusion.

Mr. Martin O'Neill (Clackmannan): I thank the Secretary of State for his statement and I think that the whole House would want to join in his tribute to the courage and skill which has been displayed by our airmen during the past two weeks, and to join him in noting that there have been no casualties and no losses to the air force during the past week. We also join him in deploring the Iraqi authorities' failure to intimate to the International Committee of the Red Cross the identity of prisoners and those people whom it is alleged have been detained at militarily sensitive locations.

We also note what the Secretary of State said about basing B52s at Fairford. Perhaps he could tell us why Britain was chosen and which, if any, other European countries have agreed to participate. We also note from his statement that the United States has not employed the normal "neither confirm nor deny" formula in respect of nuclear devices and that no nuclear air-launched cruise missiles will be carried by these aeroplanes. Will he also confirm that the aircraft will be based at Fairford only for the duration of the conflict?

We join the Secretary of State in expressing our appreciation for the German donation to the war effort. Which other countries have been approached for contributions?

We note the attempt to resolve the problem of telephone calls, but how does that facility compare with that afforded by AT and T to United States troops in the Gulf?

In his statement the Secretary of State mentioned the town of Khafji. Will he tell us more about the circumstances surrounding the liberation of that town, the casualties involved and what prisoners have been taken? Could he enlighten the House as to what military use the town of Khafji would have been to the Iraqis and whether he has any inkling of the idea behind the attack? Will he also give us some information about the latest developments regarding polluting of the Gulf by the Iraqis releasing oil? What is happening there?

Can the Secretary of State give any information to the House about reporters' access to troops, because journalists in Scotland have made a number of complaints about their inability to gain access to the Scottish regiments, which account for some 40 per cent. of the troops in the Gulf?

Mr. King: I thank the hon. Member for his general welcome and the support that he gave on behalf of his right hon. and hon. Friends.

I certainly confirm that the application in respect of the B52s is temporary, and that we have an absolute assurance that they will use only conventional munitions when operating from that base, which is important. Other countries will be assisting with the successful deployment of B52s in various ways and one other country will be involved in basing, but I think that it will shortly be making its own announcement and the hon. Member will forgive me if I do not anticipate it.

The contribution from Germany is certainly very much appreciated. I would rather not say which other countries we might be approaching. I am glad to say that several our friends and allies are approaching us. There is widespread recognition of the world community wishing to make its contribution to the multinational effort in whichever way it feels appropriate.

The hon. Member mentioned telephones and several other hon. Members were shouting about that during my statement. It needs to be considered seriously., The Americans tried to introduce and had a trial of a free system. The problem was that people who were able to use it used it all the time and it broke down. There was much more criticism because people could not then have access to the limited lines and facilities that exist. It is my understanding that the Americans have now returned to a form of subsidised system.

We try to tackle the problems. An important point that we have to tackle is that many of the people whom we are trying to help are not trying to telephone this country from the Gulf: they are trying to telephone Germany. I am glad to say that, under an arrangement that we have made—I understand that it is not yet been possible for the Americans to match it—people will be able to telephone from the Gulf to Germany for the same subsidised low price as it would cost them to telephone this country. That is, I think, significantly better than what other countries have been able to do.

I can confirm that, according to my understanding, Prince Khalid has announced that Khafji is now clear of the intruders, and I am sure that we welcome the defeat of that incursion. Although there was a further oil discharge, and it was clear that the Iraqis were actively discharging and pumping oil into the Gulf, the latest information that I have received—uncorroborated, but believed to be true —suggests that it has now ceased.

Mr. Michael Mates (Hampshire, East): The whole House will wish to join my right hon. Friend in expressing its utter disgust at the way in which prisoners of war have been treated by the Iraqi authorities. Will my right hon. Friend, however, press the International Committee of the Red Cross rather harder to speak out robustly about what it knows to be the correct conditions, so that the relatives of prisoners of war can be assured not only that we are doing all that we can—which, frankly, is very little—but that the ICRC is, too? Will my right hon. Friend also say a little more about the arrangements that he has made in the Ministry of Defence to keep relatives up to date with the current position?

Mr. King: In answer to the latter question, let me say that we are operating a round-the-clock contact service, and are trying to provide as much information as we can about these difficult matters. As my hon. Friend will know, we are maintaining very close contact with the services welfare organisations to ensure that that is done effectively.

We are bringing to bear all possible pressure and influence on the ICRC. An ICRC medical team is now going to Baghdad and we hope that it will be able to carry the work forward. The president of the ICRC is coming to see my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister next week.

Mr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East): May I, on behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends, associate myself with the Secretary of State's observations about the

. Menzies Campbell]

performance of our troops, especially that of the RAF pilots flying the ground attack version of the Tornado, whose bravery has been exemplary?

My hon. Friends and I accept that the deployment of B52s at RAF Fairford is justified if its purpose is to shorten the war and to reduce allied casualties. Does the right hon. Gentleman understand, however, that some people may be concerned about the deployment and will he take this opportunity of letting the people of the United Kingdom further into his confidence and explaining a little more clearly the current operational requirements for that deployment?

Mr. King: I am grateful for what the hon. and learned Gentleman said and especially grateful for his support of the RAF contribution to the campaign. The House will share his views.

I am also grateful for the hon. and learned Gentleman's clarification, on behalf of his right hon. and hon. Friends, of the position regarding the B52s. We want the conflict to end at the earliest possible time. Criticisms have been made of B52s in the past, but they have a precision bombing capability and they will be deployed against military and strategic targets to accelerate the end of the conflict and the liberation of Kuwait. That is clearly part of the purpose. B52s are already deployed in a number of airfields, but there is no further capacity there. It was necessary to increase the capacity and that is why the further requests have been made.

Mr. Terence Higgins (Worthing): The German Government's contribution to the cost of the war is welcome, but should not account also be taken of the fact that the British taxpayer is at the same time making a substantial contribution to the cost of German unification? More important, does my right hon. Friend agree that the making of a series of ad hoc lump-sum payments to finance the war is not a satisfactory arrangement? The war may go on for a considerable time; what is needed is a general assessment relating to the international community, on a percentage or other basis, so that the burden can be fairly shared among all who will gain from the defeat of aggression.

Mr. King: I note my right hon. Friend's comments and understand the thoughts behind them. Costs have increased sharply due to the conflict, which has led to a loss of equipment and ammunition. Moreover, we have a large number of men and women out there. We are very grateful for the support that we have received, but it would be more satisfactory if it were on a slightly more regular basis. I shall certainly think about my right hon. Friend's suggestion.

Mr. Ernie Ross (Dundee, West): I welcome the Secretary of State's commitment to the ICRC and the Geneva convention. It is absolutely essential that all those involved in the conflict should stay within the terms of the United Nations resolutions and the Geneva convention. The same criterion must be extended to our allies. Will the Secretary of State therefore discuss with his Israeli counterparts the treatment that they are handing out to the 1·7 million Palestinians on the west bank and Gaza? They are not observing the Geneva convention, particularly when it comes to the 24-hour curfew that they have imposed on the west bank and Gaza and the recent arrest of Sari Husseibh. May I ask him to raise these matters with his Israeli counterpart and to say whether the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office has been able to find out whether Her Majesty's Government have spare gas masks that could be given to the Israeli Government for use by the Palestinians?

Mr. King: I have not met my Israeli opposite number, as the hon. Gentleman puts it, but I shall certainly ensure that his comments are conveyed to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary because I understand the strength of feeling about these issues.

Sir Bernard Braine (Castle Point): As the Father of the House, may I put to my right hon. Friend a simple request: to convey to the pilots and air crews in the Gulf our great admiration of their courage, steadfastness and professional skill?

Mr. King: I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend, who occupies his position with such dignity. I shall certainly ensure that the message is conveyed.

Mr. John Cartwright (Woolwich): Yesterday we saw Iraqi tanks apparently pretending to surrender in order to mount an attack. Oil has deliberately been pumped into the waters of the Gulf. We have seen missile attacks on Israeli cities and the misuse of allied prisoners of war. Does not all that demonstrate that Saddam Hussein has no intention of fighting this war under any sort of Marquess of Queensberry rules? Has that lesson now been learnt by the allied military commanders and will they plan accordingly?

Mr. King: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is not suggesting in any way that we should walk away from the standards and codes of practice and behaviour that he would expect us to follow and we have no intention of doing so. The matters that he has rightly drawn to the attention of the House confirm what so many of us feel so strongly: that this cause, now embarked on, has to be seen through and that everything that has happened since shows what a very evil and monstrous military regime exists in Iraq.

Ms. Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood): Does the right hon. Gentleman believe that the part of the UN resolution that authorises the current action and calls for the restoration of peace and security in the region also authorises, if necessary, the invasion of Iraq in order to destroy Saddam Hussein and his war machine?

Mr. King: The issue of resolution 678 is one which, I am glad to say, is now being seriously addressed by a lot of people. I put it most simply: there is no point in seeking to achieve the liberation of Kuwait if Kuwait cannot stay liberated. The answering of that question deserves—not in slogans, nor by attempting to accuse some people of bellicosity or aggression—very serious consideration. That is precisely why, in its good sense, the United Nations put that point in the resolution. How it is going to be achieved —whether by economic sanctions or by military action —will depend on how the situation develops. But let there be no doubt that it would betray—as I have said on another occasion—all those who are prepared to risk their lives in this conflict if we settled for some halfway solution, only to have to return to the problem in a year's time.

Dame Jill Knight (Birmingham, Edgbaston): Is not the reason for so many telephone calls to Germany from our forces in the Gulf the fact that many of their wives are in Germany? Will my right hon. Friend acknowledge that they are under great strain and that they are bearing it very bravely? Will he assure the House and the country that everything possible is being done to sustain and support those ladies?

Mr. King: I am grateful for what my hon. Friend has said because that is precisely the point. May I also express my appreciation to her and other hon. Members, some of whom have been to visit the wives in Germany. We must be very conscious of the fact that it is one thing for the wife of a service man if her husband goes to the conflict in the Gulf, but if that wife is herself in a foreign country, albeit an ally, it is a double separation. I am grateful for the interest taken by hon. Members and for what my hon. Friend said.

Mr. Jack Ashley (Stoke-on-Trent, South): The whole House will support what the Secretary of State said about the treatment of our prisoners of war. I want to put to him a delicate point which I hope will not be misunderstood as a sign of weakness. Because my support for the troops is so strong, I hope that I will not be misunderstood. The prisoners of war are entitled to proper treatment under the Geneva convention as of right and the Secretary of State is right to stress that to the Red Cross. At the same time, I believe that we should consider sending humanitarian aid to Iraqi children and sick people. That is not irreconcilable with fighting a strong war and may help our prisoners of war.

Mr. King: We have the greatest human sympathy for the suffering of many of the Iraqi people at this time. That is why so many of us strove so hard to try to find a peaceful solution. Saddam Hussein clearly does not care deeply about the suffering of his people and is quite prepared to embark on these adventures, as he showed in the Iran-Iraq war and now with his aggression against Kuwait. His aggression exposes his people, including children, to very real suffering. I hope that the Red Cross might be able to perform its wide role not just in respect of prisoners of war but perhaps in other ways.

Mr. Peter Viggers (Gosport): As one who represents many of the service men and women in the Gulf and their families, may I join in the tributes paid to their courage and resilience. Is my right hon. Friend aware that there has been some criticism that the royal yacht Britannia, which was originally built as a hospital ship, has not been sent to the Gulf? Will my right hon. Friend confirm that RFA Argus, which he and I grew to know well during our time in Northern Ireland when it was under construction and then in commission, is the most suitable medical support ship? Will my right hon. Friend confirm that the choice made by the Government was entirely to give our forces the best possible support?

Mr. King: Yes, that is absolutely correct. RAF Argus was built by Harland and Wolff and has been converted to a hospital ship. It will play a useful and substantial role. It was the most convenient ship to use. I must make it clear that we were well aware that Her Majesty would wish any requirement for a hospital ship for the troops to take precedence over the royal yacht's use in any royal duties. However, it was on the other side of the Atlantic at the time and would have needed some conversion work such as helicopter decks and other things and it was quicker and more convenient to use RFA Argus.

Rev. Martin Smyth (Belfast, South): Does the Secretary of State accept that, as Iraq has invaded a second neighbouring country, those who demonstrate for peace would do well to demonstrate outside Iraqi embassies? As a former joint chairman of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, has he received any information from those allies on help in pursuing the campaign? I understand that their Opposition leader would like to send a field hospital.

Mr. King: I have not received any such request or suggestion, but my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is in Dublin this afternoon. I am sure that he would be willing to receive any offers of support. The multinational support that we are getting is widely spread through many countries. As the evil of the Iraqi regime is now being exposed, many people wish to see how they can contribute. I pay tribute to the Republic of Ireland, which has contributed to other United Nations forces in the past.

Mr. Churchill (Davyhulme): I congratulate my right hon. Friend, Mr. Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, President Bush and our Prime Minister on their conception and implementation of this campaign so far. It has been specifically designed to minimise allied and Iraqi civilian casualties. Does not that contrast most starkly with Saddam Hussein's flagrant disregard for human life —particularly civilian human life—in using Scud missiles against the civilian populations of Israel and Saudi Arabia, and his flagrant violation of the Geneva convention in respect of our own and allied prisoners of war?

Mr. King: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I can confirm, from the evidence available to me, that it seems that our requirements to minimise civilian casualties and to ensure that the campaign is conducted so as to minimise our casualties are being met in the way that we would wish. None the less, we could experience setbacks, as I warned the House. We would much rather never have had this conflict in the first place. If only there had been no aggression, no conflict would have been necessary.

Mr. Alan Williams (Swansea, West): Does the Secretary of State recognise that many of us think that his announcement about telephone calls is unbelievably mean? Even if every man and woman in the services could use this facility, it would cost a maximum of £400,000 a month, whereas in the same period the war would have cost the country £130 million. As we hope to reclaim a substantial part of th se costs from other countries, I urge the Minister to think again and to see whether he can achieve a better scheme to help men and women who have shown a readiness to put their lives on the line.

Mr. King: I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman listened to what I said. We built on the experience of the United States authorities, which tried a free trial and found that it led only to greater congestion and fewer people—*[Interruption.]* The right hon. Gentleman may seed to advance this as a great cause, but I understand from all the reports that I have received that our forces regard it as a very fair arrangement. I believe—some of the soliders in the Gulf would agree with this—that some of

[Mr. King]

our forces in Northern Ireland are undertaking tasks, and have done so for many years, that are every bit as challenging and dangerous as some of the assignments in the Gulf. The right hon. Gentleman has not spoken up for them before. I am anxious to ensure, as far as possible, that we treat people fairly and I think that this is a very fair scheme.

Dame Janet Fookes (Plymouth, Drake): Will my right hon. Friend consider the feasibility of setting up a blood donor unit in the Palace of Westminster so that those of us who want to support the troops in a practical way will be able to do so?

Mr. King: I am very grateful to my hon. Friend. In many ways, practical suggestions mean a great deal to our forces in the Gulf. The Lord President has heard my hon. Friend's comments and he is happy to look into them.

Mr. Bernie Grant (Tottenham): Did the Secretary of State see the report in yesterday's *Evening Standard* that Iraqi troops were shot while they were praying? How does that square with the allies' claim that they would be sensitive to religious issues? Does he condone the killing of Iraqi troops while they were praying and what is he going to do about it?

Mr. King: I have no knowledge of that allegation. Obviously, I do not know whether it is possible to check whether it is true. I must point out to the hon. Gentleman that in this regrettable conflict, there will undoubtedly be a lot of propaganda and many attempts to deceive and exploit such emotions. The hon. Gentleman should check whether the allegations are soundly based before he makes them.

Mr. Nicholas Soames (Crawley): My right hon. Friend has let it be known in the past few days that he is extremely worried that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis may attempt to use chemical weapons. Will he, through whatever channels remain open to him, ensure that the Iraqis are aware that, according to the conventions and articles of war, if they do such a thing, they will be dealt the most grievous retaliation?

Mr. King: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that issue. It cannot be emphasised too strongly and I am grateful for the forceful way in which he put it.

Mr. John Home Robertson (East Lothian): Does the Secretary of State agree that the best way to avoid the grim prospect of a land war in the Gulf would be for the undoubtedly brave and patriotic service men of the Iraqi armed forces to rid their country of a Government who have brought shame and destruction on their Arab nation? Will he assure the House that we and all members of the coalition respect the integrity of Iraq and that we want to help the Iraqis to reconstruct and to achieve a democratic future for their people?

Mr. King: We certainly have no quarrel with the people of Iraq and we have no ambition for their territory. We have the deepest sympathy for them as they suffer under the present regime.

Sir Anthony Grant (Cambridgeshire, South-West): Does my right hon. Friend recall that before D day the allies had overwhelming command of the air, yet it still took a year before the land campaign was won? In that context, will he confirm that there will be no question of a ceasefire to enable Saddam Hussein to launch an Ardennes-type offensive?

Does he consider the 100 Iraqi aeroplanes that have gone to Iran to be effectively neutralised, or do they still constitute a threat?

Mr. King: On the last point, Iran is, of course, a member of the United Nations and so bound by the resolutions. It must—and has made it clear that it will—give full support to the United Nations resolutions, so I sincerely trust that the aeroplanes will play no further part in the conflict.

On the first point about carrying through the campaign, it would be wrong to our forces who are now embarked if there were to be a stop-start situation—a hesitation then a start again—which would allow the enemy to regroup. We have given Saddam Hussein every opportunity. We went not only a further mile, but a further mile again. He failed to take that opportunity. We must ensure the liberation of Kuwait and the achievement of the United Nations resolutions.

Mr. Alex Salmond (Banff and Buchan): Will the Secretary of State now address the substantial complaint in the Scottish press about its access to Scottish front-line troops in the Gulf? The Scottish regiments comprise up to 40 per cent. of the front-line forces. What is his Department doing to dispel the suspicion that when looking for people to get shot at in the desert, the Ministry of Defence looks to Scotland first, but that when looking for people to comment or write on it, it looks to Scotland last?

Mr. King: I apologise, because the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) raised the matter with me and has already written to me. I can confirm that we looked into the matter. We have teams in the Gulf, but they cannot rely absolutely on unlimited access to the front-line area. A vacancy has now come up and a Scottish reporter will join one of the front-line teams.

Miss Emma Nicholson (Torridge and Devon West): In Germany yesterday, the wives expressed their particular concern about matters to do with bereavement. Will my right hon. Friend assure those wives and the House that Christian counselling will be provided for men and women who are wounded and that, in cases of bereavement, there will be Christian burial and, wherever possible, burial back in the United Kingdom if the next-of-kin so wish it?

Mr. King: On the first point about Christian counselling, I can certainly give my hon. Friend that assurance. My hon. Friend made a further point regarding burial. The usual practice is for forces to be buried close to the battlefield where they fall. The arrangement that we are making in this case—following our experience of the Falklands campaign—is that, although there will be temporary local burial, families will subsequently have the choice of a Christian burial for their relatives in the Gulf area or the repatriation of the body for burial in this country.

Dr. Norman A. Godman (Greenock and Port Glasgow): May I make a plea to the Secretary of State on behalf of an admittedly small number of service men's families? I

to those members of the American forces in the Persian Gulf who are Scots-born, whose parents in Scotland are given no facilities to write to them. Will the right hon. Gentleman ask his officials to discuss the matter with their American counterparts? A laddie in my constituency has a son fighting with the American marines and receives no concessions whatever. Admittedly, I am talking about a small number of service men, but their interests need to be taken care of none the less.

Mr. King: I had not heard that, but I shall certainly look into the matter because I am sure that the Americans would wish people in that position to have any facilities that it was possible to give them.

Mr. Bill Walker (Tayside, North): Does my right hon. Friend agree that the fact that the allies have control of the skies, with all that that means in military terms, is substantially due to what happened in the first days of the action and to the tremendous job of destroying airfield capability by the Royal Air Force Tornado crews? Is my right hon. Friend aware that the RAF presentation team will come to the House on 19 February and that hon. Members will have the opportunity to put to it any questions that they wish?

As for Scotland, Scots have always been proud to serve this country, whether in Scottish regiments, in the Royal Air Force or in the Royal Navy.

Mr. King: I certainly recognise the truth of my hon. Friend's latter sentence. I am pleased that the RAF presentation team is to come to the House. That will give hon. Members a chance to learn more about the training and background activities of the Air Force which have contributed to its outstanding contribution to the multinational effort.

Mr. Thomas Graham (Renfrew, West and Inverclyde): Is the Secretary of State aware that some of the young Scottish soldiers are writing home to their mums and families asking for supplies such as talcum powder, boiled sweets, boots, gloves and toothpaste? *[Laughter.]* This is no light matter. Did the Secretary of State see on television the other night the appalling sight of young American soldiers shivering? I only hope that none of the British troops is sitting over there shivering while we bask in this heat and that they have the comforts that are due to them.

Mr. King: We have certainly sought to provide as well as we can for our forces, and hon. Members who have been out to the Gulf have concluded that our efforts have generally been successful. We have also sought to do something about the parcel service, in so far as it is possible to get parcels through, which it will be in the next days. I have not yet told the House of the very constructive offer made by United Carriers, which has depots round the country. If any of the mums to whom the hon. gentleman referred takes her parcel to a United Carriers depot, the company will deliver it free of charge to the defence postal and courier headquarters in London, from where it will go free of charge to the Gulf.

Mr. William Powell (Corby): Will my right hon. Friend confirm and reaffirm that allied war aims have not altered at all since 15 January and are contained entirely in the United Nations resolutions, especially resolution 678, that every single action that has been taken by allied troops has been in pursuit of—and only in pursuit of—those United Nations resolutions and that that will remain the case until the end of the fighting?

Mr. King: I can certainly give that assurance. I believe that some people may not have studied those resolutions in the past. Those are absolutely the war aims on which we are agreed and which I think commentators, in analysing them, realise must be the objectives that we should pursue.

Mr. Robert N. Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby): Is the Secretary of State aware that constituents of mine whose husbands are working as civilians on the Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia are very concerned because their husbands, although they have been supplied with gas masks, have been given no extra clothing, training, instruction or assistance of any kind, as I understand it? Will he institute a thorough investigation so that British civilians working in the Gulf area may be fully protected from possible chemical warfare attacks?

Mr. King: I am not clear whether the hon. Gentleman is referring to civilians working for the Ministry of Defence or the Government or civilians working for contractors in the Gulf. It is initially the responsibility of their employers to ensure that they are properly provided for, and if employers approached us we would always see what assistance we could give. In the case of gas masks we have sought to do that.

Mrs. Edwina Currie (Derbyshire, South): Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is now a large number of local support groups for the families of the troops, and not just in the traditional garrison towns? I cite, for example, Gulf Troops and Family Support set up in my constituency by Mr. and Mrs. Brister, who have a son in the Gulf. Will my right hon. Friend ensure that such groups receive full encouragement and assistance and that there is no effort to squeeze them out because they are not traditional, long-established groups? Will he, in particular, talk to British Telecom and get it to be more helpful?

Mr. King: We would give them any help and encouragement that we could. I am very grateful to them for the role that they are playing. I am grateful, also, to my hon. Friend and to other hon. Members because I believe that one of the most valuable forms of help and support for those groups is the interest of their local Members of Parliament.

Mr. Greville Janner (Leicester, West): Is it not a sad, serious and chilling reminder of dangers ahead that the House has been told that only half Saddam Hussein's capacity to produce chemical and biological weapons has been destroyed? Recognising that he not only threatens to use these weapons but has used them in the past against Kurds and others and that this is a danger to our troops, to civilians in Saudi Arabia and to civilians in Israel, whether Arab or Jewish, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman to assure the House that every effort is being made to destroy not only the remaining 50 per cent. of production capacity but existing stocks, which he has not mentioned?

Mr. King: I can confirm that some storage has been destroyed, although we also believe that there has been some dispersal, mainly in the form of artillery ammunition, of some of the chemical stocks, for example. These matters underline what I said about the monstrous

[Mr. King]

scale of that military machine. I believe that the House has been impressed by the scale of the air campaign and by the volume of munitions been used. It is a measure of the scale of that machine that I have to report to the House that there is still some way to go before the land campaign can be safely embarked upon.

Mr. Quentin Davies (Stamford and Spalding): Does my right hon. Friend accept that throughout the country there is the profoundest admiration for and gratitude to all who have taken part in this campaign so far, from the Prime Minister and himself down? Does he also accept that an essential prerequisite for the superb performance of our RAF Tornado pilots in this campaign was the low-flying training that they received in peace time? Does he therefore share my hope that when the conflict is over we shall hear a little less from the whingers and whiners who have tried to reduce those training programmes?

Mr. King: Nothing could have shown clearly the importance of that low-flying training. I am grateful to my hon. Friend, because I know that in his constituency he will have had representations in the past and I appreciate his robust and important position on this.

Mr. Andrew Faulds (Warley, East): Should not the right hon. Gentleman express his appreciation of the resolute support given to him in the latest resolution of the national executive committee of the Labour party? Does he understand that a large portion of the parliamentary Labour party does not support the leadership on this issue?

Mr. King: I would love to respond to that question, but I do not think that it is for me.

Mr. Patrick Nicholls (Teignbridge): What my right hon. Friend said about the importance that the Government attach to proper postal and telephone arrangements will come as a great reassurance to the parents of a 21-year-old lance-corporal serving in the 39th Field Regiment who contacted me today to tell me of the problems that they have had. Is my right hon. Friend aware of any special problems in people receiving mail from Germany—for example, soldiers receiving letters from their wives? If there is a backlog, will he undertake to have it examined?

Mr. King: A number of difficult complications have arisen because of the basis on which some units have come to serve in the Gulf, but we are trying to deal with them. I am grateful for what my hon. Friend says. We are anxious. My hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces is very keen to hear any other points, and we shall certainly try to sort them out.

Mr. Bruce George (Walsall, South): Most hon. Members appreciate the regular and lengthy reporting by the Secretary of State to the House. I do not expect the Secretary of State to respond to every rumour, but is he in a position to confirm or deny that some of the aircraft that left Iraq for Iran have been shuttling back and forth from that country? What does that say about the Iraqi aims? Is the right hon. Gentleman able to confirm the story, again emanating from the United States, that Iraqi missiles are being smuggled into Jordan, stuffed inside oil trucks?

Mr. King: I have no information on the latter point. On the hon. Gentleman's first point, there may have been some redisposition of some Iraqi planes within Iran, but I do not know whether the Iranian authorities chose to position them on alternative airfields for their own convenience. I am not sure whether the question implied that they were going back into Iraq. I have no evidence of their doing that.

Mr. Michael Grylls (Surrey, North-West): May I ask my right hon. Friend about television coverage? Although nobody in this House would wish to restrict political comment, does my right hon. Friend agree that there is room for some self-restraint, particularly by recently retired senior service officers who appear on television and discuss detailed tactics, just at the moment when the ground forces are about to be engaged with the enemy? Does my right hon. Friend agree that some self-restraint might be a good idea?

Mr. King: I do agree. It is a challenge in a free society such as ours, when freedom of speech and comment is so readily available, when we are confronting a very dangerous enemy and when it may be possible for that enemy to glean important insights into our approaches and military practices from comments that are made. I hope and believe that those senior retired military officers are aware of that risk.

Mr. Dennis Canavan (Falkirk, West): Does not the battle over Khafji confirm what many of us feared and predicted from the outset—that once the ground fighting starts in earnest there will be many casualties on both sides? How many more people must die in this senseless conflict before a ceasefire is eventually called and more diplomatic effort is put into trying to build on attempts to have a peaceful solution, such as that which was tried yesterday by Secretary of State Baker and his Soviet counterpart?

Mr. King: A ceasefire now would be very welcome to Saddam Hussein. I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman, who took an initial view on this, does not seem to have noticed during the pursuit of this campaign just how evil and dangerous is his monstrous military might. The hon. Member for Woolwich (Mr. Cartwright) pointed out just how obscene are some of the practices that he follows. It would certainly be to the advantage of Saddam Hussein if we had a ceasefire, but I do not think that it would ensure future good order or benefit the world if we had one at this time.

Mr. David Tredinnick (Bosworth): May I thank my right hon. Friend for his decision, first, to reduce telephone rates for troops—he will recall that I raised that very point before the war started—and, secondly, to introduce the domestic parcel rate, which will no doubt boost morale? Will he give an assurance that he is constantly looking at ways of boosting morale? Will he consider specifically the possibility of photographs being taken of troops in situ which will not compromise any secret positions, which could be sent home to families? That would be a significant morale booster.

Mr. King: Much of that is happening already, but I shall certainly look into the point. We are anxious to pursue any ideas which hon. Members may have. We have

[redacted] able to do a certain amount. Other ideas will be obstructed for operational reasons and difficulties, but we shall do anything that we can.

Ms. Hilary Armstrong (Durham, North-West): Has the Secretary of State had time to consider the special problems faced by schools attended by the children of armed service personnel? Last week representatives from the National Union of Teachers visited some of those schools to discuss with teachers the problems that they are experiencing. Will the Secretary of State give additional support to those schools so that they can work effectively with the children, who are suffering enormous fear and trauma as a result of what is happening to their families? Most of the schools are based in Germany, so they do not have the normal environment and support and that is an additional problem. Will the Secretary of State try to do something about that?

Mr. King: I am grateful to the hon. Lady. Her point is a serious one. Tremendous efforts are being made. She will know that staff in the schools are receiving counselling and we are trying to deal with the problem. The problem for children during this television war is worrying. Every night they go home and see more pictures of what may be happening and of bombs, bullets and shells. We take the point seriously.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I have to have regard to the business before the House.

Mr. Bob Cryer (Bradford, South): It is our pensions.

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Cryer: I was elected to speak here, not to keep quiet.

Mr. Speaker: Yes, but other hon. Members were also elected to speak.

I shall allow questions on the statement to run for further 15 minutes. I hope that we shall then have a short period of business questions because we should reach the main business by 5 o'clock.

Mrs. Teresa Gorman (Billericay): Returning to the subject of support from our European colleagues for the war effort, will my right hon. Friend comment on the fact that while Conservative MEPs whole-heartedly support the Government's position and are doing all that they can to persuade their European colleagues to do likewise, the Labour MEPs en bloc do not even support the official Labour party policy and are actively discouraging their European colleagues from supporting the war effort?

Mr. King: I am sorry to hear that. I did not respond to the hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds). At a time when our forces are in the Gulf engaged in a dangerous conflict, I respect the position adopted by the Opposition on the matter. I am sorry that Labour Members of the European Parliament are not able to adopt the same position. Perhaps they are a little far away from the United Kingdom. They are very much out of step with the overwhelming opinion of the British people.

Mr. Edward O'Hara (Knowsley, South): Will the Secretary of State confirm that diplomatic efforts will be redoubled, possibly through Tehran but also through whichever channels offer themselves, before we initiate a major commitment of our land forces to a land war from which shattered bodies would start to come home in horrendous and unacceptable numbers?

Mr. King: Our whole aim was first, to avoid any conflict. Now that, regrettably, we find ourselves in this position, unless we are prepared to accept the aggression against Kuwait and what would clearly be the continuing expansion of Iraq and its particularly evil regime, we must face up to the reality of conflict, as the hon. Gentleman understands. That being the case, we are anxious to find ways of minimising casualties. We hope that it will be possible to do that. That is why the air campaign has been structured as it has. It is the first stage of what we hope will be the speedy liberation of Kuwait with the minimum casualties, not just among our forces—which is important —but among the people in Kuwait.

Mr. Richard Alexander (Newark): Will my right hon. Friend join me in congratulating my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg), on the firm way in which he condemned to the former Iraqi ambassador the treatment apparently meted out to allied prisoners of war? Will he confirm from the Dispatch Box that those who place prisoners of war in a place of danger will be brought before an international war crimes tribunal, as well as those who ordered them to be placed there, regardless of the outcome of the conflict?

Mr. King: We are taking a careful look at the conduct of any people involved in the conflict who may be in breach of conventions or international law. In the early days, when we had the outrageous treatment of hostages before the conflict started, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary reminded people that under international law every individual is responsible for his actions.

Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North): Will the Secretary of State confirm that the war aims of Britain and the United States do not include either the invasion and destruction of Iraq as a country or the use of nuclear weapons in the prosecution of the conflict?

Mr. King: I have already made it clear that our aims are the aims which are set out in the United Nations resolutions. They have not changed. They remain our objectives. We have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. We seek no acquisition of their territory. We make those points clear. We have to seek the earliest possible implementation of the United Nations resolutions. That is what we are doing.

Mr. Derek Conway (Shrewsbury and Atcham): Will my right hon. Friend convey the thanks of the House to the Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen's Families Association and to district headquarters, including the western district office which is based in my constituency, for the assistance that they are giving to Gulf support groups? Many wives of service men are giving up a great deal of their time, at considerable expense in telephone calls, to pull the families together so that they may share their concerns and news of their loved ones. It is an important morale booster to the troops to know that this is going on at home and that so many people in his Department are assisting them.

Mr. King: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for mentioning SSAFA, not just because of what it is doing now. It will be an abiding encouragement to our forces to

[Mr. King]

know not just that SSAFA is there during the present crisis but that its work will go on day in, day out in the years ahead. Certainly its work is beyond praise.

Mr. Harry Ewing (Falkirk, East): Is the Secretary of State aware that during the past month I have been told constantly that I speak only for myself? I accept that. Is he also aware that I suspect that I speak for all my Scottish colleagues when I dissociate us from the remarks of the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond)? I doubt seriously that the Iraqis will ask whether men are Scottish, English, Irish or Welsh before they shoot them.

Is the Secretary of State really using the comparison of our troops in Northern Ireland, which is part of the United Kingdom, with our troops in the Gulf for his pathetic approach to free telephone calls? Is he aware that when the open golf championship is played at St. Andrews, British Telecom can put in, overnight, 200 extra lines? When we walk along the Embankment, we can hardly get through because of all the British Telecom lines into the Secretary of State's own Department. Yet he is telling British troops that they cannot make free telephone calls home. Is not the position the same as with the poll tax—"It is only delayed; you will pay it when you get back. Lay down your lives and the Tories will have your money."

Mr. King: I am disappointed in the hon. Member, who is an old pal. That is a disgraceful way to behave. We have addressed the matter seriously. It is easy to shout for free everything. The Americans tried it. The system broke down and the congestion was appalling. The Americans found that it was fairer for people to make a contribution, which helped to ensure that the maximum number of people could make calls. This is not Glasgow. It is not a matter of linking up to the golf course in St. Andrews. This is out in the desert, in forward positions. There is huge congestion. *[Interruption.]* I do not regard this as a laughing matter.

We are trying to do the best we can for our forces. Hon. Members should understand that the telephone system, with its limited range, has to cover 500,000 American troops, all wishing to ring home, more than 40,000 British troops and more than 10,000 French troops. The extra congestion poses major problems. There may be cheap publicity in appearing to stand up for our boys, but we are genuinely trying to do the best we can. The messages coming back are that the boys think that the present arrangement is fair.

Mr. Ian Taylor (Esher): Although it came rather later than might have been desirable, will my right hon. Friend warmly welcome the German Chancellor's clear statement that Germany would regard an attack on Turkey as an attack on NATO and, therefore, a genuine matter for German contribution? If that is allied with the German Defence Minister's statement that NATO is required because of the uncertainty in the Soviet Union, it is clear that the united Germany understands the role of NATO and is willing to play its part in NATO activities against possible out-of-area conflicts such as that in the Gulf.

Mr. King: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. The House will have appreciated the positive statements made by Chancellor Kohl. I have also talked to my counterpart, the reconfirmed Defence Minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, and I am grateful for the support that the Germans are giving us, not merely the funds to which I referred today, but the significant assistance in kind as well.

Mr. John McAllion (Dundee, East): Does the Secretary of State agree that one of the main lessons of the past two days of land fighting is that whatever else the war may be it will not be short, sharp and quick? Does the right hon. Gentleman now understand that not only must allied commanders resist being panicked into an early land war, but allied politicians must do everything in their power to avoid the necessity for a land war at all? Therefore, will he tell the House what he and other Ministers have done to open up diplomatic channels with Baghdad to secure the negotiated withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait so that they do not have to resort further to the carnage and killing to which he did not refer but which we all know has been taking place in the Gulf area for the past two weeks?

Mr. King: I do not think that I can add to what I have already said. I have made it clear that we sought every way at the United Nations—*[Interruption.]* I assume that the hon. Gentleman supports the United Nations. He knows perfectly well that the United Nations made every effort that it could to avoid conflict in the Gulf. It failed and it took the action to which it believed there was no alternative. We all regret it, but I still hope that, provided we stick to the campaign, we will achieve a reasonably early solution without the sort of casualties to which he refers. That is certainly our determination. The conflict can be ended now if Saddam Hussein immediately removes from Kuwait, ends the aggression and gives the clear assurance that he has no future aggressive intentions.

Mr. John Marshall (Hendon, South): Does my right hon. Friend accept that the vast majority of the British people believe that there will be peace in the middle east only when Saddam Hussein has been overthrown and, to that end, it will be necessary to do more than just evict the Iraqis from Kuwait?

Mr. King: I have made it clear that there is no point —well, not no point, but that it will be of limited benefit to liberate Kuwait, with the pain and difficulty involved, if it does not stay liberated. These are serious issues and the House, the country, the United Nations and the world are starting seriously to debate what would be the best approach to the eventualities that we may face at that time.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): Partly since the effects of Chernobyl did not respect human frontiers, will the Secretary of State give us the facts on the damage to nuclear installations? Is there a radiation, Chernobyl-like problem? Does that go into, for instance, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia or Iran? What do we know about the effects of the dispersal of biological weapons? Those who bomb biological agent factories had better be clear about what the dispersal effects may be.

Mr. King: The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that before any of those attacks could be contemplated, it was necessary to conduct the most thorough research into the methods of attack to minimise the risk of contamination outside the sites or even outside the buildings. The information available to me is that that has been achieved. General Schwarzkopf was asked this question and he gave a similar answer. Detailed research was conducted into the weather conditions that should apply, the time of day and

the temperature at which attacks should be conducted and the method of attack that should be used against the building concerned.

This highlights the contrast between the way in which our air campaign has been conducted and the Iraqis' indiscriminate attacks with missiles. I trust that the hon. Gentleman will approve of that contrast. I know that he disapproves of Iraq's having nuclear, biological and chemical weeapons and stores and that, therefore, he understands the importance of ensuring that those weapons be eliminated and that the elimination be carried out in the most painstaking way to minimise the risk of contamination.

Sir Jim Spicer (Dorset, West): My right hon. Friend has quite rightly stressed the importance, in moral terms, of the postal services to our forces in the Gulf. It is a matter that has been raised in the House on many occasions. May I say how pleased people are at what the Post Office has now decided to do and how delighted I personally am that he paid tribute to United Carriers. But why is the Post Office always the tail-end Charlie? Why cannot the Post Office be up front? Why cannot it be the first organisation to provide a parcel post service to our forces at a very low rate?

Mr. King: I am grateful for what my hon. Friend said. I shall ensure that his remarks are conveyed to the chairman of the Post Office, who, from my personal knowledge of him, will deeply resent the "tail-end Charlie" accusation but will, instead, be first-past-the-post Nick.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: I am sure that those hon. Members who have not been called to put questions on this statement will have some priority next time.

Mr. Cryer: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Please, no points of order.

Business of the House

4.41 pm

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John MacGregor): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement about the business for next week.

MONDAY 4 FEBRUARY—Until seven o'clock, private Members' motions.

Second Reading of the Coal Mining Subsidence Bill.

TUESDAY 5 FEBRUARY—Until about seven o'clock, consideration of Lords amendments to the Statutory Sick Pay Bill.

Second Reading of the Namibia Bill *[Lords]*.

WEDNESDAY 6 FEBRUARY—Opposition Day (5th allotted day). Until about seven o'clock, there will be a debate entitled "The Crisis in Training".

Afterwards, there will be a debate entitled "The Neglect of British Science and Science Education".

Both debates arise on Opposition motions.

THURSDAY 7 FEBRUARY—Remaining stages of the Disability Living Allowance and Disability Working Allowance Bill.

FRIDAY 8 FEBRUARY—Private Members' Bills.

MONDAY 11 FEBRUARY—Second Reading of the British Technology Group Bill.

At seven o'clock the Chairman of Ways and Means is expected to name opposed private business.

The House will also wish to know that European Standing Committee A will meet at 10.30 am on Wednesday 6 February to consider the unnumbered explanatory memorandum dated 18 January, submitted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, on proposals relating to rules for the application of levy in the milk and milk products sector.

European Standing Committee A
Wednesday 6 February

Relevant European Community Document
Unnumbered *Milk Quotas: definition*

Relevant Report of the European Legislation Committee
HC 29-vii (1990-91)

Dr. John Cunningham (Copeland): May I first thank the Leader of the House for arranging the important statement that has been made today by his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence and ask him for an assurance that the House will have the benefit of regular statements bringing us up to date about circumstances in the Gulf—not just for the benefit of hon. Members, although that is very important, but also for the benefit of the public at large?

When can we expect a debate on the Scottish Rate Support Grant Order? We have debated the proposals for England and Wales already. It is very important to Scotland that we should have an early opportunity to debate the impact of poll tax there. I hope that the Leader of the House will be able to assure us that such an opportunity will be provided soon.

In June last year, the right hon. Gentleman's predecessor as Leader of the House published proposals on the means of dealing with private Bills in the House, and called for comments. Has the Leader of the House had

Sir Robin Butler

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From the Private Secretary

31 January 1991

c - Mr. Appleyard
Copy D. 6.3.91
C Gozney

Dear Simon,

THE GULF: STATIONING OF B52s AT RAF FAIRFORD

Following this morning's discussion in OPD(G), I sent a message to General Scowcroft telling him that the Defence Secretary would be informing Parliament this afternoon of the American request to station B52s at RAF Fairford and of the Government's decision to agree. I sought confirmation that we could quote publicly the assurance that the B52s would be used to support only conventional operations while at RAF Fairford. I sought confirmation that we could confirm that another European country (unspecified) was providing a similar facility.

I have subsequently heard back from General Powell that there is no objection to our making the statement today or to our quoting the assurance. But he would very much prefer us not to point the finger at Spain, since the Spanish were still trying to play down their assistance. A formulation on the lines of: "This effort is being supported by several other European nations" would be better. I passed this last point on to you by telephone and you said the Defence Secretary would take it into account.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

Sir Robin Butler

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL London SW1A 2AH

31 January 1991

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FILE No. .....

c - Mr Appleyard

Dear Charles,

Foreign Secretary's talk with Chancellor Kohl, 30 January: Burdensharing

I recorded in telegrams the Foreign Secretary's discussions about burdensharing with Chancellor Kohl in Bonn last night (FCO telnos 47 and 48 to Bonn).

I did not include an aside which the Chancellor made to the effect that if the war went on (for rather longer than he expected), then it would be open to the British Government to go back to the Germans to talk about a further contribution to British costs. The Foreign Secretary believes that we should be careful to make no public reference to this remark.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Gieve (Treasury) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

Statues

Mr. Bellotti: To ask the Lord President of the Council for what reason the statue of Joseph Chamberlain in the Members' Lobby of the House was replaced with one of Benjamin Disraeli during the Christmas recess; if he will outline the total cost of such a move; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. MacGregor: The statues were moved following a resolution of the Advisory Committee on Works of Art in the House of Commons. The cost of the work was some £3,000.

PRIME MINISTER

Engagements

Mr. Harry Greenway: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 31 January.

The Prime Minister: This morning I presided at a meeting of the Cabinet and had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House, I shall be having further meetings later today.

The Gulf

Mr. Teddy Taylor: To ask the Prime Minister if he will raise at the next meeting of the European Council the contribution made by EC members to the Gulf crisis in terms of cash and resources; and if he will make a statement.

The Prime Minister: The majority of the European Community member states have already contributed to the multinational force in the Gulf, whether with military forces, logistical, medical, financial or other forms of assistance. We are seeking additional contributions to our costs from a number of countries, including EC members. The Community and its member states are also providing economic assistance to those countries most directly affected economically by the crisis, as well as providing substantial humanitarian assistance to alleviate the refugee problem in the region.

Mr. Simon Hughes: To ask the Prime Minister what *(a)* governmental and *(b)* international activity, involving Her Majesty's Government, took place before 28 January to prepare the specialist method of responding to any environmental crisis in the Gulf; and if he will make a statement.

The Prime Minister: The Government have responded promptly and positively to requests from the Saudi Arabian Government for expert advice and assistance following the deliberate pollution of the Gulf by Saddam Hussein. We are also in touch with other states in the region. Since the risk of conflict arose, the Government have been fully conscious of a number of possible environmental risks arising from it and has maintained close contact with the Allies on all matters connected with it. It is for the Gulf states affected, drawing on the expertise on offer from the United Kingdom and the international community, to lead the response to the environmental damate that Iraq is inflicting on the region.

Gas Masks (Palestinians)

Mr. Wray: To ask the Prime Minister what representations he has made to the Israeli Prime Minister concerning the provision of gas masks to the Palestinian population in the occupied territories.

The Prime Minister: None. On 14 January the Israeli High Court ordered the army to distribute its stock of masks to Palestinians along the green line between Israel and the occupied territories immediately, and to obtain more for the remaining residents of the west bank and Gaza. The distribution has begun. We welcome this decision.

Pay Review Bodies

Mr. Madel: To ask the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the latest reports of the pay review bodies.

The Prime Minister: The 1991 reports of the review bodies on the pay of the armed forces, the doctors and dentists, the professions allied to medicine, nursing staff, midwives and health visitors, and of the Top Salaries Review Body have been published today. Copies are available in the Vote Office. The Government are grateful to the members of the review bodies for the time and care which they have put into the preparation of the reports. The table shows the increases recommended by the review bodies for each group, and their cost.

	Pay bill increase Per cent.	*Range of increases in 1991-92 Per cent.*	*United Kingdom public expenditure cost*[1] *£ million*
Armed forces	12·2	[2]11·2-18·0	536
Doctors and dentists	10·2	9·5-12·7	454
Professions allied to medicine	10·8	10·0-14·2	74
Nursing staff, midwives and health visitors	9·7	[3]9·5-11·0	696
Top salaries	9·6	[4]9·5-12·1	10

[1] These figures are higher than those in the Review Bodies' reports, which do not cover the full public expenditure costs.

[2] University cadets will receive lower increases, down to 7·8 per cent. for first year students. A few Captains RN may receive up to 20·1 per cent. as a result of changes to submarine and bonus payments.

[3] A small number of Grade B staff and staff nursery nurses will receive rises of 14·1 per cent. or 14·2 per cent., and some nurses in receipt of the geriatric lead will receive 9·3 per cent.

[4] The 12·1 per cent. is for 2 star officers only; all others receive 9·5 per cent.

The Government accept the recommendations of the review bodies and will be implementing them in full. All the proposed improvements in pay structures, designed to assist in recruiting, retaining and motivating staff, are accepted, indeed welcomed. But the overall cost of the pay packages proposed by the review bodies is high. The cost exceeds the provision available in departments' spending plans for next year at a time when public expenditure is under pressure as a result of events in the Gulf.

Accordingly, given the size of the recommended increases as well as wider economic considerations, it will be necessary to stage payment of the review bodies' awards, except to the armed forces. When many of our armed forces are on active service, we have concluded it

ould not be appropriate to ask them to wait for their full ay award. For all other groups the staging will involve an increase of at least 7·5 per cent. from 1 April with the balance paid from 1 December. In consequence the full awards for all groups will be in payment before the end of this year.

The cost of implementing the recommendations on this basis will be met from within the public expenditure planning totals published in the autumn statement. The Government recognise that the cost of the health service awards could not be met in full from present health service provision without adversely affecting services to patients. The Government will therefore provide an extra £250 million from the reserve for next year, bringing the total increase in the resources available for the national health services between 1990-91 and 1991-92 to £3·4 billion. The full increase in costs for the armed forces over the provision previously made in the defence budget will also be met from the reserve: an allocation of £70 million will be made from the reserve for this purpose.

The specific application of this approach to the respective groups will be as follows.

The increases recommended by the review body on the armed forces will be paid in full from 1 April 1991. The increase in the 'x' factor, which reflects the special demands of service life, will be larger for women than for men and will remove all pay distinctions between them.

The Government have decided to accept the recommendations of the review body on doctors and dentists, but to stage their implementation so that 7·5 per cent. is paid in all cases from 1 April and the remainder of the increases, ranging from 2 per cent. to 5·2 per cent. for different categories, from 1 December. Increased expenses for general medical practitioners, which are a necessary part of the cost of running a practice, will be paid in full from 1 April.

Similarly, for nursing staff, midwives and health visitors, the Government accept the recommendations of the review body, but their implementation will be staged so that all staff will receive at least 7·5 per cent. from 1 April and the remaining 2 per cent. from 1 December. Lower paid nursing staff, for whom the review body has recommended higher increases, will receive all but 2 per cent. from 1 April with the balance paid from 1 December.

The Government have also decided to accept the recommendations of the review body on professions allied to medicine, but to stage their implementation so that 7·5 per cent. is paid to all from 1 April and the remaining pay increases and other additional payments are paid from 1 December.

Groups covered by the Top Salaries Review Body will receive 7·5 per cent. from 1 April, with the remainder from 1 December. However, two-star military officers, for whom higher increases were recommended, will receive all but 2 per cent. from 1 April with the balance paid from 1 December. The new system of performance-related pay for civil servants, which the Top Salaries Review Body recommended in their report last year, will be implemented from 1 April 1991.

The pay rates and scales resulting from the decisions will be promulgated as soon as possible for the groups concerned. Pensions will follow the rates of salary in payment.

297 CW62/11 Job 2-10

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Companies Inspectors

Mr. Austin Mitchell: To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he will give the number and list the companies in which he has appointed inspectors from within or outside his Department under the Companies Act 1985 since 1979; and if he will give the number of those inspectors' reports which he has published.

Mr. Redwood: I refer the hon. Member to the reply that I gave on 8 January 1990, *Official Report*, columns *519-24*. Since that date, inspectors have been appointed in the following cases:

1. BOM Holdings plc.
2. Atlantic Computers plc.
3. Atlantic Computer Systems plc.
4. Astra Holdings plc.
5. London United Investments plc.
6. Norton Group plc.

Seventeen reports have been published in relation to inspections begun since 1979.

Questions

Mr. Tim Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, pursuant to his oral answer to the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, Central of 23 January, *Official Report*, column 329, what has been the cost of the 436 questions asked by the hon. Members for Great Grimsby (Mr. Mitchell) and Newcastle upon Tyne, Central (Mr. Cousins) on accountancy during the last two years.

Mr. Redwood: Detailed information on the cost of providing each answer is not recorded, but the total cost to my Department has probably been between £30,000 and £60,000 in the period since 1 December 1989.

Environmental Sensor Technologies

Mr. Cryer: To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry when the laboratory of the Government chemist received the report on environmental sensor technologies commissioned by his Department from Robert Bogue and Partners; to whom and through what outlets the report will be made available; and what was the cost of the consultancy with Robert Bogue and Partners for the preparation of the report.

Mr. Leigh: The report on environmental sensor technologies was received by the Laboratory of the Government Chemist on 3 September 1990. The findings of the consultancy were presented at an open seminar held in London on 28 November 1990. Copies of a short report which summarises the findings of the consultancy are available free on request from the Laboratory of the Government Chemist. A more detailed report can be purchased from the Laboratory of the Government Chemist. The cost of the consultancy is commercial-in-confidence information.

Iraq

Mr. Tony Banks: To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what has been the value of export-credits granted to Iraq in each year since 1979.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

c- Mr Appleyard

CABINET OFFICE
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1 FEB 1991
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POLAD 18N

31 January 1991

127/5 PT.14

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE: THE GULF

Much of the Prime Minister's talk with Vice President Quayle this afternoon was about the Gulf.

The Prime Minister began by referring to our decision to accept the stationing of B52s at RAF Fairford. We had been very happy to agree to this. Vice President Quayle said it was characteristic of the UK to be so willing. The United States greatly appreciated the sustained support which it had received from Britain.

The Prime Minister said that the air campaign against Iraq was going well. There seemed to be some indications that the Iraqis were intending to cross the Saudi border in some strength in the next day or so, to try to provoke the multi-national force into starting a ground campaign. The Vice President agreed that the Iraqis were trying to precipitate a ground war, with the intention of inflicting casualties. The Americans had in fact suffered double-digit casualties on each of the last two days: 11 marines yesterday, and a C130 shot down today.

The Prime Minister said that we assessed Iraq was likely to start to use CW quite soon. This might be against forces in Saudi Arabia or against Israel or both. The Vice President said the United States regarded it as certain that CW would be used by Iraq. They would go for an overwhelming conventional response.

The Vice President referred to the transfer of Iraqi aircraft to Iran. This might indicate that the Allied attacks on aircraft shelters were proving very accurate. He wondered how we saw Saddam Hussain's motives for moving the aircraft. The Prime Minister said we thought his main purpose was to husband his air force. The move seemed to have been agreed with Iran some time ago. We thought it unlikely that the Iranians would let the aircraft go, at least until the end of the conflict.

SECRET

The Vice President asked whether public opinion in the United Kingdom thought that elimination of Saddam Hussain should be one of our war aims. The Prime Minister said it could not be an overt aim, although none of us would shed any tears if he were to be removed. The Vice President said the feeling was growing in the United States that Saddam Hussain must be removed.

The Prime Minister stressed the need to start thinking now about what would follow the conflict in the Gulf. We had to reckon with the possibility that Saddam Hussain might still be there and a powerful political figure, with a significant part of his war machine untouched. It was very important to inflict the maximum possible damage on his forces and military infrastructure before there was any question of a ceasefire. The Vice President said that the Adminstration was wrestling with this problem. There would have to be post-war security arrangements and this might involve an American presence for a time, although he did not think the Saudis would want Western forces to remain for long.

The Vice President asked whether the Prime Minister thought the Israelis would continue to exercise restraint. The Prime Minister thought they would do so for the time being. They were deriving considerable benefit from it in terms of international approval. But they would retaliate eventually. The Vice President agreed with this view. The real problem would arise if Saddam Hussain used CW against the Israelis. At worst, and if there were thousands of casualties, the Israel response could even be nuclear.

The Vice President asked whether the Prime Minister was satisfied with information we were receiving from Washington about the conduct of the military campaign, in particular overhead photography. He knew the President was keen for the Prime Minister to be as fully informed as possible. The Prime Minister said he would find it quite useful to see rather more satellite photography. The Vice President said that he would raise this on his return to Washington.

The Vice President said that burden-sharing was a very sensitive issue politically in Washington. That would continue after the end of the conflict and could have repercussions for NATO. Opinion in the United States was becoming very critical of Germany, particularly because of its reported role in providing CW precursors and other material to Iraq. The Prime Minister said that he had just sent the President a message about our concerns on burden-sharing. We might need help from the United States in persuading some countries like Japan to contribute to our costs.

The Vice President said there was evidence that Muslim opinion was becoming steadily more vocal in support of Saddam Hussain, not just in the Middle East, but in the Far East as well. This was a worrying development.

SECRET

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



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31 JAN 1991
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127/5

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1991

Copies to: Mr Gozney
Mr Ball

cc - Mr Appleyard
Mr Reeves

FOLIO 17N

GULF CRISIS: FINANCIAL BURDEN SHARING

Thank you for your letter of 30 January enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Bush about burden sharing. I enclose a revised version which I have sent on the direct line to the White House.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (HM Treasury) and Sonia Phippard).

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

c/foreign/bush

FOLLOWING FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT FROM CHARLES POWELL:

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER:

Dear George,

There are some points which I would like to make to you about the cost of the Gulf conflict.

The United States is bearing the brunt of the military burden in the Gulf. It is right that the Gulf States, and other wealthy countries which have not made a substantial military contribution, should help you financially. I welcome the success you have had in obtaining pledges of assistance. It is very good news.

The cost to Britain is also great and a matter of concern to the people here. There is a growing feeling both in Parliament and the press, that we are not receiving enough support from wealthy potential donors. The announcements of the large pledges to the United States from Kuwait, Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia have not surprisingly strengthened that view. Your role is pre-eminent, but ours is substantial too.

We are making our own approaches: and like you, we are seeking contributions principally from Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, but possibly from some others too Helmut Kohl last night announced some very welcome assistance of DM 800 million. I have spoken to him today, to convey our thanks. We are in touch with the others.

Some coordination of our efforts would be beneficial. It would be particularly helpful if the United States was seen to

endorse our efforts. The Japanese in particular need reassurance that our respective bids for help from them are coordinated.

Our military forces in the Gulf represent about 8 per cent of yours in manpower terms. In our search for financial contributions we are therefore aiming for a figure about 8 per cent of your own. The German contribution just announced meets that target.

Perhaps we could have a word about this when we next speak on the telephone.

Warm regards

John

FOLIO 17m

nce offered by such a tax cut? Will he instead provide more expenditure for the training of our actual and potential work force? Is it not the case that such expenditure would enable many unemployed people to aspire to skills and knowledge that would put them in a better position in the labour market?

Mr. Maude: The hon. Gentleman makes his budget representations in a somewhat delphic way. In response to his point about spending money on training, I mentioned earlier, and repeat for his benefit, that the CBI survey indicates that the amount of money spent by private companies on training is likely to be increased or maintained this year. The majority of companies are expecting to increase the amount that they spend on training. That is good news. We have already a massive programme of training in Britain, which is very much to be welcomed.

Mr. Oppenheim: Will my hon. Friend resist this year the urge to raise taxes, particularly on savings? Would not the Opposition's suggestion of reintroducing the investment income surcharge discourage savings? Does not that show how little the Opposition's underlying attitudes have changed, whatever their glossy image is?

Mr. Maude: The idea propounded by the Labour party that one should at the same time encourage savings and tax them more heavily is one which I have not yet managed to understand.

PRIME MINISTER

Engagements

Q1. **Mr. Patchett:** To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 31 January.

The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): This morning I presided at a meeting of the Cabinet and had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others.

Mr. Patchett: Has the Prime Minister seen reports this morning that the Italian cargo vessel the Karin B is returning to Britain with a cargo of toxic waste? In view of the grave public anxiety on the matter, will he ensure that under no circumstances will the ship be allowed into any British port with its deadly cargo?

The Prime Minister: I can certainly assure the hon. Gentleman that waste will be allowed into this country only if it is safe to treat it. We shall certainly apply that principle to the Karin B and its cargo.

Sir Ian Lloyd: Does my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister agree that in the nuclear weapons age the much pilloried phrase, "Careless talk costs lives" is a dramatic understatement? Does he further agree that the intolerable position in which Admiral Sir Tom Woodward was put in a public discussion on television early yesterday morning by the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) was a serious threat, especially as the right hon. Gentleman asked that the relationship between the President of the United States and British use of nuclear weapons be brought out into the open? Does my right hon. Friend agree that that shows the importance of the existing convention which applies to the matter?

The Prime Minister: It is an important convention. However, I did not see the interview and I should prefer not to comment too directly upon it.

Mr. Benn: Is the Prime Minister aware that Admiral Woodward was a great deal more candid than Ministers have been about the use of nuclear weapons in the Gulf? Is he also aware that there is widespread anxiety in Britain about the extension of the war aims well beyond the United Nations objectives relating to Kuwait and about the possibility of an extension of the war? Will he welcome the initiative of the French Government in going to Tehran to see whether at this late stage some progress might be made by negotiation leading to a ceasefire?

The Prime Minister: I repeat to the right hon. Gentleman that I did not see the interview with Admiral Woodward and I have no comment on it. On the war aims, I have made it clear consistently that our aims are those set out in the United Nations Security Council resolutions. That is and remains the position.

Mr. Colvin: Will my right hon. Friend find time today to consider the somewhat fragile political climate in South Africa, following the welcome meeting of reconciliation between chief Buthelezi and Mr. Nelson Mandela? What action can the Government take to encourage the nations of the world to take a more positive attitude towards South Africa to encourage that country faster and further down the road to reform which we all want to see it travel?

The Prime Minister: I very much welcome the meeting between Chief Buthelezi and Mr. Mandela. It is an extremely welcome development. As my hon. Friend will know, the European Community nations lifted the investment sanction some time ago because of the progress that has been made. If, as I hope, further progress on dismantling apartheid is made soon, I hope that we shall see a further gesture from the European Community, the United States and the Commonwealth on lifting sanctions.

Q2. **Sir David Steel:** To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 31 January.

The Prime Minister: I refer the right hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Sir David Steel: After the Gulf war, bearing in mind what was done after the Falklands war, will the Prime Minister consider setting up a high-level inquiry into the acquisition by Iraq of British arms and technology, including some from private companies, quangos and Government Departments, so that lessons may be learned, and so that never again will our forces be faced with an enemy armed partly by ourselves.

The Prime Minister: There is a considerable degree of sensitivity about the supply of arms and equipment. As the right hon. Gentleman will know, for some considerable time we have not supplied arms to Iraq for precisely that reason. We will take great care in future to ensure that we are careful about that matter.

Sir Jim Spicer: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the record of loyalty and service to NATO of the republic of Turkey in the last 45 years, and also to the United Nations in Korea and to United Nations endeavours in the Gulf, is worthy of great praise and should be considered carefully by other NATO members and members of the European Community?

The Prime Minister: Turkey certainly has a distinguished record in NATO, and I am happy to acknowledge that fact.

Mr. Kinnock: Will the Prime Minister take the opportunity to confirm that any interest rate rise in Britain in response to today's rise in German interest rates would be disastrous for industry?

The Prime Minister: As the right hon. Gentleman knows, we will set interest rates and reduce interest rates when we think it is appropriate. As he knows, we have made our position on the subject perfectly clear. When it is appropriate and in the interests of the economy to reduce interest rates, and when we see that the reduction will be sustained, we will take action.

Mr. Kinnock: The Government have been telling us for years that they have been curing inflation. Is not it the case that they have always made the mistake of combating inflation only with high interest rates, with the result that they have hit investment? How does the Prime Minister expect the country to become more competitive in advance of the completion of the single market if all the time he is wearing down investment, skills, training and the other things that are essential to enable Britain to compete?

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman should know that as our inflation differential with the European Community narrows, we will be in a position to reduce interest rates. The right hon. Gentleman, who invariably advocates the cutting of interest rates, may recall that he also advocated a further cut in interest rates in 1987. Had we then followed his advice, we would have faced a far greater problem today.

Mr. Kinnock: The Prime Minister will have great difficulty in saying to anyone that he could have greater difficulties than those caused by 1,000 redundancies a day, a reduction in output, a reduction in investment and the highest interest rates in the developed world.

The Prime Minister: If the right hon. Gentleman is serious about Britain's success in the 1990s, he needs to bear in mind that we must get inflation down to the rate of our competitors. We are prepared to take action to do so. I regret that the right hon. Gentleman, as ever, wants the soft option.

Q3. **Mr. Cran:** To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 31 January.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Cran: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the contribution made by Germany yesterday to Britain's war expenses is extremely welcome? Can he indicate to the House whether he expects contributions from any other source?

The Prime Minister: I certainly agree with my hon. Friend that the further contribution of £275 million from Germany is very welcome. So also is the offer to provide some military material. I spoke to Chancellor Kohl this morning and was able to thank him for the generosity of the German people.

Mrs. Heal: Following the visit yesterday by hon. Members, all of whom happened to be women, to the wives of the service men serving in the Gulf, will the Prime Minister take the opportunity to write a letter of support to the wives, many of whom feel isolated and lonely? Will he agree to do that? Will he also agree to a delegation of the wives coming to Westminster to explain to hon. Members their difficulties and feelings while they are supporting their husbands who are serving in the Gulf.

The Prime Minister: I certainly agree with the hon. Lady about the remarkable contribution made by the wives of our service men. I hope shortly to have the opportunity of visiting a number of the wives in Germany and I look forward to that. I would be happy to send the letter that the hon. Lady suggests.

Q4. **Mr. Bowis:** To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 31 January.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Bowis: Does my right hon. Friend agree that there can be few worse examples of the inhumanity of Saddam Hussein than his cruelty to the prisoners of war and their families in refusing the International Red Cross access to them? Will he do everthing in his power to ensure that that access is achieved?

The Prime Minister: I assure my hon. Friend that we are certainly doing that. The action by the Iraqis in refusing access is intolerable and unforgivable. We are in daily touch with the Red Cross in Geneva and are doing our best to support its efforts. I shall be meeting the president of the Red Cross early next week.

Q5. **Mr. Lewis:** To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 31 January.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Lewis: Does the Prime Minister share my view that it is obscene that the lives of coalition forces in the Gulf are threatened by arms and weapons probably made by their own families in their own country. *[Interruption.]* Will the right hon. Gentleman give an unequivocal assurance today that he will take Britain out of the international arms trade, which includes the training of personnel from other countries and providing technical knowhow?

The Prime Minister: The obscenity lies in Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, and the sooner that the hon. Gentleman recognises that the better.

Q6. **Mr. Day:** To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 31 January.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Day: Does my right hon. Friend agree that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was an act of naked aggression, but Israel's occupation of the west bank and Gaza was brought about by decades of Arab intolerance of the state of Israel, and that because of those two different scenarios there should be no linkage at any future date?

The Prime Minister: It is clear that the situation is different because in 1967 it was Israel that was attacked. But we now have to look to the future and a solution to the Arab-Israel problem based on territory for peace. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait has made that task much

more difficult, but as I have said to the House on a number of occasions in recent weeks, we shall certainly be looking to see whether we can bring that peace forward as soon as the conflict is over.

Mr. Molyneaux: Does the Prime Minister share my admiration for the prompt response of senior members of the Commonwealth to the invasion of Kuwait? Does he share my hope that those ties with the Commonwealth will endure long after various temporary entanglements have disappeared?

The Prime Minister: I most certainly do, without qualification.

Q7. **Mr. Thorne:** To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 31 January.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Thorne: As justice delayed is justice denied, will my right hon. Friend, in his usual caring fashion, be kind enough to examine the efficiency of the courts and whether or not it is right that people, particularly from abroad, should be obliged to wait so long for their trial? I am thinking in particular of Mrs. Dina Le Tarle, the American wife of a surgeon, aged 29, who has been prosecuted for her actions while responding to muggers on the underground. She has now been waiting three months for her trial——

Mr. Speaker: Order. If the case is sub judice, the hon. Gentleman should bear that in mind.

The Prime Minister: I understand the general point that my hon. Friend makes. The Government are concerned to reduce to a minimum delay in all criminal cases.

Mr. Michael J. Martin: The Prime Minister will know that many of the soldiers who are serving well in the Gulf are in the Army because they could not get jobs in civvy street, and when the Gulf war is over there will be soldiers who, unfortunately, will be unfit for Army service. Can the right hon. Gentleman guarantee them jobs in Glasgow and the north of England?

The Prime Minister: The early part of the hon. Gentleman's remarks will be widely resented by many of our forces in the Gulf. I heard from him no talk of employment during the 40 successive months when unemployment was falling.

Q8. **Mr. Page:** To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 31 January.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Page: My right hon. Friend is hearing from those who wish to see extentions to the sanction period in respect of the Gulf, calls to bring about a ceasefire. For the benefit of the House, will my right hon. Friend surmise why those people are trying to put our troops in extra danger by giving Saddam Hussein the breathing space to develop a nuclear weapon?

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend. He makes a valid point. We are not interested in a pause or a ceasefire, which would simply enable Iraq to regroup, resupply its forces and place our troops in greater peril. The conflict over Kuwait will be concluded only when all the provisions of Security Council resolution 678 have been met.

569 CO62/9 Job 3-1

Sir Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
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FOLIO 17

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

31 January 1991

c- Mr Appleyard

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE: THE GULF

Much of the Prime Minister's talk with Vice President Quayle this afternoon was about the Gulf.

The Prime Minister began by referring to our decision to accept the stationing of B52s at RAF Fairford. We had been very happy to agree to this. Vice President Quayle said it was characteristic of the UK to be so willing. The United States greatly appreciated the sustained support which it had received from Britain.

The Prime Minister said that the air campaign against Iraq was going well. There seemed to be some indications that the Iraqis were intending to cross the Saudi border in some strength in the next day or so, to try to provoke the multi-national force into starting a ground campaign. The Vice President agreed that the Iraqis were trying to precipitate a ground war, with the intention of inflicting casualties. The Americans had in fact suffered double-digit casualties on each of the last two days: 11 marines yesterday, and a C130 shot down today.

The Prime Minister said that we assessed Iraq was likely to start to use CW quite soon. This might be against forces in Saudi Arabia or against Israel or both. The Vice President said the United States regarded it as certain that CW would be used by Iraq. They would go for an overwhelming conventional response.

The Vice President referred to the transfer of Iraqi aircraft to Iran. This might indicate that the Allied attacks on aircraft shelters were proving very accurate. He wondered how we saw Saddam Hussain's motives for moving the aircraft. The Prime Minister said we thought his main purpose was to husband his air force. The move seemed to have been agreed with Iran some time ago. We thought it unlikely that the Iranians would let the aircraft go, at least until the end of the conflict.

SECRET

The Vice President asked whether public opinion in the United Kingdom thought that elimination of Saddam Hussain should be one of our war aims. The Prime Minister said it could not be an overt aim, although none of us would shed any tears if he were to be removed. The Vice President said the feeling was growing in the United States that Saddam Hussain must be removed.

The Prime Minister stressed the need to start thinking now about what would follow the conflict in the Gulf. We had to reckon with the possibility that Saddam Hussain might still be there and a powerful political figure, with a significant part of his war machine untouched. It was very important to inflict the maximum possible damage on his forces and military infrastructure before there was any question of a ceasefire. The Vice President said that the Adminstration was wrestling with this problem. There would have to be post-war security arrangements and this might involve an American presence for a time, although he did not think the Saudis would want Western forces to remain for long.

The Vice President asked whether the Prime Minister thought the Israelis would continue to exercise restraint. The Prime Minister thought they would do so for the time being. They were deriving considerable benefit from it in terms of international approval. But they would retaliate eventually. The Vice President agreed with this view. The real problem would arise if Saddam Hussain used CW against the Israelis. At worst, and if there were thousands of casualties, the Israel response could even be nuclear.

The Vice President asked whether the Prime Minister was satisfied with information we were receiving from Washington about the conduct of the military campaign, in particular overhead photography. He knew the President was keen for the Prime Minister to be as fully informed as possible. The Prime Minister said he would find it quite useful to see rather more satellite photography. The Vice President said that he would raise this on his return to Washington.

The Vice President said that burden-sharing was a very sensitive issue politically in Washington. That would continue after the end of the conflict and could have repercussions for NATO. Opinion in the United States was becoming very critical of Germany, particularly because of its reported role in providing CW precursors and other material to Iraq. The Prime Minister said that he had just sent the President a message about our concerns on burden-sharing. We might need help from the United States in persuading some countries like Japan to contribute to our costs.

The Vice President said there was evidence that Muslim opinion was becoming steadily more vocal in support of Saddam Hussain, not just in the Middle East, but in the Far East as well. This was a worrying development.

SECRET

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and to Sir Robin Butler.

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

FOLIO 16 F

127/5

Ref. A091/248

PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 31 January

Item 1: The end of the conflict

You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce the two papers together. The first deals with bringing the fighting to an end and the second with our policy towards Iraq in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. The third paper in the series (Middle East - winning the peace), dealing with the longer term issue of maintaining stability and security in the region, will be circulated by the Foreign Secretary next week. The aim, as you know, is to hold a further round of the UK/US talks in the next week to co-ordinate our approach with the US Government on the more pressing issues covered in the first two papers. The Foreign Secretary will be looking for a second-reading discussion of the broad approach.

2. It is conceivable that the current Iraqi ground offensives are a prelude to withdrawal. This gives these issues extra urgency. The main question arising from the paper is whether a ceasefire would be acceptable without a surrender of all Iraqi forces in Kuwait (paragraph 5 of the paper). The joint Baker/Bessmertnykh statement may make a surrender more difficult to insist upon if Saddam Hussein gives an unequivocal undertaking to withdraw. You might ask the Foreign Secretary and the Attorney General about the chances of being able successfully to insist that all Iraq's CBW, nuclear and missile facilities,

plus existing stocks, be destroyed as a condition of cease-fire. We would need coalition support to achieve this.

3. An aspect not covered in the paper, but which you might like to mention, is the Israeli factor. The Iraqis might attack Israel after a cease-fire in Kuwait, or the Israelis might treat the prospect of a cease-fire as the occasion for their already threatened retaliation. The main burden would fall on the Americans to continue to keep Israel under control.

4. On UN involvement (paragraph 6), the key questions are whether we should go for a satisfactory Resolution from the outset, to forestall worse versions, and if so, what action would we need to take to prepare the ground. You might ask the Chief of the Defence Staff whether he is content with the ceasefire procedures set out in paragraph 7 and colleagues to confirm that they are happy with the policy of not declaring Iraqi leaders in advance to be war criminals (paragraph 8) since we may have to do business with them.

5. On POWs (paragraph 9), you might confirm that arranging a swift exchange takes priority over screening. One point not covered in the paper is the possibility that some POWs, if Saddam is still in power, will ask for political asylum: we will not want a repetition of the Cossacks problem after WW2 but we will need a response which takes them off our hands (eg by asking Gulf States or other Arab coalition partners to take them). You might conclude the discussion of the first paper by approving the broad thrust as a basis for consultation with the US Government, subject to points raised in discussion.

6. On the second paper, you might begin by accepting that much depends on whether Saddam is still in power and if not, on the complexion of the new regime. You might then seek confirmation that the definitions of British interests (paragraph 4) and

policy objectives (paragraphs 5-7) are acceptable. You might go on to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he accepts that containment is likely to be the most we can expect in dealing with Iraq. If so, then we should strive for the broadest and toughest arms embargo and non-proliferation regime. These will not be easy to achieve given the Israeli factor and the arms replacement exercise which will be needed in the rest of the area. You might ask the Attorney General to comment on the approach on compensation and personal responsibility (paragraphs 13-16) and the Energy Secretary on the prospects for maintaining an oil embargo to retain leverage over Iraq (paragraphs 17-20).

7. You might conclude the discussion of the second paper by approving the main conclusions, subject to points made in discussion, as a basis for coordination with the US Government and by commissioning the further work proposed in paragraph 22. You might then invite UK officials to report to OPD(G) after the next round of UK/US talks on the two papers.

Item 2: Current military situation

8. You might invite the Chief of the Defence Staff to give a brief report on allied and Iraqi air, land and naval operations, including the Iraqi border incursions. There is evidence that the Iraqis may be planning more substantial local offensives both in the East and in the West, possibly accompanied by chemical attacks. The aim may be to draw us into a premature ground battle or to establish some easy victories as a face-saving prelude to a demand for a cease-fire or withdrawal.

9. The Defence Secretary is likely to raise the initial US soundings on the deployment of B52 aircraft to Fairford together with 5 USAF tankers. We have not yet had a formal approach which is likely to come on the White House/No 10 net. Clearly it would be difficult to refuse the request, especially as the Spanish Government has allowed Spanish bases to be used. MoD are asking

the Pentagon for a more detailed indication of the role of the aircraft. While the deployment might provide an unwelcome focal point for anti-war demonstrations and terrorist incident, acceptance of any US request would be timely in the burdensharing context.

Item 3: Current international situation

10. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to report on his meetings in Bonn, especially on the burdensharing aspects. The Defence Secretary will mention his own contacts with Dr Stoltenberg. The Foreign Secretary is planning to visit Saudi Arabia for discussions with the Saudi and Kuwaiti Governments on 6-8 or 9-11 February. The Chief Secretary is planning to visit UAE on 1-2 or 2-3 February. You have now sent a message to King Fahd and have a draft message to President Bush. The German Government has announced an additional contribution of $5.5 bn. towards US military costs for the first three months of 1991. The South Korean Government is reported to be pledging another $280m. ($500m. in all).

11. In the context of burdensharing, you might invite the Energy Secretary to say a word about current discussions in the Media Handling Group on opportunities for British industry in the reconstruction of Kuwait, on which you have sent a message to the Emir. You may think it would be helpful for the Trade and Industry Secretary to be invited to prepare a brief note for OPD(G) on the substance and for him to be present when the paper is taken at a later meeting. The Americans seem set to scoop the pool and there could be a good deal of criticism if we are thought not to have been vigorous enough on behalf of our own companies.

Item 4: Media handling

12. You might invite the Energy Secretary to report on the broader picture and Mr O'Donnell to cover the day-to-day points.

Issues of interest include the allies' war aims (again), the timing of the land campaign (again), and Saddam Hussain's intentions over unconventional weapons.

R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

30 January 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir Robin Butler

FOLIO 15

R

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CABINET OFFICE
A 1123
30 JAN 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS

30 January 1991

cc- Mr Appleyard
Mr Reeves

Dear Charles,

Gulf crisis: Financial burdensharing

Following discussion in OPD(G) on 30 January, it was agreed that the Prime Minister should write to President Bush setting out our concern to recover more of our costs in the Gulf.

If the Americans continue on their present course, there is a risk that their demands will exhaust the main sources of funding. Riyadh telno 272 (copy enclosed) reports increasing Saudi discontent with the financial demands placed upon them; our Embassy in Tokyo have reported similar signs from the Japanese.

(telegram below)

I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Bush. As agreed at OPD(G), this could be reinforced by a telephone message to the President.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (Treasury), Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSCOBRD

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH

I wanted to write to you about the cost of the Gulf conflict.

The United States is, of course, bearing the brunt of the military burden in the Gulf. It is right that the Gulf States, and other wealthy countries which have not made a substantial military contribution should be asked to help.

As you know, the cost to Britain is also great and a matter of public concern. There is a strong feeling both in Parliament and the press, that we are not receiving enough support from wealthy potential donors. This has been strengthened by announcements of large pledges to the United States from Kuwait, Japan and Germany. I share this concern.

Like you, we are going to have to look principally to Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. We are seeking contributions from these and other countries and we want to make sure that in recognising the preeminent American role our own is not overlooked. Our approaches should be complementary, not competing. The British effort should not be at the expense of the United States' effort, which I am glad to see is getting a good response. Some coordination of our efforts would be helpful.

It would be particularly welcome if the United States was seen to endorse our own efforts. The Japanese in particular need reassurance that our bid to them has

your blessing. Our military forces in the Gulf represent about 8% of yours in manpower terms. In our search for financial contributions we are therefore aiming for a figure about 8% of your own. It is on this basis that we are approaching the Germans, the Japanese, the Saudis, the Kuwaitis and the UAE.

I shall hope to discuss this with you when we next speak on the telephone.

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FM RIYADH
TO DESKBY 281600Z FCO
TELNO 272
OF 272010Z JANUARY 91
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOD (FOR SEC OC), HQBFME (FOR ABBOTT)
AND TO IMMEDIATE POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE, JEDDA (FOR BLACKLEY)

MY TELNO 213: GULF CRISIS: HOST NATION SUPPORT

1. THE BBC WORLD SERVICE YESTERDAY REPORTED THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN WASHINGTON THAT THE SAUDIS HAD AGREED TO PAY THE US 13.5 BILLION DOLLARS. THIS WAS SAID TO BE FOR THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF 1991. WHICH COSTS WERE COVERED OR WHAT PAYMENTS MIGHT BE DUE LATER WAS NOT MADE CLEAR. GIVEN ITS SCALE, THIS ARRANGEMENT MUST BE DISTINCT FROM THE FORMAL SAUDI-US HOST NATION SUPPORT AGREEMENT, ON WHICH OUR OWN IS BASED. EVEN THE ADDITIONAL REFINEMENT OF THE 850 MILLION DOLLAR PER MONTH FLOOR WHICH THE US EMBASSY TELL US WAS RECENTLY AGREED (MY TUR), WOULD NOT BRING THE TOTAL VALUE OF SUCH SUPPORT ANYWHERE NEAR 13.5 BILLION DOLLARS.

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE US EMBASSY ABOUT THIS NEW ANNOUNCEMENT. THEY ARE CAGEY ABOUT THE DETAILS, AND CLAIM THAT THE ARRANGEMENT IS NOT YET PROPERLY FINALISED. THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT PRESSURE WAS APPLIED ON THE SAUDIS TO MATCH THE KUWAITI OFFER, A TACTIC WHICH THE SAUDIS FELT UNABLE TO RESIST. WE ARE UNLIKELY TO ESTABLISH VERY MUCH MORE FROM THE SAUDIS THEMSELVES, FOR WHOM THE WHOLE ISSUE OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE. THERE IS ALREADY A LOT OF GRUMBLING HERE ABOUT THE BURDEN SAUDI ARABIA IS HAVING TO BEAR. IT IS INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE SAUDIS ARE GOING TO BE HEAVILY OUT OF POCKET WHEN THE WAR IS OVER, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE CONTINUING WEAKNESS OF THE OIL PRICE. THIS LATEST COMMITMENT WILL PROVE ESPECIALLY BURDENSOME. THE US EMBASSY ITSELF ADMITS THAT IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW THE SAUDIS WILL MEET IT. EVEN USING A FAVOURABLE SCENARIO FOR 1991 OF DOLLARS 20 A BARREL AND PRODUCTION AVERAGING 6 MILLION BPD, SAUDI OIL REVENUES WILL NOT EXCEED DOLLARS 40 BILLION. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS NEW SAUDI COMMITMENT TO THE US ALONE FOR THE FIRST QUARTER OF THIS YEAR EXCEEDS BY ALMOST DOLLARS 4 BILLION OIL REVENUES FOR THE SAME PERIOD. IT ALSO AMOUNTS TO OVER 50 PER CENT OF THE KINGDOM'S ESTIMATED GDP FOR THE FIRST QUARTER (DOLLARS 25 BILLION). OIL REVENUES ARE THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO BE SUFFICIENT. SAUDI ARABIA WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE TO DRAW DOWN ON ITS RESERVES (ESTIMATED BY THE IMF TO BE AROUND DOLLARS 50 BILLION, FAR FROM ALL OF WHICH ARE LIQUID) AND/OR BORROW ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETS.

3. I AM SURE THESE LATEST AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS WILL START MINDS IN LONDON TURNING TOWARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR PRESSING THE SAUDIS FOR MORE CASH TO SUPPORT UK FORCES. FIRST HOWEVER WE NEED A CLEARER IDEA OF THE NEW ARRANGEMENT THE AMERICANS HAVE OBTAINED. ANYTHING WASHINGTON CAN PROVIDE WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IN THIS CONTEXT (C/F PARA 1(I) OF MY TUR). GIVEN THE LOCAL ECONOMIC PICTURE PAINTED IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH I MUST CONFESS THAT MY INITIAL REACTION IS TO BE A SHADE NERVOUS ABOUT SQUEEZING THE SAUDIS AGAIN. I FEAR THAT THE AMERICANS MAYBE SOWING THE SEEDS OF RESENTMENT, AND POSSIBLY CAUSE REAL INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS

HERE, IF THEY INSIST ON THE FULL POUND OF FLESH WHICH HAS NOW APPARENTLY BEEN PROMISED THEM.

4. THAT SAID, IF WE WERE TO PRESS THE SAUDIS PROPORTIONAL PARITY WOULD AT LEAST GIVE US A CREDIBLE LEVER. WE COULD CITE THE AMERICAN FLOOR ARRANGEMENTS REPORTED IN MY TUR, OR ELSE REQUEST THE PROPORTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF THE LUMP SUM THE AMERICANS SEEM TO HAVE WON THEMSELVES (8 PER CENT, OR ROUGHLY 1 BILLION DOLLARS AS WE HAVE ARGUED TO THE JAPANESE). I SEE LITTLE OR NO PROSPECT OF SUCCESS WITH THE PIECEMEAL APPROACH IMPLIED IN SMITH'S TELELETTER OF 17 JANUARY, WHICH PROPOSED ASKING THE SAUDIS TO WAIVE THE LEVY WE PAY THEM ON THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS OF THE AWACS: OUR HUNCH IS THAT THE SAUDI BUREAUCRACY WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO HANDLE. IF WE DO GO BACK TO THE SAUDIS FOR MORE WE MUST:
A) HAVE COST FIGURES OVER AND ABOVE OUR HNS AGREEMENT BASELINE TO SUPPORT A CREDIBLE BID: AND
B) MAKE A PARALLEL, OR PRIOR FUNDING BID TO THE KUWAITIS WHICH WE HAVE SO FAR FOREBORNE TO DO.

MUNRO
YYYY
ADVANCE 42

IRAQ/KUWAIT	1
PS	1
PS/MR HOGG	1
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD	1
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE	1
PS/PUS	1
MR FAIRWEATHER	1
MR BROOMFIELD	1
MR SLATER	1
MR GORE-BOOTH	1
MR GOULDEN	1
MR JAY	1
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)	1
HD/MED	1
HD/AMD	1
HD/CONSULAR D	1
HD/ECD(E)	1
HD/NAD	1
HD/NEWS D	1
HD/NENAD	1
HD/SECPOL D	1
HD/SED	1
HD/UND	1
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENT STAFF	1
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY	1
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE	1
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE	1
SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE	1
MR CHARLTON CABINET OFFICE	1
MR GOWAN, CABINET OFFICE	1
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST	2
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST	1
CABINET OFFICE DIO	1
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE	1
LT COL CRONIN CAB OFFICE	1
MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE	1
AUS (C) MODUK	1
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK	1
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND	1
MR WICKS HMT	1
EMERGENCY UNIT	1

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IRAQ/KUWAIT	230
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Sir Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
A 1154
31 JAN 1991
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PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
-
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE
-
TO: CHARLES POWELL
£10 DOWNING STREET
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-

JANUARY 30, 1991

-
DEAR CHARLES:
-

WE HAVE EXHAUSTED AVAILABLE RAMP SPACE TO LOCATE B-52S IN SAUDI ARABIA AND NOW NEED ADDITIONAL BASING AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT ON-GOING DESERT STORM OPERATIONS. SPAIN HAS QUIETLY AGREED TO OUR USE OF MORON AB BUT WE ARE NOW AT CAPACITY THERE AS WELL. AS A RESULT, WE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR PERMISSION TO DEPLOY EIGHT B-52S AT RAF FAIRFORD.
-

SINCE WE HAVE ALREADY DEPLOYED OUR ENTIRE INVENTORY OF CONVENTIONAL-ONLY B-52S TO SUPPORT DESERT STORM, THE EIGHT IDENTIFIED FOR RAF FAIRFORD ARE NUCLEAR ALCM CAPABLE. HOWEVER, WE PROVIDE ASSURANCES TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT THESE EIGHT B-52S WILL BE USED ONLY TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS WHILE AT RAF FAIRFORD. FURTHER, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF DEPLOYING ANY ALCM WEAPONS= ALCM ROTARY LAUNCHERS, ALCM PYLONS OR ALCM SUPPORT EQUIPMENT WITH THESE AIRCRAFT.
-

WE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ENDORSEMENT OF THIS REQUEST.
-

WARM REGARDS,
-

BRENT
-
END TEXT
-
DECL: OADR
£0115

NNNN

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Sir Robin Butler

CABINET OFFICE
A 1156
31 JAN 1991
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FILE

FOLIO 13

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 January 1991

Dear Simon,

THE GULF

General Scowcroft telephoned me this afternoon on the secure line. We covered a number of issues.

General Scowcroft said that he wanted to stress, in the light of some of the interpretations being put on the US/Soviet Communique, that there was absolutely no change in the United States' position on a ceasefire. There could be no ceasefire until Saddam Hussain got out of Kuwait. He must actually be on his way out. Speaking very frankly, the White House felt that the phraseology used in the US/Soviet Communique left something to be desired: not to put too fine a point on it, Bessmertnykh had taken the State Department to the cleaners.

I said that we had reacted very calmly to the US/Soviet Communique, dismissing any talk of a new initiative and taking the line that it simply restated the agreed position. I then read General Scowcroft the answer which the Prime Minister had given on this point in his interview with The Times this morning (copy enclosed). General Scowcroft said that he was very grateful for this and for the way we had reacted. He subsequently rang back to say that he had told the President, who was personally most appreciative of the Prime Minister's response.

General Scowcroft went on to say that the US was hoping to deploy eight B52 aircraft to RAF Fairford, from where they would conduct bombing operations over Iraq. He understood there had been some informal contacts about this on the military net. The Administration had originally hoped to add the aircraft to those already in Spain, but the Spaniards had refused to take any more. The President would be very grateful if the Prime Minister felt able to agree to have them in the United Kingdom. I said that it would be helpful to have a formal request from the President in the form of a short message, which might be sent overnight. I was sure that the Prime Minister would want to be helpful, although the anti-war movement would kick up a fuss and there might be some problems in Parliament. General Scowcroft said that he would arrange for a message to come as soon as possible.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

I told General Scowcroft that I had reported what he had told me about American intentions for retaliation in the event of an Iraqi CW attack. It would be very helpful to know in addition what the Americans would say publicly about their intentions in the immediate aftermath of such an attack. We would obviously need to coordinate our press line very closely. General Scowcroft said rather distractedly that he did not think anyone had got round to sorting out press guidance yet, but he would put it in hand and let me have something.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever,

(CHARLES POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CAB 164/1957

Letter dated
30/01/1991

CDP

TRANSCRIPT A - PM - INT - THE TIMES - 30 JANUARY 1991

FROM EGMG FOR COI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW

GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR JOHN MAJOR,

IN LONDON,

ON WEDNESDAY, 30 JANUARY 1991

INTERVIEWER: ROBIN OAKLEY, THE TIMES

==========

INTERVIEWER:

Prime Minister, do you seriously see any prospect of a ceasefire following the American/Soviet initiative?

PRIME MINISTER:

There is no reason to suppose there is going to be one, and what the Americans and the Soviets essentially did yesterday was reformulate precisely the conditions that underpin the Security Council resolutions. There was nothing fresh in it, it was the position that there has been since the beginning. So there is not, to that extent, a fresh initiative backing away from the present situation at all, the situation is as it was. it is a reaffirmation of the Security Council resolutions.

INTERVIEWER:

But is it an attempt to give Saddam Hussein the chance to present it as something new?

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
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Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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This should be an indication of what the extract is,
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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer
or Number not used.

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir Robin Butler RP







10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

30 January 1991

c- M. Appleyard

THE GULF: JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Prime Minister saw the Chief Rabbi and Mr Greville Janner MP this afternoon, at their request, to discuss the Gulf crisis.

The Chief Rabbi said that he would shortly be visiting Israel and wondered whether there was any particular message which the Prime Minister would wish him to convey. The Prime Minister said that he should say how much Israel's restraint in the face of Iraq's SCUD missile attacks was admired and appreciated in this country. We hoped that it would be maintained. The Chief Rabbi said that he was also intending to stress the need for a debate in Israel on the future security of the region as a whole. It was important that Israelis should start to think about the situation after the present conflict. The Prime Minister said this would also be a very helpful message. We could not go back to the status quo ante. All sorts of questions would arise, depending on the precise outcome of the conflict, for instance the need for a balance between Iran and Iraq, the wish of the Gulf States for some sort of security arrangements backed by western guarantees, and the necessity of some movement on the Palestinian issue. The Chief Rabbi said that he accepted these points with one qualification. The phrase "peace conference" had a very unhappy resonance in Israel. People associated it with Versailles and Munich and saw it as a means by which a lot of not at all well-disposed countries would try to impose a settlement on Israel. It would be better to talk simply about peace negotiations. The Prime Minister pointed out that the concept of a peace conference was firmly established and it could not be eliminated from the international glossary. But he understood the sensitivity.

Mr Janner asked the Prime Minister to investigate reports that a British company trying to export computer equipment to Israel which could be of help in detecting a CW attack had been refused a license. The Prime Minister said that he knew nothing of this but would ask the Trade and Industry Secretary to inform him of any problem in the course of 31 January. I should be grateful if DTI could follow this up.

CONFIDENTIAL

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of trade and Industry) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth office

SECRET

FOLIO 10

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO 6/17/15/1J

30th January 1991

c- Mr Applegard — copy D.6.3.91 C Terry

CABINET OFFICE
A 1231
1 FEB 1991
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FILE No. .....

Dear Colin,

GULF CRISIS: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR LEGISLATION

Bill Reeves' letter of 25th January touches on the possible need for Regulations controlling certain categories of labour. As he points out this topic is not included among the draft Regulations listed in the Annex. The sensitivity of this issue is fully recognised by my Secretary of State, and there are in any case good grounds for hoping that civilian manpower vital to the support of operations in the Gulf, such as mariners and aircrew, will continue to be available voluntarily. Nonetheless, it is possible that such Regulations could be required, since service manpower would not be available in substitution. As we understand it, it continues to be the intention that the draft Bill should include provision for Regulations to be made in this area. Drafting work on appropriate Regulations has begun and the Defence Secretary hopes that it can be completed.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the recipients of Bill Reeves' letter.

Yours sincerely

Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
Private Secretary

C J Walters Esq
Home Office

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir Robin Butler

FOLIO 9

CABINET OFFICE
A 1118
30 JAN 1991
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
PREM

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

c- Mr Applegard

30 January 1991

Dear Simon,

IRAQ/KUWAIT: BURDEN-SHARING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING FAHD

Thank you for your letter of 29 January covering a draft message from the Prime Minister to King Fahd requesting a substantial contribution to our Gulf costs.

The Prime Minister does not relish sending a message of this sort but is resigned to the necessity. I enclose a slightly amended version and should be grateful if it could be despatched as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MESAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING FAHD

I was most grateful for your kind response to my letter of 9 January, which I have just received.

Since we met, Saddam Hussain's continuing refusal to withdraw from Kuwait has obliged us to open hostilities against Iraq. This task was never likely to be easy, but it has begun as successfully as we could have hoped. Our forces and yours, together with the others in the coalition, will press on until the task is completed in the knowledge that our cause is just. I take this opportunity to congratulate you on the performance of the Royal Saudi Air Force. We were all inspired by the accounts of the recent success of your young pilots.

There is strong support in the United Kingdom for the coalition. Saddam Hussain's use of missiles as a terror weapon against Saudi Arabia, his unacceptable treatment of prisoners of war and his wanton destruction of the environment simply strengthen our determination. We are proud to be in the front line of the battle for the defence of your country and the liberation of Kuwait.

The United Kingdom is providing the second largest Western force in the Gulf. The financial burden of this is increasing. The initial cost of deployment of our forces was substantial, and with the outbreak of hostilities expenditure is again rising rapidly. In the first week of fighting alone our losses of aircraft and consumption of ammunition and other supplies have been well over £100 million. The final costs to the UK are impossible to forecast at this stage, but we expect them to be at least £3 billion. That will involve us in considerable sacrifices.

Your help to us under the host Nation Agreement is very welcome indeed. But it would be a most generous gesture if Saudi Arabia was able to make in addition a financial contribution towards meeting our very large costs. I understand that you have agreed

to make such a contribution in the case of the United States. A contribution to Britain's costs proportionate to the scale of military presence in the Gulf - some 8 per cent of the United States manpower - would be greatly appreciated and would underline the unity and resolve of our two countries in the great venture upon which we have embarked. I would ask you in friendship to give consideration to this.

I send you my warmest greetings.

JOHN MAJOR

SECRET

FOLIO 80

c - Sir Patrick Walker

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 071-270 0101

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service
Sir Robin Butler KCB CVO

cc - Sir P Cradock
Mr Appleyard
Mr Barrass
Col Wilson
Brig Budd

Ref.A091/249

30 January 1991

Dear Terry,

Gulf Crisis: Contingency Planning

I mentioned at our Wednesday morning meeting today your suggestion that Cabinet Office should bring together those Departments who might be involved in briefing Ministers and co-ordinating expert advice and assistance should Saddam Hussain resort to the use of unconventional weapons in the Middle East. Given recent experience in co-ordinating a response to the oil slick, I agreed that it would be helpful to brief Departments on the work already done by the Assessments staff here on the nature of the threat and the environmental consequences of the use of unconventional weapons, so that Departments could give some thought to the people they might need to call upon in an emergency.

I have now arranged to chair a meeting for this purpose, to be held at 11.30 am on Tuesday 5 February in Conference Room B in the Cabinet Office. The meeting will begin with a presentation from the Assessments Staff on the work they have done on the threat from unconventional weapons. This will be followed by a short input on the contingency plans already in place, co-ordinated by the Home Office, on the response to a terrorist attack using such weapons in the United Kingdom. Finally, we will focus on how the United Kingdom might respond to the use of such weapons in the Middle East (or elsewhere in the world).

/A number of

Sir Terence Heiser KCB
Department of the Environment

A number of departments have a clear interest. I would be grateful if Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office, Department of the Environment, Department of Transport, Department of Energy, Department of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Department of Employment (HSE) and Overseas Development Administration could be represented. If I have omitted any department with an interest, perhaps copy recipients would let me know. It would be useful if Departments could send as a representative the person who would have policy responsibility for co-ordinating your departmental response in the event of any incident. (Anyone attending the meeting should have PV clearance.) Perhaps your office - and other departments attending - could let Mike Sweet in my office know who will be your representative. I hope that a by-product from the meeting would be the establishment of a network of senior staff in Departments with responsibility for contingency planning of this sort, who could be called on if an emergency arose at short notice.

I am copying this letter to Wednesday morning colleagues.

Yours ever,

Robin

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CABINET OFFICE
A 1123
30 JAN 1991
PRING INSTRUCTIONS
12715

30 January 1991

FOLIO 7N

cc- Mr Appleyard
Mr Reeves

Copies to:
Ms Gozney
Mr Ball

Dear Charles,

Gulf crisis: Financial burdensharing

Following discussion in OPD(G) on 30 January, it was agreed that the Prime Minister should write to President Bush setting out our concern to recover more of our costs in the Gulf.

If the Americans continue on their present course, there is a risk that their demands will exhaust the main sources of funding. Rivadh telno 272 (copy enclosed) reports increasing Saudi discontent with the financial demands placed upon them; our Embassy in Tokyo have reported similar signs from the Japanese.

I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Bush. As agreed at OPD(G), this could be reinforced by a telephone message to the President.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (Treasury), Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell
10 Downing Street

JSW.3.RW

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH

I wanted to write to you about the cost of the Gulf conflict.

The United States is, of course, bearing the brunt of the military burden in the Gulf. It is right that the Gulf States, and other wealthy countries which have not made a substantial military contribution should be asked to help.

As you know, the cost to Britain is also great and a matter of public concern. There is a strong feeling both in Parliament and the press, that we are not receiving enough support from wealthy potential donors. This has been strengthened by announcements of large pledges to the United States from Kuwait, Japan and Germany. I share this concern.

Like you, we are going to have to look principally to Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. We are seeking contributions from these and other countries and we want to make sure that in recognising the preeminent American role our own is not overlooked. Our approaches should be complementary, not competing. The British effort should not be at the expense of the United States' effort, which I am glad to see is getting a good response. Some coordination of our efforts would be helpful.

It would be particularly welcome if the United States was seen to endorse our own efforts. The Japanese in particular need reassurance that our bid to them has

your blessing. Our military forces in the Gulf represent about 8% of yours in manpower terms. In our search for financial contributions we are therefore aiming for a figure about 8% of your own. It is on this basis that we are approaching the Germans, the Japanese, the Saudis, the Kuwaitis and the UAE.

I shall hope to discuss this with you when we next speak on the telephone.

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM RIYADH
TO DESKBY 281600Z FCO
TELNO 272
OF 272010Z JANUARY 91
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOD (FOR SEC OC), HQBFME (FOR ABBOTT)
AND TO IMMEDIATE POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE, JEDDA (FOR BLACKLEY)

MY TELNO 213: GULF CRISIS: HOST NATION SUPPORT

1. THE BBC WORLD SERVICE YESTERDAY REPORTED THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN WASHINGTON THAT THE SAUDIS HAD AGREED TO PAY THE US 13.5 BILLION DOLLARS. THIS WAS SAID TO BE FOR THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF 1991. WHICH COSTS WERE COVERED OR WHAT PAYMENTS MIGHT BE DUE LATER WAS NOT MADE CLEAR. GIVEN ITS SCALE, THIS ARRANGEMENT MUST BE DISTINCT FROM THE FORMAL SAUDI-US HOST NATION SUPPORT AGREEMENT, ON WHICH OUR OWN IS BASED. EVEN THE ADDITIONAL REFINEMENT OF THE 850 MILLION DOLLAR PER MONTH FLOOR WHICH THE US EMBASSY TELL US WAS RECENTLY AGREED (MY TUR), WOULD NOT BRING THE TOTAL VALUE OF SUCH SUPPORT ANYWHERE NEAR 13.5 BILLION DOLLARS.

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE US EMBASSY ABOUT THIS NEW ANNOUNCEMENT. THEY ARE CAGEY ABOUT THE DETAILS, AND CLAIM THAT THE ARRANGEMENT IS NOT YET PROPERLY FINALISED. THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT PRESSURE WAS APPLIED ON THE SAUDIS TO MATCH THE KUWAITI OFFER, A TACTIC WHICH THE SAUDIS FELT UNABLE TO RESIST. WE ARE UNLIKELY TO ESTABLISH VERY MUCH MORE FROM THE SAUDIS THEMSELVES, FOR WHOM THE WHOLE ISSUE OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE. THERE IS ALREADY A LOT OF GRUMBLING HERE ABOUT THE BURDEN SAUDI ARABIA IS HAVING TO BEAR. IT IS INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE SAUDIS ARE GOING TO BE HEAVILY OUT OF POCKET WHEN THE WAR IS OVER, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE CONTINUING WEAKNESS OF THE OIL PRICE. THIS LATEST COMMITMENT WILL PROVE ESPECIALLY BURDENSOME. THE US EMBASSY ITSELF ADMITS THAT IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW THE SAUDIS WILL MEET IT. EVEN USING A FAVOURABLE SCENARIO FOR 1991 OF DOLLARS 20 A BARREL AND PRODUCTION AVERAGING 6 MILLION BPD, SAUDI OIL REVENUES WILL NOT EXCEED DOLLARS 40 BILLION. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS NEW SAUDI COMMITMENT TO THE US ALONE FOR THE FIRST QUARTER OF THIS YEAR EXCEEDS BY ALMOST DOLLARS 4 BILLION OIL REVENUES FOR THE SAME PERIOD. IT ALSO AMOUNTS TO OVER 50 PER CENT OF THE KINGDOM'S ESTIMATED GDP FOR THE FIRST QUARTER (DOLLARS 25 BILLION). OIL REVENUES ARE THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO BE SUFFICIENT. SAUDI ARABIA WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE TO DRAW DOWN ON ITS RESERVES (ESTIMATED BY THE IMF TO BE AROUND DOLLARS 50 BILLION, FAR FROM ALL OF WHICH ARE LIQUID) AND/OR BORROW ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETS.

3. I AM SURE THESE LATEST AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS WILL START MINDS IN LONDON TURNING TOWARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR PRESSING THE SAUDIS FOR MORE CASH TO SUPPORT UK FORCES. FIRST HOWEVER WE NEED A CLEARER IDEA OF THE NEW ARRANGEMENT THE AMERICANS HAVE OBTAINED. ANYTHING WASHINGTON CAN PROVIDE WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IN THIS CONTEXT (C/F PARA 1(I) OF MY TUR). GIVEN THE LOCAL ECONOMIC PICTURE PAINTED IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH I MUST CONFESS THAT MY INITIAL REACTION IS TO BE A SHADE NERVOUS ABOUT SQUEEZING THE SAUDIS AGAIN. I FEAR THAT THE AMERICANS MAYBE SOWING THE SEEDS OF RESENTMENT, AND POSSIBLY CAUSE REAL INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS

HERE, IF THEY INSIST ON THE FULL POUND OF FLESH WHICH HAS NOW APPARENTLY BEEN PROMISED THEM.

4. THAT SAID, IF WE WERE TO PRESS THE SAUDIS PROPORTIONAL PARITY WOULD AT LEAST GIVE US A CREDIBLE LEVER. WE COULD CITE THE AMERICAN FLOOR ARRANGEMENTS REPORTED IN MY TUR, OR ELSE REQUEST THE PROPORTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF THE LUMP SUM THE AMERICANS SEEM TO HAVE WON THEMSELVES (8 PER CENT, OR ROUGHLY 1 BILLION DOLLARS AS WE HAVE ARGUED TO THE JAPANESE). I SEE LITTLE OR NO PROSPECT OF SUCCESS WITH THE PIECEMEAL APPROACH IMPLIED IN SMITH'S TELELETTER OF 17 JANUARY, WHICH PROPOSED ASKING THE SAUDIS TO WAIVE THE LEVY WE PAY THEM ON THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS OF THE AWACS: OUR HUNCH IS THAT THE SAUDI BUREAUCRACY WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO HANDLE. IF WE DO GO BACK TO THE SAUDIS FOR MORE WE MUST:
A) HAVE COST FIGURES OVER AND ABOVE OUR HNS AGREEMENT BASELINE TO SUPPORT A CREDIBLE BID: AND
B) MAKE A PARALLEL, OR PRIOR FUNDING BID TO THE KUWAITIS WHICH WE HAVE SO FAR FOREBORNE TO DO.

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PS	1
PS/MR HOGG	1
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD	1
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PS/PUS	1
MR FAIRWEATHER	1
MR BROOMFIELD	1
MR SLATER	1
MR GORE-BOOTH	1
MR GOULDEN	1
MR JAY	1
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)	1
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HD/NENAD	1
HD/SECPOL D	1
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HD/UND	1
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENT STAFF	1
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY	1
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE	1
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE	1
SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE	1
MR CHARLTON CABINET OFFICE	1
MR GOWAN, CABINET OFFICE	1
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST	2
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST	1
CABINET OFFICE DIO	1
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE	1
LT COL CRONIN CAB OFFICE	1
MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE	1
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IRAQ/KUWAIT	230
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CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS Telephone 071-270 0101

From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service
Sir Robin Butler KCB CVO

cc- Sir P Cradock
Mr Appleyard
Mr Barrass
Col Wilson
Brig Budd

Ref.A091/249

30 January 1991

Dear Terry,

Gulf Crisis: Contingency Planning

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/A number of

Sir Terence Heiser KCB
Department of the Environment

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I am copying this letter to Wednesday morning colleagues.

Yours ever,

Robin

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FOLIO 7

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO DESKBY 301000Z FCO
TELNO 85
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INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WAHINGTON, HM TREASURY, RIYADH
INFO IMMEDIATE POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE

MODUK FOR SEC(O)(C), HM TREASURY FOR FELGETT

MY TELNO 82: FURTHER JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION TO UK GULF COSTS

SUMMARY

1. CONSIDERABLE JAPANESE IRRITATION AT US ATTEMPT TO CLAIM FULL DOLLARS 9 BILLION. US AMBASSADOR SAYS THAT DEBATE IN WASHINGTON ON THIS WAS HIJACKED BY POLITICIANS AND US TREASURY. JAPANESE ARE TAKING THIS UP WITH WASHINGTON TODAY BUT VERY HIGH LEVEL ASSIST BY US WOULD BE WELCOME.

DETAIL

2. I TELEPHONED HYODO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAU IN THE MFA, THIS MORNING TO PURSUE THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. WHILE HE HAD NO FURTHER SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS TO REPORT SINCE THEN, OPINION INSIDE THE JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY HAS CLEARLY HARDENED AGAINST THIS AMERICAN MOVE: HYODO DESCRIBED IT AS ''OUTRAGEOUS AND VERY DISTURBING''. HE ALSO SAID THAT THIS SUBJECT WAS NOW A ''HOT ISSUE'' AND WAS BEING TAKEN UP URGENTLY IN WASHINGTON. THE NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU HAD BEEN THROWN INTO SOMETING OF A PANIC AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT AMBASSADOR KITAMURA IN LONDON HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED FORMALLY THAT HE COULD SAY NOTHING POSITIVE ABOUT A JAPANESE COMMITMENT TO FURTHER FINANCIAL ASSISITANCE FOR THE UK DURING HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE (WHICH I BELIEVE TOOK PLACE YESTERDAY).

3. US AMBASSADOR ARMACOST TOLD ME AT LUCH TODAY THAT THE BACKGROUND TO THE BAKER STATEMENT WAS THAT THE BUREAUCRATIC DEBATE IN WASHINGTON HAD PROVED SOMEWHAT INCONCLUSIVE AND THAT THE MATTER HAD THEN BEEN ''HIJACKED BY POLITICIANS AND THE US TREASURY''. HE WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT THIS HAD BEEN DONE IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE JAPANESE FROM WRIGGLING OFF THE HOOK OR SURROUNDING THEIR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION WITH INUMERABLE CONDITIONS.

I FIND THIS LATTER PART OF HIS EXPLANATION UNCONVINCING. THE FIRST TRANCHE OF THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION LAST YEAR PRODUCED NO SUCH WRIGGLING OR CONDITIONS THAT WERE IMPOSSIBLE TO MEET AND THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION WAS ALREADY A CLEAR UNDERTAKING HERE. AT ANOTHER POINT IN OUR CONVERSATION ARMACOST COMMENTED IN SYMPATHETIC VEIN (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT THE SHARE WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED LAST YEAR WAS ROUGHLY 5 PERCENT OF THE FINAL DOLLARS 1 BILLION, THE CLEAR INPLICATION BEING THAT AT THIS END THE AMERICANS WOULD SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN US OBTAINING SOMETHING OF THE ORDER OF DOLLARS 450 MILLION THIS TIME. (I THINK THIS MAY BE ON THE OPTIMISTIC SIDE FOR THE FINAL OUTTURN, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE CLEARLY PUT ON RECORD WITH THE MFA THAT AN 8% SHARE WOULD IN OUR VIEW BE MORE APPROPRIATE). I TOLD ARMACOST THAT THIS WAS A MATTER ON WHICH I WAS SURE BRITISH MINISTERS FELT STRONGLY AND THAT WE WOULD WISH TO TAKE UP URGENTLY.

4. IT WAS CLEAR FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH HYODO THAT HE WELCOMED MY INTENTION TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH ARMACOST AND THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD STRONGLY WELCOME OUR INTERVENTION AT A HIGH LEVEL IN WASHINGTON. I DREW HYODO'S ATTENTION TO THE ARTICLE IN TODAY'S EDITION OF THE FINANCIAL TIMES WHICH REFERRED TO OUR OSTENSIBLE PLANS FOR AND OFFENSIVE ON BURDEN-SHARING AND THE PROSPECT OF A MINISTERIAL VISIT HERE AS PART OF A SERIES TO A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE GULF STATES AND LARGER EC COUTRIES. I SAID THAT I HAD HAD NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION ON THIS BUT IT WAS CLEAR FROM HYODO'S RESPONSE THAT HE HOPED THE ISSUE OF A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION FOR US COULD BE RE-OPENED IN WASHINGTON ''IT IS JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND NOT AMERICAN MONEY'' AND THAT IT COULD THEN REVERT TO A RATIONAL DISCUSSION INSIDE THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT A MINISTERIAL VISIT ON THIS SUBJECT BEFORE WE HAVE SQUARED THE AMERICANS WOULD LEAD TO A PUBLIC ROW WITH THE AMERICANS, EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, AND PROBABLY LITTLE RESULT. WE SHALL BE IN QUITE A DIFFERENT BALL GAME IF WE CAN PERSUADE AMERICAN POLITICIANS THAT THE METTER SHOULD BE REOPENED AND DISCUSSED RATIONALLY.

5. ON FINAL POINT: IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT IN DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS THEY MIGHT SUGGEST THAT PRESSURE ON THE JAPANESE COULD PRODUCE A FURTHER FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION OVER AND ABOVE THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION. WE SHOULD NOT FALL FOR THIS. THERE IS IN MY VIEW NO POSSIBILITY AT ALL THAT THE JAPANESE WILL PRODUCE ADDITIONAL MONEY FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE. THE ONLY PROSPECT IS OF UP TO DOLLARS 1 BILLION WHICH WOULD CLEARLY BE EAR-MARKED FOR

NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES SUCH AS TURKEY OR EGYPT AND WOULD IN NO WAY BE TRANSFERABLE.

WHITEHEAD

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ADVANCE 45

IRAQ/KUWAIT
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PS/MR HOGG
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PS/PUS
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BROOMFIELD
MR SLATER
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
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MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
SIR C CURWEN CABINET OFFICE
MR CHARLTON CABINET OFFICE
MR GOWAN, CABINET OFFICE
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
LT COL CRONIN CAB OFFICE
MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
MR WICKS HMT
MR FELLGETT HMT
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

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Sir Robin Butler

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INFO IMMEDIATE POLAD HIGH WYCOMBE

MODUK FOR SEC(O)(C) HM TREASURY FOR FELLGETT

MY TELNO 76: FURTHER JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION TO UK GULF COSTS

SUMMARY

1. BAKER STATEMENT OSTENSIBLY CLAIMING FULL DOLLARS 9 BILLION CONTRIBUTION FOR UNITED STATES ALONE WORRIES THE JAPANESE. I SUGGEST WE SHOULD TAKE URGENT ACTION IN WASHINGTON TO AGREE WITH THE AMERICANS ON A PROPORTION FOR THE UK.

DETAIL

2. HYODO, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAU IN THE MFA, TELEPHONED ME THIS EVENING TO SAY THAT ''AT THIS STAGE THE BAKER STATEMENT IS PRODUCING SOMETHING OF A PROBLEM''. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HE THOUGHT THAT THE ''BEHING THE SCENES LOBBYING EXERCISE OF JAPANESE PARLIAMENTARIANS'' DESIGNED BY US TO RAISE JAPANESE CONSCIOUSNESS OF OUR ROLE IN THE GULF AND THEREBY TO SECURE A REASONABLE SHARE OF THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION EARMARKED FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE ''COULD PROVE TO BE PREMATURE, INDEED COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AT THIS TIME''.

3. I TOLD HYODO THAT I FELT THERE WAS IN ANY CASE A NEED TO RAISE JAPANESE CONSCIOUSNESS ABOUT OUR EFFORT IN THE GULF AND I THOUGHT THAT THIS SHOULD ALSO HELP THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IN EMPHASISING THAT THE CONFLICT WAS BETWEEN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND IRAQ AND NOT JUST THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ. HE DID NOT DISSENT BUT REPEATED THAT THE LATEST BAKER STATEMENT WAS CAUSING DIFFICULTIES OVER THE DIVISION OF THE MONEY ITSELF.

4. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF PROCEEDING WOULD BE TO TACKLE THE AMERICANS DIRECT AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL AND TO SEEK THEIR AGREEMENT TO A DIVISION OF THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION CONSISTENT WITH THE RELATIVE

EFFORTS WHICH OUR COUNTRIES ARE MAKING. IN MY VIEW THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY WELCOME SUCH A MOVE: I HAVE HAD SEVERAL HINTS THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD NOT BE AVERSE FROM OTHERS DECIDING ON THE EXACT BREAKDOWN OF THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION PROVIDED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN AGREEMENT. I THINK IT COULD ALSO BE HELPFUL FOR US TO EMPHASISIE TO THE AMERICANS NOT ONLY THE INADVISABILITY OF A PUBLIC ROW OVER THE DIVISION OF THE JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION BUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH A UNITED STATES TAKES ALL RESULT COULD HURT PRIME MINISTER KAIFU IN HIS ATTEMPTS TO EMPHASISE THAT THE DOLLARS 9 BILLION WAS DESIGNED FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES (A POINT THAT HE HAS EMPHASISED IN THE DIET ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE CURRENT DEBATE) AND THAT HE IS NOT A LACKEY OF THE AVERICANS IN THIS RESPECT.

WHITEHEAD

ADVANCES
FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/SECRETARY OF STATE AND FED

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DISTRIBUTION 45

ADVANCE 45

IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS 2
PS/MR HOGG
PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/PUS
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BROOMFIELD
MR SLATER
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR GOULDEN
MR JAY
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
HD/AMD
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/ECD(E)
HD/NAD
HD/NEWS D
HD/NENAD
HD/SECPOL D
HD/SED
HD/UND 2
HD/FED
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENT STAFF
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
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MR SHAPLAND CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND 2
MR WICKS HMT
MR FELLGETT HMT
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
RESIDENT CLERK

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FOLIO 5

CABINET OFFICE
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29 JAN 1991
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PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Robin Butler
Sir Percy Cradock

OPD(G): 29 January: Overnight Action Points

Item 1: Burdensharing

The Foreign Secretary has circulated a revised paper dated 28 January which updates the figures and slightly alters the advice (paragraph 8) but does not represent a significant departure from the basic line taken in his earlier minute of 25 January.

2. Paragraph 2 of Sir Robin Butler's brief suggests that we might concert our position with the US Government through a message followed by a word on the telephone from you to President Bush. A useful piece of supplementary action might be for you to raise burdensharing with Vice-President Quayle later in the week.

Item 2: Current military situation

3. You might ask the Defence Secretary to comment on reports from Baghdad that POWs have been injured in "allied bombing of civilian sites". This may be a bluff but if the POWs have been injured while placed at strategic sites this would be a clear breach of the Geneva Conventions. An even more sinister explanation might be that they had been badly maltreated.

Item 3: Current international situation

4. Reports overnight suggest that the pressure for a Security Council debate may be easing. Informal consultations took place yesterday evening during which only the Cubans and Yemenis called for a debate. The other members were either opposed or chary and the Zaire representative, as President, was helpfully dismissive. The Zimbabwe representative, who takes over as President on 1 February, argued forcefully that a debate would be a waste of time. The next move will be informal consultations on Thursday with enthusiasm for a formal meeting waning. The Iraqis scored an own goal against their supporters when Tariq Aziz sent an abusive letter to the Secretary General which went down badly.

L V Appleyard

L V Appleyard

Cabinet Office
29 January 1991

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir Robin Butler

THE RT HON JOHN WAKEHAM MP

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

Department of Energy
1 Palace Street
London SW1E 5HE

071 238 3290



CABINET OFFICE
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31 JAN 1991
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cc - Mr Appleyard
Mr Reeves

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AL

29 January 1991

Dear Douglas

CRUDE OIL EXPORT GUIDELINES

I said in my letter of 18 October last year that I would circulate a paper to colleagues which reviewed the UK's crude oil export guidelines. At that time minds were focussed on the impact of the existing guidelines on countries in Eastern and Central Europe because of the oil supply difficulties these countries were facing.

Since then, officials from our Departments and DTI have carried out a thorough review of the guidelines on a much broader basis, bringing into consideration the special cases of Israel and South Africa. The paper which they have produced is attached.

The paper concludes, and I agree, that the existing guidelines should now be abolished although we will need to continue to disallow the export of UKCS crude to South Africa while EC measures still exist.

The need of countries in Central and Eastern Europe for oil is great and has been heightened by their refusal to trade with Iraq. Allowing crude to be exported to these countries would have no cost to the UK; it would recognise the energy supply problems they face and show our willingness to establish normal trading relations as soon as possible.

It would be very difficult to defend a relaxation for Eastern Europe while maintaining the guidelines against Israel. In any case, the justification for maintaining the guidelines against Israel is now weaker than in the past. Our officials have therefore concluded that provided the change is presented carefully exports of crude oil to Israel should be allowed. I understand that you have already endorsed this.

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The same is not true of South Africa where we abide by EC measures designed to prevent the export of crude oil from EC countries. I understand the EC is reviewing its South African measures but has yet to consider the export of crude oil. I accept that until the measures on crude oil are lifted we will need to continue to provide guidance which disallows the export of UK crude oil to South Africa.

As the paper recommends, the presentation of the change will require careful handling and it would be useful to prepare the ground with the IEA, with partners in the EC, and the United States, and to explain the move we are making in Pretoria and in the Middle East. I understand that your Department wishes if possible to have the abolition announced in time for the visit to the UK by the President of Bulgaria on 18-21 February. This presents a tight timetable and the preparations described will have to be made quickly if we are to meet it.

I should be grateful for your and colleagues' agreement to these proposals.

I am copying this letter and attachment to the Prime Minister, other members of OD and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours ever

John

JOHN WAKEHAM

DRAFT

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CRUDE OIL EXPORT GUIDELINES

Summary

1. In this paper we consider the case for abolition of the UK's crude oil export guidelines. We assess the relevance of the guidelines in today's world and the effects of abolition, which would open up UK crude oil exports to Israel and South Africa, as well as the countries of Eastern Europe, whose oil supply difficulties prompted this review.

2. We conclude that the guidelines should be abolished; that the abolition should be effected in a way which enables us to continue to implement the EC ban on crude oil exports to South Africa; and that careful presentation of the change will be needed, particularly in the Middle East.

Introduction

3. The crude oil export guidelines were introduced by way of Parliamentary Answer in January 1979. The guidelines stated that the Government expected oil companies exporting North Sea crude oil to do so in the markets of International Energy Agency and European Community member countries, and in those countries where there was an existing pattern of trade with the UK. The guidelines have been reaffirmed on a number of occasions since 1979, most recently in 1989. (A copy of the original announcement is annexed.)

Historical Background

4. The guidelines were introduced against the background of a tight world oil market caused by the loss of Iranian oil production following the overthrow of the Shah. They were seen as a way of showing solidarity with our EC and International Energy Agency (IEA) partners by making them our primary export market at a time of world oil supply shortfall. Since then the guidelines have enabled us to implement EC and Commonwealth measures against South Africa and to justify refusing to sell crude oil to Israel and the former Eastern Bloc.

Legal basis

5. While a judgement by the European Court in Bulk v. Sun in 1986 confirmed that the guidelines are not contrary to European Community law, the guidelines have, of themselves, no legal force. It would be possible in theory to enforce the landing of UKCS crude oil in the UK but in practice this could not prevent subsequent re-export. However, companies with UK crude oil to export, the vast majority of whom are also holders of UK petroleum production licences, believe that any contravention of the guidelines would displease HMG and could result in fewer petroleum licence awards to the contravening company. This position is only satisfactory until put to the test. Legal advice suggests that if, in an extreme case, the Secretary of State for Energy were to withold a licence solely on the grounds that the licence applicant had contravened the guidelines, the applicant would have a good case for seeking judicial review on the basis that the Secretary of State had exceeded the limits of his discretion by placing too great a weight on the contravention factor. Further weaknesses in the guidelines are that they relate only to crude oil from the UK continental shelf and not to onshore crude or refined products, and, because the only perceived sanction is the threat of non-award of licences, they do not hold direct sway over the

activities of purely trading companies who may be separated by several commercial transactions from the original producer. .

The case for abolition

6. It is becoming increasingly difficult to justify the guidelines in today's world. The greatly increased importance of the spot market for world crude oils since 1979 makes it much harder now to prevent UK crude oil from reaching countries which lie outside the terms of the guidelines. Moreover, the development of this market has reduced the need for a policy to prioritize crude exports in times of supply tightness and IEA administrative arrangements exist which can be brought into play in times of crisis. If it were ever necessary to introduce some form of prioritization of exports, this could be achieved by issuing specific guidance at the time.

7. Equally if not more significantly the nature of some of the countries excluded by the guidelines has changed dramatically and reduced or removed the need to disallow crude oil exports from the UK. Moves towards pan-European energy co-operation and pressure in the Community to eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade implemented by particular Member States make the guidelines increasingly anachronistic in Community and wider European contexts.

8. There is a risk that allowing crude oil exports to Israel will create adverse Arab reaction (see below). Some measure of protection from any retaliatory reaction from Arab countries could be secured if the abolition of the guidelines was placed in an EC context and presented as a contribution to EC efforts to free trading in energy across Europe.

9. The succeeding paragraphs review the case for abolition with respect to the three countries or regions chiefly affected.

Eastern Europe

10. The countries of Eastern Europe face sharp economic disruption and hardship as a result of their transition towards more market-based economic structures. The European Council's conclusions of 15 December favoured an urgent examination of the problems arising for Central an Eastern European countries, in particular Bulgaria and Romania, because of the risk of disruption to their oil supplies. A key problem is the termination of their traditional arrangements for oil imports from the USSR. As a result they are looking for other countries who can make up the shortfall. We believe we should give them all the help we can. One form of assistance which we could give them, which would cost us nothing, would be to relax the oil export guidelines to allow crude oil from the UK Continental Shelf to be exported to them. In practical terms this would not help them a great deal; their real problems will be in finding the hard currency to pay for their oil imports, whatever the source. But the maintenance of the guidelines vis a vis Eastern Europe has become politically indefensible, the more so given our strong support for the Lubbers initiative for pan-European energy co-operation and the opening of negotiations between the EC and Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary on Association Agreements. The proposed abolition of the guidelines would mean that no country in Europe which wished to and had the means would be prevented from importing UK crude oil. The USSR would be eligible to import UK crude oil but, as a net oil exporter, has no evident need to do so.

Middle East

11. The Israelis feel particularly aggrieved by the guidelines. Mr Shamir underlined this on his recent visit both to the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary promised that we would look into the question.

12. We see no reason for continuing to restrict oil sales to Israel. To abandon the guidelines would remove an irritant in the bilateral relationship (and in dealings with Israel's supporters in this country). The Israelis are likely to want to make political capital out of the change and may, unless dissuaded, publicise any initial purchases they make from the UK, but it is less likely that they will import significant or sustained quantities of crude from the UK. We believe consequent Arab criticism should be manageable and we could in any case ask Israel not to publicise the removal of the guidelines. In defending the change we could point to the fact that Israel already buys a good deal of its oil from Egypt and that we have never countenanced a trade embargo with Israel (other than arms sales). Indeed Israel is our largest trading partner in the Middle East bar Saudi Arabia. It would nevertheless be necessary to prepare the ground in advance by giving our Posts in the region ammunition to rebut the charge that we would be making a new and important concession to Israel. Time would be needed to prepare the necessary material. There should be an interval between Ministers' decision and the announcement of the abolition of the guidelines for Israel.

South Africa

13. The existence of the guidelines enabled us to sign up to the 1985 EC and Commonwealth bans on the export of crude oil to South Africa (on the grounds that British companies did not, in fact, sell crude oil to South Africa). Under the 10 September 1985 Luxembourg package, EC Member States agreed to "harmonise attitudes" towards, inter alia, the cessation of oil exports to South Africa. The October 1985 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Nassau agreed a "ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa". The EC and Commonwealth bans, in practice, oblige South Africa to pay a premium for its oil. The South Africans would be unlikely to complain to HMG about a relaxation of the guidelines, which did not cover them. They understand the force

of the obligations placed on Britain by the EC and Commonwealth agreements. They also understand that Britain is working within these fora for the gradual relaxation of the various restrictive measures in force. Further EC measures against South Africa (bans on imports of steel products and Krugerrands, a voluntary ban on new investments) were concluded in 1986. The new investment ban was lifted at the December 1990 Rome Summit.

14. In the EC the relaxation is likely to continue with the additional 1986 measures, which do not include the oil ban. Relaxation of the oil ban is not likely to be considered until much later this year. If as we propose the guidelines are abolished, it will be necessary while the EC measures remain in force to maintain some means of disallowing crude oil exports to South Africa. The present oil export guidelines are non-statutory. In announcing their abolition we could refer to the EC measures which still apply and state that HMG expected oil companies operating in the UK to abide by these. This could be reinforced by writing to companies or to the relevant industry organisation. We would have to present our decision carefully to the South Africans so that they would understand that any mention of our obligations under the EC oil embargo merely reflected an existing measure which we hoped soon to see lifted. We would also need to make it clear that we would not be cutting across our general policy of working to lift such restrictions.

15. We do not recognise the so called UN Oil Embargo, which dates from a 1986 UNGA resolution which, along with the US, France, FRG, and Israel, we voted against. We do not apply it and it is therefore not relevant to the issue of lifting the guidelines.

Conclusions and Recommendations

16. The case for an early relaxation of the guidelines to allow the export of UK crude oil to Central and Eastern Europe is strong. The oil supply difficulties of those countries are large

and growing. Continuation of the guidelines in their present form would cut across a number of important Community initiatives.

17. A relaxation for Eastern Europe would undoubtedly prompt still stronger calls from Israel for the force of the guidelines to be lifted from them. Although a change which allows the export of UK crude oil to Israel will require careful presentation, there are insufficient grounds for continuing to disallow the export of UK crude oil to Israel.

18. For the time being, while Community measures exist, there is a need to continue the prevention of crude oil exports to South Africa.

19. We recommend that the UK crude oil export guidelines be abolished. The abolition could be announced by arranged PQ and Answer. The announcement should state that the EC ban on crude oil exports to South Africa still exists and that HMG expects oil companies operating in the UK to abide by the EC measures (we would write to the relevant oil industry organisations to make this clear).

20. There could be advantage to discussing the change with the Commission and other EC Member States with a view to presenting the abolition as a Community initiative in case of adverse Arab reaction. We have considered this, but the balance of opinion is now that such a precaution would not be crucial and should not be allowed to delay an early announcement of the change. However, we will wish to notify the Commission about the change and explain - by reference to Eastern Europe - our decision, particularly in view of the lobbying in defence of the guidelines which UKREP carried out with the Commission last year. Presentation of the change to Arab countries will require careful handling and time to prepare the ground. It would also be advisable to notify the IEA and the US administration about our intentions.

D III coeg

MR BENN'S STATEMENT 31 JANUARY 1979

The fall in Iranian oil production in November and December and the complete cessation of oil exports since Christmas are undoubtedly placing strain on world oil markets. The loss of Iranian crude is only in part being made up from additional production elsewhere and some rundown in stock levels worldwide is inevitable. The Government will watch the situation carefully and will keep in close touch with the International Energy Agency and with other Governments. I am also continuing to keep in close touch with the oil companies about the maintenance of supplies to the United Kingdom and the steps they are taking to secure additional supplies from other sources.

In the meantime, it is important that consumers should exercise restraint in the use of oil products wherever possible and avoid waste. The Government will expect oil companies exporting North Sea crude to do so in the markets of our partners in the International Energy Agency and in the European Community. This expectation in no way cuts across the maintenance, to the extent possible, of any existing patterns of trade outside those regions.

SECRET

Sir Robin Butler

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

FOLIO 3

MO 6/17/15/1D

29 January 1991

CABINET OFFICE
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30 JAN 1991
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c- Mr Appleyard

Dear Simon.

CALL TO GERMAN DEFENCE MINISTER

My Secretary of State spoke this afternoon by telephone with Dr Stoltenberg, the German Minister of Defence. The call was at our initiative, to take the opportunity to re-establish contact following Dr Stoltenberg's confirmation in post, and do some lobbying on burdensharing.

Dr Stoltenberg began by telling Secretary of State of the decision to deploy Roland and Hawk together with some 600 soldiers to the airbases in South Eastern Turkey where the German and Belgian elements of the AMF(Air) is based. Speaking privately he said that the attacks on Israel had changed attitudes in Germany considerably, and that "even the Social Democrats" were now ready for steps to be taken to help to protect Israel. In answer to a question from my Secretary of State about Patriot, Dr Stoltenberg said that the problem was that their six Patriot batteries did not have such advanced software as the US version; moreover the associated equipments such as radar and communications were German and were not therefore compatible with the US equipment deployed in Israel. Whereas the US had deployed their own troops with the Patriot batteries it was not likely to be politically acceptable to the Israelis for German troops to deploy to Israeli soil, for very understandable reasons. He commented that working relationships between his ministry and the Israeli equivalent were very good and had been so for a number of years. He believed that they would find ways of providing significant assistance for Israel eg deployment of radar, perhaps Hawk, and biological and chemical protection assistance.

My Secretary of State referred to the assistance we have already received from the Germans with supply of ammunition, spares, Fuchs and Hummel vehicles. Dr Stoltenberg referred to the announcement today of an additional $5.5 billion assistance for the US. He added that when the Foreign Secretary visited he expected there would "be a discussion". My Secretary of State took the

Simon Gass Esq
Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

opportunity to encourage Dr Stoltenberg to persuade his colleagues to consider favourably our request for help, quoting 8% of the US figure. Dr Stoltenberg commented that we would find that the Federal Chancellor was prepared to have a discussion about a general contribution.

Dr Stoltenberg then asked Secretary of State for his assessment of the situation. In reply he referred to the Allies now having achieved virtual air supremacy, continuing raids against hardened air shelters, artillery dumps etc. He felt that the air campaign would need to continue for some while yet. The Allies believed that they had damaged significantly Saddam's biological and chemical stores, but believed that much of his capability in this respect had already been distributed. There was concern that "something new" would now be tried, since the Scuds had not achieved a great deal, and the oil slick was hopefully going to be contained. We did not believe that he had the capability to produce a nuclear bomb, but might well produce a conventional bomb including radioactive material within it.

Concluding Dr Stoltenberg said that he believed the German Government position was now a strong one with the Chancellor due to make a strong speech in the Bundestag tomorrow. Public opinion was developing well, with the last three opinion polls showing increasing support for the Allies' decision to go to war - the last poll he said had showed support of upwards of 70%.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10), Tancred Tarkowski and Jeremy Hayward (Treasury) and John Neilson (Energy), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Janet Binstead

(MISS J R BINSTEAD)
Private Secretary

FOLIO 2

Covering SECRET

T01351

RDB

Sir Robin Butler

MR MORRIS, No 10

SLP

cc Miss Phippard
Mr Appleyard
Mr Ball

CABINET OFFICE
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29 JAN 1991
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MILITARY EXPORTS TO IRAQ

As requested, I attach a line to take and a short background note.

W D Reeves

W D REEVES

29 January 1991
Att

Covering SECRET

Line to take (UNCLASSIFIED)

- No evidence of a threat to British troops in the Gulf from an Iraqi long-range gun.
- There clearly was an Iraqi supergun project.
- Action taken by Customs and Excise last year severely disrupted the project.
- The Government's clear policy was to refuse to supply any lethal equipment to either side during the conflict between Iran and Iraq. This policy was adhered to at all times.

Defensive

- The Government had no information that a supergun project existed until the autumn of 1989.
- [If asked about enquiries from Walter Somers and Forgemasters about the need for licences in the summer of 1988]. As my hon Friend the Minister for Trade made clear to the House on 29 November, no basis was found for advising the companies concerned that the tubes were subject to export licences.
- [If it is alleged that the Government dropped charges against Dr Cowley and Mr Mitchell to cover up the affair]. That is a ridiculous suggestion. The decision to drop charges was taken by the Commissioners of Customs and Excise in their independent law enforcement capacity.
- [If Mr Alan Clark's meeting with the Machine Tools Technologies Association in January 1988 is raised]. My hon Friend the Minister for Trade dealt fully with that matter in his statement to the House on 3 December, and there is nothing I need add.

Background

2. The policy on exports of military equipment to Iraq and Iran was set out in the then Foreign Secretary's Written Answer of 29 October 1985 (copy attached). The policy continued in force following the ceasefire in 1988.

3. The cause celebre was the Iraq supergun, which attracted much publicity last year after the seizure by Customs and Excise of a number of steel tubes at Teesport. Charges were subsequently preferred against two people, Dr Cowley and Mr Mitchell, but were dropped on 15 November.

4. Last Friday's Daily Mirror alleged that a working supergun existed in Iraq and was aimed at our troops. It is believed that Iraq has one (and only one) such gun which is capable of firing. This is believed to be a 350 mm version (the largest version planned would have been 1,000 mm version) and is thought to be pointed along the Jordan corridor at central and southern Israel.

5. Reference could be made in the House to Mr Alan Clark's meeting with the Machine Tools Technologies Association in January 1988, about which criticisms were made in the Sunday Times on 2 December last. His successor at DTI, Mr Sainsbury, dealt with the matter in a statement the following day (copy attached).

Iraq (Exports)

3.55 pm

The Minister for Trade (Mr. Tim Sainsbury): Mr. Speaker, with permission I should like to make a statement about exports to Iraq.

The Exports of Goods (Control) Order 1987 specified the goods the export of which would require a licence from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in 1988. The export of any military equipment required a licence. The order specified a range of equipment that is capable of being used for either military or civil purposes which also required a licence. Decisions on export licences applications are taken on a case-by-case basis.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Surrey, East (Sir G. Howe), the then Foreign Secretary, set out the guidelines applying to exports of defence equipment to Iraq in a written answer on 29 October 1985, at column *450* of *Hansard*. Those guidelines state that we should maintain our consistent refusal to supply any lethal equipment and that, subject to that overriding consideration, we should attempt to fulfil existing contracts and obligations. However, the guidelines said that we should not in future approve orders for any defence equipment which, in our view, would significantly enhance the capability of Iran or Iraq to prolong or exacerbate the conflict between them.

It is clear whether or not most goods fall within the guidelines. There is, however, a range of equipment—particularly machine tools—which could have either a civil or military use and for which a licence will be required.

When appropriate, both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry if Defence are consulted before a decision is made by my Department on whether a licence will be granted.

Applications for export licences are made on a form that requires the exporter to state both the customer and a description of the equipment. It is normal practice for it to be emphasised to those applying for licences that they should make clear the purpose for which the equipment is to be used.

In early 1988, following representations from a number of hon. Members on both sides, of the House, my hon. Friend the Minister for Defence Procurement, the then Minister for Trade, agreed to meet the Machine Tool Technologies Association to discuss the application of the guidelines in relation to the export of machine tools to Iraq.

My hon. Friend the Minister for Defence Procurement strongly denies the interpretation put on the remarks alleged to have been made by him in *The Sunday Times* article. I will not comment on the record of the meeting kept by the MTTA, which was not sent to my Department at the time, as I am advised that to do so might prejudice possible proceedings.

As the House will be aware, some matters concerning the licences granted to Matrix Churchill and the exports carried out by that firm to Iraq are now the subject of investigation by Customs and Excise. These investigations are carried out by Customs and Excise under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979. It would therefore be improper for me to comment on those matters or to say anything that might prejudice any proceedings.

Mr. Martin O'Neill (Clackmannan): That insignificant statement will surprise and satisfy no one. It will certainly not satisfy the readers and reporters of *The Sunday Times*. It will not satisfy the arms manufacturers who were first encouraged to sell arms to Iraq and who now have the possibility of prosecution hanging over them. It will not even satisfy the Minister for Defence Procurement over his role in this sorry affair.

Perhaps the Minister will confirm that there have been arms sales to Iraq, involving battlefield radar supplied by Thorn/EMI, tank-tracking equipment supplied by Bimec Industries, engineering equipment for mortar shells supplied by Wickman Bennett, as well as many parts of the so-called supergun which required explosive retardants and which got through the gap.

Will the Minister say more about the status of the meeting that took place on 20 January 1988 between the then Minister, the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark), and representatives of the Machine Tool Technologies Association? Did the then Minister advise them about filling in forms? Did he tell them to couch their applications in a manner designed to emphasise—and therefore by implication to mislead the other Departments—the peaceful aspects of the deals? Did he warn them of the need for speed to avoid bureaucratic—Foreign Office—interference because of external, namely United States, considerations?

Does the Parliamentary Under-Secretary appreciate that his totally inadequate explanation and his spurious distinction between lethal and non-lethal equipment make a mockery of the explicit instructions set out in December 1984 and the guidelines announced by the then Foreign Secretary on 29 October 1985? Is he aware that those statements were reinforced by the then Prime Minister on 10 November 1989 when she said, in reply to a question by my hon. Friend the Member for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours), that

"supplies of British defence equipment to Iraq and Iran continue to be governed by the guidelines introduced in 1985."—[*Official Report*, 10 November 1989; Vol. 159, *c. 800*.]

Does the Parliamentary Under-Secretary not appreciate that the casuistry of those concerned will continue to be exposed and that the Government will not get away with selling what, if it is only the straw, is the straw with which the Iraqis are making the bricks which will be built up against our troops in the Gulf if it ever comes to action? Does he realise that, if people have been distorting, bending and falsifying the rules and hiding behind commercial constraints when they choose to ignore questions from hon. Members, they will be found out and the wrath of the British people will be heaped on them as a consequence?

Mr. Sainsbury *rose*——

Mr. Anthony Beaumont-Dark (Birmingham, Selly Oak): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Hon. Members: Is it a point of order?

Mr. Speaker: Order. I cannot know whether it is a point of order until I have heard it.

Mr. Beaumont-Dark: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) said that the statement would not satisfy the readers of the *Sunday Times*. Is it not——

WRITTEN ANSWER OF 29 OCTOBER 1985

Iran and Iraq (Armaments)

Mr. Steel asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the policy of Her Majesty's Government governing the exportation of armaments to Iran and Iraq.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The United Kingdom has been strictly impartial in the conflict between Iran and Iraq and has refused to allow the supply of lethal defence equipment to either side. In order to reinforce our policy of doing everything possible to see this tragic conflict brought to the earliest possible end, we decided in December 1984 to apply thereafter, the following set of guidelines to all deliveries of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq:

(i) We should maintain our consistent refusal to supply any lethal equipment to either side;

(ii) Subject to that overriding consideration, we should attempt to fulfil existing contracts and obligations;

(iii) We should not, in future, approve orders for any defence equipment which, in our view, would significantly enhance the capability of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict;

(iv) In the line with this policy, we should continue to scrutinise rigorously all applications for export licences for the supply of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq.

cst.ps/let/18jh29.1

Sir Robin Butler

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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

cc - Mr Appleyard
Mr Reeves

Sir Charles Powell
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

29 January 1991

Dear Charles

VISIT TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

I understand that the Chief Secretary was asked at today's meeting of OPD(G) to visit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as part of the Government's effort to seek contributions to the military costs incurred by the UK as a result of the Gulf conflict.

2. The Chief Secretary sees advantage in combining a trip to the UAE with similar visits to Qatar and Bahrain.

3. The Chief Secretary recognises that OPD(G) decided that Qatar and Bahrain should not be approached at this stage. However, given the logistical difficulties in making a trip to the region, and the proximity of these countries to the UAE, the Chief Secretary believes that, subject to the Prime Minister's views (and any comments other members of OPD(G) might have), it would make sense for him to take this opportunity to discuss burdensharing and host-nation support (as appropriate) with the Governments of Bahrain and Qatar.

4. I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OPD(G) and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely

JEREMY HEYWOOD
Private Secretary