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MEMORANDA

MEMO NO	DATE	SUBJECT	CIRC/ TIME
1	21/4/05	THE IMPACT OF DUAL USE CONTROLS ON UK SCIENCE: RESULTS FROM A PILOT STUDY	

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**OFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (HOME)**

SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE SECURITY OF PATHOGENS AND TOXINS

**THE IMPACT OF DUAL USE CONTROLS ON UK SCIENCE: RESULTS
FROM A PILOT STUDY**

Note by the Secretary

The attached note by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office is for the
information of the sub-committee.

Signed D EDMUNDS

**Cabinet Office
21 April 2005**

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THE IMPACT OF DUAL USE CONTROLS ON UK SCIENCE: RESULTS
FROM A PILOT STUDY

Note by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office

1. For the past 18 months Dr Cairiona McLeish and Dr Paul Nightingale, from the Harvard Sussex Research program based at Sussex University, have been conducting research focused on the impact of Part 7 of the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 on the scientific community within the UK.
2. The motive for this research arose from reports of the negative impact that similar legislation has had in the United States and Germany. A full copy of the research findings can be found at www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/1-6-1-2-1.htm. The following three salient points have been highlighted and are circulated for the information of the sub-committee. They are quoted verbatim from the report.
 - a) 'The first finding is that the implementation of new Biosecurity measures in the UK seems not to have had the same negative impact as has been reported in the US and Germany. This unexpected finding is important because it suggests that Biosecurity policy options do not have to involve a trade off between advances in scientific research and security. While clearly it is possible that advances in scientific understanding can increase the risks of misuse, and, similarly, that draconian security measures could disrupt science, this finding suggests at present that this is not necessarily the case'.
 - b) 'The second finding is that the success of the implementation was related to three factors (1) pre-existing security and Biosafety measures; (2) a responsive approach to regulation by the implementing body; and (3) a flexible and socially responsible reaction by this sample of the scientific community. Had any one of these conditions not been in place, the costs could have been substantially higher, but together they have contributed to a successful initial implementation'.
 - c) 'The third finding is that while the initial stages of the implementation process built on these success factors, future implementation is likely to be more difficult. The implementation of wider security measures will have to move beyond 'piggybacking' on pre-existing security and Biosafety measures and will require a greater degree of interaction between the scientific and security communities'.

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3. At the launch of the report at Sussex University on 16th March 2005 one of the authors stated that the 'implementing body had come close to producing a textbook example of successful change management'. We feel that this is to the credit of all those involved and especially the Counter Terrorism Security Advisers, and feel that it should be brought to the notice of this sub-committee.

National Counter Terrorism Security Office
13 April 2005