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CAB 164/2375k

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TERRORISM STOCKTAKE

**Meeting to be held in the Cabinet Room
10 Downing Street at 3.30 pm on 6 April 2004**


AGENDA



1. **INTELLIGENCE PICTURE**
2. **OPERATION CREVICE**
3. **STRENGTHENING OUR COUNTER TERRORISM
LEGISLATION**
4. **COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY**
 - follow-up to Cabinet : radicalisation of the Muslim youth
5. **PREPAREDNESS**
 - resilience planning

Cabinet Office
5 April 2004

4



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'Sharne Dale - Cabinet Secretary's Office -

From: Turnbull Andrew -Cabinet Sec Office
Sent: 05 April 2004 12:21
To: PS Sir Andrew Turnbull
Subject: FW: TERRORISM STOCKTAKE MEETING: Agenda for mtg on 6 April 04
Importance: High

From: Brothers Andrea - Secretariat A -
Sent: Monday, April 05, 2004 12:20:01 PM
To: 'homesecretary.submissions@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk'; Deputy Prime Minister; Hutchinson Georgia - Douglas Alexander's Office -; Scarlett John - ISS -; Home Office (John Gieve); 'norah.healy@met.police.uk'; Williams-Walker Shelley - Permanent Secretary's Office -; Gibbons Nick - Secretariat A -; Powell Jonathan - No. 10 -; Docherty Maggie - No. 10 -; Heywood Jeremy - No. 10 -; Morys Simon - No. 10 -; Turnbull Andrew -Cabinet Sec Office; Pither Sue - Cabinet Secretary's Office -; 'susan.sills@fco.gov.uk'
Subject: TERRORISM STOCKTAKE MEETING: Agenda for mtg on 6 April 04
Importance: High
Auto forwarded by a Rule

PRIVACY MARKING: RESTRICTED

Jonathan Sedgwick, HO (for The Rt Hon David Blunkett MP)
John Gieve, HO, Permanent Secretary
Nick Raynsford, ODPM (for the Rt Hon John Prescott MP)
Georgia Hutchinson, CO (for Alastair Darling, Esq MP)
John Scarlett, JIC
Peter Davies, MOD (for The Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP)
Sir John Stevens, Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Service
David Veness, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Service
Sir David Omand, Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator & Permanent Secretary, CO
Sir Nigel Sheinwald, No.10
Jonathan Powell, No.10
Ivan Rogers, No.10
Simon Morys, No.10
Sir Andrew Turnbull, Cabinet Office Secretary
Susan Sills (for the Rt Hon Jack Straw MP - or his representative)
Nick Gibbons, CO

cc: Agencies (by secure fax)

TERRORISM STOCKTAKE MEETING - AGENDA

Please find attached the agenda for the above meeting on Tuesday 6 April at 3.30pm in the Cabinet Room, 10 Downing Street.

Grateful for acknowledgement of the receipt of this email (for attendance purposes)

Thank you,



TERRORISM
STOCKTAGE - Agenda f...

Andrea

Andréa Brothers
PA to Nick Gibbons
Head of CT and Crisis Management
Defence and Overseas Secretariat

Tel: 020 7276 0173
Fax: 020 7276 0295
E-mail: andrea.brothers@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk



TERRORISM MEETING

Venue No. 10

Date and Time Tuesday 6 April
15:30 – 16:30

Attendees See attached

Next Meeting 16:30 – Immigration Meeting

Car Details

Sir Andrew Turnbull
Prime Minister
Nigel Sheinwald
David Blunkett
Nick Raynsfod
Alistair Darling

John Scarlet
Geoff Hoon
John Gieve
David Veness
John Stevens
David Omand
Nick Gibbon
Jonathan Powell
Ivan Rogers
Simon Morys
Des Simons
Jim Smith
Eliza Manningham-Buller

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CAB 166 / 2375

Agenda dated 03/04/04

Booked in

S307

18th May



Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

Sir Michael Jay KCMG
The Permanent Under Secretary of State

Telephone: 020-7008 2150

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18 May 2004

Dear Andrew,

RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Thank you for sight of the letter to John Gieve on relations with the Muslim community. John has already sent you and copy addressees the joint FCO/HO paper on Young Muslims and Extremism. As John has indicated, the paper draws on a range of sources and contains a comprehensive work programme. Both Mike O'Brien and Fiona Mactaggart have been working closely on the paper with officials, which now awaits comments from the respective Secretaries of State.

Other colleagues have flagged up some of the potential underlying causes of extremism that can affect the Muslim community, such as discrimination, disadvantage and exclusion. But another recurring theme is the issue of British foreign policy, especially in the context of the Middle East Peace Process and Iraq.

Experience of both Ministers and officials working in this area suggests that the issue of British foreign policy and the perception of its negative effect on Muslims globally plays a significant role in creating a feeling of anger and impotence amongst especially the younger generation of British Muslims. The concept of the "Ummah", i.e. that the Believers are one "nation", has led to HMG's policies towards the Muslim world having a very personal resonance for young British Muslims, many of whom are taking on the burden both of the perceived injustices and of the responsibility of putting them right, but without the legitimate tools to do so.

This seems to be a key driver behind recruitment by extremist organisations (e.g. recruitment drives by groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and al Muhajiroon). The FCO has a relevant and crucial role to play in the wider context of engagement with British Muslims on policy issues, and more broadly, in convincing young Muslims



that they have a legitimate and credible voice, including on foreign policy issues, through an active participation in the democratic process.

I attach the FCO's Strategy on 'building bridges with mainstream Islam', which outlines our approach to reaching out to the British Muslim community. Our key messages are that we are focused on Muslim concerns, we are actively working on solutions, we are receptive to new ideas and that we are fully engaged with the Muslim communities.

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Other work streams have included:

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We have established in the FCO a Partnerships and Networks Development Unit to strengthen and build upon the FCO's relationship and dialogue with UK civil society. One of the key priorities of this new unit is strengthening the relationship with, and consultation of, the Muslim community. We have employed a specialist to assist us in this.

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Every year, in partnership with the British Muslim community, we send out a British Hajj delegation of eight doctors and consular staff to Saudi Arabia, to provide basic assistance for the approx. 20,000 British Hajjis who make the pilgrimage. We are the only Western government to send out a delegation of this nature.

(c) British Muslim delegations to the Islamic world

We are working to strengthen the links between the British Muslim community and many other countries in the Islamic world, e.g. through visits by British Muslim Parliamentarians and community leaders to Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Morocco and Tunisia. In Indonesia, for example, a number of Muslim parliamentarians, visited that country last year to promote interfaith dialogue; a delegation of UK Muslim Councillors also visited Indonesia to share their experience of Islam in the UK. Most recently, the president of a British Muslim student organisation delivered the keynote address in Indonesia, to an audience of



high profile figures from across the Islamic world. We have further British Muslim delegations planned to Malaysia, Kenya and possibly Libya.

In return, we have received a number of delegations from countries to discuss the role of British Muslims in society, including from Iran and the director of the Grand Mosque in Lyon, the Mufti of Singapore amongst many others.

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We use both print and broadcast media, aiming to build networks of young people, to engage a wider spread of UK and overseas communities and to challenge stereotypes. As part of this, we have established in the Foreign Office a specialist Islamic Media Unit to work with English language and foreign language media outlets to improve our ability to communicate with Muslim communities at home and overseas.

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Both Mike O'Brien and Fiona Mactaggart recently met with the leadership of the Union of Muslim Students, and have plans for a series of meetings with young people across the regions.

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We sponsor the 'Muslim News Awards of Excellence', which are awarded every year to British Muslims who have made outstanding contributions to different fields.

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The FCO has been hosting Eid receptions for the Muslim community for a number of years (recently these have been hosted jointly with the Home Office).



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We also run an Islam awareness and diversity course for our diplomatic staff, so they are aware of the basics of the faith when posted to the Islamic world.

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The concept of 'European Islam' seems to be increasing in importance among the younger generation of British Muslims. As a result it is essential that we are seen to be engaging on this level of Muslim identity from an early stage, especially in the context of possible accession of Turkey. We have agreed to co-host with the Islamic Foundation a seminar on Islam and Europe in the early autumn.

The above actions are in line with wider HMG engagement with the Islamic world. However, much still needs to be done, especially in the area of engaging young Muslims and looking at the causes of disaffection. The FCO/Home Office paper seeks to address this.

I am copying my letter to Mavis MacDonald, David Normington, Robin Young, Richard Mottram, David Omand, John Gieve, Howell James, Nick Macpherson, Helen Edwards, Joe Montgomery, Michael Richardson and Nigel Sheinwald.

Yours ever,

Michael

Michael Jay

Enc

RESTRICTED - POLICY

From : Gabrielle Edwards
EDS
Room 410, 70 Whitehall

Tel : 276-0443

Date : 18 May 2004

Sir Andrew Turnbull

Copies : Sir David Omand
Sir Nigel Sheinwald
Paul Britton
Robin Fellgett
Sarah Tyerman or
Nick Gibbons
Lyn Salisbury
Jess Yuille
Justin Russell, No 10

RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

1. You are due to chair a meeting at 8.30 am on 19 May on Relations with the Muslim Community. This follows up discussion at Cabinet and your subsequent letter of 6 April to John Gieve. A list of those attending is at Annex A.
2. The meeting will be an opportunity to discuss the state of current knowledge on the level of disaffection and extremism in the Muslim community, factors that are contributing to this, and possible response strategies. You will want to reach agreement on future workstreams, set a clear timetable for reaching some conclusions and decide on machinery at both official and Ministerial level for taking this work forward.
3. Your letter of 6 April posed a number of questions and asked recipients to provide relevant analysis and answers in advance of this meeting. Five responses have been received – from the Home Office, DWP, ODPM, FCO and the Scottish Executive. Given the evidence about the low level of educational achievement among some parts of the Muslim community, you may want to press DfES in particular during the meeting for details of any work they have done.

Issues for discussion

4. The annotated agenda and your letter outline the main areas the meeting will need to focus on. You may want to stress that there are twin objectives

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- both to reduce the disaffection that can lead to extremism and to look at ways of reducing the acute social and economic exclusion of large parts of the Muslim community. The two can be linked but, as John Gieve's letter emphasised, there is not a direct cause and effect. Both the well-educated and those with no qualifications (and often a criminal background) are being drawn to extremism.
5. In steering the discussion, you may particularly want to focus on the issues below and ensure they are fully picked up in the various workstreams :
- how to improve, not simply intensify, communication and dialogue with the Muslim communities and rebuild trust. John Gieve's letter outlined action HO have in hand, but you may want to press him further on this. Are we talking to the people who are representative and have influence? Is the mix of age/gender/area/level of education right? Are there different partners and communication methods we should be using? What capacity building is needed within the Muslim community to make the process work?
 - are programmes to tackle social and economic exclusion having any impact in the Muslim community? You may want to ask DWP/ODPM/HMT whether they have any evidence on this and what more they could do to ensure support reaches disadvantaged Muslims. Do they need to target programmes specifically at the Muslim community to tailor them to reflect any cultural sensitivities? What can be done to overcome the particular barriers to Muslim women entering the labour market? What scope is there for targeting programmes without alienating other communities?
 - the level of educational achievement by members of the Muslim community. You may want to commission work from DfES on the reasons for low levels of performance and options for addressing this.
 - tackling intolerance both towards and by the Muslim community. You might want to ask HO for views on whether the Race Relations Act should be extended to religion;
 - the link between disaffection and the direction of UK foreign policy. The FCO/HO paper on Young Muslims and Extremism identifies this as a particular driver of disillusionment and emphasises the need for engagement with British Muslims and better communication of the rationale for UK policy. You might want to ask FCO how the likely reaction of particular communities is taken into account when considering where UK the balance of interests may lie and how they might use the concept of the "ummah" positively;

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- the impact of migration and immigration policy (where the HO response had little to say). Does our current policy increase disaffection? Should we be able to use immigration controls more effectively to minimise radicalisation?
- where are the most important gaps in our knowledge and understanding?
- who should Government's key partners be in this work?

Taking work forward

6. The agenda suggests six areas where further work is needed. You will want to agree how these should be handled at official level and how Ministers should be involved.
7. On the machinery, We suggest that you :
 - allocate a lead department to each of the workstreams and ask them to work across Whitehall to produce at least preliminary conclusions and recommendations for Ministers to consider in July;
 - propose that a Cabinet Committee should consider these conclusions and recommendations and decide when to report back to Cabinet;
 - propose that Cabinet Office should chair meetings to consider progress across the workstreams and prepare for discussion by Ministers. Such a meeting could be chaired by EDS, in consultation with other secretariats, but you may want to leave open the option of you chairing further meeting(s) of this group as well in order to maintain momentum and ensure the work is seen as a priority in departments. Giving this role to Cabinet Office will reinforce the message that this is a cross-departmental activity.
8. We suggest that you allocate lead responsibility for the workstreams to a number of different departments (HO originally proposed they should lead across the board) to ensure that it is not viewed as overly driven by a policing and anti-terrorism agenda. We would suggest responsibility is allocated as follows :
 - Communication (CO, with a strong input from FCO, HO and ODPM)
 - Capacity building (HO/ODPM)
 - Tackling economic disadvantage (DWP/ODPM, with a major input from DfES, HMT and DTI)
 - The role of the education system (DfES)
 - Tackling discrimination and intolerance, including in migration and the criminal justice system (HO)

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- Research into levels of disaffection and exclusion (HO, with a strong input from FCO, ODPM and DWP).
9. While we would expect this work to culminate in a report to Cabinet, we propose that emerging conclusions and recommendations should be discussed in a Cabinet Committee in advance. This Committee is likely to need to meet more than once given the range of issues under examination. You will want to take a view on the most appropriate forum for discussion. The options appear to DA, DA(SER), DA(AC) or a new ad hoc committee.
 10. Both DA and DA(SER) are chaired by the DPM and would allow discussion among senior ministers. Neither Jack Straw nor Hilary Benn are members of either Committee and would need to be invited to attend. However, DA is probably more suitable for resolving issues on an ad hoc basis than taking ownership of an ongoing programme of work. DA(SER)'s focus on social exclusion and neighbourhood renewal is broad enough to encompass most of this work programme and the Terms of Reference could be updated and expanded if necessary (eg to remove a reference to health inequalities which is redundant now MISC 27 has been established), although we would not recommend a specific reference to this piece of work.
 11. DA(AC) is nominally chaired by David Blunkett, but on the few occasions this committee has met he has delegated this to the junior Home Office Minister (currently Fiona Mactaggart). All the key departments are involved, again with the exception of FCO and DfID, but not at Secretary of State level. The terms of reference only cover issues of community cohesion. We would recommend allocating this work to a more heavyweight committee.
 12. If neither DA(SER) or DA(AC) are thought to be appropriate you could advise the Prime Minister to establish a new committee to oversee this work. This could be chaired by David Blunkett, as the minister with the strongest interest, or alternatively by, for example, Andrew Smith, Paul Boateng or Charles Clarke to signal the importance of action to tackle economic and educational disadvantage. We would need to consider carefully how to phrase the terms of reference for such a committee and particularly whether there should be an explicit reference to this work. As your letter said, it would be counter-productive to "badge" this work with a primarily terrorism or criminal justice label.
 13. None of the existing Committees is ideal but, on balance, we would suggest that DA(SER) would be the best option. While it has no existing work programme, it is a heavyweight committee with very broad terms of reference. On the down side, finding time in the DPM's diary is always a problem and David Blunkett may feel that he should chair any committee

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considering these issues. If you do not think DA(SER) is suitable, we would recommend establishing a new, suitably heavyweight committee to consider these issues.

GABRIELLE EDWARDS

RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Annotated agenda for meeting on 19 May

1. Purpose of meeting

- Seek consensus on scope and objectives of the work
 - Cabinet's discussion was in the context of preventing terrorism and extremism;
 - These are symptoms of disaffection. So were the riots in some northern towns in 2001;
 - We need policies which handle the symptoms and limit their impact. But we also need to go beyond the symptoms to address their causes, which include the discrimination, disadvantage and exclusion suffered by many Muslim communities;
 - Overall, our objective should be to:
- Decide how to develop and implement a strategy which will
 - extend and build on what we know;
 - agree how to develop and take forward a broad-based range of interventions.

2. Papers

- Andrew Turnbull's letter of 6 April;
- Mike Richardson's response of 20 April and accompanying paper on British Muslims and employment;
- John Gieve's response of 10 May enclosing a joint HO/FCO paper on young muslims and extremism;
- Jon Elvidge's comments of 12 May.

3. Current knowledge and understanding of disaffection and extremism in the Muslim community and attitudes to identity

- We should aim to collate and summarise available information about the following issues:
 - (a) Social exclusion;
 - (b) Economic disadvantage (inc access to employment covered in the DWP paper circulated in reply to Andrew Turnbull's letter);
 - (c) Education and skills;
 - (d) Disaffection. Sources include the Home Office Citizenship Survey 2001 (2003 data will become available later this year), recent Home Office and FCO focus groups, independent polls, some academic research (eg at Royal Holloway). The Home Office briefing paper summarises some of this. Attitudes to foreign policy are also important

- (e) The scale and causes of terrorist activity. Intelligence and case histories are key sources
- (f) Extremist views and activity falling short of terrorism.

4. Action underway or planned

- W should aim to develop a co-ordinated interventions programme as part of the overall strategy under the following headings:
 - (a) Communication, including intensified two-way dialogue with all parts of the Muslim communities relating to domestic and foreign policy;
 - (b) Capacity building and other action to help Muslim communities themselves address the main risks of radicalisation;
 - (c) Tackling economic disadvantage;
 - (d) The role of the education system;
 - (e) Ensuring that Government is effectively tackling disadvantage and discrimination faced by Muslim communities, including in the migration and criminal justice spheres, while also confronting intolerance;
 - (f) Research and surveys to better understand levels and causes of extremism, disaffection, and social and economic exclusion.;

5. Co-ordination needed across Whitehall

- For each work area identified we should
 - Identify gaps in knowledge and in interventions and ways of closing the gaps;
 - Identify and allocate departmental responsibilities;
 - Identify partners for Government to work with;
 - Agree a timetable for strategy development and implementation;
 - Agree Whitehall machinery at Ministerial and official level to take forward the work..

6. Next steps

- These are likely to include one or more further meeting or meetings, and reporting to Cabinet.

May 2004



Foreign &
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London SW1A 2AH

Sir Michael Jay KCMG
The Permanent Under Secretary of State

Telephone: 020-7008 2150
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Sir Andrew Turnbull KCB CVO
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
LONDON
SW1A 2AS

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Yours ever,

Michael

Michael Jay

Enc

STRATEGY FOR "BUILDING BRIDGES WITH MAINSTREAM ISLAM"

ISSUE/PROBLEM

1. Muslim resentment towards the West is worse than ever. This was previously focussed on the US, but the war in Iraq has meant the UK is now seen in similar terms- both are now seen by many Muslims as "Crusader States".¹ Though we are moving on from a conflict to a reconstruction phase in Iraq, there are no signs of any moderation of this resentment. Our work on engaging with Islam has therefore been knocked back. Mr O'Brien has expressed his concern.

2. Current proposed FCO initiatives (DSI's strategy and MENA's recent paper)² addressing reform in the Arab world are important and necessary. But they inevitably have their limits (particularly in the UK domestic context), and in some instances, the proposals may actually complicate the challenge, if Muslim populations exploit increased freedom of expression. This will be particularly so if there is no progress on the Palestinian issue. Other initiatives such as the British Council's "Connecting Futures" do not target Muslim foreign policy concerns, the cause of the resentment.

3. A further effort is therefore required to address Muslim resentment, and to present HMG's position clearly on issues of Muslim concern. There will be an increasing need to build, and in some cases, re-build, trust in HMG's policies and position. We also need to take full advantage of political developments on the Palestinian issue, and to underpin any such developments through supporting communication. We will still have to keep in mind that from the view of the Muslim community, our story is still not good enough and we may face criticism. But this should not deter us from engagement.

GOAL

4. Beyond radical policy solutions, the only way to tackle Muslim resentment is to build trust. This is a strategy to address that- it will play a complementary role to FCO proposed strategies of reform in the Arab world, and the British Council's Connecting Futures programme. The main areas of resentment and the drivers behind the recruitment by extremist organisations (e.g. recruitment drives by groups such as Hizb-

¹ Previously the burning of effigies of Western leaders were normally confined to the US President, but recently the British PM is also seen as a hate figure and is a target of effigy burning. The 'Crusader States' epithet is not just one used by groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir or the Jihadis, but also used in rhetoric by mainstream groups. Also note the fatwa by Qaradawi against military action in Iraq (as far as I am aware, there is no real distinction made between the US and UK). He is seen as moderate, i.e. he gave a controversial edict after 9/11, which stated that it was permissible for US Muslim soldiers to fight in Afghanistan. These are just a few examples amongst many.

² See Annex 2

ut-Tahrir and al Muhajiroon) are directly related to Muslim foreign policy concerns. It is therefore right that the FCO takes a lead in building bridges with mainstream Islam, in close partnership with others such as British Council, Home Office, DfID (RUSI and the FPC.) Other possible partners can include MPs who can plug into useful local networks. **MED, NENAD, SAD, IMU, DSI and Ed Owen have agreed this strategy.**

MEANS

5. The way in which we can achieve the above goal is by:

- a) **Demonstrating how HMG is active on key issues of concern** (see annex for details)-both past and present on primarily Palestine but also Kosovo, Chechnya and Kashmir.
- b) **Promote mainstream Islam, including the understanding that Islam and pluralism are compatible. By doing so we can enter the "Ummah loop".** The concept of the "ummah", i.e. that the Believers are one "nation", seems to have gained a significant prominence in how Muslims view HMG's policies towards Muslim countries. The war on Iraq for example, has brought an upsurge of resentment in the British Muslim communities against the government and its policies. But the concept of "ummah" can also have positive aspects for HMG. For example, if HMG is seen as promoting and engaging mainstream Islam amongst British Muslims, this will have ripple effects in other countries in which this is projected, i.e. a past example has been the FCO sponsored visits to Muslim countries by British delegations.
- c) **Full scale engagement with British Muslims on foreign policy.** This includes laying down the challenge to British Muslims, of suggesting pragmatic solutions to their concerns.

MESSAGES

6. There are four core messages we need to get across:

- a) We are focused on Muslim concerns
- b) We are actively working on solutions
- c) We are receptive to new ideas
- d) We are fully engaged with the Muslim communities

TARGET AUDIENCE

7. As well as continuing engagement with the 'usual suspects', we should have a structured approach to working with young British Muslims. This group are increasingly defining themselves by their beliefs, and extremist groups are targeting the younger age group, i.e. the majority of Hizb-ut-Tahrir members are under the age of 26. It is important that we find partners amongst the opinion formers of

tomorrow, and innovative ways in which to assist the promotion of mainstream Islam amongst them. British Muslim women are another group who we can work with in order to promote key shared values. We may need to do a 'stock-take' of the groups and organisations we are talking to, in order to determine whether we are working with the right people. Focus groups will help us refine the target groups.

8. Britain has a large number of leading mainstream Islamic thinkers, as well as vocal Muslim extremists, some of whom are renowned for advocating the inherent compatibility of democratic values with Islam. Many of them argue that democratic values, as well as the model of civil society, were adapted by the West from Islam. Engagement with these mainstream elements will help us promote common shared values within the British Muslim community, and indirectly, more widely in the Islamic world. By promoting the idea, from within the Muslim community that mainstream Islam and the West have many common shared values such as democracy, we can isolate extremists.

9. One of the dichotomies facing HMG is that organisations and figures from mainstream Islam who advocate values we share, also oppose us strongly and vocally on issues such as Iraq. For example, organisations like the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), both of which have organised national and local demonstrations opposing the war on Iraq, would be suitable and often willing partners in promoting their view of Islamic values, i.e. including promotion of human rights and democracy.

10. Many of the action points would be implemented in partnership with other FCO directorates, departments, OGDs, Muslim NGO's (such as Lord Bhatia's many foundations and think tanks) and British council, who we understand to be interested in this sort of activity. The HO has also shown interest in joint activities in this area. The total cost is estimated to be about £118,000. PaNDU's contribution will be in the region of £50,000. See annex 1 for detailed costs.

ACTION POINTS

Some of the action points cover more than one of the project areas. They are listed in **order of priority under each of the three headings.**

1.) Promote mainstream Islam:

a) "Home-grown" Imams:

One of the sources of extremist ideas within the Muslim community is the influx of Imams and clerics from abroad who often come from ultra-orthodox and 'conservative' seminaries. We need to encourage the training of British scholars who understand the needs of British Muslims living in a multi-cultural and pluralist society. This may also would include other 'ulema' who give sermons at Jum'uah prayers. This needs to be taken forward by the Muslim community itself. However, FCO/HO co-ordination with British institutions like the Islamic foundation would aid this sensitive issue to progress. This would be an extension of the work already done by Mr O'Brien.

b) Symposiums on "Mainstream Islam"/Muslim Perceptions of the West/Language of Islam:

This will be a series of one-day seminars, as a joint partnership venture between the FCO and the British Muslim community. This would give intellectuals, community leaders and opinion formers a forum in which to express their views in a productive and positive manner, and would be an attempt to move away from "West-bashing". This is similar to a symposium, which had been planned by the FCO and RUSI, but was postponed indefinitely due to the Iraq crisis. The Islamic Foundation or the Oxford Islamic Centre would be good partners for this type of activity. (Estimated costs: £5-6,000 per symposium)

c) Public Awareness Material (Islam and pluralism, etc)/ Public lecture series on "Islam and democracy/pluralism":

There are several mainstream organisations with popular bases such as the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) and the Union of Muslim Students (UMS), who are producing leaflets on issues such as human rights, Islam and pluralism, Islam and democracy, etc. These groups may be willing to work in partnership to promote mainstream Islam and shared values, within the wider Muslim communities. The proposed series of public lectures would be based on a successful format used by Asian Foundation House, which saw attendance by 500 to 1000 majority Muslim audiences, at 6 lectures by prominent figures, academics and leaders over a two month period. This would be an opportunity for the Foreign Secretary and FCO ministers to put forward HMG's views as well as being seen as assisting in promoting mainstream Islam. (Estimated costs: Public Awareness Material-£5-7,000, Lecture series- £10-12,000)

d) Guidance material on British Muslim groups:

The FCO needs a clear idea of the different groups/strands within the British Muslim communities and organisations, as this often shapes a particular communities/organisations views on foreign policy, e.g. the Muslim community in Blackburn is predominantly Deobandi/Tablighi (indicates an orthodox and rather conservative view of Islam, and concentrates on religious rituals, i.e. prayer, observance of keeping the beard, wearing of the hijab, etc, the group is almost secular in form). These strands and groups within British Muslims, often have corresponding strands in other Muslim countries, and are a way in which the British Muslim community can communicate with the wider Muslim world. It is important that we have clear guidance material on this issue.

2.) Full scale engagement with British Muslims on foreign policy:

a) Focus groups- generational differences/base-lining of opinion:

There would be dozen or so focus groups, comprising of British Muslims across different generations and ethnicity. This would give us an insight into the different generational perceptions and views of foreign policy within the Muslim community. This in turn would help inform our work. As the groups would be conducted after the war in Iraq, it would also act as a baseline of opinion in the British Muslim communities. (Estimated costs: £2,800-3000 per focus group [x10/11])

b) "Direct promotion" to 400,000 Muslim households:

The possibility of direct "communication" with large sections of the British Muslim community would dramatically enhance our engagement with the mainstream British Muslim community. A Company called MD Media has a 400,000 household mailing list, specifically for the British Muslim community, divided by gender, postcode, region and city. If the FCO purchase this or a similar mailing list, as it would enable us to directly send FCO resources/publications such as "Think Again", and even recruitment material directly to 400,000 Muslim households. We could also target certain sectors of the Muslim community. This would not have to be more than once annually. It also would help us in focusing our outreach efforts, as well as research and evaluation. If this proves to be a success, the company also holds a mailing list for 300,000 Asian households and in terms of recruitment usage, they have available, the mailing addresses for 40,000 Asian professionals. These lists have been widely used by the private sector, financial services and even the Food Standards Agency. The direct promotion would of course be in line with the Conventions on propriety of Government publicity. (Estimated costs

for 400,000 households- £35,000 for the mailing list +costs for preparation of material and postage)

c) Foreign Secretary's meeting(s) with Muslim opinion-formers:

The Foreign Secretary recently hosted a dinner where he invited a group of Muslim opinion formers from a wide range of backgrounds- business, politics, and community work. Young people and women were also represented. The dinner was successful, as the informal setting meant that a wide range of topics could be discussed quite honestly. It would be productive to organise at least another one with the same group or one with a similar composition.

d) Whitehall Co-ordination Group:

Engagement with mainstream Islam is clearly an area where the FCO needs to co-ordinate with other OGDs in order to avoid duplication and share best practice. The Home Office and DfID are two of the key departments.

e) Global Opportunities Fund: Seminar/ British Muslim delegations/Youth and Uni. exchanges/Muslim attachments:

GOF has identified engagement with Islam as one of the key priorities. One planned activity is a seminar with Muslim organisations on GOF (early May), in order to discuss possible uses. British Muslim delegations to Muslim countries, which are structured & more frequent (Islamic countries with democracies and Islamic democratic parties such as Turkey and Malaysia, as well as countries with similar Muslim minorities to Britain such as Singapore, would be good places to send delegations) would help in the promotion of mainstream Islam abroad. This could also extend to youth/university exchanges with Muslim countries such as Brunei, Malaysia, Turkey, etc. Another valuable use for GOF would be to fund senior Muslim attachments to the FCO; e.g. Imam Abdul Jalilsajid's attendance on a seminar on Militant Islam in Azerbaijan was extremely successful.

f) "Think again" booklet:

The 'Think Again' CD-ROM (a generic "one -stop shop" information resource for the Muslim community) has proved to be particularly popular, and should be re-produced. It is also important to produce a simplified paper version, which may be similar to the FCO "Muslims in Britain" pamphlet, but would include FCO activities with the Muslim community, such as the Hajj delegation, Islam awareness course, Ministerial outreach, etc. (Estimated costs: £10,000)

3.) Demonstrating activism:

a) The issue of Palestine: Outreach events/CD ROM & video on Palestine:

Palestine is an issue on which HMG has made positive progress. We should have a series of outreach events and visits, in order to specifically address the issue of Palestine. This can take place in a number of forums, including community meetings or roundtable discussions. In order to assist in outreach, on this issue, I recommend that we produce resource materials on this issue, e.g. an information CD-ROM (which has proved to be a popular format for generic outreach to British Muslims), and a short presentation video, which would be valuable for the British Arab community if it was also dubbed into Arabic. (Estimated costs: CD ROM- £7-10,000, Video- £10,000)

b) Faith & Foreign Policy week (6-10th October):


During this week we plan to hold several events, including a faith and foreign policy seminar, a public lecture attended by a Minister and an Open Day. All these events would address issues such as Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya and Kosovo in some form, as part of the wider issues. (Already accounted for in PaNDU's Domestic Echoes action plan)

c) Continuation of funding for the Hajj Delegation:

The Hajj delegation is one of the most positive focus points of our relationship with the British Muslim community. It also reads well across the Islamic world, as Britain is the only Western State to fund such a delegation. We need to promote this far more widely than we have previously done. Also as FCO funding for the Hajj delegation is due to end in 2004, the FCO seriously needs to re-evaluate further funding for this initiative. It would certainly be seen as a positive step.



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Leak shows Blair told of Iraq war terror link

- Top official warned in 2004 of British Muslim anger
- Secret document said UK seen as 'crusader state'

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Martin Bright, home affairs editor
Sunday August 28, 2005
The Observer

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The Foreign Office's top official warned Downing Street that the Iraq war was fuelling Muslim extremism in Britain a year before the 7 July bombings, The Observer can reveal.

Despite repeated denials by Number 10 that the war made Britain a target for terrorists, a letter from Michael Jay, the Foreign Office permanent under-secretary, to the cabinet secretary, Sir Andrew Turnbull - obtained by this newspaper - makes the connection clear.



The letter, dated 18 May 2004, says British foreign policy was a 'recurring theme' in the Muslim community, 'especially in the context of the Middle East peace process and Iraq'.

'Colleagues have flagged up some of the potential underlying causes of extremism that can affect the Muslim community, such as discrimination, disadvantage and exclusion,' the letter says. 'But another recurring theme is the issue of British foreign policy, especially in the context of the Middle East peace process and Iraq.'

'Experience of both ministers and officials ... suggests that ... British foreign policy and the perception of its negative effect on Muslims globally plays a significant role in creating a feeling of anger and impotence among especially the younger generation of British Muslims.'

The letter continues: 'This seems to be a key driver behind recruitment by extremist organisations (e.g. recruitment drives by groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and al Muhajiroon). The FCO has a relevant and crucial role to play in the wider context of engagement with British Muslims on policy issues, and more broadly, in convincing young Muslims that they have a legitimate and credible voice, including on foreign policy issues, through an active participation in the

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democratic process.'

Al Muhajiroon, formed by Omar Bakri Mohammed, the radical preacher who fled Britain after the 7 July bombings, was a recruiting organisation for young Islamic extremists in Britain.

Attached to the letter is a strategy document, also obtained by The Observer, which reveals further concerns. It says Britain is now viewed as a 'crusader state', on a par with America as a potential target. 'Muslim resentment towards the West is worse than ever,' the document, 'Building Bridges with Mainstream Islam', says.

'This was previously focused on the US, but the war in Iraq has meant the UK is now seen in similar terms - both are now seen by many Muslims as "Crusader states".'

'Though we are moving on from a conflict to a reconstruction phase in Iraq, there are no signs of any moderation of this resentment. Our work on engaging with Islam has therefore been knocked back. Mr O'Brien [then a Foreign Office minister] has expressed his concern.'

However, all mention of the Iraq connection to extremism was removed from 'core scripts' - briefing papers given to ministers to defend the government's position on Iraq and terror.

The document begins: 'We do not see the Muslim community as a threat. Muslims have always made, and continue to make, a valuable contribution to society.'

The lines to be used by ministers include measures designed to address Muslim concerns, such as the introduction of religious hatred legislation and tackling educational underachievement among Muslims. But there is nothing to address the concerns raised by Jay eight months earlier.

The documents reveal deep divisions at the heart of government over home-grown religious extremism and its connections to British intervention in Iraq.

The Prime Minister has consistently said that the bombers were motivated not by a sense of injustice but by a 'perverted and poisonous misinterpretation of Islam'. Although Iraq was clearly used as a pretext by extremists, he said he believed it was ideology that drove them to kill. To press home the point, Downing Street issued a list of atrocities carried out before intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. The claim was later undermined by the MI5, which said that Iraq was the 'dominant issue' for Islamic extremists in Britain.

Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, also rowed back from his comments immediately after the bombings that there was no connection with Iraq and the terror threat after it became clear that the public remained unconvinced.

But Jay's letter shows that the Foreign Office was convinced that foreign policy played a key role in radicalising young

Muslims.

The letter outlines a list of 11 'work streams' to discourage extremism. They included delegations to the Islamic world, ministerial briefings for key members of the Muslim community and receptions to mark key Muslim festivals.

It is not known how Turnbull responded to the letter, although it is clear that, by January, there was a significant difference between what was being said within the Foreign Office and what ministers were officially being permitted to say in speeches.

Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesman Mark Oaten last night called on the government to come clean about the link between extremism among British Muslims and anger about Iraq: 'For the government to deny a link between the war in Iraq and dismay among the Muslim community is ridiculous. But to try to cover it up, when senior civil servants have recognised the seriousness of the resentment, is even worse.'

• [Read the document here](#)

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SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE

SENT BY EMAIL 14/5

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12 May 2004

Dear Andrew,

RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Thank you for copying your letter to John Gieve of 6 April to me.

Clearly this is a complex and potentially emotive set of issues, and it is likely to be most helpful if our responses to these are as far as possible framed in terms of encouraging community cohesion. I therefore strongly endorse the suggestion in paragraph 3(ii) that we must avoid the perception that this is driven by a counter terrorist agenda.

Our experience is that Muslim communities are not necessarily hierarchical in ways that we might instinctively recognise: there is certainly less in the way of national hierarchy compared with some other faith-based communities. So it is right to identify the need to ensure that the people with whom we engage are representative – and it is likely that this will require quite substantial investment in building up networks at local, rather than national, level. We will continue to foster these networks in Scotland, and I will be very happy to share experience with colleagues in Whitehall and the other devolved administrations.

It seems to me that answers to a number of the questions raised in your letter, and hence reactions to the likely effectiveness of possible responses, will only be found by direct engagement with the communities concerned. So although there is substantial ground to cover under definition of the problem, and possible responses, discussion of how best to engage through partners and agents – and directly where appropriate – is likely to be crucial to better understanding and to sustained progress.

I regret that my customary difficulty with Wednesday mornings will prevent me from attending the meeting.

I am copying this letter to Wednesday morning colleagues.

Yours ever,

JOHN ELVIDGE

LEM01201.054



For Muslim meeting.

cc Robin Fellgett
Gabrielle Edwards.



SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE

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JOHN ELVIDGE

LEM01201.054



St. Andrews
Version 1.1

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Hard copy

For 19th May
meeting.

10 May 2004

Den Andre

RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Thank you for your letter of 6 April. As background for your inter-departmental meeting, I attach a draft paper prepared jointly by the FCO and Home Office on Young Muslims and Extremism. It draws on a range of sources including intelligence and last year's audit paper on British Muslims by the Strategy Unit. I also enclose a Home Office briefing paper which summarises information from the 2001 Census, the Home Office Citizenship Survey 2001 and independent polls over the last two years.

2. Extremism can be a symptom of disaffection, the riots in some northern towns three years ago were another. We need policies to handle the symptoms and limit their impact but the broader task is to address the roots of the problem which include the discrimination, disadvantage and exclusion suffered by many Muslim communities (as by other minorities).

3. The links between social deprivation among British Muslims and extremism is not simple cause and effect. Case histories suggest that the British Muslims who are most at risk of being drawn into extremism and terrorism fall into two groups: a) well educated, with degrees or technical/professional qualifications, typically targeted by extremist recruiters and organisations

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circulating on campuses; b) under-achievers with few or no qualifications, and often a non-terrorist criminal background – sometimes drawn to Mosques where they may be targeted by extremist preachers and in other cases radicalised or converted whilst in prison. Moreover many of the UK's links to international terrorism are from expatriate communities and exiles from abroad, especially North Africa, who are motivated by an international agenda. However we will certainly not be effective in tackling the dangers of extremism without gaining the active cooperation of Muslims, immigrant and British, and that gives us added reason for addressing their problems of social exclusion.

4. The Home Office's work programme is based on a four fold strategy of, first, intensified dialogue with Muslim communities; second, action to help Muslim communities themselves address the main risks of radicalisation; third, research and surveys better to understand the perceptions of our Muslim communities and changes in them and finally ensuring that Government is effectively tackling disadvantage and discrimination faced by Muslim communities. The programme includes the following.

Dialogue

(a) We are discussing with Muslim representatives their community's concerns about the operation of the anti-terrorist powers. Substantial progress has been made in building a closer relationship with the Muslim Council of Britain. The MCB letter of 31 March to Imams and Mosques urging them to be clearer about the incompatibility of terrorism with Islam and about the need for Muslims to co-operate with the police represented a significant step forward.

(b) The ACPO-chaired Muslim Safety Forum has become an increasingly important channel for Muslim/police relations and will be developed as necessary.

(c) We plan a more intensive programme of engagement with young Muslims around domestic policy issues.

(d) Fiona Mactaggart is working to enlist MPs with large Muslim constituencies as partners in Government's dialogue and engagement with Muslim communities.

(e) We are preparing for circulation to departments guidance on Muslim sensitivities and appropriate non-inflammatory terminology.

(f) One common feature of cases where young Muslims have become involved in terrorist activity has been a genuine sense of bewilderment on the part of their parents. We think we should explore with Muslim representatives whether there are ways of engaging Muslim parents and helping them to be part of the solution.

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(g) The Government needs to persuade the Muslim community that it respects and trusts the community, and knows that those involved in terrorism constitute only a very small minority. At the same time, it needs to persuade Muslim leaders, both nationally and locally, to be more active in tackling extremism and making this clear to both Muslims and non-Muslims. This requires continuing engagement with Muslim leaders and organisations, involving MPs, engaging with the Muslim business community (since local business leaders are often influential in Mosque committees), and ensuring consistent messages from Government

Radicalisation

(h) In prisons, where action has previously been taken to recruit a moderate cadre of Imams chaplains, we are looking to see what further steps are needed.

(i) Some faith communities, especially Muslims, are dependent on poorly qualified ministers of religion from abroad with little English or knowledge of our society. We will introduce in June a requirement for ministers of religion from abroad to have adequate English; and launch consultation on additional requirements.

Research

(j) Our Community Cohesion team has set up a system for monitoring community tensions in key areas around the country. This draws on local authority, VCs and police sources including ACPO's new National Community Tensions Team. We are exploring with ACPO a possible supplementary survey of extremist activity in schools and campuses in selected areas.

(k) We have in hand a research programme to give us a better insight into the causes of radicalisation and recruitment. That in turn will enable us to devise a better focused strategy for disrupting and preventing radicalisation.

(l) Building on the research already in hand, we need, for the future, to build up our understanding of the nature and causes of disaffection and disadvantage. Muslim communities appear to have low levels of civic participation and volunteering, mixed attitudes towards integration and (fairly small) minorities who do not feel loyal or patriotic towards Britain, or think terrorist attacks against the US are justified. But this may reflect demographic rather than faith-specific factors. The position on disadvantage is similarly complex. Muslims are experiencing high levels of disadvantage in terms of employment (especially among women), qualifications and deprivation, but there is substantial variation between ethnic groups within the Muslim community.

Tackling Disadvantage

(m) The departments leading on social exclusion, unemployment and educational disadvantage need to audit their programmes to ensure that they are reaching and benefiting the Muslim community. Generally there is a good

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level of awareness in Government of the need to target intervention on young people in our Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities, which are among the most disadvantaged. But there is a long standing campaign by Muslims for programmes to recognise and address them as a distinct group and community, rather than relying on ethnic classifications. They are also pressing for the Race Relations Act to be extended to religion. I agree with you that we need to revisit that. We need to ensure that Government policies and public services are sensitive to Muslims needs. The recent "Working Together" Report, about the Government's relationship with faith communities, called for enhanced faith sensitivity in Government on policy development and service delivery. Departments and public authorities are becoming accustomed to addressing race equality in their work, but there is now a need for faith to be mainstreamed. The establishment of the Faith Communities Unit in the Home Office is intended to help in facilitating this.

5. It is also important to combat Islamophobia and persuade the public and the media that Muslims are not the enemy within. Government needs to look for opportunities to highlight Muslim success stories and examples of Muslim contributions to society at national and local level. We need to help and encourage Muslim organisations to represent their community effectively and in a positive light. The FCO/Home Office paper makes some suggestions on this. Other departments, including DCMS, have a role to play.

6. We think you have correctly identified the agencies and departments which need to be engaged in this work, except that DCMS may need to be included. I would also like to invite input from the Security Service who I believe have an important contribution to make. The lead in the Home Office is being taken by Helen Edwards, Director-General of our Communities Group, supported by Mark Carroll, Director for Race, Cohesion, Equality and Faith.

7. I am copying this letter to Mavis McDonald, David Normington, Robin Young, Richard Mottram, Michael Jay, David Omand, Howell James, Nick Macpherson, Helen Edwards, Joe Montgomery, Michael Richardson and Nigel Sheinwald. I am also copying it with your letter to Eliza Manningham-Buller.

V. ew
Jr

JOHN GIEVE

YOUNG MUSLIMS AND EXTREMISM

FCO/HOME OFFICE PAPER

The remit

The Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary have commissioned a joint FCO/Home Office paper for the Prime Minister on how to prevent British Muslims especially young Muslims, from becoming attracted to extremist movements and terrorist activity.

Scope of Paper

This paper considers the combination of issues affecting some sections of young British Muslims, which may cause them to become disaffected, and in some cases turns them to extremism. It should be noted that concerns about terrorism are not the only angle from which the Home Office is addressing relations with and disaffection in the Muslim community; in particular, this paper does not encompass the Home Office's wider work on race equality and community cohesion, which also bear on those issues. In terms of the FCO's engagement with British Muslims and Islam it is also much wider than just terrorism, and ranges from policy engagement with British Muslims to engaging with the Muslim world on a raft of different issues.

By extremism, we mean advocating or supporting views such as support for terrorist attacks against British or western targets, including the 9/11 attacks, or for British Muslims fighting against British and allied forces abroad, arguing that it is not possible to be Muslim and British, calling on Muslims to reject engagement with British society and politics, and advocating the creation of an Islamic state in Britain.

The paper comments on whether there is a link between extremism and terrorism, and how we might seek to prevent young Muslims from becoming attracted to them. It does not address the prevention of terrorism, issues about intelligence-gathering or activity in the UK by non-British Muslims.

The assessment draws on input from the Security Service, cases of British Muslims known or suspected to have become involved in extremist activity abroad or at home, insights from individuals who have become disillusioned with such movements, available surveys of Muslim opinion, discussion with Muslim representatives and advice from our departmental Muslim advisers. For the purposes of this paper we are focussing on those young Muslims who were either born in the UK or who significant ties to it rather than those who have acquired British nationality more recently. It takes account of the Strategy Unit's Strategic Audit paper on British Muslim Communities (July 2003).

PART 1 - EVALUATION

Grounds for Concern

Concerns that some Muslims including young Muslims are turning to extremism, are based on:

- A small number of young British Muslims are known to have committed or participated in terrorism abroad or to have joined violent or militant organisations in other countries, e.g. the British suicide bombers in Israel.
- A number of extremist groups operate in the UK and seek to recruit young Muslims, often on campuses and colleges. (See annex A for examples and what they advocate.)

- There have been public meetings advocating extremist positions, some quite well attended. For example, Hizb-ut-Tahrir organised a conference entitled 'British or Muslim' conference, in September estimated to have attracted 10,000 (although some of these will have gone expecting an open debate rather than what turned out to be a one sided advocacy of extremism).
- Increasing numbers of British Muslims, often young, have needed UK consular services after being detained on suspicion of terrorist or extremist activity in other parts of the world (eg Yemen, Egypt and the US).
- Polls between November 2001 and December 2002 suggested that a relatively small, but not insignificant minority of British Muslims felt some sympathy for terrorist attacks on the USA, did not feel loyal to Britain, did not condemn British Muslims who fought against allies in Afghanistan or thought Muslims have gone too far in integrating into British society. The ICM poll published in the Guardian on 15 March 2004 recorded 13% of British Muslims as thinking that further terrorist attacks on the USA would be justified. In each case, substantial majorities took the opposite view but the existence of minorities disposed towards extremist positions cannot be ignored and needs to be better understood.

Context

But we need to put this into context. We know that a large number of young Muslims are able to integrate into society, define a British Muslim identity for themselves and contribute positively to society. Anecdotal evidence suggests Muslims who have experienced life in other European countries often say that acceptance is better in the UK (this perception is likely to have been enhanced by France's decision to ban the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in schools). Neither a strong sense of Muslim identity (including a sense of community with Muslims world-wide) nor strict adherence to traditional Islamic teachings are in themselves dangerous or problematic. The number of young Muslims in Britain who are actively espousing extremist politics may be very small, though we need to get a better feel for this.

Policy objectives include persuading young Muslims that they can be Muslim and British, and that Islam is not regarded with hostility. In this context the term 'Islamic fundamentalism' is unhelpful and should be avoided, because some perfectly moderate Muslims are likely to perceive it as a negative comment on their own approach to their faith.

Possible Causes

One key action point is the need to improve our evidence about the extent and causes of extremism, and of the links if any between extremist sentiment on the Muslim community and terrorist activity. At this stage all we can say is that there are a variety of issues that impact upon British Muslims, including young Muslims, and may increase the likelihood of their moving towards extremism. The factors discussed below are based partly on survey evidence but partly on the subjective impressions of Home Office and FCO officials and Muslim advisers, taking account of their contacts with Muslim leaders, clerics and academics and monitoring of publications.

Foreign policy issues

- It seems that a particularly strong cause of disillusionment amongst Muslims including young Muslims is a perceived 'double standard' in the foreign policy of western governments (and often those of Muslim governments), in particular

Britain and the US. This is particularly significant in terms of the concept of the "Ummah", i.e. that Believers are one "nation". This seems to have gained a significant prominence in how some Muslims view HMG's policies towards Muslim countries.

- Perceived Western bias in Israel's favour over the Israel/Palestinian conflict is a key long term grievance of the international Muslim community which probably influences British Muslims.
- This perception seems to have become more acute post 9/11. The perception is that passive 'oppression', as demonstrated in British foreign policy, eg non-action on Kashmir and Chechnya, has given way to 'active oppression' – the war on terror, and in Iraq and Afghanistan are all seen by a section of British Muslims as having been acts against Islam.
- This disillusionment may contribute to a sense of helplessness with regard to the situation of Muslims in the world, with a lack of any tangible 'pressure valves', in order to vent frustrations, anger or dissent.
- Hence this may lead to a desire for a simple 'Islamic' solution to the perceived oppression/problems faced by the 'Ummah' - Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir and Afghanistan. A case in point is the March 2004 ICM poll of Muslim opinion asked "Jenny Tonge, a Liberal Democrat MP said she condemned all forms of terrorism, but if she had to live in the same situation as a Palestinian she might consider becoming a suicide bomber herself. Do you agree or disagree with her?" 47% agreed with the statement, whilst 43% disagreed.

Domestic issues

Islamophobia

- Perceived Islamophobia (particularly post-9/11) in society and the media may cause some British Muslims including young Muslims to feel isolated and alienated and in a few cases to reject democratic and multi-cultural values.
- The Cantle report identified polarisation between Pakistani/Bangladeshi and white communities as a factor in the 2001 disturbances. The young people involved in these disturbances included educated professionals as well as under privileged people
- Lack of understanding of Islam - insensitive use of language and perceptions of Islam and an ill-informed assumption that Islam's teachings are inherently extremist. Media coverage of extremist fringe groups increases this.
- Muslims perception of bias in the way counter-terrorism powers are used to stop, detain and arrest people, both at ports and in-country.

Social issues

- Attainment - Muslims are more likely than other faith groups to have no qualifications (over two fifths have none) and to be unemployed and economically inactive, and are over-represented in deprived areas. However, this is largely associated with the disadvantage of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, whereas the experience of Indian and Arab Muslims is much less disadvantaged.
- Lack of participation and representation – There is still low Muslim representation in mainstream institutions of influence, especially for women - eg in public appointments, volunteering and mainstream politics (although the Home Office Citizenship Survey 2001 suggests that low Muslim participation rates largely reflect non-faith factors such as education, economic empowerment, age and gender).

Issues of identity

- Parts of the Muslim community are still developing an understanding of how to reconcile their faith and Islamic identity with living in a secular multi-cultural society, and with modern social challenges. There is a developing critique by some within the Muslim community, both abroad and here, that traditional Islamic jurisprudence is not equipped to fulfil the needs of Muslims living in the West and needs to be developed and updated. There are tentative moves towards developing Islamic jurisprudence for Muslims living in Europe and the Western World.
- A lack of any real 'pressure valves', in order to vent frustrations/anger/dissent
- There are particular issues for young Muslim women who face some of the most complex clashes of culture. We need to think hard about the positive impact they can have with the right support.

Organisational issues

- Some young Muslims are disillusioned with mainstream Muslim organisations that are perceived as pedestrian, ineffective and in many cases, as 'sell-outs' to HMG

Who are we dealing with?

Demographic facts

There are 1.6 million Muslims in Britain/the UK. About half belong to the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, which are among the most deprived educationally and economically. The remainder belong to Indian, Arabic and other ethnic communities, some of which are less deprived.

Over half of Muslims are under 25, compared with a third of the population as a whole.

Compared with the population as a whole Muslims have three times the unemployment rate¹; the lowest economic activity rates²; a higher proportion of unqualified³; and a higher concentration in deprived areas.⁴

Reliable survey data on Muslims is scarce. One exception is new data from the Home Office Citizenship Survey 2001. On identity it revealed that faith ranked second after family. This is particularly strong amongst young people aged 16-24⁵.

The majority of all faith groups were satisfied with government and employers' protection of their rights. However, a significant minority of especially young Muslims (37%) were not satisfied.

Young Muslims are less likely than all faith groups to participate in civic activities (39% and 30% respectively) and Muslims are the least likely to volunteer.

The data does **not** show that faith is itself the *cause* of disadvantage⁶ or disengagement or that they are linked with extremism. On engagement, the HOCS suggests that other factors such as economic empowerment, age and gender are more significant drivers than faith.

Extremism

The Strategy Unit's Strategic Audit paper identifies three key trends

a small yet vocal minority has become radicalised and has sought to construct a relatively narrow interpretation of Islam, drawn partly from transnational and international sources

a larger group has retained an Islamic identity whilst successfully adapting to

¹ 5% for the population as a whole and 15% for Muslims

² 67% for the population as a whole 48% for Muslims

³ 36% for the population as a whole 43% for Muslims

⁴ 4.4% of the population as a whole 15% of Muslims live in the 10 most deprived districts

⁵ 74% for Muslims and 63% for Sikhs and Hindus.

⁶ Other factors such as class, race and discrimination may be more relevant

and integrating with mainstream British society

a large group no longer identifies positively with their Muslim origins.

Extremist organisations

There is a spectrum of extremist organisations to consider, e.g. Al Muhajiroun, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, as well as less organised groups who follow a particular extremist doctrine, eg jihads, radical deobandis, etc. (See Annex C for evidence). In the majority of the cases, the ideological doctrine and even the methodology are not constructs of Muslims born in the UK, rather they are the British based brands of organisations that are found in Europe and the rest of world (the majority of which originate from the Middle East and the Asian sub-continent but have bases all over Europe and the world).

Most of the structured extremist organisations, e.g. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, will not directly advocate violence. Indeed membership or sympathy with such an organisation does not in any way pre-suppose a move towards terrorism. What it may indicate is the possibility of a few of its members being open to gradual consideration of far more extremist doctrine (e.g. these 'non-violent' extremist organisations allow members or even sympathisers to contemplate opening 'Pandora's box').

However those with very extremist or even terrorist tendencies may also be put off by these extremist organisations as they may view their activities as 'pointless pontification and debate'. They may demand more direct action and less talk and hence may not become involved with them.

Who joins extremist groups?

Surveys after 9/11 provide an *indication* – though not a reliable measure – of Muslim attitudes⁷. There is no data on how they compare with views of other faith groups. The data shows the great majority of British Muslims (up to 85%) regarded terrorist

attacks on western targets, including the 9/11 attacks, as unjustified. The great majority (up to 87%) felt loyal to Britain. A majority felt patriotic (67%) and thought it wrong for British Muslims to fight against allies in Afghanistan (62%). A survey of young Muslims in 2001 showed strong feelings of outrage at the 9/11 attacks and that the majority believed that Islam either prohibited or discouraged such attacks.

However, a minority of Muslims defend terrorism (up to 13%). A minority did not feel loyal to Britain (up to 26%).

Reasons for becoming attracted to extremism

Some young Muslims who join extremist groups or are targeted by them are poorly educated and from deprived backgrounds.

Students and young professionals from better off backgrounds have also become involved in extremist politics and even terrorism. They provide better recruits, as they may have the capability for wider and more complex proselytising. Extremists are known to target schools and colleges, where young people may be very inquisitive but less challenging and more susceptible to extremist reasoning/arguments. There is evidence of the presence of extremist organisations on campuses and colleges (often when an organisation is named as a banned organisation on a campus, its members will set-up a society under another name - the 1924 Society, Muslim Media Forum and Muslim Cultural Society all have extremist tendencies).

Individuals who are looking for an alternative to the brand of Islam their parents may have taught them, and/or are looking for a more prominent form of identity but who have little knowledge about Islam may be ideal recruits for extremists. However this form of identity can also be non-extremist and may take the form of criminality, or other cultural/belief systems. With regards to Muslim youth who may have recently started practising, these organisations offer a fulfilment of the 'Islamic obligation' of being in a jama'ah (collective work for Islam/Muslim Ummah).

⁷ Six surveys were conducted by MORI, ICM, YouGov between November 2001 and March 2004 on

For those looking for a 'practical' goal or purpose to work towards in order to solve the perceived problems of the Ummah, extremist organisations/ideologies offer panaceas to all the problems of the Muslims. (e.g. the panacea offered by organisations such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al Muhajiroon is re-establishment of the 'Khilafah' - the Caliphate.)

For young Muslims looking to rebel against their taught values, the wider community or the government these groups can provide a cathartic and vocal 'pressure valve' for anxieties, frustration and helplessness felt by a number of British Muslim youth over a whole range of issues.

Terrorist Activity

Intelligence indicates that the number of British Muslims actively engaged in terrorist activity, whether at home or abroad, or supporting such activity is extremely small and estimated at less than 1%.

It is difficult to generalise about the profile of young British Muslims who are attracted to Islamist terrorist activity either in the UK or overseas. Backgrounds and motivation to undertake terrorist or related activity vary. They range from foreign nationals now naturalised and resident in the UK arriving mainly from North Africa and the Middle East, to second and third generation British citizens whose forebears mainly originate from Pakistan or Kashmir. In addition, whilst many have grown up in Muslim households, a significant number come from liberal, non-religious Muslim backgrounds, or only converted to Islam in adulthood. These converts include white British nationals and those of West Indian extraction.

By and large most young extremists fall into one of two groups: well educated-undergraduates or with degrees and technical professional qualifications in engineering or IT; or under-achievers with few or no qualifications, and often a criminal background.

The former group is often targeted by extremist recruiters circulating among university-based religious or ethnic societies. Amongst the latter group some are drawn to mosques where they may be targeted by extremist preachers; others are radicalised or converted whilst in prison. However, a significant number of young radicalised British Muslims have been recruited through a single contact, often by chance, outside either of these environments. Such individuals are encouraged to maintain a low profile for operational purposes and do not develop the network of associates or political doctrines common to many other extremist Islamists.

Our understanding of the radicalisation process (what we have begun to call the "Terrorist Career Path") is still developing. Much more work needs to be done to identify the steps along the path where Government and community groups can intervene and prevent radicalisation. As our research progresses, it will inform the cross governmental work being done on engaging with the Muslim communities.

Key conclusions

Our key conclusions are

- (a) Muslim extremism matters for two separate reasons – it is a potential threat to community cohesion and a potential cause of terrorist activity.
- (b) It is important to understand the broader context and maintain perspective. Criticism of foreign policy is not confined to Muslims or minority communities. A number of Britain's faith and ethnic communities have multiple identities (eg many Hindus feel an affinity with India and many Jews with Israel) and the Government's approach to integration, which rejects assimilationism, accepts and encourages that. It is when some Muslims feel that they cannot be British and Muslim that we need to be concerned.

- (c) From available polls and anecdotal evidence, many Muslims are unhappy and angry about aspects of British and foreign policy, because they perceive it as biased against or unfair towards Muslims in the world. Palestine, the conflict in Iraq and Chechnya are just some of the issues.
- (d) Information about the state of opinion in the Muslim community is limited and generalisations need to be treated with caution. We should both monitor movements in opinion through repeated surveys or focus groups and seek to understand what causes those opinions through further research.
- (e) Parts of the Muslim community fear that the government, the media and the wider community regard them with suspicion and hostility, and feel beleaguered as a result. Some Muslims also currently feel anxious and angry about arrests and searches under anti-terrorist powers, which they perceive as being applied excessively and abusively. We should not lightly dismiss as unrepresentative the campaign on this currently being mounted by the mainly moderate Muslim Council of Britain and other organisations.
- (f) Despite these concerns, it is likely based on the 2001/02 surveys that only a minority of British Muslims hold extremist views, though the size of the minority varies according to what particular views one is measuring); and probably only a minority of those holding such views take any active part in extremist organisations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al Muhajiroon.
- (g) However, we need to guard against focussing on these high profile, vocal and highly visible organisations because of as much concern from a counter-terrorist perspective are those groups which are not formally organised and have no badge or label. We do not currently know what distinguishes these minorities from the moderate majority. The Security Service has some evidence that those who go on to become involved in terrorist related activity have been radicalised as a result of associating with loose networks that revolve around a respected key individual. Indeed, many have been encouraged to retain a low profile and not to be seen to openly expose extremist views.

We do however know quite a lot about the ways in which extremist movements attract followers. A common motivation for these diverse groups may be a common need to belong and to gain a sense of purpose. Often disaffected lone individuals unable to fit into their community, will be attracted to university clubs based on ethnicity or religion, or be drawn to Mosques or preaching groups in prison through a sense of disillusionment with their current existence. Volunteering to a jihadist cause abroad, or embracing a stricter Muslim lifestyle, is often seen as an answer to this lack of purpose.

PART II - ACTION

Current actions/activities/response

FCO

On the FCO's side there are a number of initiatives, which directly or indirectly impact on some of the issues highlighted. These range from Ministerial outreach, customised information resources for young Muslims, participation in 'campus' debates' to sponsorship of activities of Muslim student groups. (See Annex D- FCO minute of 5 November on '*Engaging with Mainstream Islam*' & Annex E- FCO minute of 27 October on '*Islam & Europe*'). In addition to these, there are a number of horizontal activities and policies in place, which overlap on this issue.

British Council

The British Council through its international cultural relations activity has facilitated opportunities for young and emerging leaders of British Muslim communities to work with counterparts from around the globe. It has also supported preparatory classes in Pakistan for Imams due to take up posts in the UK.

Home Office

The Home Office is engaged in a series of meetings with Muslim leaders to address Muslim concerns about the use of counter-terrorism powers. It has conducted some practical interventions as well as some long-term work that aims to create a better environment for young Muslims within the UK, for example through consultations with Imams, Mosque officials and local representatives (including young people), and by developing contacts with Muslim youth organisations, assisting in DfES policies, looking into Islamic mortgages and encouraging inter-faith dialogue (see annex F).

Other departments

Engagement with the Muslim communities, including young Muslims, by the Education Secretary on faith issues in schools and higher education is an example of work by other Whitehall departments.

Muslim organisations

The mainstream Muslim community has been vocal in its public condemnation of extremism. For example, the Muslim Council of Britain expressed sympathy with the people of Spain after the Madrid bombs and has recently written to Imams calling on Muslims to report suspicions to the police. The Islamic Society of Britain and figures such as Abdal Hakim Murad of Cambridge University, Dr Manazir Ahsan of the Islamic Foundation and Dr Zaki Badawi have also spoken out.

Muslim engagement in mainstream public life politics is still under developed. There have been a few practical steps taken such as the formation by the Muslim Council of Britain of the MCB Direct information service. The involvement of the Union of Muslim Students (UMS) and the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) in student politics is helpful. However these activities seem to be in a fledging stage and under-resourced or else are carried out in an ad hoc manner. There are [] Muslim MPs and [] Muslim Peers, but Muslims remain under represented in public appointments.

Aims of policy

Policy should have two main aims:

- (a) to isolate extremists within the Muslim community, and to provide support to the moderates, equipping and encouraging them to oppose the extremist threat within their communities. But it is important to identify moderates correctly – some of those who are influential in the extremist world purport to be moderates.
- (b) to help prevent young Muslims from becoming ensnared or bullied into participation in terrorist or extremist activity.

The government needs to redouble its efforts to develop a more constructive relationship with the moderate majority and their representatives and leaders. So long as Muslim leaders appear defensive or hostile, and ambiguous in their condemnation of terrorism, some non-Muslims will remain suspicious and extremists will draw comfort. Mainstream Muslim religious leaders indicate that extremists use a distorted and selective interpretation of Islamic teaching to support their positions. We need to encourage moderates to challenge such positions and provide leadership.

Action headings

Our two departments are jointly taking forward a number of measures. Details are at Annex A.

The main themes are as follows:

/ We need to understand the evolution of the “terrorist career path” and develop a comprehensive Interventions Strategy, to enable us to turn people from the path. The Home Office, in conjunction with the security services and other government departments will be developing a program of research in this area.

More generally we need to intensify our engagement with young Muslims, in order to better understand opinion and seek to influence it.

We need to address Muslims' sense of injustice about anti-terrorist arrests and searches. The Home Secretary and Fiona Mactaggart have initiated a series of contacts with Muslim leaders to address and respond to these concerns.

The issue of foreign policy concerns of the Muslim community needs to be addressed. This is often the area of government policy which generates the most anger and sense of injustice among Muslims generally, but particularly amongst the younger generation. The FCO is already in the process of extensive engagement and outreach, and has produced a strategy on building bridges with mainstream Islam (Annex D). The Home Office is actively engaged with leaders of the Muslim community, for example around their concerns on the use of counter terrorism powers and in the wider context of the Working Together review. We need to continue to build on the momentum created by this work.

We need to focus specifically on influencing opinion among young Muslims. Mike O'Brien and Fiona Mactaggart are undertaking a number of joint meetings with Muslim students across a variety of campuses.

The government must make a more concerted effort to persuade the Muslim community that it is trusted and respected. That requires a change of language. Public challenges to Muslims to decide where their loyalties lie are counterproductive.

Expressions of concern about Islamic fundamentalism should also be avoided, because many perfectly moderate Muslims follow strict adherence to traditional Islamic teachings and are likely to perceive such expressions as a negative comment on their own approach to their faith.

The shrill and defensive tone which has been adopted sometimes, in the past by some Muslim representative bodies risks alarming Muslims rather than reassuring them. We need to make further progress in transforming our relationship with the MCB and others into one of greater trust and partnership, building on the helpful contacts which the Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary have had with them recently. Ministers of both departments plan regular meetings with Muslim representatives.

It is privately, within such partnerships, that Muslim representatives should be challenged to work harder at improving their relations and image with other communities, and to be more unequivocal in their condemnation of terrorism and espousal of democratic values. We need to find ways of strengthening the hand of moderate Muslim leaders, including the young Muslims with future leadership potential, through the status which contact with government can confer, and through practical capacity building measures.

Linked to that, we need to find ways of supporting the Muslim community in efforts to improve the quality of Imams, many of whom are poorly educated and come from unsophisticated backgrounds abroad with little understanding of the UK and sometimes with crude and extremist teachings. Planned work includes measures to encourage more home grown Imams and raise the qualifications of Imams from

abroad through changes in immigration rules.

Home Office

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

April 2004

ANNEXES

- A Work programme
- B Ideology and Propagation of Extremist Organisations
- C Support for Extremism
- D FCO update on Building Bridges with Islam
- E Islam and Europe – Role for FCO
- F Home Office Activity

ANNEX A

This annex will contain the same action plan as is set out in the Summary paper.

ANNEX B

Ideology and Propagation of Extremist Organisations

Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) and Al Muhajiroon are probably the two extremist organisations with the highest profile in Britain. They are therefore a good case study as an example of some of the types of beliefs held by extremist organisations.

Belief system:

Both organisations come from the same origins (i.e. Al Muhajiroon is a breakaway organisation from HT). The movement itself was founded by a Palestinian jurist by the name of Taqi-ad-din Nabhani. The British counterpart was set-up by the Omar Bakri Muhammad.

“Hizb ut-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam, so politics is its work and Islam is its ideology. It works within the Ummah and together with her, so that she adopts Islam as her cause and is led to restore the Khilafah (Caliphate) and the ruling by what Allah revealed. Hizb ut-Tahrir is a political group and not a priestly one. Nor is it an academic, educational or a charity group. The Islamic thought is the soul of its body, its core and the secret of its life.”

Both organisations believe in a 3-stage methodology of reviving the Caliphate, the first two stages being the most important.

Stage One: 'Culturing' people in their way of thinking, and recruiting members to propagate the revival of the Caliphate as the way to salvation'.

Stage Two: "Publicly" opposing the non-Muslims and those Muslims who have 'strayed' from the true path of Islam.

HT consider themselves to be at stage one, whilst Al Muhajiroon consider themselves to be at stage two.

A typical example of each of their activities is:

- a.) Hizb-ut-Tahrir- A conference on whether Muslims could be British (the conclusion was that they couldn't)
- b.) Al Muhajiroon- A conference on the 'Magnificent 19'- commemorating those responsible for 9/11.

If it is taken that both organisations are part of the same ideology, the statements below (made at the Al-Muhajiroon conference) are an indication of their beliefs and methodology.

- 1.) A Fatwa that those who join the British army are apostates and those who fight in Iraq or Afghanistan or elsewhere against Muslims are apostates because of their war against Muslims.
- 2.) That integration with the *Kuffar* (Non-Muslims) and their *kufir* (non-belief) is not allowed and no one should be proud to British or become MP's, MI5 members, government officials, etc. Indeed to join these bodies is an act of apostasy.
- 3.) To urge Muslims world-wide to work for the establishment of the Khilafah, a vital issue for Muslims today following 79 years living without an Islamic state.
- 4.) To urge Muslims to support the Jihad wherever it is taking place, whether in Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, etc- against the aggressors, usurpers and occupiers in those regions.
- 5.) To call Muslims to do all they can to free the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay.
- 6.) To call the Queen, the British establishment and the public to embrace Islam.
- 7.) To explain that Muslims living in the US and UK are generally under a Covenant of security in that, in return for their life and wealth being protected they cannot attack the lives or property of the host nation. But those outside the UK & US do not have such a covenant with the UK and the US.

- 8.) To tell Muslims not to be intimidated by the many new laws introduced against them, such as those related to terrorism, immigration or by the raiding of their mosques and homes.
- 9.) To dignify and honour the Magnificent 19, who sacrificed their lives for Allah on 9/11.
- 10.) To expose the moderate *munaḥiqeen* (hypocrites) who start to cry for the British government, and yet claim they are defending Islam.

Support for extremism

As to the level of sympathy for extreme movements there is no robust evidence. Indicative evidence through opinion surveys of British Muslims in the 15 months following the September 11 attacks showed that they had a high rate of condemnation of the 11 September attacks, strong disapproval of the war in Afghanistan and sympathy for Muslim countries, strong support for a ban on religious discrimination, wide loyalty to the UK and mixed views on citizenship. The details were -

- a) between 35% and 70% thought the war on terrorism was a war on Islam, and up to 80% disapproved of the war in Afghanistan
- b) 67-85% thought it would be wrong for terrorists to attack western targets, 80-85% thought the September 11 attacks were not justified and 61% thought it wrong for British Muslims to fight against allies in Afghanistan
- c) 75-87% felt loyal to Britain (67% felt patriotic), 41% felt Muslims needed to do more to integrate.
- d) young Muslims were far more likely than young Christians to regard religion as important to their self-identity (74% against 18%). The figures for young Sikhs and Hindus were also high (63% and 62%).

- e) young Muslims were more likely than other faith groups to think that the government was doing the right amount to protect people belonging to religions.

The Hizb-ut-Tahrir conference 'British or Muslim' hoped to attract 20,000 people in 2003 (the actual attendance is estimated to being closer to 10,000). This represents less than one percent (0.6%) of the British Muslim population. And the Al Muhajiroun 2003 conferences 'the Magnificent 19' on September 11 were cancelled and the main conference in London was mainly attended by press with no supporters from the Muslim communities other than the organisers.

5 November 2003

PS/ Mr O'Brien

FCO UPDATE ON "BUILDING BRIDGES WITH MAINSTREAM ISLAM"

1. You will recall that Mr O'Brien agreed a number of submissions on strengthening our relationship with the British Muslim community, including the main strategy on 'building bridges with mainstream Islam'. Much of it is still work in progress: this is an update on where we are and what is ahead.
2. There has been a step change in our work with British Muslims. This is reflected above all in de-sensitising interaction with the FCO. Many mainstream organisations now feel more comfortable in engaging with us, and any previous stigma in doing so has been lessened. For example, we have managed to build working relationships with organisations that have previously been critical of us or have even declined to attend meetings. These include ISB, Q News, YMUK, FOSIS, etc. Even with regards to an organisation like the MCB, our relationship with them has perceptively changed, e.g. they are taking an active part in working with us on future activity, as well as positively reviewing our activities on the MCB Direct website.

3. The work already carried out, despite inevitable hindrances due to events in Iraq and Palestine includes:

- a) **Ministerial outreach** to British Muslim community organisations in London (pre and post Iraq), Birmingham and Bradford. In each case there has been growing interest from both the local and ethnic minority press.
- b) **'Think-again' CD-ROM-** this was an interactive 'one-stop shop' resource on the FCO and HMG's policies, for the Muslim community. It has been well received and we have extended the franchise to other communities.
- c) **Receptions-** these have been continued for both Eids, and are a way to provide access for members of the Muslim grassroots, to the FCO.
- d) **Regular Ministerial briefings with Muslim representatives-** the meetings are always well received as they are seen as a means of highlighting concerns at the highest level, and maintaining regular contact with the British Muslim communities. They tend to highlight the issues of the 'moment' amongst the Muslims. Our willingness to invite those who are publicly critical of HMG, has helped produce some change in perceptions of the FCO/HMG.
- e) **Engagement with Muslim youth-** This has included meetings with delegations from Muslim youth and student organisations, and Mr O'Brien's participation in debates on Iraq which had been organised on campus.

f) **De-sensitising & Participation-** We have participated in some of the big Muslim community events/activities, e.g. MCB direct, EMEL, Islam Awareness Week, Living Islam 2003, Expo-Islamia, etc.

g) **Promotion of Mainstream Islam-** We have started sponsorship and promotion of literature under the heading of 'Exploring Islam' (produced by the Institute for Islamic Dawah and Research), which was launched in Islam Awareness Week. The idea is to promote understanding of issues such as Islam and democracy. We have also assisted the CLU and the FCO Hajj Delegation in re-vamping the image of the Delegation (i.e. through its literature and communication resources)

4. There are a number of actions pending which have been agreed by Mr O'Brien. Future planned actions include:

5.

a) As a follow-up to Fraser's minute of 6 October to Heads of departments, on linking generic outreach with the specific activities of FCO depts, we will be meeting soon with NENAD, MED, AD (E), CTPD, Consular, SAD and SEAD.

b) We will continue to co-ordinate closely with the Home Office on issues of mutual interest with regards to building bridges with mainstream Islam, as well as wider outreach.

c) **Focus groups:** This will concentrate on the generational differences within the British Muslim community on foreign policy issues. We will also attempt to conduct these amongst the different Muslim ethnic groups. We are trying to carry this out in co-operation with the HO and BC.

d) **Direct Promotion:** As agreed by Mr O'Brien, we will send a revised version of the FCO 'Muslims in Britain' booklet (in conjunction with MCB) to 15,000 British Muslim households, as a pilot run. There is the

potential of up to 400,000 households if the pilot test proves to be successful.

- e) **Research on British Muslim youth and extremism:** PaNDU commissioned research on this issue, which includes data from 'defectors' from extremist organisations. I will submit on this soon, and it will also feed into the HO/FCO paper on this issue to the PM (as agreed by the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary).
- f) **Mainstream Imams:** This will focus on the issue of Imams and extremism, and will include (as agreed) a Ministerial visit to the Islamic Foundation and a seminar with British Imams.
- g) **New Focus: Islam & Europe:** I have already minuted on this issue. The activities will involve amongst other things, informing EU Embassies of our work with British Muslims, and a Europe and Islam seminar.
- h) **Communications:** This will include customised resources for British Muslims (booklet, video and revised CD-ROM).
- i) **Outreach:** In addition to the proposed cities for wider outreach seminars- (Fraser's minute of 4 November) where possible, we will try to include visits to various organisations, including those which are specifically Muslim- I would recommend that the Minister also visit Tower Hamlets (London), Leicester and Slough. These areas have some of the highest concentrations of Muslims in the UK.
- j) **Promotion of Mainstream Islam:** We are sponsoring the creation of a new award (Ibn Khaldun award for excellence in promoting understanding between global cultures/faiths) for the annual Muslim News Awards, which will take place in March. We will also support the production of literature promoting mainstream Islam, a series of public lectures (in partnership with a mainstream organisation) and a FCO symposium on the issue.

k) **Engagement with Muslim youth:** In addition to including youth organisations to Mr O'Brien's outreach programmes, we will assist Muslim student organisations co-organise a seminar with their Jewish counterparts at the NUS conference, on international issues.

l) **Engagement with new interlocutors:** There are a number of new individuals/organisations who are influential amongst British Muslims. These include; Amr Khaled (a moderate and extremely popular lay preacher from Egypt, who is based for the immediate future in the UK and also has a large following amongst British Arabs) and the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC). We are in the process of forming relationships with these individuals/groups. However, it would be useful for the Minister to meet them.

6. In addition to the priority work with British Muslims as outlined above, we are balancing it with our other engagement. We have a 10-point action plan on engaging with Ethnic Minorities, which is nearing completion (and the Minister has agreed to host a reception in February to mark it). Also as a result of Multi-Faith week, the seminar in particular, we are working on an action plan for Faith Communities, which we will submit on once we finish consulting people at the seminar.

27 October 2003

ISLAM & EUROPE- ROLE FOR THE FCO

1. I attended a conference in Brussels, in late September, organised by the Forum of European Muslim Youth & Student Organisations (FEMYSO) and the issue of Muslims in Europe. The event took place in the European Parliament and was attended by over 150 delegates (mostly under the age of 30) from across Europe, including Britain. The event was addressed by several MEPs, the President of the Parliament and a British Muslim academic who regularly advises the MoD. Other attendees included representatives from the US Embassy, as well the leading Muslim leader/speaker in Europe- Dr Tariq Ramadhan.

2. The conference was well received and discussed issues impacting European Muslims, including foreign policy.

3. A large number of leaders of the organisations said that HMG was well regarded because of the dialogue and engagement it has developed with British Muslims. They added that in many cases, this could not be said of their own governments. Many of the people, who held that view, included leaders and executive members of influential European Muslim organisations. This view was emphasised to the British Muslim attendees.

4. An interesting phenomena which seems to be emerging is that an increasing number of second/third generation British Muslims (as well as those in countries such as Germany, Belgium, France and Italy), are going further than just defining themselves by their nationality or their Muslim identity generally. Instead they seem to be defining themselves as 'European Muslims', in the same way as there are 'African Muslims' or 'Asian Muslims'. This seems to be directly linked to the common denominator that Muslims in European countries share, i.e. they are all minorities in their respective countries. As a result, 'Islamic' jurisprudence is developing in order to cater for this developing identity. As would be expected, this 'European Muslimness' is more pronounced in other European countries than in the

UK, but it is increasing rapidly here, e.g. the Vice-president of FEMYSO is a British Muslim.

Action:

5. As discussed, we should inform the embassies of countries such as Germany, France, Italy, etc, and our embassies in those countries, of our strategy of building bridges with mainstream Islam, as the assumption is that there will be a great deal of interest.

6. In that context it would be worthwhile for us to support and host a wider seminar on Islam & Europe, organised principally by British and European Muslim organisations. It seems that we are seen as having the best model of dialogue with Muslims, and an event of this kind, especially with upcoming young leaders would help to endorse that. Further, if 'European Muslimness' is one of the emerging identities amongst Muslims in the West, including amongst British Muslims, it would make sense to understand it better. I would expect interest from DSI, research analysts, the British Council and the Home Office, especially if we can involve figures such as Dr Tariq Ramadhan and Imam Hamza Yusuf. I have seen the E-mail you have forwarded me, from Rosemary Waugh with regards to a possible UK/French Muslim event next year. With some planning, this could all fit together.

ANNEX F

Home Office Activity

- The HO held consultations with Imam and Mosque officials in Birmingham, Bradford, Blackburn and East London. Young Imams (17 –25 year olds) also attended these seminars.
- The HO already has a network of contacts with young people from various organisations such as FAIR, Muslim Youth Helpline, FOSIS and recently the new UMS. However plans are to reach out to the more disaffected young people as well as young Muslim professionals through community and personal contacts via a series of seminars/consultations. The next round of consultations planned are focusing on young people and women. These will target colleges, F.E. institutions as well as H.E. institutions.
- Ministerial meetings with young Muslim people and young Muslim organisations.
- HO acted as facilitators in preparing and briefing for the FOSIS meeting with Charles Clarke, about DfES policies.
- HO has also developed research specifications about British young Muslims and British Muslim women. The purpose is to obtain a quality, comparative study that gives us more information about both groups, in comparison to other faiths, so that we can understand the issues and develop a strategy based upon research.
- HO produced guidance on entering religious premises for the police.
- Support for the Muslim Safety Forum in developing a constitution.

- Development of a package to ensure that Imams from abroad in the UK are better equipped to meet the needs of British Muslim congregations in a modern, democratic and cohesive society.
- Investigating right-to-buy Islamic mortgages with ODPM and the Housing Corporation.
- Piloted intervention model between Police and young Muslims at International Test Match.

SUMMARY

Young Muslims and Extremism

Issue

- Action plan to prevent young British Muslims from becoming disaffected, alienated and attracted to extremist movements and terrorist activity.

The problem

Many young British Muslims integrate and contribute positively to society. Britain scores higher than other European countries for acceptance of Muslims. But:

- Some feel they cannot be both British and Muslim; and polls suggest a small but significant minority are sympathetic to extremism and terrorist activity;
- Extremist groups in the UK actively recruit young Muslims;
- Small numbers of young British Muslims have engaged in terrorism, both at home and abroad.

There is no simple cause and effect and we must avoid generalising. We need to *understand better* the causes and extent of extremism, and the nature of links between extremism and terrorism. A strong Muslim identity and strict adherence to traditional Muslim teachings are not in themselves problematic or incompatible with Britishness. Factors which may attract some to extremism include:

- *Anger*: a perception of "double standards" in British foreign policy, where democracy is preached but oppression of the 'Ummah' (the one nation of believers) is practised or tolerated e.g. in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya; a consequent sense of helplessness over the situation of Muslims generally; the lack of any real opportunities to vent frustration. The following quote by a young British Muslim leader best demonstrates the link between extremism/terrorism amongst young British Muslims and foreign policy issues. *"What is needed is a debate about the root cause of terrorism, which is our country's foreign policy." As part of a truly globalised community, many young British Muslims carry the burden of struggles elsewhere - Palestine, Iraq and Kashmir.* (Quote from Osama Saeed-Muslim Association of Britain, The Observer- 4th April 2004).
- *Alienation*: the struggle to reconcile a modern Islamic identity with modern secular challenges; a general lack of young Muslim participation in mainstream politics and public life; Islamophobia and ignorance about Islam in British society and the media creating alienation, including among educated professionals; a perception that counter-terrorism powers are targeted at Muslims.
- *Activism*: a proactive desire to forge an alternative Islamic identity to that of parents but often without an underpinning knowledge of Islam, disillusionment with 'sell-out' mainstream Muslim organisations; a desire for simple 'Islamic'

solutions; the search for practical goals and a purpose in life, the need to belong: all driving vulnerable youngsters in unpredictable directions.

A number of extremist groups are *actively recruiting* young British Muslims.' Most do not advocate violence. But they can provide an environment for some to gravitate to violence. Extremists target poor and disadvantaged Muslims, including through mosque and prison contact. But they also target middle class students and affluent professionals through schools and college campuses. Others get recruited through personal contact, often by chance, and maintain a low profile for operational purposes.

The Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, which make up nearly two thirds of Muslims in the UK, experience very high levels of economic and educational disadvantage. Overall, Muslims have unemployment three times above the wider population, poor qualifications (over two fifths have none) and high representation in deprived areas.

Points of Action:

There is work being conducted in this area of engagement by the FCO and Home Office (see attached paper- part II –Action).

But to have the required impact, further action will need to be fundamentally cross-governmental (and not just Home Office and FCO), and properly costed and resourced. This requires further consideration, but subject to that the following represent key actions, which will assist in tackling extremism among Muslim youth.

Improving our understanding of the extent and causes of extremism among young Muslims

1. Conduct focus groups with young Muslims, exploring their views on key aspects of foreign and domestic policy, interpretations of Islam, and the compatibility of being British and Muslim. Focus groups to be drawn from a range of educational, economic and ethnic backgrounds.
2. In light of focus groups, if needed, commission a more detailed and scientific study of Muslim opinions and experiences, to include older generations and some comparison with other faith groups to put the views of Muslims in context.
3. Commission from the police service a survey of disaffection and extremist activity in schools and colleges in key selected areas.
4. Role of the National Community Tensions Team in helping Government to remain informed about levels of disaffection and extremism.

Combating the recruitment of young British Muslims by terrorist organisations

1. Undertake research to extensively map the "Terrorist Career Path", including changes in opinions held, changes in associates or membership of organisations,

and specific actions taken by individuals on the path from law-abiding citizen to terrorist.

2. On the basis of this research, develop a comprehensive Interventions Strategy, to enable us to intervene at key trigger points to prevent young Muslims from becoming drawn into extremist and terrorist activity and action.
3. Our work in this area will be focussed on finding local community based interventions, with support for faith, voluntary and community organisations from GOs, local authorities and central government as appropriate.

Combating Islamophobia

1. Prepare and circulate to Departments advice on Muslim sensitivities and appropriate non-inflammatory terminology to be used in referring to Muslim issues.
2. Prepare communications plan aimed at combating distorted public and media perceptions of Islam and Muslims. Collaboration on this with moderate Muslim bodies, including student bodies, will further assist Government/Muslim relations.
3. Build capacity amongst information services like MCB Direct, in providing accurate representation for mainstream Islam (i.e. representatives and experts) in the mainstream media.
4. Encourage, assist and promote mainstream Muslim communication channels, i.e. radio stations, newspapers aimed at British Muslims, and television channels. Many of these are set up during a fixed time of the year (Ramadhan), and do not have the capacity to run a full-time set-up. This is what HMG has promoted in the Islamic world. That expertise can be utilised domestically.

Dialogue with young Muslims and building leadership capacity

1. Projection of British Muslim youth as role models for overseas audiences (e.g. sending delegations of British Muslim youth to 'represent' Britain, signalling UK's pride in its Muslim youth.), and encouraging young moderate Muslims to become spokespersons for foreign media e.g. digital television.
2. Expand and deepen dialogue with young Muslims on non-traditional foreign policy areas of concern to Muslims, e.g. development (follow-up to UNDP Arab Development Report), globalisation, human rights, etc.
3. European dimension. Enable British Muslim youth to discuss mainstream/European Islam with EU counterparts, as well as how to tackle extremism internally within the European Muslim community.
4. Encourage Muslim youth to take part in local and national youth parliaments (the Bradford Youth Parliament recently visited by Mr O'Brien being a successful model of Muslim teenagers taking part in wider political engagement).

5. Strengthen the hand of moderate student and youth organisations (such as the UMS and FOSIS), and of moderates within such organisations, by:
 - continuing to offer Ministerial speakers for meetings and debates on foreign and domestic issues of concern to Muslims.
 - inviting moderate Muslim youth representatives to participate in consultative discussions with departments on specific issues.
6. Audit government and other publicly funded community capacity building funding to assess the extent to which funds are reaching Muslim organisations and especially those for young Muslims. If necessary, advise Ministers on ways of channelling more funding to this need.

Reaching out to underachievers

1. Work with DfES, DWP and DWP to address Muslim disadvantage and reduce social exclusion
2. Ongoing work with the Prison Service to develop a programme of measures to ensure young British Muslims do not leave prisons alienated and radicalised, and holding extremist views.

Responding to Muslim concerns about the use of anti-terrorist powers

1. Identify key individuals preaching extremism and recruiting to the cause and take necessary enforcement action
2. Ensure arrests and searches under the new powers are evidence-based, intelligence-led and proportionate
3. Engage Muslim community in a dialogue over the use of the powers
4. Provide feedback to Muslim community on reasons for, and outcomes of, arrests and searches under the new powers

Responding to other Muslim concerns

Show that HMG is addressing Muslim concerns, including youth concerns, by:

1. highlighting consular assistance given to British Muslim students/youth in legal difficulty abroad including those accused of affiliation to extremist bodies (e.g. the HT students in Egypt) and in relation to the Hajj, to dispel the claim of double standards
2. reviewing the scope for meeting Muslim concerns identified during public seminars with mosque representatives earlier this year, and publicising any resulting changes in policy. (Issues include family law, animal slaughter and faith in education.)

3. raising awareness among young Muslims of the current and forthcoming legal protections against religiously aggravated offences and religious discrimination in employment
4. making pump priming funding available to the Muslim Safety Forum

Promoting mainstream Islam

1. Bring about the development and provision of subsidised training, upskilling and qualifications for home-grown Islamic faith leaders. Training to focus on pastoral, community leadership and management skills. Action in hand, by Learning and Skills Council and Home Office (with FCO involvement). Subsequent roll-out of LSC-subsidised courses.
2. Raise the standards required from ministers of religion including Imams seeking admission and extension of stay. Package to include immediate English language requirement. Religious qualification requirements and civic engagement tests to follow after consultation, in stages during 2004/5.
3. Assist mainstream organisations to promote the many UK-based courses on Arabic and theology, taking away the need for Muslim youth to travel to seminaries in the Islamic world, many of which preach extremist doctrines. Encourage mainstream organisations to put their material on the web.
4. Seek opportunities through Government engagement and recognition, to promote awareness of moderate scholars with followings amongst young Muslims, such as Imam Hamza Yusuf and Imam Suhaib Webb.
5. Strengthen moderate Muslim media organisations (radio stations and publications, such as MCB Direct, e.g. by giving them stories and interviews.

Remedying the exclusion of Muslims from public life

More work is needed on promoting Muslim representation in public life. Any feeling that Muslim voices are not heard in places of influence is helpful to extremism. The Home Office should consider what more could be done, and report conclusions.

Briefing on British Muslims: socio-economic data and attitudes (updated)

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Executive summary

Socio-economic data from the census and the 2000 Index of Multiple deprivation reveals significant levels of disadvantage experienced by the Muslim community. Reliable survey data covering Muslims from the Home Office Citizenship Survey 2001 contains some positive messages: strong faith identity and satisfaction with government action to protect people belonging to religions. But it also shows low levels of participation and volunteering. Less reliable (*indicative*) data from opinion polls conducted amongst Muslims contains mixed messages: strong opposition to terrorism and loyalty to Britain but strong disapproval of foreign policy and significant concern about discrimination.

Two important caveats need to be borne in mind throughout. Firstly, whilst the data does reveal disadvantage and issues of concern amongst Muslims, it **does not prove any association between disadvantage and 'disaffection' or 'extremism'**. If participation is used as a proxy for engagement then the finding that Muslims have low levels of participation is unremarkable, since this is common to other minority faith groups.

Secondly, with the exception of faith identity, the data **does not show** that faith is itself strongly associated with socio-economic outcomes or attitudes. In other words, whilst the data shows Muslims experience high deprivation, it does not show that this is because of their faith. Other factors might be more relevant (e.g. education, class and ethnicity).

Key messages from three main sections

1. Socio-economic statistics

Economic activity: Muslims occupy the most disadvantaged position in the labour market compared with other groups. Compared with the population as a whole, the unemployment rate for Muslims is around three times higher. Economic inactivity rates are higher and economic activity rates are lower. (*Census 2001*)

Qualifications: Muslims are over-represented at the bottom of the qualifications rankings. Over two fifths have no qualifications. (*Census 2001*)

Deprivation: Muslims are over-represented in local authority areas that are deprived. The most deprived areas have a disproportionately higher concentration of Muslims. The association between deprivation and Muslim residency is strong. (*IMD and Census 2001*)

2. Home Office Citizenship Survey 2001: Religion Report

Identity: For Muslims the role of faith for self-identity ranked second only to family. This was also the case for other minority faiths. The importance of faith to self-identity is particularly strong amongst younger people. Nearly three quarters of young Muslims viewed religion as important to their identity, along with almost two thirds of Sikhs and Hindus.

Religious discrimination: The majority of all faith groups were satisfied with government and employer action to protect rights of people belonging to religions. But a significant minority of Muslims, and especially young Muslims were not satisfied.

Active citizenship: Participation of Muslims is around three quarters the rate of all faith communities as a whole. Young Muslims are least likely to participate, compared with all faith groups. Muslims are least likely of all faith groups to engage in volunteering.

3. Opinion polls of Muslims

Attitudes: High rate of condemnation of September 11 attacks; strong disapproval of war in Afghanistan and concern for Muslim countries; strong support for ban on religious discrimination; widely loyal to Britain; mixed views on citizenship issues.

1. Socio-economic data

Data From the Census 2001

1.1 Economic activity

Note: this data does not imply a causal link between faith and disadvantage

Muslims occupy the most disadvantaged position in the labour market compared with other groups. Compared with the population as a whole, the unemployment rate for Muslims is around three times higher. Economic inactivity rates are higher and economic activity rates are lower.

- The unemployment rate¹ of Muslims is more than three times that of the population as a whole and is the highest of all faith groups. 14.6% of economically active Muslims were unemployed compared with 5% for the population as a whole.
 - Muslims have the lowest rate of economic activity² of all faith groups – around half of Muslims (48%) are economically active compared with around two-thirds the population as a whole (66.5%).
 - Around half of Muslims are economically inactive (52%). This is higher than that for any other group and is over one and a half times the rate for the population as a whole (33.5%).
 - 16% of Muslims have never worked or are long-term unemployed – more than five times the rate for the population as a whole
- Note: this data concerns men and women. The situation for Muslim women will be significantly different.*

	Unemployed	Economically active	Economically inactive
ALL PEOPLE (aged 16-74)	5.0	66.5	33.5
Muslim	14.6	48.3	51.7
Any other religion	8.4	67.8	32.2
Buddhist	7.9	63.0	37.0
Sikh	6.9	66.2	33.8
Religion not stated	6.4	65.0	35.0
No religion	6.1	75.2	24.8
Hindu	5.4	66.9	33.1
Christian	4.3	65.5	34.5
Jewish	3.8	66.1	33.9

¹ Those unemployed as a proportion of the economically active population

² Defined as aged 16-74, based on census data availability

1.2 Qualifications

Note: this data does not imply a causal link between faith and disadvantage

Muslims are over-represented at the bottom of the qualifications rankings. Over two fifths have no qualifications.

- 43% of Muslims don't have a (recognised) educational qualification. This is the highest rate of all faith groups and compares with 36% of all people.
- After Christians (17.5%) Muslims were least likely to have higher qualifications (20.6%).

	No qualifications or level unknown ³	Lower level qualifications ⁴	Higher level qualifications ⁵
ALL PEOPLE (16-74)	36.0	44.2	19.8
Muslim	43.1	36.3	20.6
Christian	38.8	43.7	17.5
Sikh	36.1	41.0	22.9
Religion not stated	35.9	43.0	21.1
Buddhist	26.5	34.1	39.4
Hindu	26.5	39.1	34.4
No religion	23.5	49.4	27.1
Jewish	23.0	41.2	35.8
Any other religion	20.4	46.5	33.1

³ The term 'no qualifications' describes people without any academic, vocational or professional qualifications.

⁴ The term 'lower level' qualifications is used to describe qualifications equivalent to levels 1 – 3 of the National Key Learning targets (i.e. GCSE's, 'O' levels, 'A' levels NVQ levels 1 – 3).

⁵ The term 'higher level' refers to qualifications of levels 4 and above (i.e. first degrees, higher degrees, NVQ levels 4 and 5, HND, HNC and certain professional qualifications).


1.3 Deprivation

Data from the 2000 Index of Multiple Deprivation.

Note: this data does not imply a causal link between faith and disadvantage

Muslims are over-represented in local authority areas that are deprived. The most deprived areas have a disproportionately higher concentration of Muslims. The link between deprivation and Muslim residency is strong.

- Around three and a half times as many Muslims live in the 10 most deprived local authority areas compared with the population as a whole (15% of Muslims compared with 4.4% of the population as a whole (see table 2, annex)
- Over a third of Muslims (35%) live in the most deprived 10% of local authority areas (35 districts). This is more than twice the concentration compared with the population as a whole (15%).
- More Muslims live in deprived local authority areas than in non-deprived areas. Over half of Muslims (57%) live in the most deprived 20% of local authority areas. This compares with 28% for the population as a whole.
- Nearly two-thirds of Muslims (65%) live in the most deprived 25% of local authority areas. Amongst the population as a whole the proportion that live in the same local authority areas is around a third (34%).



2. Home Office Citizenship Survey data

2.1 Identity

For Muslims the role of faith for self-identity ranked second only to family. This was also the case for other minority faiths. The importance of faith to self-identity is particularly strong amongst younger people. Nearly three quarters of young Muslims viewed religion as important to their identity, along with almost two thirds of Sikhs and Hindus.

The importance of religion as a part of people's self-identity varies by faith group. For Muslim, Hindu and Sikh respondents religion was ranked according to frequency of being reported second only after family. Amongst Christians (and for all faith groups) it ranked seventh – almost mid-way in the ranking out of 15 possible factors.

There are other variations within this. For example, of 16 to 24 year olds the largest proportions who reported religion as important to their self-identity were Muslims (74%), Sikhs (63%) and Hindus (62%). This compares with much smaller proportion of Christians of the same age (18%). Similarly amongst 25 to 49 year olds and amongst those aged 50 and over, the largest proportion reporting religion as important to identity were Muslims and Sikhs.

Variations also exist by ethnicity and multivariate analysis indicates the difficulty with untangling whether religion or ethnicity is more strongly associated with this perception. When all personal characteristics are taken into consideration religion was more likely to be important for people from minority ethnic groups than for the majority population.

Top ten things that would say something important about the respondents by faith community						
Rank	Christian	Muslim	Hindu	Sikh	Jewish	Buddhist
1	Family	Family	Family	Family	Religion	Work
2	Work	Religion	Religion	Religion	Family	Family
3	Age/Life-stage	Ethnicity/culture	Ethnicity/culture	Ethnicity/culture	Education	Religion
4	Interests	Education	Work	Work	Work	Interests
5	Education	Country of origin	Education	Education	Interests	Age/life-stage
6	Nationality	Age/lifestage	Nationality	Country of origin	Ethnicity/culture	Nationality
7	Religion	Nationality	Age/life-stage	Age/life-stage	Age/life-stage	Education
8	Gender	Work	Country of origin	Nationality	Income	Gender
9	Income	Interests	Interests	Gender	Gender	Country of origin
10	Social class	Skin colour	Skin colour	Social class	Social class	Culture

2.2 Religious discrimination

Note: this data does not imply a causal link between faith and attitudes

The majority of all faith groups were satisfied with government and employer action to protect rights of people belonging to religions. But a significant minority of Muslims, and especially young Muslims were not satisfied.

Government

Around three fifths of Muslim respondents (62%) thought the government was doing about the *right amount* to protect the rights of people belonging to religions. This is the same proportion as Sikhs and but lower than Hindus (70%) and higher than Christians (53%). Of respondents who thought government was doing *too little* the largest proportion were Muslims and Buddhists.

Perceptions varied by age. Three fifths of Muslims (61%) aged 16-24 thought the government was doing the *right amount*. This is the highest of all faith groups. However, respondents in this age group were more likely than people other age groups to think government was doing *too little*, including the majority of Sikhs (56%), and around two fifths of Christians, Hindus (both 39%) and Muslims (37%).

The amount the government is doing to protect the rights of people belonging to religions broken down by age and faith community

Age group		No religious affiliation	All faith communities	Christian	Muslim	Hindu	Sikh	All
16 to 24	Too little	36%	40%	39%	37%	39%	56%	38%
	Right amount	50%	55%	55%	61%	57%	44%	53%
	Too much	14%	6%	6%	3%	4%		8%
	Respondents:	294	1,146	526	435	93	65	1,440
25 to 49	Too little	21%	25%	24%	32%	21%	26%	23%
	Right amount	53%	56%	56%	62%	76%	68%	54%
	Too much	26%	19%	20%	5%	3%	6%	21%
	Respondents:	1,035	5,150	3,270	1,168	376	189	6,185
50 years and older	Too little	19%	27%	33%	32%	25%	23%	26%
	Right amount	56%	51%	33%	65%	66%	69%	52%
	Too much	25%	22%	33%	3%	9%	8%	22%
	Respondents:	456	4,250	3,622	274	208	73	4,706

The findings for respondents affiliated to Jewish and Buddhist faith communities were omitted from the table because the number of cases was too small for statistical analysis.

Employers

Respondents were more critical about the extent to which employers were supportive of religious customs and practices. Around a third of Muslims (36%) thought employers were doing *too little*. This is around the same as the overall rate for all faith communities but lower than Hindus (39%) and Sikhs (41%).

The profile of respondents who thought that employers were doing too little by faith community

	No religious affiliation	All faith communities	Christian	Muslim	Hindu	Sikh	All
Male	35%	35%	35%	33%	35%	41%	35%
Female	41%	38%	38%	40%	42%	40%	39%
Male respondents:	913	4,296	2,897	860	305	140	5,209
Female respondents:	801	5,198	3,801	797	308	163	5,999

2.3 Active citizenship

Note: this data does not imply a causal link between faith and attitudes

Participation of Muslims is around three quarters the rate of all faith communities as a whole. Young Muslims are least likely to participate, compared with all faith groups. Muslims are least likely of all faith groups to engage in volunteering.

Civic participation

Around one in three (30%) of Muslims had engaged in some form of civic activity in the 12 months prior to the survey⁶. This is lower than the overall total for all faith communities (39%) but higher only than Hindus (23%) and Sikhs (28%).

When examined by age Muslims aged 16 to 24 were least likely to have participated (24%) compared with the total for other faiths in this age group (29%). Those aged 25 to 49 were the most active (32%) age group amongst Muslims.

Participated in a civic activity in last 12 months by age and religious affiliation							
		No religion	Christian	Hindu	Muslim	Sikh	Total
16-24 year olds	Yes	29	30	31	24	32	29
	No	71	70	69	76	68	71
	Respondents 16 to 24	408	664	105	517	74	1,797
25-49 year olds	Yes	43	41	22	32	30	41
	No	57	59	78	68	70	59
	Respondents 25 to 49	1,378	4,061	440	1,346	219	7,624
50 + years old	Yes	45	38	18	27	25	39
	No	55	62	82	73	75	61
	Respondents 50+	593	4,541	232	332	95	5,873

Volunteering

Muslims were least likely to volunteer. Over half of Muslims engaged in informal volunteering (54%) but this is the lowest rate of all faith groups (overall total 67%). Similarly around a third (30%) of Muslims volunteered formally compared with two fifths of all faith groups as a whole (39%).

Analysis suggests that religion combined with ethnicity was not strongly associated with participation in volunteering for all groups (with the exception of respondents who were Black or mixed race and Christian). Education, occupational status and age were the engagement in formal volunteering.

⁶ Defined as participation in at least one of the following in the 12 months prior to the survey: signing a petition, contacting a local councillor or official from the council, attending public meetings or rallies, signing a petition, contacting an MP, taking part in a public demonstration or protest, contacting a public official from central government.

3. Attitudinal data – opinion polls

Note: this data does not imply a causal link between faith and attitudes

Between November 2001 and March 2004 it is possible to identify six surveys which have examined the attitudes of British **Muslims** across various topics emerging from the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Several caveats (in addition to the note above) need to be borne in mind when using this data. Firstly, the surveys vary in quality and reliability, so **results must be interpreted with great caution**. Secondly, due to methods used the data should be treated as *indicative* of British Muslims' opinion, not *representative* of it. Thirdly, there is no comparative context to enable us to compare Muslim responses with those of other groups and understand the findings in this wider context. Finally, since questions asked were different in each survey (even when covering the same topic) strict comparison between the surveys is not possible.

With these important caveats in mind, overall, it is possible to identify broad and tentative messages across five main themes where the surveys asked similar questions.

Terrorism

Attitudes towards September 11 attacks

Between 7-15% thought the September 11 attacks were justified but a much greater proportion – between 67-85% – thought they were not justified

Poll	Justified %	Not justified %	Others (incl. d/k) %
Eastern Eye MORI Nov 2001	7 ⁷	67	13 Not v much, 13 others
BBC ICM Nov 2001	15 ⁸	81	4
Telegraph YouGov Dec.2002	8	85	7

Attitudes towards further terrorist attacks

Between 7-13% thought further terrorist attacks would be justified but a much greater proportion – between 67-85% – thought though they would not be justified

Poll	Justified %	Not justified %	Others (incl. d/k) %
Eastern Eye MORI Nov 2001	7	67	26
BBC ICM Dec 2002 (against USA)	11	79	10
BBC ICM Dec 2002 (against Britain)	8	85	7
Guardian ICM March 2004 (against USA)	13	73	15

Justified on grounds that Muslims are being killed by America BBC ICM Dec 2002	44	46	9
--	----	----	---

Whether war on terror is not a war against Islam

20-34% agree that the war on terror is not a war against Islam but 57-70% disagree

Poll	Agree %	Disagree %	Others % (incl. d/k)
BBC ICM Nov 2001	34	57	9
BBC ICM Dec 2002	20	70	10

⁷ Includes Great deal + fair amount. Further 13% replied not very much

⁸ Includes Completely + somewhat justified

Foreign Policy**Attitudes towards the Afghan war**

Between 12-20% had favourable views towards the Afghan war. Between 64-80% opposed it. There only poll on the Iraq war shows 10% in favour and 80% opposed.

Poll	Favourable %	Unfavourable %	Others (incl. d/k) %
Eastern Eye MORI Nov 2001	20	64	16
BBC ICM Nov 2001	14	80	6
Guardian ICM June 2002	19	66	15
BBC ICM Dec 2002	12	76	12

Eastern Eye MORI Nov 2001 Whether wrong to try to bring down Taliban regime	33	42	26
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Attitudes towards Iraq war

Poll	Favourable %	Unfavourable %	Others (incl. d/k) %
Guardian ICM March 2004	10	80	10

Discrimination and race relations**Whether relations between Muslims and non-Muslims have got worse because of Sep 11**

Between 3-10% thought relations between Muslims and non-Muslims have got better as a result of September 11; between 27-36% thought there had been no change and 48-66% thought relations had got worse.

Poll	Better %	Same %	Worse %	Others (inc. d/k) %
Eastern Eye MORI Nov 2001	3	34	57	9
Guardian ICM June 2002	6	27	61	5
BBC ICM Dec 2002	10	36	48	6
Telegraph YouGov Dec 2002	4	30	66	
Guardian ICM March 2004 (since Iraq war)	6	34	55	5

Whether experienced hostility due to religion/result of Sep 11

Between 30-35% had experienced hostility based on religion as a result of September 11; between 65-70% had not.

Poll	Yes %	No %	Others (incl. d/k) %
BBC ICM Nov 2001	30	70	
Guardian ICM June 2002	35	65	
Guardian ICM March 2004	33	67	

Loyalty**Whether feel loyal to Britain**

Between 67-87% feel very or fairly loyal/patriotic towards Britain and between 8-26% feel not very or not at all loyal/patriotic.

Poll	Yes %	No %	Others (incl. d/knows) %
Eastern Eye MORI Nov 2001	87 ⁹	8 ¹⁰	5
BBC ICM Dec 2002 (how patriotic do you feel)	67 ¹¹	26 ¹²	6
Telegraph YouGov Dec 2002	75 ¹³	19 ¹⁴	6

Whether ok to fight with Taliban

Between 15-24% thought it was ok for British Muslims to fight with the Taliban; 62% disagreed.

Poll	Yes %	No %	Others (incl. d/knows) %
Eastern Eye MORI Nov 2001	15	62	22
BBC ICM Nov 2001	24	62	13

Citizenship**Whether Muslims need to integrate more**

Between 33-41% thought Muslims need to do more to integrate; between 28-33% thought they had got it about right and between 17-26% thought Muslims had integrated too much already.

Poll	Yes %	About right	No %	Others (incl. d/knows) %
Guardian ICM June 2002	41	33	17	9
Guardian ICM March 2004	33	28	26	13

Mohibur Rahman
Communities Research – Race Relations
RDS, Home Office.
November 2003
Updated March 2004

⁹ Includes very loyal + fairly loyal

¹⁰ Includes not very loyal + not at all loyal

¹¹ Includes very patriotic + fairly patriotic

¹² Includes not very patriotic + not at all patriotic

¹³ Includes very loyal + fairly loyal

¹⁴ Includes not very loyal + not at all loyal

① Bex - follow up numbers
idc.

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From the Private Secretary

Sir Hayden Phillips
Department for Constitutional Affairs

06 May 2004

Dear Hayden

RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Andrew recently wrote to a number of you on the issue of relations with the Muslim community. This followed a Cabinet discussion on terrorism. Ministers focused on the need to encourage moderate Muslim opinion to the detriment of extremism both at home and overseas and the extent to which a sense of isolation and dissatisfaction within parts of the Muslim community is leading to acts of terrorism. As you know the same subject came up at one of the Wednesday Morning Meetings.

I would like to invite you and all Wednesday Morning colleagues to a further discussion on this issue which is scheduled for May 19, 08:30 – 10:00 (we have laid on a Cabinet Office no expense spared breakfast to attract attendees). Could you please let Rebecca know if you will be attending to make sure we have enough food to go around.

An agenda and any other papers will follow in due course.

I am copying this letter to all Wednesday Morning colleagues.

Sue

Sue Pither
Private Secretary



INVESTOR IN PEOPLE

Ref: AO2004/568



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Work and Pensions

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Restricted - Policy

Sir Andrew Turnbull KCB CVO
Secretary of the Cabinet and
Head of the Home Civil Service

20 April 2004

Dear Andrew

RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Thank you for your letter of 6 April.

I welcome the opportunity to discuss this important issue, on which DWP is very keen to be involved. We think we have plenty to contribute, especially since the setting up of the cross-government Ethnic Minority Employment Division in our Work, Welfare and Poverty Directorate overseen by the Ministerial Task Force on which Ministers in a number of Departments to whom you have sent your letter are represented.

In response to your request for analysis and views in advance of the meeting, I attach a note on employment and poverty issues, for which I am indebted to Jonathan Portes here, covering an as yet unpublished paper by a policy analyst currently working for us which casts particularly interesting insight into some of the issues raised in your letter.

I am copying this letter and attachments to the recipients of yours.

Yours ever

Michael Richardson

Andrew Turnbull's letter points out that "parts of the Muslim community, particularly younger men, are disaffected. This includes some that are well educated with good economic prospects." This statement is undoubtedly correct. However, it could be taken as implying that discrimination and poverty are not serious problems; that addressing them would not make a major contribution to reducing disaffection; and that disaffection must be caused by other factors. This would be a very serious mistake. History shows clearly that, within communities that are excluded economically and/or socially, the "troublemakers" are precisely those who are relatively well-off and relatively well-educated, but who feel that despite this society still treats them as outsiders (this was, for example, a persistent phenomenon throughout the Afro-American experience in the US). They are thus both inclined to, and capable of, pursuing a wider political agenda (which may be either positive or negative!). The key to engaging this group in a positive way is obviously, by reducing discrimination and promoting integration, to ensure that they become insiders and feel they have a stake in the wider society.

But this will be difficult or impossible while the majority of the Muslim community in the UK has to deal with serious issues of economic and social exclusion, aggravated by discrimination and worse. As Ted Cattle's report on the disturbances in some Northern towns pointed out, disaffection in these areas was very much related to persistent inequalities in housing, employment and so on, and the perceived failure of government policies to make any significant difference. And several years later, there is still not much evidence that much has changed. Clearly, we need to develop a more inclusive and integrated agenda but before we can do that we also need to show our commitment to addressing current inequalities.

In DWP's particular areas of interest, employment and poverty, inequality remains both large and persistent. A draft paper is attached, produced for the Open Society Institute (OSI) by Zamila Bunglawala, a policy analyst now working in our Ethnic Minority Employment Division. The paper is an OSI rather than government project, and does not represent DWP policy, although we broadly share the analysis. It is not for quotation or further distribution at this stage. It shows very clearly the scale of the challenge in this area, and the need for a considerably more proactive policy agenda.

One issue which is not mentioned in Andrew Turnbull's letter, but needs to be considered seriously, is that of gender and the role of women. As Zamila's paper shows, labour market participation for Muslim women is extremely low. But we have ample economic and research evidence to show that it is a myth that Muslim women "don't want" to work, because "it's not their culture". Muslim women do face particular barriers to entering the labour force, but – particularly given the influence of female labour force participation on family incomes and child outcomes – there is a strong economic and social case for making addressing those barriers a high priority.

Finally, an important general point is that we should avoid thinking or talking about this as if it were a "Muslim problem". It is our problem. Most of the discussion in your letter is about what government on the one hand, and the Muslim community on the other, can do. This is important – and there is much good work going on in Muslim communities already – but it is not enough. If we are to end discrimination, and promote integration and social inclusion, we will need to engage not only Muslims but the rest of society. This will involve some quite challenging messages for all sides.

**British Muslims and Employment
Executive Summary**

**Open Society Institute
Zamila Bunglawala**

- Muslims currently make up 3 per cent of the UK population. Between 1999 and 2009, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis who make up two-thirds of the **Muslim population will account for a quarter of the growth in the working-age population.**
- The challenge for Government, employers and Muslims themselves is to ensure their skills, talent and overall labour market integration is maximised for the benefit of the economy and society
- There are variations in the labour market achievements of different ethnic Muslims groups, but **all face disadvantage across all economic indicators**, and are therefore not doing as well as they should be when compared to all other ethnic and religious groups (the degree to which this multiple disadvantage can be explained by race and religion factors has yet to be researched). It is acknowledged however, that the Muslim community must also take ownership of the need to integrate into the mainstream labour market system
- This **disproportionate level of multiple disadvantage is faced by Muslims across the UK, there is no geographic specific difference**
- Indian Muslims are, on average, doing well in schools and in the labour market. However, they are doing less well when compared to Indian Hindus. Indian Muslims make up 9 per cent of the UK Muslim population
- Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims experience significantly higher unemployment, under-employment, low earnings and overall disadvantage than all other religious and ethnic groups. They disproportionately live in the most disadvantaged wards of the UK where delivery of almost all public services is poor. They make up 65 per cent of the UK Muslim population
- Muslims who are in employment are disproportionately represented in a narrow range of low-pay industries and self-employment. Over half of male Bangladeshi Muslims in employment work in the restaurant industry (compared with only one per cent of Whites). One in eight male Pakistani Muslims is a taxi driver
- **Muslims are three times more likely than the majority Christian group to be unemployed. Over half of Muslims are economically inactive**, compared to a third of all other religious groups
- All ethnic minority groups represent a higher proportion of the population who have never worked or are long-term unemployed. This is disproportionately true of Muslims at 17 per cent, compared to 3 per cent of the overall population
- **Over 50 per cent of Muslim women are not in employment.** This represents the lowest employment level amongst all groups. They are the largest workless ethnic group representing 17 per cent of all non-employed ethnic minorities. Islamic law does not restrict a Muslim woman's right to work

- Parental worklessness has a direct long-term effect upon childhood poverty. In London, where over 40 per cent of the UK's Muslim population live, Pakistani and Bangladeshi **Muslims have the highest level of children in workless households, at 30-40 per cent, compared to 11 per cent of their White counterparts**
- Muslims represent a very high proportion of the younger age cohort, **90 per cent of Muslims are aged under 50** and almost twice as many Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims are under 16, compared to their White counterparts
- Under-utilisation of their skills will not only have economic costs but also potential threats to social cohesion. The Bradford, Oldham and Burnley disturbances were, in part, a reflection of Muslim youth unrest due to a failure by policy and service delivery to meet their needs
- Increasing concerns of social exclusion and crime are surfacing with some young **Muslim males resorting to drugs and gang culture**
- Reasons for this level of multiple disadvantage is therefore complex ranging from gaps in mainstream employment and employer policy, poor service delivery disproportionately affecting Muslims, a lack of Muslim friendly work environments leading to unemployment of ethnic and **religious discrimination**, underemployment and social exclusion.
- **Policy must recognise and respond proactively to the demographic change in the working-age population and to this gap in current policy measures**
- **Policy must aim to integrate Muslims, men and women, into the mainstream labour market through local and national initiatives**
- **Initiatives must be delivered with flexibility by local institutions on the ground in the most deprived areas where Muslims, amongst other disadvantaged groups live**
- Successful labour market integration, retention and progression is possible through combined mainstream policies on education, employment and access to services such as childcare. Policy needs to ensure delivery of these mainstream services is standardised across the most affluent areas and the most disadvantaged areas of the UK, where Muslims disproportionately live
- Policy measures will all within three categories:
 - Socio-economic; where acknowledging the importance of religion will be crucial in understanding the current position of Muslims
 - Improved delivery; recognising the current lack of understanding and/or prejudice by others to deliver more religious and culturally sensitive services
 - Muslim specific; which will be ownership and integration by the Muslim community itself, such as recognising the current gap in employment by Muslim women
- Muslim specific policy measures will be necessary in some areas such as ensuring workplaces are 'Muslim friendly' and do not fall foul of the recent law of religious discrimination preferably through the use of intermediaries and Muslim organisations, such as MCB

- Employment for Muslim women will require sensitivity and cultural understanding of family structures and ethnicity
- Positive Action measures to redress the imbalance between Muslim employment levels and all other ethnic and religious groups will need to be more widely available
- In-work support will be necessary to facilitate employment progression
- Muslim communities themselves will have to accept ownership of this labour market integration agenda but to do so successfully they will need to be shown direct benefit through successful employment outcomes commensurate to their skills
- **The benefits of improved labour market outcomes through economic integration for Muslims are greater than financial, economic integration facilitates long-term social and civic integration**

**Sir Andrew Turnbull KCB CVO**Secretary of the Cabinet and
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SW1A 2AS**Telephone** 020 7270 0101**Fax** 020 7270 0208**E-mail** psturnbull@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk**Web** www.cabinet-office.gov.ukJohn Gieve CB
Home Office

06 April 2004

RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Cabinet recently discussed relations between the Muslim and other communities here in the UK. In a discussion on terrorism, Ministers focussed on the need to encourage moderate Muslim opinion to the detriment of extremism both at home and overseas, and the extent to which a sense of isolation and disaffection within parts of the Muslim community is leading to acts of terrorism. The same subject came up at one of our Wednesday morning meetings. I would like to invite you and other recipients of this letter to a further discussion, using this letter as an agenda. Relevant analysis and suggested answers to some of the questions posed below would be welcome in advance.

1. The problem

There is a feeling that parts of the Muslim community, particularly younger men, are disaffected. This includes some that are well educated with good economic prospects. Al Qaida and its off-shoots provide a dramatic pole of attraction for the most disaffected.

The first pillar of the government's counter terrorism strategy, CONTEST, is prevention. The aim is to prevent terrorism by tackling its underlying causes, to work together to resolve regional conflicts to support moderate Islam and reform, and to diminish support for terrorists by influencing relevant social and economic issues. Clearly this is a wide agenda, and reflects the need expressed in Cabinet for all departments to contribute towards the CONTEST objective.

- What do we mean by disaffection, what is the evidence and how widespread is it?
- Are the issues primarily social or cultural or economic or a mixture?
- Is the issue primarily disaffection with other communities, particularly the majority community, or is it also disaffection with the conventional leadership and established traditions of the Muslim community?
- How far is the phenomenon just the natural tendency of second or third generation migrants to revisit their roots?



RESTRICTED - POLICY

- How far are the drivers domestic and how far international?
- How far do they affect only parts of the Muslim community and how far do they impact on other communities too?
- Is the primary concern the risk of involvement by a few people in terrorist activity, the risk of inter-community conflict or any wider concerns?

2. Possible responses

Without being clear about the nature of the problem one can only tentatively identify possible responses in general terms.

- i. Research – is more needed to be clearer about the nature of the problem and the potential effectiveness of responses? Are we tapping into all external research? Have the lessons of previous problems been learnt?
- ii. Communication – are we listening enough to the Muslim communities (here and overseas) and understanding what we hear (even where we do not agree with it). Are we communicating the right messages to the right parts of the Muslim community effectively? If not how can we do better? Equally are we communicating the right messages – positive and negative (in relation to a small minority) - about the Muslim community to others?
- iii. Economic opportunity – are programmes to ensure economic opportunity for all parts of the Muslim community adequate? If they were given higher priority how would that be achieved without a negative reaction from 'losers'? Should programmes be targeted specifically at the Muslim community or be 'ethnically blind'? Are there lessons to be learnt from the response to alienation of the afro-carribean community in the 1980s?
- iv. Social and cultural issues – is the only response better communication? Is the full range of Government policy and provision of public services sufficiently sensitive to the social and cultural position?
- v. Migration controls – are these helping as much as they should?
- vi. Criminal Justice (and anti-social behaviour) – the balance between effectiveness and alienation?
- vii. What is the impact of single faith schools?
- viii. Foreign policy – should our stance (eg on MEPP or Kashmir) be influenced more by these concerns? How do we communicate our foreign policy to the Muslim community? Where are they getting their information and opinions from?
- ix. Confronting intolerance – how best to confront intolerance towards the Muslim community, and intolerance of others by some of the Muslim community (most dramatically in the form of support for and even involvement in terrorism). Would it help to look again at legislation against religious discrimination?



3. Partners and agents

- i. Depending on the appropriate mix of responses, the Government will evidently need to work with a range of partners and agents. Leadership is likely to need to be local as well as national;
- ii. Some agencies and parts of government might be better able to establish a rapport with the disaffected groups than others – a perception that this is only driven by a counter terrorist (or law and order) agenda might be detrimental;
- iii. The education service is the only agency in touch with all young Muslims, at least up to age 16 and often beyond (bearing in mind some of the most extremely disaffected are well educated);
- iv. Local authorities are involved in local communities;
- v. In the DAs, the devolved equivalents would need to be involved;
- vi. Other public services; police, health, jobcentres, Connexions etc all come into contact with some people in the community. The police also monitor community tension;
- vii. Appropriate community groups and the voluntary sector will undoubtedly have a role;
- viii. So might leaders of other faith groups.

Community and faith leaders in the Muslim community will have a role to play, and must perhaps be seen to be involved, although will be effective only to the extent they are really in touch with and can influence disaffected sections of the community. Home Office already has programmes of capacity building in these community organisations – are these targeted at the right bodies? Are the people we are talking to representative of (and in any way accountable to) their communities?

4. Departments

The points listed above suggest that CO, ODPM, DfES, HO, DTI, DWP, FCO and HMT all have a substantial interest in this subject.

Perhaps we could discuss Whitehall machinery for delivering a strategic response to the issues of concern to Ministers when we meet.

I would also like to take that opportunity to discuss who from outside Whitehall could be involved in next steps.

My office will be in touch to arrange a time to meet after Easter.

I am copying this letter to Mavis McDonald, David Normington, Robin Young, Richard Mottram, Michael Jay, David Omand, Howell James, Nick McPherson, Helen Edwards, Joe Montgomery, Michael Richardson and Nigel Sheinwald.



RESTRICTED - POLICY

I understand the FCO and Home Office are preparing a paper on Muslim Youth and Extremism. It would be very helpful if you could circulate this when it is ready.

Andrew Turnbull



INVESTOR IN PEOPLE

Ref: AO2004/463



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March 26, 2004

Carey speech on Islam in full

Address given by Lord Carey of Clifton at the Gregorian University, Rome, on Thursday, March 25 in which he criticised Islamic culture and regimes

Christianity and Islam: Collison or convergence?

I would like to begin this lecture by thanking Dr Eugene McCarthy for the privilege of being a McCarthy Visiting Professor this year at the Gregorian University. I have enjoyed the experience immensely and am grateful to the Dean, Dr. Franco Imoda, for his kindness and Fr. Bill Henn for his considerable helpfulness in so many ways.

We have been housed in a delightful cottage at the Irish College and I do want to express our gratitude also to the Dean, the staff and students of the College for way they have welcomed us so warmly. It is a great example of Irish/English relationships at their best!

The theme of my course at the Gregorian has been 'Unity and Mission'. My desire to offer a lecture on Christian-Muslim relations tonight has not only been fired by the course I have given, but also because for the last ten years or so it has been an important strand in my ministry as a Christian leader.

I need to make it plain, however, that I am not, in a technical sense, an expert on Islam or someone who is a specialist in one of its disciplines. What I can claim is that for many years I have spent a great deal of time with some of the most important names in Islam – Dr Tantawi, Hassan al-Turabi, King Hussein, Prince Hassan, King Abdullah, Professor Akbar Ahmed and many other Muslim leaders and scholars – seeking to build bridges of understanding between two great faiths.

In retirement I continue to engage in dialogue

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The S:

Enter Case s advice exclus marke

Cross:

Get the system cross

through the Alexander Declaration Process which attempts to bring Muslim, Jewish and Christian leaders together in Israel and Palestine.

A second project I am involved in is a business driven initiative founded by the World Economic Forum. Together with Prince Turki of Saudi Arabia, I co-Chair the Council of 100 leaders from different professions and disciplines which has, as its aim, to strengthen links between the West and Islam.

My wife and I have also been to many Muslim countries and appreciate the strength and depth of Islam. I think I can say with some confidence that I have a reasonable idea of the challenges that Islam presents to Christianity and the West and the challenges that Islam faces today. Whether colliding faiths and cultures can find ways of living together in harmony and peace is one of the most urgent questions of our time.

To say we live in dangerous and unstable times is perhaps the understatement of the year. '911', the emergency telephone number in the United States similar to '999' in the United Kingdom or 113 here in Italy, has become the shorthand for the terror unleashed on America in 2001. Since 911 terrorist violence has shown no sign of abating.

The attempt to dismantle the al-Qaeda network and hunt down its leader, Osama bin Laden; the Iraq war and the ongoing conflict in the country; the tragedy of the bitter conflict in a land called 'holy' by three world faiths; the oft-repeated statements by leaders of many countries that violence on the scale of the Madrid atrocity must be expected by all western nations – all this and more make the subject of the lecture deeply relevant.

And at the heart of our concern is Islam; a faith, a civilisation and a culture. A faith, that is growing fast in every part of the world; a civilisation, that has contributed greatly the human family and still has much to offer; a culture, with a unique texture that appeals to millions.

However, wherever we look, Islam seems to be embroiled in conflict with other faiths and other cultures. It is in opposition to practically every other world religion- to Judaism in the Middle East; to Christianity in the West, in Nigeria, and in the Middle East; to Hinduism in India; to Buddhism, especially since the destruction of the Temples in Afghanistan.

We are presented therefore with a huge puzzle concerning Islam. Why is it associated with violence throughout the world? Is extremism so

ineluctably bound up with its faith that we are at last seeing its true character? Or could it be that a fight for the soul of Islam is going on that requires another great faith, Christianity, to support and encourage the vast majority of Muslims who resist this identification of their faith with terrorism?

Undoubtedly, Islam's association with terrorism presents an enormous challenge for all seeking a peaceful, prosperous world. Listen to Samuel Huntington, one of the most important voices in these matters in recent days. In 1993 he published a controversial essay entitled *The Clash of Civilisations*.

His thesis was that the collapse of communism signalled the end of ideological battles of the political kind. Western capitalism was now dominant. The next battle he claimed will be the clash of cultures, with Islamic and Christian civilisations separating the world.

Scholars, writers, religious thinkers and politicians rejected this idea as flawed for historical, theological and intellectual reasons. But Huntington was unrepentant. In 1997 he published a book of the same name, modifying the thesis but retaining the underlying argument that a clash between two great cultures was inevitable.

In an extraordinary claim he insisted: "Islam's borders are bloody and so are its innards. The fundamental problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilisation whose people are convinced of the *superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power*".

Penetrating and disturbing - even shocking- words. Are they true to the facts? Certainly September 11 seemed to confirm his thesis that in our own day we are witnessing a clash of cultures and are dealing with two quite different world-views.

In order to go deeper into the issue allow me to ask four questions:

What are the reasons for Islam's association with terrorism and death?

What challenges does Islam itself face?

What is Islam's challenge to the West in general and Christianity in particular?

How may we move from collision to convergence in mutual understanding and respect?

ISLAM AND TERROR

To begin with, it is crucial to stress the positive before we get to the negative. Islam is the second largest religion in the world and the name means 'submission to God'.

There are over one billion Muslims in the world and the vast majority are peaceful and good people just as anxious as we are to bring up their children to live in harmony with others. And, like Christianity, Islam is far from monochrome in its make-up.

It too is composed of many groups and sects and its people include secular as well as religious Muslims. Yes, they too have people who are Muslim in name only.

As J.A. Williams points out in his book *The World of Islam* there has always been a secular side to Islam even though the resurgence of the faith since 1970 has tended to mask this aspect.

Whether religious or nominal, it is important to recognise that the vast majority of Muslims, like Christians, are honourable and good people who hate violence and are distressed to note that they are lumped together with evil and misguided people. We should never seek to demonise them or their faith. But a fight for the soul of Islam is going on. Why is it now associated with violence and terrorism?

Let me, for the sake of brevity, approach this from a historical perspective. Although Christians and Muslims have got on very well in countries where both have settled, along with their Jewish neighbours, there have periods when both faiths have sought to expand territorially and have clashed in bloody and bitter conflict.

The Crusades are a clear example of this where attempts were made to regain former Christian lands with unfortunate consequences for both faiths. In the 16th and 17th centuries militant Islam invaded Hungary, Poland, Ukraine and even reached the gates of Vienna.

Such facts contradict the assertion by Mohammed Madhi Shams Ed-Din in an International Conference hosted by the Gregorian University in May 2000 that: 'Aggression has been Christian in all (most) great encounters and Islam's stance has always been defensive in all (most) cases' (p.45) No.

That both Christianity as well as Islam have had such episodes of militarism should not surprise us.

The facts insist that neither faith can take the high moral ground and accuse the other of using weapons of destruction.

Apart from such well-known clashes, adherents of all three world religions were able to live in peace, even though the cost of it for many Christians and Jews in some lands was to accept the position as 'protected' (Dhimmi) citizens and pay a corresponding tax.

From the 18th through to the 20th centuries the fortunes of Muslim countries took a dip for the worst. Whilst Christian countries benefited from the fruits of the Industrial Revolution much of the Middle East has lagged behind ever since.

As a young man doing my National Service in Iraq in the 50's it was understandable why so many people of my generation, looking at such societies superficially, considered Islam to be a backward looking faith, associated with backward societies, with massive problems of illiteracy and corruption.

1967, however, is viewed by many as a turning point in the minds of many Muslims. In that year the Arab nations- Syria, Egypt and Jordan – mounted a surprise attack against Israel and were humiliated in battle.

Great swathes of Arab land were taken, Sinai, Gaza and the Golan Heights in particular. From 1967 onwards Muslims began to analyse the reasons for their defeat at the hands of the Israelis.

That event, scorched in their memories proved to be a turning point. Many concluded that a return to the simplicity of Islamic faith and wholehearted adherence to the Koran was necessary. To follow the West and to emulate its ways seemed to be the road to decadence and moral decline.

From this period on reform and renewal movements begin to appear in Islam which in spite of different emphases have one common aim, that is, to restore greatness to Islam.

Despising the political passivity of conservative Islam on the one hand, and the eagerness of modernist Muslims to embrace aspects of secularism on the other, radical movements are one in their desire to re-Islamise Muslim societies and fight the encroaching secularism and materialism that they see coming from the West.

Although it is understandable to call such groups 'fundamentalist', the term, borrowed from the Christian world where it means a literal

interpretation of the Bible, is inappropriate when applied to radical groups in Islam.

J.A. Williams makes a distinction between 'revivalists' whose aim is to help Muslims return to the fundamentals of Islamic faith and 'radical activists', who encourage a fight against infidels. It is more accurate to call radical activists, whose creed calls them to bring about revolution through violence, what they are – terrorists. But that is to anticipate; and we must continue to explore the reasons why such groups came into being.

If 1967 represents a real politicising of Islam in the hearts and minds of many Muslims we have to look to Saudi Arabia, the heartland of Islam, to trace one of the major sources of radical Islamic thought.

Two hundred years ago a Reform movement had swept through Saudi Arabia through the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Uniting with Muhammad Ibn Saud, a powerful chief, Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab subdued other tribes and imposed what Prof. John Esposito has described 'a puritanical form of Islam' on the people.

We should note that Wahhabi puritanism deemed it belonged to the purity of faith to destroy the sacred tombs of Mohammed and his companions in Mecca and Medina. Today, it is the Wahhabi form of Islam that is being exported to other countries and communities in Muslim lands.

Its intolerant and tyrannical beliefs lend themselves to young impressionable minds searching for certainties. The politicisation of young Saudi Muslims was completed in our own day when the impotence of Muslim countries was compared with what they regard the decadence of the West with its materialistic power. As Saudis became rich with oil, they had, to hand, financial resources to beat the West at its own game. It wasn't to be long before some of them tried.

If 1967 represented humiliation for many Muslims, 1979 is of major significance for Islam as militant forms appeared, giving some dubious credibility to the thought that violence is a tool to be used. The first provocation was the invasion of Afghanistan by Russia. Muslims world-wide were outraged.

As one Muslim friend put it to me 'Russians were not merely infidels, they were worse- they were unbelieving infidels!' Atheists and a 'house of war' was now a reality. A jihad was called and mujahidin – warriors- were called to fight a war to the death. It was, as we know, a turning point in the life of a rich,

very tall young Saudi, Osama bin Laden, who used his wealth to set up camps in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets.

The invasion of Afghanistan represents the radicalisation of the elite of Saudi youth. The irony was that the Americans saw leadership qualities in Osama bin Laden to undermine the Russian invasion and the United States supplied him and his comrades, now in the Al Qaeda network, with training, money, ammunition and supplies.

1979 was also of importance for the Muslim world as Shiites in Iran overturned the secular regime in a spectacular coup and formed the Iranian Islamic Republic. In 1989 another coup took place in Sudan when Col Omar al-Bashir took over control of that impoverished country and enlisted the aid of a formidable intellectual Hassan al-Turabi.

Dr Turabi, a Sorbonne-educated lawyer, a polite and polished intellectual, has a clear and unambiguous vision to impose Islam on the whole world and make Sharia law mandatory- an imposition achieved, more or less, in Sudan.

In 1994, seemingly from nowhere, a group of students living on the borders of Pakistan called the Taleban took control of Afghanistan claiming moral leadership and imposing an ultra-conservative form of Wahhabism on an impoverished country that needed an open, enlightened vision not the myopic, self-contained world of the Taliban.

In the year 2000, Osama bin Laden, now fully alienated from America and the west, announced the formation of a World Islamic Front for a Jihad against Americans and Crusaders (a euphemism for Christians).

This action may have been taken in part because of a strong sense of betrayal, as it seemed to the Afghans that the Americans had abandoned them after their sacrifices fighting the Soviets. However, the world-wide implications were very serious.

For the minority of Muslims in such movements as the World Islamic Front and the Muslim Brotherhood, the world was now divided into a veritable 'house of Islam' and 'house of war'.

For bin Laden and militants 'Jihad' now had only one meaning- a struggle to death for the soul of Islam. The alternative and basic sense of 'jihad' as a word denoting a struggle to be good and peaceful Muslims through moral and religious ways was now in danger of being lost.

On September 11 2001 the World Islamic Front struck through dedicated young men who were prepared to die with the Koran at their side shouting 'Allah is great!' guiding huge planes to destroy the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

With them died many hundreds of others who were going about their lawful and good business. Further atrocities were to follow. A few days after Sept 11, in Indonesia, 120 Muslim troops struck at a village of Chinese and Christian people at dawn shouting 'Allah is great!' killing the men and raping any women they could find.

A year after September 11 2001 came the murder of many hundreds of innocent, fun loving people in Bali, Indonesia. Madrid is but another awful episode in the unfolding drama of Islamic terrorism. The question comes with greater insistence: Is not Islam being manipulated by evil and misguided men, not only destabilising our world, but also discrediting Islam itself? Therefore, to my second question.

What are the Challenges facing Islam?

Last January I was at the World Economic Forum and appeared on the same platform as the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mohamed Mahathir who on the brink of retirement gave his sober estimate of Islam, saying that unless Islam was prepared to change it would degenerate still further.

'I find it very hard to be optimistic about Muslims in the 21st century' he said, 'Very few Muslims understand reality and they do not understand that coming to terms with globalisation is one of the greatest challenges facing them'.... 'They cannot run away' he said.

Former President Wahid of Indonesia who chaired a conference in Amman when I was speaker at the Conference on Religion and Peace expressed similar worries: 'The Muslim world is at a cross-roads. It may pursue a traditional static Islam or refashion it into a more dynamic and pluralistic world-view'.

The challenges in the opinion of such Muslim thinkers are many and varied but perhaps we might pick out four specific challenges.

The first in my opinion is for Muslim societies to integrate their faith and practice in democratic institutions. Indeed, democracy will be increasingly a major challenge as more Muslim youth are educated and demand a say in the running of their countries.

Why the glaring absence of democratic governments in Muslim lands, particularly in the Middle East, we might wonder? It is said that modern Muslim experience suggests that Islam and democracy are incompatible. I see no fundamental reason why this should be so. Indeed, Turkey is an example that confirms that there is no contradiction in the idea.

However, it is uncommon. Throughout the Middle East and North Africa we find authoritarian regimes with deeply entrenched leadership, some of whom rose to power at the point of a gun and are retained in power by massive investment in security forces.

Whether they are military dictatorships or traditional sovereignties each ruler seems committed to retaining power and privilege. When forms of democracy are introduced, as in Qatar and Bahrain, they are modest in the extreme and power remains in the hands of the Emirs.

A second challenge lies in the disturbing social conditions that militate against stable civil society and undermine the values and ethics of a great faith. Demographic factors indicate that Muslim countries will be increasingly under question as time goes on unless actions are taken to deal with chronic illiteracy, spiralling population figures leading to dire unemployment and social unrest.

Giving power to the people in democratic governance is not sufficient if economic stability, universal education and human rights are not available and accessible. The absence of such conditions are factors that may precipitate revolution or fan greater resentment at Western resources and excesses.

My third observation is that theological Islam is being challenged too, to become more open to examination and criticism. Christianity and Judaism have had a long history of critical scholarship which, we must admit and acknowledge, has not been without its pain, but there have been great gains also.

In the case of Islam, Mohammed, acknowledged by all in spite of his religious greatness, to be illiterate man, is said to have received God's word direct, word by word, from angels and scribes who recorded them later.

Thus, believers are told, because they have come direct from Allah they are not to be questioned or revised. As it happens, in the first few centuries of the Islamic era, Islamic theologians sought to meet the challenge this implied, but during the past five

hundred years critical scholarship has declined leading to strong resistance to modernity.

Christian theologians and teachers, I suggest, have two important roles to play with respect to Islamic thought. First, we should encourage theological dialogue between Christianity and Islam.

In this respect may I salute the great contribution that the Inter-religious Council of the Vatican makes and in particular the work of Archbishop Michael Fitzgerald. Second, without interfering in the workings of another faith to encourage the development of rigorous scholarship in the formation of the education of Imams. A greater openness will benefit us all.

A fourth challenge facing moderate Muslims is to resist strongly the taking over of Islam by radical activists and to express strongly, on behalf of the many millions of their co-religionists, their abhorrence of violence done in the name of Allah.

We look to them to condemn suicide bombers and terrorists who use Islam as a weapon to destabilise and destroy innocent lives. Sadly, apart from a few courageous examples, very few Muslim leaders condemn, clearly and unconditionally, the evil of suicide bombers who kill innocent people.

We need to hear outright condemnation of theologies that state that suicide bombers are 'martyrs' and enter a martyrs reward. We need to hear Muslims expressing their outrage and condemning such evil.

To be sure, the stand-off between Israel and Palestine continues to be the political arena where so many of our current unrests are focussed.

Having just returned a few days ago from Jerusalem I can sympathise with those who, at best, are pessimistic of any improvement in the situation and, at worst, conclude that the polarisation is so deep that ongoing violence and many lost lives will be the bleak future of the region for many years to come.

Yet, we are talking of two great peoples who have lived together in the past; we are talking of a situation where it seems possible to arrive at a political solution if we could find a way to end the violence; we are talking about a situation where both Jew and Arab deserve justice and peace.

If Palestinians should refrain from suicide tactics, as I believe they must as a moral duty; then Jews must refrain from using their power in unjustified

ways, for the same reason.

It is impossible to go through the road blocks and security checks as we did this past week-end, and on so many other previous occasions, without such experiences making outsiders realise what this does to further resentment among Palestinians who consider themselves prisoners in their own land.

The tactics that the IDF are using in state killings of suspected terrorists and Palestinian leaders like Sheikh Ahmed Yassin are unworthy of a civilised society and shames Israel.

The enormous wall, now being built, may give some temporary relief to Israelis but only alienates decent Palestinians still further. I saw graffiti on part of the wall separating Jerusalem from the West Bank which read; 'This is our Warsaw ghetto'. Wherever power lies – whether it is state power or the power that comes from an individual targeting another with a rifle or a bomb – is, to quote Reinhold Niebuhr, 'a poison which blinds the eye of moral insight and lames the will of moral purpose'.

My third question is: What then is the challenge to the West and to Christians in particular?

There is surely a glimmer of truth in the telling remark of President Khatami of Iran who remarked that 'today's world democracies are suffering from a major vacuum which is the vacuum of spirituality'.

It is difficult to point an accusing finger at what we regard as the weaknesses of Muslim governments when spectacular economic abuse such as Enron, Worldcom and Paamalat reveal that greed, exploitation and corruption lurk in our advanced societies and shame our claim to conduct our communities in moral and wise ways. – *may flow?*

The degree of crime and delinquency, going hand in hand with a decline in moral standards and the collapse of such institutions as marriage and the family, are reasons why the West must be reticent in claiming the high moral ground. Yes, we must own up to our shortcomings and failings and from the riches of our faith and traditions reinforce what we most value.

A second obligation is for us to strengthen western values, founded as undoubtedly they are on the Christian moral tradition and culture.

In spite of our shortcomings at least European and American civilisations are repositories of fairness and liberal values.

Democracy, as an element of these, is a beautiful and fragile flower and we should support it, value it and protect it. It allows for dissent, for freedom of expression and for rights for all. We should not give in to claims that Islamic countries are morally, spiritually and culturally superior to other civilisations and great cultures.

To give credit where credit is due, although we owe much to Islam handing on to the West many of the treasures of Greek thought, the beginnings of calculus, Aristotelian thought during the period known in the West as 'the dark ages', it is sad to relate that no great invention has come for many hundreds of years from Muslim countries.

This is a puzzle, because Muslim peoples are not bereft of brilliant minds. They have much to contribute to the human family and we look forward to the close co-operation that might make this possible.

Yes, the West has still much to be proud of and we should say so strongly. We should also encourage Muslims living in the West to be proud of it to and to say so to their brothers and sisters living elsewhere.

We should also point to the enormous contribution the West continues to make to poor Muslim countries and we should endeavour to make this better known. Recently a survey in Egypt revealed that only 6% of Egyptians viewed American favourably despite being the second largest recipient of US aid after Israel.

Most of them are unaware that American and British aid built Cairo's sewers, water supply and electrical system. Nevertheless, we should also acknowledge that the West has much to learn from Islam and value in that great tradition of faith.

But What of the relationship between church and mosque?

It is important to know what Islam stands for – its strengths and weakness. But it far more important to know some Muslims and befriend them. We shall find them that they have the same fears about us as we have of them. Most of them are good people who simply wish to be good citizens.

There is much we can admire in Islam- the simplicity of faith and devotion of worship. Islam is not a complicated faith and perhaps we have made Christianity too complicated. We can admire the devotion of the people and their desire to promote their faith. We can admire their commitment to

traditional values, the family, children and peace.

But Islam is not to be feared. Muslims respect integrity and devotion too. They have no respect for Christians who take the view that all religions are the same. They know they are not. They will always respect people who stand up for their faith and are prepared to talk about it naturally.

Christians need to be more confident and argue their corner for reciprocity throughout the world. During my time as Archbishop this was my constant refrain- that the welcome we have given to

Muslims in the West with the accompanying freedom to worship freely and build their mosques should be reciprocated in Muslim lands. However, that freedom is uneven. In some Muslim lands there are strong and cordial relationships but in some others Christians have little freedom, are sometimes persecuted, are not able build their churches, or only do so after much difficulty.

Saudi Arabia will not allow Christian worship and Christian priests and ministers are not allowed to function as such in that land. Muslim leaders often tell Christians and Jews that 'there is no compulsion in religion'. This sadly is only half true. If non-Muslims are not compelled to become Muslim, Muslims are not free to choose another faith. There is, we find, some compulsion, after all.

This, then, prompts my final question: **'How may we move from collision to convergence on things we most value and share?**

Professor Akbar Ahmed, one of Islam's leading scholars and Professor of Anthropology at the American University, Washington, in his most recent book: *Islam Under Siege: Living dangerously in a Post-Honor World* concludes by saying: 'The events of September 11 appeared to push the world toward the idea of a clash of civilisations, but they also conveyed the urgency of the call for dialogue.

The creative participation in the dialogue of civilisations, to find an internal balance between the needs and traditions of local communities and a world increasingly dominated by international corporations and political concerns, the committed search for global solutions confronting human society and the quest for a just, compassionate, and peaceful order will be the challenge human civilisation faces in the 21st century.

To meet the challenge is to fulfil God's vision; to embrace all humanity in doing so is to know God's

compassion'. Heartening words indeed.

I for one do not accept that the future is one of escalating violence, deepening bitterness and a grudging dialogue between 'incompatible faiths' and cultures.

Let me proffer some pointers for discussion and reflection:

1. We must deepen inter-faith co-operation and understanding. Religion is not going to go away. We may talk of a post-modern world but certainly not post-religious.

But religion may be used for bad as well as good purposes. In the hands of evil people religion is sometimes used as a weapon to kill and to suppress as it has been, from time to time, in the long history of Christianity. But religious leaders have an important role to play alongside political leaders. There is still too little comprehension in political circle of the power of authentic faith and the possibilities of harnessing the religious imagination and energy for peace.

We must focus on root causes of unrest where religions clash and seek to heal the wounds of the past. We must confront the deep sense of injustice felt by ordinary Muslims in much of the developing world where people see the tyranny of their own leaders, the growing gap between rich and poor and what they see as the massive support of the West to regimes inimical to Islam.

Israel, as I have already said, is a serious flashpoint of unrest and America has a key role to play in healing the wounds of a land beloved to adherents of three world religions. However, Muslims do not perceive even-handedness in America's treatment of Palestinians and the Palestinian cause. Of course, Israel has a right to a homeland and above all to peace.

There can be no serious argument about that. Christians, of all people, should honour the special religious ties they have with Jewish people. That should not restrain us from recognising that Palestine, no less, demands and deserves a viable State with secure borders and an independent Government. Resolve this urgent issue and a great deal of Muslim bitterness and antagonism towards the West will in time be replaced by understanding. This longest-running conflict in modern times deserves the West's urgent attention.

2. Compassion and understanding are the only tools to handle hatred and violence. It will do us

little good if the West simply believes the answer is to put an end to Osama bin Laden. Rather we must put an end to conditions, distortions and misinformation that create Osama bin Laden and his many emulators.

It is the battle of ideas we must win, not to show the many bruised and aggrieved Muslims that we are stronger and more powerful than they are. In this task Christian theologians, teachers, priests, pastors and people have a significant role to play.

Christianity has much in common with Islam and working from common moral demands, our joint commitment to family life and religious values, our agreement concerning the importance of worshipping God and teaching all people to build their lives on eternal and abiding values should give us confidence to create relationships between us that endure.

If we do not, the future will remain hazardous and threatening. As Christopher Coker says in 'Twilight of the West' as he contemplates the threat of terrorism in the modern world: 'What makes Islamic fundamentalism so dangerous ..is the appeal of science and technology in the modern Islamic imagination...there has been no smashing of machines, no repudiation of the Western sciences'. Indeed, 911 has taught us as much.

Yes, we live in dangerous times. But we live, no less, in times where good will, understanding, frankness based on respect and tolerance may yield offer an exciting future. Let us look forward to the day when we shall not talk about faiths colliding, but Islam and Christianity converging in a common desire to create a world of tolerance and peace and building communities on those shared values that make us human and capable of giving and receiving God's gift of love.



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OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
EU MONITORING AND ADVOCACY PROGRAM

BRITISH MUSLIMS AND EMPLOYMENT

Zamila Bunglawala



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THE OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE UK MUSLIMS RESEARCH PROJECT

The Open Society Institute-Budapest is a private operating and grant making foundation that develops and implements a range of programs in civil society, culture, education, media and public administration, public health and human and women's rights, as well as social, legal and economic reform.

In 2002, as part of its programme on minority protection in the EU, the OSI published a report on minority protection in the five largest EU member states. The reports looked at the situation of Muslims in France, Italy and the United Kingdom and the situation of the Roma/Sinti communities in Germany and Spain. The UK report, launched by the then Home Office Minister Lord Filkin, was a snap shot of the current situation of Muslims in terms of minority rights and their experiences of discrimination and disadvantage. It identified the severe levels of disadvantage experienced by British Muslims. The disadvantage and discrimination experienced by Muslim is a significant barrier to their participation and integration in British society. One underlying theme in the report was the need for policy makers in government and public bodies to ensure that their policies for tackling disadvantage and discrimination took account of the faith dimension in the identities of Muslim communities. It called upon government and other public bodies to take steps to encourage, facilitate and support participation in society by Muslims. It made over 30 recommendations on actions to the UK government and other public bodies.

Following publication of the UK report, and noting the positive attitude to engagement in the issues raised by the OSI report from the UK government, the OSI is keen to ensure that the recommendations are not left to gather dust on the shelves. The policy seminar programme provides an opportunity to build upon the work of the initial report. While the report was broad ranging and made recommendations in several areas, the policy seminars provide an opportunity to focus on the four specific areas of education, employment, criminal justice and discrimination.

The OSI policy research programme will seek to complement and support existing research initiatives and programmes and to avoid duplicating work being undertaken by others. In some of the areas that the OSI proposes to examine there is already some generic research either on ethnic minorities or on minority faith communities. The OSI research, by its specific focus on Muslims will be able to tease out the specificities of issues as they affect Muslims and make recommendations that are targeted to address those specificities. In this way the research will contribute to enriching the policy process.

1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 This paper is the first draft of the Open Society Institute policy paper examining British Muslims and employment. This draft will be discussed at the roundtable and circulated to others for further comment. The purpose of the Roundtable is to gain as much critical and constructive feedback on the paper as possible. Readers should therefore feel free to comment on all and any aspect of the paper. For example, is the analysis in the paper correct? Is it accurate? What gaps are there? How can the structure and organisation of the paper be improved? Does the evidence support the conclusions made? Are the recommendations appropriate and workable? What other recommendations could be made? How else can the paper be improved?
- 1.2 Ethnic minorities currently make up eight per cent of the UK population. The ethnic minority population has grown from 3 million in 1991 to 4.6 million in 2001. Between 1999 and 2009, ethnic minorities will account for half the growth in the working-age population. At three per cent Muslims, account for almost 40 per cent the UK's ethnic minority population. 42 per cent of Muslims are Pakistani, 17 per cent Bangladeshi and eight per cent Indian. The ethnic classifications did not provide a separate category for Afghans, Arabs, Iranians, Turks, Kurds, North Africans and those from Eastern Europe, this may explain the 12 per cent who identified themselves as White on the census form. A further eight per cent identified themselves as Black. There are wide variations in the labour market achievements of different ethnic minority and religious groups. Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims experience significantly higher unemployment and lower earnings than Whites. Census statistics show that Muslims as a whole are by far the most disadvantaged faith community, their unemployment rates are three times the national average and twice the level of any other minority faith community, they have the lowest economic activity rate of any group and the highest economic inactivity rate. They represent, proportionately, the youngest age cohort in the UK. The two largest Muslim ethnic minority groups, Pakistani and Bangladeshi, will account for a quarter of the growth in the working age population between 1999-2009.¹ Making the best use of their skills will be a challenge for Government and employers, as well as for ethnic minorities themselves. Inaction will continue to bring economic costs but also potential threats to social cohesion.² Evidence from the past two decades suggests that the continued economic recovery alone will not tackle the labour market disadvantage faced by Muslims. If no intervention is made, their position will at least stay the same if not worsen and further reinforce social exclusion. The failure to address the labour market disadvantage faced British Muslims will

¹ D. Owen and A. Green, *Minority Ethnic Participation and Achievements in Education, Training and the Labour Market*, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations and Institute for Employment Research, University of Warwick, 2000, pp. 16-7.

² *Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market*, Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, Cabinet Office, 2003, p.4. (hereafter the Strategy Unit Report)



impact on other government policies such as reducing child poverty and anti-social behaviour. This paper argues for targeted policies interventions that reach Muslim communities, and considers how this can be achieved.

- 1.3 A central obstacle in an examination of the labour market position and experience of British Muslims is the lack of data collected on the basis of religion. Ethnic data is used in this paper to highlight the experiences of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups, who make up 60 per cent of the UK Muslim population. This of course will leave unexamined the experiences of the remaining 40 per cent of Muslim communities, including Arab, Afghan, Turkish, Kurdish, North African, Nigerian and Somali Muslims. An analysis comparing the employment rates of Pakistan and Bangladeshi Muslims (38.3 and 36.7 per cent respectively) with the Muslim group as a whole suggests that the employment rate for the remaining Muslim communities is not significantly better at around 40.7 per cent. This chimes with anecdotal evidence from mosques and other Muslim groups suggesting that other Muslim groups face similar levels of socio-economic disadvantage as Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims.
- 1.4 This paper builds on the steps and policy approach taken by the Strategy Unit report, *Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market*. That report emphasised the differing levels of achievement in the labour market across all ethnic minority groups, with Indians and Chinese out-performing Whites in some categories. Whilst the new focussed interventions can produce positive change, emphasis on the most disadvantaged individual ethnic groups has yet to occur.
- 1.5 Policies are not targeted by individual religious group. Driving forward effective and significant change in labour market outcomes may require disaggregating the term 'ethnic minority' into individual ethnic groups to benefit those who are disproportionately disadvantaged. Targeting by individual ethnic group remains uneven across government. As a consequence they have limited effect upon the most disadvantaged ethnic minority groups. This paper makes the case for policy to begin disaggregating ethnic disadvantage further to produce more targeted policy and thereby more tangible positive results for the most disadvantaged group in the labour market – Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims. It also suggests that the acknowledgement of faith dimension to identity is important in ensuring the effective delivery of services. In public policy minority groups are seen through the prism of ethnic identities and mechanisms are now in place for targeting policies towards minority ethnic groups. An alternative to targeting policies to Muslims, as a group, is to target specific Muslim ethnic groups. This can easily be done for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims and could be extended to Afghan, Arab, Kurdish, Iranian, Turkish, and Somali Muslims.
- 1.6 **Chapter two** begins by outlining the context of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim participation in the labour market, their age structure, geographical distribution, and labour market attainment. By comparing the position of Pakistani



and Bangladeshi Muslims with other ethnic minorities and with Whites it becomes clear that they are among the most disadvantaged communities in the UK.

- 1.7 **Chapter three** identifies some of the barriers that are faced in entering and progressing in the labour market. These include barriers arising from poor housing, low educational attainment, childhood poverty and existing engaging in the labour market. It looks at the impact of an 'ethnic penalty' and poses the question of whether there is a 'Muslim penalty'.
- 1.7 **Chapter four** begins by outlining some of the current policy measures that are being taken to address ethnic minority labour market disadvantage by government and highlights some current research that will contribute to understanding of the economic integration of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims. The chapter concludes by looking at examples of best practice in current policy that aims to tackle labour market disadvantage at three levels. First, improving engagement with the labour market, through developing basic skills, soft skills and aspirations. Secondly, improving training for the labour market and ensuring accessibility to the labour market. This includes improving qualifications, work experiences and access to childcare. Thirdly, supporting entry and progression within the labour market. This requires a co-ordinated approach to getting people into work, positive action measures to increase employment and career support and in work support to ensure progress through the labour market. It concludes by outlining measure that are needed to ensure effective delivery of policies that reach Muslim communities.

2. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

A. ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THE LABOUR MARKET

- 2.1 All ethnic minorities are disadvantaged in the labour market on a broad range of measures of achievement: employment/unemployment rates; levels of self-employment; occupational attainment and progression in the workplace. However, there are significant differences between and within ethnic groups. Most notably, the Indian and Chinese groups out-perform their White counterparts on almost all these measures.
- 2.2 The UK now has the highest employment rate and the lowest unemployment rate of the major industrialised countries. Since 1997 the Government has set out to give people the help and support they need to move from welfare into work, and to achieve the goal of full employment in every region of the UK.³ Total employment is currently at record highs, having risen by nearly 1.7 million since 1997. Claimant count unemployment has fallen by more than 700,000 since 1997.
- 2.3 The Government acknowledges that there are areas where more progress is needed to tackle the challenges faced by some ethnic minority groups, people with no qualifications, and other groups amongst whom economic inactivity is high, such as people living in big cities and those living in rented accommodation.⁴ Employment rates amongst all ethnic minority groups are lower than those of the White population. Despite economic growth, over the past 15 years the overall employment rate gap between ethnic minorities and Whites has stayed at around 16 percentage points. The Department for Work and Pension (DWP) and the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) share a Public Service Agreement (PSA) target to increase the employment rates of people from ethnic minority backgrounds and significantly reduce the difference between their employment rates and the overall employment rates by 2006.⁵
- 2.4 The Strategy Unit report showed how the extent and nature of labour market disadvantage differed significantly by ethnic group, with some groups being more disproportionately disadvantaged than others. Across almost all indicators Pakistani, Bangladeshi Muslims and African Caribbeans were found to be disproportionately disadvantaged. Within ethnic groups, labour market performance was found to vary considerably according to factors such as gender, generation and geography.

³ *Full Employment in Every Region*, HM Treasury, 2003.

⁴ *Full Employment in Every Region*, HM Treasury, 2003.

⁵ Ibid.



- 2.6 There is no single cause for the level of labour market disadvantage faced by ethnic minorities. The class backgrounds of different ethnic groups, culture and family patterns all play a part. Educational underachievement is both a symptom of these factors and an important causal factor. The numerous factors involved intervention in areas with cross-departmental policy responsibilities. Policy measures therefore fell into four categories:
- Improving the employability of ethnic minorities, by raising levels of educational attainment and skills;
 - Improving the connection of ethnic minorities and work, by reforming existing employment programmes and tackling specific barriers to work;
 - Promoting equal opportunities in the workplace; and
 - Improving delivery, through creating a cross-departmental Task Force to carry forward this cross-departmental responsibility.
- 2.7 The report looked at the area of ethnic minority labour market disadvantage but did not disaggregate by individual ethnic groups and create targeted policy initiatives accordingly. Disaggregating by religion was difficult as almost no data by religion was available. Refinement of our understanding of minority communities is necessary if any real tangible positive change is to be achieved in the overall employment rates of ethnic minorities and Whites. Combining different ethnic minority groups on the basis of geography (such as South Asian) and skin colour (such as Black African), is no longer helpful. The Strategy Unit report established that the overall position of some ethnic minority groups such as Indians is far removed from that of other ethnic minority groups, such as Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims. The use of categories like Black African alone does not allow policy to tease out the differences in the experience, for example, of Somalis, Nigerians or Zimbabweans. Ethnic categories at present do not account for Arab, Afghan, Iranian, Turkish, Kurdish, North African and Somali Muslim communities. We only have data for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims.

B. MUSLIMS

Geographic settlement patterns


- 2.8 The current picture of geographic distribution across the UK continues to reflect 'on-entry' settlement patterns of clustering in the UK's major cities and conurbations.⁶ Approximately half of the UK's ethnic minorities live in Greater London⁷.

⁶ A. Power, *Barriers to Social Housing for Asians*, Report to Bradford City Council, Bradford, June 2001. See also D. Owen and P. Ratcliffe, 'Estimating local change in the population of minority ethnic groups, 1981-1991', Working Paper no. 1, in *Changing spatial location patterns of ethnic minorities in Great Britain, 1981-1991*, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, Coventry: CRER, 1996.

⁷ Census 2003, ONS.

- 2.9 98 per cent of Muslims live in England. Approximately 40 per cent live in Greater London (607,000)⁸. Muslims represent the second largest religion in London and make-up 8.5 per cent of its population. They are concentrated in several London boroughs. A quarter of London's Muslims live in Tower Hamlets and Newham where they make-up 36 per cent and 24 per cent of the boroughs' population respectively.⁹
- 2.10 Outside of London, the greatest proportions of Muslim communities are to be found in the West Midlands, the Greater Manchester area and Glasgow. While such clustering reflects little population drift outside of settlement areas, it is uncertain if this is through religious or cultural preference or limited access and affordability of alternative housing.

Geographic distribution by religion



Source: EMED, DWP, 2004

Age structure

- 2.11 Due to recent immigration cycles the age structure of all ethnic minority groups is relatively young. Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims proportionately have the youngest age cohort, with over a third from each group being aged under-16.

⁸ E. Howes, 2001 Census Key Statistics: Ethnicity, Religion and Country of Birth, DMAG, GLA, October 2003.

⁹ Ibid.



Distribution of Ethnic Minority Groups by Age, 2002-03

	Under 16 (%)	16-64 (%)	65 and over (%)
White	20	64	16
Indian	22	70	8
Pakistani	34	63	3
Bangladeshi	38	59	3
Black Caribbean	25	66	9

Source: EMED, DWP, 2003

This youthful age profile combined with having the highest birth rates amongst all groups not only means that half the growth in the working-age population over the decade will come from ethnic minorities, but more specifically, half of that growth will come from the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim groups.¹⁰ By religion classification we know that 89 per cent of Muslims are currently under 50.¹¹

Labour market attainment

- 2.17 To determine the level of labour market disadvantage for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims it is necessary to compare their labour market attainments levels with other groups. Labour market attainment can be measured using a range of indicators: employment/unemployment rates; earnings level, occupational attainment and levels of self-employment

Employment and unemployment rates

- 2.18 Employment rates by ethnic group; gender and religion all indicate Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims have the lowest levels of economic activity. Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim women have the lowest employment rates amongst all ethnic groups, at 25 per cent and 18 per cent respectively. Together they account for the largest workless ethnic group. They represent 17 per cent of all non-employed ethnic minorities.¹² There is a marked difference in the employment levels of first and second-generation Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim women. 20 per cent of Pakistani women and 14 per cent of Bangladeshi women not born in the UK were in employment; whereas 43 per cent of Pakistani women and 45 per cent of Bangladeshi women born in the UK were in employment.¹³


¹⁰ D. Owen and A. Green, *Minority Ethnic Participation and Achievements in Education, Training and the Labour Market*, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations and Institute for Employment Research, University of Warwick, 2000, pp. 16-7.

¹¹ Census, 2001, ONS.


¹² Analytical Services Division, DWP, 2003.

¹³ A. Dale et al, *The Labour Market Prospects for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women*, Occasional paper, 2000, [PAGE REF]

By gender and ethnicity




Source: LFS, Autumn, EMED, DWP, 2003



Source: LFS, Autumn, EMED, DWP, 2003




By religion



Source: EMED, DWP, 2004

By religion for women



Source: EMED, DWP, 2004



Self-employment

- 2.20 The rate of self-employment is high amongst all Asian ethnic minority groups. We do not know degree to which this tendency towards entrepreneurialism is a cultural preference or possible experience or fear of discrimination in the paid employment sector. High levels of self-employment should not be taken to indicate labour market success, especially for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims who have the lowest net pay of all ethnic minority groups, as can be seen from the table above.
- 2.21 The recent Scottish Census found the Pakistani population, the largest ethnic minority group in Scotland, were nearly seven times more likely than Whites to work 50 hours a week or more. This suggests there is a clear pattern of high rates of self-employment and low financial return for this group. However, ensuring access for Muslims to self-employment support through organisations such as Business Links in DTI should be assessed. Financial support and loans for business start-up are not Sharia compliant and therefore limit a Muslim's level of access and ability to finance self-employment. Muslim women would benefit more than Muslim men in this area as they have minimal representation here. Research has shown bank loans that are gender biased to women in deprived communities, with the goal of economic development and integration are very successful for the women and the family unit as a whole.¹⁴
- 2.22 **Data should be disaggregated by age to determine how many of the first and second generation of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims are self-employed. Research should then be carried out to determine whether this group is 'trapped' in this cycle and/or the degree to which they have sought entry into the wider labour market to gain better returns to employment, and their success in this. Research should also explore how far this disengagement from wider society results in social exclusion.**

The 'employment rate gap'

- 2.23 Through identifying the percentage point employment gap between ethnic groups and the length of time that it has persisted, the tables below show that ethnic minority disadvantage in the labour market has persisted for many years.
- 2.24 Research shows that while people from ethnic minority groups are more likely to live in cities, this is particularly true for groups that have difficulty in finding employment, such as those with little or no English, recent migrants, and those with a tradition of non-participation in the labour market, particularly Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim women. Their concentration in particular wards and their non-employment there suggests a skills mismatch in their area of residence. The areas with the lowest ethnic minority employment rates (Glasgow, Tower

¹⁴ M. Yunus, *'Banker to the Poor'*.

Hamlets, Oldham, Bradford, and Blackburn & Darwen) are also the areas where the largest minority ethnic groups are Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims.¹⁵

- 2.25 The benefits of the economic recovery in the mid-1990s was not shared across all the minority ethnic groups. Employment and unemployment differentials narrowed for some ethnic minority groups relative to their White counterparts. However, no significant improvement in employment prospects could be observed for Bangladeshi Muslim (and African Caribbean) men. Their employment rate hardly rose at all, at any stage in the recovery.¹⁶
- 2.26 Over the past 15 years the economic activity gap between ethnic minorities and Whites has remained unmoved at around 16 percentage points. For Pakistanis and Bangladeshis the gap is even wider at 38 and 32 percentage points respectively. By religion, the gap is greatest for all Muslims. Over half of all Muslims are economically inactive, 32 per cent of Muslim men and 68 per cent of Muslim women. The relative weight of cultural factors leading to economic inactivity separate from or in addition to skills is uncertain.

Economic Activity of ethnic groups (%)

White	76
Indian	68
Pakistani	44
Bangladeshi	38
Black Caribbean	65
Black African	56
All Ethnic Minorities	58
GB	75

Source: LFS,, EMED, DWP, 2003

Economic activity by religion (%)

	Unemployed	Economically Active	Economically Inactive
ALL PEOPLE	5.0	66.5	33.5
Christian	4.3	65.5	34.5
Buddhist	7.9	63.0	37.0
Hindu	5.4	66.9	33.1
Jewish	3.8	66.1	33.9
Muslim	14.6	48.3	51.7
Sikh	6.9	66.2	33.8
No religion	6.1	75.2	24.8

Source: Census 2001, EMED, DWP, 2003

¹⁵ Full Employment in Every Region, HMT 2003.

¹⁶ J Wadsworth, *The Labour Market Performance of Ethnic Minorities in the Recovery*, 2003. [PAGE REF]



- 2.27 In a recent study, one-sixth of British adults aged 17-59 were found not to have either a job or a working partner. Those at high risk of non-employment were people with low qualifications and skills, those living in areas of weak labour market demand and certain ethnic minority groups. Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims have been described as being 'seriously at risk of non-employment compared to Whites'.¹⁷
- 2.28 The statistics show a high level of unemployment for both Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim men and women. While much of this can be explained by human capital and disproportionate disadvantage in relation to geography and deprivation, what is uncertain is how much religion and cultural preference can explain it.

Youth disengagement and social exclusion

- 2.12 Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims represent high numbers in the younger age cohorts. They also represent high proportions of young people who are not in 'education, training or employment' and thus represent a higher proportion of people in the 'missing' category.¹⁸ While it is in part characteristic of young people not to engage in mainstream provision it becomes a disturbing statistic when they are excluded from such provision and resort to other activity.
- 2.13 The 'disturbances' in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in summer 2001 were a clear indication of Pakistani and Bangladeshi youth unrest. While the nature of these violent outbursts was complex, a high level of non-engagement in education, training and employment was cited as a key concern for this group. Greater tailoring of services to meet the needs of this group was recommended.¹⁹
- 2.14 While the UK has not seen further such violent outbursts, anecdotal evidence suggests young Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims, male and female, are still excluded from mainstream education and employment.
- 2.15 Anecdotal evidence from local providers highlight the rising 'drug problem' in Tower Hamlets, specifically amongst the Bangladeshi Muslim population as one of great concern.²⁰ If local services delivery is not enhanced to tackle this soon, the problem may well become intractable. Increased crime and gang culture is also being related to this growing drug problem.

¹⁷ R. Berthoud, *Multiple Disadvantages in Employment*, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2002. [PAGE REF]

¹⁸ 'Jobs for All', Social Exclusion Unit.

¹⁹ Cantle Report, 2001.

²⁰ NAAFAS, a local advisory organization in Tower Hamlets helping the community deal with and overcome the drug problem.



- 2.16 In Glasgow, there is growing number of young Pakistani Muslim males who are not engaging in mainstream employment services. Glasgow City Council has employed two 'Ethnic Minority Youth Development Workers' to liaise with this group and encourage them to enter education, training or employment. Ethnic minorities are clustered geographically at opposite ends of the city. The needs of Muslims and the needs of other ethnic minority and religious groups differ across gender and age cohorts. However, there is no acknowledgement of these multi-faceted issues on the ground. This had led to insufficient resource allocation and limited awareness of the needs of different groups.



3: BARRIERS

- 3.1 Labour market position is determined by a variety of factors such as human capital, social class, previous engagement in the labour market and cultural and/or religious factors. Most Muslims appear disadvantaged across all these factors.

A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC BARRIERS

Housing

- 3.2 70 per cent of people from ethnic minorities live in the 88 most deprived neighbourhoods, compared with 40 per cent of the White population. More Muslims live in deprived neighbourhoods than in non-deprived neighbourhoods. The English Housing Survey found that Ethnic minorities tend to have much less living space on average than White households – 32m sq per person compared to 45 m sq. The figure is worst for Pakistani and Bangladeshi households averaging only 22 square meters per person. They are also most likely to have insufficient bedrooms to meet their needs because suitability seized households are either unavailable or unaffordable.²¹

Childhood poverty

- 3.5 Income poverty and non-employment in households with dependent children is strongly associated with childhood poverty. 41 per cent of London's dependent children are from ethnic minorities, compared to a national figure (England and Wales) of 9 per cent. In Inner London, 53 per cent of dependent children are from a non-white group, the largest Bangladeshi Muslim, represent over 9 per cent of dependent children.²² In recent years childhood poverty in Greater London has been reduced from 41 per cent to 35 per cent. At 48 per cent, child poverty rates in inner London remain the highest in Britain.²³
- 3.6 London's economy has grown in recent years and this growth is projected to continue. However, it cannot be assumed that future economic growth will deliver more equitable outcomes to reduce childhood poverty, as the current growth has not delivered such benefits. Any policy intervention to tackle such high levels of worklessness amongst Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims and other minority Muslim communities will have to be co-ordinated to provide appropriate provision for these dependent children if movement for single and dual income earners is to be facilitated. It is important to ensure that policy

²¹ *Building the Picture: the English Housing Condition Survey 2001*, London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2003, p. 28.

²² D. Gaffney, 'Workless Households with dependent children in London: Output area maps from the 2001 Census', DMAG, Greater London Authority, October 2003.

²³ 'Tackling Poverty in London: Consultation Paper', Greater London Authority, April 2003.



interventions for addressing childhood disadvantage, such as Sure Start, are taken up by Muslim groups.

Education

- 3.7 Human capital levels account for much of the difference in labour market outcomes for all groups.²⁴ Education is an important element this. The proportion of pupils who gain five or more GCSE grades A*-C is much lower amongst Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim pupils than amongst Indians and Whites. Pakistanis and Bangladeshi Muslim pupils achieve less highly than other pupils at most key stages.²⁵ A key factor in pupil attainment is economic disadvantage.²⁶ Statistics for pupil attainment at GCSE, disaggregated on the basis of free school meals (a proxy for economic disadvantage), show that pupils from minority ethnic groups eligible for free school meals do better than their White counter-parts.²⁷ Other factors that impact on the attainment of minority ethnic pupils include lack of English language fluency, experiences of racial abuse and harassment, lack of role models, lack of familiarity with the education system and consequent lack of parental involvement in education governance.²⁸ There are also differences between the attainment of ethnic minority pupils in mainly white schools and those in multi-ethnic schools. The research has found that pupils of Black Caribbean, Indian and Pakistani background in mainly white schools outperform similar pupils in urban multi-ethnic schools at GCSE level.²⁹
- 3.8 Within the adult working population 44 per cent of Bangladeshis and 32 per cent of Pakistanis have no qualifications; for all other groups the figures are between 15 and 20 per cent. At present 20 per cent of White people hold a first degree or equivalent level qualification compared 12 per cent of Pakistanis and 7 per cent of Bangladeshis.³⁰ Research into the participation of minority ethnic students in undergraduate study found Pakistani and Bangladeshi are under-represented when compared to their numbers among 16-24 year-olds.³¹

²⁴ *Full Employment in Every Region*, HMT 2003, PAGE REF

²⁵ *Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market*, Strategy Unit, 2003, PAGE REF

²⁶ See: D. Gillborn and H. Mirza, *Educational Inequalities*, Ofsted 2000, HMI 232.

²⁷ Proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals achieving 5 or more A*-C GCSEs: White, 22 per cent; Black Caribbean, 22 per cent; Black other, 24 per cent; Black African, 27 per cent; Pakistani, 33 per cent; Bangladeshi, 42 per cent; Indian, 43 per cent; Chinese 63 per cent.

²⁸ *Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market – Final Report*, (London: Cabinet Office, 2003), p. ??

²⁹ See: T. Cline, et al. *Minority ethnic pupils in mainly white schools*, RR365, DfES 2002.

³⁰ *Education and Training statistics for the United Kingdom*, London: DfES, 2002 cited in G. Bhattacharyya, L. Ison and M. Blair, *Minority Ethnic Attainment and Participation in Education and Training: The Evidence*, RTP01-03, London: DfES, 2003, table 6, p. 30

³¹ H. Conner, C. Tyers, S. Davis, N.D. Tackey, *Ethnic Minority Students in Higher Education: Interim Report*, London: DfES, 2003, RR 448.



Previous engagement with the labour market

- 3.9 Workplace progression can be used as a reflection of higher human capital and social class. Classifications by social class show 30 per cent of Whites are in the top two classifications (higher managerial and professional plus lower managerial and professional). Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims were least likely to be in the top two classifications, 8 per cent and 6 per cent respectively.
- 3.10 Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims are disproportionately represented in a narrow range of industries. For example, 52 per cent of male Bangladeshi Muslim workers in Britain are in the restaurant industry (compared with only 1 per cent of White males), while one in eight male Pakistani Muslim workers is a taxi driver (compared with a national average of one in 100). Both these occupations offer little or no opportunities for progression.³²
- 3.11 All ethnic groups have a higher proportion of the population who have never worked or are long-term unemployed compared with the proportion for the population as a whole. Again, this is disproportionately true of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims where 16 and 17 per cent respectively have never worked or are long-term unemployed. This is around six times the proportion for the population as a whole (3 per cent).
- 3.12 When looking at the percentage of dependent children in London who live in 'workless households', we find that Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims are the most disadvantaged. The highest levels of children in workless households were found to be among the Bangladeshi and Mixed White and Black Caribbean groups, at 40 per cent. The number of Pakistani workless households was nearly 30 per cent, while Indian children were the only group to have a lower risk of being in a non-employed household than White children, at 11 per cent and 20 per cent respectively.³³
- 3.13 One consequence of the unemployed, under-employed or self-employment of their parents generation is that young Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims seeking to enter employment find themselves without the necessary soft skills and social capital linkages with the wider labour market. Thus the younger cohort may have greater human capital levels than their parents and yet still face the same level of unemployment and disengagement as their parents. This creates a gap in connectivity with the labour market as they have limited awareness and understanding of how they can translate their education and skills into employment possibilities and more crucially possible social tension. Voluntary youth organisations in Glasgow were quick to point out that with high levels of self-employment by their parents, young people were 'taking on the family

³² 'Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market', Strategy Unit, 2003, PAGE REF

³³ Ibid.



business' even when they had no desire to do so and in many cases had degree level qualifications but were simply unable to find suitable employment.³⁴

- 3.14 Due to the narrow range of sectoral engagement, imposed or otherwise, by the first generation it is possible that this has had a negative effect upon the employment outlooks of the subsequent generations. Careers workers who engage with Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims suggest that there is need to provide greater information and advice on the range of employment opportunities available and the qualifications needed, and also on the varying options of improving existing skills. They suggest that while some have high levels of qualifications, others seek employment in areas where they do not currently hold the appropriate qualifications or training.

Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim graduates were found to be experiencing engagement fatigue at trying to access employment commensurate to their skills but with little success. Youth development workers reported noticing this as having a 'knock-on' effect onto the siblings of these graduates whereby, the graduates were suggesting that with their limited success at accessing graduate-level employment, there was little point in their siblings paying for university education and then also not finding work (Youth Development Officer, Glasgow).

Other barriers

- 3.15 Is it important to appreciate the external factors that may also disproportionately influence the labour market outcomes of Muslims. The labour market in London, where 40 per cent of Muslims live, has particular employment characteristics, for example, there are employment retention difficulties especially in the public sector and many employment posts are filled by migrants. The concentration of Muslims in the younger age cohorts is also affected by the external difficulty of helping all young people into employment. The concentration of Muslims in deprived wards and the disproportionate level of childhood poverty and overall larger than average family size means any policies designed to tackle these issues may have a disproportionate impact upon Muslims as they are disproportionately disadvantaged by these characteristics. For Muslims to benefit proportionate to their need, policies will need to ensure effective delivery through local targeting to ensure positive outcomes.

B. THE 'ETHNIC PENALTY'

- 3.16 Statistical analysis can be used to estimate what proportion of labour market achievement between ethnic minorities and their White counterparts is determined by variables such as education, economic environment, age and fluency in the English language and what is attributable to ethnicity itself. **Regression analysis**

³⁴ CAN YOU SAY WHICH GROUPS, AND WHEN THEY WERE INTERVIEWED - NO



suggests that ethnic minorities remain disadvantaged in the labour market even after the factors detailed above are taken into account. For example a Pakistani person with some qualifications, not living in an area characterised as having high unemployment or having other disadvantages is more than three times as likely as an identical White person living next door to be out of work.³⁵

C. A 'MUSLIM PENALTY'?

- 3.17 We do not have a clear understanding of how cultural and religious values of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims influence their labour market choices. These 'influences' can be wide ranging from community and family expectations, which can be different for males and females, prejudices about employers either through negative experiences or assumptions and more general preference of 'working from home'³⁶ or working alongside other ethnic minority groups. These factors may also vary between first and second generations. In order to create effective policies policy must be informed of the role of religious values and cultural values, where they differ and correspond.
- 3.18 It may be that the impact of religion or faith identity is different for different faith communities. Furthermore, a difference in the impact of faith background on employment may differ according to the extent to which group membership is visible or requires accommodations. For Muslims accommodations in the workplace include space for prayers, allowing time for prayer, especially on Fridays and being flexible around the Islamic month of Ramadan. Other barriers may be subtler, such as the avoidance of after work drinks that can play an important role in building networks within organisations and with company clients.
- 3.19 Laws prohibiting religious discrimination in work in Britain only came into effect in December 2003. Until this point there was no requirement for employers to be aware of or accommodate the needs of Muslims. Further research is needed to understand the influence of religious and cultural issues in shaping the employment choices made by Muslims. There is also a knowledge gap in our understanding of the nature and shape of religious discrimination encountered by Muslims. We do not know the differences in the experience of those who are visibly Muslim or assert a Muslim identity to those who do not.
- 3.20 Religious values and principles can be an important resource used by Muslims to challenge cultural values. In relation to Muslim women anecdotal evidence from voluntary organisations suggests it is not always culturally acceptable for them to be in active employment outside the home. This is not a religious issue, as

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ A. Dale et al, *The Labour Market Prospects for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women*, Occasional paper, 2000.



Islamic law does not forbid a woman's right to work. It is accepted however, that some in the Muslim community are either unaware of this or choose cultural preference over Sharia to justify non-employment integration. Religious values therefore could be used to promote economic integration and challenge cultural values of non-integration. However, cultural sensitivity and preference should be respected and no alternate value structure imposed. Therefore any policy response should incorporate the views of Muslim organisations on this issue, such as the Muslim Council of Britain.

- 3.21 A study of the experiences of first generation Bangladeshi women in Tower Hamlets identified several factors that explain the complexity of the issue of non-employment for this group:
- One third of women were caring for someone in the home
 - One third said they could read and write English
 - Those who had difficulty in language fluency expressed frustration at their inability to attend classes due to their caring responsibilities and/or resistance to do so within their own families
- 3.23 We do not know the degree to which Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim female unemployment is a result of cultural values of a preference for the female to remain in the home and look after the children. We do know that for those born in the UK, the second generation, preferences are changing. The study also found some females in the younger aged cohort were determined to find ways in which to manage childbearing combined with a career while others felt they were unable to find paid work due to insufficient qualifications.³⁷
- 3.24 However, there is no cultural gender preference for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim men to 'work from home'. After disaggregating for human capital and other key explanatory variables, the male level of unemployment for these groups cannot be explained.
- 3.25 Data by religion has only recently become available. The level of disadvantage faced by Muslims is between two and three times that of any other religious group. The Strategy Unit report did mention this level of disadvantage but did not put forward policy recommendations in response, as the remit of the report was ethnicity and not religion. It stated that culture or religious attributes might also influence the labour market position of ethnic minorities. The risk of unemployment was found to vary significantly by religion.³⁸ Even controlling for a range of factors, Indian Sikhs and Indian Muslims remain almost twice as likely to be unemployed as Indian Hindus. Pakistani Muslims are more than three times as likely as Hindus to be unemployed. Sikhs, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims were found to experience particular under-representation in professional

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ M. Brown, 'Religion and Economic Activity in the South Asian Population' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 6, 2000, p. 1045.



employment, with this area showing higher concentrations of Hindus and Indian Muslims. In relation to earnings, Muslim men and women were found to be over-represented in the lowest income band, with almost a quarter earning less than £115 per week, compared to around one in ten Sikhs and Hindus. Despite over-representation among low earners, Indian Muslims recorded the highest share within the highest income band.

- 3.26 Even when differences in educational attainment are accounted for, all ethnic minorities, especially Muslims, experience significant labour market disadvantage. This shall be referred to as the residual possible 'Muslim penalty'. Due to the variance in outcomes between Pakistani and Bangladeshi, and Indian Muslim groups it is difficult to suggest the Muslim penalty has a blanket negative effect. The degree to which the variance in outcomes within Indian groups (Indian Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs) and between Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis is a result of their varying human capital levels is uncertain.
- 3.28 From this limited and complex picture it is clear that Indian Muslims are very different from Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims in their labour market achievements. Suggesting rather crudely, that Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims require the greatest level of policy intervention, initially, to facilitate their labour market entry and retention. Limitations in data availability must be addressed to ascertain whether, with the exception of Indian Muslims, all Muslim communities encounter the same levels of labour market disadvantage as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The focus of policy on Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims has been premised on the assumption that they suffer particular levels of disadvantage not necessarily shared by other Muslim communities. The relative success of Indian Muslims was seen as evidence of this. However, a comparison of the data on the employment rate of all Muslims with the equivalent figures for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims suggests that the non-Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims groups suffer similar levels of economic disadvantage with an employment rate of 40.7 per cent.
- 3.29 **Research is needed to gain more understanding of different Muslims groups across gender and age, and why their labour market experiences are so different to those of other faith groups, and how far these differences can be explained by varying levels of human capital and social class and not by religion.**

Broadening horizons

- 3.32 The employment rights of Muslims and the obligations upon employers under the new legislation on religious discrimination should be disseminated to all Muslims still within full-time education through the Connexions service. This will undoubtedly improve their awareness of their employment rights for religious observance once they move into employment and result in greater numbers accessing and integrating into the wider labour market through assurance that



their religious affiliation and observance will not hinder their choice of employment, as their rights are protected.

What is clear from this research and analysis, from the size of the Muslim population and the levels of disproportionate disadvantage across all employment indicators, is that there are serious detrimental economic and social consequences for inaction by policy in the area of Muslim employment.

These consequences are gender, age and geographic specific. But they collectively amount to under-utilisation of our working-age population, loss to our economy and the risk of further deepening social exclusion by failing to integrate Muslims into the mainstream labour market.

4. THE POLICY FRAMEWORK

A. CURRENT POLICY MEASURES BY GOVERNMENT

- 4.1 The Strategy Unit report set out detailed analysis of the multiple and complex causes of labour market disadvantage for ethnic minorities and gave clear policy recommendations of how their labour market achievements could be improved. It set out the goal of removing within ten years the disproportionate labour market disadvantage faced by ethnic minority groups. These recommendations are taken forward by the DWP Task Force and are monitored closely by the departments concerned. The DWP Task Force meets monthly and will continue to do so until spring 2006. As the policy recommendations are carried forward to deliver change and more in-depth understanding of ethnic disadvantage is uncovered, scope exists for more targeted policy interventions to be created. This is possible through either completely new policy recommendations or through adjusting existing interventions already underway.
- 4.2 The DWP Task Force and Jobcentre Plus have put in place a number of policies to improve the employment rate for ethnic minorities.
- The Jobcentre Plus target structure which focuses on 258 wards with a high concentration of ethnic minorities and worklessness
 - The 'Ethnic Minority Outreach' programme, a community based initiative, is designed to engage ethnic minorities with Jobcentre Plus services and improve links between communities and employers
 - From April 2004 a fund of £8m will be available to Jobcentre Plus District Managers³⁹
 - Specialist Employment Advisers will be recruited to provide advice to employers on increasing the diversity of their workforce
 - DWP through Jobcentre Plus and its delivery of employment programmes provides tailored support to all working-age claimants. They have moved away from welfare dependency to an ethos of encouraging employment activity.
 - DWP are enhancing delivery of their programmes to deliver more tailored support to ethnic minority clients.
 - Through New Deal, Employment Zones and Action Team programmes that offer work-search support and training they help the unemployed into labour market entry. New Deal currently does not achieve parity of outcomes between ethnic minority groups and their White counterparts. The reason for this is complex.

³⁹ *Full Employment in Every Region*, HMT 2003..



- 4.3.1 For Muslims, the persistent levels of disproportionate disadvantage detailed in the tables make it clear **that there is a clear policy gap. Employment policies in place to address ethnic minority employment are missing a significant element of disadvantage as they do not focus on religion. The objective for government should not only be that of equality but also of integration. The policy challenge therefore is to integrate Muslims into the mainstream labour market through improving labour market entry, retention and progression. This requires both a mainstream policy stance and some specific targeted policy measures around employment as well as imperatives for Muslim communities themselves.**
- 4.3.2 While government has service delivery targets for all current policy measures. These targets are not met evenly on the ground, especially in the conurbations. Muslims face disproportionate disadvantage therefore as the majority of them live in these conurbations. Effective delivery of mainstream services in the conurbations as well as targeted policies for Muslims will therefore significantly improve employment integration possibilities for Muslims.

B. CURRENT RESEARCH

- 4.4 In addition to policies targeted at all ethnic minority groups, other bodies are carrying out research to help improve our understanding of the economic integration of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims. For example, the Greater London Authority will be commissioning focus group research on Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims living in Tower Hamlets and Newham, (two of the most deprived areas in London and the UK), addressing the issues of employment opportunities and barriers for these groups, their awareness of in-work benefits and tax credits. The Cathie Marsh Research Centre (Manchester University) has begun a three-year study into the ethnic differences in employment for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim women. The effect of these policies will be evaluated in time and the proposed research should be utilised in any additional policies. Their theme of greater focus on local delivery and flexibility of delivery are certainly conducive to resulting in positive outcomes for ethnic minorities. It is too early to indicate how effective current policies are or will be as some have only recently been enacted with others to follow. However, it is already certain that with the focus going on the larger Muslim groups, policy is failing to meet the needs of the remaining 40 per cent of Muslim communities.
- 4.5 The following sections detail, with examples of best practice how enhanced and improved policy can be delivered presently, to improve labour market outcomes for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims.

C. IMPROVING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE LABOUR MARKET

- 4.6 The journey from non-employment to employment is the toughest for Pakistanis and Bangladeshi Muslims. In part this is because they are largely concentrated in the most deprived areas of the country, where labour market demand is more fragile. However, jobs are available in areas that are short distances away. Policies to prepare them for labour market entry must develop both hard and soft skills.

Soft skills

- 4.7 Soft skills aimed at personal development include confidence building, raising awareness of the benefits of economic integration for the individual, their families and the wider community through social integration, helping the individual realise their potential and helping them prepare for entering employment activity. Soft skills development programmes need to be delivered in a culturally sensitive and appropriate manner for those who have had limited or negative experiences, of mainstream services. Inappropriate or insensitive service delivery can lead to individuals avoiding engagement with service providers.
- 4.8 An example of how this can be done is comes from *Amina*, a Muslim Women's organisation in Glasgow. They have had success in providing intermediary support and guidance to this group. They provide help with the first stages of confidence building and interaction with others in a culturally sensitive manner. They provide support and guidance on training and advocacy, group working and skills development to improve the Muslim women's future employment prospects. They also compliment and support other government initiatives by providing advice and referrals on access to public services and the labour market including Jobcentre Plus and to ethnic minority organisations delivering labour market programmes and initiatives specifically targeted to the younger female Muslim group.⁴⁰ These services are provided through a 'drop-in' surgery and a telephone help line. Feedback from service users suggests that they and their families are happy that their cultural needs are accommodated for in the delivery of these services. For Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim women the absence of awareness of religious and cultural issues has, in some cases, resulted in the male members of their families and sometimes the women themselves avoiding accessing the services on offer. A survey found 89 per cent of Muslim women felt mainstream public services did not meet their needs.⁴¹ More sensitive delivery of services developing soft skills would help Pakistanis and Bangladeshi Muslim women take the first step towards considering and then preparing themselves for labour market integration in a culturally appropriate manner that would satisfy they and their families' cultural concerns.

⁴⁰ *Amina: The Muslim Women's Resource Centre, Glasgow.*

⁴¹ *The Needs of Muslim Women*, Glasgow University, 1995.



Basic skills

- 4.9 Lack of basic skills is a key barrier to employment. Individuals with poor basic skills are up to five times more likely to be unemployed and far more likely to have low-paid low-skilled jobs. Private sector led employment initiatives have recognised the clear need for helping ethnic minorities improve their language skills to help improve their labour market outcomes. Brent Employment Zone has had much success through funding an initiative to improve English Language fluency of those who accessed their outreach facility to help find employment.
- 4.10 DfES have a current policy initiative to improve the basic skills levels of language fluency, literacy and numeracy for the UK working-age population. They have also announced they will be improving the delivery of language training by reaching out to faith groups. The first roll-out of this service will be to the Muslim community. It will be delivered through targeting community faith leaders and encouraging them to promote language fluency training to the communities they serve. The outcomes of this initiative should be closely monitored to ensure those in greatest need of language training receive it.

Aspirations

- 4.11 Aspiration requires individuals being proactive about their futures and making informed choices about what economic activities they would like to participate in. For Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims this is a complex issue.
- 4.12 It is necessary to ensure that information about the benefits of labour market integration and the rewards it can bring are given to first and second-generation Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims. It is also important that they are aware of the contribution that they can make. Thereafter they should be encouraged to realise their aspirations and be given support. There is good practice in this area which suggests that with some encouragement many women and younger Muslims have improved their skills levels and successfully entered employment and self-employment. However these examples are few and far between.

D. IMPROVING TRAINING AND ENSURING ACCESSIBILITY TO THE LABOUR MARKET

- 4.14 Preparing individuals for employment through delivery of appropriate training is also critical if Muslims are to find appropriate employment and then to retain and progress within it. Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims who are employed are currently disproportionately to be found in a narrow range of sectors. The Workforce Development agenda by DfES seeks to improve the skills levels of people in lower-skilled positions to help improve their skills base and progress into higher employment opportunities. This measure is crucial if the needs of



Pakistani men (one in eight of whom is a taxi driver) and Bangladeshi men (one in two of whom work in the catering industry) are to be met. Concentrations in such narrow sectors result in this group being highly under-employed, which leads to financial constraint and broader social exclusion.

Qualifications

- 4.15 The single most critical determinant of lifelong human capital levels is the quality of schooling a person receives. The educational attainment levels of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim groups are the second poorest in the country. In proportionate terms the Indian group out-perform Whites by about 10 percentage points while Whites out-perform Pakistanis and Bangladeshis by over 10 percentage points although this gap is narrowing.⁴² Individuals with poor basic skills are up to five times more likely to be unemployed and far more likely to have low-paid low-skilled jobs.
- 4.16 Improving this picture will require greater emphasis on raising educational attainment for those still within compulsory schooling and those who have left. The Strategy Unit report contains various recommendations for DfES on how to improve this picture which will largely affect those still within schools. There are specific factors that can impact on the attainment level of Muslim pupils, for example the impact of supplementary schools; such issues are examined in separately commissioned OSI paper.
- 4.17 Those who are no longer in the education system are largely reliant upon employers and those delivering workforce development to improve their skills base.
- 4.18 However we know from evaluations that ethnic minorities, even those who are greatest in need, do not readily access these highly valuable services. Even when they do improve their education levels the provisions on offer do not then help connect individuals to the labour market by providing them with work experience placements and help with overcoming other barriers. In 2002 only 3 per cent of 16-19 year olds in Modern Apprenticeships were from ethnic minority backgrounds despite their proportionately high representation in this age category. There remains a need to understand more clearly what happens to ethnic minority young people after they complete Work-Based Learning programmes through greater post-completion support to ensure they are able to progress within their chosen careers.⁴³
- 4.19 A holistic approach to the multiple barriers faced by Muslim groups is needed to ensure all-round improvement in their labour market prospects is needed. The Bolton based Ethnic Minority Business Service (EMBS) provides an example of best practice in this area.

⁴² 'Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market', Strategy Unit, 2003, PAGE REF

⁴³ 'Modern Apprenticeships and Race Equality', Black Training and Enterprise Group, 2003.

THE ETHNIC MINORITY BUSINESS SERVICE

EBMS was created by the Chief Executive of Bolton Metropolitan Council as part of a strategy to improve service delivery for ethnic minorities in Bolton following evidence that members of these communities were not accessing mainstream business service providers. Set-up in 1987 to provide self-employment and business advice to ethnic minorities, it played a key role in helping many ethnic minorities men and women set up or expand their own businesses. They deliver business advice through outreach services, workshops and one-to-one support. The success of this ethnic minority led organisation to reach and understand the communities' needs and help tailor service delivery accordingly led the Council to extend the EMBS remit to include employment training and support. Again the service is proving highly successful. Coming from a business background the EMBS understands and communicates with local businesses and they are aware of local labour market needs. Crucially, through contacts with faith and cultural organisations within the minority communities, they understand and communicate effectively with their local ethnic minority communities. They are able to support, encourage and help train and facilitate employment and/or work experience placements for their ethnic minority clients. They have been a crucial element in diversifying the local public and private sector labour market. While their clients are from all age backgrounds, they engage with a large number of young people. They are also able to manage their clients' expectations, as they know what it is employers are looking for. Knowledge of this demand-led focus ensures ethnic minority clients seek training and employment in areas commensurate to their skills but also for jobs which are available locally.

- 4.20 This holistic model of service delivery through an ethnic minority provider has also been replicated by the neighbouring council Blackburn & Darwen. In assessing the success of these two initiatives it is important to remember that they are in the same region as Bradford, Oldham and Burnley. In those regions no such holistic employment training and business ethnic minority aware initiative exists.
- 4.21 In Glasgow a similar initiative can be found in the Ethnic Minority Enterprise Centre. It too has been successful in attracting young ethnic minorities who are otherwise not in education, training or employment. They have established employment links with big local employers, such as BAA, Glasgow airport is nearby. BAA have been so pleased with the recruits EMEC identified and



recommended to them, that they entered an agreement to advise EMEC directly of any future recruitment opportunities that arise and also to run workshops with other EMEC clients. However the organisation is simply not big enough for the size of the community in Glasgow where the majority of Scotland's ethnic minorities live, the largest group of whom are Pakistani Muslims.

There is a specific policy need for coordinated outreach and enhanced mainstream services to help meet the needs of Muslims in areas of workless concentration. Delivery of such support by DfES and DWP should include the following:

- **Schools through Careers Advisors and Head Teacher and Governor leadership should ensure Muslim pupils receive informed advice about the wide range of employment opportunities available to them and should not hinder their choices through assuming they would want to 'carry on the family business'**
- **Mosques, where a large proportion of young and older Muslims attend for Islamic teaching and Islamic observance should also advocate and build awareness of the benefits of education and employment integration for all Muslims**
- **The Connexions and Careers Services should disseminate employee rights and employer obligations and guidance on religious observance to all Muslims in full-time education**
- **Greater availability of intermediary services along the EMBS model should be made available**

Work experience

- 4.22 Work experience placements can be difficult to secure. For Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim women such experience would be crucial to helping alleviate the cultural concerns they or their family might have. Furthermore, as they are more likely to have dependent children a short period of employment would help them experiment with the use of formal or informal childcare and assess whether employment was something they could and would want to participate in the immediate term or prepare for employment when their children are a little older. There is also a clear need to prepare employers for a more diverse workforce.
- 4.23 The National Employment Panel's evaluation of New Deal for Lone Parents⁴⁴ recommended a one-week teaser course of employment called Discovery Week. This would allow the parents to gain greater advice and support through greater interaction with providers, gain valuable labour market experience and become used to the work pattern alongside that of caring for small children. This in turn helped to improve their personal confidence and be assured of financial support

⁴⁴ B. Verwaagen, 'What Works Final Report of Recommendations', Steering Group on Lone Parents, National Employment Panel, DWP, April 2003.



through the in-work benefits available. It would also allow the employer to gain greater understanding of this potential labour market client.

Childcare

4.24 The younger demographic profile and larger family size in Muslim communities ensures the importance of childcare policies. A recent study into the childcare needs of ethnic minority mothers found:

- There was need for cultural and religious sensitive childcare services for Muslim clients. Such as employing staff from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds
- Muslim women identified much positive change in childcare services that had taken place
- Muslim women said that the greater use of childcare did not mean they were losing their traditional Muslim values⁴⁵

4.25 London has higher than average childcare costs. Initiatives are being taken forward to help increase the availability of affordable childcare for ethnic minorities who want the service. In Stratford, East London, a training centre for childcare workers has been set-up. Due to the high numbers of ethnic minorities living in the area they have had considerable success in increasing the number of ethnic minorities becoming childcare workers.

4.26.1 Research is required into assessing the attitudes of Muslims to wider employment integration and self-employment. This will improve our understanding of the weighting factor associated with cultural and or traditional preferences to remain within the home, within the community because they are Muslim versus the characteristics which affect their employment integration, as outlined above.

4.27 **Policy proposals for meeting the needs of Muslim women:**

- **The Women and Equality Unit should work with employers, through its wider departmental responsibility for industry, to improve employers' understanding of the employment, childcare and cultural preferences of Muslim women and their families**
- **The availability of the discovery course should be extended to inactive Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim women**
- **Muslims women' responses to the question on attitudes to employment in the Labour Force Survey should be monitored**
- **Sharia compliant finance loans for self-employment should be piloted to Muslim women**

⁴⁵ 'Diversity and Difference ME Mothers and Childcare', Women and Equality Unit DTI, January 2004.



E. SUPPORTING ENTRY AND PROGRESSION WITHIN THE LABOUR MARKET

A coordinated approach

- 4.27 A clear pattern of non-engagement with mainstream services and the need for greater outreach delivery and engagement with young people, ethnic community and religious organisations with a clear focus on employment and preparation for employment is evident here.
- 4.28 In April 2002 DWP launched the Ethnic Minority Outreach service. Based within the five ethnic minority conurbations of Greater London, West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester and East Midlands, the service is delivered by organisations that are able to demonstrate their knowledge of, and ability to work with, ethnic minority communities and can find innovative ways of helping ethnic minorities overcome the barriers they face in the labour market.
- 4.29 While it may be too early to judge the effectiveness of this service, the need for such an outreach function and greater understanding of what works in this area, is evident. There is a great need to improve the capacity of such coordinated outreach services to help providers meet the needs of the Muslim community on the ground. For those they are unable to help, they should be given the capacity to refer people onto the appropriate agency. The Treasury should therefore commit an extra years funding to the service.

The outreach model should be enhanced to provide the services outlined above that caters for the needs of Pakistani, Bangladeshi and other Muslim communities. The Ethnic Minority Outreach service could facilitate delivery in a holistic manner to provide:

- **Greater understanding amongst the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim community of the benefits and value of wider labour market integration for all individuals**
- **Greater engagement with young people to understand their needs and manage their expectations**
- **Greater engagement with agencies involved in drugs, crime and social exclusion prevention to help overcome obstacles/limitations individuals face**
- **Greater employment, training and business support advice**
- **Discovery work taster weeks for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women**



Machinery

- 4.31 From the above analysis it is clear that tackling the disadvantage of British Muslims, as in the case of other ethnic minorities, requires cross-departmental co-operation. To this end the cross-departmental Task Force was designed at the centre to take forward the reports recommendations across the policy areas outlined.
- 4.32 However, the centre cannot always monitor what is happening on the ground nor identify and apply wider best practice initiatives. Part of the success and innovation of intermediary organisations such as EMBS is that they are locally focussed, have a good understanding of the local needs of the community and are able to respond to them as the community communicates with them, and crucially are supported and championed by their local Chief Executive. To learn from and share wider the knowledge base EMBS have they were invited to sit on the local economic forum.
- 4.33 It is crucial that such organisations are permitted to sit on cross-local-departmental bodies, such as the Local Strategic Partnership. Through this facilitation public and private sector bodies would be able to gain greater understanding of their local ethnic minority client group and be able to tailor their wider mainstream services accordingly. The nature and cause of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim multiple labour market disadvantage and their cultural sensitivities could be understood allowing organisations to tailor their services accordingly.

Positive action measures

- 4.34 Labour market acceptance of diversity and religious identity will no doubt deliver positive change in the long-term. However, due to the persistence in the employment gap between Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims, and their ethnic minority and White counterparts for the last fifteen years despite attempts by mainstream interventions to change this, targeted improvements through Positive Action measures are now clearly necessary.
- 4.35 A system of 'targets, not quotas' should be introduced. Targeted employment initiatives for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims, commensurate to their skills, can ensure labour market entry for this group. This will ensure Muslims who possess the appropriate qualifications are employed and therefore not given 'special treatment' because of their race and religious backgrounds leaving no room for suggestion of divisiveness.
- 4.36 Birmingham City Council identified through ethnic monitoring records that despite the high numbers of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims in their local working-age population, few were employed by the local authority. They



recognised the limitations of mainstream employment initiatives targeting all ethnic minorities and so introduced an initiative called 'Bridges into the Future: Positive Action for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis' with a target to improving the numbers within these groups employed by the authority. The programme has been running for four years and is proving highly successful for those who participate, delivering high employment and moving onto other employment outcomes. The programme therefore initiates the crucial 'first step' into employment for many in this group who otherwise face multiple barriers labour market entry.

- 4.37 The programme goes further than just entry-level success. It goes on to ensure the new recruit benefits from staff development and builds capacity within the organisation to improve the workplace culture and organisational structure to encourage diversity. It is envisaged that this holistic approach to employment will improve the working environment for this group and encourage them to retain and progress within the local authority.
- 4.38 A further step to improving employment retention levels has been the acknowledgement of minority religious holidays. Birmingham local authority was the first in the UK to publish annual religious holiday calendars which are circulated to all departments highlighting when Muslim and other religious holidays are to occur. E-mail reminders are circulated to senior staff when these holidays are approaching to ensure they prepare appropriate staff coverage for when Muslims want to take annual leave. Such measures improve Muslim relations with their employers and help them feel valued.
- 4.38 We do not know degree to which Muslims request and access religious observance provisions, such as using a prayer room during work hours and requesting annual leave for Muslim festivals as this has never been surveyed or monitored.
- 4.39 There is an economic case for employing Muslims and other minority faith communities in industries which have to operate throughout the Christian holiday periods of Christmas and Easter when those who are celebrating request annual leave. One such industry found difficulty in work coverage over the Christmas period until they diversified their workforce. They found their Muslim employees were more than happy to work over Christian holidays and in return their fellow White counterparts were happy to cover Ramadan and Eid festivals.
- 4.40 Facilitation of such employment flexibility was recognised by senior management and was filtered down to employees and achieved consensus. Therefore the measure was extended to acknowledging the need for long periods of annual leave for Muslims wishing to perform the Hajj. The company allows for a four-to-six week period of leave to be taken by employees every three years. The company acknowledged that Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims also have preferences to make long holiday trips 'back home'. The extended leave provision also covers

such visits.⁴⁶ This level of informed understanding between fellow work colleagues and flexibility by employers has helped to create a positive working environment of shared understanding of religious observance and cultural choice. Such transparency and inclusiveness of all employees' views helped ensure any potential inference of special treatment would prove unfounded.

- 4.41 The Chartered Institute of Personnel Development (CIPD) has produced guidance giving practical information on indirect and direct discrimination and religious observance for Personnel officers in the public or private sectors detailing observance of religious festivals and religious practices, such as prayers during work hours. They have also detailed issues that relate to social interaction at events during and outside working hours that may indirectly disadvantage or exclude Muslims. They include 'the after work drink in the pub' which while a common social event for the majority of workers, may be uncomfortable for Muslims to participate in.⁴⁷
- 4.42 ACAS has produced a Code of Practice outlining steps that can be taken by employers to accommodate religious observance through suggesting flexibility over hours worked during the Islamic festivals of Eid and Ramadan.
- 4.43 However, more still needs to be done to ensure all employers and all employees, not just Muslims, recognise the value of shared understanding of religious diversity in employment. The Cattle report stated one of the reasons for the presence of social tension between ethnic minorities and Whites was that ethnic minorities were deemed to be receiving 'special treatment' for their diverse needs.

A recent survey by the CIPD found almost two-thirds (64 per cent) of organisations spend less than 5 per cent of their training and development budget on briefing employees on the requirements of the new employment legislation.⁴⁸ Evidence from organisations such as BT has shown positive benefits from placing equality and diversity at the core of their business. All BT employees undertake a course to improve their awareness of different ethnic groups and their needs called 'Valuing our Differences'.⁴⁹ They found such training across the board equipped their employees with greater understanding of fellow employees and their client base, which is very diverse.

- 4.44 There is great value in the public and private sector partnering with Muslim organisations, who represent the diverse religious needs of the community, to ensure they fully understand and appreciate the religious and cultural nuances involved when discussing the issue of Islam, the Muslim community and employment.

⁴⁶ First Group, Scotland.

⁴⁷ 'Religious Discrimination: An Introduction to the Law, The Change Agenda' CIPD, 2003.

⁴⁸ 'Employment Law, Survey Report' CIPD, June 2002.

⁴⁹ 'Developing a Strategic Approach to Employment Issues for Glasgow's BME Communities', University of Glasgow, 2002.



- 4.45 The newly formed Faith Communities Unit, in the Home Office, should promote religious diversity in the workplace through working with employer organisations and Muslim organisation.
- 4.46 The DTI has joined forces with the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and other Muslim organisations to ensure employers and employees are fully aware of the implications of the new religious discrimination legislation. They are also taking a positive proactive approach through publicising the positive contribution of Muslims in the area of employment to the British economy.
- 4.47 More also needs to be done to provide individual employers with advice and guidance on preparing their working environment for the needs of Muslims. The Jewish community has for over 50 years produced guidance for employers and employees on the religious observance needs of the Jewish community.⁵⁰ As the Muslim community is relatively new proactive work in the form of awareness building needs to be carried out and the take-up and utilisation of such a service should be promoted.
- 4.48 Award schemes already exist to reward employers for recognising and valuing diversity, gender and disability. No such scheme yet exists for recognising religious diversity. Due to the disproportionately young age cohort of Muslims in the UK a rapid awareness building campaign will have to be instigated if Muslims who represent a large proportion of the new and emerging working-age population, are to be encouraged to enter wider employment.
- 4.55 Organisations such as the Institute of Directors are already investing in a new approach to champion further the diversity debate through leadership. They are developing a multi-sectoral programme to be delivered through a nationally and regionally organised platform to champion all aspects of diversity.
- 4.56 However, it needs to be ensured that organisations utilise the level of expertise that already exists within the Muslim community of how best to meet their needs.

Career development

- 4.57 Ethnic minorities with high levels of human capital still find difficulty in accessing senior positions. This could be a result of a multitude of factors from lack of social capital of how to approach such opportunities, how to fill in senior management application forms to discrimination. This may in part be a result of the fact that many of their parents were either self-employed, unemployed or under-employed thereby unable to give 'soft skills' advice on wider labour market employment to their children.

⁵⁰ 'Jews in Employment: A Practical Guide', The Board of Deputies of British Jews.



- 4.58 The University of Bradford recognised its ethnic minority graduates were not able to access graduate employment opportunities commensurate to their human capital levels. They therefore introduced a graduate mentoring scheme, in collaboration with neighbouring Huddersfield, Leeds and Leeds Metropolitan Universities. The measure is a positive action initiative designed to develop the competitiveness and employability of ethnic minority undergraduates and graduates through a tailored programme of guidance and career development learning activities. They also offer practical help with job-search strategies, work placements and personal development.

In-work support

- 4.59 To address the poor levels of progression within employment for the majority of ethnic minority groups central government recently put in place measures to help improve the skills and thereby the progression levels of public sector employees.
- 4.60 The 'PATHWAYS' initiative, operated through the Cabinet Office and the Home Secretary's Race Employment Targets, focuses on recruitment into the departments, retention and career progression for ethnic minorities by ensuring there are procedures and mechanisms in place to facilitate progression. While the introduction of these measures is to be commended their design will not benefit the most disadvantaged ethnic groups, nor Muslims. For example, the Home Office target is set by the overall number of ethnic minorities in the local population. This does not take into account the disproportionate number of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the younger age cohort. Thus while the overall percentage of Muslims in London is 8.5 per cent, their percentage in the working-age category is much higher.
- 4.61 Therefore while the overall target by population may be met, this could be achieved through the employment of Indians and Chinese groups. While this is not an undesirable outcome, the Strategy Unit report details, these groups achieve labour market success out-performing Whites in the absence of any intervention. These targets should therefore be disaggregated by individual ethnic groups. Ethnic monitoring by individual ethnic group, along the Census 2003 categories now operates in all public sector organisations. This monitoring measure should be utilised to detail the progression of individual ethnic groups and not simply combine the outcomes of all ethnic minorities together. Such targets also overlook other issues relevant to employment choice such as skills and human capital.

Mainstream DTI policies and employer practices need to be enhanced to ensure the work environment meets the needs of Muslims:

- The CIPD, DTI, and Muslim organisations should work together to create and disseminate greater understanding and awareness of the



need for employer flexibility, capacity building and the benefits to be gained from Muslim economic integration

- **Public and private sector organisations should develop an award scheme that rewards employers for valuing religious diversity, positive discrimination and religious observance in the workplace**
- **Muslim mentoring schemes should be encouraged across the UK universities to help improve the connection from education to the labour market**

F. EFFECTIVE DELIVERY

- 4.62 As the labour market outcomes for ethnic minorities are dependent upon activities that take place across government departments a Ministerial Task Force was created to ensure collective and coordinated responsibility to deliver positive change. The Task Force will exist as a machinery of government for three years. It will take forward existing policies and create new ones where necessary. **The Task Force and the Ethnic Minorities Employment Division should ensure existing any new policies it creates are targeted at overcoming labour market barriers for individual ethnic and religious groups, proportionate to need. This will ensure the groups who face the greatest disadvantage will receive proportionate allocation of resources and thereby benefit proportionately.**
- 4.63 The recommendations in this paper are also cross-departmental. Employment policy on religion, like race, is influenced and affected by various departmental responsibilities. The Task Force is a centrally based mechanism. The degree to which it will ensure delivery on the ground in local areas of labour market disadvantage for ethnic minorities is as yet uncertain. DWP have acknowledged the presence of a high level of local understanding and expertise of ethnic minority needs. They are now beginning to promote the need for local areas with concentrations of ethnic minorities to exercise flexibility of approach in addition to taking forward central mainstream policies. The aim being to ensure all local knowledge of how best to meet the needs of their client group is utilised fully.
- 4.64 Local areas with high levels of labour market disadvantage require coordinated delivery and approach by local service providers. The current mechanism in place at the local level that brings together local service providers is the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP), an ODPM body. They coordinate local delivery to promote partnership working and holistically meet the needs of local people.
- 4.65 However, it is not possible at the present time to share a lot of the best practice mentioned in this paper across departments, or at the local level, to help meet the needs of Muslims in employment, as the bodies that are responsible for the best practice do not have a seat on the LSP or other local coordination functions. Organisations such as EMBS, First Group and effective Ethnic Minority Outreach providers should be able to share their local knowledge and experience of how to



improve labour market outcomes for Muslims with all local service providers. This collective approach would limit duplication at the local and central levels by individual bodies to improve their individual understanding of the needs of Muslims.

- 4.66 Such a holistic approach would also ensure religion and race and the issues that affect labour market outcomes are kept central to local delivery planning by all LSP members. Therefore, information on engagement, capacity building, human capital, childcare, transport, gender and age specific issues religious observance and cultural practices and their effect on Muslims could be shared and receive strategic cross-departmental commitment.
- 4.67 LSP's through their work with the local Learning and Skills Council also deal with immediate and long-term skills needs, to help the local labour pool meet the needs of employers. The National Employment Panel's 'Fair Cities' project will pilot a demand-led forward planning initiative of training unemployed or inactive members of the most disadvantaged of the local working-age population in areas of great disadvantage and deprivation, to provide local jobs for local people. It is envisaged the project will help to meet the immediate and future employment needs of local employers. Such forward planning will allow for strategic skills building and training for available employment opportunities and connectivity to the labour market. Due to the high numbers of economically inactive Muslims in such areas, this initiative will undoubtedly deliver great positive benefit in labour market outcomes. In the areas of operation for these pilots, the organisation in charge of local delivery should also be given a seat on the LSP to ensure they benefit from the above mentioned Muslim expertise and wider local knowledge.
- 4.68 Sharing knowledge in this way should not just be confined to the LSP level but should also be shared regionally. The location of Bolton, adjacent to the areas where the 'disturbances' occurred highlights the need for regional sharing of best practice. This is not to suggest that one size fits all; British Muslims too are the culminations of various diverse ethnic and cultural groups. However, their needs as Muslims in the area of employment will not differ that greatly. **A LSP in an area of Muslim concentration characterised by high levels of unemployment and under-employment of this group should be piloted to include a Muslim or ethnic minority organisation that has had external success in meeting the employment needs of Muslims.**

Effective delivery – through collective responsibility

- 4.69 It is envisaged however, that even this approach will have limitations of resource and cross provider accountability. For example, Birmingham local authority has acknowledged that improving labour market outcomes at the local level requires not only collective understanding but also collective ownership of the local



employment target, especially in concentrations of worklessness, which is where the greatest proportion of ethnic minorities and Muslims reside. Presently the local employment target is the responsibility of the local authority and Jobcentre Plus. Birmingham local authority recently proposed the employment target be shared by other local service providers. This measure has been accepted. While it may be too early to state the exact success outcomes of this measure, any proposal that seeks to underpin collective delivery of services with collective responsibility through coordinated resource allocation and individual delivery is taking a clear step in the right direction.

- 4.70 This measure effectively takes the commitment of the DWP Task Force right down to the local level. Sharing the local employment target will ensure cross-departmental responsibility and accountability for meeting the needs of the local working-age population. More crucially, it will ensure commitment to improving labour market outcomes and overcoming the multiple levels of disadvantage in employment faced by Muslims, and other disadvantaged communities, is shared by all local service providers with political responsibility. The Birmingham model should be supported and monitored for success measures in employment levels for Muslims, and wider local social and community cohesion benefits.